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THE MODERN REVIEW

A QUARTERLY MAGAZINE.

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THE MODERN REVIEW.

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THE CHURCHES ESTABLISHED AND NON-ESTABLISHED.

IT ought to be known more widely than it probably is that the word Church, in the New Testament, is the representative of an original term which, in its earliest use, had no religious signification, but denoted an assembly of citizens called together for a political or municipal purpose. The religious complexion which the term assumed was of comparatively late appearance. In this sense, it must be admitted, the Church, even from its earliest birth, was the child of the State. Indeed, as a recent Bampton lecturer (1880) has well shown, the offices of bishop and deacon, with other supposed essentials of Church life, had their commencement, not in any divine appointment, but from the force of circumstances, and in the natural turn of growth taken by certain ordinary institutions and usages in the early Christian ages; just as, according to a great authority, the copes and chasubles of high Ritual are only survivals from the common garments of the every-day use of ancient times.

But however this may be, the word under notice, in the earliest instances of its employment by Christian writers, was applied to the little groups or congregations of believers

in the Christ, which were gathered together in various places by the first preachers of the "Gospel," the "good tidings" that the Messiah was come. Such is the usual import of this word in the New Testament. There are instances, nevertheless, in which it had attained the collective and comprehensive meaning in which it is frequently used in our own day. Such instances are found in the later Christian writings, as in the First Epistle to Timothy we have "the Church of the living God." Here, as in a few other such expressions, the word appears to denote, not any single or local body of believers, but rather that great ideal communion which may be conceived of as constituted by all in every place who "profess and call themselves Christians," whatever may be the particular individual sense in which they do so.

It thus appears that, by primitive usage and the nature of the case, this term Church may be variously applied. It is not, and cannot be, the exclusive property of any single communion, however numerous, which may choose to style itself the true Church, while all beyond its pale are untrue, and mere usurpers of what does not belong to them. It may be legitimately used to denote any single body of worshipping men, however insignificant they may be numerically. It may also, by consequence, denote a number or associated group of such bodies larger or smaller, such as are often designated as a sect or denomination. It may denote, further, the collective church of a whole nation; and more widely still, the entire body of professing Christians throughout the world, that imaginary assemblage and "communion of saints," which has never yet existed indeed as a visible reality, but only as the cherished conception of devout and faithful souls.

It is familiar to the reader of the New Testament that within the pages of that book no provision is anywhere made, or alluded to, for the future administration of

churches, under any of the different forms or conceptions just referred to. No directions are given as to who shall be their constituent members or officers; no laws are laid down for their government any more than for the doctrines of faith to be received, or the rites and modes of worship to be observed within them. Allusions occur, it is true, to persons who appear to have been appointed to perform certain duties and services; as, for example, in the words deacon, elder, overseer (sometimes rendered bishop); and from the occurrence of such terms inferences have been made as to the nature of the constitution and government of the early Christian congregations. But such inferences are inferences only. Nothing express is laid down on the subject, and hence there are no authoritative means, worthy to be so considered, for settling the old dispute as to whether a Christian Church should be Presbyterian, Episcopalian, or Congregational. This question, in short, does not appear to have engaged the attention of the New Testament writers, as indeed it is one of very secondary importance, and we need not here further concern ourselves with it. The fact, however, that the greatest differences of opinion have existed on the subject, may be noted as sufficiently proving that nothing very definite or imperative has been handed down to us in the Christian writings, and that the Christian brotherhood is therefore left to constitute itself into churches and congregations according to its own varying judgments, and in obedience to the tastes and circumstances that may exist from time to time.

In this connection it should be remembered that the first Christians were Jews, and it nowhere appears that they ever thought of displacing or superseding the ancient faith and worship of their fathers by any new system of their own.

Moreover, there was another very cogent reason why they could not have done so—did not think of doing so. They

were expecting the end of the world and the speedy return of Christ to reign in person among his followers on the earth. Hence the established forms of the old religion and the services of the synagogues might well enough continue as they were, until the expected "restitution of all things" should take effect and should sweep the old away; until the new heavens and the new earth should be ready for the saints, and the kingdom of God, with all that this involved, should be established.*

Such expectations have never been fulfilled. They were but the dream of an enthusiasm that was in time to pass away; but nevertheless such ideas had their consequences. The early Christians refrained from the attempt to legislate for the churches of the future; and so their successors of later ages have been left practically free, as just said, to pursue their own course in this respect. Hence have arisen the manifold "differences of administration" which now so largely exist;—from the elaborate Church system, the pomp and circumstance and the complicated theology of the Roman Catholic communion, down through many gradations, to the simplest forms of belief, and the humblest "meeting," where only two or three are gathered together in Christ's name. These are all, we must conclude, if honestly followed, legitimate results and expressions of religious faith, of reverence and loyalty to Christ. The spirit and letter of the Gospel would seem to have been purposely left wide and comprehensive enough to admit of all such different forms and modes of Church life. Nor ought any one of them, therefore, to arrogate to itself the character of being the only true Church, or say of another, merely because it is another, that it is less Christian than itself, or less acceptable to the Object of worship, or less likely to have His divine approval and blessing.

The varied and different forms under which the Christian

* Compare Acts i. 6—11, iii. 19—21; 2 Pet. iii.

brotherhood has thus come to exist in the world constitute a fact to the importance of which no observant man will pretend to close his eyes. It is a fact, also, which, in a certain sense, has been more and more forcing itself upon the consideration even of the statesmen and Parliaments of modern times. Well would it have been for our common country, for the social and religious peace of our people in past times, if the Reformers of the sixteenth century had seen it and kept it in view, and provided for it more and better than they did, in the great work which they undertook of reorganising the national churches of that day. If they had done so, they would, like the early Christians, have refrained from the attempt to set up rigid and unchangeable orthodoxies of faith and worship: in other words, they would have recognised, as they ought to have done, the possibility of progress in knowledge, of better insight into religious truths, of the growth of higher tastes and feelings in this and other nations; and they would have left a larger amount of freedom of thought and speech to their successors within the churches for future generations. Had this been done, not only would such things as prosecutions for heresy, and persecution of every kind, have been well-nigh impossible, but the indefinite multiplication of separately organised sects would certainly have been checked, if not entirely prevented; and, as a consequence, greater numbers of our people would at this moment have had their religious home within the shelter of one great national fold.

But all this was not seen, probably was never thought of, by the sovereigns and statesmen to whom in this country we owe our existing national Church. In accordance with the ideas of their time they thought it necessary not only to construct, or reconstruct, what may be termed the organism of the body ecclesiastical, but also to appoint the Creeds that must be believed, and even, in some cases, to dictate

the very words of prayer and praise which must be addressed to God ; and they did this so effectually that their work remains still with little alteration. In the Anglican establishment it still holds true that no minister shall deviate from the appointed forms of belief, or alter the prescribed words of the services, however much his private conscience, or that of his people, may be offended by their use.

The necessary consequence of this rigidity and narrowness of constitution was, and is, that multitudes from the first have been and are compelled to stand apart from the Established Churches ; and by so doing they are necessarily deprived and lose their share of the privileges of one kind and another which have usually gone with the particular form of religious belief and worship specially recognised by the ruling or State power. This condition of exclusion and deprivation, as attaching to the Nonconformist bodies of Great Britain, is being gradually recognised by our statesmen. The remedy, too, has been in some measure applied, and is being still applied, as the national conscience becomes more enlightened and the practical injustice of the established system is being more fully and clearly seen. No thanks to the Church, however, as a body, for these concessions to just principle. It is the State alone to which we owe them. Nor has this gradual recognition of the rights of others been brought about without heartburnings and conflicts. It may be said to have commenced in earnest with the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, more than half a century ago. Its latest fruit is the Burials Act—its latest, but, it is very safe to say, not its last ; for it cannot be doubted that the course of just reformation must go on, until every right and privilege and endowment of every kind, which the nation has to bestow in connection with religion, shall be attainable alike, so far as the nature of the case allows, by every subject of these realms.

It is not practicable here to enter into many details; but it may be permitted to illustrate this position by referring to a case, in the national life of our day, to which these remarks appear to be especially applicable. The Principality of Wales is eminently a land of Nonconformists. A large proportion of the people—probably three-fourths of them—are outside of the national Church; nor can they, from one cause or other, conscientiously enter it. But does this, however it may have been brought to pass, afford any just reason why all these people should continue to be deprived of their just share of the substantial means and advantages which have come down to us from the past, and from common ancestors, for the maintenance of religion and of religious services and institutions? Is there now any sufficient reason in the nature of the case why all such advantages should remain so exclusively in the hands of a minority of the whole people?—of a minority, too, who are so well able to provide for themselves?—those who constitute that minority being so largely provided for and favoured, while all the rest are left uncared-for and unaided? Such questions as these are equally applicable to England, and, though perhaps in a less degree, to Scotland also. It is not only a Burials Act that is required to put an end to this great anomaly; but a change of a far more comprehensive and effectual kind, whether that change shall come in the form of what is termed “disestablishment,” or in that other and perhaps better form of the equal admission of all existing religious communions to the fullest advantages of national recognition.

Time was, indeed, when there was a degree of reason and a show of justice, in giving all that the nation had to give for the service of religion to the one national institution, because it comprehended the vast majority of the population of the country, while those who stood apart from its communion were comparatively unimportant in point of

numbers. But that time is long past ; the relative proportions are greatly changed ; and with this altered relation of parties to each other, the time has come when the whole question of national endowments in connection with religion claims reconsideration, and when all the sects and parties of religious men must be treated by the State power with the same equal justice and impartiality. If some are admitted to privileges, all must be admitted ; if some are excluded, all others must be excluded with them.

Here, however, there comes in a consideration of obvious importance, to which a few words must be given. No *wrong* would be done to the existing Establishment by admitting a larger portion of the nation to share in those material benefits of national recognition of which it has for so long enjoyed the monopoly. Due regard should no doubt be paid to personal interests, and to any rights of property that may be involved. But this being understood, it should be remembered that the property of the existing Church is not to be looked upon as its own by any natural or absolute right of possession. It is essentially a Trust held for the benefit of the nation at large ; and if the spiritual well-being of the nation should call for a change in the terms or the manner of that Trust, the same National Will which committed it to the keeping of its present holders may properly and justly make any change which appears to be required by altered circumstances. The nation is not to be bound for ever by the judgment of Queen Elizabeth and her counsellors, and we may be very sure it will not be so.

Here, too, it may be observed that the political or State power which called the existing Establishment into being, which appointed the form which it should assume, and also the revenues out of which it was to be maintained, has often interposed since in the control and regulation of Church affairs—as, for example, in settling the Act of

Uniformity. It has mostly done so in the interest of the Church itself, and has added to its means even from the general resources of the country, as well as by allowing and securing to its use the benefactions of private individuals. It has interposed thus in the interest of the Church, and thus, therefore, it may rightfully do so again in the interest of the entire nation. The right to do this the State has never renounced; and if it is to treat all its subjects alike, with impartial justice and impartial liberality, it cannot refuse to exercise it once more;—to exercise it this time, if it shall see fit, even by the admission of those who are now excluded to the position of favour which is at present held by a portion only of the whole people.

In any reformation of this kind, however, it is important next to observe the State power should not attempt, and need not attempt, to impose a Creed, to prescribe the forms of worship, or the words of prayer, to be used by the congregations. This may possibly have been once expedient in the old dark days of popular and even clerical ignorance, which it may be hoped are now passing away. But yet it is clear the State, as a political body, has no faculty for the discernment of religious truth; and it should not attempt to play the Infallible. We are sometimes, indeed, told that in case the State should be led to comprehend, or propose to comprehend, all the various denominations as equal members within one national religious body, one comprehensive National Church, it must needs impose upon them some common Creed. But *why* should it do so? The State, as the representative of the nation, when it establishes a chair of geology, or a school of chemistry, does not think it necessary to prescribe the teaching to be given in either case; nor ought it to attempt to do so in the case of religion. The ministers of religion, with their congregations of every name, are entitled to be left at liberty to profess and to teach what they may see, or think they see, to be

divine truth; and although diversity of profession and of teaching will necessarily result from this principle of liberty, this, again, affords little reason for allowing either sovereigns or Parliaments to interfere with the inalienable rights of the private conscience.

Diversity, indeed—diversity of thought and belief—like difference of feature, is plainly one of the conditions of human existence. It is found everywhere, in every house and family, even in the midst of the most substantial unity and harmony in the greater essentials; nor can we divest ourselves of it in the finer and more elevated region of things spiritual. That diversity, therefore, should be the outcome of religious liberty, should neither surprise nor distress us. It is more to the purpose to accept it, as the evident intention and an admirable provision of Divine wisdom, and as being, therefore, within limits, an essential element of healthy Church life.

But here the objection may be raised that, without some definite Creed imposed upon it, and binding, or supposed to bind, its members together by a common assent to fundamental truths, the existence of a Church is inconceivable; that, indeed, a Church so constituted would be impracticable and “anarchical.” This has in substance been recently said, and by an eminent and liberal-minded man.

In reply, let it be remembered that a Church is, by its origin and nature, a religious and a Christian institution,—one or other, or both. As such, it involves two things: first, that its members are joined together for the worship and the service of God, to help and encourage each other, in common sentiments of devotion, to the divine will, so far as this may be known to them; secondly, a Christian Church involves and implies the acknowledgment of Christ as head, with the love and reverence to Him which the word discipleship properly expresses. A National Church should doubtless be founded upon the broadest basis

possible, and should not exclude any congregation whatever of earnest worshipping people. Congregations which desire to be Christian will naturally have liberty to be so; those which prefer a broader basis, whether Jewish, or any other form of monotheism, should have equal liberty to stand upon that. In either case there is a firm and definite foundation,—religious Faith in the one case, embodying itself in religious worship, which implies, even though it may not formulate, a Creed of a deep and comprehensive kind; and Christian Faith in the other case, which carries in it not only the same element of religion, but also the recognition of Christ with all that this involves; each worshipping assembly (or church) being free to define its religious and its Christian faith for itself, or also to hold it in its own way without precise definition, and that, too, without the permission or the control of any external power whatever.

And, surely, sentiments of faith and devotion towards God, of reverence and discipleship towards Christ, might be *trusted* to serve as a sufficient bond of communion, in each case. With Christian men loyalty to Christ is nearly akin to a personal affection. It is largely made up of admiration and sympathy for spiritual excellence felt to be exalted and high above us. And feelings of this character, are they not better, more persuasive, more constraining, than any verbal creed? Indeed, we know that, even where a verbal creed exists, it does not always produce a true accord either of thought or of sentiment. It may be repeated mechanically, without any real depth of living sympathy or conviction; so that, as compared with that spiritual bond just spoken of, it may be a feeble and superficial principle, too often serving but as a dead weight upon the soul, rather than as an elevating and inspiring influence to help and guide a man in the way of life.

It should not be forgotten by those who would build upon

the teaching of the Christian master, that no dogmatic creed has been laid down within the pages of the New Testament. Christ himself refrained from this, and taught that men should enter into the kingdom of heaven, not by saying, "Lord, Lord," but by practically doing the will of God. If then it be impracticable and "anarchical" to have a Church without dogmatic creeds, even such is the Church, as it is left to us by the Master's own will. Who, moreover, shall now undertake to do what He left undone? to act as the dictator, and draw up or select the dogmas of faith which shall be essential? To let Parliaments, or Conventions, or Presbyteries, or ancient Church Fathers do this, in such a way as to constrain and do violence to the individual conscience, would only be as a going back to "weak and beggarly elements."

From such considerations as these it clearly follows that great room should exist within the Church of a nation for differences of belief, of teaching, and of administration. A true and sincere uniformity is impossible; it is precluded by the nature and the essential conditions of the case. Nor is it even desirable. Men and congregations should be left, therefore, so far as teaching and belief are concerned, to group themselves round various centres, according to circumstance and sentiment, much as they do now. But in this there would be no real or permanent loss of power, but only gain. Freedom to think, and to speak out the results of honest thinking, could not fail to be advantageous to the Church and the country, in religion as in everything else. The mass of the people, too, would feel that their appointed teachers did not, at all events, hold the doctrines they taught merely in an official, imposed, or non-natural sense, but with real and earnest conviction; while the guidance of men who were really free to speak what they really thought, would be all the more gladly accepted by those who might feel themselves unable to inquire and judge for themselves.

I will now venture to add to the foregoing remarks the more distinct expression of my own belief that of the two methods of settling this great controversy, that by disestablishment, and that by a large and equitable comprehension, the latter is the better alternative—the better, at least, for a people which professes to be a religious people. In the long run, I cannot doubt, it would prove to be the wiser and the nobler policy, and the one, therefore, which is the most worthy of a great nation. What I mean to recommend may be stated very briefly, thus:—It is, that we should make the National Church co-extensive with the religious portion of the nation, leaving to each section of it, and indeed to each congregation, full liberty of thought and of confession. At the same time, retain existing endowments of every kind for the religious uses for which they have been instituted and handed down to us. Continue to employ the resources which we have, as they have hitherto been employed—supplementing them so far as necessary from and by the voluntary offerings of the congregations. The English people are, on the whole—must we not say?—a religious people, and are likely to remain so. They need, therefore, religious institutions and services, churches and chapels and colleges for the education of ministers. And the means of providing for these have, to a large extent, been left in our hands by our forefathers, voluntary gifts of their piety. They have been left, in the main, not for the use of a section only of the English people, but for the benefit of the entire nation. Why not continue to apply them to the ends for which they were intended?

Many will reply by telling us to trust to voluntary zeal, and to abandon the ancient endowments to other uses. I confess, I shrink from this, on the simple ground of prudent expediency; and when I think of the poorness of the results from this method in multitudes of cases, of the miserable pittances on which ministers have often to subsist,

and the difficulty there is, from time to time, in raising needed funds for necessary purposes, I think I see clearly that it will be a huge mistake to abandon, that is, to divert to other uses, the national means which have come down to us from the past, and to leave the support of religion in the country entirely to the goodwill, or the fitful zeal, of voluntary contributors. Voluntary help will still, indeed, be required, and largely required, to supplement existing funds ; but it would clearly tend to the stability, the orderly working, and the general efficiency of the great institution of a Church truly National, if at least its foundations were laid in the continued employment of the considerable national resources which already exist and are available for the purpose.

To this proposal a special objection will be raised, of which I may be expected to take some notice. This plan of allowing all churches and sects to participate in national funds and privileges is tantamount to the endowment of Error, manifold error. Some of the religious bodies are manifestly wrong ; they cannot all be right ; yet all would alike and equally share in the advantages of national recognition.

This objection loses its force when it is remembered that freedom of thought, of speech, and of profession would be the legal right of every congregation and its ministers—the acceptance of this great privilege being assured to them, and even made an essential condition of participation in national funds and privileges. A true liberty of thought and speech, such as is not at present possessed by the churches, could only lead, as a great practical influence and tendency, to the destruction of error and the establishment of truth. Error is indeed, without doubt, more or less present in every form of human teaching ; but with freedom to think, to discuss, and to avow, carefully provided for, must it not be gradually detected and cast away ? It is not men's interest, whether

as churches or as individuals, to rest in false doctrine, either in religion or anything else. Their evident interest, their natural right, is to find out the Truth, and hold it fast. This right and interest it would be that was permanently upheld and endowed, not the perishable element which must by its own nature fall away and disappear before the investigation of free and sincere minds. A real liberty, therefore, to think and to profess being assumed to exist, it is not Error that is endowed at all, but *only* Truth—the truth which is held in each given case, and which, being what it is, must in the end stand firm and abide. How can any one doubt this who is a devout man, and a believer in the sanctity and the power of all that is right and true?

Another important consequence would attend the change above proposed. A man whose mind had been opened to the admission of new light would not on that account be liable to be displaced from his position in church or chapel, would not feel himself bound to resign his office, because, perchance, the Spirit from on high had touched his soul, and brought him to see some things otherwise than as they appear in established creeds and other ancient forms of doctrine. Such cases as these are not unknown to churches—or chapels* either!—and under the prevailing systems they will not fail to recur from time to time. Would it not be a manifest gain to the world if their occurrence could now at last be rendered an impossibility?

In the foregoing remarks no attempt has been made to discuss the question of Disestablishment in detail, or to estimate the difference between the policy which it involves and that which is here proposed. The former subject has, however, been alluded to, and it may be permitted, therefore, in a few concluding words, to express a doubt as to the consequences of that course of policy, if carried out. Is it quite clear that disestablishment will lead to the religious equality

* For example, in the Huddersfield Chapel case, not many months ago.

for which those who are demanding it are no doubt anxious? Will it not be productive for a long period, and even as a chronic condition, of too much of spiritual unrest and antagonism throughout the nation? It will certainly add another great sect—perhaps more than one—to the many sects which already exist. The country will be given up to a rivalry of “denominations” greater than ever—of denominations competing with each other for popular support—each, too probably, shutting itself up more closely than before within the limits of its own set of doctrinal beliefs,—the “struggle for existence” not always in this case ending in the survival of the fittest.

Meantime, the munificent endowments, now by the will of the nation set apart for the religious education of the people, will be turned to other uses. One great sect, that of the Disestablished Church, starting from its vantage ground of long-existing endowment and privilege, will still overshadow all others, and the Nonconformists, it is much to be feared, will be as far as ever from a true equality. The very possession of ancient churches and cathedrals—into which it is scarcely possible to see how other religious bodies can be admitted—will give a great and manifest superiority to the present Church of England, even when it has undergone the process of “disestablishment and disendowment.” It will, without doubt, be the Church of England still. It will still so call itself—not without reason—and in that character it can have no possible rival. It will remain and be recognised as the sole and legitimate owner of all the numberless traditions and glories of that ancient church. The Nonconformists, by their own act, will have cut themselves off from these, and given them up to others. This they will have done, instead of claiming their rightful share in the common inheritance; instead of taking their place within the shelter of the common fold, and participating, as most probably they might do if they would,

on equal terms, in the privileges which, by national law, are the common property of Englishmen. All this of their own choice they will have abandoned, and so while "dis-establishing" others they will surely gain but little of either grace or glory for themselves.

But it is idle to forecast the future, and many will think such anticipations but the expression of groundless and unreasonable fear or prejudice. Perhaps they are so; and therefore let me close these remarks with words of hope and trust in which, without doubt, religious men of every name will heartily join: that the great change, whenever it comes and whatever the form it may take, may be wisely and righteously made, and may tend effectually to the peace, the unity, the renewed and lasting prosperity, of our common country.

G. VANCE SMITH.

WESTCOTT AND HORT'S GREEK NEW
TESTAMENT.

THE year 1881 will henceforth be held to mark an epoch in the history of English New Testament study. It has given us, in the Revised Version, the result of the labour of a large body of competent scholars extended through ten and a half years,—a labour with a definite and practical aim, and a result which commends itself to the interest of a vast Bible-reading public. An interest and expectation equally keen, though restricted to a smaller circle, greeted the simultaneous appearance of the Greek Text which had long been looked for at the hands of Doctors Westcott and Hort, followed after an interval of three months by an Introduction, in which the purpose and methods of their critical procedure are set forth. We learn that we have in the volumes before us the issue of a task undertaken as long ago as the spring of 1853, and since that time “never laid more than partially aside.” Successive instalments of the text now given to the public have been in the hands of a small number of eminent scholars, including the members of the New Testament Revision Company, since 1871. The high value attached to our editors’ labours by those best qualified to express an opinion, has long been notorious among Biblical students—if from no private source, at least from the judicial statement of

* *The New Testament in the Original Greek.* The Text revised by BROOKE FOSS WESTCOTT, D.D., and FENTON JOHN ANTHONY HORT, D.D. (Vol. I., Text. Vol. II., Introduction, Appendix.) Cambridge and London: Macmillan and Co. 1881.

Dr. Scrivener, who while writing, in 1874, had before him only the Text of the Gospels (with a temporary Preface of 28 pages), Acts, and Catholic epistles.

So far as appears from their Preface, the editors have not made any great additions of their own to the mass of collated materials for the revision of the sacred text. Those which exist ready at hand have been verified as far as possible, and the whole mass of evidence, both documentary and internal, has been thoroughly and deliberately weighed by them, separately and in conference, with an amount of care and diligence that have been hitherto unexampled. Hence it follows that even when full Prolegomena shall have been provided, and the Appendix of select various readings and discussions upon them added, the work will still convey to an uninitiated reader but a feeble notion of the time and thought which have been freely bestowed upon it, and that too by men who are in every way fit for the task they have undertaken.

It will be the aim of the present Article briefly to state the problem presented to the textual critic in the present day, and the principles upon which the editors have dealt with it, as set forth in the Introduction, and illustrated in the Appendix now before us. These are from the pen of Dr. Hort, but they represent "a combination of purely independent operations" carried on by each editor, and only made subject of conference between them when results were at least provisionally attained. Points of difference were discussed on paper, and, where necessary, repeatedly discussed, till either agreement or final difference (marked in the text by alternative readings, in the Appendix by bracketed and initialled clauses), was reached. Seldom, if ever, have any fellow-labourers succeeded in holding the balance between independence and coalition with so steady a hand. The aim of Drs. Westcott and Hort may be characterised as distinctly ideal. It is "to present exactly the original words of the New Testament, so far as they can now be determined from surviving documents." Their work is not one of emendation. They renounce at the out-

set all allegiance to the Received, or any other, text, and apply themselves at once to documentary evidence, "no account being taken of any printed edition."

The student of the New Testament can never sufficiently marvel at the enduring importance attached to the Received Text, and the slenderness of the claims upon which it is founded. Its *origines* are to be found in the two earliest printed texts, the Erasmian and the Complutensian. The latter, printed in 1514, was not issued until 1520 ; it waited for the issue of the great Polyglot of Cardinal Ximenes, of which it formed the fifth volume. Meanwhile, in 1516, Erasmus's first edition appeared at Basel, the result of ten months of literary hack-work, undertaken by contract with Frobenius, the printer, and of which its editor said that it was "shot headlong from the press, rather than edited." It was, in spite of its defects and typographical errors, a great commercial success ; four more editions* were called for within the lifetime of Erasmus, the later freely amended from the Complutensian.

An Erasmian text with Complutensian modifications, varied by occasional adoptions of "fresh readings from MSS. chiefly of a common late type,"—such, in the judgment of Drs. Westcott and Hort, is the character of the text issued from the press for three or four generations :—

After a while this arbitrary and uncritical variation gave way to a comparative fixity equally fortuitous, having no more trustworthy basis than the external beauty of two editions brought out by famous printers, a Paris folio of 1550, edited and printed by R. Estienne, and an Elzevir (Leyden) 24mo, of 1624, 1633, &c., repeating an unsatisfactory revision of Estienne's mainly Erasmian text made by the reformer Beza † (II. p. 12).

* 1519, 1522, 1527, 1535. Erasmus died 1536. It is said that of the first edition, 3,300 copies were printed. Dr. Scrivener, however, makes this the total of the first and second editions together. (*Introd.* p. 384.)

† The intermediate text of Beza is estimated to differ from that of Stephens in more than fifty places, while between the Elzevir of 1624 and that of Stephens, Dr. Scrivener has noted 287 variations. (*Introd.* 392.)

The brothers Elzevir contributed to this fortuitous fixity by the declaration that their edition presented the "text now received by all" (*textum ergo habes nunc ab omnibus receptum, in quo nihil immutatum aut corruptum damus*). The Elzevir Text has consequently become the Received Text on the Continent, though in England the name is applied to that of Stephens's *Editio Regia* of 1550, which maintained its position as a standard in this country. The importance of the Received Text depends on no intrinsic merits of its own, but upon the fact that, for the sake of convenience, freshly-discovered MSS. have been generally collated with it, and their characteristic readings displayed as variations from it.*

This will be obvious when we glance at the MS. authorities which underlie the Received Text. The great uncials, the manuscripts which by their age and excellence command the respect of the critic, whose symbols stud the page of the most rudimentary modern critical edition of the New Testament, are conspicuous by their absence. Money for the purchase of MSS. was not wanting to Ximenes, as it was to Erasmus. We hear of Hebrew MSS. obtained at a cost of 4,000 ducats; of Latin MSS. of the seventh or eighth century; but at present it seems impossible to suppose that even the further researches of Prof. F. Delitzsch will greatly add to the authority of the Complutensian Greek Text.† A *Codex Rhodianus* of the Epistles, the only one mentioned by Stunica, who appears to have had most to do with the later portions of the New Testament, has disappeared, or has not been identified. It was long

* To this may be added, as an element of its influence, its relation to our Authorised Version, which, however, from its reference to former translations, probably represents in some degree almost every Greek Text from Erasmus to Beza.

† F. DELITZSCH: *Studies in the Complutensian Polyglot*. I. S. BERGER: *La Bible au 16ième Siècle*, p. 51. It seems to be anticipated that further research may prove a connection between the Complutensian Text and uncials S and U, and cursives Evv. 51 and 234.

supposed that Ximenes had received valuable assistance from the Vatican Library, and possibly that the great Vatican Codex (B) had been lent him for the purposes of his edition. But Vercellone declares that the only parchments that went to Alcalá from Rome were two MSS. of the Septuagint. It is possible that collations of many MSS., including B, may have been sent to the Cardinal or to Stunica; just possible, too, that the Vatican Ottobonian MS. (Actt. 162) of the fifteenth century, "the only *unsuspected* witness among the Greek MSS. for the celebrated text, 1 John v. 7,"* may at least have furnished the Complutensian scholars with the Greek of the "Three Heavenly Witnesses."

However poor, from our point of view, were the resources of Alcalá, those of Basel were far scantier. Erasmus had to borrow what MSS. he could find on the spot. Three were lent him by the Dominicans, one by a local printer; and his array of authorities stood, at best, as follows:—Two MSS. of the gospels—of these he unfortunately made most use of the worse, a fifteenth century copy, for which the monks had paid only two Rhenish florins, "and dear enough too," said J. D. Michaelis; the other was a beautiful little illuminated MS. of at least two or three centuries earlier. This latter also contained the Acts and Epistles; but of these, two other MSS. were at hand (Actt. 2 and 4), and perhaps a fourth (Paul 7), for the Epistles of Paul, none of them older than the thirteenth century. Of the Apocalypse, Erasmus had but one MS., which he had borrowed of Reuchlin, a writing probably of the tenth century, in which the text is almost undistinguishably intermingled with the commentary of Andreas. It was (or is, for the MS. was rediscovered by Delitzsch in 1861) mutilated in the last page, and comes to a stop in the middle of the word *David*, in ch. xxii. 16. Erasmus completed the text

* Scrivener, *Introd.*, p. 283.

for his edition by turning the Vulgate Latin of the remaining verses into Greek; even when the Complutensian furnished the means of displacing this makeshift, he did not avail himself of it,* and his extemporised readings still affect the Received Text.

So far we have noted a scant employment of cursive MSS. only, and none of greater antiquity than the tenth century. As we approach the texts of Stephens, Beza, and the Elzevirs, the great uncials gradually come into view.† Of the five,‡ which now occupy the front rank, the last (D) is the first to appear. A collation of this MS., then in Italy, was supplied to R. Stephens, and used by him in his edition of 1550, the only other uncial employed by him being L of the Gospels, then, as now, in Paris. In 1562, Codex D came into the possession of Theodore Beza, and was used in his editions of the Greek Testament, though but sparingly. Beza was alarmed at the peculiarities of his MS., especially in the Gospel of Luke; and when he presented it to the University of Cambridge, it was with a warning that it should be kept safe rather than made public. It was, however, collated by Archbishop Usher for Walton's Polyglot (1657), a work whose appearance marks the beginning of "the preparation for effectual criticism," and the first result of an impulse given to New Testament study in England by the arrival of the Alexandrian MS. (A).

* Though he inserted 1 John v. 7, under pressure from the advocates of the Complutensian, in his edition of 1522; but he was particularly sensitive to any charge of heresy on the Doctrine of the Trinity. He was subsequently accused, as M. Bonet-Maury has recently pointed out, of being the source of the Antitrinitarianism which made its appearance among the Dutch Anabaptists.

† It may be useful to remind the reader that the *uncial* (separate capitals) writing was employed down to the tenth century; *cursive*, or running hand, came into use a century earlier. So that the use of uncials, especially for Church books, overlaps the use of cursive character.

‡ Viz. :^s. (*Aleph*) Sinaiticus [IV. cent.]. A. Alexandrinus [V. cent.], in the Brit. Mus. B. Vaticanus [IV. cent.]. C. Ephraemi [V. cent.]. D. Bezae [VI. cent.], Cambridge.

This was sent as a present to Charles I. by Cyril Lucar, the Patriarch of Constantinople, in 1628. Its readings appear at the foot of the Greek text on Walton's page, and his critical apparatus includes readings from at least a dozen new sources, almost exclusively cursives. In 1707, a fortnight before his decease, Dr. Mill gave to the world his edition, which embodied the results of a lifetime spent in careful study. A surprising advance in the number of manuscripts used is made manifest by the list of Mill's authorities furnished by Dr. Scrivener,* which enumerates at least seventy cursives, besides A, D, three new uncials, and a collation of B. Four years later, Küster (Neocorus) republished Mill's Testament at Rotterdam, with additional readings from twelve fresh MSS., including the great Paris palimpsest (C). In 1730, Wetstein published his Prolegomena, followed in 1751-2 by his Testament. He gave to the MSS., a vast proportion of which he had collated himself, the notation by which they are now cited; his list includes (if we count separately the four parts into which the New Testament is divided)† 33 uncials, and 258 cursives.

To give even a similarly brief summary of the labours of Matthæi, Alter, Birch, and Scholz in the same field would lead us too far into details of discovery and collation. Within the present century this labour has been prosecuted with remarkable diligence and success by Tischendorf and Tregelles, both deceased, and by Dr. Scrivener, our greatest living authority on New Testament MSS., especially cursives. The romance of discovery was restored to this department of study by the adventurous, and finally triumphant, efforts of Tischendorf to obtain possession of the great Manuscript which for fifteen years he believed to

* *Introduction*, p. 398.

† *Viz.*:—(1) Gospels; (2) Acts and Catholic Epistles; (3) Paulin Epistles; (4) Apocalypse. This order, which is general in MSS., is retained by W. and H.

be in the possession of the monks of the Convent of St. Catharine on Mount Sinai, and his ultimate success in bringing the precious codex to St. Petersburg in 1859.

The circle of the great uncials being thus completed up to the present date, we may now (with the aid of Dr. Scrivener's summary)* take stock of the manuscript resources at present available. There are known and catalogued 56 uncial MSS., and 623 cursive, of the Gospels; 14 uncial, and 232 cursive, of the Acts and Catholic Epistles; 15 uncial, and 283 cursive, of St. Paul; 5 uncial, and 105 cursive, of the Apocalypse. Adding a number of lectionaries, or service-books containing New Testament lessons, uncial and cursive, and deducting double or treble enumerations of MSS. containing more than one of the four divisions, we arrive at a result of 1,763 several MSS. of the whole, or of some portion, of the Greek Testament. This profusion of MS. resources will explain why it is mainly in connection with the New Testament that textual criticism has assumed the proportions of a science. Many ancient texts depend on three or four MSS., while, we believe, the History of Paterculus, the Octavius of Minucius Felix, the Epistle to Diognetus, and the Instructions of Commodianus have each been edited from a single MS.

John Owen charged Brian Walton with taking upon himself to correct the Scriptures, which are the word of God, and with having, by the publication of his Polyglot, taken away all certainty about truth. How impossible must it at first sight appear to be, to determine among the thousands of variations noted between the readings of so vast a mass of MSS., the original words of the New Testament! Yet for more than a century the task to which Drs. Westcott and Hort have set their hands has been attempted again and again. Some editors, indeed, have tried so to modify

* *Introduction*, p. 269. See Mr. Hammond's useful table, *Outlines of Textual Criticism*, p. 26.

the aim proposed as to exchange the ideal for what they believed to be practical; others have endeavoured to choose from the whole number of manuscripts (to which must be added, as resources for the construction of a text, the evidence furnished by early versions of the New Testament in various languages, and by quotations in the Christian Fathers) certain which might prove in the main to be safe guides to the earliest attainable text. Thus Bentley was at one time persuaded that the correction by MS. authority of the Received Text, and of the Latin Vulgate, would establish such marvellous similarity between the two, that we might be sure that we had the text from which Jerome made his translation in the fourth century.

This point, and this only, Lachmann thought it was possible for criticism to attain, on the authority of a few selected uncials, selected MSS. of the old Latin and Vulgate versions, and selected Fathers: he promised no *ideal* text, but one as correct as a Christian living in the fourth century would be likely to buy, and no more. Almost equally subjective was Dr. Trégelles' selection of authorities, though it was far from being so narrow as Lachmann's, yet, involving as it did an almost wholesale rejection of the testimony of cursives, it was nearly as capricious. The result of these and similar endeavours at selection has been a general discrediting of "plans for abridging the labour of investigation," and the recent strong affirmation of the critical principle that "every element of evidence must be allowed its full weight." *

It is obvious that, however independent may be the labours of a critic in the present day, he has not to commence his work absolutely *de novo*. The experience of scholars has led to the tabulation of certain results, commonly called Canons of Textual Criticism, external and internal, which, as they are generalisations from observa-

* Hammond. *Outlines*, p. 94.

tions made in various fields, are applicable, in some degree, to the investigation of any literature extant in manuscript. And further, the same kind of observation has led to the classification of errors found to be inseparable from the work of the copyist—unconscious errors of sight, hearing, memory (shown in the omission or repetition of a syllable, or the passing from a word in one line to the same word in the next, the intervening words being omitted)—which, when the copy in which they occurred came to be used as an exemplar by subsequent copyists, propagated themselves, and often led to fatal corruption of the text by prompting unintelligent correction. Thus it is plain that a comparison of only two MSS., provided one be not a copy of the other, and both be not copies of the same copy, would account for, and eliminate from further critical consideration a vast proportion of their variations, the probability that independent copyists would make the same error in the same place being infinitesimally small. Such comparison, carried forward on a more extensive scale, naturally leads to the attribution of a certain character to each MS.: it discovers a proneness to one class of clerical error, exemption from error of another kind. This character assumes positive features, and becomes more determined, when the *conscious* action of the scribe, as revealed in his work, is taken into account. He betrays, it may be, a mental tendency to amplify, even to paraphrase; or to draw parallel, but not identical, passages into uniformity; or again, we find him concise where others are diffuse, obscure where others are smooth and easy.

We are prepared, then, to pass from what our editors term Internal Evidence of Readings, to Internal Evidence of Documents.* We cannot deal conclusively with each textual variation as it meets us. If we should attempt to do so at this stage of our inquiry, it must be upon one of

* W. and H., I. 543, II. 30.

the following grounds :—(1) Preponderance of mere number among the available MS. authorities, a principle which might lead us to the absurdity of arraying MSS. of a common late type against the early texts, or of counting as independent witnesses copies which on examination betray a common origin.* (2) Deference to a select number of authorities ; but the age of a MS. not being in itself a sufficient criterion of its critical value, we are not yet in a position to make effectually such a selection. Moreover, such a limitation might prove abortive (as it occasionally did in the widely different schemes of Griesbach and Lachmann), when the testimony of the selected authorities proves inconclusive or hopelessly at variance, and a determinant, confessedly of inferior authority in itself, has to be sought outside the judicial circle, to settle the difference. (3) Intrinsic Probability : † the certainty, or presumption, in the mind of the critic that the author must have said *this*, and could not have said *that*. Such moral or subjective consideration, while it cannot be banished from Biblical any more than from any other literary study, appears to be entirely outside the pale of purely textual criticism. To this, as to conjectural emendation, recourse must only be had in case of individual dissatisfaction with the best attainable reading ; and in its application the scholar, however highly qualified, speaks only for himself. The application of such a canon of Internal Evidence as that laid down by Mr. McClellan‡—viz., *That no reading can possibly be original which contradicts the context of the passage or the tenor of the writing*, must in every case depend upon preconceived ideas concerning the writing and its author, and may open the doors to emendation at least as subjective as that of the text of Æschylus by Mr. George Burges. Only when documentary attestation has said its last word do

* W. and H., II. 42-3.

† W. and H., II. 20.

‡ The New Testament, &c., Vol. I., 1875, p. xxxv.

subjective considerations demand a respectful hearing; then the principle of congruity may make us legitimately doubt whether we have, in this passage or that, the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus or of Paul; * but, from the nature of the case, conclusive demonstration is impossible.

As we are now fairly within the domain of our editors' special and independent method, we will endeavour to mark the line of their procedure by frequent citation of Dr. Hort's own words. We have already seen the insufficiency of "Internal Evidence of Readings" :—

A moment's consideration of the process of transmission shows how precarious it is to attempt to judge which of two or more readings is the most likely to be right, without considering which of the attesting documents or combinations of documents are the most likely to convey an unadulterated transcript of the original text; in other words, in dealing with matter purely traditional, to ignore the relative antecedent credibility of witnesses, and trust exclusively to our own inward power of singling out the true readings from among their counterfeits, wherever we see them. . . . The comparative trustworthiness of documentary authorities constitutes a fresh class of facts at least as pertinent as any with which we have hitherto been dealing, and much less likely to be misinterpreted by personal surmises. The first step towards obtaining a sure foundation is a consistent application of the principle that KNOWLEDGE OF DOCUMENTS SHOULD PRECEDE FINAL JUDGEMENT UPON READINGS (II. 31).

To the required knowledge of a document both external evidence and internal character contribute. Under the first head comes the determination of the date, which, if the scribe has given no direct indication,† must be estimated from the style of writing, the material employed,

* Of course, the sphere of the *higher criticism* is here entered, as, e.g., when we estimate the relation of the recorded discourses to the actual words of Jesus; the probability of his allusion to *Gentiles*, Matt. vi. 7, 32, or the appropriateness to its position of John iv. 22.

† The earliest *dat:d* MS. of the New Testament (S of the Gospels) is of the year 949.

presence or absence of breathings, accents, punctuation-marks, division into lessons or sections, &c. But when the skill of the expert in this department has fixed an approximate date, it must be remembered still that relative antiquity, while furnishing a presumption as to the relative freedom of a MS. from the corruptions that seem inseparable from repeated copyings, is by no means a final ground of preference. An examination of readings must now be undertaken, not for the purpose of adjudicating upon them one by one, but for the sake of arriving at an estimate of the *character* of the scribe and his performance. Here, as in any inductive science, a majority of observed cases will furnish a generalisation which, when applied to the remaining minority of cases which did not seem at first to be contributing to its formation, will now be found to derive fresh exemplification from them.* The application, however, of this threefold process brings us face to face with new elements of difficulty.

The use of Internal Evidence of Documents has uncertainties of its own, some of which can be removed or materially diminished by special care and patience in the second and third stages of the process, while others are inherent, and cannot be touched without the aid of a fresh kind of evidence. They all arise from the fact that texts are, in one sense or another, not absolutely homogeneous. Internal knowledge of documents that are compared with each other should include all their chief characteristics, and these can only imperfectly be summed up under a broad statement of comparative excellence. . . . General estimates of comparative excellence are at once shown to be insufficient by the fact that excellence itself is of various kinds; a document may be 'good' in one respect and 'bad' in another. The distinction between soundness and correctness, for instance, lies on the surface. One MS. will transmit a substantially pure text disfigured by the blunders of a careless scribe, another will reproduce a deeply adulterated text with smooth faultlessness (II. 35, 36).

* W. and H., II. 33.

Not only, therefore, must the scribe's proneness to clerical error or conscious variation be accurately estimated, and prevented from unduly affecting the estimate formed of the deeper qualities of the MS.; but the question of homogeneity opens another range of inquiry.

We have no right to assume without verification the use of the same exemplar, or exemplars, from the first page to the last. A document containing more books than one may have been transcribed either from an exemplar having identical contents, or from two or more exemplars each of which contained a smaller number of books;* and these successive exemplars may have been of very various or unequal excellence (II. 37).

And, moreover, the simultaneous use by the scribe of two or more texts belonging to different lines of transmission entails an equal but still more perplexing loss of individuality by mixture. The two or more elements of its divided personality attach the document to diverse relationships, and the authority for its readings must be sought beyond itself. We are led to the next great step, which consists in ceasing to deal with documents as individuals, and examining them as "fragments of a genealogical tree of transmission." Only thus can we hope to account for the combinations of agreements and differences which they present.

The more exactly we are able to trace the chief ramifications of the tree, and to determine the places of the several documents among the branches, the more secure will be the foundations laid for a criticism capable of distinguishing the original text from its successive corruptions. It may be laid down then emphatically, as a second principle, that ALL TRUSTWORTHY RESTORATION OF CORRUPTED TEXTS IS FOUNDED ON THE STUDY OF THEIR HISTORY, that is, of the relations of descent or affinity which connect the several documents (II. 40, cf. I. 544).

In despair of being able to give an exposition more

* Cf. p. 268. "It is, indeed, quite uncertain to what extent the whole New Testament was ever included in a single volume in Ante-Nicene times."

concise than Dr. Hort's of the method and results of this study, we must limit ourselves henceforward to dealing with them rather by sample than by extract or summary. Our editors are not profuse in illustration, and the processes so often repeated in detail during their long labour reappear, for the most part, in formula upon their pages.

The cases in which the descent of one from another, or an absolutely similar relation, to a common source, can be confidently predicated of existing MSS. of the New Testament, are very rare. More often, when a certain family character marks off a number of documents into a group, we discriminate, first, a common element which may be ascribed to the general relation of all to an ultimate common ancestor; next, cases of agreement among certain members of the group, where all the other members differ, which mark off a smaller circle as having common relation to an ancestor lower down in the line of transmission. It may turn out that several generations are represented within the family group; and not only will familiar errors of transcription reveal themselves as the text passes from stage to stage, but a number of other variations will be accounted for by reference to an older reading in which the germs of all alike may be detected. Hence "a wide and helpful suppression of readings that cannot be right."

But it rarely happens that the variations are limited to those which could have been originated by transmission in one line. A document may present evidence of a second line of ancestry. This may be manifested by the fragmentary appearance of readings regarded as characteristic of a distinct group either substituted for, or combined with, those which mark the group to which it is in the main allotted. Such combination or *conflation* is the first ground of their primary grouping of documents with which our editors deal at length. The simplest instances of conflation are afforded by such a passage as Acts vi. 8, where docu-

mentary attestation being divided between "full of grace" and "full of faith," one MS. (E₂) reads "full of grace and faith." Or Mark vi. 56, where a similar dilemma between "in the market-places" and "in the streets" is evaded, in one Latin MS., by the modified combination, "in the market-place and in the streets."* No reader can entertain a doubt as to the later origin and double or mixed derivation of the conflate reading; it is evidently a case in which, according to Griesbach's canon, the shorter reading is to be preferred to the longer. Drs. Westcott and Hort maintain that a text (which they denominate the Syrian), represented by a very large group of MSS. versions and Fathers, reveals unmistakably this character of *mixture*, and consequent dependence upon, and posteriority to, two texts represented by two other groups. We select two instances from the number cited.†

LUKE xxiv. 53. First simple reading. *ἐυλογῶντες τὸν θεόν*. "blessing God."—Rev. Version (N B C L). Second simple reading. *ἀινῶντες τὸν θεόν*. "praising God." (D and several Old Latin MSS.) Third (conflate) reading. *ἀινῶντες καὶ εὐλογῶντες τὸν θεόν*. "praising and blessing God." Auth. Vers. (A, with a mass of later uncials, cursives, some Latin and two Syriac versions. Received Text.)

LUKE xi. 54. First simple reading. *ἐνεδρεύοντες αὐτὸν θηρεῦσαι τι ἐκ τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ*. "laying wait for him to catch something out of his mouth." R.V. (N B L). Second simple reading. *ζητοῦντες ἀφορμὴν τινα λαβεῖν αὐτῶν ἵνα ἐβρωσω κατηγορῆσαι αὐτοῦ*. "seeking some pretext to take hold of him that they might find (where-with) to accuse him." (D) Third (conflate) reading. *ἐνεδρεύοντες αὐτὸν, ζητοῦντες θηρεῦσαι τι ἐκ τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ, ἵνα κατηγορήσωσιν αὐτοῦ*. "Laying wait for him, (and) seeking to catch something out of his mouth that they might accuse him." A.V. (A C, a mass of uncials and cursives. Vulgate Syriac and Latin. Received Text.)

* W. and H. II. 94.

† W. and H. II. 99, seqq.

The extension of this inquiry leads to some very significant results. Codex Alexandrinus (A) continues to range itself, with the late uncials and cursives, and the later Syriac version (Harklean) on the side of the third, or conflate, reading—often accompanied by C, never by \aleph , B, or D. The first simple reading is that of B and L, and generally of \aleph ; the second that of D generally, supported occasionally by \aleph , and, among versions, most frequently by the Old Latin. Hence three primary groups, the first-named and latest being the Syrian—*i.e.*, that which represents “the dominant Antiochian or Graeco-Syrian text of the second half of the fourth century,” largely identical with that used by Chrysostom in his homilies. The group led by the Graeco-Latin D has long been recognised as “Western,” though Drs. Westcott and Hort are disposed to suspect that the Western text took its rise in North-Western Syria or Asia Minor. The Non-Western Pre-Syrian text our editors decline to designate as Alexandrian* (the term which has hitherto obtained), reserving this to describe readings whose local origin is attested by the Alexandrian Fathers, while in their judgment, B, with its probable descendant L, and \aleph stand apart, on a level of their own, in exceptionally close relation to a neutral and original text.

Our editors' determination of primary groups invests with renewed interest the views of those scholars who have preceded them in this particular field. Their general confirmation of Griesbach's results (though not of his criticism in detail), will do much to draw attention back to the labours of that great scholar, and to bring “principles of grouping” once more from the outside to the very centre of New Testament study. Bengel (1734) proposed to divide the documents known to him into two classes, Asiatic and African, again distinguishing under the latter heading two

* W. and H. II. 129.

“nations” or families, represented typically by A and the Old Latin version respectively. The three resultant groups were renamed by Griesbach (1796), Byzantine or Constantinopolitan, Alexandrian, and Western, and he certainly at one time hoped that final determination of an original text might be attained by the exhibition in any particular instance of two groups uniting their testimony against the third. Hug, in his “theory of recensions,” endeavoured to arrive at more precision with regard to the dates, places, and personages with which the origination of these groups might be connected. He supposed that the ‘Western text’ was a *κοινή ἔκδοσις*, or Vulgate edition; that this was revised in three different lands. Applying a passage in Jerome, he attributes an Alexandrian recension (Griesbach’s Alexandrian) to Hesychius, and allots to it B C L; another (Griesbach’s Constantinopolitan) he supposes to have been made at Antioch by Lucianus, and to be represented by E F G H S V; while a third was made on the soil of Palestine, and is represented by A K M, the later Syrian version, and the readings of Chrysostom; Hug’s attribution of this recension to Origen is disproved by Origen’s own citations.

It would obviously involve a stultification of their whole method if our editors proposed to use their primary groups in the way Griesbach suggested, or to select one as giving a pure and original text. Every group points upward and beyond itself. The Syrian text is “smooth and free from surprises”; it is really a “recension” made by editors who aimed at lucidity and completeness; as we should expect from the extensive presence of conflate readings, it is to be accounted for by the convergence of at least two lines of transmission, while its readings do not account for variations characteristic of other groups. The Western text is characterised (as in our instance, Luke xi. 54) by a

tendency to paraphrase. "Words, clauses, and even whole sentences, were changed, omitted, and inserted with astonishing freedom wherever it seemed that the meaning could be brought out with greater force and definiteness."* Our editors conclude that early in the second century Western variation had set in; the Apostolic text had its securest refuge at Alexandria, but there underwent another but slighter series of changes (the Alexandrian readings, characterised also by occasional paraphrase, but more by clever harmonistic alteration); while an eclectic text, having its origin at Antioch, perhaps towards the end of the third century, established itself at Constantinople, and thenceforward increasingly prevailed. The persecution under Diocletian in the beginning of the fourth century was accompanied by a vast destruction of MSS.; and when reaction set in under Constantine, it was the Antiochian text which was propagated, and became the standard New Testament of the East.†

We have already hinted at the exceptional position claimed by our editors for \aleph and B. They find \aleph and B "to stand alone in their almost complete immunity from distinctive Syrian readings; \aleph to stand far above all documents except B in the proportion which the part of its text neither Western nor Alexandrian bears to the rest; and B to stand far above \aleph in its apparent freedom from either Western or Alexandrian readings" (with a partial exception in the Pauline Epistles).‡ They conclude, moreover, that the texts of \aleph and B represent two lines of transmission from a common original (or probably a collection of exemplars of separate portions), "the date of which cannot be later than the early part of the second century, and may well be earlier"; § but surmise that both were written in the West,

* W. and H. II. 122.
 † W. and H. 210.

‡ W. and H. II. 139, 142.
 § W. and H. II. 223.

probably at Rome; the ancestry of B being Western, of \aleph Alexandrian, in the geographical, not in the textual, sense.*

We hoped, if time and space permitted, to illustrate by citation the influence exerted by the readings common to B and \aleph upon the text of Drs. Westcott and Hort, and, largely through their text (we may fairly suppose), upon the Revised Version. It must, however, suffice us to say that of twenty noteworthy passages in one of the Gospels, in which our editors vary, with \aleph B, from the Received Text, in fourteen cases the text of the Revised Version is with them, while in the remaining six their reading is noted in the margin.

The *quod erat faciendum* of our editors, in reference to the problem they proposed to themselves, is thus expressed: "The text of this edition, in that larger sense of the word 'text' which includes the margin, rests exclusively on direct ancient authority, and its primary text rests exclusively on direct ancient authority of the highest kind."† But still they are not slow to recognise the fact that there are passages in which no extant document preserves the original reading, and where, consequently, there is legitimate scope for subjective consideration and conjectural emendation. Such a passage is 2 Peter iii. 10. τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ ἔργα ἐυρεθήσεται, "the works that are therein shall be found." (R. V. 'discovered,' which is ambiguous.) The reading of A, κατακαήσεται, "shall be burned up," is merely an attempt to rescue the sense. Here Drs. Westcott and Hort conjecture that the original reading was ῥυθῆσεται, or one of its compounds.‡

* W. and H. II. 267.

† W. and H. II. 290.

‡ W. and H. II. 279, Ap. 103. We have been inclined to suggest ἐρρήσει[και] or a related word. Conjectural emendation, so long discredited, has recently attracted some attention in connection with the efforts of Naber in this field. His suggestions seem of very unequal value: ἰσθῶν for σίτων (Acts xxvii. 33) is possible; while ὅτι κατέγνωμεν δεῖν (Gal. ii. 11) is confuted at once by Clem. Hom. xvii. 19.

It would be mere presumption on our part to attempt to pronounce a judicial verdict upon our editors' methods or results, or to predict the position these will hold in the opinion of those most qualified to estimate them. The editors themselves will take that assured place in the front rank of textual critics to which their scholarly and conscientious labour entitles them. We venture to say, however, that their Introduction, while it is "caviare to the general," is, in one respect at least, disappointing to the student of New Testament criticism, by whom alone it will be read. It is a record of processes that are not shown; it is like the enunciations and figures of Euclid without the demonstrations. It is difficult to read page after page dealing with difficulties and dilemmas without one concrete example to show that these are not hypothetical, or with literary characteristics (such as those of the Alexandrian readings) without an illustration to help the understanding or the memory. The lucidity with which Drs. Westcott and Hort can make texts and variants tell their own tale when they please (as in the instances of conflation) prompts a keen regret that they did not make their Introduction twice as long and much more detailed.

The execution of the volume containing the Greek Text leaves nothing to be desired. Print, paper, and arrangement make this probably the most beautiful manual text ever published in England. The quotations from the Old Testament are printed in a fine uncial type, very like that used in some recent classical editions from the Teubner press,—the poetical passages in metrical arrangement, which is also adopted for passages presumed to be from Christian poetry (*e. g.*, Eph. v. 14; 1 Tim. iii. 16), and the Lord's Prayer in Matthew.

We wish we could give an equally hearty commendation to the externals of the second volume. The Introduction

would not be an easy book to read under any circumstances ; but we cannot imagine why a pale and dazzling type and a thin yellowish paper should have been permitted to render it the most painful modern book to read by gas-light that we ever remember to have encountered.

J. EDWIN ODGERS.

HERBERT SPENCER'S 'DATA OF ETHICS.'

THE publication, two years ago, of Mr. Herbert Spencer's "Data of Ethics" was an event of real importance in the history of the philosophy of Evolution, and the book at once established its claim to be reckoned with by all who should thenceforth undertake to discuss the grounds and principles of morality. It had been looked forward to, both by Mr. Spencer's own followers and by those who were by no means prepared to subscribe to all the methods and conclusions of his philosophy, with an interest proportionate to the supreme importance of this branch of his work.

To establish the laws of right and wrong on a scientific basis would be to render the greatest service to humanity, and to require this of any philosophical system is to put it to the severest test. The Synthetic Philosophy would have been a column without a capital if it had not culminated in some systematic declaration of the outcome of the principles of Evolution in that which is its highest field, the motives and rules of human conduct. Mr. Spencer was wise, therefore, in deferring the second and third parts of his Sociology till he had given us the essential points of his Principles of Morality.

It was with hope, as well as interest, that we awaited his exposition of these principles. Mr. Spencer enjoys a well-earned reputation for the ingenious disentanglement of many knotty problems, for industrious collection of facts, and for comprehensive and thorough systematisation. His Social Statics exhibited a moral enthusiasm and a compre-

hension of the shortcomings of the Utilitarian School, which seemed as though they must save him from its errors; while his scientific and philosophic studies would lead him to find in physical and human nature more solid foundations for our motives of right and wrong, than many popular representatives of the Intuitive School had cared to search for. While there are many points in Mr. Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy from which I entirely dissent, it is undoubtedly full of acute argumentation and luminous explanations. It contains many brilliant and valuable expositions, which have thrown new light upon Biology, Psychology, and Sociology. The new theories, that have been so successful in these domains, might well give us some fresh guidance in the labyrinth of Ethics. Mr. Spencer's leading principle, that of Evolution, seemed especially likely to render good service in supplying a law, inductively determined, for the normal course of human nature, and the rightful end of all actions; a law and an end substantially the same as those which the clearest school of Intuitive Morals had so long ago divined.

It is true that several years ago, in his well-known letter to John Stuart Mill, Mr. Spencer had thrown out, in hasty outline, a theory of the origin of the moral sense which claimed to supersede both the Association theory and the Intuitive theory, and which, if accepted, would thoroughly unsettle the present foundations of morality. But this derivation of the moral sense from man's former experiences of utility, consolidated and transmuted by heredity, is by no means necessarily connected with, or required by, the theory of Evolution. To make such a connection is to confound assistance with production, occasion with cause; and as there are very many other weighty objections to such a derivation of conscience, I trusted that when Mr. Spencer came to treat with more deliberation the basis of morality, he would either, on the one hand, withdraw, or modify this

suggestion, or, on the other hand, so explain and substantiate it that it would not be a stumbling-block in the way of the acceptance of his ethical system. We find, however, that this derivation of our ethical intuitions from our ancestors' experiences of utility is not only retained in the "Data of Ethics," but has a permanent and foremost place assigned to it henceforth in Mr. Spencer's theory of morals. It is neither modified, nor demonstrated by any adequate inductions, nor are the objections to it removed; but it is made a primary assumption, the substructure upon which the several stories of the Ethical system are built up.

Mr. Spencer could hardly write a book on any subject, least of all upon the principles of morality, without saying something strong and fresh and acute. The "Data of Ethics" contains not a little which is of incontestable value and importance. The author recognises, as he says, a truth in the orthodox ethical system. We can quite cordially return the compliment, and recognise a truth in his system. Heredity has certainly played an important part in strengthening the moral sense. Experiences of pleasure and pain, of the expedient and the inexpedient, have doubtless assisted to unfold human intelligence, until it became capable of apprehending the higher ideas of right and duty. Happiness is an object of general desire, and is a usual incident of virtuous life, and it is ever attained much more readily and surely when we do not consciously make it our aim than when we do. To estimate directly the useful, or that which will, in a given case, supply the greatest happiness to the greatest number, is most certainly a calculation too uncertain, and open to too much personal and class bias, to be made the standard of morality. The current axioms of Ethics have been approved by the experience of many generations, and the wise man will accept their authority, rather than essay to draw his own moral inductions.

So far as this, every advocate of Intuitive Morals would gladly go with Mr. Spencer. The factors in every ethical system are the same. The difference lies in the relative rank given to each. The fatal defect of the new Ethics is that it would elevate the incidental concomitants to the supreme place, while the higher essential features it would either degrade to subordinate rôles, or ignore altogether. Though Mr. Spencer's ambition to harmonise the Intuitive and Utilitarian Schools has saved him from sinning as badly in these respects as some others who have essayed to expound to us the moral teachings of modern science; nevertheless he has not avoided, it seems to me, many noticeable and capital errors. Even his special admirers, I think, must admit that the "Data of Ethics" is, in some respects, the weakest volume that he has given us.

Such, in general, is my estimate of the "Data of Ethics." But the reader, of course, desires specifications and proofs. Let me begin at once, then, by a statement of the particular points which seem to me to be open to objection.

(1.) At the outset I take issue upon the statement that the ultimate moral aim is happiness. Here is a fundamental error that vitiates Mr. Spencer's whole system of morals. He opens the "Data of Ethics" with a survey of conduct and its course. Moral conduct is a part of conduct at large. As we ascend up the scale of creation we find the adjustments of ends to means better and more numerous. There is a greater elaboration of life. It is prolonged in time. It becomes broader, embracing more varied activities. Thus the quantity of life is increased. The evolution of conduct is measured by that adjustment of means to ends by which the aggregate of the actions of the developed being is both widened and elongated. But the individual cannot reach his completest life alone. His highest development depends upon that of the race, upon that of society. "Evolution becomes the highest possible when the conduct simul-

taneously achieves the greatest totality of life in self, in offspring, and in fellow-men." Good conduct is that which conduces to any one of these three forms of life. Good conduct becomes the best "when it fulfils all three classes of ends at the same time" (p. 25).

This is not a bad beginning. It is a logical outcome of the evolution theory. It is a path which, consistently pursued, would have led to the discernment and enunciation of an ultimate end of Nature's ascending path, a consummate fruit of all the kosmic effort, which would rightfully present itself as the supreme end of all moral agents—viz., the highest perfection of the highest class of beings that we have to deal with. This would have constituted a noble object as the goal of the Ethics of evolution. Mr. Spencer seemed almost to have advanced to it, having progressed as far as to "totality of life, special and general," as the end toward which the development process moves. He needed only to add the further but most important element—*elevation or quality* of life, to its length and breadth, as a measure of the evolution of conduct, and he would have given the new Ethics a worthy key-stone.

But suddenly he stops short and faces in quite another direction. Why should we promote life? There is no reason for so doing, he says, unless life has a surplus of pleasure, a surplus which is larger the greater the totality of life. "Taking into account immediate and remote effects on all persons, the good is universally the pleasurable" (p. 30). "Conduciveness to happiness is the ultimate test of perfection in a man's nature" (p. 34). "Acts are good or bad according as their aggregate effects increase men's happiness or increase their misery" (p. 40). "The absolutely right in conduct can be that only which produces pure pleasure—pleasure unalloyed with pain anywhere. By implication, conduct which has any concomitant of pain, or any painful consequence, is partially wrong" (p. 261).

Virtue, in Mr. Spencer's system, has no intrinsic worth or authority. Its worth and authority come only from its usefulness as a means subservient to the happiness of the man or his fellows. The paramount worth of righteousness over pleasure has always been a cardinal point of Ethics. But Mr. Spencer would put "surplus of pleasure" at the summit of morality, and make of righteousness and duty mere servants that are to procure for mankind the greatest amount of gratification. Mr. Spencer has criticised most severely the *methods* of Bentham, but he has in fact adopted his ultimate *end*. And, much as he makes of righteousness, much as he inculcates the pursuit of truth and perfection, and the practice of love, purity, mercy, they are never, in his system, the supreme and essential *ends*, but mere *means*, subordinate to the attainment of happiness.

Now, to put at the summit of Ethics any such end is to subvert its fundamental order. The distinctions between the right and the expedient, between virtuous and prudent acts, are native to all languages, are essential to any sound system of morality. A noble character, a well-intentioned act, are good things, not simply because they will conduce to happiness: they are good, irrespective of whether they bring happiness or not. This is the sure testimony of man's conscience. Honesty is right, not simply because it is the best policy, but because it is the plain dictate of conscience. The reason why a man on the witness stand is bound to tell the truth about a friend's crime is not that it will give a surplus of pleasure. On the contrary, it is very easy to suppose cases—every day there are cases occurring—where pleasure, both that of the individual concerned and of the general public, would be much better promoted by the suppression of the truth. Nevertheless, to declare the truth and not a lie is right, because it is the requirement of eternal laws that demand this as the only fit relation of word to fact. Nay, more than this, the moral sense, whenever it is

fully developed, makes us feel that the very fact that the man practises honesty only out of policy eliminates from his honesty its quality of virtue.

“Acts are good or bad according as their aggregate effects increase men’s happiness or increase their misery.” Let us test this ethical standard by some familiar facts, and see if it is a correct measure of moral worth, or if moral ideas have been formed under its implicit guidance, as Mr. Spencer says. In the first place, the seeking of pleasure for one’s self ought to be, in accordance with his theory, one of the chief duties of man. We recognise it, indeed, as quite proper, when not incompatible with other claims; but no one regards it as a duty, the neglect of which he feels to be a sin. It is a *privilege* simply, which he is at full liberty to enjoy or not. Again, the pursuit of agriculture and manufacture, rather than a hunting life, has been shown by Mr. Spencer to be most essential to social advancement and the increase of general happiness. “Conduct gains ethical sanction,” he tells us, “as it becomes more and more industrial.” Nevertheless, these special activities are neither ranked as virtues by the moral sense of mankind, nor is abstention from them reckoned sin. Similarly, thrift and avarice, the political economists tell us, have done, and still do, much more for the welfare of society than charity or piety. Yet the former certainly rank far below the latter in the moral scale. The custom of blood revenge, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, has been in the past and still is one of the most powerful deterrents from crime. Shall we call it a virtue?

Again, the chief factor in the development of civilisation, the formation of society, and the adoption of industrial life, is the increase of population. This multiplies happiness, not only in the ratio of the multiplication of mankind, but in the ratio of the more complex activities it forces into action in man. Increase of population is, according to Mr. Spencer’s

view, the very creator of modern morality. Nothing else, if his system of morals be correct, ought to be a higher and plainer duty than the procreation of offspring. Yet has the tribunal of conscience ever pronounced celibacy or childlessness, flagrant moral sins? They may be called mistakes or misfortunes, but not transgressions. If there have been people who from purely religious notions, have looked upon failure to rear offspring as a dereliction of duty to departed ancestors, such cases are more than matched by the races and ages in which celibacy has been reckoned the virtuous state, and procreation sinful.

The fact is, that instead of its usefulness for the production and extension of happiness being the unfailing test of the rightness of an action, it is, on the contrary, in not a few cases, precisely the detachment of an act from all considerations of pleasure, or pain, or expediency, that gives it its elevation in the moral scale. This is the case, for instance, in many acts of heroism, such as the return of Regulus to his death at Carthage in observance of his promise, or the unswerving obedience to orders by the Six Hundred who made the famous charge at Balaclava.

There is no better test of the correctness of any proposed ethical standard, than the application of it to the qualities exhibited in those grand historic acts which by common consent keep their place at the head of the world's roll of honour. In the position just discussed we found the Spencerian standard disclosing its inadequacy. Let us look at another similar point. Not satisfied with putting the virtuousness of any act in its tendency to promote happiness, Mr. Spencer goes on to lay it down (and it is of course a logical deduction) that no act is absolutely good if it produces any pain. It is evident, then, that none of those noblest acts of martyrdom and patriotism, the self-sacrifice of a Huss or an Arnold Von Winkelried, are any longer entitled to be reckoned among the supremely virtuous deeds. They must

give place to such more politic actions as can contrive to combine with their ministry to others' happiness a thrifty securing of one's own.

Does the reader desire an example of what Mr. Spencer considers an "absolutely good action," one that in the Ethics of evolution is to be ranked as the climax of rectitude? Here is what, in strict accordance with his theory, he singles out as the *ne plus ultra* of good conduct.*

Foremost, the action of a healthy mother, suckling a healthy infant; or the relation of a father to a sympathetic and docile son. Next, the life of a poet, painter, or musician, who obtains his living by acts that are directly pleasurable to him, while they yield, immediately or remotely, pleasure to others. Then certain of the so-called benevolent acts, such as combine the obtaining of pleasure for self with the giving it to another; as, for example, when one who has slipped is saved from a fall by a bystander, or when an explanation removes a misunderstanding between friends.

That which the moral sense of the world has always estimated as the greatest addition to the moral worth of an action—viz., its *cost* to one's self, is reckoned by Mr. Spencer as impairing its absolute rightness. The noble refusal of a Jerome of Prague to recant his faith is very far from absolutely right, for it brings a great deal of suffering upon both himself and the community whose religious torpor it painfully awakens. But the action of the opera singer, who can put a thousand dollars a night into her own pocket while tickling the ears of the people is conduct absolutely right, because both sides profit by the transaction!! This certainly is *not* a scientific analysis of our ethical notions. If it is true, it is a radical overturning of the fundamental principles of morality.

(2.) Suppose we take happiness for our ultimate end, and

* *Data of Ethics*, pp. 261, 262.

conduciveness to happiness as our test of the absolutely right. Have we then a standard that can be scientifically used to determine the merit of actions?

By no means. For what is the happiness we shall take as our standard? Happiness is not a thing of a single kind, but of many kinds, essentially different in their claims on the regard of an intelligent being. There is happiness of the belly, happiness of the eye and ear, happiness of the mind, happiness of the soul. Which of these shall we take as our end? Of course, I do not mean that I am doubtful which I myself would choose. The critic would be very stupid who should so misunderstand me. The question is, which ought all men to aim at, on the Spencerian theory? The aim of life in this system is, remember, to make most sure of surplus of pleasure, special and general. By the religious man, of course, the highest pleasure is to be found in the satisfaction of his spiritual nature. For the man in whom this part of his nature is little developed and in whom the understanding predominates, pleasure consists in the gratification of intellectual tastes. The sensual man, in his turn, finds his happiness, as naturally and exclusively, in satisfying the demands of his bodily appetites. Men of each class will place the end of life in the attainment of that kind of happiness which to them is the desirable kind.

Happiness is not an entity or a quality in itself; but a simple equilibrium between desire and attainment. So far from being something primary and absolute, and so fit for being an ultimate end, it is a result, often quite accidental, of varying and transitory causes. It is a part, not a whole, and supposes always the craving or felt lack, the outreach and struggle for the object of its longing, and the chance of success in this struggle; in fact, all those inner vital needs, desires, and tendencies, and those outer supplies, by which a new equilibrium is reached. The only thing that the idea of happiness fixes is this equilibrium between desire and

attainment. But this equilibrium, as all know, can be found as much on the lowest as on the highest level of life. It comes to the ignorant and the brutal, not less than to the intelligent and the spiritual-minded.

To make happiness, then, the ultimate aim is to give the man who would know his duty a compass that would change its direction in the hands of every different class in the community, according to the plane of development on which he stands. The variableness of the notion or standard of virtue amongst different races and ages, is one of the standing objections made by the utilitarian school against the intuitive moralists. But the variability of the idea of happiness is still greater.* Not only do the notions of happiness of a worm-eating Australian or a Polynesian cannibal differ *toto celo* from those of the refined European, but in the same nation and age the conceptions of beatitude vary almost as much. Even with the same individual they vary with each shifting mood. If happiness is to be of any use as an ethical end, we must fix on some one kind of happiness as the standard. What kind does Mr. Spencer select?

When we make this inquiry, we find another defect of his (Mr. Spencer's) system. He makes no clear distinctions between different kinds of happiness as of different worth, but practically lumps them all together, and asks simply for the sum-total. It is surplus of pleasure, the maximum gratification, special and general, accompanied with the least pain, that is the measure of good, according to Mr. Spencer (see p. 268). A qualified and average supremacy is allowed, it is true, to the more compound and representative feelings over the more simple and presentative; but this is due simply to the experienced benefit of such a course for the aggregate of happiness (pp. 112, 113). The higher gratifications have no *intrinsic* superiority claimed

* *Data of Ethics*, p. 185.

for them. Perfection of nature is of worth only because it is estimated to bring a greater aggregate of pleasure.

Let us see then to what such an ethical end might be expected to conduct us. For nine-tenths of the human race, at least, what are the easiest and surest means of gaining happiness? What else but those means that will gratify the desires of the senses? The bulk of mankind are swayed most powerfully by their bodily appetites, and the happiness which in Mr. Spencer's system is their being's end and aim, can be most readily attained, often can only be attained, by satisfaction of these appetites. For obtaining the greatest aggregate of pleasure in the human race, the chief thing to be aimed at is healthiness of the bodily organs, and an abundant supply for the animal cravings.

Now compare with this the declarations of the moral sense. It looks at the character of the different kinds of gratifications, and distinguishes them as of essentially varying worth. Satisfaction of the intellect is a more worthy satisfaction than that of the appetite; satisfaction of the affections is higher than that of the senses; and satisfaction of the moral nature is highest of all. The superiority of our moral nature, on Mr. Spencer's theory, is due simply to its greater serviceableness to the sum-total of happiness. "Quantity of pleasure being equal," Bentham used to say, "pushpin is as good as poetry," and Mr. Spencer's reasoning often seems based on the same implication. But the instinctive moral sense of the world recognises a difference of value in our pleasures, according as it is the lower or the higher part of our nature that is satisfied. The satisfaction of the higher nature occupies a superior rank in the moral order, independent of its greater or less aggregate of pleasure. To awaken reason and conscience in a community is good, though it ruin for ever the animal content in which its members had dozed, and even

though it fill their hearts with spiritual longings never to be entirely satisfied. The discontent of an aspiring heart is a nobler thing than the completest satisfaction of any clam at the highest of high water. Pascal on his bed of pain, or Savonarola at the stake, is a better sight, morally, than any thousands of lives that have been passed merely in eating and sleeping and aimless ease.

The various satisfactions of our nature differ not merely in quantity but in quality, as John Stuart Mill was forced eventually to grant. To use the admission of this most acute defender whom utilitarianism has yet had, "a little of one of the higher pleasures is worth as much as a great quantity of one of the lower." Thus even in our pleasures, it is not the surplus of quantity that becomes the most powerful motive, but the moral element has an intrinsic superiority in kind which rightfully commands the will. But when it is admitted that the satisfaction of our higher nature is of more importance and obligation than the satisfaction of our lower nature, irrespective of the question on which side lies the greater intensity or aggregate of pleasure, then the cause of Hedonism is virtually surrendered. For it is acknowledged that there is another factor, superior in its claims to "surplus of pleasure."

In the name of Evolution itself, I object to the ultimate end that Mr. Spencer has presented for human conduct. The end which should be the object of our noblest strivings, the worthy reward for faithful obedience, ought to be among those ends towards which the whole Kosmos is plainly toiling as it mounts, step by step, the grand stairway of creation. As we track the course of development through the geologic ages and the successive ranks of the animal and vegetable worlds, we plainly see sensibility, perception, intelligence, will, and the moral sense constantly increasing. This steady elevation of life is unmistakable. No matter how many lives, how many tortures it costs,

provided that some better organism, some new faculty, some fuller unfolding of our psychical life may be purchased by the struggle. But for happiness Evolution seems to have concerned itself only in a minor degree. The pleasure and pain of individuals, the destruction of whole species, do not matter much to Nature when engaged in some great upward movement. Hardly do her chariot wheels make a single revolution without crushing multitudes. Hardly can her most consummate product—the man of superlative genius—tell whether, in the matter of *surplus of pleasure*, he has much advantage, if any, over the turtle that basks for two or three hundred years on its tropic beach.

The ultimate end of evolutionary ethics ought to be something that evolution, without a shadow of doubt, aims at and secures; something that is inseparable from the very idea of development. The most that can be claimed for happiness is that it is a usual incident of progress, not at all that it is inseparable from it or essential to it.

(3.) The older Hedonists not only made pleasure the ultimate end of existence, but the immediate aim and guide of man. This was a view which was open to such grave objection that Mr. Spencer himself has been one of the warmest in criticising Bentham and his school for taking such a position. He has acknowledged and strongly restated the ancient truth—that he who would have happiness must not aim directly for it. While men fiercely and selfishly struggle for it, it dissolves within their very grasp; but when they turn away from the constant anxiety about it to discharge their duties to others, then, of its own accord, it returns and drops gently and refreshingly upon them like morning dew. Moreover, Mr. Spencer has recognised the impossibility of any such comparative measurements of all the various kinds and intensities of happiness as Hedonism, either egoistic or universalistic, requires. Under neither its personal nor its general form, he argues,

can the components of happiness be assessed and calculated, so as to form a practicable and trustworthy guide.

Mr. Spencer, therefore, separates here from the Utilitarian schools, and makes this one of the cardinal features of his system, viz., that for our immediate aim or guide we must take, not calculation of happiness, but those general rules of conduct which experience has shown to be the best means of giving happiness, special and general. Happiness is a result of laws and conditions, a product of organism and environment. The happiness of any individual is inextricably bound up with the welfare of his fellows, the good order of society, the prevalence of justice, truth, and altruistic habits in the community at large. The best way to secure happiness, then, is to conform to those principles which in the nature of things causally determine happiness. What the moralist must aim at is "the *fundamental conditions* to the achievement of happiness, both special and general." But if the Hedonistic calculation of the more immediate means of happiness be impracticable, one would suppose that this calculation of the more remote and general means would be at least equally so. To what shall the common man who wants to know his duty look as a standard? Mr. Spencer takes refuge in the assumption that the intuitive principles of Ethics are laws of general welfare, which the experience of the ages has led past intelligence to discover and proclaim. These are to be taken by us as provisionally correct statements of the conditions of human welfare, till illuminated and made more precise by an analytic intelligence.

Here is, indeed, a wide divergence from the older Utilitarianism. The evolutionists look upon it as a notable contribution to the science of Ethics. I see in it, indeed, a bold and novel move to cover one of the chief weaknesses of the Hedonistic line; but a move that will not succeed. For in confessing the injuriousness of using

happiness, not only individual, but corporate happiness as a proximate end of conduct (p. 238), Mr. Spencer does in fact admit its insufficiency as an ultimate end. How can it deserve to be the last and highest standard, if not fit at all to be directly pursued? That which is the true supreme test, the absolute good, it may not always be practicable to apply. But in simple cases it must be not only practicable to apply it, but it must be the only proper test; and wherever it is feasible to apply it, there it must be useful and entirely fitting so to do. It is not credible that a primary principle, which is (as Mr. Spencer says of happiness) the ultimate end to which all action should be *conducive*, and the real origin of our ideas of virtue and vice, should nevertheless be (as he afterwards has to admit) "of little service unless supplemented by the guidance of secondary principles," and that guidance by his ultimate end should have to be "entirely set aside and replaced by other guidance," "throughout a large part of conduct."

That which is the supreme end of conduct is that which evidently ought to be aimed at by wise and good men. How comes it, then, if happiness be that end, that the pursuit of it is an obstacle to its own attainment? as Mr. Spencer admits. If happiness be our proper end, the *summum bonum* of existence, it is extraordinary that the whole system of Nature should have been so arranged as to deny it to him who seeks it most earnestly and directly, and to confer it, instead, upon him who does not care for nor labour after it. Such an incongruity would be an incomprehensible anomaly in a system which everywhere else connects reward with labour and attainment with effort. There is no explanation except the very simple one, that the proper end of life is something higher than happiness.

(4.) Mr. Spencer's criticism of Bentham's inductive method of determining right and wrong by direct valuation of the pleasures and pains of a given act is very forcible. But is

his own deductive method any less objectionable? When there are some self-evident truths to start from, or first principles possessing intrinsic authority, the deductive method is a good one. But are Mr. Spencer's starting points of this character? Not at all. They are merely the organic expressions of the past experience of the race. Are these moral discoveries of past generations, then, to be taken as authoritative in themselves without modern reason needing to verify them, or in spite of what modern reason finds? May the modern man who would know his duty, and who, in obedience to Mr. Spencer's demonstration, acknowledges that he is not able directly to value the aggregate pains and pleasures of any given act, reasonably take refuge in the hypothesis that the earlier ages of humanity were quite equal to such tasks?

That would be a very fitting position to be taken by a champion of the Eden story, and the primitive divine illumination of our race; but it is utterly incompatible with such views of man's primitive ignorance, superstition, and degradation, and the great forward strides of humanity in the last three centuries, as Mr. Spencer has presented to us in his works on Sociology.

Before the consistent evolutionist, then, can accept these first laws of morality, handed down by past experience, as fundamental principles, so as to use them as fixed points from which to let down the links of his deductive logic, he must verify them. And how can they be verified, except by the same direct estimation of the pleasures and pains, special and general, proximate and remote, caused by given acts? To establish scientifically the first principles of Ethics, which may constitute the starting point of his deductive system, Mr. Spencer must use the very method he censures so strongly in Bentham.

The fact is that, unless he adopts the intuitive method, there is no other alternative. Practically we find that, while

Mr. Spencer claims to give Ethics a new and better basis than that afforded by either the Inductive or the Intuitional school, he shifts from one to the other. In one place, ethical laws which our moral intuitions lay down for us are corrected, because they do not conform to his estimate of surplus of pleasure. In another place, and in the very same chapter, too, he tells us that in order to establish the standards from which to deduce practical rules of right, we must ascertain the ideal ethical truths, and form in our minds a model of a perfect man, and consider how he would act in a perfect society. But how this ideally perfect man is to be constructed without the aid of that moral intuition which Mr. Spencer would dispense with, we fail to see.

While most unfortunately immovable in his view of the ultimate moral end, sticking firmly to his pet "surplus of pleasure," he is as unfortunately shifting and inconsistent in his declarations concerning the methods of determining ethical first principles. When seeking to rout the Hedonistic school, he inveighs against the direct estimation of the aggregate of happiness. When ambitious to demonstrate the superiority of his system over the Intuitive, he wishes us to have first principles which are not mere assumptions, but which express the experience of past ages. When reviewing another of those current ethical systems whose scalps he would take to adorn his war-belt, he expresses his surprise "that a notion so abstract as that of perfection, or a certain ideal completeness of nature, should ever have been thought to be one from which a system of guidance can be evolved." Yet when he retires from the foray to build up his own system, he turns his back on the very positions that he had previously taken, and would give us as first principles of absolute Ethics, from which all relative Ethics are to be deduced, the ideal acts of an ideally-perfect man, in that

fully evolved society which the far-distant future is expected sometime to present.

If Utilitarianism, both egoistic and universal, is to be condemned, as Mr. Spencer urges, on the ground of the impracticability of definitely estimating the quantities of pleasure and pain to be weighed against each other, much more difficult of calculation, it seems to me, will be this ideal man, who has reached the summit of human evolution, and the manner in which he will act in a perfectly evolved society, and the amount of variation from this standard that is lawful for the imperfect man in his imperfect surroundings. When Mr. Spencer begins to think what a task he has set the seeker after righteousness, he dare not himself assert its feasibility. Here are his own words: "That it will ever be practicable to lay down rules for private conduct in conformity with such requirements may be doubted" (p. 283). Especially, in that extensive and important field of duty comprehended in beneficence, negative and positive, he finds that his system has little application, and is not of much assistance. For one who has spent so much time and space in proving the impracticability of the Hedonistic calculation, and made that his chief arsenal of attack on Bentham, and a cogent reason for rejecting the older Utilitarian system, this is surely a most humiliating, most fatal confession.

(5.) Especially distinctive of Mr. Spencer's system of Ethics is his treatment of our moral ideas and moral sentiments.

Conscience, in the generally accepted view, has been held to be a native, underived faculty. The moral elements have been regarded as innate, simple, necessary, of absolute obligation, universal and immutable. But as modern chemists have decomposed the ancient simple elements, earth, air, fire and water, into their components, so modern

psychologists have endeavoured to demonstrate that the moral elements are really compound, and they essay to exhibit the lower and coarser factors from which they have been formed by various kinds of cerebral fusion.

By constant mental association of certain elementary sensations, these simpler and lower feelings grow into a single complex sentiment. Means are thus inextricably connected with ends, and soon, as in the case of avarice, the means, like a French mayor of the palace, makes itself sovereign, and becomes an object of honour and desire on its own account. The individual learns by experience that his own interests are inseparably bound up with those of his fellows, and that the conditions of prosperous life are everywhere the same; and thus the immutable, universal conditions of prosperous life take the place of personal happiness as the proximate ends of human pursuit, and soon acquire a sacred character.

These views of the derivative origin of conscience and its peculiar phenomena have been urged for many years now by the moralists of the Association school. But the hypothesis, though presented and advocated with extreme ingenuity by Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill, and Sidgwick, was seen to have some decidedly weak points. Individual experience did not give sufficient time for these moral metamorphoses. The appearance of moral intuitions in as strong or in a stronger form in youth than in age was an unexplained difficulty. Some further hypothesis was necessary if the derivative character of moral ideas was to be established. It is the distinction of Mr. Spencer, we are assured, that he has supplied this further analysis of psychological chemistry, and solved the crucial problem of Ethics.

By introducing the element of hereditary accumulation and transmission, it is claimed that he has harmonised the old antagonisms of the Intuitive and Association schools

in a theory that embraces the truth contained in both. Moral truths are innate in the present generation. But they are so only because, by a law of inheritance, the experiences of our ancestors have been organised in our brains. The social environment, by its constant pressure upon humanity for ages, has moulded the individual, little by little, into harmony with his social conditions of happiness till at last they have become embodied in him as a social instinct. Thus, to quote Mr. Spencer's own words, "The experiences of utility organised and consolidated through all past generations of the human race have been producing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition, certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility" (p. 123).

But there are manifold experiences of utility, such as the more immediate means of gratifying the appetites, cases of prudence and economy, industry, &c., which have been subject to all this accumulation and organisation as much as any, but which have not been transformed into moral intuitions. Why this difference? It is due, according to Mr. Spencer, to the fact that the earlier and simpler feelings, which refer to more immediate gratifications, have been found by the accumulated experience of the race, not to be as highly conducive to welfare as guidance by feelings more complex, concerned with more indirect and remote and more widely diffused effects. The later evolved, more compound, and more representative feelings, serving as they do to adjust the conduct to more distant and general needs and greater benefit in the end, thus come to have authority, and the lower and simpler feelings, as less conducive to ultimate benefit, are by comparison looked upon as without authority (pp. 114, 122, 126).

It is evident, then, how action under such sentiments as

love, justice, truth, should become especially valuable and honoured. But conduct of this kind is recognised by the moral sense as something more. It is not merely a dictate of prudence to be kind, equitable, and truthful, but something that we feel *bound* to be, something that we *ought*. Whence this imperative character and sense of coerciveness, which is the most striking characteristic of a moral duty?

This originates, says Mr. Spencer, "from experience of those several forms of restraint that have established themselves in the course of civilisation—the political, religious, and social" (p. 126). The punishments which they severally have inflicted in the past, or the dread of legal, supernatural, or social penalty which our ancestors have felt, have become ingrained by inheritance in us, forming an inner compulsion, born with us, restraining us from immediate and present gratifications, such as those upon which political, religious, and social penalties have been laid, and urging us by a sort of nervous reverberation of our ancestors fears to pursue those more remote and general ends which these external powers have generally favoured.

The sentiment of moral obligation is thus due, in the main, according to Mr. Spencer (pp. 115—127), to fears of political, social, and religious penalties. The general sense of duty disengages itself gradually from these other controls; an abstract idea is formed of it, and, as often occurs in the case of abstract ideas, acquires "an illusive independence." But as the moral motive becomes more distinct and predominant, it loses its associated consciousness of coercion, and begins to fade. "The sense of duty or moral obligation is transitory, and will diminish as fast as moralisation increases" (p. 127). "This self-compulsion, which at a relatively-high stage, becomes more and more a substitute for compulsion from without, must itself, at a still higher stage, practically disappear" (p. 130).

Such, in brief, is Mr. Spencer's now famous theory of the

origin of moral ideas and sentiments. At the first glance we cannot fail to see its utter inconsistency with the received principles of Ethics; and it seems to me to be in blank contradiction to our moral consciousness. The idea of duty is granted only an "illusive independence." The Categorical Imperative, to use Kant's classic term, instead of being recognised as the voice of a legitimate authority, is but the cerebral vestige of our ancestors' alarms before the menace of social disgrace, the vengeance of some despot or dead chieftain's ghost. Our moral ideas represent not what we individually see to be wise or right, but what preceding generations thought most useful. By the subtle operations of heredity these ideas of our ancestors as to what was conducive to their happiness have not only smuggled themselves into our brains, but have assumed a sacred authority. As the suggestion of a companion may take possession of the brain of a delirious person, and the thought and will of a hypnotizer seize control of the mind of his patient, and make him do what his own reason and will would never order, so do the experiences of past generations as to the pleasurable and the painful, obsess our brains with their illusory convictions of self-evident right and solemn duty. Not only is our general idea of duty an illusion, but our special ethical ideas are hallucinations due, in more than one case, to no superior wisdom of our ancestors, but simply to their superstitions. For example, the *asceticism*, which finds moral worth in self-denial rather than self-enjoyment, and which repudiates the idea of happiness as the end of conduct, is derived by Mr. Spencer from the devil worship of the savage, and "the views of life and conduct which originated with those who propitiated deified ancestors by self-tortures" (p. 40).

The perception of an ineradicable difference between right and wrong, an inevitable obligation to obey the right, and a sense of sin when we disobey it, form and have always

formed the basic elements of morality. "This instinct," eloquently says Isaac Taylor, "flushes in the cheek of every sensitive child, and it prevails over the laborious sophistications of the philosopher. This belief is cherished as an inestimable jewel by the best and purest of human beings; it is bowed to in dismay by the foulest and the worst; its rudiments are a monition of eternal truth whispered in the ear of infancy; its articulate announcements are a dread fore-doom ringing in the ears of the guilty adult." In the analytical crucible of Mr. Spencer all those lofty, solemn, and essential elements of the moral sense are resolved into the common clay of the rest of our nature. Duty is in truth but prudence, and remorse the echo of our ancestors' chastisements. Conscience itself is but an evanescent phenomenon, due to the maladjustment of our nature (still in great measure retaining its military and anti-social constitution) to the industrial and social stage into which evolution has now passed. When the transition is fully made and the limit of evolution reached, conscience will disappear. Its place will be taken by organic necessity and an instinctive promotion of happiness.

The very statement of the theory would seem enough to show its falsity. But its champions will demand specifications of error, based not upon the views they would overthrow, but upon grounds which they themselves admit.

Let us test Mr. Spencer's system, then, by that which in it constitutes a thing good or bad—viz., its consequences. Will it be likely to be conducive to the welfare of the race, if universally adopted? Mr. Spencer has himself recognised the danger of a moral vacuum in society. One of the standing and urgent needs of society is that of a controlling moral agency. The very reason that has led the author to hasten the composition and publication of the "Data of Ethics" in advance of its regular place in his Synthetic System is that, as he says, "Few things can happen more

disastrous than the decay and death of a regulative system no longer fit, before another and fitter regulative system has grown up to replace it" (*Preface*, p. iv.). It is most proper to ask, then, whether Mr. Spencer's ethical system is capable of providing the needed moral regulation for humanity. Does it possess the requisite authority to give it efficiency in controlling mankind, supposing that it should become generally adopted?

It seems to me that it does not. Were men already perfectly evolved in their moral nature, so that whatever it was right for them to do they would take satisfaction in doing, the new Ethics would, of course, suffice; for no control at all would then be needed. But it will be many ages yet before that moral Utopia will be reached. Meantime, man needs a system that can compel him to do what he does not find personally agreeable. Any system of Ethics that is to be efficacious must have some law-giving power that may keep the lower nature subordinate to the higher, and not allow the general happiness to be sacrificed to personal and selfish gratifications. What power of this kind has Mr. Spencer's Ethics?

It bids its disciples, to be sure, to guide themselves by the higher, more complex and universal feelings. But why? Only because they are directed towards wider benefit, are more conducive to general happiness. Its only motive to induce a man to speak the truth or to act honestly and benevolently is *prudence*—a consideration of the ultimate advantage of self and others. But suppose the man says, "I prefer my immediate and personal advantage. By honesty, I may possibly do better in the end; but by cheating, I know I do better now. A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. If my cheating should not turn out as well in the end, I am quite willing to stand the cost of it for the sake of the present gain." What argument can the ethical scheme we are considering bring to bear on such a man?

To see the fatal lack of authority inherent in the Spencerian Ethics, let us take a concrete case and consider it more fully. Let us suppose that one of Mr. Spencer's disciples, whose moral nature is a little unfortunate in its inheritance of a surplus of egoism over altruism, has just found a mislaid deed which proves that the home he is living in is not his but belongs to a rich neighbour. In accordance with the egoistic nature which he has inherited, he has made up his mind quietly to destroy the deed, and keep the unjustly held estate. Mr. Spencer, happening to visit him, is informed of the circumstance, and at once proceeds to remonstrate with him. On what grounds could he remonstrate, and what defences could the disciple bring forth from Mr. Spencer's own system? The dialogue, I think, would run something as follows.

Mr. Spencer : To destroy this deed, sir, as you propose, would be very wrong.

Disciple : Why so?

Mr. S. : The estate belongs to your neighbour. You have no right to diminish his happiness.

Disciple : I shall not do so. He has already more property than he can manage with comfort, whereas its loss would make me and my invalid wife and child miserable, perhaps kill them. The act conduces to a greater aggregate of happiness to self and others, and therefore, as you have shown us, must be right.

Mr. S. : You forget, sir, that I told you that the aggregate of happiness was not to be directly estimated, neither was it to be immediately aimed at; but that it was to be best gained by observing the unchanging conditions of welfare, chief among which is justice.

Disciple : How do you know that justice is so essential to general welfare, if it is impossible to estimate pains and pleasures correctly?

Mr. S. : Does not your own conscience tell you?

Disciple : As you have shown, the voice of conscience is a humbug, pretending to a divinity which it has no right to ; the idea of duty as distinct from prudence has only an "illusive independence." Its throne was usurped and its regalia fabricated by the arts of that tricky sprite, "Association." We owe no obedience to such a pretender. Conduct, in every case, is a question simply of prudence or imprudence, nothing more.

Mr. S. : At any rate the voice of conscience is the accumulated experience of the past, and that ought to warn you of the bad results of injustice.

Disciple : You have yourself taught me how far I stand above the past, how superstitious and unenlightened men were in the old times. I will not believe, and do not think you yourself believe, that our ancestors, in their ignorance and barbarism, knew more about right and wrong, or how to secure the welfare of myself and others, than the reason of a modern man may perceive, especially one whose mind has been illuminated by the great truths of Evolution. I have always been taught to think that a man was to determine what was right for him by his own reason, not by the opinion of others. In more than one place you have spoken, in a very caustic tone, of those who think that social opinion constitutes right. But if the social opinion of one generation cannot make or unmake right, how can the social opinions of past generations? I do not think that you will claim, yourself, that we ought to accept all the moral ideas of our ancestors. Have you not told us in your "Data of Ethics" (pp. 111 and 112) that the supremacy of higher feelings is only to be "a qualified supremacy," and that the authority of the lower and simpler feelings, though ordinarily less than that of the higher and more compound, is "occasionally greater"?

Mr. S. : Well, yes ; now you remind me of it. And I have also intimated that these innate perceptions of right

“may possibly have to be corrected as to their form,” and must be “~~duly enlightened and made precise by an analytic intelligence~~” (pp. 167 and 173).

Disciple : That is just what I have done in this case.

Mr. S. : But no analysis can make injustice a better rule than justice. Justice is the general and standard means for the attainment of happiness, special and general, and it should therefore be the proximate aim.

Disciple : Yes. As you say, it is a *means*, but happiness is the *end*. And the securing of the end is always paramount to the use of the means. Right and wrong, as you have told us, vary with the environment. The family circumstances that form my environment in this instance demand a modification of the general rule.

If I should act with regard to justice alone in this case, and give up the estate, I should impoverish myself and my family, and render all of us miserable for the rest of our lives. Now, as you have pointed out in your book, called “The Study of Sociology” (p. 277), speaking of a similar case, that of the pursuit of liberty, “the worth of the means must be measured by the degree in which this end is achieved. A citizen nominally having complete means, but partially securing the end, is less free than another who uses incomplete means to more purpose.” So I say with reference to the means “justice” and “injustice” in reference to the end “happiness.” Injustice is in this case the better means, as it better secures the surplus of pleasure over pain, which is the supreme good. Nay, in your “Data of Ethics” (p. 95), you have said the same thing in as many words. “If the rules of right living are those of which the total results, individual and general, direct and indirect, are most conducive to human happiness; then it is *absurd to ignore the immediate results* and recognise only the remote results.” Now the immediate results in this case have one

voice. They unanimously bid me destroy the proof that this estate belongs to any one else, as the surest and quickest way of preserving the happiness of myself and my family, and also of my weary neighbour, already too much burthened with great possessions.

Mr. S. : But if all men should act in this way, society would suffer badly. Justice is the very cement of social order, and your unjust act will tend to dissolve the mutual confidence and general integrity which alone allow society, with all its higher enjoyments, to flourish.

Disciple : Do not be disturbed. I shall not advertise what I do. Nobody but you and I will know it. There will be little or no chance for it to produce imitators, or to affect the conduct and future acts of others. I am but an obscure individual, and the effect of my example would be but small, if it were known ; and as I intend to keep it a profound secret, there will be no evil effects worth mentioning to come from it. Certainly, the remote evil effects will not begin to outweigh the immediate good effects to myself and family. The "surplus" will be most decidedly a "surplus of pleasure," and, therefore, the action will be right.

Mr. S. : You forget that I have taught you that nothing is perfectly right, if it gives pain to any one, and this proposition sadly shocks me.

Disciple : True. It is not absolutely right. Hardly anything, as you have shown, can be, which man does in his present unfortunate environment and imperfectly evolved stage. But, if I should give up the estate to its true owner, that would not be completely right, for, as you have shown, "actions are completely right, only when, besides being conducive to future happiness, special and general, they are immediately pleasurable" (p. 99). As it is inevitable that my action should be partially wrong, in any case, I prefer to secure the immediate and personal pleasure that I

can make sure of, rather than aim at the more remote and uncertain returns which regard for the general welfare may bring. www.libtool.com.cn

Mr. S. : I regret to see you so absorbed in egoistic satisfaction, and so forgetful of the altruistic sympathies that should impel you to the other-regarding actions without which society cannot evolve.

Disciple : You forget that you have yourself told us, and at some considerable length have "clearly shown," that "pure altruism is suicidal," and that "egoism precedes altruism in order of imperativeness" (p. 197), and that altruism is rather to be diminished in its sphere, than increased, as society evolves towards a complete development (p. 253). I am not only convinced of it, but I intend to act on these principles whenever I can gain anything for myself by so doing.

[*Mr. Spencer walks off, looking very grave, and repeating to himself a sentence from his "Study of Sociology."* "A utilitarian system of Ethics cannot at present be rightly thought out even by the select few, and is quite beyond the mental reach of the many."]

To drop our illustration, and return to straightforward statement, I look upon the teachings of the "Data of Ethics," if they should be generally adopted and put into practice, as fraught with disastrous consequences to the morals of society.

Those noblest and most needed virtues—steadfast integrity, purity, and unselfishness—are not to be enforced by considerations of "surplus of pleasure over pain." The returns of happiness, either special or general, for such virtues are too remote and uncertain to have much efficiency by themselves. It is only the unqualified supremacy of duty, and the authority of a conscience which is something more than an organic remembrance of our ancestors'

experience, that can maintain these virtues and destroy the vices which are their opposites. An ethical system which, whatever regard it may profess for these authorities, practically destroys them, is plainly unfit to be taken for the regulative agency of human society. If nature or past experience had left us no stronger moral system than this, we should have had forthwith to invent one ourselves.

JAMES T. BIXBY.

RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION IN SCHOOLS.

THE main object of this Paper is to exhibit a sketch of a scheme of religious instruction such as might be given with fairness and advantage to the children of parents of all Christian denominations, in which term I include all parents who profess to make the teaching of Christ the guiding principle of their lives.

It can hardly be asserted that the possibility of giving such religious instruction has ever yet been temperately discussed as an educational problem.

On the one hand the opponents of the secular system have been too ready to brand those who differ from them with the titles of infidels and atheists, and to threaten the judgments of God on the State and prophesy the downfall of morality if God be not recognised as King in the way they desire and if morality have not the sanction of religion in the school.

In their mistaken zeal those who argue in this way are apt to forget the cardinal precept of Christ that we should do unto others as we would they should do unto us, and to do disparagement to the attributes of God whom they represent as acting in a manner unworthy even of a chivalrous man. They underrate also the value of other influences, apart from the hours given to religious instruction, on the character of the pupils. To the formation of this the presence of the teacher, his acts, words, and tones, the habit of discipline and of deference to authority, and the renegation of self entailed on children by their living

together in numbers, all contribute. Moreover, education tends to make children realise clearly, and by thus enlarging their sympathies will develop in them a more active regard for the feelings of other human beings, and even of animals. We usually find criminals callous as well as uneducated, though of course there are exceptions, many of which can probably be accounted for by considerations of race.

On the other hand the advocates of the secular system have regarded the question rather as a political than an educational one, have been biassed by a natural jealousy of a predominant Church, or with praiseworthy religious earnestness setting before their minds an ideal and it is to be feared impracticable picture of an organisation for religious instruction outside the ordinary day-schools, have sometimes been led to throw an undeserved slur on the religious qualifications of the ordinary school teacher, even going so far as to assert, or at least to imply, that he is not a fit person to give religious instruction.

I desire to make a warm protest against this assumption. Elementary teachers have small opportunity themselves of rebutting it. They do not appear much on platforms, and if they did they could not with delicacy discuss their own religious qualifications. No doubt the strong feeling frequently exhibited against the treatment of religion by the secular teacher has its source in many minds in real religious earnestness ; but the danger to the cause of religion that must follow from the preachers setting themselves in array against the teachers should surely make the former pause before they assert their right to a monopoly in religious teaching.

That there is an increasing number of conscientious men who do not accept the old forms of stating religious truths, and whose opinions are not fixed, is quite true. But it is also quite certain that in the essentials of religion, in devo-

tion to the interests of truth and of the race, in the disciplined use of their faculties for the advancement of both, many such men may compare very favourably with those who have uninquiringly accepted and retained the traditional beliefs of their childhood. As far as I know, it has never been shown that such men have sought to give negative instruction to their pupils. It is likely that such positive teaching as they give will have a more enduring influence coming from the habitual teacher than could be asserted by any unsystematic teaching given by an amateur imported into the school. Practically, as was recently said by a writer in the *Spectator*, such men are content to enforce the precepts of religion, as far as they themselves honestly agree in and adopt them, and to exert as high a moral and spiritual influence as they can, keeping silence on subjects on which they cannot speak with real advantage to their pupils.

Moreover, the notion that the teacher is not a fit person to give religious instruction ignores the elementary fact of human nature strenuously and more than once insisted on by Christ, that the contact with children has a tendency to foster the religious sentiment. So that we might expect that the giving religious instruction to children would be more likely to foster a religious character than almost any other calling.

And experience here fortifies the speculations of theory. Two of the most popular and influential lives of the Founder of Christianity have been written by schoolmasters; an episcopal schoolmaster planned and executed in the metropolis the most gigantic scheme of Church extension we have known in our time; the great English Commentary on the Fourth Gospel is written by an ex-schoolmaster; sermons delivered by Head Masters in their school chapels form a literature in themselves. If religion gain by the exposition of its documents and the practical enforce-

ment of its precepts then have schoolmasters a claim to be spoken of as religious teachers without disparagement by their fellow-religionists apart from the fact that they are called upon to exhibit the Christian virtues by a life of service to the weak, a mode of living which we are told met their Master's especial approval.

But I may be told that all this refers to the teacher of first grade schools, whereas it is the elementary teacher, a person of inferior capacity and tone, whose fitness is denied. I answer I cannot recognise, such a division of the Profession.

The fact is, those who would deprive the elementary teacher of the opportunity of giving religious instruction, disparage the work of the schoolmaster, as such, for lack of full sympathy with it. But what is the work of the elementary schoolmaster? He may be regarded as an official paid to produce results in percentages. Those who regard him in this light are perfectly justified in assuming that he is a being without religious sentiment; but they are not justified in grumbling that he exhibits a low tone. But if this is all he is, the ratepayer is an ill-used individual. I venture to think, however, that the view is a false one, and those who entertain it belong to an age of cynicism that is fast becoming fossil, and may be defined as the age of the licensed victuallers. I think the more earnest age of the future will regard the elementary teacher in a different light. He has daily to struggle for the redemption of the waifs and outcasts of society from the results of vice, improvidence and ignorance, and he has a claim to the use of every available means to accomplish the task society has delegated to him. Other members of society may make speeches about the task, rhapsodise in connection with it on the vague, the vast, and the vehement; but he has to do it as soon as they leave the stage clear to him. They are the glorified, he is the

suffering Israel. We should hear less about his low tone if he could give dinner parties or throw the social halo round his work that is thrown round the work of those to whom the title of ministers has been narrowed.

There may be other and overpowering reasons for declining to permit the elementary schoolmaster to give religious instruction, but I think it is high time for the sake of religion that we ceased to hear of his unfitness for the office.

Neither are we prepared to regard the stately literature of the Hebrews and the simple narratives of the Gospels as the sacred property of ministers of religion and the partisans of the sects.

The time is gone by when such men, however excellent, can be regarded as the sole possessors of the keys of these mysteries, and the lay mind of England as education progresses will effectually reject the new papistical tendencies of the Ultramontane Nonconformists.

It is not to be denied that those who seek in the name of Religious Freedom to banish Religious Instruction from the Public Elementary Schools can find grave reasons for doing so in the religious history of England in the past. But when we consider the immensely accelerated rapidity with which events have marched and thought has developed in our own generation we shall, I think, be led to believe that they are in the position of persons who, in considering the geography of a country, fix their eyes on a single county in its territory. Religious liberty, they assert with justice, has been infringed in the past by the establishment and support of a special form of religious belief. Therefore, in our public schools in the future we will have no reference to religion at all, so that absolute fairness may be insured. But slavery and freedom do not depend solely on external organisations. The power and authority of an established church in an age when the arts of reading or writing were

confined to the clergy, or in a more recent age of Squire Westerns and Tom Joneses, are likely to be of a totally different character from its power and authority in an age of Huxleys and Tyndalls and Endowed Schools' Commissions. Over the School Board children of this latter age neither the passmen from whom for the most part our curates are selected, nor the specialists often as narrow as they are enthusiastic who are trained in the seclusion of our Nonconformist Colleges* are likely to maintain the influence that their predecessors exercised over ruder minds more open to appeals to the feelings. The crowds that listened to the stirring eloquence of Whitfield could be moved to a change of life by histrionic and rhetorical appeals all the more effective because subtlety and learning and criticism found no place in them. But the crowds of that day were unlettered barbarians. Far different, unless the Education Act fails, will be the crowds of the future; and though the time will never come when the eloquence that comes from the heart ceases to influence, every forward movement in education diminishes its influence when unaccompanied by judgment and reason and knowledge. Miss will be cynically indifferent to the impassioned appeals of a preacher whose intellect she sees no reason to reverence and of whose life she knows nothing; fresh from the laboratory Miss will fail to see the immediate connection of every event in the Old Testament with the inward life or outward conduct of Miss of the nineteenth century. But her knowledge of history will make Miss bitterly resent the notion that its most famous pages are to be closed to her in her school life, and that on one biography alone her teacher, who is her guide, her ideal, and the object of her worship during six days of the week,

* I rejoice to think that now the unfair restrictions imposed on a University career have disappeared, young men training for the Nonconformist Ministry are in increasing numbers leaving this seclusion for residence at the Universities.

is to be silent, that on the seventh day a strange teacher may assert a monopoly of interest in the great Personage who is its subject, as though He were connected with her life only on one day of the week, and His history had no bearing on the other lives and events of which she reads in school.

The fact is, the torrent-like rapidity of thought, in the nineteenth century, has in its course swept priestcraft into an ocean where the air and the space are alike ampler than have ever been dreamt of in human history before. In this ocean the differences between Churchmen and Non-conformists are already lost. The narrow, though powerful, torrents of the sects are being merged in it. Drifting towards it the discerning eye may see the Liberation Society, and all disputes about the unknowable. To drop the figure, life has become too complicated, its interests too manifold, for men to be moved as they once were by religious contests. The problems with which they are connected are lost in the crowd of other problems which call for solution. Every succeeding day will make men less willing to leave the treatment of religion in the hands of those whose position as supporters of one set of views in opposition to other sets tempts them to dwell on those points on which men differ rather than on those on which they agree. The same causes will lead to a revolt against the arbitrary separation of the sacred and secular. In the web of human life you cannot separate the threads which you call sacred from the threads you call secular. They are closely woven together, and the work has taken its colours from the combination. Atropos is preparing in the future to twine them still more closely.

No one should shrink more earnestly from the attempt to pull them asunder than the ardent religionist. The separation of religion from conduct has stained the past history of religion with an indelible dye of crimson that is

its bitterest reproach, and to this hour repels some of the noblest spirits in the world from its noblest character, to whose teaching they erringly attribute these disastrous results.

In treating of the character of the religious teaching that should be given in a public school it will be regarded as pardonable to refer to the views of Dean Colet. One of his chief objects in founding his famous school of S. Paul's was to combine rational religion with sound learning. We may not agree with him in regarding the knowledge of Greek as useful exclusively for religious purposes. But weariness of theological controversies may well lead us to sympathise with his longing to find a rational and practical theology in the Gospels themselves, and to base his faith simply on a vivid realisation of the person of Christ, and to find a simple and rational Christianity in Christ's sayings, crying with him, "About the rest let divines dispute as they will." Is there anything in the whole history of education that throws a more real and beautiful halo of sentiment about our work than his pathetic saying to his scholars, "Lift up your little white hands for me, for me which prayeth for you to God"? Is there anything in history that more eloquently summons us, *ceteris paribus*, to cling to the teaching of Christ in our schools, than the figure of the child (not the man) Jesus which stood over the gate of his, the first, grammar school with the words graven beneath it, "Hear ye Him"?

In some respects our age resembles that of Dean Colet. He founded the first of those grammar schools, which in our time have been reformed and developed. He lived in an age of new learning when old beliefs were being shaken and men's minds were confused and even convulsed by new notions that many feared would destroy religious belief altogether. He sought a remedy not in the whirlwind of denunciation, or the earthquake of persecution, but in the

still small voice of accurate scholarship applied to the words of the founder of the Christian religion. In our own day, by new methods, and with different views, that vivid realisation of the person of Christ which he longed for has been sought after by scholars in nearly every country in Europe. In England, by the popular and epithetical Farrar, by the painstaking antiquarian Geikie, and the scholarly and sympathetic author of "Philochristus;" in Germany, in a scientific and inductive spirit that often rises to that eloquence of thought which surpasses that of phrase, by Keim; in Holland, in a more matter-of-fact and prosaic way, by Hooykaas; in Switzerland, in the sweet if not strong commentaries of Godet; in France, from an orthodox point of view by Pressensé, and with immense learning in the fascinating pages of Renan. The variety of views presented by these writers shows that the dream entertained by Colet of a vivid realisation of the person of Christ as the basis of religion has not been so easy as he imagined. But in spite of these discrepancies I think it may be maintained if not in a way to convince every one yet with more force than most assertions that are made outside the domain of rigid science that in the pages of all these writers, divided as they are, we have presented to us a life and character more fascinating and lovable, more capable of wooing men to love one another, and to work for the world's good, than any other we possess in history.

But it is probable that the intellectual difficulties of our age as far transcend those of the age of Colet as the social difficulties of his age transcended ours. Men are no longer in danger of being burnt or beheaded for expressing views different from those entertained by the Court or the Pope; even the social disabilities consequent upon holding unconventional views are, excepting in small country and cathedral towns, insignificant. But to the thoughtful and earnest minds of this age many questions are open which

in Colet's time presented no difficulty. So intimately are these difficulties connected with the subjects of modern education that the men of our time who are really in earnest in the education of youth must needs smile sadly at the notion that children or boys can receive their religious training apart from schools, and that indeed it is better for them they should do so. It is as though men should suggest skating over a glacier full of crevasses in preference to following a guide who has himself been over them before. The time has gone by when it could be regarded as meritorious to have had no religious doubts, and the thoughtless repetition of religious formulæ could be regarded as the loftiest evidence of Christian piety. For the present and the next generation at least the path of religious thought is likely to be steep and rugged and beset with thorns. The cynic and the fanatic may urge the young to refuse to climb it, or to climb it on the back of others. But the true teacher knows that the climb is healthy for his pupil, and is ready to give him the kindly help of an experience which, after many a fall, is still leading him laboriously upwards. And, on the whole, it is to his teacher the pupil will trust. Those religionists who think otherwise have surely reason to mistrust that they are breaking their Master's precept by despising the little ones in throwing a slight on their teacher.

What then, if he is to avoid as far as possible disputed matter, can the public schoolmaster best teach his pupil? He has to deal, we must remember, with the religion of the citizen rather than that of the devotee, and with the piety of social life rather than of the sanctuary of the heart. He has the enormous advantage of being able, if he will, to avoid all formulæ, all circumlocutions that lead to hypocrisy. The young are not naturally hypocrites; they can be induced to say what they mean and what they think, if their characters are not subjected to distorting influences;

and this characteristic has an educating influence on the genuine teacher. Such a teacher will not, I think, of choice, dwell on the supernatural element in religion. He will not do so because he knows that he has not time to inculcate more than the general principles of religion into the minds of his pupils, and that, with regard to this subject, the more thoughtful among the parents of his pupils have doubts if not dogmas. For the sake of the nobility of the literature and its historical importance, he will make the Divine Library, which in England is popularly called the Bible, the basis of his teaching. But he will not use it without discrimination. If he were teaching English literature, he would select Shakespeare and Milton for the basis of his teaching, and the masterpieces of each rather than their minor poems or juvenile efforts. He would not read Piers Ploughman or Chaucer in the junior forms. If he were teaching English history he would not, it is to be hoped, in these days begin with the Anglo-Saxon Period. He would rather select such periods and such events as he felt would really be intelligible to his pupil, and which the pupil could visualise, his object being always to check the pupil from using words without meaning.

If this principle were applied, it is evident that the common practice of teaching to the youngest pupils in schools the events of the earliest historical books of the Bible would be largely abandoned. It is difficult for adults to present before their minds the condition mental and physical of men living in other ages. The difficulty is enhanced when the ages are remote and the climate, manners and customs different from those of their own country. But to a child the task is impossible. We may not under-estimate the beauty of the Old Testament stories—they certainly have a fascination for childhood. But if we were to analyse it, we should probably find that this interest has little connection with religion or

morals and excepting as training the fancy little educational value. There is no one among us who would not find it very difficult to explain to a child why Samuel was a good man when he hewed Agag in pieces, and yet the Archbishop of Canterbury would have been very wicked if he had treated Cetewayo in a similar fashion. If we resolved in dealing with children to teach them reasonably from the very first, we should find similar difficulties perpetually checking our unreasonable ardour to introduce them at the tenderest age to the most difficult historical and literary problems. I fear it is a melancholy fact that the majority of middle-class Englishmen are far better acquainted with the names of the stations at which the Israelites rested in their wanderings, and of the Kings of Judah and Israel, than they are with the masterpieces of Isaiah's poetry, or the lyrical beauties of the Psalms. Yet we do not teach English history through the medium of Froissart, and in our selections of English poetry we usually take pains to put the choicest pieces most prominently forward. Few religious teachers of ordinary intelligence and average culture could now be found who would deny a progress in the religious training of the Israelitish nation. It is almost impossible to bring this idea of progress home to the mind of a child or even of a boy of 14 or 15, especially as it is not explicitly advanced in the literature. But granting the progress, surely we should present the child of the nineteenth century rather with the flower than with the bud or the root, and with those ideas first which he is best able to assimilate because they most nearly resemble his own environment. Instruction in Bible history, as all other instruction, should quicken rather than deaden thought. Nothing tends so much to stifle a child's mind as the habit of answering questions on subjects which are beyond his comprehension, because he has not the data for comprehending them.

In the ideal form of religious instruction, then, which I am endeavouring to set out, the early books of the Old Testament will not occupy their present important position, but will come like Thucydides and Aristotle late in the school career, excepting perhaps that the children will be familiarised with a simple version of the biographies of Joseph and David accompanied however with a careful account of Eastern customs illustrated by faithful pictures.

To sketch a plan of religious instruction for pupils of all ages would carry me into too wide a field and take up too much time. It will be more expedient to limit myself to the instruction that may be given to boys of fourteen or fifteen, the latest age perhaps at which it is desirable that dogmatic statements should be received in an uninquiring spirit, an age when we may hope with our improved system of education the minds of all who show any intelligence will begin to be on the watch for cause and effect, to demand as a matter of course the meanings of all words and sentences, and to be ready to understand that there are differences of customs in different climates and different ages.

I should like to lay down two postulates before I pass on, in which the majority of teachers, though perhaps not all, will probably agree. No doubt in connection with religious instruction many would prefer a larger number.

First : That forasmuch as Christianity has had immense influence on the history of the world, no one can be said to have a liberal education who is not acquainted with the history of the people from whose midst it sprung, and the life and sayings of the Founder and His disciples.

Secondly : That religious instruction in schools should not only supply needful information on this point, but should also bear on conduct, and especially on conduct in relation to others.

A few years ago it would have seemed unnecessary for

any teacher to lay down these postulates. There is no necessity to apologise for doing so now. But, though in past years they would have received a far more general assent than they do now, those who accept them unhesitatingly may take comfort in this that there was probably never a time in the history of education when problems and theorems were more carefully and earnestly based on them.

Well then, let us suppose we wish our boy of fourteen or fifteen, the modern Emile, to enter into life armed with some knowledge of opinions on which he will find men divided and heated, and with motives which will enable him to control his passions and stimulate him to civic virtues.

The modern Emile will learn that religion has centred round a biography. His teacher will be alive to the difficulties connected with that biography; but he will not think it necessary to trouble Emile with these unless Emile shows an inquiring spirit. Then he will be open with his pupil; but he will neither encourage him to think himself clever because he has discovered difficulties, nor good because he pretends to be readily satisfied about them. He wants Emile to be good, not goody; and he desires an intellectual conscience to be an element of his goodness; I am supposing that Emile's teacher is firmly convinced that the teaching of Christ is the best that has been given to the world, and that he has adopted this conclusion not on authority but after investigation not unaccompanied perhaps by scepticism. As far as I can make them so, I want both Emile and his teacher to be ideal.

They open then the New Testament together, the teacher with intense anxiety, the pupil with awakened curiosity. Emile has probably read "Line upon Line" and "Peep of Day," learnt his catechism and heard

sermons, perhaps he has sung in the choir, and knows some of the Psalms by heart. He has read chapters in an isolated and unconnected way, and learnt some texts as a child to make him good or to please his mother or sister, or to get marks and beat his schoolfellows.

Leaving the omissions in Emile's religious instruction to the discernment of the reader, I proceed to describe what he is actually taught.

First, then, he is introduced to the Founder of Christianity as a boy asking pertinent questions in the Temple. In connection with this subject the manner of Jesus' boyhood is described to him, the scenery in which He lived, His education, His surroundings, the political, religious, and social condition of His country, the contrast between Galilee and Judea in scenery and in social life. Next the disciples of Jesus are described, their call and their character, all references to ecclesiastical legends being avoided, the Gospels being left to tell their own tale with such help as can be obtained from reliable sources as to the relations of Jewish Rabbis and their disciples.

Then an account is given of John the Baptist which will naturally lead to a description of the Prophets, their history, position and influence, the reason why they ceased with Malachi and were revived with John. John's relations with the people of the time will naturally lead the teacher to dwell further on the condition of the country, and the aspirations, religious, social, and political, of the people, John's relation to Jesus, and their different methods of teaching.

Then will come what is really the *pièce de résistance* in Emile's religious instruction — the Sermon on the Mount. This will lead the teacher to define forgiveness, resentment, and unselfishness, to distinguish between thrift and parsimony, to discuss the meaning of prayer and the limitation to its objects; perhaps, to dwell on the

advantages and disadvantages of war from an ethical point of view.

Chapter xi. of S. Matthew's Gospel, containing what has been called the secret of Jesus, and a review on His part of John and his other contemporaries in their relation to Him will bring out more forcibly the contrast between John and Jesus, and by defining what is meant by Jesus' yoke will display the difference between the teaching of Jesus and that of the Rabbis and enforce the Christian virtues of meekness and humility.

The parables in Matt. xiii. will bring out the contrast between the method of teaching in the East and in the West, and the love of nature displayed by Christ, and the lessons He drew from natural objects, besides furnishing an opportunity of unfolding what He meant by the kingdom of heaven.

The next subject might be the teaching of Jesus on ceremonialism—contained in Mark vii. This would be accompanied by some account of the Talmud and the Traditions, and of the connection between religion and morality, severed by Jesus' contemporaries, united by Him, but frequently dissevered again by His followers. The teacher would here too have an opportunity of vividly depicting the condition of Palestine, in which religion was acting as a dissociating rather than a harmonising element, and of showing how Jesus sought to introduce love and harmony into a land filled with hate and discord.

Next, the Confession of S. Peter in Matt. xvi. would lead to a graphic picture of the fugitive and desolate condition of Jesus, and the devotion of His disciples to Him in spite of His apparent abandonment of His Messianic career, the change in His style of preaching, and the foresight of His coming doom.

From the parable of the Unforgiving Debtor the pupil would learn more of the true spirit of forgiveness; from

that of the Good Samaritan, the lesson of religious toleration and, what is of immense importance, that the spirit of persecution was the outcome of ecclesiasticism and is in direct opposition to the teaching of the Founder of Christianity.

The story of Martha and Mary would lead to a contrast between the advantages afforded to a religious life by action and by contemplation respectively; the parable of the Rich Fool to a definition of the different kinds of riches and a glance at ideals of life; that of the Pharisee and Publican, to an account of the Pharisees (given with a strict view to fairness) and of the Pharisaic spirit in all phases and among all societies; that of the Prodigal Son, to an account of the publicans and of the Jewish feeling towards Gentiles; that of Dives and Lazarus, to an investigation into the feeling displayed towards the poor in the Gospels and the reasons for it, and to a definition of the duties of the rich towards the poor, and the different methods in which these duties should be discharged in modern as compared with ancient times. The story of the Rich Young Man might fairly lead to an account of monasticism and its advantages and disadvantages in the history of civilisation. It might do this because the words of Jesus to the young ruler inspired the founder of the system, and the teacher, knowing this, will at once face the difficulty to which the words give rise. The parable of the Labourer in the Vineyard will lead to a discussion of the place held by Rewards and Punishments in the teaching of Christ. Here, again, the Teacher, knowing that this teaching has been unfavourably contrasted with the teaching of other systems, will face the difficulty and endeavour to meet it: the more so as he will be desirous that Emile's religion should have love, and not selfishness, for its motive. The entrance of Jesus into Jerusalem will lead to a description

of that city and of the Temple. The later parables will introduce an epitome of the history of the Messianic Expectation among the Jews, some account of the morality of the Early Christians, the reasons why the passive rather than the active virtues are dwelt upon in Christian morality, a comparison of the advantages of the two sets of virtues, with the part they have respectively played in the world's history. The parable of the Ten Virgins in Matt. xxv. will naturally lead to a discussion of the views entertained about the Second Coming of Christ and a history of them, and this Second Coming will then be put in its true light; the ensuing parable on the Talents will give the teacher an opportunity of enlarging on the religious and social work that the nineteenth century claims from Christians. As the teacher will constantly be striving after truth and reality, he will not fail to compare the influence Christians may exercise now in such work as an important community under a constitutional government with their powerlessness as an insignificant body under the despotism of Rome. Most carefully, too, will he balance the merits of the active and passive virtues. "The turning of the left cheek" will be a phrase constantly on his lips till none of his pupils can ever forget the meaning of its spirit. But knowing that the manly or heroic virtues are the most attractive to boys, he will be at pains to point out the true courage of Christ and of Paul not didactically so much as indirectly, being well aware that the latter method is the most telling. Nor will he while glorifying the virtues most peculiarly Christian, seek to disparage those that are most peculiarly Pagan. Believing that they both have the same heavenly origin he will seek indirectly to blend both in the character of his pupils. In one pupil he will have to check an excess of the Pagan

virtues, in another perhaps, an excess of the Christian. S. Paul's great hymn on Love will give him an opportunity of delineating the ideal Christian character.

I have insisted on the Bible as the legitimate basis of religious teaching, and the words of Christ Himself as the pearl and crown of the Bible from an ethical point of view. If He was Divine then His Divinity will be best displayed by the utterances of His Divine Heart, and among those who dispute His Divinity they are in the minority who gainsay the beauty and force of His teaching. The crimes and vices that are the reproach of Christianity arose from a neglect of that teaching. It is one of the most remarkable features in the history of Christianity that there should be so little reference to the ethical teaching of the Founder. Men were diverted from this teaching at first by the expectation of His return to reward His friends and punish His foes, then by disputes about His Person and struggles for ecclesiastical predominance. If we take up a history of Christianity with the object of correctly analysing the influence Christianity has had on the morals of the world we shall be met with an immense difficulty in arriving at facts. In ecclesiastical as in secular history the lives of the poor and struggling, on which we should expect Christianity to have most influence, are lost sight of amid the quarrels of emperors and popes and nice disputes on the Personality of the Founder. It was a noble saying of the far-sighted Erasmus, "Never was the Christian faith purer and more undefiled than when the world was content with one creed and that the shortest creed we have."

This unhappy neglect of the ethical teaching of Christ was due among other causes to the fact that the early Christians were engaged in defending themselves against the assaults physical and intellectual of the Pagans, and that subsequently Christianity was adopted by rude and unlettered barbarians whose religion was based not on the

recorded words of the Founder, but on the pageants they witnessed in the churches and the brief formulæ of the creeds. Christianity was hardly less leavened by barbarism than barbarism was leavened by Christianity, and Christianity has been reproached for results which were due to the Zeit Geist.

If there be any truth in these positions the influence of Christian morality in the past is no gauge of its influence on the future if those who believe in the efficacy of the example and teaching of its Founder resolve with prudence and honesty to promote the knowledge of them.

If the character of Christ be the highest and most winning the world has seen, if it is best for the welfare of the human race that conduct should be regulated in accordance with His words, then the presentation of this character and these words to the ardent and susceptible minds of children must be regarded as one of the most salutary measures for the future of mankind.

It is impossible in the limits of a paper to define all the good results that might be expected from such a presentation in the class rooms of our schools. The chief characteristic of boyhood, perhaps, is selfishness tempered by generous impulses. The life of Christ, by appealing to the latter, will subdue the former. Withdraw that life from the pages of history and from the orbit of the boy's imagination, and where else will he so well learn to subdue his selfish instincts? Again, men seek in these days rest from the distractions of life in the calm teachings of Nature, and Wordsworth is regarded as the priest of those mysteries. But Christ was the first who taught men to love Nature for her own sake and for her quiet teachings apart from her material uses. Christianity has been reproached, and not without cause, for the blood shed in her name by antagonistic sects. But the child whose mind has been imbued with the teaching of the parable of the good

Samaritan will find it naturally part of his religion to be tolerant and kindly to those who differ from him ; and this spirit of tolerance will influence not only his conduct but his estimates of historical actions and literary characters. We wish our religious teaching to influence our future writers and statesmen as well as our ordinary citizens.

I will conclude by an adaptation of the noble words of the religious teacher in whose pages are combined the most profound devotion with the most cultivated reason.*

The object of the Christian teacher will be to train a character that shall exhibit in just proportions a combination of the active and passive virtues—the life of devotion and the life of activity ; that shall be able to stem moral wrong-doing without betraying pride in its own rectitude or a personal feeling against the wrong-doer ; that shall seek truth by every method of investigation, and yet be unassuming and simple before the ignorant and unlearned ; that shall be resolute in will, and yet tender-hearted in its affections ; that shall love all beautiful things that are in the world, and yet be capable of showing sympathy with the unlovely and the deformed, and working if necessary amid squalor and misery ; that shall combine heroism with refinement, and saintliness with manliness ; that shall be the light of the society in which it lives, and yet be so little conscious that it is so as to create no jealousy in the minds of other men.

And as regards the influence of his teaching on the intellects of his pupils, he will seek to prepare them for the doubts and difficulties he knows they will have to encounter, not by openly introducing these to them, but first by insisting strenuously on matters comparatively undisputed in the main outlines of the life and teaching of Christ, and secondly by giving indirectly such hints of solutions or of abandonments of attempts at solutions as have been helps

* James Martineau.

to himself; so that if in after life it should come about that any pupil is led by his studies to abandon some doctrine of traditional belief, he may feel that this is no adequate reason for detaching himself from his love and loyalty to Christ, the beauty of whose character has been indelibly imprinted on his boyish mind; nor will he, perhaps, be less steadfast if he is conscious that the knowledge of similar difficulties did not withdraw his master from his allegiance.

J. HUNTER SMITH.

THE LEADING IDEA OF THE DIVINE COMEDY.*

DANTE—a name derived from *Durante*, “the enduring one,” ALIGHIERI, “the wing-bearer,” and certainly no words could be more expressive of the man, seeing that his great poem has endured through nearly six centuries, increasing in favour as men became more and more capable of appreciating a work of the highest intellect, and seeing, also, that no poet ever attained to so lofty a flight as our Alighieri, the wing-bearer.

Dante did not bestow upon his poem the epithet *Divine*; he modestly named it “THE COMEDY,” to distinguish it from what he deemed the grander poems of Homer and Virgil, each of which he distinguished as “THE TRAGEDY”; and he points out that while these two poems are written in the heroic style befitting the term, his poem was pitched in a lower key, in what he named “the middle style,” as befitting comedy. It was the loving admiration of his countrymen that suggested the term *Divine*, and it first

* *La Divina Commedia di Dante Alighieri*. Text by Carlo Witte. Berlin, 1862.

La Divina Commedia di Dante Alighieri. Riveduta nel Testo e Commentata da G. A. Scartassini. Leipzig, 1874-5-. In progress.

Critical, Historical, and Philosophical Contributions to the Study of the *Divina Commedia*. By Henry Clark Barlow, M.D. London and Edinburgh, 1864.

A Vision of Hell: the Inferno of Dante. Translated into English Tierce Rhyme, with an Introductory Essay on Dante and his Translators. By Charles Tomlinson, F.R.S. London, 1877.

The Barlow Lectureship on Dante. Introductory Lecture to the First Course of English Lectures on the Divine Comedy. By Charles Tomlinson, F.R.S. London, 1878.

occurs in the Venice edition of 1516. A previous edition bears this title: *Comincia la prima parte chiamata Inferno della Commedia del Venerabile Poeta Dante Alighieri, nobile cittadino Fiorentino.*

About fifty years after Dante's death, which occurred in 1321, it became the practice in Italy to establish lectureships on the Divine Comedy, not only because the poem existed only in manuscript (printing in movable types not having been invented), and the number of copies was comparatively small, but also because Dante's style is very concise, and his statement of facts often equally so. These facts, in some cases of a domestic character, might be known to the poet's contemporaries in their full detail, so that little more than a hint in the poem could be enlarged and commented on by a contemporary reader. But the next and succeeding generations would become involved in the hopeless obscurity of many passages, unless Dante's immediate successors should have transmitted the key by which the poet's concise problems could alone be unlocked. One example will suffice to illustrate the necessity for the work of the commentator. In the fifth canto of the *Purgatorio*, where the spirits desire to be remembered to their friends on earth, to which, as they are informed, Dante will return, one of them addresses the poet thus concisely:—

*Recorditi di me, che son la Pia ;
Siena mi fè, disfecemi Maremma ;
Salsi colui che innanellata pria,
Disponando m'avea con la sua gemma.*

“ Do thou remember me who am the Pia ;
Siena made me ; Maremma me unmade ;
He knoweth it, who had encircled first,
Espousing me, my finger with his gem.”

In this short passage there is nothing but allusion which could not well be explained without contemporary aid. It appears that Madonna Pia was a lady of extraordinary

beauty, of a noble family of Siena. She was married to Nello della Pietra, who, being misled by false reports and unjust suspicions, conveyed her to the Maremma, a pestilential district, where in an isolated castle he shut himself up with his victim. He never told her the reason of her banishment, nor condescended to answer her questions, or heed her remonstrances. He waited in cold silence until the pestilential air should destroy her health. Some say he used the dagger to hasten her end. It is certain that he survived her, and became a prey to sadness and silent grief.

Dante had in this story, as Foscolo remarks, all the materials of an ample and very poetical narrative, but he bestows upon it only four lines. Yet how pathetic are these few words! Her first desire is to be recalled to the memory of her friends on earth; her modest request; her manner of naming herself, and of describing the author of her sufferings, without any allusion to his crime, but merely by the pledges of faith and love which attended their first union. All this is expressed with much pathos and power, and all within the narrow compass of four lines.

It is worthy of remark, as characteristic of the age, and of the high veneration in which Italy held her first national poet, that the lectures on the Divine Comedy were invested with a certain religious character by being delivered in churches, and, as a rule, on the days of great Christian festivals, when the crowded congregations, already under the influence of religious emotion, were in a fit state of mind to listen to the solemn strains of the great poet, who, according to the popular belief, had actually been in Hell, in Purgatory, and in Paradise, and only described what he had personally witnessed.

By a decree of the Florentine Republic, of the 9th August, 1373, it was ordered that Dante's poem should be read and explained in public, and Boccaccio was engaged as the first lecturer for a fee of 100 florins. Accordingly,

on the 3rd October, 1373, in the church of S. Stefano, near the Ponte Vecchio, before a numerous congregation, Boccaccio ascended the pulpit, and imparted a solemn tone to his subject by his introductory remarks :—

“ Human nature,” he said, “ although enriched by the Creator with so many privileges, is nevertheless so weak, that it can do nothing, however insignificant, without the Divine grace. Hence the greatest men, whether of ancient or modern times, urge us to seek for this grace in all simplicity, and with all the fervour of our devotion, at least at the beginning of any undertaking. At the very moment, then, of taking upon me a burden which is too heavy for me to bear, namely that of explaining the learned text, the multitude of historical events, and the elevated thoughts concealed under the veil of the *Comedy* of our Dante, and especially before persons of so high an intelligence and of such admirable perspicuity as you are, certainly I feel more than ever the need of such aid. Hence, in order that my words may redound to the honour and glory of God, to the benefit and consolation of my hearers, before proceeding further, I must invoke in all humility, the aid of God, confiding much more in his bounty than in my merit.”

Boccaccio did not live to complete his arduous task. His written lectures end abruptly with an unfinished sentence, referring to the seventeenth canto of the *Inferno*, line 17. His friend Benvenuto da Imola succeeded him in these public readings ; and it is said that at Bologna the audience was so numerous, that the Professor had frequently to deliver his lectures in the public square of the city. The substance of these lectures was, at the request of Petrarch, formed into a commentary, which, to a certain extent, supplies what is wanting in Boccaccio.

The Laurentian Library at Florence contains a codex known as the *Ottimo*. It consists of a large folio volume, of 175 leaves of parchment, with the text in the middle of the page, surrounded by the commentary in smaller characters. The author of this commentary is not known. Some refer it to Jacopo della Lana, others to Dante's son Jacopo.

Whoever it was, he had personal relations with the poet, for he remarks on *Inferno* x. 85—"I, the writer, have heard Dante declare that he was never led by rhyme to say other than what he intended; but that he often caused his words to signify different senses to those in which they were used by other poets." It may also be noted that Dante often varies the spelling of a word for the sake of a rhyme.

At the time when Benvenuto was lecturing at Bologna, an unknown author was writing a commentary which is known as that of the *Falso Boccaccio*. It is the first of the four commentaries printed by Lord Vernon. It was for some time regarded as the work of Boccaccio, but it is marked neither by his pleasant style nor by his learning.

The most voluminous commentary resulted from the lectures of Francesco di Bartolo da Buti, delivered in the University of Pisa. It was completed in 1385, and is a mine of literary wealth, which for faithful and conscientious exposition of the text has not been surpassed. Landino, in his edition of 1481, made considerable use of this commentary; and Landino's work, according to Professor Witte, is the first real critical production for fixing the reading of the text and for determining the meaning of the poet.

It is only in recent times that lectureships on and societies for the study of the Divine Comedy have been established out of Italy. The late King of Saxony published a translation in German of the poem, under the *nom de plume* of "Philalthes," and he also established a Dante Society of which he was the first President, the present one being Professor Witte of Halle. This society has published several volumes of Transactions, and the present President has devoted many years to a careful preparation of the text of the poem; the result of the collation of the various manuscripts or codices, of which nearly 500 are scattered among the libraries of Europe, by far the greater number (390) belonging to Italy. There is no codex in existence of

a date anterior to that of the death of the poet. The earliest is dated 1336, or only fifteen years after that event ; but unfortunately this MSS. has in many places been altered from the original. The greater number of codices date from the middle of the fourteenth century to the middle of the fifteenth, when Gutenberg's great invention came into use, and printed books took the place of written ones.

The late Dr. Barlow, who devoted the greater part of his life to the study of Dante, bequeathed his large Dante library, coins, medals, parchments, MSS., &c., to University College, Gower Street, London, and invested a sum of money in the Funds for the purpose of founding a lectureship on the Divine Comedy, twelve lectures to be delivered every year free to the public, without charge and without tickets, each lecturer to fill the chair during three years in order to allow him to get through the three great divisions of the poem.

Having published in 1877 a translation of the *Inferno* in the metre of the original, the Council of University College applied to me to undertake the first English course. Accordingly the first or introductory lecture was delivered in April, 1878, the subject being the literary history of the Divine Comedy. The second lecture consisted of a sketch of the history of the Italian Republics ; and the third comprised a study of the character of Beatrice, the central figure of the Divine Comedy. The remaining nine lectures were devoted to a study of the *Inferno*. A similar course on the *Purgatorio* was delivered in the spring of 1879, and the third course on the *Paradiso* in 1880.

I propose in the following pages to attempt to convey to the general reader some idea of the scope and objects of the Divine Comedy.

In 1317 Dante dedicated the portion of his *Paradiso* which he had completed to Can Grande della Scala of Verona, imperial Vicar in Lombardy since 1312. He

informs his noble patron that in the beginning of every doctrinal work six things have to be investigated: the *subject*, the *agent*, the *form*, the *end* or *object*, the *title of the book*, and its *kind of philosophy*. In three of these things—the *subject*, the *form*, and the *title*—this cantica of the *Paradiso* differs from the rest of the poem; in the others it does not. He then proceeds to state that this work has many senses; the *literal* and the *allegorical*, which latter is *moral* or *anagogical*. These he illustrates, as also the preliminary matters to be considered. The *subject* of the whole work is “The state of souls after death, considered simply as such”; but, allegorically, the subject “is man, who, in the exercise of his free will, according to his merits or demerits, is subject to the justice of reward or punishment.” The *end* of all or each part is both immediate and remote; but, omitting all subtle researches, it is “to remove those now living from a state of misery, and to lead them to a state of happiness.” This short definition, however, gives no idea of the encyclopedic character of the poem, nor of the treasures of learning which it contains. It is a *résumé* of mediæval lore, the final expression of the ethics, the metaphysics, and the theology of the schools. It also exhibits the physical science of the period. It contains examples of fervid eloquence. It is a middle-age manual of the symbolical mythology of the classic poets. It presents the political movements of the time in Italy, and in an essentially dramatic form brings us into personal intercourse with the leading men of the period. The poet marked out for his countrymen a policy for the future—namely, the unification of Italy under one head; the deprivation of the temporal power of the Papacy, and the limitation of the papal power to spiritual things.

As a lover of Nature, Dante regarded her beauties with the eye of an artist and described them with the pen of a poet; never obtruding them, but presenting a finished

picture in a few pregnant lines. Himself skilled in design, he has given descriptions of imaginary works of art which seem to reflect the marbles of Phidias. As a teacher of morality by examples, and of kindness by winning illustrations, no writer surpasses Dante. Envy was the root of all bitterness among his countrymen and the moral source of their national calamities; this vice the poet endeavours to root out. Nay, more—he sought to make this great poem, as Dr. Barlow expresses it, “a hand-book to Heaven, a treasure of religious sentiments, and of aids to the perfection of spiritual life.” Hence we cannot wonder “that Christian advocates should quote its authority in their pulpits as inferior only to that of the Scriptures.”

There is one thing, however, that Dante is not. He is not sentimental. Throughout this great poem I have been able to find but one sentimental passage, and that fits in admirably with the context. The passage referred to includes the two tercets which introduce the eighth canto of the *Purgatorio* :—

’Twas now the hour that wakes to longing who
 Sail o’er the sea, and moves the heart tenderly
 The day they said to their sweet friends, Adieu !
 And the new Pilgrim pricks to love if he
 Should hear from far away a little bell *
 That seems a-weeping o’er the dying day.

According to the astrological science of Dante’s time, the earth was regarded as the fixed centre of creation, and the sun a planet revolving around her, together with the other planets, not in obedience to the mechanical laws as we now understand them, but under the immediate guidance of Angels, Archangels, Thrones, Principalities, and Powers. When Satan was hurled from heaven, that part of the earth on which he fell, shrinking from the polluting contact, formed a vast conical cavity, or hell, the destined abode of

* The *Ave Maria*;

the unrepenting soul, and the portion of earth thus displaced formed an enormous mountain in the Southern hemisphere, the Mount of Purgatory, where the repentant soul should become purged from its sin. During this great convulsion the terrestrial Paradise was removed to the summit of the Purgatorial Mount, so that the purified soul had to pass through the abode of our first parents on his way to Heaven.

According to this scheme, the earth and its inhabitants are the central objects of God's care, and there is a constant interchange of relationship between the earth and the heavens. The earth is surrounded by the spheres of air and of fire, the latter producing lightning, the aurora, fiery meteors, &c. Beyond the sphere of fire is the heaven of the moon, the abode of those who on earth had failed in the religious vow of continence. Mercury contains the souls of patriot kings and active spirits; Venus is the fit abode of lovers; the Sun of schoolmen; Mars of Christian warriors; Jupiter of righteous rulers; and Saturn of contemplative saints. The heaven of the fixed stars contains the Host of the triumph of Christ; the *Primum Mobile* is the sphere of the Divine Glory, and the *Empyrean* the sphere of God's visible presence.

Dante writes throughout in the first person, and begins by stating that, having attained the middle age of thirty-five, he found himself in a dark, entangled forest, symbolical of life full of sin and error, in which the beaten path was lost.

Ah, me! how hard it were to make it clear,
What was this strong, rough forest, tangled o'er,
Which only in the thought renews the fear,
So bitter 'tis, e'en Death is little more.

So bitter is it to recall the sins of one's youth. But, while struggling on, he saw in the distance the delectable mountain, the top of which was illuminated by Christ, the

Sun of Righteousness ; and, pressing eagerly forward to climb it, he was arrested by a panther, symbolical of sensual pleasure, which drove him out of his path. Proceeding in another direction he was arrested by a furious lion, symbolical of pride or ambition, and also by a hungry she-wolf, the symbol of avarice. These three beasts wrought such terror in him that he fled, and was thus still further removed from the delectable mountain. While swiftly running, he became aware of the presence of one

Who hoarse appeared through silence long sustained ;
thus referring in the usual figurative language to the general neglect of the study of Virgil, for it was the shade of the Bard of Mantua that now stood before him.

O light and pride of all the Bards that sing !
May the great love, long study profit me,
Which to explore thy Volume me did bring.
In thee my Master, Author, too, I see,
For thou art he alone, from whom I won
The beauteous style that made me honoured be.

Then, imploring protection against the beasts, especially the she-wolf, which is further symbolical of the Court of Rome, and the temporal power, Virgil explains to him that it is necessary for his welfare that he traverse Hell in order to see how sinful sin is, and how awful its punishments ; after which he must see Purgatory, in order to know something of repentance, before he can witness the joys of Heaven. Virgil will be his guide through Hell and Purgatory, but for the higher vision

A soul shall come, worthier for that than I ;
I'll place thee 'neath her guidance, quitting mine.

This is the first allusion to Beatrice, and, although she does not actually appear until towards the end of the second cantica, yet we never lose sight of her, and it is upon the proper understanding of her character and function that the real meaning of the poem becomes apparent.

In the second canto Dante expresses doubt as to whether his manhood is equal to the tremendous undertaking that has been proposed to him; he urges that he is not Æneas, nor Paul, and no one would deem him worthy to emulate them. Virgil replies that if he has understood him rightly, his soul is infected with cowardice, which has kept many a man back from an honoured deed. He then proceeds to explain how he came to that desert place to meet Dante. "I was 'mong those who in suspension be" (that is, in Limbo, so suspended as to be neither blessed in glory, nor tormented with punishment; neither saved nor lost)—

A saintly Lady called me, one so fair,
 I begged her to command my service free.
 Her eyes shone brighter than the star;* and clear
 And soft her angel voice, when she began
 In her own tongue thus to address mine ear:
 "O courteous spirit of the Mantuan!
 Whose fame yet in the world hath known no end,
 Fame that will last as long as motion can;
 A friend of mine, of Fortune not a friend,
 Now on the desert slope upon his way
 Is hindered, and through dread would backward wend:
 He may, I fear, be so much gone astray,
 That I have risen to his aid too late,
 From that which I of him in Heaven heard say.
 Now hasten thou, and with thy speech ornate,
 And with what else it needs for his release,
 Assist him, so that I be consoled;
 I who now bid thee go am Beatrice."

Virgil eagerly accepts the commission, but expresses his surprise that Beatrice should venture into Hell to seek him out. She replies:—

" 'Since thou desir'st my inward thoughts to trace,
 I'll tell thee briefly,' she replied to me,
 'Why I fear not to come within this place.
 Of those things only should we fearful be
 Which powerful are in doing others ill,
 Not of the rest; in them no fear we see.

* The planet Venus.

I was created, by God's merciful will,
 Such that your misery doth not me attain,
 Nor flame of this same burning me assail.
 A gentle Lady * doth in Heaven complain
 Of this impediment to which thou'rt sent :
 So there stern judgment broken doth remain.
 With her request to Lucia † she went
 And said : " Thy faithful one needs aid from thee,
 I recommend him unto thy intent."
 Lucia, the foe of every cruelty,
 Bestirred herself, and came to the place where I
 With ancient Rachel ‡ sat in company,
 And said, " True praise of God, O Beatrice ! why
 Dost thou not succour him who loved thee so,
 That he for thee the vulgar herd did fly ?
 Dost thou not hear his piteous cries of woe ?
 Nor see death combat him that floods § beside
 O'er which the ocean can no boasting know."
 Never did persons in the world abide
 More swift to fly their ill, their gain to meet,
 Than I after such speech as this. I hied
 Me straightway downward from my blessed seat,
 Confiding in thy speech ingenuous
 Which honours thee, and those who've heard thee yet.
 When she had finished speaking to me thus,
 Her beaming eyes in tears she turned away,
 Whereby she made me swifter on my course.
 And so I came to thee, as she did pray ;
 From that wild beast have I delivered thee,
 Which to yon mountain bright barred the short way."

It will be observed that Beatrice is styled by Lucia
 " True praise of God ! " and earlier in the canto, Virgil
 addresses her

" O virtuous Lady ! thou through whom alone
 The human race excelleth all who dwell
 Within that Heaven by lesser circles known."

* Divine Mercy—"Gentle" is in the sense of generous, or of gentle birth.

† Emblem of enlightening grace.

‡ Emblem of the contemplative life.

§ Man given up to turbulent passions leading to spiritual death.

i.e., the Heaven of the moon, which contains or encircles the earth.

But in order to see how the idea of Beatrice, *i.e.*, "the blessing one," or "one who blesses," became developed in Dante's mind, and formed the central figure of the Divine Comedy, it is necessary to enter into some detail

Dante was born at Florence on the 8th of May, 1265. He was of noble family, being a great-grandson of Cacciaguida Elisei, who married a lady of the family of Alighieri, of Florence, and her children assumed her arms and her name. Cacciaguida accompanied the Emperor Conrad II. in his crusade, and was knighted and died in battle in Syria, in 1147. We meet with him in the *Paradiso*, where he gives an account of himself and of the state of Florence and its primitive manners before the breaking out of the feud between the Guelfs and the Ghibelins.

Dante's father died while the poet was still a child. His mother Donna Bella gave him a good education, and selected for his master Brunetto Latini, a famous philosopher and poet. Dante bears eloquent testimony to the value of his tutor's services in the fifteenth canto of the *Inferno*. Under his guidance he became master of several languages and learned to find his chief delight in Virgil, *il suo maestro e il suo Autore*, and he confesses that he acquired the beauties of his style, *con lungo studio e grande amore*. He mastered the Aristotelian philosophy, as it was then taught in the schools, and acquired a name among *color che sanno* ("those who know something"). He studied the scholastic theology then in vogue, by which he escaped from the vulgar crowd—he loved thee (Beatrice) so

*Che t' amò tanto,
Che uscio per te della volgare schiera.*

He was skilled in jurisprudence; was master of astronomy and geography; had a knowledge of medicine and geometry;

of mythology and history ; of all of which he gives abundant proofs in his great poem. He was also practically acquainted with the fine arts. Casella was his music master, Giotto his drawing master. The former set to music some of his canzoni and the latter gave us his portrait ; but his most intimate friend was Guido Cavalcanti, a good poet, and a better philosopher.

When Dante was a boy of nine years of age, his father, who was then living, took him on a May-day to a festival at the house of a rich neighbour, Portinari by name, who had a young daughter called *Beatrice*, or, in the Florentine abbreviation, *Bice*. She was eight years and four months old. But now we must let Dante speak in the language of that remarkable book which he wrote in his twenty-fifth, or, as some say, in his twenty-ninth year, namely, *La Vita Nuova*, which has often been translated as the "Early Life" of the poet, but, for reasons which will afterwards be given, I prefer to render it literally "the new life."

Dante says :—

"In that part of the tablet of my memory (previous to which there is little legible) is a Rubric which says, *Incipit vita nova* 'My new life begins.' Under which Rubric I find written the following words, which it is my intention to collect in this little book.

"Nine times from the hour of my birth had the heaven of light returned, as it were, to the same point in its orbit, when the glorious lady of my thoughts appeared for the first time before my eyes. By many she was called *Beatrice*, who knew her by no other name."

After noting that she was about the beginning of her ninth year while he was at the end of his, he continues :—

"She appeared to me in a dress of a noble colour, a subdued and becoming blood red, with a sash and ornaments suited to her very youthful years. At that moment (I speak the truth) the spirit of life which dwells in the most secret chamber of the heart began to tremble so violently as to be fearfully visible in

the smallest pulses of my body, and with faltering voice said these words, *Ecce Deus fortior me, qui veniens dominabitur mihi.* 'Behold a God stronger than I, who, coming, will subdue me.' Then the animal spirit that dwells in the lofty chamber, whither the spirits of the senses carry their perceptions, began to marvel greatly, and, addressing itself especially to the spirits of vision, said, *Apparuit jam beatitudo vestra.* 'Now has thy blessedness appeared!' At that moment the spirit of Nature, which dwells in that part to which we administer food, began to weep, and, amidst tears, said, 'Ah! wretched me! from henceforth I shall often be impeded!' From that time forth, I say that Love held absolute empire over my soul (which had been so quickly betrothed to him), and began to exercise over me, in consequence of the strength which my imagination gave him, such vast and uncontrolled power, that I was compelled wholly to comply with his wishes. He oftentimes commanded me to strive to get a sight of this youthful angel; consequently I frequently sought her during my boyhood, and found in her so noble, so praiseworthy a bearing, that the line of Homer might with truth be applied to her; 'she seems not to be a daughter of mortal man, but of the Gods!' and although her image, which was always present to me, might be the effect of love's bold seigniorship over me, yet it possessed a power so noble that on no occasion (in those matters which required the faithful counsel of reason) would it suffer love to move me, without listening to its dictates."

"When exactly so many days had elapsed after the above described apparition of this most noble lady as were necessary to complete nine whole years, it chanced that on the last of those days this most admirable person appeared to me in a dress of the purest white, between two noble ladies older than herself; and passing along the street she turned her eyes towards the spot, where, trembling with fear, I stood; and with an ineffable courtesy (which now has its reward in eternity) saluted me in so striking a manner that I seemed to reach the very extreme of happiness. The hour at which I received this most bewitching salutation was precisely the none (*) of that day, and as this was the first time that her words had reached my ears, the pleasure which I had received was such that I quitted the company in a state of intoxication."

* The fifth of the seven canonical hours, or 11.30 a.m.

He then relates a remarkable dream in which Love appears holding the dreamer's inflamed heart in his hand, which he gives to the Lady of his happiness. Having discovered within himself the power of composing in rhyme, he made his dream the subject of a questioning sonnet, which he sent to many who were celebrated as poets in those days. A number of sonnets were returned by way of answer—one from Guido Cavalcanti, another from Cino da Pistoja, but Dante significantly remarks, "The real meaning of my dream, which is now manifest to the most simple understanding, was not then seen by any one."

He goes on to state that his whole soul being absorbed in the contemplation of that lovely person, his health became frail and tottering, as was noticed by many persons who inquired after the cause. But what most deeply afflicted the poet was that for some imagined affront,

"My most noble Lady, the enemy of all vice, and the Queen of all virtue, denied me her most graceful salutation as she passed me, in which alone all my happiness consisted. Now I would endeavour to make intelligible the power with which her salutation operated upon me. I say, then, that wherever she appeared, the hope of receiving her adorable salutation effaced all enmity within me; nay, a flame of charity pervaded me which caused me to pardon every one who had given me offence. . . . Hence it is manifest that all my happiness dwelt in her salutation, which very often surpassed and overwhelmed my power of utterance."

The effect of this salutation is further described in some of the sweetest sonnets that were ever composed. I will attempt to convey some idea of one of them in the following translation:—

SONNET: *Negli occhi porta la mia Donna, Amore.*

My Lady carries Love within her eyes,
 And thus makes gentle whom she gazes on;
 Where'er she goes, all men towards her turn;
 Whom she salutes, trembles his heart somewise,

And conscious of his own defects, he sighs,
 With downcast look and countenance all wan :
 Before her, anger, pride, are quickly gone :
 O aid me, Ladies ! to set forth her praise.

Who hears her speak, feels something come to bless,
 For, in his heart, sweet, lowly thoughts are bred :
 He's blest who first beholds her for awhile :
 But how she looks if she but gently smile,
 Cannot be kept in mind, still less be said,
 New miracle is she of gentleness.

There are many more details which the space at my command does not allow me to quote, among which must be mentioned the death of Beatrice's father, and then of Beatrice herself. The book winds up with a sonnet and these remarkable words :—

“ Soon after writing this sonnet, a wonderful vision appeared to me, in which I saw things that made me determine to write no more of this beautiful Lady until I could treat of her in a manner more suited to her dignity. In order to arrive at which I study with all my might, as she well knows. So that if it be the will of Him in whom all things have their being, that my life should continue for a few years longer, I hope to speak of her as no woman was ever spoken of before. And may it please Him who is the God of Mercy, that my soul may ascend to behold the glory of its Lady, the blessed Beatrice, who, in a beatified state, seeth Him face to face *qui est per omnia sæcula benedictus* ; who is blessed for evermore.”

Now there are many things to be observed respecting the *Vita Nuova*. If it be a true narrative, as many suppose, why did not Dante strive to make Falco Portinari's pretty daughter his own wife, instead of allowing her to become the wife of another? In the *Vita Nuova* there is not the slightest allusion to courting or the ordinary conversation of lovers ; but when questioned by some ladies as to his intentions respecting Beatrice, he declares that his only object is to be recognised and publicly saluted by her. Certainly, no young lady would be satisfied with such a lover, and that Beatrice was not may be inferred from her conduct in

marrying another, while at the same time Dante was probably engaged to another. Beatrice is said to have died on the 9th June, 1290, a few years after her marriage; and in the year following Dante married a lady of the Donati family, Gemma di Manetto, the mother of his six children. We know that Dante held a high position in Florence, that he was employed on important embassies, was listened to in Council with admiration, and consulted with deference on all State affairs. Will it be believed that at such a period he could have written a love-sick book, if we take it literally, full of the most exaggerated and even grotesque praises of a pretty girl? I say again, if taken literally.

But, suppose we regard the *Vita Nuova* as an Allegory, as an intellectual treatise on Love—not the love of Woman, but of Wisdom, of Divine Wisdom as depicted in some of the finest poetry that was ever written:—

Where shall Wisdom be found? And where is the place of understanding?

Man knoweth not the price thereof; neither is it found in the land of the living.

The depth saith, It is not in me; and the sea saith, It is not with me.

It cannot be gotten for gold, neither shall silver be weighed for the price thereof.

It cannot be valued with the gold of Ophir, with the precious onyx, or the sapphire.

The gold and the crystal cannot equal it; and the exchange of it shall not be for jewels of fine gold.

No mention shall be made of coral or of pearls; for the price of Wisdom is above rubies.—JOB xxviii. 12—18.

I love them that love me, and those that seek me early shall find me.—PROVERBS viii. 17.

The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his day, before his works of old.—*Ibid.* 22.

Then I was by him as one brought up with him, and I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him.—*Ibid.* 30.

I loved Wisdom, and sought her out from my youth; I desired to make her my spouse, and I was a lover of her beauty.—WISDOM viii. 2.

If we adopt the allegorical theory, the *Vita Nuova*, instead of being a love-sick story, becomes one of the most beautiful allegories that was ever written, and the key to the grandest poem that has appeared in any modern language.

Let me now cite another passage from the *Vita Nuova*, and it will, I think, no longer be felt to be inflated :—

“That most lovely Lady rose so high in the estimation of others, that as she walked along the streets, people ran to get a sight of her; which circumstance occasioned me wonderful delight; and such modesty came over the heart of him who chanced to be near her, that he did neither dare to raise his eyes nor to return her salutation. If any be incredulous, there are many who by their own experience are able to testify to the truth of this matter. She moved along, crowned and adorned with humility, exhibiting no pride on account of those things which she both saw and heard. Many, indeed, when she had passed would say, ‘This is not a woman, but one of the beautiful angels of heaven.’ Others said, ‘She is a miracle! blessed be the Lord who is able to perform so admirable a work.’ I say, then, she was of so noble a presence, so abounding in every charm, that those who looked upon her felt within them so chaste, so gentle a sense of pleasure, that they were incapable of describing it. Nor was there any one that had the opportunity of seeing her who did not instantly feel compelled to sigh. These and other extraordinary effects were produced by her, actually and miraculously; wherefore, reflecting on all this, and desiring to resume my former style of writing in her praise, I purposed saying some words, whereby I might be able to make known her excellent and admirable powers; so that not only those who had occasion actually to see her, but that others also might know as much of her as can be conveyed by words. Then I made this sonnet :—

Tanto gentile e tanto onesta pare.

When she, my Lady, greets folks with “Good-day,”
Such candour and such gentleness combine,
That tongues grow tremulous and speech resign,
And to look on her no one dare essay.

She feels men's praises as she goes her way
 In meekness clad, an influence benign ;
 You fancy she must be a thing divine,
 Come down from heaven a marvel to display.

Her presence is so pleasant to the eye
 That through the eye the heart with sweetness glows ;
 To understand it you its power must prove ;
 And from those lips an influence seems to move,
 So sweet and full of love, it overflows,
 And goes on saying to our spirits, " Sigh ! "

" I have said that my Lady grew so much in favour that not only was she honoured and praised, but through her many others rose to honour and praise. Seeing this, and wishing to make it manifest to others who had not seen it, I wrote this sonnet, in which is expressed the power her virtue had on others of her own sex :—

Vide perfettamenteemente ogni salute.

He sees each form of goodness perfectly,
 Who among other ladies looks on mine ;
 And her companions should, most duteously,
 For such sweet grace in thanks to God incline.
 Such virtue in her beauty all must see,
 That envy causes no one to repine ;
 But in her lustre clad, she seems to be
 Of love, and faith, and gentleness the shrine.

Her presence makes all else more meanly show,
 Her presence more than pleasure doth confer,
 For each through her in honour may improve.
 From every act of hers such graces flow,
 That no one in his mind can image her,
 But he must sigh in all the sweets of love.

Having once contemplated the beauty of Divine Wisdom, our poet became enamoured of her; but he never ventured to speak to her, being content to contemplate her beauty in secret and from a distance. He had given her all his heart, and all he desired in return was her recognition, her smile. This made him happy, the withholding of it made

him miserable. In this way we may find in every sentence of the *Vita Nuova* a hidden meaning; for having once found the key in the fact that Beatrice, the blessing one, is the figure of Divine Wisdom, we read this apparent piece of autobiography as a fit and proper introduction to the study of the Divine Comedy.

Solomon says that Wisdom "teacheth Temperance and Prudence, Justice and Fortitude." Dante makes these the handmaids of Beatrice who accompany her, as in the following sonnet, while Love that appeared to him in the vision, and is here led by her, is properly the Spirit of holiness, or even the Holy Spirit, or, as he says in another sonnet, "our Lord's name," which is Love:—

Di Donne io vidi una gentile schiera.

It was on All Saints' Day that's just gone by,
I saw some ladies pass—a gentle band,
And she, who chief seemed of that company,
Came forward, leading Love on her right hand.
Her eyes shone forth with so much brilliancy,
As of a spirit from celestial land;
And as I gazed with more persistency,
An Angel seemed before my sight to stand.

On him, who's worthy, meekly she bestowed
Her salutation, with a look benign;
So that his heart with goodness overflowed;
She surely comes from heaven—a thing divine,
And for our good on earth has her abode;
So blest is he who near her may remain.

The marvellous vision that Dante describes, in which Love appeared like one full of joy, with the Poet's heart in his hand, and on his arm Beatrice asleep, wrapped in a mantle; his waking her and making her eat Dante's heart, and then ascending with her on high; all this points to Divine Wisdom steeped in the sleep of mortal life; the mantle round her, her temporary embodiment; Divine Wisdom by eating absorbed his life into her own, so that

henceforth he lived in her, and, as described in the *Paradiso*, he lives on her looks, her words, her smiles.

In the *Vita* we may, if we please, represent to ourselves an intermingling of sacred and profane love; for it is more than probable that Dante, meeting with Portinari's daughter, was arrested by her beauty, and also by her name, Beatrice, the blessing one, and this may have led him to idealise both her person and her name into the Divine Wisdom which he loved and so earnestly sought; but it is impossible to infuse an earthly passion, if it ever existed, into the Divine Comedy, for there the sacred character of Beatrice alone responds to the poet's subject, and will alone stand the test of analysis.

There is an expression at the beginning of the *Vita* which has greatly puzzled those commentators who advocate a literal interpretation. Dante says: "By many she was called *Beatrice*, who knew her by no other name." Surely common sense must suggest that they who knew Portinari's daughter must have known her as Beatrice Portinari; but they who knew of Divine Wisdom knew her as the Blessing One, and knew her by no other name.

The various qualities which the Apocryphal Book applies to Wisdom Dante attributes to Beatrice. Wisdom is a loving spirit, glorious, easily seen of them that love her, and found of such as seek her; that to think of her is perfection of wisdom; that she goeth about seeking such as are worthy of her, showing herself favourably unto them in the ways, and meeteth them in every thought; that the beginning of her is the desire of discipline, and the care of discipline is love, and love is the keeping of her laws. Compare this language with that of the *Vita*, and it will be found to be identical. Dante first announces Beatrice as the glorious Lady of his mind; that she appeared to him as such; that the first time he ever heard her voice was in the street; that she made herself known to him; and the

thought of her constrained him frequently to go and seek her. Her influence on those who saw her was such that she did not seem to be the daughter of man, but of God.

In the comedy the parallelism is even more marked. In the Bible Wisdom "is the breath of the power of God." In the second canto of the *Inferno*, as we have already seen, Beatrice is addressed as the "true praise of God," and Virgil says that through her alone the human race excelleth. In the *Purgatorio* she is addressed as the "light and glory of the human race." Her mouth is described in the *Paradiso* as "the fount whence springs all truth."

Wisdom is "the brightness of the everlasting light." Beatrice is described as "the splendour of everlasting light." Wisdom is "more beautiful than the sun, and above all the order of the stars." The eye of Beatrice shone "brighter than the star." Her eyes are "the living seals of every beauty." Wisdom "maketh all things new." Beatrice was the cause of the new life in Dante; for it was indeed a new life to our poet when he first recognised Divine Wisdom. Hence we may dismiss the elaborate arguments which would prove the *Vita Nuova* to be the early life and not the new, regenerate life.

The Bible says again:—"And in all ages entering into holy souls, she maketh them friends of God and prophets." Dante was a prophet, and wrote as such. "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom." Hence Dante, forsaking Beatrice, fell under the Divine displeasure. "So low he fell," says Beatrice, in the *Purgatorio*:—

" So low he fell, that all appliances
 For his salvation were already short,
 Save showing him the people of perdition.
 For this I visited the gates of death,
 And unto him, who so far up has led him,
 My intercessions were with weeping borne."

In other words, Divine Wisdom, contemplating a soul that had gone astray, recovered him by making him feel the horrors of Hell, the purifying influences of Purgatory, and the complete happiness of Paradise.

Again, Wisdom is not subject to hurt. Beatrice descends into hell to find out Virgil, and declares that

“ Its misery doth not me attain,
Nor flame of this same burning me assail.”

The Bible says :—“ For her sake I shall have estimation among the multitudes and honour with the elders, though I be young.” This is exactly what Dante obtained through Beatrice. “ Moreover, by means of her I shall obtain immortality, and leave behind me an everlasting memorial to them that come after me.” This, also, is what Dante desired to do, and which, through Beatrice, he effected. “ She teacheth Temperance and Prudence, Justice and Fortitude.” These were the handmaids of Beatrice before she descended to earth :—

“ We here are nymphs, and in the heaven are stars ;
Ere Beatrice descended to the world,
We as her handmaids were appointed her.”

Some commentators suppose that Beatrice is a figure intended for Theology. But, as Dr. Barlow remarks, “ between Divine wisdom, or *Sapienza*, and Theology there can be no just comparison. *Sapienza* is the wisdom of God *per se*, or the perfect knowledge of Divine truths as they exist in Deity. Theology is merely the derived conception of these truths as they are received and held by human minds and expressed in human formulæ.” And the old commentator Buti remarks that “ many have been great theologians who have been damned, not beatified.”

Beatrice, then, represents Divine wisdom ; Virgil, Dante’s master and guide, represents human wisdom, unenlightened by the Divine ; and as a knowledge of

Divine truths is vouchsafed only to those who give themselves to the meditation and contemplation of them, so Beatrice's place in Heaven is next to that of Rachel, the symbol among the Hebrews of the contemplative life. But although Beatrice takes the place of *Sapienza*, and is so in a general sense as the cause of human happiness universally, yet with reference to the poet she is so much of Divine wisdom as was vouchsafed to him for his salvation and glory; just as the *Sapienza* of Solomon was so much of the Divine wisdom as he was able to receive and comprehend.

Dante says in the *Paradiso*, canto xviii. :—

While the eternal pleasure, which direct
Rayed upon Beatrice, from her fair face
Contented me with its reflected aspect,
Conquering me with the radiance of a smile,
She said to me, "Turn thee about and listen;
Not in mine eyes alone is Paradise."

Dante's guide to eternal felicity reminds him that Paradise is not to be found even in the eyes of Divine Wisdom, but is only reflected therefrom, and that he must seek the reality—the greater glory to which those eyes are guiding him.

Divine Wisdom is impersonal, but Dante, following the example of Scripture, depicts it in a visible female form, the most lovely his imagination could create, and exalting her beauty and influence above all created things. In his great work the poet desires that all his readers should realise the influence of such a heavenly guide. By means of Beatrice Dante is delivered from the perils of that savage forest,

"Which only in the thought renews the fear,"

symbolical of life full of error; from the three wild beasts, symbolical of lust, pride, and avarice; he is made sensible of the manifold and terrible consequences of sin in the

sufferings of those who people the vast extent of the infernal regions, which are described with such wonderful power. He emerges from these gloomy regions into the sweet air beneath the Southern Cross at the early dawn of Easter Monday; he washes off with the fresh dew of morn the stains contracted in hell; girds himself with a rush in token of humility, and then mounts upward through the various circles of Purgatory, until he arrives at the Terrestrial Paradise, where, taking leave of Virgil, Beatrice receives him and rises with him to the regions of heavenly glory.

In looking back through the long centuries that separate us from Dante, we see him always maintaining his place among the great intellects of the earth; and his position is secure because he addresses the universal conscience of men, because he deals with those universal principles which guide the soul to everlasting peace. Among Dante's great and varied qualifications for his mighty task we must note his thorough command of Scripture, and how much he was interpenetrated by its spirit, and how little of a sectarian he was in the largeness of his conception of the Christian faith. In his time the Church of Rome was the only Church. Dante wished to see it purified, so that it might represent its Divine Head. He spared nor pope, nor cardinal, nor priest; but if notoriously untrue to their sacred trust he banishes them to hell, just as while exercising the functions of chief magistrate of Florence, he impartially banished the heads of both political parties who outraged the public peace. Dante was a truly great man, and after six centuries he still stands the test of greatness, namely, that the more he is studied, the more fascinating he becomes.

C. TOMLINSON.

RICHARD COBDEN.

ENGLISH literature has, during the last few years, been enriched by some excellent biographies; and Mr. John Morley takes a high place among the best of the contributors to our knowledge of our great contemporaries, by his "Life of Richard Cobden."* He was fortunate in his subject; but he brings to his task rare qualifications, and he has used the mass of material which was at his disposal with a discrimination and tact which have been already universally recognised. In telling the story of Cobden's life, his biographer has had to deal with many delicate questions and to touch matters in which living persons are concerned; and yet there is not, I believe, a single line in the two volumes, which can cause pain to any reader, or which the writer will regret having written. The angry feelings of the controversies in which Mr. Cobden was engaged were very rarely able to stir the self-possessed calmness of the great leaguer's mind, and they are not permitted to mar the record of his life.

Mr. Morley has acted wisely and well in not recalling petty grievances, but has contented himself with giving what cannot fail to be a most valuable addition to the sources, on which the future historian will have to draw for materials, while describing a period of history more fruitful in lasting influence upon English society than any other of modern times. For while the Anti-Corn Law

* *The Life of Richard Cobden.* By JOHN MORLEY. 2 vols. London: Chapman and Hall. 1881.

Agitation in its results upon public peace and prosperity has been productive of incalculable benefit to the community, yet its results have not been confined to securing freedom of trade and consequent increase of comfort and prosperity. The circumstance that, with strange blindness to their own real welfare, the representatives of the landed interest resisted the repeal of the taxes on food to the very last, compelled commercial men to enter into political life in a manner previously unknown, and to acquire such skill in the use of the weapons of party warfare that the whole character of our Government has gradually undergone a remarkable change, and commerce is represented in the Cabinet and among the chief officers of Her Majesty's Government in a manner which would have been deemed impossible thirty-five years ago. It is ceasing to be true that the aristocracy and the landed gentry are the governing classes of the nation. The increase of wealth, the higher education and the practical business habits of the mercantile community have secured for them an influence in the country, to which the Conservative and aristocratic prejudices of the nation have given way, and to which it is not difficult to see that greater concessions will still have to be made. In this silent revolution Cobden's career has been of untold power, and his life must therefore be carefully studied by all interested in the progress of English liberty.

Richard Cobden sprang from a good stock, but had few advantages of education as a boy. The Midhurst dame-school, and a Yorkshire school, of the Dotheboys Hall type, where he spent five miserable years, were the only places claiming to give education which he ever attended; it is only just, therefore, to count him among those who must be called self-educated. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that he should have valued utilitarian branches of knowledge more than those classical and

theoretical studies which give a wider foundation, and therefore a surer training, for the work of life. But no reader of Mr. Cobden's political writings and collected speeches can fail to see the traces of extensive and thorough reading in history and literature which prove that he must have made more than ordinarily good use of his opportunities, and must have had a very pure natural taste to make his style so attractive and convincing, and to enable him to draw his arguments not only from contemporary experience, but from the accumulated stores of history.

The space at my disposal does not admit of my entering into any detailed account of Richard Cobden's successful business career. He had to work, not for himself alone, but also for the rest of the family, his father and brother having both of them failed in their undertakings. His first public work was the establishment of schools for the children of that part of north-east Lancashire where his print works were situated. In his letters to his partner, Mr. Foster, who shared his interest in educational work, he reveals his natural skill in organisation, and his perception of the best means of enlisting the services of others in the work he wished to accomplish.

It was after a visit to the United States in 1835, from which he returned with an increased admiration of the American character and with a high estimate of the future of the country and its institutions, that his real life-work may be said to have fairly begun. His first pamphlet, "England, Ireland, and America," which had been published before his journey to the States, may be regarded as his earliest contribution to the Free Trade controversy, as well as his first statement of the principle of Non-intervention. On his return from America he found that the fear of Russia, roused to a large extent by Mr. Urquhart's writings, was endangering the prospects of peace, and in

the summer of 1836 he published his second pamphlet, "Russia." Both these pamphlets were undeniably successful. The opinions to which Cobden devoted himself with so much power in after days are all contained in these his earliest writings, and are supported by the arguments which by varied illustration and repeated enforcement at last won the nation's agreement and adoption.

His health, never robust, seems to have given way under the pressure of work he had to perform on his return from America, and as his business was in good order, he spent the winter of 1836-7 in visiting the East. Of this journey Mr. Morley gives a very interesting description by well-selected extracts from Mr. Cobden's letters and journal. But we must hurry on towards the time when he put the vast mass of information which he gathered on this, as on his other journeys, to practical use in dealing with the social questions which with increasing force pressed for solution.

The general condition of the country had been growing more and more depressed, and the poverty and suffering of the working classes had caused discontent to spread widely among them. Every article they used was taxed, and as this taxation not only rendered everything dear, but also diminished production, it lowered wages, while it made the purchasing power of what was earned less. No one who knows how poverty affects those who suffer without education sufficient to enable them to judge as to the true cause of their suffering, will be surprised at the disturbances which occurred in Lancashire. There were torch-light meetings and midnight gatherings, under the leadership of earnest men, who thought that only by the reforms embodied in the People's Charter could the nation's wrongs be redressed. Cobden, with clearer vision, saw how the material evils weighing on the country could be removed. He did not condemn the people, but saw that they should be better

guided. "I think," he writes to his brother in October, 1838, "the scattered elements may yet be gathered round the question of the Corn Laws. It appears to me that a moral and even a religious spirit may be infused into that topic, and if agitated in the same manner that the question of slavery has been, it will be irresistible" (Vol. I., p. 126).

The Corn Laws had from the beginning been unpopular with the workpeople in Lancashire. At Peterloo the mottoes on the banners demanded their repeal as strongly as they asked for Parliamentary reform. But now the middle classes were beginning to see how important to their welfare would be the adoption of Free Trade. An Anti-Corn Law Association had been founded in London in 1836, by Grote, Molesworth, Joseph Hume, and Roebuck; but they were not the men to organise a popular agitation, nor was London the place from which the work could be carried on which was needful to overcome the prejudices and mistaken theories of the landholders and their tenants. London is a vast aggregation of individuals, it is not a unity which can be stirred; too many objects distract the attention of its inhabitants, and its size makes it impossible to produce results which can be attained in smaller towns. On the 24th of September, 1838, seven men met in the York Hotel, Manchester, and determined to form a new association on a popular basis. Their numbers soon increased. The name of Cobden does not appear on the first list of the provisional committee, though that of John Bright does; it is only published in the second list—exactly a week after he had written the memorable words just quoted from his letter to his brother. Several meetings of the new association were held, and the pressure thus exercised caused the Chamber of Commerce of Manchester to take action. Its leading members were cautious, and desirous of avoiding all extremes. They proposed a petition in favour of modifications of the Corn Laws, but did not mention repeal. A warm debate

ensued, and "Cobden struck into the debate with that finely tempered weapon of argumentative speech which was his most singular endowment. . . . He brought out a lucid proof that the Corn Law was the only obstacle to a vast increase of their trade, and that every shilling of protection on corn which thus obstructed their prosperity, passed into the pockets of the landowners, without conferring an atom of advantage on either the farmer or the labourer" (Vol. I., p. 145). The debate was adjourned, and at the subsequent meeting a petition prepared by Cobden was almost unanimously adopted. The association, cheered by its first triumph, began the agitation in earnest. In January, 1837, "Cobden threw out one of those expressions which catch men's minds in moments when they are ripe for action. 'Let us,' he said, 'invest part of our property in order to save the rest from confiscation.' Within a month six thousand pounds had been raised, the first instalment of many scores of thousands still to come" (Vol. I., p. 146).

It is not possible to tell the tale of the agitation here. It occupies more than 200 pages of Mr. Morley's book, and yet that only records Cobden's share in the great task, with many omissions. But the literary skill displayed in this part of the work is so great that a far clearer idea is given of the labours of those engaged in the agitation than we gain from the more detailed chronicle of the League's work contained in Mr. Prentice's "History of the Anti-Corn League."

As we read we seem to hear again the rising power of popular indignation against the selfish greed which banded the defenders of the Corn Laws together during the seven years' struggle; we see how wisely and judiciously that power was directed. Again, we wonder at the marvellous skill with which the leaders invented new methods of applying the popular enthusiasm which they had roused. Again and

again we admire the varied means by which the stronghold of monopoly was assailed, and witness how, with never-failing novelty of argument and fresh store of evidence, Cobden and his colleagues overwhelmed their antagonists, until the fatal season of 1846, with its famine and consequent pestilence, overcame the last obstacles, and Lord John Russell's letter to the citizens of London, giving up his long-cherished proposal for a fixed duty made Sir Robert Peel's Parliamentary position untenable, and brought the great work to a triumphant issue. The whole force of the land-holding interest, the power of the aristocracy was overthrown, and that chiefly, as the leaders of all sections of politicians united in acknowledging, by the "unadorned eloquence of Richard Cobden."

While reading this portion of Mr. Morley's work, we cannot help wishing that the advocates of what is called Fair Trade would but carefully study it. Every argument they adduce, as if it were an original discovery of the present day, would be seen to be a fallacy exploded years ago. Their conception of forcing foreign nations to reduce their high duties upon our manufactured goods by imposing taxes on what we import from them has been exposed by the old advocates of the Anti-Corn Law League time after time, and it is curious to find business men fancying that the distress caused by a succession of bad harvests and by the constant waste of wealth caused by the national expenditure on strong drink, would be relieved and not intensified by burdening trade by the restoration of Protection.

The change which has come over the trade of the country in consequence of Free Trade has been of such incalculable value, that it seems incredible that the advocates of Fair Trade can have examined the figures which the statistical abstract places at their disposal. Take the article of food alone. In 1840 the importation of live

cattle was absolutely prohibited, in 1880 we imported live animals to the value of £10,239,295; of bacon and ham we imported in 1840, 6,180 cwt., in 1880, 5,743,900 cwt.; of corn and flour of all kinds we imported in 1840, 16,600,774 cwt., in 1880, 134,173,520 cwt.; taking all kinds of provisions, the value of our imports in 1840 amounted to £27,599,431, while in 1880 it exceeded £184,000,000. Who can even imagine the increase of comfort and of health which these figures imply? Again look at the results of Free Trade, as far as it is carried out by us, upon the foreign commerce of the nation. In 1840 our imports amounted to £62,004,000, our exports to £110,128,718, our total foreign trade amounted therefore to £172,132,718. In 1879 our imports were £362,991,875, and our exports £248,783,364. The figures are too vast to be comprehended; but does not this immense increase tell of the improved condition of the nation in a manner which should silence the foolish cry of those who are seeking by their attempted revival of protectionist fallacies, to distract the attention of the nation from the serious reforms which still are needed to place its welfare on a sure foundation?

Or, again, we may take another set of figures—those referring to pauperism. The number of able-bodied persons relieved by the Guardians in the year 1840 was, in England and Wales, 201,644; in 1881, notwithstanding the increase of the population by 10,000,000, this number had fallen to 111,169. Any one who is in the slightest degree acquainted with the condition of the people will be able to appreciate the vast amount of moral as well as material improvements that is implied by such a diminution of pauperism amongst us, and is not a great part of this improvement to be ascribed to the increase of industrial activity, which has been the necessary and inevitable result of free trade even in its incomplete application

to our fiscal arrangements? When we read the speeches which Mr. Cobden delivered during the seven years of the Anti-Corn Law agitation in the House of Commons or on the platform of Anti-Corn Law meetings, we are struck by the clear foresight and startling accuracy with which he foretold the results which the policy he advocated would secure. His speeches had not perhaps the power of kindling such enthusiasm as the impassioned eloquence of John Bright could arouse, nor did they reach the rhetorical grandeur of some of W. J. Fox's studied orations, or move their hearers to tears, as did some of the touching speeches of Mr. R. R. Moore, but their unanswerable array of facts, their clear enunciation of undeniable principle, and their irresistible logic, made use of the feelings which his coadjutors evoked, and at last compelled the unwilling assent of Parliament.

Cobden's public work on the platform and in the House, and in the practical organisation of the League, was done at the expense of his private interests. His own business was neglected in order to serve his country, and had it not been for the generous help afforded him by personal friends, he would have been compelled to withdraw from the struggle before his reward came, in the final triumph of the principles he advocated. There is scarcely anything more touching than the brief extracts Mr. Morley gives from the correspondence with Frederick Cobden, revealing the pressing personal difficulties which assailed the great leader during the years 1844 and 1845. In September of the latter year Cobden, "at the cost of anguish which we may imagine, came to the terrible resolution to give up public affairs." He communicated his decision to Mr. Bright, and the letter he received in reply has fortunately been preserved to enable us to understand something of the tie which has united the names of Cobden and Bright in far more than political connection (Vol. I., pp. 330—336).

The means were soon raised to tide over the emergency, and Cobden was enabled to return to the cause, then on the eve of victory. But what suffering had not to be endured by the nation before that victory was won. The mysterious potato blight fell upon the country, and a population, reduced by iniquitous legislation to subsist on that least nutritious kind of food, stood face to face with starvation. Those were exciting days. Lord John Russell's Edinburgh letter, the resignation of Sir Robert Peel's administration, the excited meetings of the League, the attempt of Lord John Russell to form a Liberal Government, and the offer of a subordinate place in it to Cobden, which was declined, and the resumption of office by Sir Robert Peel, all followed one another rapidly. When Parliament met, the Government announced its intention of repealing the Corn Laws; but still all was not over. The Ministry could not give the whole of its attention to one subject. The distress in Ireland had produced "its natural fruits in disorder and violence." A Coercion Bill, the usual device, was proposed, amid the united opposition of the Irish and the Radical members, who were opposed to coercion on principle, and of the Whigs and Protectionists, who, as party men, were desirous of driving the Government from office. It was evident what the result would be. The Bill for repeal was carried in the House of Lords, and on the same night the Coercion Bill was rejected in the Commons. The Ministry went out, and Lord John Russell was called upon to form the new Cabinet. Cobden's refusal to take office in November, 1845, prevented his being again invited, but Mr. Milner Gibson was appointed to the office which Cobden had declined. On the very day on which Lord John notified the fact to Mr. Cobden, the final meeting of the League was held. The laborious and exciting work of eight momentous years was finished.

Although on one great subject Cobden had seen the

nation come to his own opinions, on other matters he had yet to experience that he was in advance of his time—nay, even of many of the men who had supported him in his economical reforms. In 1847 the Lancashire Public School Association had been established in Manchester, to obtain for the county a system of rate-supported secular schools under local management. To this limited plan Cobden gave strenuous support, as also to the scheme which, in 1850, was extended to the whole country. Unfortunately, religious jealousy prevented any national educational measure being carried for nearly a quarter of a century. On the one hand, every liberal proposal was opposed by the members of the Established Church, who denounced every scheme which did not secure to them the control of elementary schools; while, on the other hand, the great mass of Dissenters on voluntary principles opposed the interference of the State in the management of schools. Mr. Cobden, himself a Churchman, was too enlightened not to deplore this theological rivalry. He strove to unite his more liberal co-religionists with the educational reformers, and might have been successful had not the great political crash of 1857 occurred just when he had brought about a compromise between Sir John Pakington and his friends with the Council of the National Public School Association.

But even more prominent than in the agitation for National Education was the place which Cobden took in working for international disarmament and international arbitration. He attended Peace Conferences at home and abroad, moved resolutions in the House of Commons in favour of his scheme, and attacked the practice of lending money to the great military powers of the Continent, which he justly asserted was a system calculated to perpetuate the horrors of war. He pointed out that “those who lend money for such purposes are destitute of any of

those excuses by which men justify resort to the sword. They cannot plead patriotism, self-defence, or even anger, or the lust of military glory. They sit down coolly to calculate the chances to themselves of profit or loss in a game in which the lives of human beings are at stake. They have not even the savage and brutal gratification which the old pagans had, after they had paid for a seat in the amphitheatre, of witnessing the bloody combats of gladiators in the circus" (Vol. II., p. 69).

It was a noble thing to see Cobden thus striving to make men feel the moral responsibility of the use of capital; but events were not as yet to favour popular acquiescence in such advanced views. He was in the minority which opposed Mr. Roebuck's resolution approving of Lord Palmerston's foreign policy in 1850. The popular feeling was that Lord Palmerston was upholding the glory of England and the cause of freedom in Europe by his antagonism to Russia. Looking back upon the tone of the country at the time, it is undeniable that the military spirit was rising more and more. Mr. Morley aptly quotes from one of Cobden's pamphlets (Vol. II., p. 131) the absurd rumours which filled the public mind with expectations of a French invasion, and tells us how Cobden bravely maintained his position against the sneers and taunts of less far-seeing statesmen. In a pamphlet entitled "1793 and 1853," he showed how unjustifiable our conduct had been in provoking the great war which involved this nation in such fearful sacrifice of life and treasure. He pointed out that we were on the verge of a like iniquity, and urged with eloquent words the wiser course of using the energy, the courage, and the resources of the nation in redressing the many social wrongs which still weighed down our country, instead of wasting them in arming against fancied dangers from France. It would be difficult to find a nobler description of the superiority of civil to military courage than in the con-

cluding words of the pamphlet, which Mr. Morley quotes with just appreciation :—

A famine fell upon nearly one-half of a great nation. The whole world hastened to contribute money and food. But a few courageous men left their homes in Middlesex and Surrey, and penetrated to the remotest glens and bays of the west coast of the stricken island, to administer relief with their own hands. To say that they found themselves in the Valley of the Shadow of Death would be but an imperfect image: they were in the charnel house of a nation. Never since the fourteenth century did pestilence, the gaunt handmaid of famine, glean so rich a harvest. In the midst of a scene which no field of battle ever equalled in danger, in the number of its slain, or the sufferings of the surviving, these brave men moved as calm and undismayed as though they had been in their own homes. The population sank so fast that the living could not bury the dead; half-interred bodies protruded from the gaping graves: often the wife died in the midst of her starving children, whilst her husband lay a festering corpse by her side. Into the midst of these horrors did our heroes penetrate, dragging the dead from the living with their own hands, raising the head of famishing infancy, and pouring nourishment into parched lips, from which shot fever flames more deadly than a volley of musketry. Here was courage! No music strung the nerves, no smoke obscured the imminent danger, no thunder of artillery deadened the senses. It was cool self-possession and resolute will; calculating risk and heroic resignation. And who were these brave men? To what gallant corps did they belong? Where they of the horse, foot, or artillery force? They were Quakers from Clapham and Kingston. If you would know what heroic actions they performed you must inquire from those who witnessed them. You will not find them in the volume of reports published by themselves—for Quakers write no bulletins of their victories (Vol. II., p. 140).

The pamphlet can hardly be said to have changed the current of public opinion, but a strange revolution did take place within a few months of its publication. Instead of finding herself at war with France, England saw her troops side by side with a French army engaged in a fierce struggle

with Russia. A divided Cabinet had drifted into war. It is needless to repeat the sad story of our mismanagement in the Crimea, and the sufferings which our brave soldiers consequently endured. It is a poor consolation to know what we then did not know, that our allies suffered even more than we. But it is only honest to acknowledge that the great mass of the electors, at least, were in favour of the war, and believed that in defending Turkey they were assisting a nation which was striving to reform. How mistaken we were, recent events have shown. Not one of the objects for which France and England entered into the struggle has been attained, though we may see how some unlooked-for benefits have sprung from the conflict. The share which Sardinia took in the war, laid the foundation for Italian unity; and the proved weakness of Russia relieved Prussia and the German States from that dread which checked every movement for union among them. But no one thought of these results; while in behalf of Cobden and Bright and the few who opposed the war it may justly be claimed that they had denounced the falseness of the pretences on which the war was defended, and Cobden had asserted in his first pamphlet that Russia was never to be dreaded as an aggressive power, however strong she might be in defence.

During the progress of the actual contest, Mr. Cobden did not take any very active part in public affairs. He knew there was no party to support his views, and he was not at any time willing to spend his strength in unavailing protests. But, strange to say, at the close of the war, the plenipotentiaries who met at Paris agreed to add to the treaty of peace two points which were material acknowledgments of the justice of his principles. They embodied a recognition of the advisability of submitting disputed points to arbitration, "and incorporated in the public law of Europe certain changes in the right of maritime capture,

which tended to make trade which was free in time of peace as free as possible in time of war." And when we think of the *Alabama* settlement, of our late behaviour in Afghanistan and in the Transvaal, and, in connection with Europe, of our non-intervention in the many wars which have occurred since 1856, do we not feel that the arguments of Cobden and his colleagues have not been lost? Though for a season the advocates of peace might be ridiculed, and even driven from their Parliamentary seats, yet truth and righteousness have prevailed, and "wisdom is justified by her works."

It was at this time that the great sorrow of his life fell upon Cobden. He lost his son, a lad of singular energy and promise. In the midst of this grief, Mr. Bright, his dearest friend, was attacked by serious illness, which seemed, indeed, not unlikely to prove fatal. Mrs. Cobden's health broke down, and Cobden had to devote himself to her with unremitting care. There is a tender pathos in the whole of the seventh chapter of Vol. II. which relieves the almost constant political strain of the biography, and which makes us take a deeper personal interest in the man who felt bereavement so deeply, and yet had strength enough to find alleviation for his own grief in striving to comfort his fellow-sufferer, and in thinking of the means of doing good to others. It is only right in this connection to say that Mr. Morley has constantly exercised a rare tact, both in communicating and in withholding matters relating to the private concerns of Mr. Cobden. The character and history of the man is vividly brought before the reader, and yet nowhere is the painful impression left upon the mind that anything is told which Cobden himself would rather have kept concealed.

Cobden would gladly have tried to escape from the thoughts of the past by plunging immediately into the hard labour and turmoil of politics, and very soon he was compelled to do so. Mr. Morley's fair description

of the origin and course of the Chinese troubles, which sprang from Sir John Bowring's conduct at Canton, should be carefully read, as it is a typical instance of the manner in which British representatives among half-civilised and barbarous countries have involved us in quarrels which the false pride of our rulers at home justified instead of rebuking. Cobden carried a motion condemning the conduct of the Government. Lord Palmerston, who knew the power of English prejudice, and who calculated accurately upon the combative spirit of his countrymen, dissolved Parliament. The remembrance of the pacific counsels of Cobden and his friends during the Russian War was fresh in the popular mind. Palmerston's address to his constituents was skilfully directed to rouse the passions of the country against his opponents, and he succeeded. The leaders of the Peace Party, the heroes of the Free Trade agitation were everywhere defeated. Mr. Bright was absent from the country, but his long services, his enfeebled health, were in vain spoken of with pathetic sympathy by Cobden. He had not taken part in the Chinese debate, but he shared the penalty of his friend's victory. At the General Election, Cobden, Bright, Gibson, Fox, Miall, lost their seats. "The Manchester School, as it was called, was routed."

Cobden retired for a season from public life, though with eager eye he watched the terrible struggle which the Indian mutiny evoked. It was, perhaps, as well for his comfort that he was not in Parliament, for he would have been compelled to take the unpopular position, and to have pointed out how the mutiny proved that by our own abuse of power we had failed in India, as elsewhere, to conciliate the affection of subject races. He believed that we were being demoralised by our own Asiatic conquests, as Greece and Rome had been, and yet he saw no practical escape from the difficulties of the situation.

It was during this enforced season of retirement from

public affairs that Cobden paid his second visit to the United States, and during his absence Mr. Disraeli's Reform Bill was defeated, Parliament was dissolved, and Cobden was elected for Rochdale. A vote of want of confidence was passed when Parliament met, and after some delay Lord Palmerston undertook the formation of the Cabinet. When Cobden landed in Liverpool on the 29th of June, 1859, he received the news of the change of Government, and a request from Lord Palmerston, strongly supported by Lord John Russell, that he would accept a seat in the Cabinet. The feeling of all Mr. Cobden's friends but one was that he should accede to the proposal, but he was firm in refusing. Mr. Bright was the only man who declared that Cobden looked at the matter in a true light, and subsequent events soon proved that he was right. The policy of Lord Palmerston would have driven Cobden out of office in a few months; it was better never to enter.

But if he held no office in the Cabinet, he did undertake official work for the Government; and I, for one, am more than doubtful whether in this he did not take a wrong step. I feel that it is very bold to question the policy of the French treaty, the negotiations for which Cobden conducted with so much skill during the year 1860. I am, however, strongly of opinion that though some temporary advantage may have been derived from the slight reductions which were made by France in her tariff, yet the general result on foreign nations by our negotiations for commercial treatise has been to strengthen them in their opinion that we were seeking some advantage at their expense, and to confirm them in the maintenance of the fallacy that if a reduction by them would benefit us, it must in the same proportion injure them. Mr. Morley has devoted a special chapter (Vol. II., chap. xiv.) to the defence of the policy of the French treaty, but I cannot see that he has been able to meet the objections which economists urge against it, or

that he succeeds in clearing Cobden from inconsistency with that speech which he delivered in 1843 on Mr. Ricardo's motion in favour of immediate reduction of our import duties. His words were then, "Let us settle our own duties and our own commercial policy for ourselves, and leave other nations to do the same."* The results of the French treaty are strongly in favour of the course which Cobden advocated in 1843. Trade with France has increased immensely. The imports from France during the three years ending with 1859 averaged £14,000,000; in the year 1880 they had reached no less a sum than £42,000,000; our exports to France in the three years ending with 1859 averaged £10,000,000; in 1880 they were £28,000,000. In other words, there is an increase in our imports to the amount of £28,000,000, while the increase of our exports has been £18,000,000. There was no need of any treaty in order to reduce the duties whereby the increase of our imports would have been secured, and we may rest assured our exports must have increased in proportion, treaty or no treaty, as no one supposes that France would have given us her products without payment. It might have happened that we should not have paid our debt by direct export to her, but we should have done so by export to countries which would have paid our merchants by credits in France, and we should not have departed from clear economical principles in such a manner as to strengthen Protectionists all the world over by our inconsistency. The only safe commercial treaty for this country is one which secures for us the advantages of "the most favoured nation clause," but which leaves us absolutely free to deal with our own tariff as it seems best for our revenue purposes.

Cobden hoped, by a commercial treaty, to secure such mutual confidence between France and England as to prevent all future suspicion and jealousy. He argued, and

* Prentice's "History of the League," II., 73.

argued correctly, that the more intercourse there was between the two nations, the more they would learn that their interests were to be found in peace and not in armed rivalry. But confidence would have sprung up naturally if the attempt had not been made to force it by a treaty which, in France at any rate, was imposed upon the nation, against its will, by the despotic power of the Emperor. As it was, while Cobden was negotiating in Paris, the annexation of Savoy and Nice fed Lord Palmerston's restless desire for increased armament and made England willing to follow his lead in the vast and useless expenditure of our resources in the fortifications, which remain the one lasting monument of Palmerstonian rule. We still watch the French ship-building yards with suspicious care, and spend untold thousands upon unwieldy ironclads, which, happily, have as yet been only used in mutual destruction. The negotiations pending in Paris while I write these lines show that we have not succeeded in converting Frenchmen into Free Traders, as they still seem to believe that opening their ports will be conferring favours upon us, instead of benefiting themselves. I am not unwise enough to risk a forecast of what the result of our present negotiations will be, but if they fail, I shall be more sanguine as to the ultimate adoption of Free Trade principles abroad. Experience is the best teacher of nations. When increasing prosperity is seen to attend this country, at the same time that waning production and increasing prices create growing distress among other nations, I have little doubt but that the world will accept those principles of common sense which are embodied in the science of Political Economy.

It would be unjust, in any sketch of Cobden's career, to pass over the interest which he took in other great questions than those of Free Trade and its great concomitant, Peace among all nations. But I have no space to enter into a criticism of his views on Parliamentary reform, to which

he seemed to attach too little importance to satisfy Mr. Bright and others. He was an advocate of an extended suffrage, and though he believed that "women are the greatest favourers of soldiering and sailing and all that appertains to war," he considered himself a labourer in the cause of women's rights (Vol. II., p. 366). His latest utterances show that, having achieved his first great object of freeing commerce from the hindrances of Protection, he would, if he had had youth on his side, have taken up the not less important subject of the reform of our laws relating to land. And now that this question has come so prominently before us, we cannot fail to lament that his clear intelligence, his wide experience, and his practical wisdom are not with us to guide us to a just and complete solution of the many difficulties which beset the legislation which must before long take place.

There is one other subject in which he might have exercised a greater influence than most men, and where his help would have been invaluable. In a letter to Mr. Ashworth, written as long ago as 1849, he said, "The moral force of the masses lies in the temperance movement; and I confess I have no faith in anything apart from that movement for the elevation of the working class. We do not sufficiently estimate the amount of crime, vice, poverty, ignorance, and destitution which springs from the drinking habits of the people" (Vol. II., p. 61). Since the time when this was written the very prosperity of the country, by increasing the means of the people, has been productive of increased intemperance, while unwise though well-intended legislation has multiplied the temptations to drink.* I have but little doubt that Cobden would have been of invaluable assistance to Sir Wilfrid Lawson in

* See "Crime and Pauperism": a Letter to the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P. By Wm. Hoyle. London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co. 1881.

his indefatigable labours ; indeed, I have good reason to know that it was by accidental circumstances only that he was prevented from voting with him on the only occasion of his going to a division while Cobden was a Member of the House. His words are still true : " The temperance cause lies at the root of all social and political progression in this country."

On another great subject which divided public opinion in England, the American Civil War, Cobden, as we should have expected, espoused the side of the North, but not at once. " He could not for a time bear to face the prospect that a community which had hitherto been the realisation on so great a scale of his pacific ideals, should after all plunge into war just as a monarchy or an oligarchy might have done. The North, by refusing to allow the South to secede, seemed to him at first to be the author of the strife. Another reason why his sympathies wavered was that, though the Southerners were slaveholders, their interests made them Free Traders. As we have seen more than once, Cobden was always prone to be led by his sympathies as an economist. The hesitation, however, did not last long. He tolerably soon came round to a more correct view of the issues at stake, partly under the influence of Mr. Bright, whose sagacity, sharpened by his religious hatred of slavery, at once perceived that the break-up of the American Union would be a damaging blow to the cause of freedom all over the world " (II., p. 373).

Cobden made use of the events of the American contest to promote his views on reform of international law as it affects commerce in time of war, and especially claimed that commercial ports should be exempt from blockade. But even yet his views on this and kindred reforms are *sub judice*. His desire was to make commercial intercourse possible, even in time of war ; while his opponents urge that it is in the interest of peace to

make war as productive of evil as possible, so that the nations may dread its recurrence. But if he did not live to see the success of his views on this point, he was happy in seeing us hold aloof from the struggle which broke out between Denmark and Germany in 1864. There can be no doubt that Lord Palmerston had wished to interfere in behalf of Denmark; but, as Cobden said in the last speech which he ever delivered, a revolution had been achieved in our foreign policy. The country certainly sympathised with the Danes, but it was felt that it was contrary to public policy to rush into a war with Germany. The non-intervention principle so long advocated by Cobden had gained a victory, its first, but not its last. How he would have rejoiced could he have seen the national uprising which drove Lord Beaconsfield from power, when he attempted to reintroduce Palmerstonian principles into our policy, and have witnessed the national approval which has followed the present Government's action in Europe, Africa, and Asia. Must we not acknowledge that much of the sentiment which has produced this change is owing to the consistent advocacy of peace principles by Cobden and by Bright? His last speech, the one delivered to his constituents in Rochdale, shows, as I have just said, that he recognised the change which was already beginning to show itself. Would that he had been spared to rejoice in seeing still more clearly that his labours had not been in vain!

He had never been a man of robust health. To Mr. Livesy, the great temperance reformer, he had confessed that it was the strictest temperance alone which had enabled him, even in his younger days, to do his work. At the age of sixty, the exertion of the speech just referred to, and the reception by his constituents on the next day, caused him to suffer in a manner which justified his friends in feeling alarmed. He did not go up to the opening of Parliament, but waited till near the end of March before

leaving the country. He could not resist the temptation of raising his voice against the expenditure of money on Canadian fortifications. On his arrival in town he was seized with asthma, and on the 2nd April "his ardent, courageous, and brotherly spirit passed tranquilly away."

I trust that this sketch, imperfect and fragmentary as it is, will lead many of my readers to a careful study of Mr. Morley's biography. There have been many statues erected in honour of Cobden, but a nobler memorial than these volumes cannot be raised. It tells its story with the grace of the highest literary skill; and the admirers of Mr. Cobden will be grateful that his life has been written by one whom extensive knowledge, political insight, and enlightened sympathy have fitted to do justice to so noble a theme.

S. ALFRED STEINTHAL.

ARCHITECTURAL 'RESTORATION' IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY.

TO a country like England, so rich in architectural remains, both ecclesiastical and domestic, this is an important question. At a time, too, like the present, when every church dignitary, from cathedral dean to country vicar, is fired with the ambition of "restoring" the particular building over which he presides, the question has become doubly important.

In view of the extensive work already done, and of that which is likely to follow, it may be well to consider how far it resembles, and how far it differs from, similar work carried out in past ages. How far is nineteenth-century "Restoration" really restoration?

To determine this, let us first consult the experience of the Past; and then inspect the work now going on, or but recently executed.

In considering the work of past restoration, we may distinguish, broadly, two periods: the first, when the addition of building was not so much *restoration* as the direct succession of style, before architecture had become a dead art; the second, when restoration pure and simple was carried on by those who had no original art, but chose, as they pleased, from the museum of bygone styles. *Renaissance* is the link between these periods; and it had some show, though, perhaps, only a show, of originality.

In this lapse of originality lies the failure of the modern

building art. This is obvious in the phrase of the day, when we speak of the choice of particular schools; a thing unknown to the Past, when the prevailing style of a period made itself omnipotent in men's work, though without *self-consciousness*, which is the special vice of the Present. When we enter a new building we speak of the style selected, whether *Classic* or *Gothic*; and of the particular variety, whether *Doric*, *Ionic*, *Corinthian*, whether *Early English*, *Decorated*, *Perpendicular*, or a curious mixture of all.

And in looking at the question, this absence of originality must be kept in mind, for it largely affects the merits or demerits of modern restoration. While, however, denying originality *in se* to modern architecture, we must remember that some stamp of individuality is sure to be impressed on men's work, according to the measure of talent possessed. While there is nothing in Mr. Street's Church of St. Mary Magdalene, Paddington, which cannot be shown in older work, there is a pleasing harmony in the entire combination which indicates the designer. In this sense, and this only, is there originality in modern architecture.

The fault of all the iconoclasts of the Past, whether destroyers or restorers, was barbarism; but what remained from destruction escaped contamination. Like broken statues, but all untouched, a fragment was left to the museum of Time. The destroyers under the two Cromwells, and the careless demolishers of the eighteenth century, after they had done their worst, at least left a pure remnant; while the restorers of the Classic Revival did not sufficiently esteem the old work to meddle with it; and when they did, the student has no difficulty in distinguishing between the old and the new. The easternmost portion of St. Pierre, at Caen, and the western towers of Westminster Abbey, are examples of this. Even the shame-enduring

work of eighteenth-century Wyatt—the most disgraceful restorer of any time—had yet this virtue, that no one could ever confuse Wyatt with the original; and so something was preserved. The restoration by this architect of Hereford Cathedral, when its noble west front fell in 1786, is a signal example of what an art can come to when its spirit is lost. The fine Norman clerestory and triforium, only a few bays of which had fallen, were entirely removed, to give place to a substitute which has this claim to originality—that it is no style at all. Yet Wyatt's work, past censure as it is, is scarcely so irritating as Cottingham's restoration of the Norman arcading underneath. There, again, there is no mistaking the old for the new; but the latter was none the less meant to be in harmony with the former; and it is instructive to see how this treatment of the old Norman has vulgarised and spoiled it. The late Sir Gilbert Scott's restoration of the same cathedral (fortunate in belonging to an early period of his labours) contrasts favourably with that of his predecessors, inasmuch as the old work has been carefully preserved wherever possible.

But if the fault of the Past was barbarism, that of the Present is sentimentalism; and with sentimentalism comes its natural ally, self-consciousness. The sentimentality of *aestheticism* is everywhere seen in the present day. Its influence is felt in every art, and in none more so than in Architecture.

In our time the question is no longer who shall reduce an old church to a ruin, or leave it to fall if it be so inclined; but who shall convert a ruin back into a church, or rebuild a sound one larger. The injury now done to Architecture is inflicted by those who profess to love her best. She can no longer complain of cruelty or neglect; but she may well apply the saying to herself—"Save me from my friends, and I'll take care of my enemies."

A curious feature of our day (the result, probably, of the

educational impulse) is the amount of interest in special arts and sciences professed by persons who, a quarter of a century back, would have disclaimed any such devotion. This would be satisfactory but for the doubt whether these refining studies do not share the success of a new garment. It is common to hear charming enthusiasm expressed for music by persons who talk persistently through Bach or Beethoven, sometimes of their admiration—admiration for what they will not listen to! First impressions of Turner's "Liber Studiorum" have been mistaken for faded photographs by those who a minute before discoursed eloquently of their zeal for high art, yet could not *see* the beautiful when in front of its loftiest forms!

It is the same with Architecture; only that, to its sorrow, it has something practical to lose. Just as formerly there was utter neglect, now there is a restless æstheticism, longing to make itself heard. City dean and rural vicar alike burn to do something. The Wrens or Wyatts of the period are consulted as to what can be "done with our church." Funds are collected far and near, a great dust is raised, and the usual result follows in the partial or total destruction of some fine old relic, under the guardian name of "Restoration."

The great fault of nineteenth-century restoration is doing too much. Enormous sums are spent, and enormous work is done. Starting often with the idea of merely doing such repairs as, in their opinion, decay has rendered necessary, the restorers are drawn on to more extensive alterations, sometimes to additions. Then the temptation comes—"While we are about it, while the dust is raised, let us make our work complete: let us make God's house honourable"—a pious work, surely, which means more money for decorations, tiles, rood-screen, reredos (to eclipse that at Ely, Exeter, or elsewhere), and so forth. And after all this is accomplished, we must have

a great new organ, the largest ecclesiastical one, perchance, in England; and my lord who presents it to the cathedral, say at Worcester, cares nothing for the noble transept—almost the church's history in stone—which he completely blots out with it; neither for the finest crypt in the kingdom, which this same organ's waterworks obliterate by one-third: and the Dean and Chapter care nothing either, for if his lordship gives all this money, who shall doubt the soundness of the taste? The Dean, himself, gives a reredos—heavy, and of many marbles—which blocks out the grand perspective of the church. A rood-screen is designed which is to be lighter than the one at Hereford, and, like the wicket gate of Paradise, all angels and gold—but without much of heaven. Somebody makes a fine new pulpit for the nave, marble, and marble apostles, and the vergers proudly point it out long before the poor old work around, which, indeed, is only grand. And, for the pavement of the nave, his lordship, at great cost, brings all the way from Italy a gift of marble slabs, alternate black and white—just the thing for the sunny South, but looking, perhaps, a trifle cold in a dim Northern cathedral.

Simplicity, as an artistic quality, is little appreciated by our modern restorers. The beauty of plain stone is quite disregarded; the old masonry is made to glare with colour; and the argument is adduced, and considered convincing, that it was the custom of the ancient builders to cover their walls with similar decoration.

This is a specimen of the presumption of modern architecture. For be it remembered that, in the first place, the extent of mural decoration in mediæval churches is only guessed: and secondly, if absolutely proved, it would be no warrant for us in the nineteenth century to make the dangerous experiment of imitating what we do not understand. A glance at the mural decoration yet remaining in old

buildings will show how little we know of the art of colouring on stone. Yet we are as bold as if we had the authority of David to grapple with the giant.

The examples of this rampant temerity are, unhappily, unnumbered. Clothe Shakespeare with the stripes of a pantaloons, and you have the indecorous effect of St. Cross at Winchester. How little veneration for the art of the past must the man have had who could throw such a paint-pot at such a statue! And what sort of guardians of the public treasure were the men who let him do it! The fine old church of St. George of Bocherville, in Normandy, is an almost worse example; the whole of the magnificently simple Norman work being treated with bands of brightest vermilion on a ground of whitest white. The chapel at the western end of St. Mary Redcliffe, Bristol, is another instance of this paint-pot restoration.

The Cathedral of Worcester, only lately completed, is a less violent, but none the less instructive, instance of modern decoration. Its choir, one of the finest specimens of Early art in the country, has been literally stuffed with furniture, and studded with gold. (So hot is this rage for gilding, that even King John's broken nose has not escaped a golden plaster, which mars what dignity the chisel had supplied, and usually provokes laughter.) At Worcester, as at Ely, and in so many churches, we may see that sign of a corrupted art, the ambition to "add another hue unto the rainbow." The vaulting is ablaze with gold and colour; the general effect of all this being to spoil the graceful harmony which was the choir's glory; the particular evil being the pulling down of its height, the usual result of over-colouring roofs. The vault decoration of the choir aisles is still more inappropriate, consisting of sprinkled monograms, resembling (only more unlovely) the conspicuous spots on a leopard's back. Even Sir Gilbert Scott confessed that this was the work of a clerk, and not

to his liking. Yet the fate of a great cathedral is allowed to depend upon a fluke like this !

The figure bosses of the nave vaulting in the same church, and treated by the same architect, are embellished with bright vermilion, gold, and green—a favourite combination in the mural decoration of the day. Imagine a winged saint, suspended from the roof, looking down on you with a bright vermilion countenance! Even at their great height they have a ghastly look, half cynical, yet comically grave, as though resenting their purgatory of paint. But the good fortune lies in there being few of them.

In Gloucester Cathedral the very vergers regretfully point out how the height of their choir has been diminished by the same process. One of the side chapels in this cathedral, though the work of a man of culture, only evidences the same thing—our utter ignorance of the application of colour to stone.

Let not the argument be misunderstood. The right, the duty, of modern art to exercise its powers in every department of architecture is not contested ; but let modern art occupy itself with modern subjects ; let not the great relics of the Past be made mediums for the imperfect practice of the Present.

And modern art itself is a loser. In contrasting the old and new work in an ancient church, one is struck with the *prettiness* of the modern mind—a prettiness, too, as inappropriate as if we were to pin a butterfly upon the back of an elephant. The butterfly is a beautiful object, but its place is *not* on the back of an elephant. The harmony in nature is what so delights us. There is always appropriateness. Who would stick a daisy on the petals of a tulip? Both are beautiful, but not together. A modern pulpit of Derbyshire marble, with elaborate details of saints and gilding, is very pretty in itself—fit for an Exhibition, where it sometimes appears ; and it looks in its

right place in a modern church, where richness of detail is aimed at rather than any lofty general conception.

The modern reredos is of the same sort: not like the old English design, light, perforated, and not too high where distance lay beyond; but tall, cumbersome, gaudy with coloured marbles and gold, hiding everything beyond, thinking only of itself and nothing of what surrounds it, utterly inappropriate, and out of harmony with the building it inhabits. Exceptions to the old treatment of this and other details are common enough, but they do not furnish an argument; being due to some special cause, which, generally at a later period, influenced the design. The occasional blocking off of the Lady Chapel for special parish service, is an instance.

As with the other details of Church decoration, so with the encaustic tiles and stained glass. The colour is at fault—it may be better said, the *feeling*. Manufactories for encaustic tiles and stained glass abound in the country; but, with more or less variety in the talent displayed, there is this distinctive feature in them all—a total want of adaptability to end, the presence of which is the most charming quality, and one which is never absent, in the old specimens of these arts.

Copies, very much more exact than their originals—the drawing on which was often of careless execution—are made of existing old tiles: all that modern science can accomplish is bestowed upon their manufacture: and yet, when we see them in an old church, we only wish they formed part of a modern villa decoration, for which they are so much better suited. Compare an old tile of Malvern or of Westminster—soft in colour, free in design—with its modern imitation—hot, sharp, very exactly drawn—and the difference is plain. It is no mere effect of age; for, as in the stained glass, the colour of the old work is really brighter while it is softer; but there is a coolness and appropriate-

ness, a beautiful harmony with the sombre stone, the old oak, the painted windows, and all the subordinate decoration. There is a meaning in it all: you *feel* the mind of the worker in every touch: it is not *manufacture*.

With the glass it is the same. Brilliant colours, but always cool, always harmonious; the very grotesque (so often ignorantly laughed at), full of meaning and beauty of drawing; and sometimes (as the head of Christ in Malvern Priory), sublime in conception and execution as a creation of Raphael's. The old windows never strike a purple with their reds and blues as the modern ones do, never cast painted shadows on the walls, never make the eye ache with gazing on them; but, in addition to their beauty and their teaching, throw a pleasing barrier between the strong light without and the building within, adding to the religious atmosphere which every detail of an old church helps to create.

The early lancet at the eastern end of Coutances Cathedral shows how bright, and yet pure, the old glass was—the most brilliant rubies and blues being mingled in the most perfect softness, while preserving absolute their distinctive hues.

The fourteenth-century glass of the chancel of Tewkesbury is a fine example of the rich, deep colouring of that period—the transition in the art of glass.

The fifteenth-century windows of York and Great Malvern give us a study of the highest perfection in drawing and colouring upon glass. The north clerestory windows of Great Malvern choir are among the most beautiful in the kingdom, the cool reds and blues of the period being relieved by a profusion of that silver white so characteristic of this date; and the drawing in pure yellow (a yellow never since obtained) mingling harmoniously with the whole.

But the radical defect in modern glass is in the *arrangement*. Even where the colours themselves are tolerable,

their combination is inharmonious; the picture as a whole is unpleasing. Yet, beyond doubt, more progress has been made in this art than in any other detail of church decoration. We have good work done where the artist is left untrammelled by the warping uses of manufacture.

In misapplied adornment there is a comfort which is denied to the body adorned. Bad colours can be removed by a wiser generation; inappropriate pulpit and reredos can be displaced at a hundredth part of the cost which erected them; but the injury done to an old building by destroying its very structure can never be repaired. The careless restoration of our English churches during the last twenty years has done a mischief to Architecture which Time never rivalled. New churches rise out of old ones with the abruptness of a transformation, and it is called "restoration." And the assurance is given that it is the old church still!—as true as that a cork substitute for the original flesh and bone is the same leg.

Examples of this modern process of demolition are unhappily so common that it is almost idle to give instances. There is scarce a village church which does not bear some marks of rash and useless renovation; and if this process is to go on with the same zeal as hitherto, it is to be feared we shall soon have no vestige of the great architectural legacy of England.

The worst of all meddling—because the most needless—is where "restoration" is applied to interior work which is in no danger of falling, and which has no superstructure to support.

How many gems of old stone, carrying withal a little of the years' mould on them, and wearing a few scars of past conflicts, have to lament the rude modern hand laid upon them! What a thrill of terror comes over us when the verger of Tewkesbury says simply that the architect has declared that it would cost "such a sum" to

restore the Countess of Warwick's chapel! Guardian angel of old architecture! for what must it be restored? A chapel three paces long, whose roof you can touch, built of the lightest mould, whose fall would scarce ruffle the tiles beneath it—why must it be meddled with? At present it is beautiful: Antiquity's finger-tips have harmoniously stained it with exquisite colouring: it has the very air of calmness, that united sense of harmony which Age breathes on her cast-off children, making them lovely while she destroys them: it has a few broken shafts which are not needed for its support, and which may its patroness preserve from being *restored*! As it is, it is perfect—a gem of old art in stone: the spirit of the Past lives in it: as it is, let it remain. The hand of the enemy has wounded it, but the medicine of the physician would be its death. Let us hope that such a restoration is not really contemplated, but the mere mention of it is alarming, for it shows the way of the wind.

Memory comes of an old Norman arch, recessed in a porch, carrying no weight, little decayed, grand in work and expression of past time. In a while it is gone, a new one in its place—hard, sharp, unmeaning—a fresh face in an old house. The vicar explains that it is just the same as it was, that it was a little “gone,” and that his stonemason—a very clever fellow—made it exactly like the old one. Exactly! Ye gods which weep over despoiled fanes!—where is the spirit? This new arch has not even the merit of a bad photograph of a good man. The old stones are lying in a sad heap in a corner of the graveyard—an apt resting-place.

There is a practical side to all this. The art treasures of our museums are secure from the careless handling of ignorant meddlers. No one would dream of suggesting to the authorities at the British Museum the experiment of “restoring,” according to nineteenth-century ideas, heads,

arms, and legs to the immortal remains of Phidias in the galleries over which they jealously watch. The lines of beauty are broken, but are beautiful still ; and no guardian of the nation's stores would think of calling in a modern sculptor to try and make them better ; nor is it likely that any good sculptor would accept the task. With the art-remains of Architecture it is different. Unhappily, they are regarded as a legitimate target for every man's arrows to fly at.

In one sense, a specific art like Architecture, which is mainly concerned with form, differs from arts where *thought* is the essential test of originality. This is well seen in literature. When Mr. Swinburne is said to write Greek plays, it only means that he gives us an embodiment of his own thought in the form of that particular school. His choruses in "Atalanta" and "Erectheus" are his own, the ideas and musical phrases being essentially original, and not merely transcripts from any known classic drama. So in painting, etching, music. In architecture it is very different. Definite forms being exhausted, there is an end to the art, and originality can only be shown in the re-combination of the elements already used.

Perhaps this will account for the fact before alluded to, that of all the arts employed in modern architecture, that of stained glass has made the most genuine advance ; and this because it has really never been a dead art. But here, also, good work is only found as the result of true, individual art-labour, not as the product of manufacture.

It is the age of Imitation. Not that there is no good original work, comparing well with that of the Past, in most departments of art ; but there has never been such imitation before. Till now, imitation was never a *science*.

The Chinese imitated their porcelain of earlier date centuries afterwards—if we can call it imitation, for the art never really died, nor is it very difficult to distinguish the

early *Ming* specimens from those of a hundred years later. They also, during the egg-shell and surface enamel period, in the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries, took to designing European subjects on their porcelain; but the colours and paste were unmistakably their own, and there was no more real imitation than there is when Chinese figures are drawn upon Worcester and Staffordshire plates.

But now there is a regular system of imitation reduced to a science, and devised for the express purpose of commercial fraud; and its evil influence upon art cannot be too strongly denounced. Just as there are manufactories where every kind of wine can be produced, so that it is only the best judges who are not deceived, there are people whose business it is to imitate every variety of ancient design, so that all but the most experienced are victimised. The great majority of these imitations are tolerably patent, except to the completely ignorant; and if the matter stopped here, it might almost be considered useful, as giving lessons in experience. Unfortunately, however, there are exceptions to this rule; exceptions so ingenious as to deceive the greater number of professed experts. Such, for example, in the Ceramic art are the recent French imitations of old *Ming* enamel colours on square jars with roughed bottoms, the marvellous approach of which to the originals might deceive the best connoisseurs, except on close scrutiny.

The effect of such imitation on art must necessarily be bad. Even if as good work as the copied originals can by peculiar pains be produced—though this is not the case—it is not for good: it is the time out of joint: it confounds the real with the unreal, and confuses the judgment. It has a debasing and meretricious effect on art, and on art influence.

In architecture we find the same thing exactly, although

springing from widely different motives. Imitation lies at the root of much that is to blame in modern architecture, and in modern restoration.

Let it be remembered what imitation really is. To repeat:—Originality is more often seen in detail than in general conception and embodiment. The thoughts of a man of genius give shape to the medium chosen to embody his conceptions; and it often happens that one will commence with some well-known style, and work through this to originality—an originality distinct in proportion to the genius of the worker.

So in architecture, in the first *Romanesque* of the South of France, we find the builders of churches in the early Christian centuries working through the known Classic forms, until they emerged into originality in the great *Norman* period. In the early Saxon churches of England we see the same progress—rude Classic imitations, gradually leading the way to a similar freedom of style. This is not imitation, it is education. But in architecture all varieties of form seem to have abruptly come to an end at the close of the fifteenth century; and after a lapse of three hundred years, they are as suddenly awakened, to find, like Rip van Winkle, all things changed, and no link to join the divided chain. But in the American legend the sleeper had, at least, a memory, while we have only a tradition. Our artists in stone cannot originate, because they labour at a dead art. They can only copy what is long past, and trust to their ingenuity to blend together a variety of forms into the semblance of originality.

Imitation, which goes no further, is to be condemned in every art. It is slavish, deceptive, and lacks the spirit which the sense of originality gives, and which is a necessity to art progress.

If a church in England fell, or wanted enlarging, at the end of the twelfth century, it would have been continued

in the *Early English* style, then coming into use; all the old work that could be retained being at the same time carefully preserved. So a church at the close of the thirteenth century would be continued in the style of the fourteenth, and so on, in regular succession, according to prevailing modes. But now we take our choice from the model-book of the Past. No present style prevails. Enlarging or building a church is for all the world like choosing a suite of furniture from a Tottenham Court Road list. Will we have *Norman, Early English, Decorated, Tudor*? It is all one to the architect: and to the builder, too; for these seldom fall out.

The infallible result of this system is that a great number of our most interesting churches are robbed of their simple unity, and often at a cost which would build a new church ample for all the needs of worship, leaving the old one as a relic to be preserved to art and history.

New chancels are the peculiar *rage* of High Church country vicars. With the usual adornments of hot tiles, fiery glass, and bad mural colour, they are tacked on to some grave old nave and aisles—the effect being very much like that of a gay, modern bonnet placed on the head of Apollo or Discobolus.

In ancient work, while an original school was existing, the imitation of a previous style was extremely rare, and was only resorted to for some special object; even then, the form alone being copied, none but contemporary details of moulding and ornament being introduced.

In Scotland there is an exception to this. Late in the fifteenth century there seems to have been a general copying of English and other work. In Roslyn Chapel, Holyrood, and many similar structures, we find all the ornaments of all the periods mixed up in one strange whole, yet still preserving their own date mouldings—the most vital expression of a style.

In the naves of Westminster Abbey and Worcester Cathedral, both works of the fifteenth century (the latter being curiously traditional, but in the main *Perpendicular*), we have two marked instances of this rare practice, in the imitation of the admirable thirteenth-century choirs which preceded them. In both the form of the earlier point is copied; but all the details are in the style of the period when the work was executed. Yet these are great exceptions, and, although erected at a time when art was flourishing, are still unsatisfactory.

The principle observed in the old work was to respect that which went before it, and never to replace what could conveniently be left. A thousand old churches and castles bear witness to this spirit of conservatism. The Priory of Great Malvern, originally built *circa* 1085, must have suffered a great fall, or have been otherwise injured, in the fifteenth century. What did the fifteenth-century builders do? Everywhere throughout the church we find the old *Norman* and the later *Perpendicular* side by side in beautiful historical contrast. No Norman stone has been removed that could be left. Square-hewn Norman stones have even been used in the later construction, and everywhere may be seen interspersed with the heavier and more irregular *Perpendicular* masonry. Even part of a Norman aisle has been preserved, for its alteration would have interfered with the cloisters abutting it, and it forms an interesting contrast with the wider aisles of the fifteenth century; and the old Norman apse, itself, is enclosed by the square eastern wall of the later period. Scraps of plain chamfered basement, even, may here and there be traced, along with the moulded basement of the *Perpendicular* restorers. There is no spirit of *purism* to be detected in this glorious example of fifteenth-century work, but the strictest conservatism everywhere reigns. This should be a great lesson. For it must not be supposed

by the most devoted archæologist that old work is *never* to be restored. The issue lies in the spirit and manner of restoration. www.libtool.com.cn

The case of old statues and other art-reliques in one respect differs from that of architectural remains. But these are none the less to be respected as art-reliques, and they should be approached with the touch of tenderness and the eye of veneration. If, at a time when the art of masonry was flourishing, regard was paid to the work that went before, how much more does it become us, who have no art, humbly to respect the ancient reliques of our country, which we cannot have again !

To say it once more, there is a practical side to this question : we have to consider—first, the dangers to which old buildings are subject ; secondly, the remedy.

Three sources of this danger from Restoration are to be feared in our day. In the first place, the work is often undertaken by sincere persons, zealous of improving their churches, but ignorant of the way to set about it, the best means to be employed, and the right men to consult. Secondly, there is the danger from those dignitaries in the Church who place the supposed requirements of ceremonial above the preservation of art-reliques, and who, while professing the most advanced æstheticism, would not hesitate to pull down an ancient aisle or chancel (re-building what they think to be a statelier edifice) if the services of the Church—irrespective of practical wants—would thereby be enhanced ; or who, on the other hand, with their flaunting adornments would blot out the simple graces of antiquity. Lastly, there is the danger—a very great one—from the architects themselves ; from those who are either ignorant of the proper methods of restoring old work, or who do not approach their task with the veneration of true artists, being unable to sink themselves in the great examples before them.

The remedy is soon told, for it consists chiefly in omis-

sion—in what should *not* be done. The golden rules are simply :—

I. Never restore without real, practical necessity. Within bounds of public safety, the guiding law of restoration should be to *preserve everything, and remove nothing*.

II. When restoration is necessary choose the right man, and use the right means. A clergyman, as guardian of his church, has a right, without undue interference, to control a work of restoration. He is as much responsible to the whole nation for the proper care of his church as are the guardians of a public gallery for the treasures entrusted to their charge. Many a fine old building may yet be saved, if only this rule can be enforced.

III. Never replace an old stone by a new one except where absolute necessity requires it. A good architect, when restoring an old church, will be in the habit of carefully marking all the stones, and resetting them in their former places. The south transept of York Minster, restored in 1873, is an instance of this excellent method. The quality of various strata, of course, affects the above rule, the hard oolitic formations of the East of England, Gloucestershire, &c., differing widely from the crumbling sandstones of the West and North, and so forth. But the maxim is sound wherever applicable.

IV. Never use hard tools in removing washes and plaster, but get rid of them only by means that will not injure the integrity of the stone face, mouldings, and ornaments. Plain water and a strong brush, or potash and water, or (where the stone is hard) such an instrument as "Manchester card"—a hard brush of fine wire—are the legitimate means for effecting this end. If plaster encases a moulding (which sometimes happens) it may be necessary to loosen the former by other means than those named; but even then the most patient care should be exercised, and

no rough measures permitted which might damage the concealed work.

V. Purism—the creation of false harmony and the destroyer of history—should be abjured. Modern work should never replace old, merely to make the predominant feature the only one. Renaissance, and even the Debased English of the seventeenth century, tell the tale of their time, and should not be blotted out.

VI. Restrain undue ornamentation in restoring an old church. In our present knowledge of colour and gilding the decoration of old buildings is a dangerous experiment, and usually results in the disfigurement of the ancient work, without any compensating benefit.

VII. Do not fill an old church with more furniture than the necessities of service demand. It is to be feared that the æstheticism of the day has thinned popular judgment and spoiled critical taste. It is common to hear the most glowing admiration expressed for such gaudy trappings as have vulgarised Worcester, Ely, and other fine churches. The judgment which condemns this “unfitness of things,” and recognises its vulgarity, is unhappily in a powerless minority which can only cry out, but cannot lift a hand. But when once it becomes recognised that the architectural remains of the country are part of its art-treasures, and, as such, are to be watchfully guarded, we may then hope to see a change in the treatment of our old buildings. Like all such happy changes, however, in the slow march to better knowledge, the reform, it is to be feared, may come a little late.

CHARLES GRINDROD.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

REMARKS ON THE MORAL INFLUENCE OF THE CHRISTIAN PULPIT.

IN the limited space at our disposal it would be impossible to attempt an adequate discussion of the subject indicated by the above heading, and the following remarks are intended as little more than stray suggestions which the reader may expand and apply under the guidance of his own judgment and experience.

That the pulpit affords a grand opportunity for elevating the motives, clearing the view of duty, and strengthening the higher purposes of our people will hardly be denied. Already it accomplishes an untold amount of good; and we cannot doubt that, if the ministry of every church rose to the greatness of its calling, the continual enforcement of earnest, high-minded, manly counsel would have a marked effect upon the character of our nation.

It is true that Christianity is not a mere ethical system, and that where it is ethical it departs widely from the legal and prescriptive method, and a preacher who confined himself to the morality of civilised life would fall far short of his vocation. Yet, for this very reason, Christianity binds religion and morality into indissoluble unity. Its dominant aim is to destroy the sin which separates man from God, and, by raising man into that communion which belongs to the children of God, to fill him with Divine righteousness. Accordingly it holds before us a supreme ideal of character; and to depict the beauty of this character, to search the depths of the Christian spirit, to waken its vivifying power, and to trace its ramifying obligations, must constitute a most important part of the preacher's work.

This portion of ministerial duty assumes three main directions.

First, it is necessary to exhibit the inwardness of Christian morality in opposition to a mere code of commandments and

prohibitions, and to describe the inward principle of life in its essential unity. The fountain of moral life is, in the Christian view, nothing less than the Holy Spirit of God working within the soul, and all holy living is the spontaneous outcome and expression of this Spirit. Hence it is the highest aim of the pulpit to lift men into communion with God, to waken in them the consciousness of Divine things, and commit them to the free prompting of the Spirit; and he who can bring the soul to God, and reverently leave it there to be moulded by the higher will, has the loftiest power that belongs to the preacher's office. Could all ministers do this their task would be complete, and life's duty would shape itself into the Divine pattern without their imperfect admonitions. But there are many who are not, indeed, unconscious of the influence of the Spirit, but whose consciousness is dim and uncertain, and needs the assistance of some more discerning mind, and we are all under the temptation to take the sweetness of religion, while we turn a deaf ear to its call for self-sacrifice. It, therefore, becomes necessary to insist, and again and again to repeat, that the Spirit of Life in Christ Jesus is not only a Spirit of truth and peace, but a Spirit of active goodness, with serious and even awful claims upon him who would receive it in its fulness. If we inquire more nearly into its ethical quality, we shall probably accept the word Love as the supreme term which, best expressing the eternal essence of God, sums up in itself the moral perfection of man. This, then, is the ideal good which the preacher has to set before men as the ethical side of their Christian faith, a life of love flowing broad and deep from the infinite fulness of God, and converting the finite and mortal into an organ of Divine and eternal purpose. If the thousands of our clergy and ministers called men to this life, out of the over-mastering impulse of the Spirit in themselves, would there not be a great awakening of the national conscience?

Secondly, the unity of the moral life, owing to the variety of objects towards which it is directed, and its varied relations to these objects, resolves itself into several dispositions or virtues. Love to God exhibits itself in such dispositions as reverence, humility, trust, and so forth. Love to man divides itself into justice and benevolence, and the virtues which flow from these. Love to creatures below man shows itself in appreciation and reverence towards their mysterious life, and in the humanity which shrinks from giving them needless pain. Every one of these dispositions may form a separate theme for Christian

teaching, and, coupled with warnings against their opposite faults, they ought to be frequently pressed upon public attention; for who will say that even the sincere believer in Christ is always distinguished by the largeness and graciousness and beauty of soul which are the natural expression of his faith? These things are the fruit of the Spirit; but we all know how that fruit is spoiled by passion and self-will, and how prone we are to deceive ourselves, and ascribe to the Spirit what is only the pitiful outbreak of our own selfishness and puerility. Hence it is needful to unfold in detail the lineaments of spiritual perfection, that men may *know* what spirit they are of, and through the clear recognition of realities be saved from self-deception. Only thus can they learn to discern the spirits and to distinguish heavenly inspirations from earth-born suggestions. The pulpit needs a large increase of its influence in rousing and cultivating this faculty of spiritual discernment.

Lastly, the various graces of the Christian character have to display themselves in practical life. If they were not confronted by any opposing forces, they would issue spontaneously in certain lines of action which would constitute the Christian ideal of public and private conduct. When these actions are duly classified and arranged, we obtain a moral code, which may be regarded from two different points of view. According to the Christian idea it simply describes in detail a manifold and prolonged offering of love to Him who has Himself consecrated the sacrifice. From a lower spiritual position it appears as a law of duty, which lays its commands upon the will and requires obedience. Now, if we all stood upon the Christian height, we should not need any law of duty, but (so far as the fundamental principles of conduct are concerned) might live each moment out of the spontaneous impulse of the pure heart; but, in fact, the spirit is not always equally fervent, and the inspirations of our highest moments turn into duties for our lower moods. And therefore the preacher, when he has taken men up with him to the mount of vision, and shown them there the practical results of the highest spiritual energy, should press upon them the obligations which thence arise, and urge them to the fulfilment of their duties, not only as members of a church, but as members of a State, of a society, of a family, and as solitary workers responsible in their most secret life to the Lord of their conscience. We must remember, too, that many people who are comparatively insensible to spiritual appeals are not without a moral sense

which would respond to the claims of duty or take warning from denunciations of wickedness. There are also some matters on which Christian teaching has not generally expressed itself with the clearness and emphasis which we might expect. Might not the pulpit do more than it does to foster a spirit of international justice, and put an end to those wars which are more like the revelry of fiends than the serious pursuit of sane and Christian men? Might it not do more to cultivate that purity which would destroy from the root the social blight that is ever seeking to wither the virtue of our people, and whose unveiled iniquity has recently sent a thrill of horror through every right-minded man? Might it not raise a sterner voice on behalf of honesty in trade? Might it not declare itself on the side of lofty principle and honourable dealing and respect for one another's rights in elections and other political matters? Might it not even do something to slay that intolerance which it has too often commended by draping it in garments stolen from the Prince of Peace? When the various parties in Christendom are made aware of the width and the practical bearing of their own faith, they will become conscious of the unity of the Spirit, and find in Christian righteousness a meeting-point for those higher aspirations and that larger purpose before which our sectarian animosities will disappear; and, encouraged by the general call to nobler living, those who venture to undertake the preacher's office will, while not neglecting the other requirements of Christian instruction, be more than ever prophets of holiness and illuminators of the national conscience.

JAMES DRUMMOND.

NOTE ON ST. PAUL'S SAYING IN 1 COR. XV. 32.

“**N**AY, you may search all the Gospels with whatever microscope you will, and you will not find a syllable to match that unguarded exclamation which slipped in an evil moment from the pen of Paul, though in direct contradiction with all his life and all his principles, ‘If the dead rise not again, let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.’” Does this exclamation of the apostle deserve all the opprobrium that is so often heaped upon it by liberal theologians? The opinion regarding it which I have quoted from the admirable article of Dr.

Hooykaas,* in vindication of the character of Jesus, is one very generally adopted. It is thought that St. Paul fell below himself here; that he was so carried away by the necessity of vindicating the resurrection of Jesus, which to him was the great basis of his belief in the immortality of the soul, that he speaks from the point of view of the popular conception of heaven, as a place where the faithful are compensated for the ills they have suffered on earth.

It is to be noticed, however, that we cannot say that this was an "unguarded exclamation which slipped in an evil moment from the pen of Paul." It is the underlying idea of his whole argument. "If there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen: and if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain. . . . If in this life only we have hope in Christ, then are we of all men most miserable. . . . Why stand we in jeopardy every hour? If after the manner of men I have fought with beasts at Ephesus, what advantageth it me if the dead rise not? Let us eat and drink; for to-morrow we die." It is clear, then, that St. Paul deliberately thought he had made a great mistake in life, if the sweet dream of rejoining his blessed Lord beyond the veil were a dream alone, and the final verdict upon humanity be that of the Patriarch Job, "Dust thou art, and unto dust thou must return."

But in thus thinking, does the apostle descend from that pure, spiritual region where he habitually lived, to an altogether lower and grosser religious atmosphere? Is it that he forgets his "system, which absolutely excluded the idea of reward"—a system which was not to him a mere fabric of the intellect, but the very life of his soul—a system which had been beaten out by those agonising spiritual experiences which only great-souled men feel in all their intensity? Is he now more selfish and calculating than when he addressed the Roman Church in an ecstasy of passionate self-forgetfulness: "I say the truth in Christ; I lie not, my conscience also bearing me witness in the Holy Ghost, that I have great heaviness and continual sorrow in my heart. For I could wish that myself were accursed from Christ for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh"? That depends upon how we interpret his words. Many liberal theologians and many evangelicals understand him to say that this life, to himself and his fellow-Christians, was so very miserable that it would be unendurable if it were not for the hope of another

* See *Modern Review*, Vol. II. p. 713.

and a better; that the pleasures of sin are in themselves sweeter than those of purity and goodness, but that, in the latter case, the glories of the future world come in and abundantly turn the scale. Now, of course, the logical result of all this is to make religion a purely utilitarian matter, and this is so entirely foreign to the spirit of St. Paul that I cannot conceive how he can have so far forgotten himself as deliberately to argue from this selfish point of view.

Is it not rather that this great question of immortality is in his mind intimately associated with his whole theory of a spiritual world? If immortality be a delusion, he argues, then the spiritual life is a delusion, God is a delusion, and Jesus lived and died in vain. If the soul perishes with the body, then it is a growth of the material world, having no real and essential existence. Then the carnal life is the only true life—the spiritual life is but its shadow. Better surely to live in what is real and substantial than in what is shadowy and fanciful. Better to take one's stand on the solid realities of earth than to dwell in the illusions of a feigned spirit world. If there be no immortality Christians are indeed wretched, for the sweet ecstasies of devotion which have filled their hearts have been inspired by a baseless belief—the belief that this world is under the government of a wise and holy God, and that righteousness is in its essence different from iniquity. What pain, what agony is to be compared with the misery of those whose fair ideal is thus ruthlessly shattered? “If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable.”

Looking, then, at the question as St. Paul viewed it, we shall find that the words which give so much offence are by no means discordant with his system. To him it seemed that if there be a spiritual world at all, then immortality is simply a necessity. It is one of a series of truths so closely linked together that the falsity of one involves the falsity of all. He is naturally very zealous to maintain his theory of life and of salvation. He sees before him nothing but despair if it could be proved untrue. Is this at all to be wondered at? Does it show an obscurity of mental vision or a want of elevation of spirit? Remember that the apostle has himself staked the labour of his life upon the existence of a spiritual world and the great truths involved therein. He has felt himself inspired with a glorious message to mankind—viz., that man's true life consists in living in the spirit, in living for what is good and pure and holy: that through Jesus

of Nazareth, who was crucified on Calvary, can he alone thus live; that by Him he is brought again into unison with God, is enabled to die to the mere carnal existence, and to rise to newness of life. The apostle was carried away by these truths. For them he willingly spent his life. Difficulties and dangers were faced with gladness, persecutions borne with cheerfulness, through his firm faith in the reality of the life of the spirit. And though he looks forward with ecstasy to the time when the soul shall be freed from its earthly trammels and from its continual warring with the flesh, he does not regard it as a reward for labours undergone. He feels that the mere living this spiritual life here on earth is its own best reward, because he is developing his true being. His love to Christ is so strong, his sympathy with his brethren so intense, that if it were possible to secure their happiness, he would even face annihilation, and worse, and yet not, by any means, feel that he had been the most miserable of men. He would be content, individually, to deny himself the consolation of immortality, if it would only commend the truth of Jesus Christ to mankind. But what if there be no such thing as immortality? Then his great idea has lost all ground of reality. Then the spiritual life is not man's true life. He has been striving with all the might of his passionate soul to cast a glamour over men. He has been erecting his great superstructure upon a shifting quicksand. Well, therefore, might he say that if all his glorious visions of future perfection, all his bright hopes of a sinless life with Jesus, were visions and hopes, and nothing more, the Christian, woefully deceived and utterly heartbroken, would be the most miserable of men.

It will be said:—"But the spiritual life is not founded on a belief in personal immortality. Universal experience shows that it is in itself a very real thing; the compulsion of our moral nature is actually felt, the happiness of a good conscience is an incontrovertible experience, while immortality is a transcendental idea of which we have no empirical knowledge. St. Paul, therefore, was wrong when he thus based his system, which is true and can be proved, on a metaphysical foundation which, to say the least, can never be proved." But the point at issue is not whether or not the apostle was *intellectually* right. Personally I think he was. I think that if our intuition of immortality be false, then our moral intuitions are very likely to be false also. What I am endeavouring to maintain, however, is that St. Paul was *morally* right; that in the utterance under discussion he gives no coun-

tenance to a grossly selfish ethical theory; that he is perfectly consistent with himself, and does not fall below his usual lofty spiritual tone. w Dr. Hooykaas says, truly enough, that there is a vast difference between working for an extrinsic reward and working for a reward which is inherent in the task itself. And it was this latter which was all the apostle wished for even in the passage before us. "To see of the travail of his soul"—that was his aim, that was his reward. Is it the mark of a man of a low and mercenary spirit, to be miserable and despairing when he finds his life has been all a mistake? Do we reproach St. Paul because he felt he would be utterly wretched if the cares and dangers which were already furrowing his brow and blanching his hair had been undergone for nought? Do we think that he ought to have had a light heart in the reflection that he had been encircling his followers with a halo of mystical illusion; that while he had foolishly conceived he was pouring upon them the full-flooded splendour of the eternal glory, they had simply been receiving the exhalations of earth tinted with the glowing colour of his fervid imagination? Surely not. Is it not rather an evidence of his moral intensity that at the very suspicion of the overturning of his system—a system which he knew by a blessed experience to be able to save the soul—he should be blinded with grief, overwhelmed with despair? Surely it was only natural, it was only right, that he should say to his followers if he felt his faith in God and Christ waning: "I have been deceived; I have lost my clue. Not Jesus of Nazareth, but Epicurus, seems to have solved 'the painful riddle of the earth.' The worldlings, after all, are right. Follow me no longer. Obey the behests of your own hearts, and enjoy the sweets of a mere earthly existence. If there be no other than this visible world for which you are to live, I have no message for you."

ANDREW MILLER.

A CONTROVERSY ON THE TALMUD.

AN interesting and instructive controversy on the Talmud has recently taken place in Holland between Professor Oort, of Leiden, and Rabbi Tal, of Amsterdam. The former had contributed an article to a popular Dutch journal (*Eigen*

Haard, 1880, No. 1), in illustration of a picture by de Haan, in which he gave a short account of the Talmud, with specimens of Talmudic reasoning. Rabbi Tal, disliking the tone of this article, and detecting certain inaccuracies in it, made a violent attack upon Dr. Oort, which led to the prolonged controversy to which we allude.*

Rabbi Tal's main thesis is that the ethical system of the Talmud is identical with that of the Gospel, and that any discredit thrown upon the former necessarily falls upon the latter also, and his most important contribution to the controversy is contained in his elaborate survey of Matthew v., with citations of Talmudic parallels to every verse. Many interesting or beautiful passages have been gathered by Rabbi Tal into his collection, and together with a number of familiar citations, we find others that are probably not generally known to Christians. We have, for instance, the following touching legend: On the night before the crossing of the Red Sea "the angels wished to raise a song of triumph over the deliverance God was about to send to Israel. But the Eternal said, 'What! so many of My creatures are to be drowned in the sea, and you will raise a song!'" The following is cited in connection with Matt. v. 21—26: "The first temple was wasted because Israel was corrupted by idolatry, murder, and in chastity. But why was the second temple destroyed? Did not men live after the laws of God, fulfil their religious duties, and even give alms to the poor? Why, then? Because, in spite of all this not love dwelt in their hearts, but hate. This shows us that to cherish hate against one's brother is reckoned as great a misdeed as idolatry, murder, and in chastity." Of alleged verbal coincidences, perhaps the most remarkable is "that he who makes peace is called a son of God." But when taken in the mass Rabbi Tal's quotations appear to be very far from vindicating his thesis: That the main lines of all developed systems of religious ethics must have much in common; that all alike will insist on honesty, on the forgiveness of private injuries, on chastity, and so forth, may be taken for granted. But when we inquire into the spirit in which these general principles were applied and

* Rabbi Tal in *Israel's Nieuwsbode*, Jan. 30, Feb. 6, 13, 1880; and in a pamphlet, *Een blik in Talmud en Evangelie*, Amsterdam, 1881; Dr. Oort in *de Gids*, 1880, No. 4; and in a pamphlet, *Evangelie en Talmud, uit het oogpunt der zedelijkheid vergeleken* (Gospel and Talmud compared from the ethical standpoint). Leiden, 1881.

worked out, Professor Tal's own pamphlet gives us striking proofs that the spirit of the Talmud is legal and traditional in the highest degree, and in so far opposed to the spirit of the Gospel. We can hardly restrain a smile at the naïveté of Rabbi Tal's citation of the following sentiment amongst the parallels to Matthew v. 6—(Blessed are they that do hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be filled.) "He whose good deeds exceed his evil deeds, even by one, to him shall it be well; his days shall be lengthened, and at last he shall obtain eternal blessedness." Again, the following story furnishes an interesting illustration of its better known companion, in which Hillel declares the "golden rule" (in its negative form) to be the "whole law":—"A heathen came to Shammai and said to him, 'I want to be a Jew, but only to believe in the written, and not in the traditional, law.' Shammai chased him out of the house with words of wrath. The heathen went to Hillel with the same proposal. 'Very good,' said Hillel, 'I will accept you.' The first day Hillel taught him the Hebrew letters. The next day Hillel said the letters in the wrong order. 'That isn't right,' said the heathen. 'You taught me differently yesterday.' 'Well then,' said Hillel, 'if you trust me in my way of teaching you to read the written law according to fixed rules why will you not trust me when I teach you to interpret the law according to the fixed rules of the oral tradition?'" We may remind our readers that Hillel was the inventor or systematiser of a wonderfully elaborate method of Scriptural interpretation, which enabled the Rabbis to prove anything they liked from Scripture.

Dr. Oort's thesis is as follows:—"The morality of the Gospel is in many respects diametrically opposed to that of the Talmud. Not only is the former far purer and more exalted than the latter, but their characters are so diverse that if a man is to understand and comply with the demands of Jesus he must shake himself entirely free from the morality of the Talmud." Dr. Oort defends this position with great vigour and penetration, and carries the controversy into a region where the precepts and illustrations of morality are shown in due subordination to the spirit and principles that underlie them. The comparison of Gospel and Talmud cannot be fairly made on the strength of selected "parallels." But perhaps the most noteworthy portion of Dr. Oort's pamphlet will be found in his examination of some of the alleged parables themselves. The results he gives

us serve to impress upon our minds the extreme caution with which we should receive statements we are most of us quite unable to check concerning the Talmud and its contents. For instance, Rabbi Tal cites as a parallel to Matt. v. 33—37 (the prohibition of oaths) the following story from the Talmud:—“Once, in a time of famine, a man gave a golden denarius to a widow to keep for him. She put it into her meal-measure, and it got into the meal, and finally into a loaf which the widow gave away to a poor man. After a time the owner came and asked for the coin, and, of course, it could not be found. Then the widow cried, ‘May the poison of death strike one of my children if I have had any profit from your piece of gold.’ A few days afterwards one of her children died. When the Scribes heard of this they said, ‘See! so heavily is he punished who adds oaths to his assurances, even if they are perfectly true. How stern, then, shall the penalty be of him who swears falsely?’” Here Rabbi Tal breaks off. But Dr. Oort corrects and continues his translation, by a reference to the original, thus:—“‘If it goes thus with him who swears in good faith, how much more to him who swears deceitfully.’ Why [was she punished]? She was punished because she had profited by the space occupied by the coin.” That is to say, she had more meal left for her own use than she would have had if the loaf she had given away had not had the coin in it! Her oath was, therefore, false, though sworn in good faith, and she was punished. The reader may now judge of the aptness of this citation to dispel the belief that the Talmud deals in hair-splitting subtleties, and to foster the conviction that its morality is identical in spirit with that of the Gospel.

Perhaps a still more instructive lesson is taught by the following passage. Rabbi Tal, to show the gentle and forgiving spirit of the Talmud, cites: “If you should meet your friend’s beast bowed down under his burden, and your enemy should be standing near, and should need your help to load his beast, then you should help your enemy first. Even if your friend’s beast must suffer pain a few moments longer as he lies under his burden, yet help your enemy first. For you *must* not cherish any hate against your brother in your heart, and sternly to repress the evil disposition to do so, must go before everything.” Now, we are prepared to learn that translations from such a book as the Talmud must not be made too literal if they are to be made intelligible. But with all due allowance for this necessity, we are

a little startled to learn from Professor Oort that the passage so freely rendered by Rabbi Tal runs thus when translated literally: "One must help a friend to unlade, an enemy to lade. We are bidden to help the enemy in order to restrain his hatred. If cruelty to animals were forbidden in the Law, then must not the first [unlading the friend's beast] have precedence? Yes, but to restrain his passion comes first." Dr. Oort shows that the passage comes in a long and complicated discussion of the question whether cruelty to animals is or is not forbidden in the Law, and shows also from the context, and from the best Jewish authorities, that the "passion" which is to be so carefully restrained is not our hatred of our enemy, but our enemy's hatred of us—which might be dangerously excited if we gave our friend the precedence!

Enough has been said to indicate the extreme interest of the controversy we have been reviewing. It is a matter of congratulation that the Talmud is at last being attacked by Christian scholars who decline to submit themselves blindly to the Jewish tradition, and are determined to see with their own eyes. When Christians make an independent study of the Talmud, availing themselves of Jewish learning, and Jews make an independent study of the New Testament, availing themselves of modern criticism, we may hope to leave behind us the period of barren recriminations, and enter a fruitful epoch of intelligent and friendly co-operation between equally candid and earnest minds approaching with different and mutually supplementing traditions the same great problems of history and criticism.

PHILIP H. WICKSTEED.

DR. J. H. STIRLING'S 'TEXT-BOOK TO KANT.'—REMARKS ON
SOME POINTS IN THE TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

WE may take it as a proof of the intrinsic worth of Kant's thinking, that the centenary of the publication of his greatest work is signalised by the appearance in various parts of the world of a quite surprising amount of Kantian literature. But this revived interest in the exposition and criticism of Kant's writings is, in this country at least, not wholly, or perhaps even chiefly, due to any hope of finding in Kant an

ultimate philosophical guide. It is in the interests of that modified Hegelianism, which is now so vigorous at some of our great centres of learning, that especial attention is being directed towards him who started the grand philosophic impulse of which the Hegelian theory is regarded as the only logical and self-consistent product. Accordingly, the more eminent of the recent English interpreters of Kant, as Edward Caird at Glasgow, J. H. Stirling at Edinburgh, and W. Wallace at Oxford, have previously distinguished themselves as able Hegelians. The same is, to some extent, true of Professor Adamson's work on Kant, and of a treatise by Dr. J. Gould Schurman on "Kantian Ethics and the Ethics of Evolution," an able essay which (we may say in passing) will be noticed in the next number, along with Mr. Wallace's forthcoming account of Kant in Blackwood's "Philosophical Classics."

Dr. Stirling's somewhat formidable work * is certainly no easy reading, but to the earnest student of philosophy the labour spent on it will prove both interesting and profitable. It consists of three parts; firstly, an introductory sketch of the Critique of Pure Reason, excluding, however, the final section (the Transcendental Dialectic), in which is discussed the validity of the three ideas—the soul, nature, and God; secondly, a new translation of the same portion of the Critique; and finally, an elaborate commentary on the part translated.

We took up this volume with much eagerness, for in our former occasional excursions into the Kantian Philosophy we have always hitherto found ourselves brought to a vexatious standstill at certain critical points, but were never sure how far this was really due to our inability to penetrate deep enough into the master's thought. When Dr. Stirling's book reached us it seemed possible that, with so accomplished a guide, a path might be discovered through or over these apparently insurmountable obstacles. In this respect we have been disappointed. Dr. Stirling's clear and vigorous exposition has enabled us to discern more distinctly the true character and bearings of the Kantian doctrine, but in so doing has strengthened rather than weakened our conviction that that doctrine, though it has certainly made good some new and important positions which

* *Text-Book to Kant. The Critique of Pure Reason: Æsthetic, Categories, Schematism. Translation, Reproduction, Commentary, Index. With Biographical Sketch.* By J. H. STIRLING, LL.D. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd. 1881.

philosophy will never abandon, cannot as a whole be looked upon as a tenable account of man's cognitive faculty.

The section on Transcendental Aesthetic, establishing the *a priori* character of Space and Time, is most luminous and satisfactory; but when we pass on to the Transcendental Logic, and attempt to follow Kant in his endeavour to show that the world of experience is produced by the imposition upon our sense impressions of the twelve categories or notions which correspond to the twelve elemental forms of logical judgment, then we find ourselves in what seems to be an artificial system which does not admit of being harmonised with the facts of consciousness. Kant tells us that the impressions of sense are a mere chaos till order is superinduced upon them by the necessary modes of our understanding. But this doctrine, as Dr. Stirling shows, leads to much that is either unintelligible or self-contradictory, and it is quite impossible for us to escape the belief that the order and relations of our various sense impressions are *discerned* by the mind, and not *imposed* by the mind. While Kant maintains that the intelligibility and the order of phenomena are due to the mind's action upon the material of sensation, Dr. Stirling maintains with more reason that the material of sensation is itself an orderly whole, so that the character of our scientific knowledge is determined by the order and kind of our sensational experience, and not solely by the action of the categories of thought upon chaotic sense impressions.

In Dr. Stirling's criticism of Kant's view of the relation of sensation to experience we heartily concur; but when he attempts to replace Kantian by Hegelian doctrine we find that the latter, though a great improvement on the Kantian scheme, is still far from satisfactory. Dr. Stirling holds that the sense impressions, which constitute the material of our knowledge of nature, not only exist *per se* in *orderly* relations, but also in *necessary* relations, and that, therefore, a belief in the uniformity of phenomenal sequences is necessitated by the constitution of our thought. But, so far as we can see, the Hegelians are as little able to show that nature *must* express the particular thought which it does express, as the Kantians are to show that the sensations, apart from the understanding, are an unrelated chaos of feeling. Kant and Dr. Stirling are at one in representing causation as a necessary *time* relation among phenomena,

but while Kant teaches that the necessity is imposed on nature by our thinking, Dr. Stirling, as an Hegelian, finds the necessity in that absolute thinking of the Eternal to which all right thinking is bound to conform. It is with the Kantian view that we have specially to do in this note, but what we have to say implies a divergence from the Hegelian view likewise. For, as we apprehend it, the quest of the intellect for an adequate cause for events is not satisfied till the mind reaches what is felt to be an original or uncaused cause, a true creative source and ground. Such needful satisfaction is given neither by the Kantian statement that the understanding imposes a necessary nexus upon certain successive phenomena, nor by the Hegelian dogma that we are constrained to regard the universe as a complex of thought-relations held together by logical necessities; but it is given, we think, by the reference of phenomena to a noumenal Will who out of infinite possibilities calls into existence the actual phenomenal world.

Probably most students of the Critique have experienced the difficulty which we have always felt on reaching that part where Kant endeavours to explain and establish what he calls the Schematism of the pure intellect, his contention being that before the understanding can act upon sense impressions, it must prepare certain schemata (or general notions of possible relations among phenomena) out of the *idea of Time*. We will leave out of consideration here how far the categories of Quantity and Quality admit of being presented in the form of time relations, and confine our attention to that category of Relation called the Law of Causation, the discussion of which plays by far the most important part in connection with this subject; and naturally so, for it was through Hume's sceptical doctrine on this head that Kant was (as he tells us) "roused from his dogmatic slumbers," and it is to the task of showing that the causal idea is an *a priori* synthetic judgment that our philosopher continually recurs.

Kant's selection of the Axiom of Causality (as he and Hume understood this axiom) for a crucial test of his theory of *a priori* synthetic judgments has always seemed to us an unfortunate one, for, although Dr. Stirling triumphantly declares over and over again that here, at all events, Kant has made out a genuine case of necessary synthesis, we cannot help thinking all the while that Kant has made

out nothing of the kind. It is obvious that the maxim, "Every change must have a cause," may express either of two very different thoughts. It may mean that the mind, by its constitution, must ascribe every event or phenomenon to the action of a power that is not phenomenal, but, as Kant would say, noumenal; or it may mean, on the other hand, as it appears to have done to Hume and to Kant, that the mind cannot help believing that every phenomenon, regarded as an effect, can appear only in uniform sequence to one or more other phenomena called its cause or causes. Now the former of these two meanings is ignored by Kant in this connection, and he spends his strength in endeavouring to prove that we posit a causal connection between the antecedent and the consequent phenomenon, because *necessity* is imported into this time-relationship by the mind's own act. After reading what Kant has to say on this subject in the new light of Dr. Stirling's comments, we feel more assured than before that the belief in the uniformity of time-relationship among phenomena does not belong to the class of necessary truths at all, and that it is the former of the above meanings of causation which alone has a valid right to rank among *a priori* synthetics. The special nature of physical phenomena, and the time-relations among them, have all the marks of being contingent matters, which rest on observation simply, and cannot possibly attain an apodictic character.

Dr. Stirling is clearly aware that the so-called necessity which is supposed to link together the antecedent and the sequent phenomenon is of a very different nature from the necessity which attends geometrical and numerical relations, and, apart from the unproved Hegelian dogma that the universe is a necessary process of thinking, which the Thinker (if any such being exist) *must think in one determinate way*, we believe he would find it a very hard matter to allege any justification for the use of the term "necessity" in this connection. For ourselves, we can only say that reflection utterly fails to make clear to us that phenomena *must* always have followed, and *must* always continue to follow, their present order. That it is immensely improbable that any deviation from the regular course of events should arise we freely admit, on the ground that we have had no sufficient evidence that any such deviation has occurred, and also because there is much reason to expect that the phenomenal universe,

having its cause in infinite love and intelligence, should preserve that uniformity of sequence which appears to be indispensable, both for exact science, and for moral discipline. But when we are told that this uniformity *cannot* be deviated from, for it is a necessary law of our thinking faculty to bind together in indissoluble union the so-called phenomenal cause and the phenomenal effect, we must say that we utterly fail to find any provision in our mental furniture for the production of this assumed insoluble nexus. All that our thought demands is that the aggregate of phenomenal changes in nature should be referred to an adequate cause; and if the Will of the Eternal One be regarded as that cause, the mind's thirst for causal explanation is satisfied, and there appears to be nothing in what either Kant or Dr. Stirling adduces, to exclude from the Divine Will the *possibility* of changing or reconstructing the order of the physical universe. If phenomena and their mutual relations have their ground and their cause in the Will of the Eternal, physical miracles, however improbable they may be, cannot, we think, be unceremoniously bundled out of the court of reason as being at open variance with a necessary law of thought. We have not space at present to discuss the interesting question how the other idea of causation, as a nexus among phenomena, arises; but we have a strong persuasion that it can be fully explained on psychological grounds without referring it to any category which the mind imposes upon our sense perceptions, or, indeed, to any necessity of thought at all.

There is a palpable and fundamental confusion in one portion of Kant's exposition which of itself goes far towards proving that he was mistaken when he fixed upon necessary sequence among phenomena as the essential feature of the causal axiom. It is evident that in issuing the second edition of the Critique Kant was very anxious to guard himself against the charge of Idealism, to which charge many passages in the first edition had fairly laid him open. In furtherance of this object he accordingly accentuates the fact that we cannot help referring the material of sensation to a noumenal *Ding an sich* as its cause, and that in so referring it we are justified by the laws of thought. But one main object of the treatment of Causality in the Transcendental Analytic was to make good the thesis that the notion of causality is a subjective form of our thinking, and, therefore,

possessed of no validity beyond the sphere of phenomena. Now, however, strange to say, Kant declares that it is because of this very same law of causation we are justified in assigning our sense-impressions to a noumenal cause. Nor can we explain this glaring inconsistency as simply one of the few cases in which, *bonus dormitat Homerus*; it has, we believe, a far deeper root in Kant's inability to escape from the true idea of Cause as something quite different from phenomenal sequence.

In place, then, of Kant's *schemata* of the understanding, or the artificial conversion of the twelve logical judgments, through time ideas, into categories, according to which the mind necessarily groups and co-ordinates phenomena, we would venture to suggest that in addition to the *a priori* ideas of Space and Time, and the necessary mathematical relations which they carry with them, we need only the category of Substance (derived from the mind's consciousness of the relation of the permanent Ego to its fleeting states and activities) and the category of Causality (derived from the mind's consciousness that the Ego is the original cause of its own volitions, and their subsequent results) in order to explain all that is necessary or apodictic in our cognition of the external world. The Ego understands Cause and Substance simply because it is itself both Cause and Substance, and Time and Space would appear to be *a priori* forms of our sensibility, which provide the needful theatre on which God symbolises for our instruction and discipline some phases of the inexhaustible riches of His eternal thought. Compared with the material of sensation—*i.e.*, the phenomenal world—Time and Space are necessary in relation to us, for we cannot think away these essential conditions of all finite knowledge; but theirs would appear to be only a *relative* necessity, whereas it seems an *absolute* necessity that all that is phenomenal, and even Time and Space, the theatre of the phenomenal, should be contingent in relation to Him from whose uncaused casuality all existence arises. Kant, as expounded by Dr. Stirling, truly and grandly says :—

A phenomenal world implies a noumenal; and the assumption of such is absolutely necessary in order to subordinate and limit the pretensions of sense. It does not follow, nevertheless, that its phenomenal nature attaches any character of uselessness and meaninglessness to this the world of time which we, in time, inhabit. Here, as evidence from every side assures us, existence is but probationary. There, beyond, is our true and noumenal

home awaiting us for eternity, with God, when time and the shows of time shall have worked out their function on us.

In these words is revealed the secret of the marvellous influence of the Koenigsberg seer. They manifest that clear spiritual insight in which faith and philosophy ultimately blend, and which makes Kant, notwithstanding the needlessly negative issues of his first Critique, a teacher at whose feet the present leaders of modern thought would do well to sit with humble and teachable minds. But it is not till we reach the Critique of the Practical Reason that we find philosophic justification for the above prophetic words, and the unfortunate want of concurrence in the results of the two critiques is, we think, due partly to Kant's imperfect apprehension, in the first critique, of the true nature and sweep of man's intuitive belief in causality, and partly to his unwillingness to acknowledge that the Ego has an immediate and valid knowledge of its own substantive and causal nature. The "shows of time," to which Kant refers above, are surely dependent on Him who is their true noumenal source, and if order prevails in this show, as it undoubtedly does, this is to be ascribed not to the action of our minds upon sensation (as Kant teaches), but to the action of the Eternal; and if we say that He, who is infinite intelligence and eternal love, *must* (as the Hegelians hold) maintain uniformity in the phenomenal world, we seem to be dogmatising about that which, by its very nature, transcends our cognition. Had Kant admitted this he would not only have brought his two critiques into harmonious relations, but he would also have escaped the paradox into which he falls, when in one passage he speaks of "the empirical in perception as, apart from the action of the understanding, a mere chaos of feeling," and in another passage says that "there is a certain *pre-established harmony* between pure form and empirical matter; the one could never be subsumed under the other, were they wholly disparate, wholly incommensurable." It is, indeed, impossible to believe that the sensational experience which constitutes our universe is a primeval chaos into which our mind *puts* order; rather is it a cosmos in which our mind *finds* order and beauty, and of which it by slow degrees learns the deep and divine significance.

As we have said, there seems to us very much in Kant's critique, especially in the Transcendental *Æsthetic*, which should be regarded as a most important and permanent addition to

philosophical truth, and we think that for the appropriation of this element of truth Dr. Stirling's able volume furnishes most reasonable and effectual aid. And if some of our readers should, like ourselves, be unable to follow Kant with perfect satisfaction through the Transcendental Analytic, the strenuous effort to do this, under Dr. Stirling's guidance, will assuredly result in no small mental gain.

C. B. UPTON.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

CANON FARRAR'S 'MERCY AND JUDGMENT.'*

CANON FARRAR here winds up the long controversy created by his sermons on Eternal Hope. It is marvellous how rapidly a revolution may be effected in relation to some popular religious opinions. A few years ago those who wished to entertain a hope that the mercy of God might reach beyond the grave, found it all but impossible. The Scriptures seemed to speak with the utmost plainness and decision as to never-ending punishment. The doctrine was found in creeds and liturgies, not indeed so much as an article of faith that had been defined because somebody had called it in question, but as one of those things assumed to be undisputed. Men of daring intellects like Origen had supposed restitution probable, or had at least expressed a hope that in some way unknown to them it might be possible. But had not the Church Catholic condemned Origen, and since that time has there not been an unailing tradition that the never-ending punishment of the wicked was part of the Catholic faith? The great preachers of all churches, East and West, Anglican, Presbyterian, and Nonconformist, had guarded sacredly the doctrine of a never-ending hell in which the great majority of mankind were to burn for ever. It might have been argued that surely if ever a doctrine answered to the criterion of *Vincentius Lirinensis* it was this; and yet Dr. Farrar has brought weighty arguments to prove that its existence in Scripture is very doubtful, and that it has never been a necessary part of the Catholic faith.

This present volume takes the form of an answer to Dr. Pusey, and the result is that the two doctors of divinity, though representing entirely different, not to say antagonistic, theologies, are apparently more agreed than at first sight could have been expected. Men rarely understand those who differ from them, and, strange to say, Dr. Farrar finds it necessary, in the very first page, to say emphatically that he never denied "the possible endlessness of punishment." It is a subject on which he dare not dogmatise, a subject on which the Church has not dogmatised, and on which the Scripture writers speak, as they do on all transcendent

* *Mercy and Judgment. A few Last Words on Christian Eschatology, with reference to Dr. Pusey's "What is of Faith?"* By F. W. FARRAR, D.D. London: Macmillan and Co. 1881.

subjects, in indefinite or metaphorical language. It is not against a dogma that he contends, but against an accumulation of errors, which constitute the current or popular belief.

Dr. Farrar discourses of four points which he regards as accretions to the Catholic faith. The first is that the fire of hell is corporeal, and its tortures physical. That this was believed not merely by ignorant or popular preachers, but by learned theologians, is shown by a long list of quotations from Fathers, schoolmen, and modern theologians, both Roman Catholic and Protestant. Yet the nature of the sufferings of hell has never been defined; whether they are mental or physical is a mere scholastic question. The second accretion is that the vast majority of mankind are doomed to endless torments. It has been said that on this question Lacordaire changed the faith of the Roman Catholic Church. The Church itself was never committed to any belief on the subject. But in the time of Massillon the number of the saved was believed to be small. Now many eminent theologians of the Roman Catholic Church believe in the ultimate salvation of the vast majority of mankind. It is, however, certain that this has not been the general opinion of the theologians of any church.

The third supposed accretion is that there is no such thing as a terminable punishment beyond the grave. A termination to punishment is found in the Purgatory of the Roman Catholics, which, however mixed up with many things that are "Romish," may yet be identified with the intermediate state which is a doctrine of the Early Church. On the present, as well as on the first two, there is a verbal agreement between the two doctors; but under this agreement there is a difference, which, it appears to us, Dr. Farrar has too anxiously ignored. Dr. Pusey denies any further probation, and only admits a purification; agreeing here with Dr. Newman, who said, in a letter to Dr. Plumptre—"What we cannot accept is . . . that man's probation for his eternal destiny, as well as his purification, continues after this life." Dr. Farrar makes it indifferent whether there is a purification or probation; and so it would be if all were to undergo the purification, and so perhaps be finally saved. But if it is not a probation, it cannot be extended to all, as only those souls pass into Purgatory which are not good enough for Paradise, but which are yet among the saved. And this runs into the next question, which is, that "the supposition of the necessarily endless duration of hell for all who incur it," is also an accretion to the Catholic faith. Dr. Farrar persuades himself that on this point he is at one with Dr. Pusey, because he believes that "the soul which never repents to the end will suffer to the end," words which evidently imply that probation continues; while Dr. Pusey and Dr. Newman merely allow a purification, which extends only to a certain class. Dr. Farrar seems from the first to have been under an illusion as to the charity of the Roman Catholic Church. Its hell is as terrible and as endless as the hell of President Edwards or Mr. Spurgeon, and as many go into it. It is only the souls of the faithful which are admitted to the purgatorial purification, and these,

it is commonly understood, are only to be found within the pale of the Church.

Dr. Farrar is at issue with Dr. Pusey on a multitude of details, such as the meaning of the words usually translated "eternal," or "everlasting," the meaning of "Gehenna," which, he maintains, was not an endless hell, but a place of terminable punishment,—the judgment of the Fathers, whose universal consent Dr. Pusey claimed as on his side. But against Dr. Pusey's list of names and quotations Dr. Farrar sets another, equally, if not more, imposing. The chapters on Origen and the Councils by which he was condemned, are of special interest. The idea of final restitution has been represented as first broached by Origen, but immediately condemned by the universal Church as heretical. Dr. Farrar shows, on the contrary, that four Œcumenical Councils and several Synods were held after Origen's death without any condemnation of him or his theory. If his doctrine of the restitution of man was ever declared heretical by an Œcumenical Council (which is held to be very doubtful), it was not till three hundred years after his death, and the Council was one that "goes for very little, being by no means a creditable assembly."

JOHN HUNT.

DR. LECHLER'S 'JOHN WICLIF.'

THE re-issue of Dr. Lechler's *Life of Wiclif* in its English dress,* gives us an opportunity of congratulating historical and theological students that a work of its various, and in some respects unique, merits should be introduced to this country. It is remarkable how seldom the attempt has been made by Englishmen to furnish a biography of the great schoolman. Only two works of this sort deserve mention; one was published in 1720, the second in 1828. The latter is, of course, the standard biography by Dr. Robert Vaughan, who collected every fragment of manuscript evidence in regard to Wiclif that he could lay his hands on, but who, curiously enough, ignored almost entirely Wiclif's Latin writings. It is in this direction that his book departs most widely from that now before us; for Dr. Lechler has explored, with indefatigable pains, the rich stores of Wiclif literature, contained in near forty manuscript volumes—the plunder of the Bohemian monasteries—in the Imperial Library at Vienna. Every page of the work bears witness to the exhaustive knowledge of these documents—hitherto hardly opened—which the venerable author possesses. Nor has he failed to make use of the select English works of Wiclif, lately edited by Mr. Thomas Arnold (whom, we may notice, Dr. Lechler does *not*, in the German, signify by the title of "Reverend," a title added by the translator, and hardly com-

* *John Wiclif and his English Precursors*. By Professor LECHLER, D.D. Translated from the German, with additional Notes, by PETER LORIMER, D.D. New edition, in one volume. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co. 1881.

patible with the position of a Catholic layman). Indeed, it would be difficult to point out a department of his subject about which Dr. Lechler has not learnt all there is to learn, or which he has not illustrated with a fulness of reference and solid quotation hitherto unapproached.

The strength of such a work, and the fruit of such researches, should appear less in the actual biography than in the treatment of Wiclif's theological system. It is, however, to be deplored that Dr. Lechler has not chosen to digest Wiclif's system in the order of the thinker's mind, on the lines of his great Theory of Dominion. He has simply arranged and compared the scholasticism of Wiclif with the scholasticism of Luther, and docketed it with the nomenclature of justification, sanctification, and all the curious vocabulary of the reformers. In fact, Wiclif is seen by Dr. Lechler exclusively as a "Reformer before the Reformation." He has no interest for him otherwise. His metaphysics are passed by perfunctorily; and in his theology it is only the points of alliance and the points of difference that receive copious treatment. It is evident, however, that "contact" and "divergence" fail entirely to express Wiclif's relation to the later reformers. His world is another world than theirs, and the whole grasp of his mind held in by totally different conditions. We can only appreciate the great teacher justly when we have erected the fabric of his theological system as he built it; afterwards we may fairly lay this system beside that of Huss, of Luther, or of Calvin. It is unjust and uncritical to cut it into fragments, shaped after the pattern of the Reformation, and estimate the bits according to their likeness or unlikeness to this criterion. It may be added, moreover, that this was not Dr. Lechler's declared intention; only, writing as an Evangelical divine, he saw no other way open to him, he could not conceive a quasi-evangelical system differently arranged from his own. He has advanced before most writers of his school, in so far that he has laudably attempted to regard Wiclif as he stands in relation to the general course of religious thought in the later Middle Ages; but the survey, considered as a philosophical exposition, loses its lucidity and unity in consequence of the same primary defect.

John Wiclif and his English Precursors is far from covering the same field as the original, *Johann von Wiclif und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation*. It is, in fact, only a translation of three parts of Dr. Lechler's first volume. We lose the valuable summary of the opposition to the Catholic Church in Continental Europe from the Waldenses onwards; and we have nothing so compact and thorough in English. But more than this, the entire second volume, with the history of Wiclif's followers, the Lollards, the Hussites (including an elaborate biography of Huss), and all the other streams of religious opinion that tended towards the gulf of the reformation, is entirely omitted. This is much to be regretted, since Dr. Lechler is at his best as an historian. He is learned, laboriously accurate in detail, entirely conscientious; and his narrative is throughout orderly and clear, above the measure of most German books.

In the actual biography of Wiclif there is room for little but praise.

True, the man does not stand before us in Dr. Lechler's pages with that life and vigour which the extent of the author's resources might have enabled him to infuse into his personality. What Dr. Lechler has done, and done most successfully, is to furnish the student with every available material out of which to create for himself a portrait of the great doctor; and, except in the "systematic" chapter, this material is well arranged and critically balanced. For convenience the English book cannot compare with the German. The notes have been relegated from the foot of the page to the end, sometimes of a chapter, sometimes of a section; and the numerical references to them have been misplaced in an incredibly careless way. We have not found a single chapter in which they tally beyond the first few pages; and in some, for page after page, there are nearly five false references in each, and conversely there are actually notes left standing which relate to a portion of the German omitted in the translation. In a work of which the peculiar value consists in its reliance on manuscript evidence, this inaccuracy is unpardonable. Otherwise Dr. Lorimer has produced a creditable translation. The style cannot be called scholarly or careful, but the translator rarely perverts the sense of the original, and only becomes confused in philosophical passages. Generally he is clear and readable. He has also done good service by adding some notes on Wiclif's life at Oxford. In these he has succeeded in giving a high probability to the supposition that Wiclif was never at Merton, and that, from the beginning down to his appointment as Warden of Canterbury Hall, he was continuously a member of Balliol College. We hope that the success of the work, which its substantial merits should warrant, will encourage Dr. Lorimer to make his part of it more accurate; perhaps it is too much to hope that he will increase it, if not by the rest of the introduction, at least by the subsequent history of Lollardry, and the most interesting fortunes of the church-opposition in England.

R. LANE POOLE.

DR. STOUGHTON'S HISTORY OF RELIGION IN ENGLAND.

DR. STOUGHTON'S half-dozen handsome volumes* comprise, in consecutive form, those histories of religion in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which he has occupied one-fifth of the nineteenth in compiling. They are rich in learning, broad in conception, generous in temper, and agreeable in style, and will, undoubtedly, command a conspicuous, perhaps an enduring, place among standard works of reference. No one else has brought together so much matter from out-of-the-way and special sources for the illustration of the

* *History of Religion in England, from the opening of the Long Parliament to the end of the Eighteenth Century.* By JOHN STOUGHTON, D.D. Six Vols. New and Revised Edition. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1881.

story of English religion in the days of the Commonwealth, of the Restoration, and of the Revolution. Yet Dr. Stoughton has not escaped the penalty which must be paid by every writer who undertakes to treat of one department of human thought and action to the exclusion of the rest of the complex whole. The events and the personages of the stirring drama which he unfolds are alike incomplete in the account he gives of them. Indeed, no period could have been selected in which it is more impossible to separate the religious from the political movement, than that which Dr. Stoughton has made the subject of his labours. You cannot write adequately of the Caroline Anglican and Puritan without writing much about the Cavalier and the Roundhead. You cannot unfold the causes which led to the successive predominance of Presbyterians, of Independents, and of Episcopalians, without dwelling on the rights of Parliaments and the claims of kings. And thus Dr. Stoughton has had at every page to solve the problem, how far the discussion of contemporary politics was essential to the clear exposition of matters ecclesiastical. On the whole, we think, he has decided with tact and judgment; but it would not be true to say either that he had painted full portraits of the chief characters on his canvas, or that he had avoided all confusion in narrative. The edge of the story is jagged. We have sudden gaps. Narratives are begun and left unfinished; the first move towards the arrest of the five Members is related; the rest of the narrative is dropped. The famous Conference at Uxbridge is left sitting. We visit Charles I. in the Isle of Wight, and see him removed to Hurst Castle; but we next meet him on the scaffold. The threads of the history are so many that Dr. Stoughton drops this one and that unconsciously from his hand. We often wander down lanes which turn out to lead nowhere at all.

But to say this is only to say that Dr. Stoughton has not accomplished an almost impossible task. A graver defect in his book is the comparatively slight insight it gives us into the popular religious life of the period as distinguished from its ecclesiastical politics. It is true that the material for a full account of what religion was in the hearts of the people is not to be got from State papers or Parliamentary journals. It must be caught from the books, the letters, the news-sheets of the time; and even these cannot be made to yield it in any abundance. It is true also that Dr. Stoughton goes far towards making good the defect by the admirable sketches of a multitude of preachers and pastors which cover some of the most delightful pages of his volumes, and are ingeniously gathered from all kinds of sources. But we cannot always assume "like priest like people," and a great history like this should give us something more; and it is as a great history that Dr. Stoughton's work deserves to be judged.

And now we have said all that can fairly be alleged against the excellence of Dr. Stoughton's remarkable achievement. For the rest, we can use no language but that of praise. Dr. Stoughton deals with the most profoundly interesting period of English history in its most profoundly

interesting aspect. And his work does not fall short of the proper interest of its theme. Perhaps the most striking merit of the book is its conspicuous fairness—fairness on a field where, as the historian justly observes, neutrality is impossible. “No reader,” says Dr. Stoughton,

“Who has any fixed theological opinions, can examine the Church systems of that age without feeling sympathy with some one of them, mingled with disapprobation in reference to others. The theologian is constrained to take a side as he studies this exciting history. A passionless neutrality is absolutely impossible. At the same time, a student is chargeable with injustice who does not carefully strive to ascertain the defects of his own party; and he also is wanting in charity if he be not ready to acknowledge the moral and spiritual excellencies of persons whose opinions were different from those which he himself entertains” (Vol. II., p. 407).

While the author's own partiality for the Independents is nowhere disguised, neither Anglican, nor Presbyterian, nor even Catholic can lay to his charge any injustice towards any section of the Christian Church. It is in the spirit of the paragraph just quoted that Dr. Stoughton writes from first to last.

It is impossible within the limits of this notice to include any quotations which would adequately illustrate Dr. Stoughton's method. It is the personal sketches that are the brightest ornament of the book. While, in a religious history, Cromwell or William III. can only stand half revealed, with ecclesiastics of all shades we make a really intimate acquaintance. Baxter goes in and out familiarly, now visiting his parishioners at Kidderminster, now—in his godly simplicity—thinking to move the Bishops at the Savoy Conference. Philip Nye, the preacher, but politician before he is a preacher, turns up now and again through many volumes; and in him we understand the more restless spirit of Independency. The group of the Cambridge Latitudinarians prepare the way for the milder prelacy of the eighteenth century. Dr. Owen breathes the spirit of the milder Independency at Oxford; Philip Henry exhibits the sweet, brave life of the faithful Presbyterian pastor; George Herbert shows what piety Episcopalianism can nurse and cherish; San-croft illustrates how not all men of large and liberal mind could adjust their conscience to the Revolution.

Be the student Episcopalian, Presbyterian, or Independent, he will do well to study in this excellent book the virtues and the vices, the strength and the weakness of his ecclesiastical progenitors. Be he none of these, he will learn from Dr. Stoughton much of that complex play of human motive which produces history, and he should acquire from these volumes, not only a larger information, but a larger sympathy with forms of Churchmanship other than his own.

R. A. A.

PROFESSOR BARTH'S 'RELIGIONS OF INDIA.'

THIS recent addition to Trübner's valuable "Oriental Series" is an attempt to give in one octavo volume a reliable and reasonably full sketch of the history of religious thought in India.* When we recollect that India is about as large in extent, and contains as numerous a population, as Europe does exclusive of Russia—and when we further recollect how much older is Indian than European civilisation—we shall be able to estimate the difficulty of the task. But its importance is equal to its difficulty. Religious opinion in India has run precisely the same course that it has in Europe; it sprang from the same sources, and rests on the same basis; it has been modified by the same causes, and in the same directions; no phase of it is unrepresented by a similar phase in Europe; and though this last is also true of the religious history of some other places, nowhere so clearly as in India has the process of development retained throughout, and even down to to-day, the evidence, and the remains of its earliest stages. To give, therefore, an accurate sketch of this parallel development of religious thought cannot fail to be of the utmost value for the right understanding, not only of the Indian religions, but also of religions in general, and of the European religions in particular.

M. Barth's manual, which is dedicated to Dr. John Muir, of Edinburgh, begins, of course, with an account of the religious beliefs so wonderfully preserved for us by the memory of Indian priests in the Vedic hymns. Not that M. Barth considers the literature so preserved to us to contain within itself evidence of the whole beliefs of the Aryan tribes in the valleys of the Punjab at the time when they were composed. "I am far from believing," he says, "that the Veda has taught us everything on the ancient, social, and religious condition of even Aryan India, or that everything there can be accounted for by it. . . . The hymns do not appear to me to show the least trace of popular derivation. I rather imagine that they emanated from a narrow circle of priests, and that they reflect a somewhat singular view of things. . . . Outside of them I see room not only for superstitious beliefs, but for real popular religions, more or less distinct from that which we find in them. On this point we shall arrive at more than one conclusion from the more profound study of the subsequent period. We shall perhaps find that, in this respect also, the past did not differ so much from the present as might at first sight appear—that India has always had, alongside of its Veda, something equivalent to its great Sivaite and Vishnuite religions, which we see in the ascendant at a later date, and that these anyhow existed contemporaneously with it for a very much longer period than has, till now, been generally supposed." This is all very true, and very important. In fact the Vedas do not represent, as they are so often said to do, a

* *The Religions of India.* By A. BARTH. Authorised Translation by Rev. J. Wood. London: Trübner. 1881.

primitive phase of belief. They afford evidence only of an advanced and cultivated stage of religious opinion—a kind of Polytheism or Henotheism which had grown out of a previous Animism. And the lower animistic beliefs which the authors of the hymns pass by as scarcely worthy of notice, not only survived, but had a very real influence on the daily life of the people, as is evident from the Atharva-Veda, as well as from later records. Of these beliefs, earlier than those in the Rig Veda, though scarcely mentioned in it, M. Barth gives no account. This is much to be regretted. As it is, the remarks quoted above (from the preface) may easily be overlooked, and the reader may carry away the very erroneous impression that the history of religious opinion among the Indian Aryans begins with the Rig Veda. It would, indeed, almost seem that, when M. Barth wrote his book, he was himself still of that opinion, and that the modified view put forward in the preface was, though not an afterthought, still not uppermost in his mind before the preface was composed.

The chapter on the Rig Veda gives, first, a general view of the successive formation of the Vedic literature, in the course of which he expresses his belief that "the great body of the chants of the Rig must be referred back to a much earlier period than the eleventh century before the Christian era." Then follows a detailed account of the various divinities, and of the Pantheistic and even Monotheistic conceptions which appear in some of the later hymns. And, finally, a short sketch of the morality underlying the general view of things, winding up with a reference to the animistic notions above referred to.

Chapter II. deals with Brāhminism—that is with the time when the hymns had become degraded into use as parts of the ritual of an aristocratic, expensive and bloody worship, for the services of which an exclusive and educated priesthood were considered necessary. The cultus, without images or sanctuaries, is described with sufficient fulness; and the growth and character of the sacred caste is set forth in detail. Then follows a description of the speculative thought of the Upanishads, and of the well-known six schools of philosophy based upon it—the chronological order being here not strictly observed, for a good deal of the later phases of this side of Brahminical opinion is really post-Buddhistic. The chapter closes with the decline of Brahminism, the formation of the later portions of the sacred literature, the changes in ritual (such as the abolition of animal sacrifices), and the advance of speculation down to the supremacy of the Vedantic Pantheism.

The reader is then taken back to Buddhism; the short account of which is coloured by that strange animosity which so often—there are not a few brilliant exceptions—characterises those writers who look at it in the light of Sanskrit studies. The chapter might almost be called "Buddhism, from a Brahmin's point of view," and is the least satisfactory part of the volume; written without insight into its deeper side—M. Barth thinks it is only a philosophy of despair—with no mention of its ethics, and not seldom without accuracy in the statement of facts.

A short chapter is devoted to Jainism ; and then follows a very full and interesting treatment of post-Buddhistic Hinduism, which occupies half the volume. First the deities of the different orthodox sects ; then a sketch of the history and doctrines of those sects ; then the various reformers, before and after the influence of Mahommadanism became felt ; then the modern rites and idolatries, the sacred symbols and objects, the festivals and pilgrimages, are successively passed in careful and elaborate review.

This is not only on the whole the best, but the only manual of the religions of India, apart from Buddhism, which we have in English. Professor Monier Williams's *Indian Wisdom* and *Hinduism* scarcely do more than touch upon the Vedic beliefs ; and Professor Max Müller has never travelled far beyond them. The present work is in every way worthy of the promising school of young French scholars to which the author belongs, and shows not only great knowledge of the facts, and power of clear exposition, but also great insight into the inner history and the deeper meaning of the great religion—for it is in reality only one—which it proposes to describe. The list of authorities given in the notes is both ample and well chosen ; and, subject to what has been said above about Buddhism, it can be strongly recommended as a useful manual, and a very complete and accurate sketch.

T. W. REYS-DAVIDS.

DR. TIELE'S COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF THE EGYPTIAN
AND MESOPOTAMIAN RELIGIONS.*

THE publication of this translation will place this valuable work within the reach of a larger circle of readers than its Dutch original could secure. Dr. Tiele's labours on the history of religion are now so well known and so highly esteemed, that a few words will suffice to call the attention of students to this important volume. It really represents the first great instalment of a comprehensive History of the Ancient Religions, and embraces the religion of Egypt with those which may be briefly designated Mesopotamian, viz., the pre-Semitic and the Semitic Religions of the Valley of the Tigris and Euphrates, and of the Phenicians and Israelites. Dr. Tiele's general views on these different developments have been summarised in the *Outlines of the History of Religion*, already in the hands of English readers, and recently translated also into German and French. But whoever would fill up the sketches there traced must consult the larger work before us, into which Dr. Tiele has woven the results of nine years' additional study since the treatise was first composed.

* *Histoire Comparée des Anciennes Religions de l'Égypte et des Peuples Sémitiques*. Par C. P. TIELE. Traduite du Hollandais par G. Collins. Paris. 1882.

These nine years have been fruitful in further discovery. The cuneiform Scholars, in particular, have been hard at work, and an immense mass of material has been placed in their hands by the publication of new texts, and the accumulation of knowledge for their decipherments. Amid these Dr. Tiele threads his way with steady step; cautiously withholding assent (especially in the matter of some of the Akkadian theories) from unproved conjectures, and waiting for further revision and more assured results. The progress of investigation has, however, cleared up a number of obscure and difficult points, and the author has accordingly recast the portion of the treatise specially devoted to the religions of Babylonia and Assyria. A new chapter has been added on the religion of the Sumirs and Akkads, and the other chapters have been largely re-written. This division may be, in fact, regarded as almost a new work; and the amount of labour which it must have cost the author is a significant testimony to his love of truth. Several changes have also been made in the first part, devoted to the religion of Egypt. These have been to some extent necessitated by the development of inquiry in fresh directions: in other respects they are designed to indicate the effect of religion on the morals and social condition of the Empire at different periods of its history. In the older treatise this great subject was rather ignored; and the reader was left with but scanty information on one of the most deeply interesting questions connected with the organisation of any religion, viz., its influence on ethics. This defect has been largely repaired, and several pregnant generalisations afford the student provisional guidance, as he prepares to attempt the difficult task of estimating the value of particular forms of belief for the culture of the conscience and the regulation of life. In the third section, on the religions of Phœnicia and Israel, there has been less need of change. The main views of Dr. Tiele were framed in accordance with the theory of the late origin of the Levitical legislation, which has so completely altered our whole conception of the development of Hebrew religion. The progress of inquiry during the last ten years has tended steadily to confirm this once startling idea, and our author accordingly has found little to modify or suppress. His hypothesis of the Kenite origin of Yahvism remains unshaken, for the simple reason that it is not capable of disproof; while the part which he ascribes to Moses in establishing the primitive religious institutions of Israel places him among those who may almost in a sense be called conservative, from their recognition of the value of religious tradition, compared with critics who have less faith in historic continuity.

Why, however, should the religions of Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Palestine be grouped together? Externally, of course, there is a certain significance in thus comparing with the religion of Israel the religions of the great powers with which it was successively in contact, and whose movements exercised again and again such decisive influence upon its history. But this is not the point of view which Dr. Tiele adopts. He describes the faiths of the Nile and the Euphrates for their own sakes, quite apart from all question of their place upon the map. And he finds

in them certain common elements amid their multitudinous differences. These are not mere outward resemblances—such as between Hathor of Egypt, and Ishtar of Mesopotamia (Athtar in Yemen), or between the Theban Amun and the Chaldean Anu, both signifying “the hidden.” It is not a question of the likeness of the brick pyramids, the tombs of Apis, among the most ancient monuments of Egypt, and the terraced temples of Babylonia—which were regarded as the tombs of the gods. Rather is it the essential ideas, the fundamental conceptions, which lie parallel with each other. Remote in origin, they advanced in a similar direction—viz., towards a theocratic constitution of the most definite kind. The Kings reign as the representatives of the gods; in Egypt they are the objects of an actual cult; in Assyria, they reign in the name of the deity Asur; in Babylonia, royalty had a distinctly sacerdotal character. The significance of the Egyptian name for divine beings—*nuteru*—was, if Mr. Renouf may be followed, the same as that of the Semitic *ilāni*—viz., “the strong ones.” Dr. Tiele shows in an interesting manner how the circumstances of Egypt led to a modification of this idea into that of revolutions of life and the renewal of being, with which was closely connected the doctrine of existence after death. The sterner climate of Assyria, and, possibly, varying political conditions, gave to the northern theocracy an austerer form, wherein religious thought, working under other modifying causes, rested more simply in the ideas of naked power, and became more exclusive and less accommodating.

Midway between the two, geographically speaking, but far above them both, spiritually, was the religion of Israel. Its numerous points of contact with the Phœnician and other Semitic faiths, are necessarily exhibited with great fulness by our author, who plants himself on the firm ground of historical connection, proved by community of language, usage, and ideas, and can deal with the records of its development without the necessity of vindicating any pre-established view. The religion of Israel, like that of the two great powers who so often aimed at each other across it, was a theocracy. But the leading idea which its prophets infused into it, was that neither of cyclic life, nor of pure might, but of an absolute holiness. The causes of this new departure, for such it essentially was, remain still obscure. Why Israel alone should have produced an order of prophets to enter on the long struggle with idolatry; why the ethical conception should have attached itself so early to the religious, so as completely to triumph over all the lower mythological elements, whose presence, nevertheless, in the older phases of belief and practice can still be detected—these are questions which our author does not essay to solve. The time is not yet come, he would perhaps say, for attempting their solution. He is content with a clear statement of the facts and of the conditions immediately preceding them: it is for the philosopher to discover the ultimate causes, or to abandon the quest and confess his impotence. In this matter, however, we fancy that Dr. Tiele's estimate of the value of the prophetic teachings is perhaps lower than our own; at any rate, we confess that we are not disposed to

find fault with them because they were unacquainted with the doctrine of development, and had no notion of the historical method.

It is impossible in this brief notice to give any adequate idea of the richness of learning, the wealth of illustration and happy suggestiveness, of this treatise. The lucidity of Dr. Tiele's style is well preserved in the French translation by the practised hand of M. Collins. Press of matter has, we suppose, excluded several interesting notes; and we particularly regret the disappearance of many references likely to be of great service to the student. Moreover, we cannot help also protesting against the omission of the detailed table of contents, and the absence of any guidance by means of page-headings. There is no way of finding anything in the book except by reading it through from end to end, or guessing in which chapter it is likely to occur. The value of such a book of reference as this would be doubled by a good index. It is much to be hoped that some English publisher will follow the enterprising example of his brethren in Amsterdam and Paris, and reproduce the work in this country. It is a matter of just pride to us to count up the honoured names of our own scholars who have been among the foremost in original discovery and in subsequent research in some of the fields which Dr. Tiele here surveys. But no one has yet brought to the treatment of the material they have so amply provided, the ripe knowledge, the calm judgment, the broad sympathies, the clear insight, which are so conspicuous in this history of the Ancient Religions of Egypt and the Semitic Peoples.

J. E. C.

PROFESSOR SCHOLTEN'S 'PAULINE GOSPEL.'

PROF. SCHOLTEN'S works on the Gospel of Luke and the authorship of the book of Acts, published in Holland in 1870 and 1873 respectively, have at last been made accessible to a wider circle of readers by Dr. Redepenning's German translation.* Even in Holland this translation will be welcomed, for when Scholten wrote his "Pauline Gospel," he was still under the dominion of the almost undisputed critical tradition of the identity of the authorship of the third Gospel and the book of Acts—a tradition with which his own researches and conclusions were in reality at war. Hence, the book, though an extremely valuable contribution to the literature of Gospel criticism, was to some extent unsatisfactory, more especially its concluding portion, which dealt with the "tendency" of the Acts, giving a painfully obvious example of a theory rough-ridden over the facts. All this was corrected in a small supplementary work on the authorship of the Book of Acts, in which Scholten broke with the received opinion as to the connection of that book with the Gospel of

* *Das Paulinische Evangelium, &c.* J. H. SCHOLTEN. Übersetzt von E. R. Redepenning, Elberfeld, 1891.

Luke, ascribing only the final editing of Luke and the insertion of certain specified passages to the author of Acts. This view was sustained with such ability and supported by arguments of such weight, that it is difficult to explain the comparative silence with which they have been passed over, except on the supposition that their having been presented in a Dutch dress only prevented their finding their way into the general current of theological studies. Prof. Scholten has now recast his earlier work and united it with its corrective sequel, so that Dr. Redepenning's translation presents his views in a more compact and uninterrupted form, as well as in a more widely read language, than those in which they have hitherto been accessible, and we can hardly doubt that they will now produce an impression proportionate to their high critical significance and value.

P. H. W.

EWALD'S 'PROPHETS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.'

THE fifth and concluding volume of Mr. J. Frederic Smith's translation of Ewald's "Prophets of the Old Testament" * completes a work of the highest importance to Biblical scholarship in England, and we heartily congratulate the publishers and translator on its issue. The present volume contains the feeble and dying echoes of the old prophetic literature, already paralysed by the growing strength of the priestly spirit, together with the great type of the revived prophecy of Apocalypse—the Book of Daniel. The dull and spiritless exhortations of Haggai, the livelier visions and discourses of Zachariah, the son of Berekiah—a finger post on the road that leads from Ezekiel to Daniel—and Malachi's rekindled zeal and passion, together with the scattered and anonymous oracles of the period immediately before them are brought into connection on the one hand with the historical circumstances of their origin, and, on the other, with the literary history of prophecy and the deeper religious thoughts which they suggest or embody. Then follows a survey of the prophetic "aftergrowths." Jonah represents a mass of legendary matter grouped round the names of the older prophets; while the Greek Baruc and Epistle of Jeremiah represent the simpler form of the newer prophetic style.

Then comes the Book of Daniel, the most interesting portion of the volume, and a fitting close to the whole work. In an elaborate introduction Ewald explains the significance of this great Apocalypse under all its aspects, and develops his theory of an older prophetic work on the same subject (representing Daniel as living in the court of Nineveh) upon which our present Daniel to some extent rests.

The translation strikes us as most successful where it might be supposed to be most difficult. In point of accuracy Mr. Smith's work is,

* Williams and Norgate. 1881.

of course, above suspicion, but in point of style it leaves much to be desired in the introductions and notes. In the text, however, where Mr. Smith had to contend with the notorious difficulty of making a satisfactory translation of a translation, he has been eminently successful. In spite of an occasional oddity which seems almost wilful, the sustained dignity and beauty of the translation of the text of Daniel will secure quite a new feeling of its fascination to the English reader. Though we may hope that we have not yet bidden farewell to Mr. Smith as a translator of Ewald, he will hardly be able to eclipse the best portions of the great work which he has now brought to a successful conclusion, and for which he deserves the sincere thanks of all English students.

P. H. W.

TWO STUDIES OF THE LIFE OF JESUS.

MR. HEBER NEWTON* appears to be a Broad-Church clergyman of the school of Maurice and Stanley—an admirer, though by no means entirely a follower, of Max Müller and Renan. His volume of sermons consists of the last six of a course of twenty-one, preached between Advent and Easter, 1879-80. There is much thought in them, and occasional originality, and there is comprehensive, devout Christianity in every page. It is curious that a preacher, who is evidently well acquainted with the latest New Testament criticism, and appears to accept many of its conclusions, should be so uncritical in his use of the Gospels. Probably so far as the biography of Jesus is concerned, the whole course of sermons must have left his hearers in considerable confusion, but as setting forth the spirit of Christianity they will be found very suggestive, even by those who cannot accept all the preacher's conclusions. The sermon on the Sacrifice of Jesus works out well the great idea that his was but a part, immeasurably great, of the universal self-sacrifice by which man overcomes sin and evil. In "The Continued Life of Jesus" the preacher deals with the question of what are the truly Christian characteristics of modern life and civilisation. In "The Christ that is to be" he describes his own vision of a less dogmatic but more spiritual Christianity than that of the churches at the present day. The sermons are sermons on Christianity, rather than "Studies of Jesus," as they are entitled. What the earlier ones may have been we cannot say, but in these the writer seems to avoid the difficult questions of Gospel history, and to deal with ideas. The ideas may be more important to us than the facts, but we require to have the facts clear, if possible, to prepare the way for the ideas.

* *Studies of Jesus.* By R. HEBER NEWTON. New York: T. Whittaker. 1880.

Mr. Chadwick* certainly leaves his readers in no doubt regarding his opinion as to what is historical and what is not, in the Gospel narratives. His lectures are clear, outspoken, and yet reverent. If only Mr. Chadwick had given copious references in foot-notes, his little volume would have been an excellent little manual of the life of Jesus. It is always a drawback to a work like this if it gives its readers no means of verifying its statements. Still, as a concise statement of the results of the latest and most searching New Testament criticism as affecting the life and character of Jesus, it may be recommended to all who find the greater and more original works inaccessible. The gain to the character of Jesus which arises from our improved knowledge of the formation of our present Gospels is well stated in the first lecture. The description of "The Place and Time" of Jesus is concise and vigorous, and evidently written by a man thoroughly interested in the surroundings of Jesus for their own sake, though we can scarcely believe Mr. Chadwick's own statement that he would "like to dwell upon the character and career of"—Herod the Great. The lecture on the "Birth, Youth, and Training," presents the reader with a suggestive picture of the home and early life of Jesus, concerning which we have no individual facts, but which we may so clearly and safely describe in outline from various sources which give us information, directly or indirectly, as to the life of a Jewish peasant at the beginning of the Christian era. Mr. Chadwick is very outspoken in his rejection of what he regards as the mythical parts of the Gospel, viz., the legends of the infancy and the resurrection, but he accepts with too little question and sifting the other portions of the synoptics. It should scarcely be stated as a simple fact, without reference or note, that Jesus "advised a celibate life," or that he "believed in the resurrection of the body," or that he "had said that his second coming would take place within the lifetime of his disciples." But every student must have his own opinions on these points, and Mr. Chadwick has evidently not reached his hastily or carelessly. The lecture on "The Resurrection" gives a most careful and thorough comparison of the Gospel narratives with one another, and with the words of St. Paul; that on the Deification contains a plain, concise account of the growth of the doctrine of the deity of Christ. The writer's general view of the teachings of Jesus cannot be better given than in his own words:—"The particular moral precepts of Jesus will not in every instance bear the strain of social science, and of wide experience. His principles, subordinating ceremonial to social conduct, and social conduct to private character, are the same immutable and glorious principles, yesterday, to-day, and for ever."

F. H. J.

* *The Man Jesus*. By JOHN WHITE CHADWICK. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1881.

MR. SORLEY'S 'JEWISH CHRISTIANS AND JUDAISM.'

IT has occurred to Mr. Sorley that there is still another way of regarding the problem of the parties in the early Christian Church, and he has accordingly given us an essay* which goes over a great deal of old ground, and opposes incidentally many of the conclusions of the Tubingen School, but yet seeks to give an independent view of the relation which Jewish Christians bore, not to the Gentile Christians—a subject extensively treated elsewhere—but to non-Christian Jews. Speaking generally, Mr. Sorley thinks that the gulf between the Christian and non-Christian Jews was much wider than Baur and his followers admit; that the Apostles occupied from the first an intermediate and mediating position, such as is ascribed to them in the Book of Acts, and that the bitter opposition St. Paul encountered came from unauthorised representatives of the extreme Jewish section of the Church. There is, of course, nothing very new in these conclusions, but there is a certain amount of freshness with which the subject is handled, and a scholarly tone is preserved throughout. A change which came over the meaning of the term Jewish Christian, is well pointed out. "At first the question was one of the relation of 'Jewish Christians' (*i.e.*, Christians born Jews) to the Gentile converts on one hand, and to the Judaism in which they had been brought up, and with which they had not expressly broken, on the other. Afterwards, when the rights of the Gentile converts had been vindicated, and for St. Paul and many others there was neither Jew nor Gentile in Christ Jesus, the question became one of the relation of 'Jewish Christians' (*i.e.*, Jewish Christians in the former sense who sought to retain their Judaism) to the rest of the Church (whether admitted by Jewish or Gentile gate) on the one hand, and, on the other, to the creed and constitution of that Judaism from which they were unwilling to separate themselves. These different phases of the question correspond broadly in time to the apostolic and post-apostolic ages respectively. And the division between the two periods agrees pretty exactly with the date of the destruction of the Temple and the dispersion of the Jews, events which formed a crisis in the history of Christianity as well as of Judaism." This division separates the two main parts into which the essay is divided. In the First Part, the distinction between the earliest Christians and other Jews is thus brought out. The new creed had from the first an aggressive character unlike that of any other existing Jewish sect. A natural consequence was that the early Christians were persecuted. And the immediate result of missionary enterprise and persecution was the formation of an independent organisation. Mr. Sorley emphatically denies that the persecution to which Stephen fell a victim can have been directed only against the Hellenist portion of the Church,

* *Jewish Christians and Judaism: A Study in the History of the First Two Centuries.* By W. R. SORLEY. Cambridge: Deighton, Bell, and Co. 1881.

because he says that Paul and the others who originated it were Hellenists themselves. This is not a strong reply to one of the cardinal points in Baur's theory. Paul was a Hellenist only in the sense of having been born at Tarsus. Mr. Sorley himself notes that Paul's family were strict Jews (p. 6), and certainly this "Hebrew of the Hebrews, as touching the law a Pharisee," "as touching the righteousness which is in the law found blameless," is the very man to have been stirred up to persecute any who disregarded the law and despised the Temple, and there must have been some reason why the Apostles were not "scattered abroad," like the rest, when the Church was so laid waste. However this may be, Mr. Sorley admits that it was only very gradually that the earliest disciples felt that in their Christianity they had something which superseded Judaism, and that it was only the entrance of numerous Gentile converts which at all brought up the question whether a Christian need also be a Jew. His treatment of the subsequent controversy, the Council at Jerusalem, the scene at Antioch, the state of the Churches in Galatia and at Corinth, seems wanting in appreciation of the character and work of St. Paul, such as is inevitable when the Apostle's life is approached first from the point of view of the Book of Acts, and only filled in from a study of his own words in his epistles, and when the general conclusions attained are such as have been already indicated. In his Second Part Mr. Sorley easily indicates how wide the separation between Christians and Jews grew soon after the destruction of the Temple, and how inevitably those Christians who would not go with the times, but tried to retain their Judaism, speedily sank to the condition of heretical sects, despised and rejected by both parties. The Ebionites of this period he considers to have been nothing more than a body of Essenes, who, on the utter collapse of the Jewish State, adopted some Christian beliefs without in the least accepting the spirit and leading of the Church. Perhaps we cannot now give a better idea of the aim of the book than by quoting one of its concluding paragraphs :—

"The course this essay has traversed shows how misleading it is to look with Baur on the early history of Christianity as ruled by the conflict of two parties standing over against one another in abrupt opposition, and by their attempts at reconciliation. What we have really had to do with was the development of a single force, which got possession of the minds of the early disciples, which modified and in time was moulded by its environment, and which found its realisation in the Christian Church. We have seen that not one of the Apostles merely, but all the Apostles, were impressed with this new idea, and that it led them by a necessary process beyond the Judaism in the midst of which they had been brought up and it had its origin. Here, as always, there was a conflict between the new and the old. For the customs and ceremonies which had grown up alongside of the Jewish faiths in an earlier stage were not at once given up when it reached its consummation at a higher point. The old ceremonies were indeed broken through by the new step the national life had taken, and the old customs fell away. But they were broken as the bud breaks before the blossom; they fell as the blossom itself falls before the advancing fruit. The whole development was a natural and consecutive one in which the Christian Church worked out into fuller realisation the idea that had been latent in it from the first, and gave birth to institutions originally connected with its own life to replace the antiquated law and ritual of Judaism."

Of less critical value, and lower in scholarly tone than the work just described, are the lectures lately published by the Rev. W. H. Simcox.* But it is likely to be a popular book. There is a large class of people who want to have religious history put before them in a vivid and picturesque form, without being troubled with controverted questions and without much interference with the old legends which do so much to make a narrative vivid and picturesque. This want Mr. Simcox has set himself to supply, rather unworthily, we think, for he gives evidence of being able to appreciate the higher criticism which cares for the truth above all things. But everything that has been written on the subject during the last forty years is here almost utterly ignored, and the book is, therefore, completely out of line with all modern thought. This makes the very modern language in which it is written, and the occasional introduction into its pages of rather strong colloquialisms, all the more incongruous, not to say amusing, but the character of the book is not determined by its style. The real student, however, will find in it a good deal of interesting reading, and much useful matter handily arranged.

H. S. S.

MR. RHYS DAVIDS' HIBBERT LECTURES.

THE volume containing the last series of the Hibbert Lectures,† delivered by Mr. Rhys Davids seven months ago, has appeared too recently to allow of our giving at present any adequate review of it. We have, however, much satisfaction in promising our readers an article on the subject, in our next number, by Dr. Kern, of Leiden, whose name will be familiar to students of the Indian religions as that of an accomplished scholar and earnest and patient investigator, who, like the Hibbert Lecturer, can speak on the subject of Buddhism with the authority that comes of knowledge and insight. How much light has been thrown on the more obscure and difficult questions connected with the life and teaching of Gotama Buddha is strikingly shown in these deeply interesting Lectures. Mr. Rhys Davids has selected with great skill the main points on which to concentrate the attention of his hearers and readers, suggesting resemblances or contrasts, parallelisms and divergences, which serve in many ways his purpose of illustrating the Origin and Growth of Religion. He is careful to warn his readers against the danger of being misled by merely superficial points of comparison, while he often calls attention to less apparent but more real ones which are much more significant. Beginning with a consideration of the place of Buddhism in the development of religious thought, Mr. Rhys

* *The Beginnings of the Christian Church.* By the Rev. W. H. SIMCOX. London: Rivington. 1881.

† *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion as Illustrated by Some Points in the History of Indian Buddhism.* By T. W. RHYS DAVIDS. London: Williams and Norgate. 1881.

Dauids gives a concise account of the religious and philosophical ideas amongst which it was born. Then we have an interesting description of the writings from which we obtain our chief real knowledge of the Buddha and his teaching. The third Lecture contains an exposition of the doctrine of Karma, the Buddhist analogue of the Brahminical conception of the transmigration of the soul. It is so curiously remote from all our ordinary ideas of existence, its origin and ultimate issue, that the lecturer has accomplished a veritable intellectual feat in bringing fairly within the scope of our apprehension this doctrine of what he calls "transmigration of *character*, not of *soul*;" one of the most curious attempts that have been made to solve the ever-recurring problem of the unequal distribution of good and evil in the world. In the fourth Lecture we have an extremely interesting account of the Buddhist lives of the Buddha, with illustrations of the origin and growth of the Buddhist legend, again presenting us with many suggestive parallelisms with what we find in the earliest Christian records. A description of the society or order into which Gotama's followers were formed, and a brief review of the later developments of Buddhism, which conclude the course of lectures, still serve the main purpose of comparison and illustration.

The Oriental scholars who have found their way through the same intricate mazes of Hindoo thought can alone fully appreciate the difficulty of the task which Mr. Rhys Davids has undertaken in these Lectures, or rightly estimate the success with which he has accomplished it. Certainly, the treatment of the whole subject of the Indian religions by the latest investigators is marvellously different from that which prevailed till comparatively recent days, and which is still to be met with, taking its tone from the impulses now of hostility to Christianity, now of a narrow and ignorant theological partizanship. The Hibbert Lectures have all been excellent specimens of the right attitude in which to approach the whole subject of the comparative study of religions. Looking forward to Dr. Kern's review of this latest series, we have abstained from attempting any detailed critical notice. They are written in a singularly clear and effective style, and there can be no question of their interest and value as a contribution to the literature of religion.

THE EDUCATION LIBRARY.

A DEBT of gratitude to the publishers who send forth this Education Library, to Dr. Magnus who gives his excellent judgment and great experience to its editing, and, most of all, to the authors who are devoting their various and special gifts to preparing the different volumes, is due from all members of the Reform party in the Education controversy. The pædagogic Conservative, too, will gather precious spoil. He will say, "The new-fangled notions are all old! They have been tried and have failed." He is right! But the children call to us, "Try again."

While called a History of Theories,* Mr. Oscar Browning's work is rather a history of Methods recommended, or actually put into practice, and this is most valuable. One day, a work may be given us to be compared in importance with Kant's "Criticism of Pure Reason," which shall examine the philosophical grounds of educational notions in a way to form a true theory. Meanwhile, for the teacher who is disgusted with existing practice, nothing is more instructive than to know what methods were tried, and what maxims laid down, by ancients like Plato, Cicero, Quintilian; by moderns like Montaigne and Verulam; by practical teachers like Comenius, Locke, Pestalozzi.

For pith and brevity the preface is a masterpiece. A note of despair marks the preliminary and the concluding pages, and its pitch may have something to do with Etonian experiences. The Psychology which asserts that "a child is born into the world with its faculties given to it once for all," seems to need as correction a grain of the venerable "pliant wax" and "white paper" theory of the omnipotence of training. At least, we may take the comfort of J. S. Mill's reminder that our ideas of what good methods of teaching might effect, need not be limited by any results as yet produced, for good methods have nowhere yet been consistently put into practice. What little is to tell about Middle Age Teaching is well told. One wishes for more about the "Brethren of the Common Life," one of whom is credited with the "Imitatio Christi," and who certainly bred Erasmus, and for that would have given all the account of Montaigne and Rabelais. Nowadays, with the importunate Democracy pressing on us, we have scant leisure for thinking how best to teach single gentlemen! Perhaps a distrust of the Jesuits' purposes may have led to some undervaluing of their methods. The importance of Rousseau is fully allowed, but not overrated, and the extracts from his "Emile" will be found most instructive. To Pestalozzi, also, justice is done. A little more than justice where it is said, "The Kindergarten of Fröbel is only the particular development of a part of his general scheme." Yet more surprising is this: "We live so completely in the system which Pestalozzi helped to form that it is difficult for us to realise how great a man he was." No schools, known to us, have even begun to take as their *raison d'être* that "harmonious development of all the natural powers" which to him was "the end of education." Schoolmasters *thun noch mit Worten krämen*, "keep on peddling with words," as Faust complained a century ago.

The chapter on Kant, Fichte, and Herbart is, perhaps, for weight of matter, the most valuable of the little book, and contains a treasury of wisdom for the practical teacher. The last chapter on the "English Public School" contains many glimpses of the theory which our author may be supposed to hold. He touches the centre when he asserts (p. 190) "that a simple love of work, and of acquisition of knowledge, is the natural condition for a healthy child;" and "the best means of

* (1) *An Introduction to the History of Educational Theories*. By OSCAR BROWNING, M.A., King's College, Cambridge. London: Kegan Paul and Co. 1881.

effecting this is by day-schools, and no great impulse will be given to the secondary education of England unless a net-work of day-schools is drawn over the country." He disposes of the chosen British argument from results, thus: "If the flower of English youth go habitually to boarding-schools it is not strange that the most successful Englishmen come from these establishments."

If teachers owe a large debt of gratitude to Mr. Browning for his history of "Educational Theories," much more deeply are they indebted to Professor Laurie for his account of the life and works of John Amos Comenius.* A practical teacher, coming to the study of the "Great Didactic" in the selected, condensed, and yet characteristic form here given, will be apt to think he has found a "Novum Organon" of his own special art and mystery! The teacher will find all his "counsels of perfection" quietly prescribed, with hints to elevate his best maxims, and rules to improve his highest practice. What is usually ascribed to Pestalozzi, the study of words through objects, he will find here; and pressed with special earnestness, what makes one of the supreme distinctions of Fröbel, that *learning* be always *accompanied by doing*. His words are "Autopsy" and "Autopraxy," which may look a little scholastic, but, in their meanings, point to the very millennium of education. For the books (of Aristoteles) he proposes to "lay open the living book of Nature, in which there is much more to contemplate than any one person can ever relate" (p. 87). The portion on Method is full of maxims, which, if truisms, are so only in the sense of truth neglected! "In schools they teach words before things;"—is that error universally amended? "Nothing should be taught except when it can be comprehended." What then would become of *our* examinations? He would graduate a complete education in four periods, each of six years, occupying the whole period of youth—from birth to manhood. A system worthy, we think, of being adopted—one day! in this "the richest and worst taught country of Europe" (*Sartor Resartus*). In the Family he shows (p. 140), in a manner quite worthy of Verulam, how the rudiments of every science and every art are learned naturally, by the events and occupations of life: Discipline, good Manners, the elements of Religion and Morality being taught at the mother's knee. The Vernacular School answers to our Primary school; and Comenius maintains that *all*, whatever their rank and prospects of extended study, should therein be taught, together, "all that will be of use to the whole of life." In the Gymnasium, Latin would be thoroughly learned, and preparation made—*certo, facile, solide*—for every known subject of study. These the University would, in the case of the choicest heads only, complete. Comenius is no teacher of ones or twos. He maintains that one teacher may teach a hundred pupils, anticipating in a rational form the monitorial plan, which, with us, still persists in a form not rational. His rules for securing attention are excellent: the Socratic mode is his: continual questioning, with time given for

* (2) *John Amos Comenius: Life and Educational Work*. By Professor F. S. LAURIE, A.M., F.R.S.E., University of Edinburgh.

questions from the pupils also. Space precludes a hundred farther proofs that the "Great Didactic" deserves the name of an Encyclopedia of the Art of Teaching, which no change of circumstances in the two centuries and a-half will be found to have superseded. Comenius is in no sense the founder of a *School*. He is a Reformer. He is an Apostle *ad gentes minutulas*, the children! No more impressive picture can be imagined than is here given us of the Moravian Bishop—in worldly position truly Apostolic, in sufferings Paul-like, yet never bating a jot of heart nor hope. "Wandering (says von Raumer), persecuted and homeless, during the terrible and desolating Thirty Years' War, he yet never despaired: but . . . laboured unweariedly to prepare youth by a better education for a better future."

Professor Mahaffy's sketch of Old Greek Education* may not contain as much direct instruction for the Reformers of modern education as does Comenius, but it is supremely interesting, and conveys with wit, reminding us whence it comes, hints and corrections which doubtless we Reformers need. No one who begins to read this little book will need our exhortations to finish it. Even the unlearned can detect the wide foundation of knowledge out of which the light and easy structure grows. Delightfully unexpected is the account (p. 51) of early pictorial teaching of children. Our respect for the Greek schoolmaster is enhanced by knowing that he used a pointing wand more constantly than a ferule of punishment. Yet, from the combination of uses still existing in our public elementary schools, perhaps this wand, while first intended to illustrate a lesson or "adorn a tale," may also have served "to point a moral." That the Hellenic athleticism was far inferior, in useful effect, to the cricket, football, and boating of Eton and Oxford, may be gladly accepted, with the modest gloss, that Hellenic parents would perhaps not have been so entirely satisfied as British society seems to be, if the supposed pupil of Sophist and Rhetor came forth from his studies, distinguished *only* as Leaper or Pancratiast.

The Ephebi patrolling the frontiers, as preparation for soldiership, match well with our Rifle Volunteers. Above all interesting is the account of the later Schools of Philosophy, by virtue of which Athens became the university of all Europe. Omitting very many things about Greece as it was, this account (p. 184) of the University of Athens, as it is, must not be left out. "At the present moment the University of Athens provides free education for every Greek. . . This now unique provision brings to Athens an influx of young Greeks from all the Levant, from Turkish countries, from Egypt, nay, even from Italy. They support themselves as best they can, often by menial employments, provided they can keep their lecture hours free. Lodging together in the humblest apartments, they club their scanty earnings for the purchase of a light and a text book, which they use in common, the one sleeping till his fellow has done his work, and wakes him to hand him the fresh-trimmed

* (8) *Old Greek Education*. By the Rev. Professor MAHAFFY, M.A., University of Dublin.

lamp and the well-worn manual." We are not surprised that, on the next page, the Professor says: "The condition of things at Oxford and Cambridge, which, in addition to their vast endowments, demand a heavy outlay from their alumni, is not to be defended." It may surprise us that he thinks a worse abuse possible—too great a cheapness of high Education! However it impede progress, the unconsciously selfish Conservatism, which cannot see the "wood"—of real facts—"for the trees," under whose shade it has lain and whose fruit it has eaten, has its momentous share in the inertia without which change would be eternal and true progress *nil*. Nevertheless, we are permitted to hope that the national property, at present invested in the old Universities, will not for ever be expended so much, as at present it is, in Scholarships for those who learn no more, and Fellowships for those who teach no more, for having them. Perhaps the filial feelings of our present Premier, transcendent though he is, more by the forces of his Conscience even than of his Intellect—if in his case one can venture to divide what God hath joined—may forbid him to pry *intra viscera matris*. But that, before long, a successor (*ὑδδοχος*) to him will set about restoring to the English nation the educational endowments which are at present practically wasted on the very classes that hold in addition all the wealth, all the culture, and all the opportunities, of the Empire, may be permitted as a pious hope. That true Learning, that the interests of culture, in the most exclusive as well as the widest sense, need not suffer, no one knows better than *our* Professor. Often as he banters "*the Professors*" (German), no one knows better than he what earnestness of mental toil, what unweariedness of research, what self-denying devotion to Science, are—not rare, but characteristic—products of a German University. His own beautiful sketch of the Greek poor students would stand perfectly well, local tints being changed, for multitudes of *Burschen* and *Privatdocenten* of the German "Fatherland."

W. H. HERFORD.

MR. ROLLESTON'S 'ENCHEIRIDION OF EPICTETUS.'

IT was a happy thought of Mr. Rolleston to give us, in such a very neat and convenient form, this most precious monument of the philosophy of the early Roman Empire.* What better companion, indeed, could the meditatively-inclined traveller pack up in his knapsack than the "Encheiridion of Epictetus"? If he does not find here food for high thinking the fault will assuredly be his own. Mr. Rolleston's translation, not being so literally exact, is much more easy and idiomatic than that of the late Mr. Long, though, it must be said, he might sometimes

* *The Encheiridion of Epictetus*. Translated from the Greek with Preface and Notes by T. W. H. ROLLESTON, B.A., T.C.D. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co. 1881.

have followed his predecessor with advantage. Thus, in chap. iii., he quite misses the force of *καταφιλήs*, which means, not "if you love," but "if you are kissing" or "caressing." In chap. xi. to render *ἀπεδόθη* "it is a return," instead of "it has been restored," is to substitute a somewhat ambiguous phrase for one both exact and unequivocal. In chap. i. "realise it" seems a very questionable translation of *εξέταξε αὐτήν*, and in xvii., *ἵνα καὶ τοῦτον εὐφρῶς διακρίνη* is not correctly rendered by "then may you act that part with grace!" These, however, are small blemishes, and do not materially detract from the merits of the translation, which is probably, on the whole, the best that has ever appeared in English. The introduction by which it is preceded may be read with profit, but the distinction drawn between "a man's real and permanent, and his transitory or phantasmal self," if it is implied in the thought of Epictetus (which it hardly is), is remote from his phraseology, and in our judgment will certainly *not* justify Mr. Rolleston's rendering of *προσάγων ἑαυτὸν* (chap. li.), "bringing forward his true self." The booklet is beautifully printed, with ample margin for pencil notes. On page 28, line 11, there is an *erratum*—for "when" read "where."

R. B. D.

DR. ALLON AND DR. MARTINEAU.

DR. ALLON deservedly holds a high position in the Congregationalist body to which he belongs, and in the Christian world at large. He has rendered eminent services both as a preacher and author, and there is abundance of power yet left in him for good work. He belongs to the school of moderate orthodoxy, and uses old-fashioned language in a comparatively modern sense. He is baptized by sprinkling, not by immersion, with the spirit of the new times, and is borne along by forces which he fears, but to which he needs must to some extent yield. On the other hand, Dr. Martineau is a true son of the age, and foretells the ages that are to follow; and he shows us how the manifold stream of speculation is flowing towards the divine sea into which it is at last bound to pour itself, notwithstanding all its devious meanderings. A courteous controversy between these two representatives of religious thought has recently brought into prominence some important questions of Scriptural interpretation and philosophical theology, and in the controversy, so far as it has gone, both our sympathies and our judgment go with Dr. Martineau.

The full matter of the controversy is summed up in Dr. Martineau's address on "Loss and Gain in Recent Theology," in Dr. Allon's reply to it in his address to the Congregational Union, and in Dr. Martineau's rejoinder in an Appendix, critical and interpretative.* Dr. Martineau

* *Loss and Gain in Recent Theology. Appendix, in Reply to Dr. Allon's Critique.* By JAMES MARTINEAU. London: Williams and Norgate. 1881.

has since published an address on the "Relation between Ethics and Religion."* It is not ostensibly connected with the controversy, and was indeed delivered in the ordinary course of his duties as Principal of Manchester New College; but, still, we shall take it into our consideration in endeavouring to present a picture of Dr. Martineau's complete attitude, both as regards the older dogmatic forms, and the fundamental principles at stake. The occasion is, perhaps, not large enough for a full exposition, and, therefore, we shall confine ourselves to a brief statement and a briefer criticism.

In the summer of 1880, at the request of forty-five former students of Manchester New College, Dr. Martineau delivered the address on "Loss and Gain in Recent Theology," which was noticed in our last number, and has probably been read by all who read this article. It is enough now to say that it was the historical and prophetic picture of a consummate artist. As we read, the shadows of the past moved before us in mournful procession to the tomb, and yet we heard glad songs of rejoicing from mystic watchers on the mountain tops who saw in the distance the break of a brighter morn. While timorous spirits have lamented over the decay of old dogmas as if their decay were the death of the Eternal, and the disappearance of poor theatrical scenery were the removal of the Divine from the stage of history, Dr. Martineau showed that for what we lost, which was no longer worth keeping, God let us into the possession of richer treasures in the new times than ever blessed us in the old. To die was gain. But, as is customary with him, a poet by nature, he clothed his arguments in metaphors, and spoke with all his might and main, as befits a man stating facts and declaring a faith. Dr. Allon seems to have been bewildered by the metaphors, to have doubted the facts, and shrunk from the grandeur of the faith. The consequence was a profound misunderstanding of the drift of the whole address, and the architect appeared a destroyer. In his own address to the Congregational Union he warned his hearers against Dr. Martineau's lamentable falling away from the truth. Misunderstandings of some sort are always inevitable, and generally it is best to leave them to cure themselves, which they are sure to do in time. But now and then they arise in quarters where they cannot safely be ignored, and where they would inflict serious injury if the original utterance were not re-stated in plainer terms. In the Appendix, therefore, Dr. Martineau has wisely gone over the ground a second time with especial reference to Dr. Allon's criticisms, and has made his constructive aims plainer to the ordinary reader, while he frankly bids farewell to obsolete sanctities.

The first address was given to an inner circle of disciples, and so would naturally appear iconoclastic to outsiders. Still, Dr. Allon's misconceptions were, to say the least of them, very remarkable, for surely we might have expected him to interpret particular phrases by the prevailing

* *The Relation between Ethics and Religion.* An Address at the opening of the Session, 1881-82, of Manchester New College, London. By JAMES MARTINEAU, Principal of the College. London: Williams and Norgate. 1881.

spirit. Yet in various instances he managed to read the exact opposite of what was meant, and argued with vehement eloquence and sincere piety against figments that only existed in his own imagination. The appendix is an appeal to the lay public. While it deals one by one with the misunderstandings of the eminent Congregational critic, and makes their repetition practically impossible, it is also quite clear from it that the two men stand on widely different foundations. We are glad to have the appendix. It is a useful commentary on the original text. It is almost unnecessary to add that, notwithstanding their divergent conclusions, Dr. Martineau and Dr. Allon speak of one another with unflinching courtesy and respect. But, if anything, Dr. Martineau is over-modest in his preamble, and Dr. Allon is over-confident all through.

The address on "The Relation between Ethics and Religion" was delivered at the opening of the session of Manchester New College in October. Dr. Martineau has made the philosophy of Religion and Ethics peculiarly his own. When he deals with either of them in their general principles the whole theological world welcomes him as its foremost champion against Agnosticism, Materialism, and the Utilitarianism that denies original moral faculties in humanity. But when he faithfully carries out his principles, and applies them to the Bible and current dogmas, the bulk of the theological world that admired him aforeside lags behind and declines to be logical in his company. It is enough for him to furnish it with weapons which it now uses in its own way, and not in his, against the enemies of both alike, but for other ends.

This is Dr. Martineau's definition of Ethics (page 5).

"Ethics treat of the right ordering of personal relations, so far as these may be made better or worse by our will." And "to say that *personal* relations are essentially *mental* relations is to say that the essential business of ethics is with the *inner springs of action*."

From these premises we get Free Will, a Moral Law, and a Sense of Duty. With the penetrating criticism to which he has often subjected opposing theories, and which he here reproduces in narrow compass with triumphant force, he wanders over the field of thought, and meeting Hobbes and Herbert Spencer, leaves them behind him slain. You cannot get the feeling of duty out of a philosophy if the germ duty be not there to start with. Evolution may be true, and for our part we think there is more truth in it than Dr. Martineau seems to think there is; but even if it be true, as there is an undoubted moral sense now, the potentiality of the moral sense must have been there from the beginning, and the actual is only the invisible which has partly come to light. Mr. Herbert Spencer admits the moral sense *de facto*, but insists that *de jure* it has no business to be there. It is a delusion or an illusion, and will fade away with a completer knowledge of our origin and whereabouts. But, as Dr. Martineau points out, this is turning nature upside down, whereas we have not to put faith only in its lowest groundwork of sense and impulse, but must estimate the moral value of the beginning from what we see in the end, of which the beginning is a dim prophecy,

and the present end the prophecy of a farther end. There is, then, an independent morality. Injustice has been done to it on two sides—on the side of the theologians who have needlessly blasphemed human nature in order to set up the supremacy of theological science, and on the side of the purely human moralists who have cast theology out-of-doors in order to show that man is sufficient for himself in all things. Dr. Martineau attempts and achieves a reconciliation of Religion and Ethics with complete success. We are moral beings because we are men, and we are religious beings because we are men. Morals at their apex flower into religion, which they imply all along, and religion imparts inspiration, strength, and the consecrating halo of the Infinite and Eternal to morals, when, without its aid, they threaten to break down in the storm and stress of life.

We can imagine no finer and more convincing spiritual arguments on the value of the relation subsisting between Ethics and Religion than the paragraphs in which Dr. Martineau shows how, with Religion added, (1) "The *Authority* of Duty becomes transcendent and Divine," (2) "The *Scope* of Duty becomes for the first time co-extensive with the area of the Will," (3) "The *Volume* or internal capacity of the Moral Life is immeasurably expanded by gaining its religious interpretation," and (4) "*Enthusiasm* of the Moral Life is intensified by the consciousness of its Divine Source." The address is an eloquent and concise synopsis, rich alike in poetic thought and feeling, and with impregnable main lines of argument, of the valued author's philosophy of morals and religion.

After this, we may perhaps venture, without presumption, to mention two points where we are unable to agree with him, either because we fail to understand his meaning, or because his meaning is really opposed to what we ourselves take to be the true statement of the facts. The first point is this. He says (page 5):—

"Personal relations constitute the prior condition and very matter itself of morality, and in their absence it has no room to be. An absolutely solitary individual, if invested with power of various action and disposition, might affect himself for better or worse by what he did, but would incur no obligation and incur no guilt. The harm he occasioned would be a blunder, and not a sin; the good which he earned would prove his wisdom, not his virtue."

The question here raised is not of much practical importance, for Robinson Crusoes are scarce. But the theory seems to us unsound, and out of harmony also with other portions of the address. We hold that morality existed for Robinson Crusoe before Man Friday joined him, as well as after, though the opportunities for actively manifesting it were of a simpler character. He is not here to be cross-examined, but we cannot think that he would accept Dr. Martineau's account of his moral nature, as a solitary individual, as a true account. There are two ways in which personal relations exist for a man, even when he is, as we say, alone. He carries a sort of double personality in his own soul, in his higher and lower self, and surely he is sinful or virtuous according as he yields allegiance to one or the other, and not merely blundering or wise. And

then, also, there is always the personal relation between him and God. From this latter point of view Dr. Martineau's "absolutely solitary individual" is an absolute impossibility. To apply the *argumentum ad hominem*, would any of our readers suppose *moral* distinctions obliterated for themselves if they were in Robinson Crusoe's position? We sincerely hope not. Our *ego* would still feel itself in the presence of a moral law, and conscious of higher and lower inner springs of action. Base inclinations would be sins; lying would be more than a blunder. Thus ethical ascent and descent would be realities. Nor would the soul be solitary. It would cry, "I am not alone, for the Father is with me;" and if all else failed, religion and the sense of personal relations with God would be competent to create ethics anew. We may be told that ethics are concerned with human relations only. This we cannot grant. We dare not dismiss religion into the death in life of an unmoral world. The very righteousness and holiness of God forbid us to do so. And besides, what is the essential difference between lying to ourselves or to God, and lying to our neighbours? It is only in the effects that are produced. The downward tendency of the conscience and the personal spiritual corruption are the same in both cases. And if we are to count these morally valueless in themselves, and deriving their sole ethical worth from the influence that they exercise upon other men, what is this but to stumble into the quagmire of Utilitarianism, and to judge right and wrong by a calculus of consequences? This cannot be Dr. Martineau's meaning. However, we need discuss no further the psychology either of Robinson Crusoe or the Man in the Moon. The venerated author's principles seem to us much wider than his own illustration, and to include all that we contend for.

The second point is this. Dr. Martineau says (p. 25) :—

If you quit this unique ground of *moral* experience, and for any other side of your nature throw open the windows to the Infinite, the overwhelming inrush of the Primary Causality will utterly drown the secondary, abolish the conditions of personality, and dissolve all detached existence in the deified cloud with which the mystic fills all space.

Now so long as Dr. Martineau occupies the ground of the moral consciousness, and argues thence for a recognition of the human and Divine personalities over against one another, we are entirely at one with him, and gladly admit the unanswerableness of his reasonings. In the moral sphere we do certainly know ourselves, and know God at the same time. But the brilliant metaphor is unfair to the mystic whose Pantheistic deity is something more than "a deified cloud," and it reduces the intellect, as a religious organ, to a condition of bankruptcy. It seems to us that Dr. Martineau, in his laudable anxiety to maintain the supremacy of the moral consciousness, underrates the value of pure metaphysics as the rational revelation of relationship between man and God, and falls over into the same abyss, though in another way, into which some human moralists fall when they decry theology, and into which some theologians fall when they decry an independent morality. The subject and the object are given

equally in the intellectual consciousness as in the moral consciousness. In both we may lose sight of the distinction, and melt the two into one; but in both when we do so the process is illegitimate. No doubt it is easier to do this in the intellectual sphere than it is in the moral sphere, and that is why Pantheism often has an intellectual glamour about it, which is dissipated as soon as we look at it in the clearer light radiating from the moral centre. But the apparent admission that intellectually there is no escape from Pantheism, and that when we open the windows of our nature to the Infinite on that side, the human personality fades away into the Primary Causality and the deified cloud, is one that we cannot make. We fear, too, that religious philosophy would soon come to incurable grief if we were to allow that, while it rests on a moral rock, it flounders helplessly in intellectual quick-sands. Both reason and conscience may place their feet firmly on the primary granite, and hold fast at the same time to the union and distinction between the finite and the infinite.

The three pamphlets we have briefly noticed are all important contributions to literature, embodying the ripe thoughts of Dr. Martineau on subjects of undying interest,—subjects, too, into which no man has a keener insight, and about which we know no man who can write with more quickening power. For the “Loss and Gain” and the Appendix, we have only thankfulness. They are admirable expositions of permanent theological truth enduring through changes of form, and in its fresh modifications coming forth with fresh strength. From two points in the Relation between Ethics and Religion we have expressed our dissent. That, however, little detracts from our sympathy with the author’s main positions, and our admiration of the strength and charm with which he expounds them. Of the first point we can only say further that, to our mind, Dr. Martineau’s philosophy involves personal relations between man and God, and that ethical conditions appear necessarily to follow them. Of the second, that the opening of the intellectual side of his own nature to the Infinite has left us, notwithstanding his warnings, in the enjoyment of full and divine sunshine, where our personality is not lost, but feels itself *one* and yet embraced, illuminated, and overflowed by the life of the *all*.

WILLIAM BINNS.

PROFESSOR BLACKIE’S LAY SERMONS.

PROFESSOR BLACKIE has rightly named the papers collected into this volume * “Lay Sermons,” for, while they are not all on formally religious subjects, they all have that severity of ethical intention and that direct purpose of edification which are the chief marks of

* *Lay Sermons*. By JOHN STUART BLACKIE, Professor of Greek in the University of Edinburgh. London: Macmillan and Co. 1881.

good sermons. Each is complete in itself, and there is no thread of logical continuity binding them together. It is very interesting, and it may be very useful, to see how a shrewd, clear-headed layman looks at religious questions; and still more so to see how, being a religious man, he brings his religion to bear upon matters of a purely secular kind. The public generally will, perhaps, give more heed to the religious aspect of things when put before them by a layman who has no professional interests to arouse their suspicions, and who looks at religion in unconventional ways; and even religious teachers themselves may learn something from seeing, not only how religious problems present themselves to the minds of the laity, but also how secular subjects may be made to "feel the light of eternal things."

The subject-matter of the sermons—nine in number—is very various: from "The Creation of the World" to "The Politics of Christianity," and from the doctrine of "Faith" to "The Dignity of Labour;" but they are all fresh and vigorous; some of them careful and learned, and others characterised by all the shrewdness of a keen Scottish man of the world who has clear eyes, an independent mind, and an outspoken tongue. All this can be felt and admitted without the reader's mind committing itself to agreement in many matters of detail or to some more important portions which may be considered as yet fairly open questions. The book has the merit of compelling the reader often to pause and think—to ask questions, and to go back and see how the thread of the argument leads up to where it has reached. Professor Blackie is far too individual himself to expect to carry all his readers along with him over ground which is thick with points of controversy, and the path not seldom right across old distinctions and time-honoured limitations.

The first sermon says all that can be said in favour of the "Genesis" account of the Creation, regarding it as a symbolical, poetical summary of the most reverent insight of the old world—a "revelation of the great lines of theological and philosophical truth." In the face of recent criticism, this is claiming much for the story; and it is, at least, open to question whether a great deal of the Professor's doctrine is not read into his text rather than deduced from it. He assumes too easily for it the authorship of Moses and its extreme antiquity, and never seems to have come within sight of the probability that however old it may be as a Semitic legend—in many of its features common to all the Semitic peoples—it can hardly be, in the form we know it, earlier than the captivity. That there is in it an attractive nobleness and simplicity no one can reasonably deny, and also a rough conformity to the probable order of development; but it needs a keen eye and a very prepared state of mind to see in it a "revelation of the great lines of theology and philosophy." The sermon is, however, suggestive, and full of matter which will well repay careful study.

The second sermon sets forth the institution of the Jewish Sabbath, its purpose, and how for Christians it came to be superseded by the first day of the week; and closes with a very powerful and attractive plea for

the Sunday as it ought to be in a Christian country. The whole treatment of this much-disputed question is likely to give little satisfaction to rigid Sabbatarians, and is too common-sense and wisely practical to be generally adopted in the present state of society.

"Landlords and Land laws" is a moderate and fair argument for reform, in which the conclusions tend to the radical side, with a good deal of caution and qualification. There is, however, no doubt left possible as to the inexpediency of the present laws of entail and succession, or of the injustice of the existing restrictions and difficulties of transfer. The special value of this sermon lies in the way in which the subject is lifted out of all party lines, and set in the light of simple justice and of the general weal.

There is only room to refer to one more sermon—that upon "the Scottish Covenants," in which is told once more the story of one of the bravest, most courageous, and enduring of all the world's struggles after spiritual freedom; and it is well told. Here the preacher's heart is in his work, and every drop of his blood glows with appreciative enthusiasm as he follows them through loss and gain, through strife and death, to final victory. One may hesitate a little, perhaps, at some of the acts he takes pains to justify; but those were not common times nor common men, and they are not to be tried by common rules. We commend the "Lay Sermons" to careful perusal and thought. They will repay all that is expended upon them.

T. W. F.

CHRISTMAS EVANS.

IN a bulky volume of over four hundred pages* Mr. Hood has vividly depicted the career of a very remarkable man, and incidentally that of several of his Welsh contemporaries possessed—he eminently, they in a less degree—of remarkable preaching power. Christmas Evans was born on Christmas Day, 1766. Unable to read till he was seventeen, he devoted himself eagerly to self-improvement after his conversion at a revival meeting. The low and ruffianly companions whom he abandoned in consequence waylaid him one night and gave him an unmerciful beating, depriving him, by a blow, of the sight of one eye, a calamity which became a mark of distinction afterwards when he was widely known as "the one-eyed preacher." At twenty, as a Baptist minister, he entered the pulpit, or mounted the platform when the crowds who flocked to hear him were too numerous to be contained within the walls of a chapel. The Welsh had then, perhaps have still, a passion for great religious gatherings and lengthy discourses such as would now be termed highly sensational. Not one

* *Christmas Evans, the Preacher of Wild Wales, his Country, his Times, and his Contemporaries.* By the Rev. PAXTON HOOD. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1881.]

preacher but two were often required to sustain the interest of a crowded congregation for a couple of hours. Nor were they sober, silent auditors. They listened to a sermon pretty much as a secular audience would now surrender themselves to a powerful actor. They gave vent to their intense excitement in loud ejaculations of sympathy, even in torrents of tears, as their passions and their feelings were stirred by oratory uttered in their own strikingly picturesque mother-tongue. Christmas Evans might thus be called an actor of sacred dramas. The stories, the events, the characters of the Bible, he made visible and audible, sometimes in allegories, after the manner of Bunyan, sometimes in descriptive scenes and highly dramatic dialogues. His preaching thus was not altogether spontaneous. He carefully prepared and thought out his subject beforehand, and then trusted to his marvellous command of language for the verbal drapery in which to clothe it. Mr. Hood gives us many specimens of this order of preaching, so well suited to the times and the people; but detached from these, and especially from the preacher himself, they do not possess any marked merit in a literary point of view.

Christmas Evans was apostolic in his way of living, not only in his purity and self-denial, but in the scantiness of his worldly means. For many years he had but £17 as his annual stipend, which rose to, but never exceeded, £30; and on this small income he had to maintain himself and his excellent wife. In the midst of his many labours and preaching engagements he managed to become a fair scholar, acquiring a knowledge of Greek, Latin, and Hebrew. He may be said to have died in harness, in his seventy-third year. Mr. Hood's biography of this remarkable man is full of incidents and anecdotes, all more or less illustrating the times, the manners, the superstitions, and, above all, the religious life of the Welsh people. Why they are so universally given to dissent, not formally and of set purpose, may be seen in the fact that this life is altogether too excitable and emotional to find vent within the dry formulas and sober and dignified services of the State Church.

C. L. C.

MR. W. R. GREG'S LAST ESSAYS.*

BY the lamented death of Mr. William Rathbone Greg we have lost one who for many years past has been recognised as a master of criticism and of warning counsel, in matters which concern some of the most deeply felt interests of our present day life. To those who are given to the serious study of the more complicated and difficult problems of the social state, and who feel the influence of those questions of religion, and philosophy, and of politics and practical ethics, which are "in the air," and which, directly or indirectly, affect men's personal convictions and ways of life, his removal from the scene of our controversies will be a source of unmixed regret. Mr. Greg's vocation might almost be defined

* *Miscellaneous Essays.* By W. R. GREG. London: Trübner and Co. 1881.

by Mr. Matthew Arnold's phrase, though not in the sense in which he used it, "the criticism of life." He had the courage to look facts in the face, and put them to the question, however unwelcome or unpromising they might appear; and he never ceased to warn us of the folly and danger of shutting our eyes to these facts, and dreaming our idle dreams of cheerful optimism and *laissez faire*. Whether we agreed with him or not in the view he took, or the conclusion he arrived at, he forced us at least to acknowledge that the questions he stated so clearly and emphatically must be answered, or if the answer lay beyond the scope of our knowledge, that we must, at any rate, leave off ignoring their existence.

Certainly, Mr. Greg did not pretend to be able to give a final answer to a tithe of the questions he could so concisely state; and when he did indicate the conclusion which he himself would draw, it might frequently happen that we were by no means prepared to accept it. In practical politics, especially, he was as likely as not to take what we should consider the wrong side; and in discussing questions of social economy, he often failed to give us any certain guidance, or to make out any definite methods of action. But it was a bracing and wholesome discipline to be forced to reconsider the social problems which Mr. Greg had such a singular skill in setting out. Or, when he turned the light of his clear, intellectual lamp upon the prevalent ideas and beliefs in matters of personal morality and judgment, we again had to acknowledge the service he did us, even though it might sometimes be against our own will and inclination.

There was a grave earnestness of tone, with an underlying tenderness of feeling and reverence of spirit, in speaking of the essential things of the religious life, which was calculated to soften the shock that many must have received from what they would call his destructive criticism, when applied to the documentary evidences of religion and the traditional dogmas of Christianity. The author of "The Creed of Christendom" was animated by no light-hearted iconoclastic zeal. In the preface to that memorable book he expressed, with the deepest feeling, his sympathy with those to whom the pursuit of truth was a daily martyrdom, for whom the past and the familiar have chains and talismans, which hold them back in their career, "till every step forward becomes an effort and an agony; every fresh error discovered is a fresh bond snapped asunder; every new glimpse of light is like a fresh flood of pain poured in upon the soul." Truly, in this high seriousness and these touching regrets, we have the signs of a very different temperament from that which so often shocks us by the jaunty "good-bye and a good riddance" with which it dismisses some of the most cherished beliefs and hopes of humanity. Mr. Greg recognised and always dealt tenderly with those deepest feelings, aspirations, and spiritual affections, which are, in every case, the real ground of our religious life. His most important work, on the whole, was "The Creed of Christendom;" and nowhere before, perhaps nowhere since, have the main features of what is somewhat unmeaningly called the negative criticism of the Bible and Christi-

anity been more clearly defined. Yet in his latest edition Mr. Greg emphatically reasserted his allegiance to the Christian idea, and declared his supreme reverence for the character of Jesus. Referring to the question, "Are we yet Christians?" which Strauss had recently answered in the negative, he wrote:—"I am disposed to give an entirely opposite answer to Strauss's question to that which Strauss himself has given, and to believe that when we have really penetrated to the actual teaching of Christ, and fairly disinterred that religion of Jesus which preceded all creeds and schemes and formulas, and which we trust will survive them all, we shall find that, so far from this, the true essence of Christianity, being renounced or outgrown by the progressive intelligence of the age, its rescue, re-discovery, purification, and re-enthronement as a guide of life, a fountain of truth, an object of faith, a law written on the heart, will be recognized as the grandest, as the most beneficent achievement of that intellect" (Pref. to Third Edit., p. xxxix.). In the volume of essays before us, in a contribution to a discussion between Mr. Frederick Harrison and others on the question of Immortality, he writes:—"I may say I share in the anticipations of believers, but I share then as aspirations, sometimes approaching almost to a faith, occasionally, and, for a few moments perhaps, rising into something like a trust, but never able to settle into the consistency of a definite and enduring creed" (p. 253). "I must be true," he said, "to my darkness as courageously as to my light." It is this blending of free intellectual criticism with a strong sense of the deep significance of the facts of our inner experience which makes the "Enigmas of Life" so powerful and impressive. It touches a wider range of interests than does "The Creed of Christendom," and does not require the acquaintance with technical theological matters which some parts of the latter do; and it will probably be the book by which Mr. Greg will be the best and most widely known.

In the new volume of essays Mr. Greg has collected some of his more recent utterances on social and political matters, and also on topics of more personal and individual concern, which have appeared chiefly in the Reviews. It includes also his very interesting estimate of Harriet Martineau, written as "the testimony of one who enjoyed her intimacy for many years, and entertained a sincere regard for her throughout." The opening essay contains some fresh warnings about "rocks ahead" in the relations between employers and employed, the latter being sternly rebuked for their injustice, as well as folly, in striking against a reduction of wages in exceptionally bad times. If it could have been shown that in exceptionally prosperous times the masters voluntarily gave their men a fully proportionate share in the increased profits, the arguments as to the wastefulness and unfairness of strikes would have had a more irresistible force. Unless the workmen can reckon with certainty on this fair participation in gain as well as loss, they can scarcely be expected to make common cause with their employers. In another essay, entitled "A Grave Perplexity," Mr. Greg depicts in a very forcible

way the difficulties of the situation when, under our Poor Law system, it inevitably comes to pass that, in the event of a persistent strike, the masters have ultimately to pay, in the form of a heavy Poor Rate, for the support of the very men who are ruining them by refusing to work; whereas the latter would be forced to capitulate if they could be allowed to be reduced to starvation point. Under the heading, "Obligations of the Soil," the author meets by a *reductio ad absurdum* the doctrine that the use and tenure of land must be judged by its fulfilling, or tendency to fulfil, the end of supporting as large a population as possible, for which he substitutes the proposition that it must "produce and sustain the finest race, physically, morally, and intellectually." In the short essay, "Verify your Compass," there is much wise caution against the danger of mistaking the dictates of inclination, of "egotism, ignorance, incapacity, intolerance, or conceit" for the commands of conscience. The practical conclusion is "that conscientiousness in its absolute form—that is, being a slave to your conscience, always doing what it tells you to do—is commendable or defensible only on the preliminary assumption that you have taken every available pains to enlighten and correct it."

The last three essays deal with questions directly bearing on religious matters, and are marked by that intellectual incisiveness, combined with a certain sympathetic spiritual apprehension, which characterises the "Enigmas of Life" and "The Creed of Christendom." The one on the Prophetic Element in the Gospels sets forth forcibly enough the great difficulties involved in a literal acceptance of the reported prophecies of Jesus about His own resurrection and the coming of His kingdom (as that kingdom is pictured in the Gospel narratives). In dealing, however, with the accounts of the resurrection, Mr. Greg injures his case by showing a strong inclination to adopt one of the least tenable of the hypotheses which have been advanced, viz., that Jesus had revived after what was only an apparent death on the cross. We have already referred to the contribution to the discussion in the *Nineteenth Century* about the Future Life. In the essay with which the volume concludes there are some very suggestive thoughts on the question, "Can truths be apprehended which could not have been discovered?" The bearings of this question on the current notions of revelation, inspiration, the evidences of religion, &c., will be easily seen.

These latest utterances of Mr. Greg's acute and judicial mind, if they are less weighty, in some respects, than those which he has presented in his more systematic works, have a special interest as affording specimens of his treatment of the various topics, political, social, ethical, religious, —indeed, almost all except purely literary ones,—on which he has, from time to time, given his judgment, or which he has helped us to judge for ourselves. It is with a strong sense of loss that we take this volume as the last contribution we shall have from his pen towards the solution, or at least the clear statement, of some of the involved and difficult problems of modern life and thought.

THE MENDELSSOHN FAMILY.

THERE can be few of those who enjoyed Mendelssohn's delightful letters (the *Reisebriefe*, and others), introduced some twenty years ago to English readers by Lady Wallace, who have not wished to see something of the other side of the correspondence. The writer appeared in them as the heart and soul of a family group, in all the members of which we could see that there must have been a close spiritual kinship, and a kinship also of intellect and genius. The letters from Felix to his father, and to his sisters, especially, assured us that there was, on their part, not only an eager interest in his musical work, sympathy with his purposes, and delight in his achievements, but also a large share of the same artistic and poetic nature. It was certain that these good, clever people, in whom so much of Felix's life was wrapped up, and who had a part in everything he did and enjoyed, were worth knowing, for their own sakes; and we thought that it would be delightful to be introduced into that family circle of which we had had such attractive glimpses from without.

This service has been done for us now* by the son of that sister, Fanny (Hensel), to whom Felix addressed so many of his letters; and at the same time the introduction has been made more complete by reverting to the founder of the family—Moses Mendelssohn, the friend of Lessing, and the original of *Nathan der Weise*, showing how much of character and intellectual distinction came to his children by inheritance and by education, to be concentrated, in the next generation, in the genius of the great musician. Herr Hensel is the fortunate possessor of a mass of precious correspondence; and he has had access also to other private sources, which have enabled him to complete a family record that is full, from beginning to end, of the most fascinating personal interest. The author has, indeed, exercised a proper discretion in withholding the more private and sacred utterances, which would have been profaned by being given to every one to read. But the numerous intimate letters which he has felt free to publish are the frank spontaneous expression of their writer's feelings and opinions, and through them, assisted by the author's interesting and sympathetic narrative, we are admitted within the charmed circle of friends, and share in the enjoyment of that "singularly beautiful poetic life" which centred in the household in Leipziger Strasse, No. 8.

Amongst the letters which have been selected are a large number from Felix himself, of which only half-a-dozen or so have been printed before. We give them the highest praise when we say that they are not inferior in charm and interest to those with which we have been so long

* *The Mendelssohn Family* (1729-1847); from *Letters and Journals*. By SEBASTIAN HENSEL. Translated from the second revised edition, by Carl Klingemann, and an American Collaborator. With a Notice by George Grove, Esq., D.C.L. Two vols. London: Sampson Low and Co. 1881.

familiar. We may refer especially to the letters from England, and to a series describing a Scotch tour, in company with his friend Klingemann, who contributes his share to the correspondence in pages full of lively description and droll humour. Next in interest to the letters of Felix himself are those of his sisters, Fanny Hensel and Rebecca Dirichlet, of whose letters about a hundred and fifty are given; Abraham Mendelssohn, the father, contributes some five-and-twenty.

These budgets of letters, which (with a few from other members of the family) naturally form the chief and most interesting part of the book, are set in a framework of narrative and explanation which makes the family chronicle as complete as we could wish. The earlier portion of the book is chiefly biographical, beginning with a well-proportioned sketch of Moses Mendelssohn, the founder of the family which his fame, and that of his grandson, have made illustrious. Enough is told us of his career, and of the work he did, to give a vivid impression of the innate strength of character and fine spiritual integrity which eventually triumphed over the most adverse circumstances, and enabled the son of Mendel, the unknown Jew of Dessau, to take his place among the philosophers and men of letters whose names are most conspicuous in the history of German thought and literature.

Moses Mendelssohn, enlightened as he was, unfortunately thought fit to exercise the absolute authority of the head of a Jewish household in choosing husbands for two of his daughters, without consulting their affections in the matter. Of one of these daughters, Recha, we are not told much more than that, after a time of extreme domestic unhappiness, she was divorced from her husband. The other daughter, Dorothea, had a longer and more romantic story. She was a remarkably clever woman, a friend of Varnhagen von Ense, of Rahel, and of Henrietta Herz (with whom Schleiermacher was on such familiar and sentimental terms). Her husband was an excellent man, and devoted to her; but her excitable, romantic nature and intellectual pursuits drew her more and more away from him, and in the end he, to his sorrow, felt compelled to agree to a divorce. Dorothea transferred herself, as she had already given her affections, to Friedrich von Schlegel, who appears in no very heroic light, though to his wife he shone out as a very superior being indeed. It is, however, said, and we are glad to think it, that a certain vein of strong common sense which there was in her character compelled her occasionally to laugh at some of the more absurd developments of romanticism and sentimentality in her husband and his friends.

There was another sister, Henrietta; and the sketch we have of her character, and the extracts from her correspondence which illustrate it, are very attractive and interesting. Rahel, who knew her well, said that hers was the richest and most refined nature she had ever known, and that, compared with Dorothea, "she had a quieter charm, a more reserved gravity, was less expansive, and more observant of outward things; whilst, perhaps, inwardly nothing could be more passionate, sympathetic, and tender than she." She numbered among her friends

many distinguished men and women of her time, but had to endure also a good deal of the society of small diplomatists and would-be politicians, whose shallow talk of ("so-called politics" she heartily despised. "I shrug my shoulders," she says, "as I perceive that, after all, these gentlemen do but gaze at their own images in the mirror of time.")

Of the three sons of Moses Mendelssohn, Abraham has much the most important place in the record. The picture of this excellent, clever, and genuine man is drawn with a skilful and appreciative hand; and by his side there is his sweet and true-hearted wife, Leah Salomon. They were the parents of Felix, and we can see how much of what was most noble and beautiful in his character was due to them, whether by inheritance or by personal influence. A good many of Abraham Mendelssohn's letters, as we have said, are printed here, and for the first time we learn what manner of man he was. Whether they are occupied with amusing accounts of his visits to Paris or London, or with affectionate home gossip, or with wise and earnest fatherly counsel, they are equally characteristic. He used to say that he had once been his father's son, but now he was his son's father. It is certain, however, that he had a well-marked character of his own; and his daughter Fanny, after his death, wrote of him: "He frequently regretted, in the latter time particularly, that no talent had been given him; but the most remarkable feature, to my mind, was the harmonious development of his whole faculties, including the intellectual organs, which produced a unity of thought, feeling, and action such as we seldom see. He was, indeed, the centre of our circle, and we miss him sadly." This estimate by one who knew and loved him best agrees exactly with that which we should form from Herr Hensel's account of his life and the extracts from his letters, and we owe the author much gratitude for having enabled us to make so genial and noteworthy an acquaintance.

Equally fresh to us and still more charming are the numerous letters from Felix's sisters, Rebecca and Fanny. With many resemblances, there are differences of character and style which give originality and variety to the letters of these two clever and accomplished women. They were alike gifted with a bright intelligence, a sprightly humour, a delight in everything that is noble and beautiful, and a strong, deep affection for family and friends—all of which gave a tone to everything they said or wrote. The letters abound with vivid, artistic descriptions and intelligent criticisms, and there is an element, too, of downright fun and frolic which is always ready to sparkle out in these lively pages. It is interesting to compare the two series of letters describing visits to Italy made separately by Fanny and Wilhelm Hensel, and by Rebecca and Lejeune Dirichlet. Perhaps Madame Hensel has the most purely artistic taste and feeling, and her sister the shrewdest judgment and insight; but both are so delightfully clever and entertaining that it is difficult to say whose letters have given us the greater pleasure.

We have already mentioned the contributions to the book from the pen of Felix's intimate friend, Herr Klingemann, who appears to have held an

official post in England. His correspondence, if the few pages here given may be taken as a specimen, would furnish material for an amusing volume. Perhaps it is to the translator, Carl Klingemann, rather than to the author that we should make this suggestion. We ought not to omit to say that he and his American fellow-worker have done their part very satisfactorily in giving us a version of Herr Hensel's book in good, fluent English, though not quite without occasional awkwardnesses of expression which need not have escaped the eye of a careful reviser. The volumes are illustrated by copies of some of Wilhelm Hensel's beautiful and delicately-drawn portraits of different members of the family. We are told that he was wont to give his own artistic conception of a face rather than to make an exact likeness; and certainly, when we look at the lovely face of Leah Salomon, and then read that "she was not handsome," we feel that we must make considerable allowance for the artist's "idealising, beautifying, and juvenising tendency," which made his wife remark that he made a baby out of a grandmother! He has, at any rate, drawn some very sweet, refined faces, except in the case of Felix Mendelssohn, whose portrait is by no means an ideal one, and it certainly does not faithfully represent the man described by Mr. Grove in an interesting page towards the end of the second volume.

The special charm of the whole book is the same as that of the *Reisebriefe*. It lies in the unreserved self-revealings of good, pure, and refined natures of high intellectual culture, the varied and vivid expression of thoughts and feelings, which are always genuine and characteristic. There is nothing in the record that we could wish softened down or hidden away. The life that is self-pictured to us is marked by devotion to the poet's standard of "plain living and high thinking," while full of hearty and grateful enjoyment of existence, instinct with eager sympathies and affections, with a capacity for both the homeliest and the most exalted happiness. Perhaps the same kind of brightness and light-heartedness can be granted to us only at rarer intervals in our often over-burdened and over-strained life. Perhaps, even now, we might have more of it if we would. The Mendelssohn family may, at any rate, help us to appreciate it more, and may tell us something of its secret, while we enjoy it with them in imagination, and feel how pleasant it is to breathe that healthful, exhilarating atmosphere of freedom and sunshine and delicious laughter which makes these pages so delightful and refreshing.

THREE BOOKS ABOUT 'THOMAS CARLYLE.

ALMOST immediately after the death of Carlyle, there sprang up a "Carlyle literature," to which fresh additions are continually being made. Beginning with his own "Reminiscences," so unhappily fruitful of heart-burnings, reproaches, and much exaggerated outcry, we have

had lives and studies, letters, recollections, critiques, eulogiums and vituperations, which have variously helped or hindered us in making a final estimate of the long, strenuous life-work which had been ended. It was not to be wondered at that the most strongly marked personality in modern literature should have made a deep impression, and excited the wide-spread interest to which all this bears witness. Perhaps there is scarcely one of these numerous studies and memorials from which something of personal or literary significance may not be gleaned. The specimens of Carlyle's correspondence, especially, which have been given, make us look forward with a still keener interest to the publication of the great collection of letters entrusted to Mr. Froude's care. Of the more or less detailed biographies which have appeared, the volume by Mr. W. H. Wylie* is on the whole the most satisfactory. It would be too much to expect it to be free from inaccuracies, of which we have an instance, in the story of the burning of the manuscript volume of "The French Revolution," the erroneous statement being, oddly enough, retained in the text of what appears as the third edition, while it is acknowledged and accounted for in the preface. Mr. Wylie has evidently trusted too much to the accuracy of Mr. W. H. Milburne's recollections of Carlyle's conversations, from which he has drawn some of his materials. A good and interesting account is given, in the first hundred pages, of Carlyle's early home and education, and his life up to the time of his marriage. After that there is, of course, not much incident to record; and the book is concerned chiefly with a record of Carlyle's literary work, accompanied by some criticism of his writings, and there is a sprinkling of anecdotes of his sayings and doings. Mr. Wylie has followed the career of his hero with by no means an indiscriminate hero-worship—like that which we find, for instance, in Mr. Shepherd's book, to be noticed presently. He expresses his dismay at the course which Carlyle took in the bitter controversy caused by Governor Eyre's conduct in the Jamaica insurrection, and deploras his utterances on the Slavery question, and other matters treated in the *Latter-Day Pamphlets*. Perhaps Mr. Wylie's statement of the case would have been more effective if it had been more concise; but the nine pages in which he recalls the actual facts of the Jamaica affair, may be read with advantage, as a corrective to the off-hand statements by which the thorough-going partisans of Mr. Carlyle, and abusers of "The Jamaica Committee," have endeavoured to dispose of the question. Mr. Wylie also expresses his regret, in which we heartily share, that those laborious years which were passed, as Mrs. Carlyle was wont to say, "in the valley of the shadow of Frederick," had not been spent in writing a history of John Knox and the Scottish Reformation, "instead of crowning the magnificent edifice reared by his literary skill and industry, with a book that seems to deify one of the vilest characters in the whole range of history." These independent judgments and expressions of disapproval will, no doubt, greatly offend the implicit believers in all the

* *Thomas Carlyle: The Man and his Books*. By WILLIAM HOWIE WYLIE. Third edition. London: Marshall Japp and Co. 1881.

Carlylese doctrines; but they make the genuineness of the author's admiration of Carlyle's best and noblest work all the more apparent.

The value of Mr. R. H. Shepherd's book* consists much less in the biographical part than in the many illustrative documents which the author has gathered together from various quarters, and reprinted in these two handsome volumes. Whether Carlyle would himself have approved of his early writings being hunted up for our benefit may be doubted, but this is a matter for Mr. Shepherd's own editorial conscience. It is certainly a gain to have these specimens of Carlyle's early literary ventures, the biographical articles in Brewster's "Edinburgh Cyclopædia," and the story of "Cruthers and Johnson," published in *Fraser* in 1831; and we are glad to read again his Newspaper Articles on Ireland in 1848, his Memorial Notice of Charles Buller, his preface to Emerson's Essays, and other characteristic matters not reprinted in the Miscellanies. It was a good idea also to reproduce some of the contemporary criticism of Carlyle's writings, the estimates by Mill and Stirling being especially noteworthy, and to bring together some of the reminiscences and descriptions which have been given by various literary people who had met him. One chapter contains the newspaper reports, probably from the pen of Leigh Hunt, of the three courses of lectures which preceded those on Heroes and Hero-worship. In another we have a pretty full transcript of Carlyle's evidence before a commission of inquiry into the management of the British Museum, some parts of which must certainly have both amused and offended the Commissioners. Of his letters these volumes contain more than a hundred, and, though the author does not say which of these have already been in print before, it would seem that a considerable number are given for the first time.

The most interesting letters, however, which have yet been published, and by far the most valuable personal reminiscences, are those contained in Mr. Moncreu Conway's volume.† Both Mr. Wylie and Mr. Shepherd had seen something of Carlyle, and have something to report of his appearance and conversation, but Mr. Conway was admitted to his intimacy for many years, and had some rare opportunities of knowing him.

Especially interesting is his report of a long monologue in which, when resting after the exciting scenes of his rectorial address at Edinburgh, Carlyle told the story of his early life, his struggles and conquests, speaking, says Mr. Conway, "as if unaware of any one's presence; as if conversing with the risen shades of a world I knew not." There are many other reminiscences of conversations and impressions of the man and his opinions, for the record of which we are grateful. The letters,

* *Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Thomas Carlyle. With Personal Reminiscences and Letters to Numerous Correspondents.* Edited by RICHARD HERNE SHEPHERD, assisted by CHARLES N. WILLIAMSON. Two vols. London: W. H. Allen and Co. 1881.

† *Thomas Carlyle.* By MONCREU D. CONWAY. London: Chatto and Windus. 1881.

or extracts from letters, which form the third division of the volume, illustrate all that was best, gentlest, and wisest in Carlyle's character, and are amongst the many true revelations of his mind which will remove surely and finally the painful impressions which seem to have been so generally produced by the hasty publication of the "Reminiscences." For our own part we have always thought that the feelings of disappointment and regret caused by what it is the fashion to call "that unhappy book," were to a great extent unreasonable, and we should have been much the poorer if those vivid and deeply pathetic pages had never seen the light. At the same time we may entirely agree with Mr. Conway when he says:—"I . . . cannot admit that the outcries of a broken heart should be accepted as the man's true voice, or that measurements of men and memories, as seen through burning tears, should be recorded as characteristic of his heart or judgment." Certainly all the three pictures of him which we have before us may help us to a true appreciation of the abundant generosity of spirit, the delicate consideration for others and genuine kindness which were continually being shown, though they were, it is true, often hidden away, and sometimes rudely shouldered out by an equally genuine bearishness, in the morose moods of a dyspeptic invalid. We at any rate know enough to amply justify the prediction that when we have the full materials which Mr. Froude will give us for forming our estimate of Carlyle's character and work, the picture of him which must be finally accepted as authentic will be very different from that which some readers of the "Reminiscences" have been foolish enough to draw, on the strength of some harsh judgments and bitter and desponding words, written in his gloomiest days of loneliness and sorrow.

THE POEMS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES.

IT was quite time for some English publisher to provide us with a complete issue of Dr. Wendell Holmes's Poems, in a form which should secure them their rightful place in the Poets' Corner in our libraries. The pretty edition before us* certainly leaves very little to be desired. Nothing could be more delicately printed, or more tastefully got up altogether. It is one of those books which the book-lover is tempted to buy, being enticed and led away by their external attractions, irrespective of the intrinsic value of their contents. In the case of Dr. Holmes's Poems this value might be safely taken for granted by any who were not already familiar with them, but who knew the Autocrat, Poet, and Professor, at the Breakfast-table, and his two chief works of fiction, especially the wonderfully clever and powerful story of "Elsie Venner." The poems abound in the sweetest-flavoured, clear, bright humour—now resolving

* *The Poetical Works of OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES.* Two vols. London: Sampson Low and Co. 1881.

itself into pure fun, now allying itself with a quietly insinuated pathos, or kindly wisdom. There are some more serious and meditative pieces, not without gleams of more or less conscious humour; but the most characteristic are the witty and sparkling verses in which the poet dwells on some odd fancy till he laughs and makes us laugh outright; or the amusing but more thoughtful ones in which his wit is itself a form of wisdom, and in his kind, genial way he lets us into the secret of the light heart and generous, hopeful spirit which have gathered so much sweetness out of the experiences of more than threescore years and ten. From the earlier, more purely comic poems we could pick out not a few which are quite worthy of being placed in the same rank with Hood's poems of wit and humour. Let doubters read "To the Portrait of a Lady," "The Music Grinders," "The Treadmill Song," or a dozen more we could name, The grave and gay meet in the "Poems of the Class of '29," written for the annual gatherings of Harvard Classmates, from 1851 to 1881, with many other *pièces d'occasion*, or (in plain English) poems written to order. Such productions are apt to show an author at his worst, instead of his best, but this is not Dr. Holmes's case; and we may congratulate ourselves on the custom which seems to have been observed on all fraternal and festive gatherings, anniversaries, welcomes, &c., of calling on him, not for a speech, but a poem. The few graver and more studied pieces are a trifle more conventional in form and diction than those we have briefly characterised. But it would be difficult to turn to any of these pages and not feel that they bring us into pleasant and almost intimate relations with the author, whose cheerfulness is so catching, and who, in his gayest as in his most serious moods, has such a high appreciation of all that is good and true in life.

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*ECCLESIASTES.**

WITH respect to its enigmatical character, its sceptical uncertainty, and its tone of pessimistic sadness, Ecclesiastes may be called the *Hamlet* of the Bible. And, like Shakespeare's drama, the great Biblical enigma has long presented special attractions to the student. In a similar manner, also, scholarly devotion to its study has borne fruit in an abundant literature. But the parallel between the two works is certainly not in all respects perfect. For example, in times past Ecclesiastes can scarcely be said to have been a popular book. Probably its great author did not intend it to be such. Its unbending individuality, its gnarled and unsymmetrical form, show little of those arts which are wont to please the populace. Instead of courting popularity, its motto would rather seem to be—

“ Odi profanum vulgus et arceo.”

“ Me raris juvat auribus placere.”

Nevertheless, in our own day Ecclesiastes appears to be

* *Ecclesiastes ; or, The Preacher. With Notes and Introduction.* By E. H. PLUMPTRE, D.D., Professor of New Testament Exegesis, King's College, London, Prebendary of St. Paul's, Examining Chaplain to the Archbishop of Canterbury. Cambridge : At the University Press ; London : Cambridge Warehouse, 17, Paternoster-row. 1881.

attracting attention more widely, and attaining greater prominence in the public view, than heretofore. If the book is not already popular, it is in a fair way towards becoming so. Reasonable causes for this change are not very difficult to discern. The foundations of cherished creeds are loosening and yielding. And the spirit of the age is thus in harmony with that of the book, in its sceptical questioning and restless, fluctuating uncertainty. The atmosphere is clouded with gloom. The self-confident optimism of the last century, which has, especially in this country, through the influence of the economists, so long protracted its power, is tottering to the fall, or is already fallen. Wealth in huge accumulations, ostentatious frivolity, and luxury worthy of imperial Rome, cannot stifle and subdue, or even conceal, that inner sadness which contemporary art and poetry embody and express. The age can adopt as its own the utterance, "I looked on all the works that my hands had wrought, and on the labour that I had laboured to do : and, behold, all was vanity and vexation of spirit, and there was no profit under the sun." Science boasts vaingloriously of her progress, yet mocks us with her grand discovery of progress through pain, telling of small advantages for the few purchased by enormous waste of life, by internecine conflict and competition, and by a deadly struggle with Nature herself, "red in tooth and claw with ravin," greedy to feast on the offspring of her own redundant fertility. The revelations of Geology and Astronomy deepen our depression. The littleness of our lives and the insignificance of our concerns become more conspicuous in comparison with the long and slow procession of the æons which have gone before, and with the vast ocean of being around us, driven and tossed by enormous, complicated, and unresting forces. A new significance is thus given to the words, "One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh ; but the earth abideth for ever ;" " All things are full of labour ; man

cannot utter it : the eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing ;" " There is no remembrance of former things, neither shall there be any remembrance of things that are to come with those that shall come after ;" " In much wisdom is much grief ; and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow ;" " Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher ; vanity of vanities ; all is vanity."

But, besides the causes just mentioned, in an age of restless inquiry, the enigma of Ecclesiastes could scarcely fail to attract special attention. The impracticable knot must now at last be untied—or cut. From another point of view, also, Ecclesiastes has been recently regarded with peculiar interest. Theologians, generally distinguished for conservative orthodoxy, have, with respect to the authorship of Ecclesiastes, assented to the conclusions of modern criticism, and abandoned the traditional opinion that the book was written by Solomon. It is not unreasonable, therefore, that there should have been a strong desire aroused to defend the Solomonic authorship. If this, ostensibly the weakest point, can be rendered impregnable, the defence of traditional opinion as to the age and authorship of certain other Old Testament books need occasion little anxiety. To this end a rather bulky volume on 'The Authorship of Ecclesiastes' has been lately put forth. But the writer of this volume—who does not give his name—is defending a desperate and hopeless cause. The negative verdict which has been pronounced is not likely to be changed or reversed.

In England, during recent years, besides German commentaries introduced in an Anglicised dress, the number of works published, dealing more or less completely with Ecclesiastes, has been somewhat remarkable. This number would be considerable even in Germany, that land of Biblical research. Lately there has been added to the list a commentary on the book from the pen of Dr. E. H. Plumptre,

Professor of New Testament Exegesis in King's College, London. Since the publication of this commentary, Dr. Plumptre, we are glad to find, has been appointed to the Deanery of Wells—an instance of preferment worthily bestowed, though perhaps it may admit of question whether Dr. Plumptre's numerous and long-continued services may not fairly claim a still higher reward.

The present article will be mainly concerned with some of the subjects discussed in Dr. Plumptre's Introduction; and there are in relation to Ecclesiastes three especially fundamental questions:—(1) When was the Book written? (2) What is the meaning of the name *Koheleth*?—a name which the Authorised Version translates “The Preacher;” and (3) Is the so-called Epilogue an integral part of the Book, or a later addition? If we can answer these questions, we shall have proceeded far towards solving the enigma which Ecclesiastes presents.

I.

When was the Book written?

Until a comparatively recent period there was a general agreement among both Jewish and Christian writers that Ecclesiastes was the work of the great Hebrew monarch, Solomon. Opinions adverse to the traditional belief had been expressed by Luther, and subsequently by Grotius; but it was long before the belief appeared much shaken. At length, however, critics of widely divergent theological views admitted the soundness of Grotius's judgment that the diction of Ecclesiastes is inconsistent with the alleged Solomonic authorship. The recognition of Aramaisms and later Hebrew words did not, however, fix the date of the book with even tolerable precision. With a copious and continuous literature for comparison the case might be otherwise; but great difficulty results from the paucity of

Hebrew literary monuments for a long period previous to the birth of Christ. Nor was the chronological question solved by the assertion that there are in the language of Ecclesiastes indications of Greek influence. If this assertion had been well supported, the mere fact of such influence would still permit a good deal of doubt as to the exact date. It might be argued, indeed, that the book must probably have been written after the Eastern conquests of Alexander the Great. Still there would be nothing to prevent our placing its origin very much later, and assigning it, for example, with Dr. Graetz, to the time of King Herod. The critical sagacity of Hitzig enabled him to fix the date at about the end of the third century B.C., a conclusion which was, as sometimes happens, a good deal better than the arguments by which it was supported. Hitzig was followed by Van Gilse,* and by the distinguished theologian, Dr. Kuenen, of Leiden, who placed the date not very far from 175 B.C. The present writer arrived at a similar conclusion, before he had recognised the facts on which, as it now appears to him, the conclusion must chiefly rest.

It has been said that Ecclesiastes gives forth a sound out of harmony with the general tone of the Biblical books. Such a remark, while just with respect to the book in general, would be, perhaps, especially true of that portion which may be called "The Catalogue of the Times and Seasons," iii. 1—8, "For everything there is an appointed time, and a season for every matter under heaven; a season for giving birth and a season for dying," &c.† These verses, so singularly untheocratic and unbiblical, if it is allowable to use such expressions, take the place, in Ecclesiastes, of the Mosaic Law, or the Decalogue; and

* Mentioned by Kuenen, *Historisch-kritisch Onderzoek*. Third part, p. 188.

† Previous quotations have been borrowed from the Authorised Version. This and following quotations usually differ therefrom.

having introduced them at the beginning of the third chapter, the author probably never afterwards loses sight of them (Comp. iii. 12, 17; viii. 6; xi. 9, 10). That there is some analogy between the Catalogue of the Times and Seasons and the moral law of the Stoics, "Live conformably to Nature," seems tolerably manifest. These remarkable verses may be regarded as a setting forth of that law with some detail, giving a compendious statement of the particulars which make up human life, and for each of which there is in Nature a pre-determined season. Man must "live conformably to Nature," observing in every action the allotted season, since "for everything there is an appointed time, and a season for every matter under heaven." Taking into account the period when Stoicism originated—Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, having died probably towards the middle of the third century B.C.—the conclusion previously suggested that Ecclesiastes was written about 200 B.C. thus acquires a better basis on which to rest. Moreover, other evidences of Stoic influence are lying not far off. According to the Stoic physical philosophy, the course of things in Nature proceeds in a predetermined order, and with invariable sequence, like an ever-revolving wheel or circle. When one cycle is completed, the procession of events begins anew, to repeat in its minutest particular what has gone before. This teaching appears pretty obviously reflected, when we read, "I perceived that, as to all that God doeth, it is to be for ever: there is no making addition to it; and there is no taking away from it" (iii. 14). "Whatever hath been, it had been long ago before, and what is to be, already hath been; and God will seek after what hath gone before" (iii. 15). These words receive an easy explanation if the course of things in the world was conceived of, according to the ideal of the Stoics, as being like a revolving wheel or circle. Parts of the circle, or objects upon it, which may have passed out of

view, are ever brought back again in precisely the same order as before. "God will seek after what hath gone before," or, more literally, "what is pursued," for objects thus revolving seem to pursue or chase one another. The same doctrine of the cycles appears also in the first chapter: "What hath been, that it is which will be; and what hath been done, that it is which will be done; and there is nothing new under the sun. Let there be a thing as to which one saith, Behold this; it is new: it hath been long ago in the olden time which was before us" (i. 9, 10).

The evidence just given is perhaps sufficiently clear and conclusive. Scarcely less cogent is the accordance of our book with the Stoic doctrine that folly is madness; that fools are mad. And in the class of fools, and consequently of madmen, the Stoics included all except the philosophers, the truly wise (see Horace, *Sat.* ii. 3; Diog. Laert. vii. 124). Thus we read, "I gave my heart to know wisdom and knowledge, *madness and folly*" (i. 17); "And I turned to behold wisdom, and *madness and folly*" (ii. 12); "I proceeded, I and my heart, to know, and to explore, and to seek out wisdom and a plan, and to know *the depravity of obduracy and folly, even madness*" (vii. 25). The "madness" thus spoken of as opposed to wisdom, and associated with folly, or identified with it, is manifestly not mental derangement or insanity; and the way in which the word is used is perplexing or inexplicable till we apply the Stoic doctrine above mentioned. This gives us an easy solution of the difficulty. Indeed, to some readers the way in which the word "madness" is employed may possibly appear to yield more striking and conclusive proof of Stoic influence than that previously adduced relating to the Stoic moral law and the doctrine of the cycles.

The evidence thus furnished as to the date of Ecclesiastes is greatly strengthened when we find evidence, not only of the influence of Stoicism, but also of the contrasted, though

contemporary, doctrine of Epicureanism. Two passages may be selected in which the influence of Epicureanism is especially noteworthy—iii. 18—22, and v. 18—20. The first passage may be given thus :

I said in my heart, with respect to mankind, God meaneth to test them, and to see that they are beasts, even they themselves; for the lot of mankind is also the lot of beasts, and there is one lot to them. As is the death of the one, so is the death of the other; and there is one spirit to them all, and pre-eminence of man over the beasts there is none; for they are all vanity. All are going to one place: all were from the dust; and all are returning to the dust. Who knoweth as to the spirit of mankind, whether it goeth up on high, or as to the spirit of the beasts, whether it goeth down beneath to the earth? And I saw that there is nothing better than that man should be glad in his works, for that is his portion; for who will bring him to look upon what will be after him?

In this passage we have the Epicurean denial of man's immortality expressed with a good deal of emphasis. Men are but as beasts. All alike have come from the dust, and are returning to the dust. God has no special regard for man, whose only portion is the enjoyment which he can obtain while his fleeting life continues; none will bring him back again to behold the world as it will be after he is gone. But the Epicurean character of this passage becomes most clearly apparent when it is compared with the Stoical teaching of the two verses (iii. 16, 17) which immediately precede, and with which the sequel, as just quoted, comes into sharp opposition :

And further, I saw under the sun the place of judgment, there was wickedness; and the place of righteousness, there was wickedness. I said in my heart, God will judge the righteous and the wicked; for there is a season for every matter, and for all the work, *there*.

These verses manifestly set forth the Stoic conception of an order in Nature to which man is required to conform in

“all the work” that he executes. This order being divinely appointed, it naturally follows that disobedience and failure to observe it will be followed by judgment and punishment. The author is manifestly looking back to the Catalogue of Times and Seasons as embodying and exemplifying the course of Nature. It is to this that the final word “there” refers. “There is a season for every matter, and for all the work, *there*.” This is shown also by his again using in part the very formula which he had employed to introduce the Catalogue: “There is a season for every matter.” In contrast with this Stoical view of the world and man, the Epicurean character of the verses following becomes more clearly apparent.

The second passage above cited, v. 18—20, not only gives the Epicurean idea of life, but also introduces at the end what may be called an Epicurean technicality, which, in some sort, may be placed on a level with the Stoical identification of folly and madness already mentioned :

Lo, that is what I have seen good, what I have seen suitable, to eat and to drink, and to experience enjoyment in respect of all one's toil which he toileth under the sun, during the number of the days of his life which God hath given him ; for that is his portion. Also as to every man to whom God hath given wealth and treasures, and hath given to him power to eat therefrom, and to receive his portion, and to rejoice in respect of his toil ; as to this, it is the gift of God, so that *he remembereth not much the days of his life, for God is making answer to the joy of his heart.*

The “not remembering much the days of one's life,” as they glide on calmly and peacefully, answers perfectly to the Epicurean *ἀταραξία*, the perfect tranquillity which it was especially the object of the Epicurean philosophy to secure. But the concluding words, which are above translated, “God is making answer to the joy of his heart,” have been in time past a source of no small perplexity to the commentators. There is, however, one special Epicurean notion

which throws a very remarkable light upon them. It was supposed by the Epicureans that the fitness of things involved a balance or analogy between gods and men. The felicity of the gods consisted in a tranquillity and calm enjoyment like that which it was the object of the Epicurean philosophy to attain. The Epicurean gods lived the life of philosophers. The Epicurean philosophers lived as gods among men. Gods and men might thus be spoken of as harmonious or responsive choirs. And in this way we get an easy explanation of the perplexing words, "God is making answer to the joy of his heart." Taken together with the previous representation of Epicurean tranquillity in what is said just before of the "not remembering much the days of his life," the evidence of Epicurean influence becomes extremely cogent and convincing.

With regard to the fact of Epicureanism being introduced among the Jews, there is corroborative evidence of no small importance. The name "Epicureans" was of not very infrequent use, appearing even in the Mishnah. In one passage (*Berakoth* ix. 5) we are told that the Epicureans corrupted the Jewish faith, asserting that there is but one world. Perhaps still more important is the account given of Antigonus of Socho in *Aboth* i. 3. This Antigonus, who, it would appear, lived in the third century B.C., is the first Jew of whom we have any knowledge as bearing a Greek name. He is also particularly distinguished as having taught that men should not serve God like hirelings impelled by the hope of a reward. Another account (*Aboth of R. Nathan*) connects Antigonus with the Sadducees, through his two disciples, Boëthus and Zadok. These disciples are said to have reiterated the teaching of Antigonus—a course pursued, moreover, by successive generations of disciples; whence it arose that, in the course of time, the future state and the resurrection of the dead were called in question. The resemblance between Epicureanism and the doctrine of the

Sadducees is sufficiently obvious; and it is remarkable that the Sadducean teaching is connected genealogically with a Jew bearing a Greek name, and living, moreover, just about the time that Epicurus was founding and establishing his sect of the Garden, namely, in the first half of the third century. The Sadducean denial of immortality in Ecclesiastes, taken together with the historical indications just mentioned, is quite in accordance with the position that the Book was written at the end of the third century, or about 200 B.C., though alone it would not fix this date.

A very powerful argument in favour of this date is furnished, however, by the fact that the book, with its indications of Greek influence, thus comes into accord with the known facts of Jewish history, and especially with the outburst of Hellenism which occurred in the time of Antiochus Epiphanes; when Greek customs of various kinds were adopted; and when the priests themselves were so affected by the Hellenising mania as to disregard even their ministrations in the Temple. We are too much inclined, perhaps, to think of Epiphanes as thrusting on the reluctant Jews new ideas and new customs. It is a better supported opinion, and one which, apart from direct evidence, would not be improbable, that the king was encouraged in his enterprise, or stimulated to it, by the sympathies of a portion of the people, and by no means an inconsiderable one, already pervaded by the Hellenising spirit, and anxious to sweep away and abolish customs and institutions which had now become distasteful. (See 1 Macc. i. 11—13.)

Jewish history presents us also, in the Maccabean war, with a limiting boundary, after which it becomes unlikely that Ecclesiastes would have been written. Subsequently to this powerful conservative reaction such an exhibition of Stoic and Epicurean philosophy would scarcely have been made. At least, the outward form of the book would have been, we may well believe, a good deal modified. Greek

thought, no doubt, had obtained too firm a lodgment in Judaism to be driven out even by the Maccabean reaction. But such thought, as it appears in Ecclesiastes, seems to be still in great part on the outside, or at least not to have been as yet fully incorporated and assimilated. But, if this view is just, we may with probability place the date of the book at some time previous to the accession of Epiphanes, though not very far distant, or, as before mentioned, about 200 B.C.

There is, however, another important aid towards determining the date furnished by the indications of acquaintance with Ecclesiastes to be found in Ecclesiasticus. One of the most remarkable of these is furnished by a comparison of Ecclesiastes vii. 13—15 with Ecclesiasticus xxxiii. 13—15. The first-cited passage may be given thus:—

Behold the work of God; for who can straighten what He hath made crooked? In the day of good enjoy thyself, but in the day of evil behold. God indeed hath set the one over against the other, because man findeth nothing after him. I saw all in the days of my vanity; there is a righteous man perishing in his righteousness, and there is a wicked man prolonging his life in his wickedness.

And the passage from Ecclesiasticus:—

As a potter's clay in his hand—all its ways according to his good pleasure—so men in the hand of Him who made them, to render to them according to His judgment. Opposite to evil is good, and opposite to death is life; so opposite to a pious man a sinner. And so look at all the works of the Highest—two and two, one over against another.

At first sight the resemblance may not appear so very striking, though it may become convincing when the two passages are more fully pondered. Both passages are concerned with the same subject; the earthly condition of men, and the dispensations of Providence. "Behold the work of God," in the one, answers to "look at all the works of

the Highest" in the other. The first passage speaks of the impossibility of straightening what God hath made crooked, while the second compares the Divine control over human destiny to the power of the potter over the clay which he moulds "according to his good pleasure." In Ecclesiastes "the day of evil" is contrasted to "the day of good." In Ecclesiasticus we have "opposite to evil is good." A more subtle analogy may be detected by comparing what is said in the one passage of the "righteous man perishing" and the "wicked man prolonging his life" with the words of the other, "opposite to death is life, so opposite to a pious man a sinner." In the one passage the righteous man perishes, while the sinner prolongs his life; in the other, taking the words in the order of their occurrence, "death" in the one clause corresponds to "a pious man" in the other, and "life" to "a sinner." For this seemingly inverted order the comparison of the two passages gives a probable reason. But perhaps the most important resemblance is seen when the words of Ecclesiastes, "God indeed hath set the one over against the other," are compared with the concluding words of the passage from Ecclesiasticus, "Look at all the works of the Highest—two and two, one over against another." The words of Ecclesiasticus appear as if, in part, a direct translation from the Hebrew of Ecclesiastes.

This resemblance—and other instances might be adduced in corroboration—points to the conclusion that Ecclesiastes was already in existence when Ecclesiasticus was written. We may place the composition of Ecclesiasticus approximately at 180 B.C., before the Maccabean war. The date of Ecclesiastes will have to be placed between this time and the origin and diffusion of Stoicism and Epicureanism. Probably no date can be found more likely, and answering better to all the conditions, than that already mentioned, about 200 B.C.

With respect to the influence of Greek thought on Ecclesiastes, Dr. Plumptre goes considerably beyond what has been said above. Thus he says at p. 32, "It is throughout absolutely saturated with Greek thought and language." In support of this position Dr. Plumptre adduces numerous references; but the Catalogue of the Times and Seasons of iii. 1—8, he refers, not to the Stoic moral law, "Live conformably to Nature," but rather to the Greek sense of seasonableness and opportuneness. It seems, however, pretty conclusive against Dr. Plumptre's opinion, that acting unseasonably is spoken of as "wickedness," and as exposing the delinquent to the Divine judgment (iii. 16, 17). Here there is evidently something involved a good deal deeper than an æsthetic avoidance of the indecorous and unseemly. Dr. Plumptre considers, on the whole, that the evidence of Greek influence "compels us to admit that the book could not well have been written before the schools of the Garden and the Porch had obtained a prominent position—i.e., not earlier than B.C. 250." This evidence, taken together with other indications, brings Dr. Plumptre to the conclusion that Ecclesiastes was written between B.C. 240 and B.C. 181—that is, about B.C. 200.*

II.

What is the meaning of the name Koheleth?

The name Koheleth, which the Authorised Version translates by "the Preacher," has given rise to most divergent explanations. Dr. Graetz, in despair, apparently, of finding

* This conclusion regarding the date of Ecclesiastes, based on the relation of the book to Ecclesiasticus, and the manifest influence upon it of the Stoic and Epicurean philosophies, was given by the present writer in a pamphlet, entitled *Some New Evidence as to the Date of Ecclesiastes* (1872); and afterwards more fully in a commentary on the book, with the title, *Ecclesiastes; A Contribution to its Interpretation, containing an Introduction to the Book; an Ezegetical Analysis; and a Translation with Notes.* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1874.) His obligation to this work Dr. Plumptre very handsomely acknowledges.

any sense suitable to his Herodian hypothesis, admitted the possibility of its being a sort of nickname. Interpreters generally regard the word as expressing the idea of collecting, or of convening, or addressing an assembly. But to regard the word as meaning the Collector, or the Convener, is not in harmony with grammatical requirements; and we cannot arrive at the sense "one addressing an assembly," or "the Preacher," by any process which can be fairly sustained. Dr. Plumptre changes "the Preacher" into "the Debater," and attains this meaning not directly from the Hebrew, but through the rendering of the Greek and Latin versions, *Ecclesiastes*. He supposes that the word *Koheleth*, which is found only in this book, and nowhere else in the Bible, "was coined because the writer wanted a word more significant and adapted to his aim than any with which his native speech supplied him; possibly, indeed, because he wanted a word corresponding to one in a foreign language that was thus significant." It would thus seem, in Dr. Plumptre's view, that the author of our book first thought of the Greek *ἐκκλησιαστής*, and then formed, as a translation of it, the Hebrew *Koheleth*. But this suggestion, however ingenious, would be, under any circumstances, too purely hypothetical to be readily admitted. If, however, we waive this objection, it must still be apparent that, to a writer having a considerable familiarity with the Greek language, and who wished to express the idea of one speaking, debating, or questioning, other words would, without much difficulty, suggest themselves which would suit his purpose much better than *ἐκκλησιαστής*. An *ἐκκλησιαστής* was "a man of an assembly," "a member of an assembly," though not necessarily a speaker, orator, or debater. But assent can scarcely be given either to Dr. Plumptre's explanation or to his method of attaining it. We must, on the contrary, begin with the Hebrew, which the Greek, in accordance with the common exigencies of

translation, may or may not fully represent. The true view of the matter appears to be this: *Koheleth* is a participle, but, like various other verbal forms, it is what grammarians call *denominative*, or derived from a noun, the noun in this case being *kahal*, "an assembly." *Koheleth* may thus be translated, "one who is an assembly." This explanation may seem at first sight strange and improbable; but it is open to no valid objection on grammatical grounds; and it has the great advantage of exactly suiting, or even being required by, certain important and perplexing phenomena which the book presents. Throughout the book, from i. 2 to xii. 8, the discourse of one speaker only is reported. Thus, in a passage already cited (iii. 16, 17), *Koheleth* said in his heart that God will judge the righteous and the wicked; and immediately afterwards we are told that *Koheleth* also said in his heart that men are but beasts, like them coming from the dust, and returning to the dust. The variety of opinions expressed has given rise to the opinion that the book contains the report of a discussion in a learned or philosophical assembly. But, in accordance with what has been said, we certainly have, from i. 2 to xii. 8, the words of *one* *Koheleth*. The solution of the difficulty is to be found in regarding *Koheleth* as a personified assembly. This explanation allows the required combination of unity with variety and multiplicity. Many philosophers, Stoic, Epicurean, and others, speak by the mouth of the one *Koheleth*.* *Koheleth*, moreover, as a collective unity, as

* Dr Kuenen, writing in the Leiden *Theologisch Tijdschrift*, in a generally favourable *critique* on the present writer's *Ecclesiastes*, yet strongly objected to the explanation given of the name *Koheleth*. If the name in question, an active participle, meant "an assembly," what, asks Dr. Kuenen, must have been the sense of the preterite *kahal*? It may be replied that if, in accordance with the explanation given, *Koheleth* meant "one who is an assembly," or "she who is an assembly"—if it were of any use to do so—there would be no difficulty in suggesting a congruous sense for the preterite as a denominative. If in Isa. xviii. 6 *kuts* and *kharaph* mean, as denominatives, "to pass the summer," and "to pass the autumn or winter," in neither case is this the normal and radical sense.

personifying an assemblage of philosophers, becomes a personification of Wisdom or Philosophy in the concrete; and Wisdom thus conceived of, as a collective unity, was identified also with the great King Solomon, whose comprehensive intellect may thus have been regarded as having embraced all the wisdom of the philosophical Koheleth—as having been a sort of microcosm of Philosophy. This identification was probably suggested by the fact that in “The Proverbs of Solomon” it appears to be now Solomon and now Wisdom that is represented as speaking (Prov. i.—ix.), if, indeed, the utterances of Wisdom and Solomon can be always distinguished.

The view thus given of the name Koheleth is not, however, in accordance with Dr. Plumptre’s opinion that the book contains an autobiographical confession; that it is a record of its author’s personal experience; and that seeming contradictions indicate oscillations of sentiment and opinion, by which his struggle towards truth was marked and accompanied. This view, previously presented by Dr. Plumptre in Smith’s ‘Dictionary of the Bible,’ is now given anew with great amplitude of illustration in the Introduction and Notes of his Commentary. It has been so modified, moreover, that it meets, to some extent, an objection which had been urged by the present writer, that, “if the author of Ecclesiastes had never been ‘king over Israel in Jerusalem,’ if he had never lived in that princely magnificence described in the second chapter, we cannot, with any approach to certainty, determine that we have elsewhere only a record of his personal experience” (*Ecclesiastes*, &c., p. 49). We have now, in the third chapter of Dr. Plumptre’s Introduction, a skilfully-drawn “Ideal Biography” of the author of Ecclesiastes. Dr. Plumptre meets by anticipation “the charge of evolving a biography out of one’s inner consciousness,” by asserting that the veil which the author of Ecclesiastes has thrown over his character is so slight “that

the task of portraying the lineaments that lie beneath is comparatively easy." There is reason to fear, however, that Dr. Plumptre will scarcely avoid the charge of making not infrequent excursions into "the cloudland of imagination," to use his own expression.

Koheleth, we are told, was the only son of wealthy parents living in a country town in Judæa. In the synagogue school of the town he received the usual rudimentary education. He had little sympathy with his mother, who came under the influence of a coterie of hypocritical pretenders to piety. Advancing onward from childhood he was required by his father to take part in the labours of the cornfield and the vineyard, days spent in which he afterwards looked back upon regretfully. As he grew up to manhood, however, he became dissatisfied, and, wishing to see the world, directed his steps to Alexandria. He had obtained from his father a large share of property, which "enabled him to surround himself with a certain magnificence; and he kept before himself the ideal of a glory like that of Solomon's." Like the prodigal son of the parable, "he wasted his substance in riotous living, and devoured his wealth with harlots." Such a life naturally tended to "the bitterness of a cynical satiety." He hated life itself, declared it to be intolerable, yet shrank from death. But "the utter weariness and satiety, the mood of a *blasé* pessimism into which he fell, was as the first stepping-stone to higher things." For the time, however, his despondency was deepened by the falsehood of a woman whom he had loved "with a passion fiery and fond as that of Catullus for Lesbia." But he was saved from despair by the influence of a faithful Israelite, who proved himself "one of a thousand." Still his heart-wound was not easily healed; and to quiet his perturbed heart and intellect he betook himself to the stores of Greek literature and philosophy which were available to all students in the Alexandrian

Library. He imbibed pessimism from the Greek poets, and found their utterances in accordance with his own feelings. But it was the works of the Stoic and Epicurean philosophers that he studied with the greatest eagerness. Eventually, however, he made choice of Epicureanism, though, as carried into practice by him, the Epicurean system would seem to have led to somewhat unusual results (see pp. 48, 49). From the Library of Alexandria, Koheleth passed to the Museum, and enjoyed the high honour of becoming "a member of the august body who dined in its large hall at the public expense, and held their philosophical discussions afterwards." Here Epicureans and Stoics, Platonists and Aristotelians met; and in this *ecclesia*, he became an *ecclesiastes*, or *debater*. Under these conditions, though the gold was still debased by much alloy, Koheleth found life brighter and more cheerful than before. He even looked forward to domestic felicity, with wife and children around him. But the dream was not to be realised. Pleasure and revelry, study and debate, had drained so far the springs of life that "there crept over him the slow decay of a premature old age; of the paralysis which, while it leaves consciousness clear, and the brain free to think and muse over many things, attacks first one organ of sense or action and then another." The "days of darkness" were many, the "long struggle with disease" continuing some six or seven years. There were, moreover, additional sources of disquietude. He had no son to inherit his estate; and the deep draughts he had taken from the fountain of Greek philosophy did not prevent his being a good deal troubled about the place and conditions of his burial. His faithful Israelite friend continued, however, to visit him, and partly, it would appear, as the result of his influence, Koheleth experienced "a religious reaction." "The voice within once more spoke in clearer notes than ever." The old faith reasserted itself. And now, notwith-

standing his weakness, he was induced "to put on record the results of his experience." Regardless of fame, he composed his book under the pseudonym of Koheleth. And as other writers had employed the names of Aristotle, and Plato, and Hippocrates, so he thought himself justified in speaking in the character of Solomon—a character for which, indeed, the magnificent surroundings amid which he had lived had in some sort prepared him. "He still thought in the language of his fatherland, and therefore in that language he wrote."* "The close of the book all but coincided with the close of life." After his death the book was "brought by the grandson of Sirach, or some other seeker after truth, from Alexandria to Palestine, and translated by him into Greek."

Dr. Plumptre's biographical edifice displays no small amount of artistic skill; though to take a just view of it the reader must see it for himself in Dr. Plumptre's pages. But, after all, there is reason to feel some regret that it has been composed. It may be doubted whether it will advance the interpretation of Ecclesiastes. Of the several particulars and incidents of which the ideal biography consists, few, at most, can be regarded as probable; and a biography woven from possibilities is of little avail. We are to take it, for example, that Koheleth was an only son, because in iv. 8 it is said, "There is one, but there is not a second; moreover, he hath neither son nor brother." It is difficult to see how the required sense can be attained. With as much, or as little, probability he may be considered as having been one of a very numerous family, since we read in iv. 16, "There is no end to all the people." His parents were wealthy; probably because of the wealth and magnificence described in the second chapter. It would be quite as likely that he was born of poor parents, and had

* But ought not the Book in this case to have been written in Aramean, and not in Hebrew?

suffered severely from the strain of poverty, the *res angusta domi*, because we have brought before us in the ninth chapter "a poor wise man" who was neglected and despised. And so we might go on. The fact is, that, treated in this way, the verses of Ecclesiastes become a good deal like the fragments of glass in a kaleidoscope, which may be made to assume an almost endless diversity of forms.

Does the philosophical portion of the book (i. 2 to xii. 8), exhibit on the whole a gradual advance towards a firmer faith? In opposition to the view of Dr. Plumptre, the present writer would be disposed to answer this question decidedly in the negative. If a gradual advance is manifest at all, it is an advance in scepticism, and in dissatisfaction with the state of things in the world. Thus in viii. 14, it is said that "there are righteous men to whom it happeneth according to the work of the wicked," implying that this occurs in the case of only *some* righteous men. But in ix. 2 we read, "All is alike to all: there is one lot to the righteous and to the wicked." And so near the end of the book as xi. 9, the Stoical law of the Times and Seasons, which had been previously set forth as foreboding judgment to the unjust and wicked, comes to be so applied, as under a similar sanction, to enjoin indulgence in youthful pleasure, thus outstripping even Epicureanism. Moreover, the picture of old age in chap. xii. seems too gloomy and appalling to suit such a view as Dr. Plumptre's, notwithstanding the poetical power with which the picture is coloured. And as to the future state, while xi. 8 points apparently to the shadowy and insubstantial condition of the dead in Hades, described by the classic poets, xii. 7, would seem—in accordance with a form of Stoical opinion—to denote the re-absorption of the soul into the Deity, as the dust mingles again with the earth.

An important question is, however, started by Dr. Plumptre

with regard to the influence on our book of Alexandria, and the contact between Judaism and Greek thought which occurred in that city. This question may be viewed apart from Dr. Plumptre's Alexandrian life of Koheleth. If Alexandrianism exercised at the time a potent influence on the Judaism of the fatherland, this influence may well have been extended to Ecclesiastes. But, to judge from such memorials of Judæo-Alexandrian literature as have come down to us, it may be confidently declared that Ecclesiastes was not a product of the Alexandrian School, but that its affinities are with Palestinian Rabbinism. On the whole, the book looks towards the Talmud, and not towards Philo, or Aristobulus, of Maccabean times; and it is, perhaps, more likely that the Stoicism and Epicureanism which appear in the book have come from Greece through Asia Minor than through Egypt.

Regarding, then, as inadequate to explain the phenomena of the book the idea that it presents a varied personal experience, with great oscillations of thought and sentiment, it appears to the present writer the only probable opinion that Koheleth is, as already stated, the personification of an imaginary assemblage of philosophers, Stoics, Epicureans, and others, and that this idea is represented by the name.

It has been already intimated that to Luther is due the honour of a pioneer in calling in question the Solomonic authorship of Ecclesiastes. The great reformer also in his *Table-talk* assigned the book to the time of the Maccabees, connecting its origin with the Alexandrian Library; a suggestion which, as we have seen, Dr. Plumptre has followed. Luther seems also to have detected the composite character of the book, its being the voice, as it were, of an assembly, for he speaks of it as being "like a Talmud, brought together out of many books." Whether or not Luther suspected that Talmudic tendency of the book which will be adverted to in the sequel, the expression *wie ein Talmud*, taken

together with what is said in the context on the abrupt style of Ecclesiastes, seems to point to something beyond the variety by which the book is characterised.

III.

Is the so-called Epilogue an integral part of the Book, or a later addition?

The Epilogue may be given thus :—

And moreover, since Koheleth was wise, he still further taught the people knowledge; and he paid attention, and investigated; he set in order many proverbs. Koheleth sought to find pertinent words, and what was written was right, words of truth. The words of wise men are like goads, and those of the editors of collections, like nails driven in: they were given by one Shepherd. And further, be admonished, my son, by these; as to the making of many books there is no end; and much close study is a wearying of the flesh.

The conclusion of the discourse, the universal law, let us hear. Fear God, and keep His commandments; for this is the universal law for man. For God will bring all the work into judgment,* concerning everything hidden, whether it be good or whether it be evil (xii. 9—14).

Dr. Plumptre, however, assents to the opinion of those who regard the Epilogue as beginning with verse 8—"Vanity of vanities, said Koheleth; all is vanity." The chief, or longer, portion of the book thus ends with what is said, in verse 7, of the spirit returning to God who gave it. And indeed, if Dr. Plumptre and others were right in their opinion that what is thus said declares or implies the doctrine of personal immortality, the "vanity of vanities" might seem a good deal out of place, tacked on so closely to the "return to God." But, on the other hand, what has the "vanity of vanities;

* Or, with a slight change in the pointing of the Hebrew, "For all God's work will He bring into judgment;" a rendering which, perhaps, accords better with what Koheleth had previously said of the anomalous and unintelligible condition of things in the world.

all is vanity," to do with what follows? If it be said that the Epilogist, whoever he may have been, prefixed this formula as ~~summing up the teaching~~ of Koheleth, how then, it may be asked, could this teaching end and culminate in a declaration of personal immortality? * The more reasonable opinion would seem to be that the words in question conclude the longer portion—the philosophical portion—of the book, and that they were added by the original author to reiterate what he had said at the beginning, and to give the outcome and result of the intervening discourse.

Obviously, however, if the discourse i. 2 to xii. 8 (or in Dr. Plumtre's opinion xii. 7) were an autobiographical confession written by Koheleth himself, then the Epilogue must be, in all probability, a later addition. The words, "And, moreover, since Koheleth was wise," can scarcely be regarded as written by Koheleth just after the self-revelation of his inner conflict and struggle towards truth. But the idea of such a self-revelation having been made need not be here further considered.

The fact that Koheleth in the Epilogue is *spoken of*, furnishes no valid objection to its having been written by the original author. Koheleth is spoken of, also, in the previous part of the book; as in i. 2, "Vanity of vanities, said Koheleth;" and in vii. 27, "See, this I found, said Koheleth," &c.; and where the words "said Koheleth" are not inserted, Koheleth and his experience are usually placed in the past. In fact, the discourse i. 2 to xii. 8 is, probably, to be taken as if it were the report of an oral discourse written out subsequently by Koheleth himself. In accordance with this fiction, the Epilogue may be regarded as written by the original author, as though editor of the work. Analogous examples from literature

* Dr. Plumtre's notes on xii. 7, 8 should be consulted. They are too long to be here transcribed. See also at p. 55, "'Return to God'—that was his last word on the great problem."

may suggest themselves to the reader without much difficulty.

There is still one other source of difficulty which requires particular mention. The exhortation to "fear God and keep His commandments," in ver. 13, seems to differ so very greatly from what has gone before, that considerable doubt may arise—at least, on a superficial view—as to the identity of authorship. The conclusion of the book, however, appears to have had great influence in preventing its being excluded from the Canon. And the Rabbins who decided on retaining it because of its ending with words of the Law were doubtless right. The relation of the conclusion to the previous discourse may be thus given. Having set forth the fruitlessness of philosophical investigation by exhibiting the contradictions in which such studies had resulted, the author concludes by giving the positive lesson for which the previous discourse was intended to prepare the reader. The injunction to fear God and observe His commandments is not introduced as given by *Koheleth*; and, indeed, if we are right in regarding *Koheleth* as a personification of Philosophy in the concrete, that is, of philosophers Stoic, Epicurean, and others, it will easily appear that the final injunction could scarcely come from the mouth of *Koheleth*. Possibly the conclusion may indicate, on the part of the author of *Ecclesiastes*, a recantation of Greek philosophy, and a renewed adherence to the Jewish law and ritual. But even such an inference as this with regard to the author's life cannot be looked upon as altogether certain. Admitting, as we must do, that the work is, to a large extent, a work of fiction, it is scarcely possible to determine the relative limits of fiction and of fact.

A strong argument in favour of the genuineness of the concluding verses, and of the unity of authorship, is furnished by the book being thus brought into harmony with the conditions of the period to which, as we have seen,

there are preponderant reasons for assigning it. If, in accordance with what has been already said, the book was intended to dissuade its readers from philosophical speculation, and to recall them to the ancient faith of Judaism, or to confirm those who were vacillating, such an intention is precisely what might be expected in a book written about 200 B.C., in opposition to Hellenistic tendencies already in vigorous operation, though these tendencies may not as yet have resulted in much outward apostasy. And, with regard to the view thus presented in Ecclesiastes concerning philosophical studies, it is important to observe that the presentation of philosophy is included within the circle of the "vanity of vanities; all is vanity," formed by i. 2, and xii. 8.

An objection may, however, be drawn from the seeming disproportion which would thus arise between the extended philosophical discourse (i. 2 to xii. 8), and the brief religious exhortation of xii. 13, 14. And it may be said that Koheleth's presentation of philosophic doctrines is characterised by too much of impressiveness, by too intense earnestness and self-devotion, to allow of our thinking that his intention was merely to warn his readers against the study of philosophy, and then to recommend the sacrifice of the intellect. Had he been an enemy of all philosophical study, he would not have sent forth his philosophical arguments like brazen knights in armour of dazzling brightness, so that he might come at last to so poor a conclusion, and one, moreover, which he himself had previously done so much to contradict and refute.*

This objection is specious, and may seem at first of no small weight. But with regard to the vivid interest

* So Dr. Siegfried, in a review of the writer's commentary on Ecclesiastes, in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschrift*, though in other important respects Dr. Siegfried expresses his assent to the opinions set forth in that work, as with regard to the influence of the Stoic and Epicurean philosophies on Ecclesiastes, and the meaning of the name Koheleth.

seemingly manifested in philosophical doctrines, this may be accounted for, if the author of Ecclesiastes had previously been a warm adherent of one of the philosophical sects. A further and fuller answer to the objection is, however, to be found in what may be called the Talmudic tendency of Ecclesiastes. Closely connected, as the book appears certainly to have been, with the learning of the Jewish schools, it shows already in its language—to an extent exhibited by no other of the Biblical books—an affinity with the Hebrew of the Mishnah. This tendency towards Mishnic Hebrew is to be seen in a marked manner in the last verse but one (xii. 13), where the words of the original translated above, “this is the universal law,” admit, apparently, of no reasonable or probable explanation, till they are viewed in the light of that very frequent formula of the Mishnah *zeh hakkelal*, meaning, “this is the general principle,” or, “this is the universal law,” and used to introduce the law or principle by the enunciation of which a discussion is commonly closed. And the unexpectedness of the transition in Ecclesiastes, together with the seeming want of balance, is quite in accordance with the characteristics of the Talmud. The Talmudists delight, apparently, to surprise the reader by a sudden transition, and to task his ingenuity in discerning a subtle thread of connection. The late Emanuel Deutsch observed in his celebrated essay on the Talmud, “We can understand the distress of mind in a mediæval divine, or even in a modern *savant*, who, bent upon following the most subtle windings of some scientific debate in the Talmudical pages—geometrical, botanical, financial, or otherwise—as it revolves round the Sabbath journey, the raising of seeds, the computation of tithes and taxes—feels, as it were, the ground suddenly give way, the loud voices grow thin, the doors and walls of the schoolroom vanish before his eyes, and in their place uprises Rome the Great, the *Urbs et Orbis*, and her million-voiced life. Or

the blooming vineyards round that other City of Hills, Jerusalem the Golden herself, are seen, and white clad virgins move dreamily among them." The transition in Ecclesiastes is of a different nature; but though such, perhaps, as to give no small disappointment to the philosophical student, yet it may be doubted whether we are justified in regarding the closing verses as a poor conclusion.

Viewed in relation to the Talmud, not only is an explanation found for the abrupt transitions of Ecclesiastes, but also for its love of enigma and its uneven style. Moreover, the sacrifice of the intellect, so far as this is implied in observance of the law without philosophical inquiry as to its inner meaning and intention—"the spirit" lying beneath "the letter"—this was, on the whole, especially characteristic of Talmudic Judaism, the tendency towards which already in Ecclesiastes exists in the germ. But, with regard to the injunction, "Fear God and keep His commandments," it is not easy to define precisely the significance, so as to infer from it what view the author of Ecclesiastes took of the Mosaic law and, it may be added, of the Prophets. There are, however, in our book some probable indications that, in interpreting the Biblical narratives, the allegorical method was sometimes employed, whether from real or supposed difficulties connected with the direct and literal interpretation, or from whatever other cause. On this subject, the present writer has said elsewhere, "It would certainly appear probable that we have in vii. 26 a generalised application of the account of Samson and Delilah in Judges xvi. Instead of Delilah and her wiles, we have 'the woman who as to her heart is nets and snares.' The binding of Samson is represented by, 'whose hands are bonds;' his escape at first, while he retained his Nazariteship, by 'he who is pleasing to God will escape from her;' his being taken by

the Philistines when his locks had been shorn, and the LORD had departed from him, by 'the sinner will be caught by her;' and the words, 'I find a more bitter thing than death' represent the voluntary death by which Samson finally escapes from Delilah and her pernicious wiles. So in v. 1 we have, apparently, a reference to Samuel's rebuke of Saul after the defeat of Agag. But instead of *Saul* not intending to do wrong, we have a general statement respecting 'fools offering a sacrifice, though they mean not to do evil.' Similarly in vi. 10, *Adam* 'of the earth, earthy,' according to the narrative in Gen. ii., is taken to represent the nature of man in general. And probably in the same verse there is a similar generalised application of what is said concerning the antediluvians in Gen. vi. 3."* Such a tendency to the allegorical would afford an additional mark of affinity with the Talmud.

Attention must be directed, however, to another matter of considerable importance in its bearing on the relation of Ecclesiastes to the Law and the Prophets, and also on the significance of the concluding verses. The Mosaic legislation was supported by sanctions of earthly good and evil. The righteous and obedient were to enjoy worldly success and prosperity, while calamities were to overtake and overwhelm the disobedient and wicked. These promises and threatenings did not appear, however, to be uniformly fulfilled, if we may take as evidence what is said by the Psalmists (Ps. xxxvii.; lxxiii.). And the Book of Job is occupied with the same subject, though, at least ostensibly, its scene lies outside the theocracy. But the difficulty was met by the allegation that the prosperity of the wicked and the calamity and suffering of the righteous were but for a season. In the end the normal order would prevail. The tempted and suffering Job becomes at last far more pros-

* Tylor's *Ecclesiastes*, pp. 54, 55.

perous than before his temptation. Koheleth states the difficulty very broadly:—

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For I laid all this to heart, even to investigate all this, that the righteous and the wise, and their works, are in the hand of God, yet men discern neither love nor hatred in all that is before them. All is alike to all: there is one lot to the righteous and to the wicked, to the good and to the pure, and to him that is defiled, and to him who sacrificeth, and to whom who sacrificeth not: as is the good man, so is the sinner; he who sweareth, as he who feareth an oath (ix. 1, 2).

The difficulty could not easily be removed by the suggestion that the rule was uniformly observed in the very early times of the theocracy, though subsequently it had not been regarded, for it was reiterated by the prophets, and declared about as emphatically as ever, even after the captivity (see Haggai i. 6—11; ii. 16—19). Malachi stated it apparently with some reserve, looking forward to a day of retribution, possibly beyond the range of earthly life (Mal. iii. 16—18).* Koheleth, in viii. 12, 13, gives substantially the old explanation, that, notwithstanding present appearances, "it will be well with those who fear God," but that "it will not be well with the wicked man," who will not prolong his earthly life to the extreme limit. But this explanation does not seem to be given in Ecclesiastes as having greater authority than the dicta of Stoics and Epicureans. Indeed, in relation to this subject we are advancing on ground occupied, also, more or less by the Greek philosophers. The injunction, "Fear God and keep His commandments," will thus stand opposed to all speculations about the moral government of God, the course of Providence, and the distribution of earthly good and evil. The utterances of the Law and Prophets on the subject were probably to be regarded as hidden mysteries, which should not interfere with practical obedience. But it would appear from xii. 14 that a future

* Comp. Kuenen, *Prophets and Prophecy in Israel*, p. 355, seq.

judgment was to be looked for, when everything hidden as to the work of God in the world is to be reviewed, in order to its justification, though the manner in which this final adjustment and rectification is to be made is not stated.

In bringing to a conclusion the discussion of our third question, it may be affirmed that there appears no valid reason whatever for cutting off the Epilogue, or attributing it to a later hand. On this matter Dr. Ginsburg has said, "As to the assertion that verses 9—14 are not genuine, and have been added by a later hand (Döderlein, Schmidt, Berthold, Umbreit, Knobel, &c.), it is most arbitrary, and to be repudiated. Nothing can be more weak than the arguments brought to support this allegation."*

To Dr. Plumptre's exegetical notes we may possibly have an opportunity of referring hereafter in connection with M. Renan's work on Ecclesiastes, which is understood to have been now some time in the hands of the printer.

THOMAS TYLER.

. The anticipatory publication of M. Renan's Introduction in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* enables us to append his answers to the three questions discussed above. (1) He is inclined to place the origin of the Book at about a hundred years before Christ. (2) The name Koheleth, which he regards as an unsolved enigma, he represents by the four letters QHLT. These letters, he suggests, may be the initials of four words now unknown. This suggestion scarcely needs refutation, since M. Renan admits that the letters in question form in the text of Ecclesiastes a veritable name, and that the ordinary pronunciation, as represented by the vowel-points, is probably that intended by the author himself. (3) With regard to the Epilogue M. Renan acts in a very arbitrary manner, cutting it in two between xii. 10 and 11, and allowing only the ninth and tenth verses to be genuine.

M. Renan traces the genesis of Ecclesiastes to a supposed fundamental Semitic Monotheism, which required that the Deity should reward the good and punish the bad. But this theory came directly into collision

* Ginsburg's *Koheleth*, p. 470.

with the hard facts of Nature and human society. Nature is but injustice (*La nature est l'injustice même*); and Society is very little better than a reflection of Nature. Faith in a compensating immortality had not yet emerged in Israel. This faith it was to be the function of Christianity to evolve. Ecclesiastes marks a pause in the struggle and evolution. Its author knows nothing of Messianic hopes, nothing really of a life beyond the grave. Though not an atheist, he may be regarded as a fatalist, a materialist, and, above all, a pessimist far superior to Schopenhauer. He is resigned to fate, and teaches a moderate Epicureanism; but it is by no means certain that this Epicureanism had any connection, either direct or indirect, with Greece. A complete explanation of everything in the book may be derived from the logical development of the Jewish thought with regard to the Deity and retribution, though the attempt has often been made to prove that the philosophy of Ecclesiastes bears a trace of the philosophy of Greece (*On a souvent cherché à prouver, &c.*)—a remark, by the way, fitted to convey a very false impression.

M. Renan's theory, however "logically developed," is, in several respects, a good deal out of harmony with facts. Will M. Renan reply, *D'autant pis pour les faits?*

T. T.

*MATERIALISM.**

MATERIALISM is a system of thought which regards the universe, including man and the mind of man, as solely consisting of or produced by matter, or what is called "material force." The importance of such a doctrine cannot be over-estimated, since it apparently implies disbelief in the existence of God and in the moral freedom of man. God disappears in this system of thought as a needless hypothesis, whilst man is reduced to a mere effect of the powers of Nature. Such, at least, appear to me the logical results of the doctrine.

Yet it is certain that Materialism has been the philosophic creed of men, both in ancient and in modern times, whose aspirations were lofty, and whose lives were temperate, laborious, and serene; and to some of its professors it has seemed to be consistent, not only with a high morality, but even, strange to say, with strong religious feeling. A lively sense of the inadequacy of Materialism as a theory of the universe, and of its present mischievous tendencies, need not interfere with our appreciation of it as a necessary and often useful element in the historical development of philosophical opinion, and of science and the practical arts.

The great achievements of our time in the field of physical research, and more especially the brilliant induction connected with the name of Darwin, have, without doubt, largely contributed to the revival in the latter half of this

* A Lecture delivered before the Union Debating Society, Wellington, New Zealand.

century of materialistic habits of thought. What is called scientific explanation has penetrated to groups of phenomena hitherto enveloped in a mysterious darkness, more particularly in the department now called "Biology," which concerns itself with the development, structure, and functions of living organisms. Darwin's data are few, seemingly simple, and, for the most part, well established on the solid basis of experience; so that one is apt to forget that he postulates any force of which the origin is unknown. We learn how the eye has been developed from mere spots of pigment, and the honey-bee educated by circumstance to attain the perfect symmetry of her hexagonal cells; how monkeys have obtained prehensile tails, and giraffes have been provided, in the same organ, with special fly-flappers; why the orchid *Coryanthes* entraps the humble-bee, visiting its gigantic flowers, to a plunge-bath in its great water bucket; why the argus pheasant and peacock spread such glorious fans whilst their hens are soberly attired; why the glow-worm carries a light in her tail; how the torpedo came by his galvanic battery; with an endless list of like "whys" and "hows:" we read and are delighted—almost spell-bound; not only by the variety of Nature, but by the force and ingenuity of the human mind; and are prone to believe that the plummet of science has really touched bottom, and that the origin of all things in mere physical adjustments is at last on the point of demonstration.

Persons unused to philosophical inquiry may not be aware that the question of original causation is not even approached by the physical researches to which I have alluded. To many such it seems simple to say—"We take our stand upon experience; we believe what we know; we know what we can see, hear, touch, taste, smell. To us the world seems to go of itself. If any one will explain the origin of things without going beyond the limits of what we perceive through the senses, to him we will listen as proposing a

possible and a rational solution. No solution which transcends these limits, and resorts to the super-sensuous, is admissible.”

But by the general consent of both the great divisions of modern philosophy, compliance with this demand is an impossibility. Those who are determined to ascend to the first cause of things, may, if they please, call themselves Materialists, but must needs transcend the limits of sensuous experience. Nature presents our outward senses with nothing more than a succession of appearances—phenomena. Suppose a line of billiard balls; and let the outermost be struck by another ball impelled by some unseen hand; the motion will be transmitted from ball to ball in regular succession until the force is spent by friction. No one would think in such a case of attributing the motion of any one ball to its immediate predecessor in the line of movement. It is plain that the balls are mere vehicles of force, and not originant causes. They are, as regards their movement, but links in a chain of effects, where each indeed stands in the relation of a cause to those that follow, but is at the same time the mere effect of all that precede. Physical nature presents to our senses precisely such a chain of successive effects, the originant cause of which is hidden from us. To the philosophic eye the world does not seem to go of itself. True, the phenomena follow one another in an invariable order. But unless we go behind phenomena, unless we carry our thought back to the unseen power—I myself should say to the unseen hand—which first set the machine in motion, and still keeps it moving, we learn nothing more than the order of events. “We only find,” as Hume asserts, “that the one does actually in fact follow the other. . . This is the whole that appears to the outward senses. . . The scenes of the universe are continually shifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted succession; but the power or force which actuates the whole

machine is entirely concealed from us, and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities of body. . . In reality there is no part of matter that does ever by its sensible qualities discover any power or energy, or give us ground to imagine that it could produce anything, or be followed by any other object which we could denominate its effect." *

This is just one of the points on which the first impression of nearly every one will be against the doctrine of the philosophers; yet, if you will ponder the matter, remembering always that the question is as to what we know *by means of the outward senses*, you will, I think, be sure to agree in the end that Hume is in the right. When, indeed, experience has taught us that any natural occurrence has been invariably followed by some other, then, assuming as we all do in modern times the perfect uniformity of nature, we confidently expect that the appearance of the former event, whenever it occurs, will be infallibly followed by its regular consequence; and in common speech we couple the two together as cause and effect; though, if we reflect upon the matter, we easily perceive that the so-called cause is itself a mere effect of something antecedent. We must not delude ourselves with the metaphor of a self-acting machine, for, in truth, there is no such thing. No machine goes of itself, or is more than an arrangement for transmitting force—like the intermediate billiard balls. We may then take it as established, that the notion of producing cause or force is not given us by the senses, nor to be found in external nature, for this is the concurrent verdict of all the schools of modern philosophy. On this account, Hume and his followers, including Mill and Herbert Spencer, consistently maintain that the knowledge of a producing cause is beyond the scope of science. Knowledge of the order of phenomena is all that, in their opinion, is possible to the human intellect.

* Hume's *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*. Section VII., 'Of the Idea of Necessary Connection.'

But despite the caveats of these philosophers, the dynamic idea, the notion of a force in nature, maintains its hold upon the human mind. We are impelled by an irresistible necessity to demand a cause of every occurrence. "By an irresistible law of thought all phenomena present themselves to us as the expression of power, and refer us to a causal ground whence they issue. This dynamic source [this origin of power] we neither see, nor hear, nor feel; it is given in *thought*—supplied by the spontaneous activity of the mind itself as the correlative prefix to [*i.e.*, inseparably coupled in the mind with] the phenomenon observed. By the general acknowledgment of philosophers this idea is so strictly a necessary idea as to be entirely irremovable from the conception of any change: to cut the tie between them, and think of phenomena as *not effects*, is impossible, in fact, even to the very writers who propose it in theory."* A productive power, though unrevealed to sense, must then be sought for behind the things produced. To revert to our well-worn illustration—the movement of the first billiard ball must be accounted for, or nothing is finally explained.

In one respect the backward search for the primal cause of all things has, of late, been made easier for the materialist, and a guess of ancient science has been confirmed. Modern experiment has taught us that the various effects ascribed to the supposed forces of matter are mutually interchangeable—that force arrested in one manifestation and seemingly absorbed, is not destroyed but transmuted. The old fable of Proteus, as has been often said, is exactly realised in nature as she appears to the eye of modern science. Bind her you cannot, for she forthwith reappears in a new shape. The motion of the smith's hammer, arrested by the anvil, sets the atoms vibrating and is

* *Essays Philosophical and Theological*. First Series. By JAMES MARTINEAU, p. 47. Trübner. 1866.

changed to heat; whilst heat in the furnace of the steam-engine results in molar motion. An electric current can be made to produce magnetism, and *vice versâ* magnetism to give rise to the phenomena of electricity. The galvanic current is an effect (in the physical sense) of chemical changes, and is also (in the same sense) a cause of them. Heat, electricity, radiant energy, and chemical action are mutually convertible, can all produce motion, and be, in turn, produced by it. More than this, there is reason to conjecture that the effects of force, differing as they do in their action on ourselves as sentient subjects, may be identical when considered in their own nature, or, as we say, *objectively*; and that all are resolvable into modes of motion. Such an objective identity with motion is considered to be already established in regard to light and heat. Motion appears the simplest effect of force, and everything points to the probable resolution of all other phases or effects of force into this one mode of manifestation. That accomplished, physical science will have verified the datum of Democritus. We shall have matter in motion, in void space, as the apparent beginning of physical things. There the science of nature must come to a stand; the investigation of phenomena can take us no further back. But behind the ultimate phenomenon of motion the materialist assumes a force as causing motion, and through motion, in its successive phases, producing all other phenomena. This force is supposed to reside in atoms, the ultimate particles of matter. In modes yet to be explained it leads on to combinations of ever-increasing complexity, and is displayed in higher and higher developments of power; rising from mechanical to chemical, from chemical to vital, from vital to mental manifestations. Without diminution or increase, by imperceptible gradations, it ascends through the infinite series of physical existence,—from the glowing hydrogen and nitrogen of

the incandescent Nebula to the light of reason in the brain of man. Such is the theory we have to deal with.

It will be seen that the Materialist herein agrees with the Theist, that he asserts, and, so to speak, believes in, a First Cause; differing in this from Hume and the Phenomenists: for the scepticism of Hume is as fatal to Materialism as to Theism. But the first cause of the Materialist is mechanic force, or matter endued merely with mechanic force, and wanting not only mind and consciousness, but sensation, and even life. Yet this dead matter, or, if you please, this mindless unconscious power, is the supposed origin of life, sentiency, and self-conscious intellect. What we have to consider is whether this be a thing conceivable.

It is implied in the very notion of an originating cause that it shall be adequate to the production of its appropriate effect. No words can make this matter clearer. But here you will, of course, bear in mind the distinction between cause in the proper sense, and in the sense of mere physical antecedent. In regard to the latter, there is no necessary resemblance between it and the natural occurrence of which experience has shown it to be the invariable precursor, although in familiar language the two things are, as we have seen, coupled together as cause and effect. For example, there is nothing in the qualities of oxygen and hydrogen that could *a priori* lead one to suppose that the result of their combination could be a substance like water, which differs in every sensible quality from either of its natural predecessors or parents. In the physical antecedent we cannot, as Hume rightly teaches, by mere dint of thought and reasoning, discern the presence of any power or quality adequate to the production of any effect at all, far less to the production of any particular effect. And when we recur, as we must recur, to the super-sensuous, or metaphysical, notion of cause, we are at the same time carried back by reason behind all the phenomena of nature

to some real energy in which they all originate, and by which they are maintained. When, therefore, I insist that the cause ~~must appear to the mind~~ adequate to the production of its appropriate effect, it is of this *vera causa*, this true originating power, that I am speaking. But the proposition is one not capable of proof, for it relates to a simple primary idea of which no analysis is possible. I can only throw myself upon the general consciousness of mankind, and beg you to ask yourselves whether it is not as I say.

Now, the Materialist assumes, as we have seen, that he has at his disposal a force self-capable of the wonderful series of transmutations which has been enumerated. The series includes as its last two terms the ascending steps, first to vital, and thence to mental, manifestations. Let us fix attention on the last step but one; that, namely, from inorganic matter to living organisms. Observation has, it is true, as yet failed to discover any case in which even the lowest organism appears to have been generated out of inorganic matter. Let it, however, be assumed that such a sequence of phenomena—no more, remember, than a sequence of phenomena—may be at last recognised as sometimes occurring, or as having at some time occurred in the course of nature—there will still remain at this upward step a huge difficulty for the materialist. Beginning as he must with separate atoms endued with motion, and this motion resulting in attractions, repulsions, and mutual affinities, he has with these when we arrive at animated nature to build up *an organic whole*. Now, an organic whole is not the mere sum-total of the constituent atoms. These, as we all know, are in perpetual flux in every living creature. “The parallel,” says Huxley, “between a whirlpool in a stream and a living being, which has been often drawn, is as just as it is striking. The whirlpool is permanent, but the particles of water which constitute it are incessantly changing. Those which enter it on the one

side are whirled around, and temporarily constitute a part of its individuality; and as they leave on the other side their places are made good by new comers."* The turmoil of molecules in a living creature may, he thinks, be justly likened to the great wave of the vortex below Niagara, which for centuries past has maintained the same general form, though the component particles of water are changing every moment. One might almost think that Samuel Taylor Coleridge was speaking, and with Coleridge I continue:—"As the column of blue smoke from a cottage chimney in the breathless summer noon, or the steadfast-seeming cloud on the edge point of a hill in the driving air-current, which, momentarily condensed and recomposed, is the common phantom of a thousand successors—such is the flesh which our bodily eyes transmit to us; which our hands touch." "Not only," he proceeds, the "characteristic shape is evolved from the invisible central power, but the material mass itself is acquired by assimilation. The germinal power of the plant transmutes the fixed air and the elementary base of water into grass or leaves; and on these the organic principle in the ox or the elephant exercises an alchemy still more stupendous. As the unseen agency weaves its magic eddies, the foliage becomes indifferently the bone and its marrow, the pulpy brain or the solid ivory. That what you see *is* blood, *is* flesh, is itself the work, or, shall I say, the translucence of the invisible energy, which soon surrenders or abandons them to inferior powers (for there is no pause nor chasm in the activities of nature), which repeat a similar metamorphosis according to *their* kind;—these are not fancies, conjectures, or even hypotheses, but *facts*, to deny which is impossible, not to reflect on which is ignominious."†

We see, then, that an organic whole imports a distinct

* *The Crayfish*, p. 64. Kegan Paul, 1880.

† *Aids to Reflection*, p. 392. Pickering, 1836.

and individualised agency, whereof the identity consists not in the ever-changing material, but in the living principle, which on that changing material imposes a definite form. The profound and candid Lange clearly recognises the difficulty which here arises for the materialistic thinker :—
 “Sensation,” he says, “is found only in the organic animal body, and here belongs not to the parts in themselves but to the whole. We have thus reached the point where Materialism, however consistently it may be developed in other respects, always, either more or less avowedly, leaves its own sphere. Obviously with the union into a whole, a new metaphysical principle has been introduced, that, by the side of the atoms and void space, appears as a sufficiently original supplement. . . . The organic whole is then a wholly new principle by the side of the atoms and the void, though it may not be so recognised.”*

This leads on to what appears to me an insuperable objection. Atoms in motion, and, of course, a void space to move in, are, it will be remembered, the postulate of the Materialist. Sensibility for the atoms is not demanded. If it were, other considerations would be opened, to which I shall hereafter advert. Given, therefore, the non-sentient atoms, how is the sentient to be developed out of the non-sentient? I again refer to Lange, who thus pursues the subject of my last extract. “The difficulty,” he says (Vol. I., p. 146), “which here again suggests itself of fixing the exact seat of sensation is in the most important point completely evaded by the Epikurean system, and in spite of the immense progress of physiology the Materialism of the last century found itself at precisely the same point. The individual atoms do not feel, or [if they did] their feelings could not be fused together, since void space which has no substratum cannot conduct sensation, and still less partake of it. We must, therefore, constantly fall back on

* *History of Materialism*. Vol. I., p. 144. Trübner. 1881.

the solution—the motion of the atoms is sensation.” But, he asks, a few lines further on, “How can the motion of a body in itself non-sentient, be sensation? Who is it, then, that feels? How does the sensation come about? Where?”

With these last words of Lange, the full difficulty of the problem opens upon us. Mere animal sentiency may perhaps exist without any degree of consciousness, as, for example, in the oyster. But the philosophy which would explain the Kosmos as the effect of the forces of matter, must show those forces to be adequate causes of conscious sensation in man. Here, however, on the confession of men themselves strongly attached to atomic Materialism as a physical theory, we reach the brink of an impassable chasm. “On the atomic theory,” writes Lange (Vol. I., p. 23), “we explain to-day the laws of sound, of light, of heat, of chemical and physical changes in things, in the widest sense, and yet Atomism is as little able to-day, as in the time of Demokritos, to explain even the simplest sensation of sound, light, heat, taste, and so on. In all the advances of science, in all the modifications of the notion of atoms, this chasm has remained unnarrowed.” Even when science shall have succeeded in constructing a complete theory of the functions of the brain, and in showing clearly the mechanical motions, with their origin and their result, which correspond to sensation, she will be (I again recur to the words of Lange) “for ever precluded from finding a bridge between what the simplest sound is, as the sensation of a subject—mine, for instance—and the processes of disintegration in the brain which science must assume in order to explain this particular sensation of sound as a fact in the objective world” (Vol. I., p. 23). To the same purpose Professor Tyndall who, on this point, will not be a suspected authority, says in his article entitled, ‘Virchow and Evolution’ (*Nineteenth Century*,

November, 1878),* “ Here, however, the methods pursued in mechanical science come to an end ; and if asked to deduce from the physical interaction of the brain molecules the least of the phenomena of sensation or thought, we must acknowledge our helplessness. Between molecular mechanics and consciousness is interposed a fissure ”—the Professor is thinking of the Alpine glaciers—“ over which the ladder of physical reasoning is incompetent to carry us.”

But if no mechanical theory of the universe can account for mere sentience, how complete must be the failure of every such system to take the last upward step from vital to mental, and to resolve the problems of human thought and feeling. “ The special case of those processes we call intellectual,” says Lange, “ must be explained from the universal laws of all motion, or we have no explanation at all. The weak point of all Materialism lies just in this, that with this explanation it stops short at the very point where the highest problems of philosophy begin ” (Vol. I., p. 30). Man himself is, so far as our experience extends, the highest product of the universe. Is it rational—is it possible—to regard him as the effect of something destitute itself of mind and consciousness? Can the effect be more and greater than the originating cause? It may, indeed, be less, but can it, I repeat, be greater? Just in this point lies the vast advantage of those who, in any form, hold to the doctrine of an originating mind. On either side an assumption simply stupendous—for the moment let me call it an assumption—must be made when we endeavour to account for this stupendous universe, of which we form a part. Some one, perhaps, will interject, But why endeavour to account for it? The question is foreign to our immediate purpose ; but I reply, in passing,

* Republished in *Fragments of Science*. Sixth Edition. Vol. II., p. 375. Longmans. 1879.

because we cannot help attempting. The problem of existence is thrust upon us. *We are*, and know there was a time when we were not. We know ourselves to be effects of an unknown power. Not to suppose a cause is simply a thing impossible. Some cause of all things—that which I just now called “an assumption”—is then no assumption, but a belief, which is inevitable. The belief of the Theist is in a Being not less than man, but immeasurably greater; who of the fulness of life has given us a portion. The first cause of the Materialist is matter in motion—nothing more—and I ask again, Is such a cause of things conceivably adequate to the production of the known effects? Can we so explain to ourselves our own rational existence? We have seen materialistic explanation brought to a stand before the phenomenon of mere organic life. How can it deal with the fact of conscious personal existence? Have I then no meaning when I say, I AM? Let us ask ourselves that question, for it is vain to argue with those who will not face it. Then are we, in deference to supposed deductions from physical experience, to give the lie to that inner consciousness which tells us that we are other than, and more than, the material organism to which our life is for the time inexplicably bound—that the *mind* of man is not his *brain*, nor his life the sum of the mere vital forces which are its perishable instruments? Can we indeed believe, that, saint and sage, philosopher and poet; the play of fancy, the method of reason, the struggles of the Will, the warnings of the Conscience, with all that belongs to the abysmal deeps of Personality; all the drama of history; all the passion of life; are, as this pseudo-science pretends to teach us, the mere outcome and expression of molecular change, all products alike of the fortuitous concourse of atoms? Rather let us confess an ineffable mystery than thus darken counsel by words without knowledge!

The notion of a self-transforming power, which becomes

of itself at each upward movement more than itself, is no solution of the riddle of the world. Each successive change requires a cause. Under the term "development" we only conceal the difficulty, for that which is developed must have pre-existed potentially in the germ. Out of matter, we can get nothing which hypothesis has not first put into it; and if mind be the outcome and effect, nothing less than mind will suffice as the cause and origin. It may be argued that the creative ascent to man is by an infinite gradation extending downwards and backwards into past Time through æons of lower existence. But this does not diminish the requisite creative power. It is not as in mechanics, where the smallest force, with time to work in, may suffice to the mightiest tasks. For it is here a question not of quantity, but of quality. "In not a few of the progressionists," writes Dr. Martineau, "the weak illusion is unmistakable, that, with time enough, you may get everything out of next to nothing. Grant us—they seem to say—any tiniest granule of power, so close upon zero that it is not worth begrudging; allow it some trifling tendency to infinitesimal increment; and we will show you how this little stock became the Kosmos without ever taking a step worth thinking of, much less constituting a case for design. The argument is a mere appeal to an incompetency in the human imagination, in virtue of which magnitudes evading conception are treated as out of existence; and an aggregate of inappreciable increments is simultaneously equated—in its cause to *nothing*, in its effect to *the whole of things*. You manifestly want the same Causality, whether concentrated on a moment or distributed through incalculable ages; only, in drawing upon it, a logical theft is more easily committed piecemeal than wholesale. Surely it is a mean device for a philosopher, thus to crib causation by hairs-breadths, to put it out at compound interest through all time, and then disown the

debt. And it is vain after all:—for dilute the intensity and change the form, as you will, of the Power that has issued the Universe, it remains, except to your subjective illusion, nothing less than Infinite and nothing lower than Divine” (*Essays* : First Series, p. 141).

Fairly viewed, the facts import that at every step in the ascent, there has been a fresh influx of power, a gradual imparting of new qualities. We may grant to the physicists that the stock of mere physical force has been a constant quantity. But it is rational to hold that its persistence has been accompanied by gradual infusion of transforming power and purpose, of which physics can take no account, and to do the tasks of which material force has been, as it were, set as a bond-slave.

Still, however, there will recur the old question, How are we to explain the apparent dependence of mental phenomena upon material arrangements? A single clot of blood upon the brain will destroy consciousness. And how shall we account for the phenomena of insanity, and of old age, unless we regard the mind as an effect of the material organism? Is it not true, as the German says, “Without phosphorus, no thought”? The argumentative force of these questions depends upon the fallacy of which Hume has furnished the refutation already quoted. Philosophy does not justify us in asserting that the concomitant phenomena of mental and cerebral action are related to one another as cause and effect. They are to be regarded as conjugate effects of an unknown cause which has coupled them together, perhaps only for a time. To say that consciousness and thought are *produced* by the motion of the molecules of the brain, is to outstep the limits of physical science, and more than that, to state a proposition which is absolutely inconceivable. To use the language of Professor Tyndall, “it eludes all mental presentation.” Vibrations of matter cannot be conceived of as translated into thoughts

and feelings. This would be to cross the unbridgeable chasm between mind and matter. And there is this additional reason for not regarding the mental as products of the accompanying material phenomena. The molecular changes in the substance of the living brain result in the generation of nervous force. The physical series of events is complete in itself, without reference to the synchronous mental series. The energy developed in the brain is no doubt a physical force. As such it can be fully accounted for. It disappears in the performance of its appropriate physical work—including not only those material phenomena (whatever they may be) which accompany thought, but digestion, secretion, respiration, muscular action—in short, in the provision of the main supply of power for every vital process. We have every reason from analogy to believe that the dynamic account of expenditure and product could be made out, and exactly balanced, were our physiological knowledge equal to the task. But in such an account it would not be possible to place "thought" to credit as a product of expended force. The account would balance without it. "That metaphysical ghost the Ego," it is Huxley's phrase, suddenly looks in on the completed calculation of the physicist, as an unwelcome visitant from some strange region, refusing to be accounted for or to be explained away. The mental power developed simultaneously with molecular changes in the brain, is, therefore, not a phasis of the material energy developed. It cannot be computed in foot-pounds. "Consciousness, on this view," says Tyndall, in the article already cited, "is a kind of by-product, inexpressible in terms of force and motion, and unessential to the molecular changes going on in the brain." Except the term "by-product," which implies causal connection, we may accept this statement. A little further on in the same paper, Tyndall quotes himself as inquiring, "What is the causal connection between molecular motions and states

of consciousness?" "My answer," he continues, "is, I do not see the connection, nor am I acquainted with anybody who does. It is no explanation to say that the objective and subjective are two sides of one and the same phenomenon. Why should the phenomenon have two sides? This is the very core of the difficulty. There are plenty of molecular motions which do not exhibit this two-sidedness. Does water think or feel when it runs into frost-ferns upon a window pane? If not, why should the molecular motion of the brain be yoked to this mysterious companion—consciousness? We can form a coherent picture of all the purely physical processes—the stirring of the brain, the thrilling of the nerves, the discharging of the muscles, and all the subsequent motions of the organism. We are here dealing with mechanical problems which are mentally presentable. But we can form no picture of the process whereby consciousness emerges, either as a necessary link or as an accidental by-product of this series of actions. The reverse process of the production of motion by consciousness is equally unrepresentable to the mind. We are here, in fact, on the boundary line of the intellect, where the ordinary canons of science fail to extricate us from difficulty."

It is a favourite saying of the ultra school of Materialists that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile. In the light of the foregoing observations we may perceive the full absurdity of such a statement, as of others of the like coinage. Such language has no real significance; except, indeed, as displaying that the speaker who employs it has failed to grasp the facts of the case. Our conclusion then is, that the association of the human mind with a physical organism is not ground on which the philosopher is warranted in regarding mind as the mere effluence and expression of material changes.

As I have quoted largely from Professor Tyndall, it is as well to say that, whilst glad of him as a useful ally in what

he calls "laying bare the central difficulty of the materialist," I am by no means content with his conclusion of the whole matter. "If," then he says, "you consent to make your soul a poetic rendering of a phenomenon which, as I have taken more pains than anybody else to show you (!), refuses the yoke of ordinary physical laws—then I, for one, would not object to this exercise of ideality." It is impossible to accept as satisfactory this jaunty concession to the faith of mankind. We know what the Professor means when he relegates a belief to the ideal realm. It is to him, as to many other votaries of physical science, the world of unreality. Rather would I profess with Robert Browning, "God and the soul the only facts for me."

Prove them facts? that they o'erpass my power of proving,
 proves them such,
 Fact it is I know I know not something which is fact as much.

I content myself with this passing protest, for my present design is rather to expose the fallacies of Materialism than directly to vindicate a more rational creed.

I have had more than once to fall back upon the general consciousness of mankind in proof of an assertion. Such appeals are not to be avoided in a discussion like the present, but are not always satisfactory. Some seem to find consciousness a blank, where to others it appears to render a clear verdict. But in regard to the distinction between mind and matter, so far as human knowledge goes, it happens that the question can be brought to a conclusive test. It is this: All material objects appear to occupy a certain space. In the language of metaphysics, extension is an attribute of matter. The mind, on the contrary, with its faculties and affections, cannot be thought of as extended. Neither long-measure suits them, nor square, nor cubic; love and hatred, hope and fear, honour and honesty, will and conscience, occupy no space, have neither length,

breadth, nor thickness. Weight, and other measures of material force, all of which have relations to space, are equally inapplicable. Mental powers are, as Tyndall puts it in the passage I just now cited, "inexpressible in terms of force and motion." So much is clear beyond all possibility of doubt or cavil.

On this ground we are justified in treating the chasm between mind and matter as, to human conception, absolutely impassable, and that not merely in the present state of physical science, but for ever. In truth, we know more of mind than we do, or ever can, of matter. Men of Tyndall's way of thinking recognise this chasm—this "fissure" which their "ladder" is too short to cross. But they are under an illusion common in the case of those who limit their studies to physical nature. They place themselves, in idea, *on the wrong side of the gap*. They think they can approach the problems of mind from the side of matter, and try in vain to lay the plank across. But in reality they stand with the rest of us on the opposite edge of the chasm.

We know less, I repeat, of matter than of mind, and always must do so, for the simple reason that we ourselves are minds. Of matter, whatever we may believe, we know directly nothing but its phenomena—not the thing in itself. Here we may almost shake hands with the school of Hume. How far that school, generally held in reverence by Materialistic thinkers, can go in the direction of pure subjective idealism is shown by John Stuart Mill, who would resolve the external world into "permanent possibilities of sensation." Huxley, too, has hinted at his own possible escape from the platform of Materialism through the same trap-door.

It has been attempted to reform the hypothesis of Materialism in several ways with a view to evade the difficulties which have been pointed out in regard to the evolution of the sentient and intelligent from the non-sentient

and non-intelligent. The course pursued has been essentially philosophical, namely to import into the supposed cause the qualities known to appear in the effect. Mind and a thinking power have accordingly been assumed, either as qualities of the universe of matter as a whole, or of the constituent atoms. Upon the former hypothesis of the universal diffusion of soul in matter, Materialism merges in Pantheism. Such a notion, taught by Paracelsus and others, is well known as the doctrine of *anima mundi*. The other method is adopted by Priestley in his lectures on "Matter and Spirit," commended by Bain as one of the ablest expositions of Materialism in the last century. It has recently been revived in a new shape by the late Professor Clifford, in his doctrine of Mind-stuff, and has even found an expositor amongst ourselves in a pupil of that accomplished and admirable man. My objection to the doctrine, so far as it here concerns us, may easily be anticipated from what has gone before. No theory which disperses sentiency and intellect amongst the atoms composing our bodily frame can account for that conscious unity which is the most intimate of our convictions. Mind as it exists in the atoms is of course to be supposed something less than human; that being so, the summation, or fusion of their intellectual forces, or even the bringing of these forces to a focus, were any such processes imaginable, do not give us the required effects in the production of human consciousness. It is quality which is wanted, and the physicist is ever seeking to fulfil the requirement by accumulating quantity. In illustration of this topic, I cannot forbear borrowing a quotation of Tyndall's, from the German Materialist Ueberweg, in a letter to Lange. The passage is as follows:—"What occurs in the brain would, in my opinion, not be possible, if the process which here appears in its greatest concentration did not obtain generally, only in a vastly diminished degree. Take a pair of

mice and a cask of flour. By copious nourishment the animals increase and multiply, and in the same proportion sensation and feelings augment. The quantity of these latter possessed by the first pair is not simply diffused among their descendants, for in that case the last must feel more feebly than the first. The sensations and feelings must necessarily be referred back to the flour, where they exist, weak and pale, it is true, and not concentrated as they are in the brain."

This passage presents itself to me, I confess, as quite a burlesque of the doctrine of Mind-stuff. Ueberweg, it will be seen, prefers to trace the sensations of the increasing family of young mice not to the organic power transmitted through the parents, and impressing a form on the assimilated particles of the food consumed, but to similar feelings, "weak and pale, it is true," in the flour itself! A Cheshire cheese, or a bunch of tallow candles, would, no doubt, be found to possess like sentiments. Surely Ueberweg, in penning this absurd passage, cannot have reflected that the same particles which might nourish mice might also form the food of a pair of cats, or even of a human couple, and would in that case be proved by his argument to possess the sentiments not of mice alone, but of their natural enemy, and of mankind.

At the beginning of this lecture I adverted to the theory of Darwin, as tending to favour the spread of Materialism. Darwin has, in fact, revived "the simple and penetrating thought," as Lange calls it, first offered by Empedocles to the thinkers of antiquity—that adaptations preponderate in the animated world, just because it is their nature to perpetuate themselves; while what fails in adaptation has long since perished. In the light of this idea the appearance of design in creation may seem explicable without resort to the hypothesis of a creative mind. Now and then, though rarely, Mr. Darwin himself writes as if this were a legiti-

mate inference from his theory. Thus at the beginning of the last chapter of his work *On the Origin of Species* we have the following passage:—“Nothing at first can appear more difficult to believe than that the more complex organs and instincts should have been perfected, *not* by means superior to, though analogous with, human reason, *but* by the accumulation of innumerable slight variations, each good for the individual possessor.” “Surely,” observes Martineau, commenting on this passage, “the antithesis could not be more false were we to speak of some patterned damask as made, *not* by the weaver, *but* by the loom; or, of any methodised product as arising, *not* from its primary, *but* from its secondary source. All the determining conditions of species—viz.: (1) The possible range of variation; (2) its hereditary preservation; (3) the extrusion of inferior rivals—must be conceived as already contained in the constituted laws of organic life; in, and through which, just as well as by unmediated starts [or, as he says elsewhere, “creative paroxysms”], reason superior to the human, may evolve the ultimate results.”* To which I would add that some of the laws of organic life, upon the assumption of which Darwin works out his explanations, are in themselves so marvellous—for example, a taste for beauty in the female pheasant coincident with our own—that we may well transfer our wonder from the “patterned damask” to the “loom” itself. And behind these postulated laws a power, as we have seen, is wanted. As Max Müller reminds us, “even Charles Darwin requires a Creator to breathe life into matter,”—and, indeed, a good deal more than mere life. No scientific explanation even touches the ultimate dynamical question. Light is thrown on the methods of creation, but the creative power remains a mystery beyond the sphere of science.

I have thus endeavoured, I fear at too great length, to

* *Essays*, First Series, p. 144.

present you with a sketch of one branch of the argument against corpuscular Materialism (the only popular form of the doctrine of Materialism), as it presents itself to my mind. We are, I have contended, absolutely unable to conceive that the organic and sentient wholes which make up the animal world can have sprung from inorganic, non-sentient atoms, without a new infusion of power, still less that the self-conscious minds which constitute the world of man can have had such an origin. To the difficulties thus raised the Materialist has only one reply, which consists in the hypothesis that the atoms themselves are, from the beginning, endowed with all the powers, including the power of thought, which ultimately make their appearance on the stage of Being. I have endeavoured to show, with the help of better illustration than I myself could bring to bear upon the subject, that even this hypothesis is insufficient to account for the facts and the phenomena, either of sentiency or intellect. The attempt to reform the hypothesis so as to supply at the beginning a cause adequate to all that is finally developed in the result, can only end in that very supposition of a Divine Original which Materialism repudiates. Nothing less than God can be the adequate cause of Man. It has, indeed, latterly been attempted to evade this conclusion in a strange way. To secure the sufficiency of a mechanic force as the origin of things, Man, as the supreme effect, is degraded to the level of an automaton. There is a sort of consistency in thus completely banishing mind from the universe; yet it is strange to think of the trouble these acute intellects are taking to persuade us that we and they alike are mere magnetic mockeries—the ephemeral result of unstable combinations of matter. By first giving the lie to our perceptive constitution, and then inviting us to confide in suicidal conclusions founded upon data furnished by this discredited witness, they involve themselves in a tissue of contradic-

tions, and we may safely leave their refutation to the common sense of mankind.

The secret sources of disbelief, as of belief, often lie beyond the reach of logic, deep in men's character and history. What appears to me convincing argument may find no way to the recesses of another's mind, may fail to break through the crust of inveterate mental habit, or prove futile in presence of deficiencies which are organic. Yet I hope that to a few, to whom the argument may not have been familiar, and who may have been drawn in what seems to me the wrong direction by prevailing tendencies, I may, perhaps, have succeeded in showing that the difficulties of the question are in reality enormous; and that it is at least utterly unwise to draw from materialistic premises conclusions which are repugnant to practical good sense, or, what is still worse, which seem to liberate us from obligations hitherto deemed sacred.

C. W. RICHMOND.

DR. MICHAUD ON THE SEVEN ŒCUMENICAL
COUNCILS.*

WHEN the Old Catholics had their great congress at Cologne in 1872 it was a question still open on what ground they were to stand after rejecting the authority of the Vatican Council. Regarding themselves as Catholic, they refused to be satisfied with the Protestant ground of the Bible and the Bible alone. Some proposed to stand by the Council of Trent, as representing the Catholic Church until July 1870; but others wished to go further back and take the first seven General Councils, as representing the whole Catholic Church before the separation of the East and West. Those who proposed Trent were probably the more advanced party, as they simply took provisional ground, leaving their ultimate destination to the course of events. At the Bonn Conference of 1874 it was expressly abandoned by the great Munich leader of the movement, who said that he also spoke in behalf of his brethren.†

Dr. Michaud, who, at Cologne, was known as the young French Abbé fresh from the Madeleine, was one of those who advocated going back at once to the undivided Church, represented by the decisions of the first seven Œcumenical

* *Discussion sur les Sept Conciles Œcumeniques.* Par E. MICHAUD, Docteur en Theologie. Berne: Jent et Reinert. 1878.

† His words were, "As regards the Council of Trent, I think I may declare, not only in my own name, but also in the name of my colleagues, that we hold ourselves in no way bound by all the decrees of that Council, which cannot be considered as Œcumenical" (*Report*, p. 6, English translation).

Councils. That position he still holds, and the present work is a defence of it against Romanists, High Church Anglicans, and all Protestants. These seven Councils appear to him to offer the only true basis for the reunion of the Churches. "Here," he says, "East and West, Catholic and Protestant, may all be one, and enjoy with the necessary unity that variety which is also necessary."

We shall first dispose of Dr. Michaud's arguments against the Romanists. It is not without wisdom that the Church of Rome has adopted the principle formulated by Cardinal Manning that history must give place to dogma; which really means that history must go for nothing when it tells against the dogmas of the Church of Rome. The era of the first seven General Councils covers the first five centuries of the activity of the Christian Church, after its deliverance from Roman persecution. We have here the mind, or rather minds, for we must use the plural, of the Christian community during the time of its greatest prosperity, and while the Church was ostensibly one visible body. Dr. Michaud shows that all these Councils were convoked by emperors, and that, with rare exceptions, they were presided over by emperors or their legates. No Bishop of Rome appears in any of them, except by his representatives, and the decisions received the confirmation of all the patriarchs. The Bishop of Rome has a precedence, in virtue of his being bishop of the imperial city; but this is simply a political precedence, and not one involved in his ecclesiastical position. The arguments of Ultramontane writers against these statements are examined and found to be largely grounded on writings the genuineness of which is not now admitted even by the great scholars of the Roman Catholic community.

In the first Council Constantine said expressly, "I have called you together." The letter to the Churches of Alexandria, Egypt, and Libya said that the Council was

assembled "by the grace of God and the summons of Constantine." There is no trace of anything to the contrary until after a lapse of three hundred and sixty years, when some one in the sixth General Council joined with the name of Constantine that of Sylvester, Bishop of Rome. Rufinus, speaking of this Council, says that it was suggested to Constantine by the priests. From this Roman Catholic writers make the rapid inference that the idea of the Council must have come from Sylvester, he being the chief of the priests. Some maintain, from the very fact that there were at the Council delegates from the Bishop of Rome, that they must have presided, taking the place which he would have taken had he been personally present. Others suppose that Osius, Bishop of Cordova, was president of the first Council, but there is no evidence of this, and, moreover, he was not the representative of the Bishop of Rome. The second Council was convoked by Theodosius, but in the acts of the sixth Council it is said that "Theodosius and Damasus opposed Macedonianism." This conjunction of the name of the Bishop with that of the Emperor, as opposing the heresy condemned by the Council, is construed as evidence that the Bishop of Rome, in conjunction with the Emperor, summoned the Council of Constantinople. Three bishops—Meletius of Antioch, Gregory of Constantinople, and his successor, Nectarius—were presidents of the Council, and all of them were aliens to the Bishop of Rome. The first he reckoned an Arian. He opposed the elevation of the second to the patriarchate, and Nectarius he did not regard as validly ordained. The third Council was convoked by the Emperors Theodosius II. and Valentinian III. In their names letters were addressed to all the metropolitans. The Bishop of Rome gave his consent after the Council was summoned. The first president was Cyril of Alexandria. He had written letters to the Bishop of Rome

concerning the heresy of Nestorius, and from this it has been inferred by Roman Catholic writers that he presided as the Pope's legate. The fourth Council was summoned by Marcian, the successor of Theodosius. The Bishop of Rome had asked Theodosius to hold a Council in Italy, but he declined. The legates of the Bishop of Rome advanced some claims of precedence for the Roman see, which the Council refused to admit. The fifth Council was summoned by the Emperor, and presided over by the Bishop of the city where it was held. The Bishop of Rome had given a decision on the question at issue, and different from that at which the Council ultimately arrived. Though present in Constantinople, he refused to attend the Council. The Emperor threatened to excommunicate him, an act which all seem to have believed was fairly within his province. The Bishop ultimately gave his assent to the decisions of the Council. The sixth Council was summoned by Pogonatus. He asked the Bishop of Rome to send as deputies for the Roman Church three or four clergymen, but for the patriarchate twelve archbishops, with twelve Greek monks resident in Rome. From this division of deputies Dr. Michaud argues that the Church of Rome at this time, so far from being regarded as the Catholic Church, was not even reckoned the Church of the West. The Roman legates had three places on the left of the Emperor. This, by the ingenuity of the Roman Church, has been made the place of honour. The seventh Council was convoked by Irene, and presided over by the Bishop of Constantinople. The Bishop of Rome was consulted last. According to the Latin version of the letter which he wrote, he advanced claims for his see which the Council refused to admit. This portion of his letter he afterwards allowed to be suppressed, and we only know of it from the Latin version in Anastasius, the translator of the Acts of the Synod.

Dr. Michaud further shows that many of the canons of these Councils bear direct witness to the usurpation of the Roman see. The fourth of the first Council gives the right of confirmation of bishops to the metropolitans. The bishops were then elected by the people; but of this privilege the Papacy has since deprived them. The liberties of the Church, as they were settled by the first General Council, have been ruined by the centralisation of all power at Rome. The sixth canon of that Council says that "the old customs which exist in Egypt, in Libya, and in Pentapolis, according to which the Bishop of Alexandria has authority in all these countries, shall be maintained, as a similar custom exists in Rome." It was also decreed at this Council that bishops, priests, and deacons should continue to live with their wives whom they had married before ordination. The second canon of the second Council forbids any bishop to interfere in the diocese of another, and orders all differences to be brought before the provincial synod, which alone has jurisdiction over the whole province. The third canon decrees that Constantinople, being new Rome, shall have the second place after old Rome; a decree which plainly determines the nature of the Roman primacy. Before the Council of Ephesus, the Bishop of Rome held a synod, in which the Nestorians were condemned; but the Council of Ephesus, taking no cognisance of the Roman decision, went anew into the whole question. The Council decreed that Christ should be worshipped in His divinity, but not in His humanity. The Council of Chalcedon confirmed the Pope's letter to Flavian, not because it was written by the Bishop of Rome, but because it agreed with the decisions of former General Councils. The second of Constantinople pronounced Pope Honorius a heretic: so that fallibility belonged either to the Pope or the Council—probably to both; but in this case the Council was not so wise as the Pope.

At the hands of Dr. Michaud the High Church Anglican

does not fare better than the Romanist. It is somewhat humiliating for our English friends who boast of their Catholicity, as giving them a superiority over other Protestants, to be beaten by an Old Catholic on their chosen ground of the first Councils. The argument is that the Anglican takes the first four or six Councils, and rejects the seventh, which, though not at once accepted by the whole Church, because of political disturbances and misunderstandings, was yet afterwards accepted as an Œcumenical Council, both by the East and the West. The dilemma then comes for the Anglican, who must either accept this Council which decreed the lawfulness of images in worship, or reject it on the Protestant ground that image worship is forbidden in the Scriptures. But to reject officially the authority of any General Council, accepted by the whole Church, is to reject Catholicity.

On the subject of the use of images in worship, Protestants are charged with "blind fanaticism" and "absurd madness." Their use is defended by leaving the word worship in that vague indefiniteness of meaning in which it may be taken for simple respect, or for any amount of veneration, running up almost, and sometimes apparently altogether, into that worship which is said to be reserved for God alone. Allowance must indeed be made for the demonstrativeness of some nations. An Eastern, or it may be a Frenchman, bowing before a statue, or throwing kisses towards it, would appear to men of cooler temperament to be taking the statue for a living being. Image worship is not fully explained by the mere respect which we have for the portrait of an absent friend. More than this it evidently was when the Iconoclasts began their crusade against it; and more than this it evidently was as defended by the seventh Council.

It is argued that image worship was not forbidden in the Old Testament. The second commandment, it is main-

tained, only forbids giving images the same worship which is due to God. This is said in the face of the fact that this commandment absolutely forbids even the *making* of images, much more bowing down to them, or worshipping them in any sense. But Dr. Michaud finds in the commandment the word *serued*, from which he infers that God alone is to have *latria*, but worship of another kind might be given to images. Other defenders of the seventh Council admit that this commandment forbids images, but they add that it was merely a positive precept addressed to the Jews. Images were forbidden to the Jews because of their proneness to idolatry. The same reason is given for the absence of images from the religious services of the first Christians.

The adoption of image worship by Christians exposed them to the charge of idolatry, both from Jews and Moham-medans. That the charge was not without good foundation seems proved by history. Dr. Michaud ascribes to Leo no higher motive in the destruction of the images than a desire to possess the treasures of the Church : but to find unworthy motives for the conduct of any great reformer is always easy. In a Council of Constantinople, in 754, the use of images was condemned by 318 bishops. Dr. Michaud says that they did not really condemn images ; but the idolatry which they did condemn shows that image worship had become something more than the mere respect or veneration which is given to the portrait of an absent friend.

This seventh Council was finally accepted by the whole Church ; but its history sufficiently demonstrates that Catholicity is a mere name with no attendant reality. Leo had 318 bishops to vote against the use of images, and thirty-three years later, in the seventh Council, Irene had about the same number of bishops to support her in upholding image-worship. This Empress made an oath to her husband that she would never restore the images, but the

oath was broken as soon as her husband died. The Patriarch of Constantinople, who had taken part in the Iconoclastic Council, prepared the way for the triumph of the opposition by resigning his see, and history, such as we have it, makes him die repenting that he had ever opposed the worship of images. Irene created Tarasius, a layman, Bishop of Constantinople. Before he accepted the office, he bargained that the images were to be restored. The Patriarchs of Alexandria, Jerusalem, and Antioch were to be invited to a General Council, but the messengers were unable to reach them because of the Saracens. They made known their business to some monks whom they met, who sent ambassadors in the name of the Patriarchs. The Bishop of Rome being in favour of the images, overlooked all irregularities, and followed in the wake of Irene and Tarasius. An important part of the proceedings of the Council was the penitence of the bishops who had been active in their opposition to the images, but who were now as submissive to Irene as formerly they had been to Leo. Their ignorance seems to have been as remarkable as their vacillation, so that it was a matter utterly indifferent which way they voted. The long and wide-spread opposition to this Council proves that there was little unanimity on the subject of images. The decrees of the seventh Council were condemned by a Council of bishops at Frankfort in 794. Dr. Michaud pleads ingeniously in excuse for the bishops of Frankfort, that they were misled by a bad Latin translation of the Acts of this Council, and so what they condemned was not the same as what the Council decreed. There are many things here that cannot be fully explained ; but it is surely strange that the Pope's legates, who at Frankfort joined in this condemnation of the seventh General Council, should not have known what their master had sanctioned, and wherein the fathers at Frankfort mis-

understood what they meant to condemn. It can scarcely, we think, be doubted that the Council at Frankfort, as well as the Council of Paris in 825, condemned the use of images in the same sense in which it had been sanctioned by Pope Adrian when he confirmed the decrees of the seventh Council.

Leo the Armenian, who came to the throne in 800, found the opponents of images so numerous that, though not himself an Iconoclast, he was compelled for the sake of peace to oppose the use of them in worship. Michael the Stammerer, who was placed on the throne by the murderers of Leo, had to adopt the same policy. Michael, in a letter to Louis le Debonnaire, describes the image worship which he had to oppose, and which found shelter under the decrees of the seventh Council. It consisted in chanting hymns before the images and invoking their assistance, making them sponsors for their children and witnesses to monastic vows. Some priests even mixed paint from the images with the sacramental wine and administered it to privileged communicants, while others put the symbols of Christ's body in the hands of the images, that they might in this way realise the communion of saints. These appear to have been the things which the Iconoclasts opposed, and which were virtually sanctioned by the seventh Council.

Dr. Michaud calls his treatment of these Councils "traditional and liberal." He wishes to find in them a basis of union for all Christians. The object is commendable, but the idea could only have arisen with one who takes that mediæval view of the Church which logically ends in the reception of the Vatican Council. If unity is to be based on General Councils, some of those which followed the first seven can make equally valid claims to authority. Catholicity, in the last analysis, is a mere question of majorities to which, for the sake of unity, minorities must

be subject. Against this principle the Church of England, with other Reformed Churches, rebelled at the Reformation. It distinctly set forth that General Councils "may err, and sometimes have erred, even in things pertaining unto God." Dr. Pusey is willing to accept the words of Du Pin that "General Councils received by the Universal Church *cannot have erred*;" (*Eirenicon*, p. 216), but Dr. Pusey is not the Church of England, and Dr. Michaud might have saved himself the trouble of uncatholicising the "Anglican," if he had attended more to what the Church of England officially says about General Councils. The recognition which it gives to the first four is found in an Act of Parliament of the first year of Queen Elizabeth, and the tenor of it is that a Royal Commission was appointed to determine heresy by the standard of the Holy Scripture, the first four General Councils, or any other Council whose decisions rested on Scripture. These first four, as well as any other General Councils, may or may not have erred, but what is not taken out of Holy Scripture has "neither strength nor authority."

The position of the English Church as to Catholicity might have been settled long before any question was raised about the seventh Council. The fourth canon of the great Council of Nicæa ordains that "every bishop be instituted (consecrated) by all the bishops of the province. When this is not possible three of them may give imposition of hands, with the written permission of the absent bishops." This decree was necessary for the preservation of that unity and Catholicity which depend on the submission of the minority to the majority. But this kind of Catholicity the Church of England repudiated. Matthew Parker was consecrated Archbishop of Canterbury by three Protestant bishops who had no sees and no permission, either written or unwritten, from the bishops of the province, who were deprived, solely by royal authority, because they refused to

acknowledge the royal supremacy. If Dr. Michaud were to apply the same canon to the consecration of the Old Catholic bishops by the Jansenists of Holland, he would find that they too had been consecrated by excommunicated bishops, or rather a bishop, and in opposition to the wishes of the bishops of the province and the Church of the majority.

The advantage which Dr. Michaud has, as a liberal, from the rejection of all Councils but the first seven, is that he is not bound by any dogmas decreed by later Councils. This means that the less we define the nearer we are to unity : which holds good as to the first seven as well as to those which follow. It is put down as an axiom that the disciples of Christ "have a religion with positive dogmas, positive precepts, and positive worship" (p. 6), and the business of Councils is to explain or determine what are those dogmas, precepts, and worship. Now these are either all clearly discernible in Scripture, in which case Councils are unnecessary, or they are not clearly discernible, and in that case nothing is to be believed but what has been decreed by a General Council. But the great doctrines of Christianity, as summed up, for instance, in the Apostles' Creed, are so evidently in the New Testament, that they are received by almost every Church or sect which bears the name of Christian. The doctrines, on the other hand, which have been the subject of conciliar decrees relate mostly to abstract questions which in most cases would have been better left open. Those determined by the first seven Councils might be thus summed up : "The Son is consubstantial with the Father, so also is the Holy Ghost ; Christ has only one person, but two natures and two wills. And as to worship, what these Councils have decreed is that we ought to keep Easter on the Sunday after the fourteenth day of the new moon which follows the vernal equinox, worship God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost

with *latria*, and give *dulia* to the images of Mary and the Saints." The brevity of the dogmatic creed is satisfactory ; but if we can go thus far on the mere authority of General Councils we need not strain at the Vatican. It is credible that if the Church had infallible Councils for eight centuries it would continue to have them for eighteen ; but it is incongruous to suppose that the Spirit of God presided over General Councils so long as the Roman Empire remained one, but abandoned the Church to fallibility when it was divided into East and West.

Dr. Jortin once said that the Council of Jerusalem was the first and the last Council over which the Holy Ghost presided. The history of the first seven Œcumenicals does not entitle any of them to be regarded as an exception. In a letter written by Constantine to the contending parties in Alexandria, which is described by the historian Socrates as containing "arguments wonderful and full of wisdom," we have the judgment of that Emperor as to the question for the determination of which the first General Council was summoned. The scope of the letter is that the two parties were one in the substance of the faith, and therefore they ought not to fight about mere trifles. These differences did not affect any important doctrine of Christianity. The question had already emerged in philosophy, whether the *Logos*, or Wisdom of God, was eternal, or if the absolute Being had not, at least in thought, priority of existence. It was only by inference that the Arians were supposed to touch the Trinity or the Incarnation. The Council decreed that the Son was consubstantial and coeternal with the Father. This definition or dogma was not the faith, but only a certain mode of expressing the faith. The subject was really above definition ; and though that of the Council is to be preferred to the Arian, it ought never to have been made an article of faith. The great patristic scholars of all Churches are agreed that the Athanasian mode of explaining

the Trinity is not that of the ante-Nicene Fathers. To prove that it was so is the object of Bishop Bull's famous work, and with him Dr. Michaud agrees; but Bishop Hefele says truly that "the Anglican Bull undertook to demonstrate what was not demonstrable." The creed of Eusebius of Cæsarea, nominally an Arian, was the basis of the Nicene Creed. It was rejected by the Council simply because the Arians were willing to subscribe it. Eusebius said it was the same which he had learned from his predecessors, and which he had taught his presbyters. The Athanasian party in the Council inserted the word *consubstantial*, to which they knew the Arians objected, as they took the word in a different sense. But Eusebius and his party afterwards accepted the *consubstantial*, with explanations which really meant that the truth was compatible with either the Arian or the Athanasian definitions. The Arians feared that *consubstantial*, as they understood it, endangered the doctrine of the Trinity, just as Dr. Michaud infers that the Arians, without knowing it, really denied the divinity of Christ (p. 53).

The second General Council determined that the Holy Ghost was also consubstantial with the Father. This followed necessarily from the consubstantiality of the Son. Both were congruous parts of the same mode of explaining the Godhead. The decisions of the third Council were more doubtful than those of the first two. Nestorius, the Patriarch of Constantinople, zealous for the humanity as well as the Divinity of Christ, thought that to defend both successfully it was necessary to ascribe to Christ two persons. As the word person sounds now to us, the mode was clumsy, but the heresy was slender. Nestorius specially objected to call Mary the Mother of God, as she was not the mother of Christ's divinity, but only of His humanity. The Council decreed that, though not the mother of Christ's divinity, she was yet the mother of God, because of the personal

union of the two natures in Christ. The dogma decreed by this Council has been vastly more mischievous than that of Nestorius ~~could ever have been~~. It has contributed more than anything in history to that exaltation of Mary which is now the most conspicuous idolatry of the Church of Rome, and the stem on which have been engrafted the most objectionable of Romish superstitions. The orthodoxy of the third Council developed into a heresy which was condemned by the fourth. To secure the unipersonality of Christ against the Nestorians, Eutyches maintained that Christ had only one nature. He neither denied the divinity nor the humanity, but, with an ingenuity worthy of a great metaphysical theologian, he said that the one nature was "God made flesh and become man." The condemnation of the Eutychians was only the condemnation of an ingenious mode of expressing the truth of the Incarnation. The fifth Council defines nothing. The Nestorians, instead of appealing to Nestorius, who had been condemned, found their doctrines in writings which had passed for orthodox. The Council contented itself with condemning these writings, confirming the decrees of previous Councils, and anathematising a long list of reputed heretics, beginning with Arius and ending with the great Origen. The sixth Council made a dogma of the theory that Christ has two wills, one human and one divine. It also condemned Honorius, Bishop of Rome, who protested against the introduction into theology of abstruse metaphysical terms and subtle distinctions, saying that the doctrines of the Scriptures were sufficiently clear, and that discussions about such questions as one or two wills ought to be left for the ingenuity of grammarians and the amusement of children.

Dr. Michaud maintains that these seven Councils were free and œcumenical, and therefore represented the mind of the Church Catholic. But we need not go beyond the facts, even as he records them, to see that they were not free, nor

did they always express the mind of the majority. They exhibit to us the usual phenomena of bishops fighting with bishops about subjects on which they barely understand each other. The Emperor sometimes compels them to agreement and sometimes to compromise by means of words which they take in different senses; or if this fails, he lends his influence to one party to crush the other. The first Council surpasses all the rest in good qualities; but even here the influence of Constantine cannot be ignored. He regarded the whole business with the eye of a politician, and his main object was peace. Only thirty-eight of the assembled bishops are put down as Arians, and only two refused to conform to the decrees of the Council. What then, we might ask, was the cause of all the disturbance? Dr. Michaud even denies the prevalence of Arianism at any time, and takes Jerome's lament that the world had become Arian as mere hyperbole. It is, indeed, easy to play at see-saw with the word Arian; but if we take the Arians as those who objected to consubstantiality, Jerome's words will be found not far from the truth. The fight may have been about a word, or, as it was in the Greek, about a letter, and that an iota; but those who objected to consubstantiality were always a numerous party, sometimes so numerous as to constitute the Catholic Church—if Catholicity is to be constituted by numbers and majorities. After the Council the strife continued, and the Arians were even able to compel the other party to subscribe creeds in which for consubstantiality, or of the *same* substance, was substituted a word meaning of *like* substance. Dr. Michaud pleads that those who thus agreed to abandon consubstantiality did not renounce the truth intended by it. Probably this is true, and it agrees to what Constantine said in his letter, already quoted, that both parties were really of the same opinion, and so the strife was all about trifles—that is, different modes of expressing the same thing. The Nicene Council,

therefore, did not give the Church the doctrine of Christ's divinity, but only a certain mode of expressing it, and if that mode is to be called a dogma, then a dogma is not a revealed doctrine, but only an opinion decreed by a Council.

The history of the other Councils shows the same scheming, fighting, and coercion which mark the most objectionable Councils held in later times, and regarded as infallible by the Church of Rome. Theodosius summoned the second Council purely to give peace to the Church militant. There were present only 186 bishops, of whom 38 were reckoned heretics. This is the Council described by Gregory Nazianzen, who says that the bishops raged like furious horses in battle, or like madmen casting dust into the air. He adds that they go even as they are led by their chief men, who to-day are of one opinion, and to-morrow, if the wind veers about, come to another judgment. The 150 orthodox, with the Emperor on their side, were too strong for the 38 on the other side, and so the latter retired from the Council, leaving the 150 to settle the faith of the Catholic world.

The third Council did not await the arrival of John of Antioch, who with his party were supporters of Nestorius. The President was the notorious Cyril of Alexandria, who urged the assembly to proceed with the condemnation of Nestorius; but Count Candidian, who represented the Emperor, refused to sanction the proceedings. When John arrived he opened a Council of his own, with forty bishops, who deposed Cyril and the Bishop of Ephesus. Both parties appealed to the Emperor, and complained of each other's partiality and injustice. The Emperor prudently decided in favour of the strongest party; but Cyril had pushed his objections against the doctrines of Nestorius so far, that he seemed to deny the two natures. His successor, Dioscurus, certainly did so, and appealed to Cyril's writings in defence of Eutyches. By the authority of

Theodosius, a Council was summoned at Ephesus, over which Dioscurus presided, when the Eutychians were declared orthodox. To condemn this Ephesian Council was the object of convening the fourth General Council. As soon as the legate of the Bishop of Rome saw Dioscurus among the bishops, he exclaimed that he had orders to depart if Dioscurus were allowed to be present. A tumult followed, in which it was evident that Dioscurus was on the losing side. Then all the bishops who had taken part with him in his Ephesian Council rose up against him, and swore that what had been done there they had been compelled to do. The same plea for going with the stream was made by the bishops of the seventh Council, who sanctioned the use of images, which once they had condemned.

A General Council seems a likely method of settling differences of doctrine. It might be supposed to give the Catholic voice of the Church, and, moreover, to manifest such Catholic wisdom as would overcome all opposition. But experience is here contrary to expectation. No General Council has ever had a tendency to heal; and every one, not excepting the first, has either made or perpetuated a schism. The more a Church defines, the more exclusive it becomes. The fires that once burned with the fury of volcanoes may now be extinct, but the divisions once made continue as petrifications, which it seems impossible ever again to put in solution. The influence of the rash fury of Cyril is still visible in the separation of the Nestorian community, once the great missionary Church of the East. The Armenian Church is also in separation, because it never received the decrees of Chalcedon—in fact, apparently never understood how that which was condemned could be a heresy. The Jacobites of the Syrian Church are the descendants of those condemned at Chalcedon; and the Maronites, the other party of the same Church, are monuments of the heresy-making work of the fifth Council.

The Coptic Church was also separated from the rest of the East by the decrees of Chalcedon, and in its daughter, the Abyssinian Church, these controversies about the nature of Christ, fruitful only in mischief, still exist. No Councils have helped towards the reunion of East and West, and all who accept the authority of the seventh Council must exclude from their fellowship the whole Protestant world.

Dr. Michaud's book has received less attention in England than it deserves. But for his acceptance of the seventh Council he would have had the full sympathy of English High Churchmen. But he has reduced them to the dilemma of accepting the seventh or giving up the first six; and they retort on him that in accepting the seventh he commits himself to the idol worship of the Church of Rome.

We would counsel Dr. Michaud again to look in the face the simple facts of Christianity. He will find that many questions, especially such as those which occupied the first General Councils, are still open for further investigation; that many things which he regards as dogmas or authoritative doctrines are mere opinions; and, moreover, that there has been no such thing as Catholicity of dogma or worship since St. Paul anathematized the Judaizers in Galatia, or withstood Peter at Antioch, because he was to be blamed. The necessary unity with the necessary variety must have some better basis than the authority of the first seven General Councils.

JOHN HUNT.

ELIZABETH STUART, QUEEN OF BOHEMIA.

I.

ELIZABETH STUART, sometime Queen of Bohemia, and still titular Queen of Hearts; daughter of James I., and Anne of Denmark; grand-daughter of Mary Queen of Scots, fourth in descent from Margaret Tudor; sister of Prince Henry, and of Charles I.; wife of the *Winterkönig*; mother of the Princes Rupert and Maurice, and of the Electress Sophia; friend of Lord Craven—is the Princess who took the blood royal of England and of Scotland to Germany, where it became blended with that of the Guelphs; the result being that Elizabeth's descendants, Stuarts on the spindle side, succeeded to the throne of England, after the last Stuart King had been deprived of the Crown, and after his two daughters had died without leaving issue.

A direct descendant of this mixed strain of royal blood now wears the Crown of Britain. "The sovereign qualification was restored to the realm (at the accession of the house of Hanover) in its highest purity through the descendants of the Guelphs, passing back through the house of Este to connect themselves with some of the illustrious Roman *Gentes*. The new dynasty was, indeed, by centuries older in history than the Plantagenets." (Burton.) Elizabeth Stuart was born in Falkland Palace, 19th August, 1596; she died 13th February, 1662, in Leicester House, London.

Between birth and death, this descendant and ancestress

of kings lived through many adventures, saw many men of mark in many foreign lands, experienced bitter sorrows, and passed through a strange life of royal romance. Princess, Electress, Queen, fugitive and refugee, her career knew pomp and pleasure, penury and pain. After stormy alternations of rule and of reverse, the (titular) ex-Queen of Bohemia returned from the continent to England, to die there, generally neglected and half unknown. The years which elapsed between the period at which she quitted England as Electress Palatine, and returned to it a beauty-waning and distressed widow, discrowned and forlorn, embraced the terrible epoch of the Thirty Years' War; and Elizabeth's vivid memory was filled with vital images of the long agony of that most cruel civil and religious struggle. She had actually and intimately known the persons, intrigues, interests, of the great war; had seen many of the heroes, adventurers, tyrants, of that woful time; had spoken with Gustavus Adolphus, Maurice of Nassau, Mansfeld, Christian of Brunswick, and many other of the notabilities of that distinctive epoch of history; had shared the somewhat heavy splendours of the German Courts of the seventeenth century, and had experienced the substantial comfort of the hospitable States-General in the great days of Holland. Around her image stand the figures, behind her glooms the sombre background of that dire convulsion. The years over which her active life extended were of singular importance alike to the politics and to the religion of all Europe. A witness of, and an actress in, that supreme struggle between faiths and dynasties, Elizabeth lived in the very midst of the horror, the romance, the woe of that dæmonic strain and anguish of thirty years' duration. She saw the long process of that exhaustion of war-worn nations which dictated the peace of Westphalia: her own brother, after the civil wars of England, perished on the scaffold at Whitehall: she lived through the time of

the Protectorate, and she witnessed the restoration of the royal line in England. Her life, and the times through which she lived, are surely subjects of surpassing interest for an historical essay. Of the sources of information about the Thirty Years' War it may well be said that their name is legion. The number of German authorities, the plethora of continental records are, in truth, almost bewildering; but the writer about that complex time may well bear in mind Professor Masson's modest and pregnant saying, "I can never pass a sheet of the historical kind for the press without a dread, lest from inadvertance, or from sheer ignorance, some error, some blunder even, may have escaped me."

The girlhood of Elizabeth, after her father's accession to the throne (1603), was passed chiefly at Combe Abbey, under the wise guardianship of Sir John, afterwards Lord Harrington, and of his wife. There she played, and studied, and became a mighty huntress. The influences which surrounded her youth were noble, kindly, natural. The Gunpowder Plot conspirators designed to seize her person, and to proclaim her Queen after the murder of her father. They hoped to mould her tender youth to the religion of the Romish Church, and to obtain from such a sovereign Catholic supremacy in England. During the danger arising from the plot, the young Princess was removed, temporarily, from Combe Abbey to Coventry; but after the execution of the conspirators she returned to the beloved home of her childhood. The great delight of her years of girlhood consisted in the tender friendship which subsisted between Elizabeth and her noble brother, the young Prince Henry; a Prince of rare promise, "the expectancy and rose of the fair State," who evinced in his early years a true sympathy with all that was noblest in English life and thought. Henry, had he lived, would, probably, have been, like the last great Tudor monarch, an

England-loving King, "more English than the English themselves," and in intimate and instinctive union with the essence of the national life. Both Henry and Elizabeth were convinced and ardent Protestants. Between the royal children and their parents there was not—there could not be—much intimacy or close sympathy. Anne of Denmark was gay, pleasure-loving, cheerful, frivolous. James, fittest, by nature, to squabble with another mind of like calibre with his own about the trivialities of theology, was a monarch besotted with his own fatuous conception of the divine right of Kings; and was unstable, pedantic, undignified, and unvirile. That he had a coward's cruelty, the fates of Arabella Stuart and of Sir Walter Raleigh amply prove. Ungainly in person, he was yet more unlovely in mind. Entering upon the noble inheritance of a reign which succeeded to that of Elizabeth, he alienated the nation from his dynasty, he prepared the great rebellion, he lowered England in the councils of Europe; and, while a most exasperating tyrant to people and to Parliament, he remained long the abject slave of Spain and of unworthy favourites. The best excuse, perhaps, for the pusillanimous King of England, who dared not look upon a drawn sword, consists in the fatal event which occurred while he was yet in his mother's womb. James and his daughter never came very near together; James and his son Henry drifted even farther and farther apart. It was inevitable that it should be so.

As the years rolled on, the question of the marriages of such a hopeful Prince and Princess began to press. "I would rather espouse a Protestant Count than a Catholic Emperor," said Elizabeth. In this, as in other things, she took her tone from her knightly Prince brother, who opposed heartily a scheme for marrying him to the Infanta Anna of Spain, sister to that Infanta Maria whom his brother Charles afterwards pursued in Madrid with bootless

courtship. Henry, indeed, proposed to accompany his sister to Germany, in order there to be able to remain purely Protestant, and to select and marry some Protestant Princess.

At the suggestion of Maurice of Nassau, a suitor for the hand of Elizabeth presented himself in the person of Frederick, Pfalzgraf of the Rhine, and son of the *Kurfürst*, or Elector, of the Palatinate, Frederick IV. Frederick IV., who was born in 1574, and married 1593, Luise Juliane, daughter of William the Silent, a noble daughter of a noble father, was the most considerable Protestant Prince of Germany. His territory did not equal in importance that of Saxony, but the talents, the character, and the zeal of Frederick IV. soon placed him at the head of Protestant Germany. He took a leading part in founding the famous Protestant Union in 1608; and was, indeed, the Chief of the Union, which included among its members the Duke of Würtemberg, the Landgraf of Hessen-Kassel, and the Markgrafs of Anspach and of Baden Durlach. Frederick IV. died 18th September, 1610. The Protestant Union called into being the Catholic *Liga*, founded 10th of July, 1609. The Union had many heads; the *Liga* only one, but that one was Maximilian of Bavaria, while its general was Tilly. Maximilian was unscrupulous, eager, crafty, energetic. A pupil of the Jesuits, and a bigoted Catholic, Maximilian knew well what he wanted, and he hesitated at no means that would serve his ends. He had the advantage, to a partizan, of a clear will, a ruthless cruelty, and a cunning audacity.

The youth of Frederick V. was passed chiefly at Sedan, under the guidance of the Duke of Bouillon, though his guardian was the Herzog Johann von Zweibrücken, to whom Frederick IV. left the Government of the Palatinate while Frederick V. should remain a minor.

At Sedan the young *Kurfürst* was in a court, but never

in a camp. He learned politics, and not war; he was taught accomplishments, but not warfare; he acquired arts without learning arms. His education was political, and was peaceful. The son of the Chief of the Union, he remained ignorant of the art of war. Such knowledge as he attained to in the use of arms fitted him rather for the holiday tilt-yard than for the terrors of the battlefield. He was but a poor soldier, and he was no general. For the needs of his day, and of his own future life, he was but imperfectly trained. He was a cavalier, but not a warrior. Frederick was graceful, and was gentle; courteous, tender, and true. He was capable of a constant and a noble love. His person was fine, though not stalwart: he shone more at the ball than in the school of arms. His father had passed from Lutheranism to Calvinism, and the young *Kurpfalz* was a convinced and zealous Calvinist. As a suitor for the hand of Elizabeth Stuart, he was acceptable to James, and was highly popular with the English nation, which ardently desired a Protestant Prince as a husband for the daughter of the throne.

The match was distasteful to the Catholic party, and to the gay and sprightly Anne of Denmark. Her ambition desired a King as the husband of her daughter, and Anne's sneer at "Goody Palsgrave" damped the present joy, and influenced the future career of Elizabeth, who inherited much of her mother's light and frivolous temperament.

The race of the renowned Otto of Wittelsbach split itself into two branches—the Bavarian and the Palatine. The original stock obtained the Duchy of Bavaria, in 1180, from the Emperor Frederick I.; and, afterwards, from Frederick II., the Palatinate of the Rhine. The treaty of Pavia, in 1329, divided the two countries under two reigning houses springing from the parent root, and, in the early years of the seventeenth century, Bavaria was ruled by the strong and wily Maximilian (born 17th of April, 1573), while his

cousin, the weak and gentle Frederick V., inherited the Government of the Palatinate.

Prince Henry, the gallant-springing young Stuart, died November 6th, 1612; but, amid the actual mourning for her well-loved brother, Elizabeth married Frederick on the 14th of February, 1613. The nuptials were celebrated with great rejoicings and with extraordinary pomp and expense. The honeymoon over, the married lovers sailed from Margate to Flushing, where they were received by Maurice, and whence they passed, in a sort of triumphal procession, to Heidelberg—Elizabeth's new home.

Born in the same year, 1596, Frederick and Elizabeth were alike seventeen years of age at the date of their marriage. Frederick was still a minor when they reached Heidelberg; nor did he assume the reins of Government until the next year, 1614; but his territory had been well administered by his mother and his guardian. In 1614, Elizabeth's first child, Heinrich Friedrich, was born in the Palace of Heidelberg.

The early time of their marriage was one of singular happiness; of a happiness so great that it contrasts painfully with the sorrows of the coming years. Elizabeth exercised an unlimited empire over an uxorious young husband, who found his chief delight in her affection. She had all the things for which she vitally cared—pomp, pleasure, dominion, and hunting; though the crumpled rose-leaf in her lot was, perhaps, the rankle of her mother's sneer at "Goody Palsgrave." The years of peace and of pleasure in Heidelberg were but few. Frederick and his wife could not remain contented with their own Palatinate. Light and trivial natures both, they were not too light or too trivial to remain untouched by ambition during the intoxication and the ferment of their day of strain and storm:—

'Tis dangerous when the lesser nature comes
Between the fell pass and incensed points
Of mighty opposites.

To his own utter undoing, and to the great injury of the Protestant cause, Frederick plunged into those troubled waters in order to encircle the round hat of an Elector with a golden crown. The primary cause of the Thirty Years' War in Germany was the determination of the Austro-Spanish Monarchies, aided by the Catholic Princes—and notably by Bavaria—to establish the ecclesiastical dominion of the Pope in all Germany, in Holland, and afterwards, if possible, in the northern kingdoms of Scandinavia, and in all the other "Heretic States" of Europe. The Treaty of Augsburg (1555) was to be torn up, and the Reformation suppressed by force as well as fraud. The House of Hapsburg, as vassal of the Pope, was to rule and reign throughout the land of Luther. Religion furnished the impulse; political ambition the secondary cause; while bigotry lent ferocity to the conduct of the merciless and devastating struggle.

The Austrian branch of Hapsburg sought absolute imperial power and universal monarchy. The war was a battle-field for princes and for captains who desired either to acquire or to defend territories and inheritances. It was an arena for the plots of schemers and for the ambition of heroes. It fostered the trade of mercenary soldier, and developed to gigantic dimensions the place, the profit, and the pride of the able warrior of fortune. Through valour, cruelty, treachery, it marched over a country rendered wretched, desolate, and waste. By the process of utter exhaustion, it left the chief combatants in the situation in which, as regards principles, if not position, they were at the treaty of Augsburg in 1555. It confirmed a religious toleration which it ought never to have disturbed. It returned practically to the point from which it started. In result it was a triumph for Protestantism and for religious liberty; its issue repelled the fierce onslaught of Catholicism; but the war was, on the part of those who provoked it, a wicked

war ; and such success as was attained was purchased by oceans of blood and by years of misery.

The preliminary indications of the long war were the violent seizure by Maximilian of Bavaria of Donauwörth, and the intricate tangle of the question of the inheritance of the Duchies of Cleve and Jülich. The weakness of Protestantism in Germany was caused in part by the fatal split between Lutheran and Calvinist, and by the contemptible character of the leading Protestant Princes—of such men as Johann Georg, of Saxony, and Georg Wilhelm, tenth Elector of Brandenburg. Both Electors honoured and dreaded the Emperor more than they loved their religion ; neither would peril aught for that cause. Carlyle says, “ in fact, had there been no better Protestantism than that of Germany, all was over with Protestantism. . . . Over seas there dwelt and reigned a certain King in Sweden ; there farmed and walked musing by the shores of the Ouse, in Huntingdonshire, a certain man ; there was a Gustav Adolf over seas, an Oliver Cromwell over seas.” Selfish and sensual, a lover of the wine-cup and the boar hunt, *Kur-Sachsen* was an “ unspeakable curse to Germany. A man of no strength, devoutness, or adequate human worth ;” and the Elector of Brandenburg was led by him of Saxony. At the outbreak of the great war Protestantism in Germany had but little to hope from its natural leaders.

Then came the irresistible temptation for Frederick and Elizabeth. The great prize of a crown—that of Bohemia—was dangled before their eager eyes.

When, in 1612, Matthias succeeded Rudolph II. as Emperor, he managed, by practice, to impose upon Bohemia, as his successor to the crown of Bohemia, Ferdinand, son of the Archduke Charles, Prince of Styria. Both Rudolf and Matthias were childless men. Charles was brother to the Emperor Maximilian ; and both Charles and Maximilian were the sons of the Emperor Ferdinand I., and of Anne,

heirress of Bohemia and Hungary. Bohemia resisted the nomination of Ferdinand as King, but could not shake off the yoke. The country was essentially Protestant, but saw its liberties invaded and its religion proscribed by the fanatic, Jesuit-led monarch who was so ruthlessly forced upon the country. When, in 1619, Ferdinand was elected Emperor, as Ferdinand II., and ruled the Empire, being himself ruled by Father Lämmerlein and Father Hyacinth, the Bohemians hastened to depose him as King of Bohemia, and to offer the crown to the best Protestant Prince who could be induced to accept the dangerous dignity. It was promptly refused by Saxony and by Brandenburg, nor was it accepted even by the Prince of Transylvania; and then, as a last resource, the crown of Bohemia was offered to Frederick. Anne of Denmark died (1619) before a crown was placed within the reach of "Goody Palsgrave;" but there can be no doubt that the chance of becoming Queen was welcomed by Elizabeth with light-hearted rapture.

To Frederick every project was easy; every action difficult. However he might secretly hesitate about accepting so perilous a crown, he was yet elated by the prospect, and he had his wife to lean upon. She chastised him with the valour of her tongue; and she wrote to her father, asking James I. for his approval and advice. Charles I. said, later, of the Palatine pair, that "the grey mare was the better horse;" and Elizabeth's exultation overcame their sense of dread of danger. Meanwhile Frederick sought advice from various quarters. Saxony besought Frederick to remember that, in accepting the Bohemian crown, he hazarded the loss of his hereditary dominions. Max of Bavaria wrote in a frank, even cousinly way, and warned Frederick earnestly against acceptance. Max told his cousin how fickle the Bohemians were: "You want subjects; they want a servant:" and added that motives of interest alone impelled

them to choose Frederick. Maurice of Nassau would not help, but did not dissuade. Had Maurice himself desired the Bohemian crown, he would, probably, have won and have worn it; but Frederick was not Maurice. Luise Juliane, the mother of Frederick, addressed her son in a letter of singular ability (*Mémoires sur la vie et la mort de la Princesse Louise Juliane*; Leyden, 1644), and this remarkable state paper is worth producing here. She said that "the affairs of the Empire might soon be retrieved, and that the Pope would convoke all Catholics to defend the Emperor. The King of France, however inimical to Austria, is not in a state to oppose its power; the King of Spain will eagerly sustain it. As to the King of Great Britain, believe me, you little understand him if you persuade yourself he will break with Spain for your interests. On my brother Maurice, there is more reliance to be placed; but the States will not sacrifice Holland to the Palatinate. What aid can you expect from the King of Denmark? He is too far distant. The houses of Saxony and of Bavaria are already jealous of yours, and will heartily concur in driving you from Bohemia. Trust not too much to the Protestant Union. . . . Distrust still more the Bohemians. If they offer you the crown, it is not that they love you better than another Prince, but that they have no other resource. Do not flatter yourself they will be more constant to you than they have been to Ferdinand; but, even though you could depend upon your kinsmen, your allies, your friends, and your subjects, you have neither troops nor treasures adequate to the charges of war." Surely wise advice. Every prophecy of Luise Juliane was fulfilled by the bitter event. Frederick was not the man, nor had he the means, to obtain success in such a desperate venture. He was well known to the men of his own day and land; no man would help because no man believed in him. Frederick could not oppose Fer-

dinand. Bohemian Protestantism could only be helped by German Protestantism ; but that, in 1619, was selfish and supine, and would by no means stir for Frederick. If Frederick could not maintain himself in Bohemia, and defend the Bohemians, his enterprise sank into a mere usurpation, which would give grounds for reprisals, and for the further oppression of Protestantism. Nowhere in all Germany was there any enthusiasm for, any belief in, Frederick.

Half deceiving themselves, Frederick and Elizabeth attempted to sanctify their decision with the name of religion, and veiled ambition under the pretext of piety. The Kaiser himself deigned to warn Frederick, though Ferdinand steadfastly refused to believe that *Kurpfalz* could contemplate a seizure of "Austrian territory." Meanwhile Bohemia was pressing for Frederick's answer. His council in Heidelberg advised him to come to no decision until he should have heard from England ; but Elizabeth was not inclined to wait for anything. After declaring that the chance was a call from God, she writes to Frederick—"Nor shall I repine whatever consequences may ensue; not even though I should be forced to part with my last jewel, and to suffer actual hardship." Söttl quotes another letter of hers in which she reminds Frederick that he has married the daughter of a King, and should not want courage to make his wife a Queen. Elizabeth concludes by saying—"rather *Sauerkraut* with a King than luxury with a Prince " This sentence expresses her real motives for decision, and exhibits her character ; which was ambitious, shallow, and fond of splendour. Without waiting for her husband's final decision, she made all preparations for starting for Bohemia. Another pressing mission came from Prague, and Frederick was ultimately pushed over the edge of treason. As he rode away from Heidelberg, his weeping mother cried out, "Ach! Du trägst die Pfalz

nach Böhmen!"—"Thou art carrying the Palatinate into Bohemia!"

The Palatinate itself was left under the Government of Zweibrücken; but Frederick, who, in his incapacity, seemed to forget that he was burning his ships behind him, made no provision for the defence of his native territory.

Frederick and Elizabeth entered Prague, amid great rejoicings, on 31st October, 1619. His coronation took place on November 4th.

He immediately issued an address to his new kingdom. This manifesto was large and loose and liberal as a modern hustings declaration. It promised everything to everybody, and was so framed as, if possible, to please all his subjects.

Acting with the nervous hurry of small natures bent impatiently upon a darling project, Frederick and Elizabeth accepted the Bohemian crown without having waited for the reply of James I.

James was, according to Clarendon, "very quick-sighted in discerning difficulties, very slow in mastering them." His confused love of peace, and poverty of spirit, threw him into a perplexed astonishment when he heard of the serious step taken by his son-in-law without his royal concurrence; nor did he ever approve Frederick's Bohemian usurpation. It may well be contended that a King of England should not have wasted English blood and gold in the mere attempt to win a crown for a son-in-law; but it may be a question whether, in the larger sense of European politics, a great English King, the natural antagonist of Hapsburg ascendancy, and natural defender of Protestantism, might not have enlarged the question into such an action of combined Protestantism as that which Gustavus Adolphus afterwards led. James might have wielded the strength of England, and such a war would have been highly popular. Frederick personally was liked, though he was not known in connection with great affairs, in England; and his cause,

and that of Elizabeth, would have merged into the greater cause of European civil and religious liberty. But James, a laggard in love and a dastard in war, was not the man for great causes. He might have ruined Austria and have served Protestantism; but he was led by Gondomar, and was, probably, in reality a crypto-Catholic. Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, Count of Gondomar, reached London as Ambassador from Spain, in 1613; and soon acquired complete dominion over the lean-souled King. Marc Antonio, archbishop of Spalatro, was made Dean of Windsor in 1618; and Goodman, yet more Catholic than Laud, sat upon the bench of bishops. Rightly had Luise Juliane said that James would not break with Spain. The Spanish marriage was dangled before his eyes by the astute Gondomar. On 4th of November, 1616, the rickety Duke of York (afterwards Charles I.), had been created Prince of Wales; and James burned to match his son with the blood of Hapsburg. James hastened to disavow his unfortunate son-in-law; he would not recognise Frederick as King of Bohemia, and he apologised to Ferdinand for Frederick's "usurpation" of Austrian territory. The Spanish leanings of James were, until the Spanish match was broken off in failure and contempt, very pronounced; and were as stable as anything in his unvirile nature could be stable or strong. The first Stuart Kings, who robbed the English Nation of the Church of Elizabeth Tudor, drove the force and passion of the National religious character into Puritanism; into the "sectaries"—Presbyterians, Independents, Anabaptists—into those intense, if gloomy convictions which animated the Ironsides, and rode in victory through the red fields of Naseby and of Marston Moor.

The German title of *Winter-König* is, being interpreted rather than translated, to be rendered into English as a "mockery King of snow." An estimable country gentleman may be a very poor monarch; and incapable, fatuous

Frederick, whose very amiability increases the contempt felt for him by history as a King, soon began to melt away. Anxieties commenced early to surround the fire-new royalties of the hapless King and Queen of fickle Bohemia; and yet their first time in the palace of Prague was one of unalloyed triumph and exultation, especially to the sanguine, pomp-loving Elizabeth. Feast succeeded feast; ceremony followed ceremony; she was, at last, a Queen, and Elizabeth was royally happy. Despite the tolerant tone of poor Frederick's "hustings manifesto," he too, as a Calvinist, was priest-ridden. He took with him to Prague his narrow and bigoted chaplain, Schulze (*Scultetus*), and the interfering minister soon embittered both Catholics and Lutherans against his royal master.

Bohemia became gradually dissatisfied with its new King. It was found that Frederick could neither help Bohemia nor himself; and that he could bring no help from outside. Elizabeth, who in the flush of her triumph was extremely gracious, and was always graceful, was, for a time, popular; but Bohemia found that there was but little behind that superficial gracefulness. Neither Frederick nor Elizabeth could speak, or could understand, the Bohemian language. The split between Court and Nation widened, until Frederick found himself in the position of a timid and unskilful rider mounted, without saddle or bridle, on an unbroken, vicious horse.

They that stand high, have many blasts to shake them;
And if they fall they dash themselves to pieces;

and none stand in greater danger than those who, impelled by their own vanity, and assisted by accident, have attained to an elevation for which they are incompetent. He who, in the 17th century, would usurp a possession of the House of Austria must have been a warrior who could hold what he had seized in the tenacious grip of an iron gauntlet.

The dangers thickened round them ; and Frederick, with his want of insight, and confused vision, was like a short-sighted man before the invention of spectacles. A miner does not notice the lengthening or shortening of the days. Frederick, in the darkness of his incapacity, seemed unconscious of the fate that was surely drawing near. The Pope Paul said : " That young man has got himself entangled in a nice labyrinth." Ferdinand absolutely refused at first to give credence to the report of Frederick's coronation. Such blind audacity seemed to the Emperor incredible. The Protestant Princes, meeting at Mülhausen, under the guidance of Saxony, wrote to Frederick, urging him to relinquish the crown, and not to involve the cause of Protestantism with " his rebellion." The Emperor curtly summoned Frederick to vacate the throne by the 1st June ; failing which—ban of the Empire and war. Spinola and his Spaniards were gathering to march on the Palatinate ; the *Kriegsvolk*, the war-folk of the *Liga*, were assembling for the Empire. Spinola led one army—Tilly and Bucquoy the other. The Palatinate had been left defenceless ; what would Frederick do to defend his new kingdom ? The Bohemians were tired of Frederick, and were in dread of Ferdinand. Frederick's army was indifferent in point of quality, and had no heart in the cause ; there was no discipline and but little pay. The troops had to live by plunder ; and, indeed, they seized Elizabeth's private jewels, as they were being conveyed to Prague, and confiscated their own Queen's gems. Frederick was not the man to teach drill, to enforce discipline, to lend a soul to an army, or to inspire it with confidence in its King and leader. His affairs were ready to tumble to ruin. Elizabeth refused to quit Prague, and held on to the last to the seat of her brief Queenship.

The smaller fight of Rakonitz was lost for Frederick ; and, on Sunday, November 8th, 1620, the Imperialists

attacked Prague; and the battle of the White Mountain—a battle which lasted only one hour—completed the defeat and ruin of the wretched Frederick. Most characteristically, Frederick was at dinner, at a stately dinner which he gave to the Ambassadors, during this crowning fight for his own crown and interests. “After dinner, the King resolved to go to horse to see the army; but before the King could get out of the gate, the news came of the loss of the Bohemian and the royal cause.” The fact is, Frederick was driven back through the city gate by his own troops, who, in full rout, crying out, “The battle is lost!” were tumbling pell-mell into the city, to gain the protection of its walls.

It was intended to defend Prague, in order to secure the retreat of Elizabeth, but she herself opposed the measure. Cousin Max granted an armistice of eight hours; during which the King and Queen fled wildly, and in such haste that they left behind them crown, papers, jewels—almost everything that they had. Prague, with terror in its heart, did trembling homage to the incensed Emperor. Frederick *had* taken the Palatinate to Bohemia; had lost crown, Elector’s hat, his new kingdom, and his ancient inheritance. He was to become a penniless, discrowned fugitive, and under the terrible ban of the Empire.

The hardships which Elizabeth had been willing to incur for the sake of a crown had come upon her, as, with husband and with child, but reft of all else, she fled through the snow of a severe winter to Breslau in Silesia. The Markgraf Georg Wilhelm of Brandenburg had married (in 1616) Frederick’s sister, Elizabetha Karolina; but the timid brother-in-law hesitated, at first, to grant to the hapless couple refuge in Cüstrin; where, on December 25th, 1620, Elizabeth’s son, Maurice, was born. Rupert, the “Rupert of the Rhine,” of our Civil Wars, was born in Prague, December 20th, 1619. In 1617, Karl Ludwig; in 1618, Elizabeth was born; indeed, the first dozen

years of Elizabeth's life abroad are all speckled with confinements.

Frederick ~~preached~~ ^{was libelous} resistance, and called loudly upon every one to help him. Meantime the Upper and Lower Palatinates were overrun by Spinola; and Heidelberg was taken by Tilly. Without consulting the Electors, the high-handed Ferdinand gave the Palatinate Electorship to Max of Bavaria, who also got the Upper Palatinate, while the Lower was, for the moment, given to Archduke Albert. The Archduke died July 13, 1621, and then the Lower Palatinate fell also to Maxmillan. Max "had done more than any Emperor could expect," and deserved reward from a grateful *Kaiser*. On December 13th, 1621, all Protestant preachers and teachers were ejected from Bohemia. On February 28th, 1621, Tilly put to death, in Prague, some eight and forty of the best and noblest citizens, on a large public scaffold, similar to those used by Alba, for similar purposes, in the Netherlands. The tongues of some were torn out by the roots; the right hands of others were hacked off. Confiscation, persecution, death and misery succeeded Frederick in Bohemia.

On January 22nd, 1621, the Ban was pronounced against Frederick. On April 12th, 1621, the Protestant Union dissolved itself. The whole Palatinate was subjected, compulsorily, to the Romish religion, and the Pope wrote to the Emperor to congratulate him upon the triumph of Catholicism. Truly, Frederick's zeal for religion had done but little for the Protestant cause.

Frederick and Elizabeth took refuge in Holland, and were received with great kindness by the generous States General. Even James, stung by the violent seizure of the Palatinate, awoke to a certain passionate activity—of words. On January 30th, 1621, the King told the Parliament, "Now shall I labour to preserve the rest; wherein I declare that, if by fair means I cannot get it, my crown, my blood,

and all, shall be spent, with my son's blood also, but I will get it for him (Frederick). And this is the cause of all, that the cause of religion is involved in it; for they will alter religion when they conquer, and so, perhaps, my grandchild also may suffer, who hath committed no fault at all."

Brave words! But James "dared not strike one blow for the inheritance of his daughter's children, and was dallying with the oppressors of the people and of the Church of God." Of James' negotiations Nani (quoted by Mr. Samuel Rawson Gardiner) says, "His first proposals to Vienna might have been listened to, but they were so impracticable and absurd that the subtil Spaniards soon saw what sort of person they had to deal with, and availed themselves accordingly of his improbable schemes and delays; they knew, likewise, that James trembled at war, and abominated a rebellion."

The polite evasion of contempt was the only answer obtained by James.

On January 30th, James, seeking for popularity, told the Parliament that religion "was the cause of all;" and yet Gondomar reports to Philip (Simancas MSS.)—also quoted by Mr. Gardiner—on February 18th, the pith of a memorable conversation between James and himself, held on February 2nd, in which James admitted that he was "ready to acknowledge his readiness to recognise the Pope as the head of the Church in matters spiritual, and to allow appeals to lie to him from English Bishops, provided the Pope would refrain from meddling with temporal jurisdiction in his (James's) kingdoms, and would renounce his claim to depose Kings at pleasure. If in his writings he (James) had spoken of the Pope as Antichrist, it was because of his usurped power over Kings, not because he called himself the head of the Church;" and, in testimony to the truth of this statement, the King gave his hand to the delighted ambassador. The Pope might have the

diviner right, but yet was not to interfere with the "divine right" of Kings.

Elizabeth implored her father to take action for the recovery of Bohemia as well as the Palatinate, and, by her advice, Frederick refused to lay aside the title of King of Bohemia. In this dark hour of her fortunes, Elizabeth, a true Stuart, with a nature satisfied with the pleasures of the present, writes to Sir Thomas Roe, the English ambassador (she always addressed him as "honest Thom"), "yett I am still of my wilde humour, to be as merrie as I can in spite of fortune." The gentler Frederick felt his misfortunes, and especially the loss of his hereditary possessions, more keenly. "The Winter King's account was soon settled;" but the Elector's loss was harder to bear, and this loss he owed partly to Elizabeth, partly to his own imbecility.

German political sympathy was, to a great extent, with Frederick so far as the Palatinate was concerned; but it was also felt that Frederick, in taking Bohemia, had done to Ferdinand the same thing which the Emperor, in savage reprisal, had done to the Elector. The sentiment of the sacredness of hereditary possession was then strong among the German Powers. The monarchy of Bohemia was not, in a practical sense, an elective monarchy. In default of an hereditary succession, the crown of Bohemia was seizable by him who could take and hold it. The crown had on various occasions been the prey of violence and fraud, and had been mainly at the mercy of the *Kaiser*. Thus, Matthias compelled the weak Rudolf to cede Bohemia to him; and Matthias, when he was elected Emperor, compelled the Bohemians to accept Ferdinand. The unfortunate, if fickle, Bohemians constantly saw their religion and their liberties outraged by Catholics and by tyrants. They sought freedom by means of a Protestant Prince, and, failing in obtaining one of power and mark, they had the misfortune to see

their ruin consummated by their last resource, Frederick. Their hope that the Union, that the German Protestant Powers, that England, would support Frederick was soon shown to be the shadow of a shade.

. Two defenders sprang up for the lost cause of Frederick and Elizabeth. One was a partisan of policy; the other a champion of chivalry. The first was Count Mansfeld; the second was Christian of Brunswick.

Mansfeld was the ablest adventurer, the most successful soldier of fortune of his land and day. He had strong reasons for hating Austria, and hated her accordingly.

Christian was a man of a very different stamp. He was *Geschwisterkind* (first cousin) of Elizabeth (Söltk), and was born September 10th, 1599. He was, therefore, three years younger than Elizabeth. Christian's mother, also an Elizabeth, was the daughter of Frederick II. of Denmark. Christian first met Elizabeth Stuart when, after the disastrous day of the White Mountain, she had taken refuge in Holland. He was charmed with his cousin; he felt knightly sympathy for a Queen's misfortunes: a passionate Protestant, he glowed with true zeal for Elizabeth's religion. Burning for military glory, a fanatic of chivalry, a knight-errant of romantic devotion; high-flown, sombre, and intense, Christian eagerly devoted life and fortune to his cousin and her cause. He wore her glove in his helmet; he adopted as his motto, *Alles für Ruhm und ihr*, "All for glory and for her." He called himself *Gottes Freund, der Pfaffen Feind*—"the friend of God, the foe of priests." When, after a wound at the siege of Breda, his arm had to be amputated, he caused the trumpets to sound while the operation was performed, and said that "the arm he had left would be enough for revenge upon his enemies." Heroic as a knightly champion, Christian was yet unsuccessful as a general. Intrepid, rash, and headstrong, he was easily beaten by the wily Tilly. Mansfeld was abler

and more successful ; but their joint help had really availed but little when, on July 16th, 1662, Frederick saw himself compelled (partly by pressure put upon him by his father-in-law) to dismiss the two generals who—the one from hatred of Austria, the other from love to Elizabeth—bravely maintained and kept alive a falling cause.

After the bitter step of such a dismissal, Frederick would seem to have begun to suffer from life-weariness. He stood apart, and left his affairs mainly to his sprightly wife, and to the Secretary, Russdorf.

It is impossible in this short essay to narrate all the battles, sieges, fortunes, which occurred in the great war, even in so far as such events may have indirectly affected the fortunes of the Palatine House. Much must necessarily be passed over, and I am compelled to restrict myself to those leading occurrences which were most clearly determinate of the fortunes of Germany, and by consequence of those of Elizabeth Stuart.

H. SCHÜTZ WILSON.

(To be continued.)

MR. RHYS DAVIDS' HIBBERT LECTURES.*

WE can hardly be surprised that Mr. Rhys Davids begins his course of interesting and suggestive lectures by declaring that "it would be a hopeless task to attempt in six Lectures, that is to say, in six hours, to give any adequate account of that great movement which has influenced the greater portion of the human race during the lapse of so many centuries." It might perhaps be possible to give a tolerably complete sketch of Buddhism in a volume of the same size as the one before us; but the result would be a mere sketch more suited to a handbook on the history of religion than to a course of lectures. For a lecturer must never forget that he has to rouse the interest of his hearers in his subject; nor can he find any more efficient means of doing so than the constant reference to points of resemblance and difference between the ideas with which they are already familiar and those which they are to meet with on the comparatively strange field of his special investigations. The lecturer, therefore, is at liberty, or rather is compelled, to make a selection from the rich accumulations of his knowledge, and to go to work eclectically, without, however, considering himself absolved from the necessity of following a definite plan.

The plan which Mr. Rhys Davids has proposed to himself is "to discuss those points in the history of Buddhism

* *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion, as Illustrated by Some Points in the History of Indian Buddhism.* By T. W. RHYS DAVIDS. (Hibbert Lectures, 1881.) Williams and Norgate.

which appear to throw light on the origin and growth of religious belief," and, further to explain his meaning, he adds, "This means, as I understand it, the origin and growth of religion outside, as well as inside, the circle of the Buddhist beliefs themselves."

The method which the lecturer promises to follow is "the comparative method," especially that which is followed in "comparative philology." In this science, we are told, "we find, *firstly*, that words in the more modern dialects of any family are derived, as far as possible historically, from words or roots in the older dialects." I am afraid that no one who has not worked at "comparative philology" himself will be led to a correct idea of the method in question by these words. The fact is that the philologist, by comparing the facts and phenomena observed in the languages of one family known to him, and by applying certain strict rules which he has derived from his linguistic studies, endeavours to track out the older *pre-historic* condition of a family of speeches. He endeavours to proceed from the known to the unknown, to fix the degrees of relationship between the several members of the same family of languages, and to prove that at some remote period there was one language, out of which, in the course of time, all these dialects, which appear so different, have grown in natural or, at any rate, in explicable ways. We shall see the important bearing of the distinction here drawn when we come to the Sixth Lecture.

The second mark of "comparative philology," we are told, is that in it "*general* rules respecting the tendencies of the growth of language, and of vowel and consonantal change, are laid down as being of very general or even sometimes of universal application." It is very questionable whether such general rules with respect to tendencies have much value on the field of comparative philology, even

if they are anything more than hasty generalisations. What does chemistry care for the fact that the elements, as a general rule, have a tendency to combine? On the contrary, it is of supreme importance to her to ascertain the conditions under which the compounds are formed and resolved, the quantitative relations of the respective elements in each compound, and so forth. It is just the same in comparative philology, the results of which, at any rate so far, have been due exclusively to the investigation of very special laws derived from the observation of phenomena. Possibly the time may come when every one will endorse Mr. Davids' remark:—"It is precisely such general observations which are now, and will increasingly be, the most valuable results of philological research." But in any case he himself admits that the application of the method in question to the study of the development of religions only leads to the discovery of "general tendencies," and, what is more, that we are not to look for anything else, even in the future. "We must not hope to find more than tendencies, to find laws in the scientific sense." The reason why this is so is set forth on p. 10.

We shall perhaps do best, under these circumstances, in taking up, lecture by lecture, a few of the special points on which Mr. Rhys Davids' views appear to us to be open to criticism, rather than attempting any general survey of the subject.

After speaking of those phases of religion which are indicated by the words "animism" and "polytheism," and the connected representations of the soul and the future life, the lecturer pauses at the conception of "transmigration." The same point is treated more fully in the third lecture, where the conclusion is reached (on grounds for which we must refer the reader to the volume itself) "that the pre-Āryan occupants of the valley of the Ganges were

believers in something of the kind, and that the Āryans first derived the principle of the idea from them; but not until long after the Āryans had entered India, and until the conquerors and the conquered had been fused together into one people" (p. 82).

Be our opinions what they may as to the probability of this supposition, it is certain, at any rate, that we have no right *a priori* to deny that the aborigines exercised any influence upon the Indian Āryans; but we do not know whether they were numerous enough to produce any marked effect upon the mind of the Āryans, any more than we know to which of the three races—Dravidian, Kolarian, or Kirātan—they belonged. This much, at any rate, would follow from the hypothesis of Mr. Rhys Davids, that the aborigines were not exterminated, nor even very grievously oppressed, as it has been sometimes asserted.

We return to the First Lecture to ascertain the views of Mr. Rhys Davids with reference to Indian monotheism and pantheism. Concerning the latter, we find much which remains, to me at least, even after repeated reading, far from clear—*e.g.*, "And as to the souls of men, though they are condemned to wander for ever and ever from shape to shape, from labour to trouble, their existence is not independent; they are not self-existent, and they can defeat the unlucky action of the God that gave birth to their individuality by certain ceremonies, or a certain kind of knowledge, held, by various opposing schools, to be able to destroy again that individuality by bringing about the return of the spark to the central fire, by the absorption of the human soul in that Great Soul which was supposed to be the only real existence" (p. 20). I am not aware that any school taught that the Salvation (Moksha, Mukti, &c.) could be obtained "by certain ceremonies, or a certain kind of knowledge." The highest good, inseparably associated

with the cessation of all evils, was conceived to be attainable by dint of completely fathoming the *true* and *highest* knowledge, which could only be reached as the fruit of unremitting contemplation. For the Vedāntin, in earlier and later times, Salvation is associated with the full recognition that the individual is identical with the absolute, imperishable being—whatever may be understood by that term. It would have been less confusing, therefore, to speak of destroying “the false conception of individual existence,” rather than “individuality.” No necessary connection exists between the attempt to gain Salvation and “transmigration of souls.” The latter doctrine is, indeed, mentioned in some of the Upanishads, but opinions are ascribed to certain teachers, especially Yājñavalkya, which have nothing in common with “transmigration.” According to Yājñavalkya, the soul is born with the creature and disappears again at its death.

Think what we will of these and other such theories, we cannot properly apply such a term as “hopeless creed” to them. If a man regards the cessation of individual existence and of all suffering as the highest good, and believes that in reflection and contemplation he possesses the means of securing it, then his creed is to him a very hopeful one. The pessimistic element in the Indian conception of things is not found in its theory of Salvation, but in its exaggerated contempt for the beautiful and good on earth.

Mr. Rhys Davids regards the doctrine of the Upanishads as “the highest point of the old Indian philosophy,” “the ultimate outcome of the long history of the Āryan spirit-belief.” A further step in the same direction was well-nigh impossible. Buddhism, then, “started on a new line.” “*It swept away from the field of its vision the whole of the great soul theory.*” “For the first time in the history of the world, it proclaimed a salvation which each man could gain for himself, and by himself, in this world, during this life,

without any the least reference to God, or to gods, either great or small." Much of what is contained in these last lines is applicable to every Indian theory of salvation. The gods, whether great or small, have no influence over the Salvation. The use of the word "God" in this connection may easily cause confusion. A contrast between "a knowledge of God," *i.e.*, knowledge of *the brahma*, and "a clear perception of the real nature, as they supposed it to be, of men and things," such as is drawn on p. 29, appears to me to be rather verbal than real. What is the *brahmanvidyā* or *ātmanvidyā* but "a clear perception of the *real* nature, as they *supposed* it to be, of men and things"? For instance when the Chândogya Upanishad (3, 18) identifies the *brahma* with mind or thought (*manas*), and at the same time with space, and assumes that these two conceptions of mind and space are necessary to explain phenomena—then surely the knowledge of the *brahma* is made to include "a clear perception of the real nature, as they *supposed* it to be, of men and things." In a word, "God," and "*the real nature of men and things*" were to the Indians identical, and cannot therefore be contrasted.

The Second Lecture deals with the canonical books of the Southern Buddhists. On the ground of "the internal evidence afforded by the books themselves," the lecturer arrives at the following conclusion: "It is quite clear that the literature has been of gradual growth, and that, though the books as we now have them contain a great deal of older material, some of it perhaps reaching back to a time even before the death of Gotama, they cannot have been put into their present shape till long after that event" (p. 35).

In these words the rights of historical criticism are allowed and we shall avail ourselves of these rights to examine how far the Assalāyana Sutta, the chief contents of which are

given on p. 51, can be allowed a place amongst the "older Suttas."

In this Sutta the Buddha speaks of Greeks—doubtless the Greeks of Bactria*—on which the editor, Professor Pischel, makes the following remarks: "The name of the Yonās or Yavanās is a rather ambiguous one, but the fact that in our passage and in numerous other passages they are mentioned along with the Kambojās, tends to show that their country cannot have been situated very far from that of the latter. Now if we consider the geographical site, as defined by our Suttam, and remember that in other Buddhist scriptures the Yonās are doubtless Greeks, we are, I think, driven to the conclusion that the Yonās of our text can only be the Bactrian Greeks, and as there is no ground for supposing that the sentence in which they are spoken of has been interpolated, we must assume that the whole Suttam has not got its present shape before the third century B.C." There is nothing to urge against this conclusion. The Sutta, as handed down, cannot be altogether authentic. I would even go further, and maintain that it contains much more also that marks its apocryphal character. For instance, we are told of the brahman boy, Assalāyana, who, when sixteen years old, was "perfect in the study (pāragū) of the three Vedas with their complements, Nighaṇṭu, Ketubha, the etymological science, and the Itihāsas (which are the fifth Veda), who was familiar with the Padapāṭha, a grammarian, and perfectly acquainted with casuistry and the science of fortune-telling." All this is simply impossible. In India it was reckoned that thirty-six years, on an average, were needed for the study of the three Vedas; † and Assalāyana is said to have completed the study not only of the three Vedas but of other branches of knowledge, some of which, as the

* The *Greeks of Bactria*, not simply "Bactria," as appears in the lecture.

† Manu 3, 1.

Itihâsas, are completely distinct from the Vedas. No genius, however great, could have accomplished all this at the age of sixteen. How could any one have dared to record such an absurdity of a contemporary, and in a society in which Brahmans actually lived? And, moreover, this same Assalâyana shows, later on, that he is really ignorant of the doctrine of the Brahmans. This appears from his words—“The Brahmans, O Gotama, say thus: The Brahmans are the best caste, all the other castes are inferior to them; the Brahmans are the white caste, the other castes black; the Brahmans alone are pure, not the non-Brahmans; the Brahmans are the legitimate sons of Brahmâ born from his mouth, sprung from Brahmâ, created from Brahmâ, heirs of Brahmâ.” So far the Sutta. Now the first sentence contains no misrepresentation. The second and third are in contradiction with what every one in all India, with the exception of Ceylon, might have known. The Brahmans never asserted that the other Āryas, that is to say the Kshatriyas and Vaiçyas, were either black or unclean. In the fourth sentence truth and error are so jumbled together, that it could not possibly have been uttered by a Brahman. Every one who believed that the Brahmans were created by Brahmâ, likewise believed all men and everything that exists to be created by him. Such mistakes on matters of general knowledge make it impossible, in my opinion, that the Assalâyana Sutta can have been composed in India. We may conjecture that it was drawn up in Ceylon by some one who had read and heard certain things about the Brahmans, but did not really understand the matter. We have great cause to regret the apocryphal character of this Sutta, for it prevents our citing it, as we might otherwise have done, in evidence that the Brahmans recognised the *same* rules of morality as did Gotama himself.

A striking case of ignorance of Brahmanic ways of

thought is also found in the Tevijja Sutta (p. 56), where the Brahman Vâsetṭha says, amongst other things, "Are they all paths which will lead him who acts according to them into a state of union with Brahmâ?" This "Brahmâ" is the masculine, not the neuter word, as appears further from the sequel; but though it is rather strange that a Brahman should use the masculine in such a connection, it is not impossible. Let us see, however, what follows. To Gotama's question: "Is there a single one of the Brâhmins, &c., or of their forerunners up to the seventh generation, who has ever seen Brahmâ face to face?" Vâsetṭha answers "No," which again is conceivable. But not so the idea that any one who had had a Brahmanic education should have been at a loss for a retort when Gotama thus went on:—"Know, Vâsetṭha, that from time to time a Tathâgata is born into the world, a fully enlightened one, blessed and worthy, abounding in wisdom and goodness, happy, with knowledge of the world, unsurpassed as a guide to erring mortals, a teacher of god and men, a Blessed Buddha." No Brahman who knew his trade would have failed to ask, in reply, what proof Gotama had of the existence of such Tathâgatas. How far the Brahmins were from allowing themselves to be taken in by the charlatany of an *ipse dixit*, may be seen amusingly enough in the scene between the Jaina and the Buddhist in the Prabodha-candrodaya.*

The Third Lecture, on the Buddhist theory of Karma, is, in my opinion, the very best of the many valuable contributions to scholarship contained in these lectures. The doctrine of Karma consisted in the belief "that after the death of any being, whether human or not, there survived nothing at all but that being's Karma, the result, that is, of its mental and bodily actions. Every

* P. 50 sqq. ed. Brockhaus.

individual, whether human or divine, was the last inheritor and the last result of the Karma of a long series of past individuals—a series so long, that its beginning is beyond the reach of calculation, and its end will be coincident with the destruction of the world." A necessary supplement to this is found on page 99, in the remark that the Karma ceases as soon as Arahathship has been reached in any case. Without annihilation of the Karma there can be no Nirvāna. It follows that man must aim not at doing that which shall bring a blessing on remotest posterity, but at destroying everything that has any consequences either good or bad.

Quite independent, at any rate in principle, of the "doctrine of Karma" is "the duty of universal love." This "goodwill towards all beings" is not specifically Buddhistic, as might be gathered from p. 111, but is common to all Indian systems. The command of *ahimsā*, the prohibition to hurt any living creature, and the exhortation to cherish *maitrī* (goodness, charity), play as important a part in both the Brahmanic and the Jainistic literature as they do in the Buddhistic.*

In the Fourth Lecture, on the Buddhist lives of the Buddha, Mr. Rhys Davids has occasion to expound his views as to the historical and ideal elements in the accounts of the life of the founder of Buddhism, "a perfectly natural man, whom the orthodox Buddhists came eventually to regard as a being quite different from ordinary men, and endowed with powers quite different from theirs." After relating "the little that can be ascertained of his real life," Mr. Davids attempts to explain (p. 129) the unhistorical elements of the biography. "The early Buddhist ideas of

* *E.g.*, Manu 4, 288; 6, 66; 2, 87. Yogaśāstra 1, 33; and for the Jainas Sarvadarśana—Sangraha 89. With regard to *ahimsā* towards animals, the Jainas, it is admitted, go furthest of all.

the Buddha were chiefly modified by two ideals dominating the minds of men in those days, neither of which had any necessary connection with the particular individual whom we know by the name of Gotama, so that both might have been equally well applied to any other person in India, if he had only excited the same feelings. The one ideal was chiefly due to political experiences, the other to philosophical speculations; the one was the ideal of a King of Righteousness, the other of an all-perfect Wisdom."

We are not expressly told from what sources the knowledge of the "early Buddhist ideas of the Buddha" is to be drawn, but there can be no others than the canonical books, for the non-Buddhistic literature of India makes no mention of Gotama until far later. Now since even the earliest of these canonical writings give us more than the simple history, the "early ideas" must be extracted from them by the help of criticism. Now where criticism is admitted differences of opinion will manifest themselves, and it cannot surprise us that different investigators should arrive at very different conclusions as to the historical or unhistorical character of the narratives that have come down to us.

The ideal of a King of Righteousness began to develop itself, in the opinion of Mr. Rhys Davids, under Candragupta, the ally of Seleucus Nicator, whose victories and wide-spread dominion brought home to the people *the idea of a universal monarch*, a Cakkavatti. To this idea was united "the theory of a golden age," in which the Cakkavatti, "a king of kings, irresistible and mighty, ruled in righteousness over a happy people."

We may readily admit that such an ideal of a Cakkavatti might be applied to the Buddha, and that too at the period indicated. But a difficulty still remains. If Gotama roused such feelings as to fasten this ideal upon himself alone, how are we to explain the fact that it was about two hundred

years after his death that men first thought of the application of this ideal of the ruler of the "golden age" to him? The saga of the golden age was known long before Candragupta. We must further acknowledge that other strange phenomena present themselves in the earlier history of Buddhism. For instance, that the order had existed about two hundred and fifty years before any one attempted to spread the doctrine beyond the boundaries of Magadha. This too would point to the conclusion that in the course of the third century before Christ, perhaps under the patronage of Açoka, a change came over the spirit of the church, the zeal of which had remained latent for two or three centuries. Others may prefer to adopt the belief that the Singalese date of the Nirvâna is simply an official fiction.

Mr. Rhys Davids continues:—"Besides the ideal King, the personification of Power and Justice, another ideal has played an important part in the formation of early Buddhist ideas regarding their Master. . . . It was the ideal of a perfectly Wise Man, the personification of Wisdom, the Buddha" (p. 141). "It was Gotama himself, in all probability, who gave the start to this latter phase of the new Buddhist conceptions, by his own belief, as recorded in the Suttas, that he was himself a Buddha" (p. 143). This may well be, especially as the ideal itself was already age-old in India. It is a conception of extreme antiquity that the Brahman, so far as he deserves this name of honour, stands at the head of all the world. It is true that Brahman and Kshatriya are of one origin—(*brahmakshatram ekayoni*, says the Mahâ-Bhârata). It is true, likewise, that the Buddha and the Cakkavatti may be united in a single person; but yet the Brahmanship or Buddhahip is higher than the earthly kingship. In principle, therefore, the Brahmanic and the Buddhistic ideals of the sage as the highest and best of men resemble each other. Hence the Buddha is called both a King and

a Brahman—the latter because he has put away all sins, and has attained all the other excellences of Brahmanship.*

On page 147, Mr. Rhys Davids makes some good remarks on the points of similarity between the Cakkavatti-Buddha and the Messiah-Logos. A little further on he deals with the question whether there is any evidence “that the Christian writers, who lived about five hundred years after the Buddhist writers, borrowed their ideas from India;” and he declares that he “can find no evidence whatever of any actual and direct communication of any of these ideas from the East to the West.”

The history of Gotama's Order, “the Community or Society of those who had given up the world to carry out the new ideas,” a history “most instructive, from a comparative point of view,” is handled in a masterly style in the Fifth Lecture. Though by no means blind to the one-sidedness of the monkish ideal, and the defects which, in the long run, must cleave to every Order, the lecturer, nevertheless, brings out with great eloquence all that is attractive and broadly human in the search for calmness and peace. The well-chosen selections, both from the Pāli literature and from European writers, increase the value of this lecture, which, together with the third, seems to me to be amongst the best in the whole series.

The subject matter of the Sixth Lecture, as Mr. Rhys Davids is careful to show, is no less interesting than that of the one that precedes it. It is the “later forms of Buddhism.” But the difficulty of the subject is proportioned to its interest, for the forms which the doctrine assumed in different lands are as numerous as they are divergent. “The history of Buddhism, therefore, in each of the countries where it was adopted, requires separate treatment. It is incorrect to speak, as is often done, of

* See *Milinda Pañha*, 225.

Northern and Southern Buddhism as the only two great divisions into which Buddhism had been divided." Against this latter assertion, it may be urged that the Northern Buddhists, in spite of all their differences, at any rate agree in recognising the same canonical writings; and in this sense can be said, with perfect justice, to stand opposed, as a single whole, to the Southern Buddhists. When the lecturer goes on to say: "There was a unity in Southern Buddhism; but there has been no such unity in Northern Buddhism," we venture to doubt whether his thesis can be established. We hear, it is true, of diverse sects among the Northern believers, but neither was there any lack of such amongst their Southern brethren. This assertion I make on the authority of the *Dipavansa*, V. 30 sqq., where we read (cf. Dr. Oldenberg's translation) as follows:—

The wicked Bhikkhus, the Vajjiputtakas who had been excommunicated by the Theras, gained another party; and many people, holding the wrong doctrine, ten thousand, assembled, and (also) held a council. Therefore this Dhamma council is called the Great Council.

Before going further, a word or two of explanation may be given. We hear of a great schism that took place at the time of the second council, a century after the Nirvāna. The Theras, the senior priests,* represented the orthodox doctrine. Their system is called the Theravāda, and is laid down in the Pāli canon. The second council is said to have been held in Vaiçāli, more than a century before the doctrine was introduced into Ceylon. And since the Southern Church is identified by Mr. Rhys Davids with "early Buddhism," his "unity in Southern Buddhism" implies and includes unity in the creed of the Buddhists before the conversion of Ceylon. Now let us see what the *Dipavansa* goes on to say:—

The Bhikkhus of the Great Council settled a doctrine contrary

* Enumerated in vv. 22, 23. l. c.

(to the true Faith). Altering the original redaction they made another redaction. They transposed Suttas which belonged to one place (of the collection), to another place; they destroyed the (true) meaning and the Faith, in the Vinaya and in the five collections (of Suttas). Those Bhikkhus, who understood neither what had been taught in long expositions nor without exposition, neither the natural meaning nor the recondite meaning, settled a false meaning in connection with spurious speeches of Buddha; these Bhikkhus destroyed a great deal of (true) meaning under the colour of the letter. Rejecting single passages of the Suttas and of the profound Vinaya, they composed other Suttas and another Vinaya which had (only) the appearance (of the genuine ones). Rejecting the following texts—viz., the Parivāra, which is an abstract of the contents (of the Vinaya), the six sections of the Abhidhamma, the Patisambhidā, the Niddesa, and some portions of the Jātaka, they composed new ones. They changed the original rules regarding noun, gender, composition, and the embellishments of style.

If we suppose this account to be true, it follows that in “early Buddhism,” a century after the death of the founder of the Order, two great and hostile parties were already in existence. The party which the Theras laid under their ban held a Great Council. It is not expressly said that they in their turn laid the party of the Theras under the ban; but it follows from the facts that they regarded the Theras—the real or supposed fathers of the Pāli canon—as heretics. The circumstance, too, that the gathering of the heretics is known by the name of “the Great Council” is significant enough. But without dwelling further on this point, we will proceed with the quotation from the Dipavansa:—

Those who held the Great Council were the first schismatics. In imitation of them many heretics arose. Afterwards a schism occurred in that (new school); the Gokulika and Ekabyohāra Bhikkhus formed two divisions. Afterwards two schisms took place amongst the Gokulikas: the Bahussutaka and the Paññatti Bhikkhus. And opposing these were the Cetiya (another) division of the Mahāsaṃgītikas.* All these five sects, originating

* *i.e.*, Those who held the Great Council.

from the Mahāsaṃgītikas, destroyed the (true) meaning and the doctrine and some portions of the collection, &c.

All these schisms took place outside the limits of what the lecturer means by "Southern Buddhism"; but the latter did not remain free, as we learn from the following account :—

In the orthodox school of the Theras again a schism occurred. The Mahīṃsasāka and Vajjiputtaka Bhikkhus formed two sections. In the school of the Vajjiputtakas four sections arose—viz., the Dhammuttarikas, Bhaddayānikas, Chandagārikas, and Sammitis. In later times two divisions arose among the Mahīṃsasākas: the Sabbatthivāda and Dhammagutta Bhikkhus formed two divisions. The Sabbatthivādas and Kassapikas, the Kassapikas and Saṃkantikas, and subsequently another section, the Suttavādas, separated themselves in their turn. These eleven schools, which separated themselves from the Theravāda, destroyed the (true) meaning and the doctrine and some portions of the collections, &c.

Seventeen are the heretical sects, and there is one orthodox sect; together with the orthodox sect there are eighteen in all. The most excellent Theravāda, which resembles a large banyan tree, is the complete doctrine of the Jina, free from omissions or additions. The other schools arose as thorns grow on the tree. In the first century there were no schisms; in the second century arose the seventeen heretical schools in the religion of the Jina.

There are thus eighteen sects; the number (accidentally?) coinciding with the official (not the actual) number of the Purāṇas. But although the number of the sects is put at eighteen only, yet at the same time it is admitted that there really were twenty-four of them: for the Dīpavansa yet adds:—

The Hemavatikas, Rājagirikas, Siddhatthas, Pubba, and Aparaselikas, and sixthly, the Aparā-Rājagirikas arose one after the other.

If all this, which is part of the official version of the ecclesiastical history of the Southern Buddhists, be true,

then it is admitted that instead of having any "unity in Southern Buddhism" we find that the Pāli-canon represents the doctrine of *one* of the eighteen or four-and-twenty sects. Now, if any one chooses to say, "I, for my part, side with this one sect; for I am convinced, on grounds that to me are conclusive, that this sect is in possession of the pure, unadulterated doctrine of Gotama," then no one can disturb his faith; but it would be as well not to speak of "a unity in Southern Buddhism," and contrast it with the want of "unity in Northern Buddhism."

But even those who do not regard it as proved that the Pāli-canon contains the pure, unadulterated doctrine of the oldest Buddhism, "free from omissions or additions," will in the main agree with the opinion expressed on p. 195. "It is impossible rightly to understand any one phase of later Buddhism in any country, without starting from the standpoint of the earlier Buddhism of the Pāli Piṭakas." Even this, however, must be taken with some reserve. Mr. Rhys Davids draws an illustration from another field—"A Buddhist would never understand Spanish Christianity unless he traced it up, in a manner reasonably and sufficiently complete, from the earliest Church." To say nothing of the fact that "Spanish Christianity," as a separate ecclesiastical society, does not exist—for the Spanish Roman Catholics profess the same doctrine as the English and other Roman Catholics—the two cases are not alike, for all Christians, Spanish or other, have the same sacred writings; *all* Christian sects, orthodox or not, recognise essentially the same canon as the foundation of their faith. Now it happens that in the case of Buddhism it is precisely the opposite. The sub-divisions of this Church have *not* the same canon, and, what is more, they have not one single book in common. We have seen from the Dīpavansa that the Pāli Piṭakas are the books of one sect, which called

itself orthodox, and professed to have faithfully preserved the doctrines of the eight Theras. The reason why the authority of these eight Theras is so great is that they had all known the Buddha face to face. Now, luckily, these eight were still living, exactly a hundred years after the Buddha's death, to lay the "wicked Bhikkhus, the Vajjiputtakas, who held the Great Council" under the ban. The youngest of these Theras, therefore, cannot have been less than a hundred and twenty years old at the time. One of them, Yasa, was amongst the first converts of the Buddha, and must, therefore, have reached the ripe old age of a hundred and sixty-five at least. Truly the orthodox church enjoyed a rare piece of good fortune in the lengthened lives of all these eight Theras, which enabled them to hand down the doctrine in all its purity, "free from omissions or additions;" but, alas! even these eight could not avert a schism when the first century had gone by. Are we to suppose that the Northern Piṭakas were the work of these schismatics, or of later heretics? There is not a shadow of evidence to that effect. What became, then, amongst the Northern believers, of the old canonical writings of the golden age, when all Buddhists were as yet united? There are short fragments *in* the canonical writings of the North, which coincide verbally, or almost verbally, with passages *in* the Pāli Piṭakas, and of these fragments we may assert that they were the common inheritance of all the sons of Buddha; but in all other cases it still remains to be seen whether and how far the canonical books of the North can have arisen from modifications of the *existing* Pāli texts. At the same time, inquiry must be made which writings are derived from other—ultimately non-Buddhistic—sources. Hitherto such comparative research has been impossible, inasmuch as hardly any of the Northern Canon has yet been edited in Sanskrit.

Amongst the few Buddhistic books that have been edited

in the Sanskrit text, is the Lalita-Vistara. In a discussion of the date of this work, Mr. Rhys Davids comes to the conclusion that it may have been composed some thousand years after Gotama's death; on which he takes occasion to enter "a protest against the careless and much too common habit of using works dating many centuries after the time of the Buddha, as evidence of opinions or teachings of Gotama himself." Every one must admit without reserve that the later the book the greater the chance of its contents departing from the original. But the question is by no means so simple as is here represented. Are we at liberty, for instance, to use a work in which the Greeks are mentioned "as evidence of the opinions or the teachings of Gotama himself"? and are we precluded from using other books, such as the Lalita-Vistara, the date of which is entirely unknown? In this same Lalita-Vistara, and in other writings of the Northern Church, passages occur which are found verbally, or almost verbally, in Pāli books as well. These passages, at any rate, must be regarded as equally ancient in either case. It is true, however, that there is a different spirit in the Lalita-Vistara. The ideal of the Bodhisatva, who endures all things out of love of created beings, comes out more beautifully perhaps in this than in any other Buddhistic writing; and if it may be taken, in its entirety, "*as evidence of Nepalese beliefs at the time when it was composed,*" the Nepalese poet who so well perceived and worked out the ideal deserves our highest admiration.

It is far from my intention to deny that Northern Buddhism approximates more closely to Hinduism than Southern Buddhism does, or to maintain that the writings of the former have not felt the influence of other Indian systems; and considering that most, if not all, of these writings were composed by Indians and in India, and that the Buddhists of the mainland remained much longer than the Singalese in close relations with their unbelieving

countrymen, their distinguishing tendency and line of development is easily enough explained.

"The modifications the faith has undergone in various countries" are to be ascribed to "influences of ideas foreign, even antagonistic," to the faith itself. Amongst the characteristics of the Northern Buddhism, Mr. Rhys Davids mentions "the exaggerated importance attached to its mysticism, to its negative teaching." As regards this latter point, we may remark by way of supplement that the *zeal* of the Northern believers, at any rate, was not "negative." Their preachers and pilgrims were men of action. They spread their faith successively over China, Thibet, Japan, and Mongolia, and made numerous converts in Kamboja (in Further India), in Java, and in Sumatra.

In comparing the remarkable coincidence between the organisation of the Roman Catholic Church and the Thibetan Lamaism, Mr. Rhys Davids remarks (p. 194) that "each had its origin at a time when the new faith was adopted by the invading hordes of barbarian men bursting in upon an older, a more advanced civilisation." We will say nothing of the circumstances under which the Thibetan hierarchy was developed; but, confining ourselves to Europe, we may ask how far the facts to which the Roman Catholic hierarchy owed its origin are fairly represented. The "invading hordes of barbarian men bursting in upon an older civilisation" can only refer to the Teutonic peoples who made themselves the temporary or permanent masters of portions of the Roman empire in the fifth and sixth centuries. What influence may we ascribe to these peoples in the development of the hierarchy? This question demands the most careful consideration, for the Teutonic race, from the days of Julius Cæsar to the present time, has, on the whole, shown itself to be anti-hierarchical, and to value freedom more than autho-

riety. This fundamental trait in their character displayed itself in ancient times far more conspicuously than even now. As long as these "barbarians"—a term which, for my part, I should be sorry to use on my own account—retained their nationality, they were not favourably disposed to the Pope at Rome. The Goths, under Alaric and Theodoric, in their capacity of Arians, were anything but promoters of the hierarchy, while the Longobardi had other reasons for hostility. It was not till the eighth century, long after the invasion of the said "hordes of barbarian men," and long after the establishment of the hierarchy, that certain Frankish kings supported the Pope. Their reasons for doing so need not be investigated here, but they certainly imply no want of insight or conduct, for Pepin and Charlemagne cannot well be called "children in intellect." It may be urged that the deeds of princes prove little as to the spiritual and moral condition of peoples. But what proof or shadow of a proof is there that the Franks, Longobardi, and the rest were more apt to further the rise of the Roman hierarchy or organisation than the Romanised inhabitants of the countries conquered by the Teutons were? When we see that the peoples of Teuton race in Germany, England, Holland, Scandinavia, North America, and elsewhere, have for centuries been involved, in one way or another, in strained relations with the Holy Seat, and have in large measure formally severed themselves from the Roman Catholic Church, and when we compare all this with what we know of the Goths and Longobardi, we incline to the conclusion that the "invading hordes of barbarian men" were not in a position, indeed, completely to check the growth of the hierarchy, but that had it not been for them and their strong tendencies to decentralisation, this hierarchy would have become far mightier yet. So much is certain, that the Roman Catholic organisation has found

more acquiescence and firmer support in countries of "an older, more advanced civilisation," than amongst the Teutonic "barbarians," so that we have no reason to suppose that the defective mental culture of these latter favoured the development of the hierarchy. Nor must we forget that, rightly or wrongly, these "barbarians" stood, in their own estimation, far above the Romans and the Romanised peoples, not only in strength and courage, but also in sound common sense.

I conclude these notes on the Lectures by adopting the words of Mr. Rhys Davids and saying, in relation to my own criticisms, "What has been left unsaid is . . . more in extent, and in many directions more interesting perhaps, and more important, than what has been said." My object has by no means been to give such a full analysis of the contents of the Lectures as to tempt the reader into holding himself absolved from studying the book itself. On the contrary, everything I have said has been intended to stimulate all who read it to make themselves acquainted with the Hibbert Lectures; and it was in no spirit of barren compliment that I began by pronouncing them in a high degree interesting and suggestive.

H. KERN.

Leiden.

*ALFONSO LA MARMORA.**

WHEN Burke, at the time of the French Revolution, lamented that the age of chivalry was gone, he meant the old cavalier spirit of loyalty to the reigning dynasty. And the statement was true to a certain extent. In our island the downfall of the Stuarts had given a fatal blow to this sentiment. After James II. had been thrust from the throne, and a foreigner elected in his stead, never again could the principle of Divine Right hold up its head with any sort of confidence. Thenceforward British sovereigns should reign by the will of the nation, and learn that Legitimacy, though a respectable thing in itself, was not an insuperable barrier to the removal of a prince who made himself obnoxious to his subjects. A century later, when the French Revolution gave birth to democracy, the spirit of chivalry (in Burke's sense) may be said to have expired generally throughout Europe. The nations, suddenly awakened to a sense of man's rights, rose and protested against despotism; and if they sank again under the yoke it was in a sullen mood awaiting a day of reckoning.

In Italy the gross abuse of sovereign power provoked frequent conspiracies and rebellions. The Italians are naturally an easy-going, patient people, and could bear a considerable amount of paternal government if judiciously administered; and so it happened that in a State where the Prince, though despotic, was in the main just and true, he

* *Il Generale Alfonso La Marmora. Ricordi Biografici. Per GIUSEPPE MASSARI. Firenze.*

was loved and served with that romantic devotion which united a Highland clan to the chief. The Kings of Sardinia had never been given to grinding their people into poverty to support extravagant pomp and luxury. They were hardy soldiers who did not send their armies to fight for them; they led them to the field, and shared their hardships. For ages the spirit of loyalty to the house of Savoy and personal attachment to its actual representative had grown into the blood of the Piedmontese nobility and people, and it bound them like an enchanter's spell from raising their hand to grasp the liberty they began to long for when the echo of the French Revolution made itself heard. Even the young Constitutionals of 1821 had no intention of dethroning Victor Emmanuel I.; they wished to separate him from Austria, and "make him greater and more powerful" against his will. Santorre Santa Rosa, the leader of the movement, wrote of the King's abdication:—

"The night of March 13th, 1821, was fatal to my country; so many swords raised in defence of liberty dropped; so many dear hopes vanished like a dream. The country, it is true, did not fall with the King, but for us the country was *in* the King—Victor Emmanuel himself personified it, and the young promoters of that military revolution often said, 'Perhaps some day he will pardon us for having made him King of six million of Italians.'"

Thus we see that the old cavalier spirit of loyalty to the sovereign as such was still alive in Piedmont after it had died a natural or violent death in most other Continental countries, and it was so strong that in the struggle with the fierce young spirit of democracy it was able to hold its own. The reconciliation of these two spirits took place in 1848, when Charles Albert voluntarily renounced his absolutism, and proclaimed a Constitution. With rapturous joy the citizens of Turin beheld their hereditary Prince raise the tricoloured banner on the balcony of his palace, and

with tears of passionate emotion they vowed eternal fealty to the House of Savoy. They could not be more royalist than the King, and he had become revolutionist; there was nothing now to divide them, and he became their hero. There is enough of the savage in the most civilised races to make them like their ruler to be a fighting man. The Princes of Savoy had always been such, and, the Salic law prohibiting female succession, there was never an exception to the rule. Charles Albert did his duty to the best of his ability, and recklessly exposed his life on repeated battle-fields; but he was not an able general, and the fates were against him. His successes in the beginning of the campaign were due chiefly to the wild daring of his son Victor, and the enthusiasm he inspired.

It was in this school that Alfonso Ferrero La Marmora was bred. Descended from a princely line old as the dynasty itself—which counts more than nine centuries of existence—to which he was bound by a hundred family traditions, he grew up amongst his numerous brothers and sisters with all the prejudices and virtues of his race. He was by nature, as well as by education, conservative; but with an intelligence of no common order he sought, by the study of foreign nations, to learn how to improve his own, and though extremely cautious and given to look at the worst possibilities which might arise out of any measure, when once it was decided upon he was resolutely brave in carrying it out. Alfonso La Marmora was the Bayard of New Italy, with all the chivalry and gallantry of his prototype, and some additional attributes which were, perhaps, wanting in the latter. He was an affectionate brother; a model husband, idolised by his wife; a true, warm-hearted friend; a loyal enemy; a patriotic citizen, and the most self-sacrificing, devoted subject king ever had. Though a strict commander, he took such a kind interest in his men that he was called the father of his soldiers, and was

sincerely loved by them. His talents were of a high quality, but he never overrated them, or depreciated the merits of others. He was not ambitious, and his biographer, Massari, has aptly put on the title-page of his life this line from Macaulay—“*He found glory only because glory lay in the plain path of duty.*” Lord Clarendon, who met him at the Paris Conference, said: “He looks statesmanlike, soldierlike, and gentlemanlike.” And contemplating his portrait taken at middle life, when he was covered with honours, one can see that he had a commanding presence. Tall, thin, upright, with the Italian type of face; broad across the forehead, tapering downwards; long, Roman nose; keen, dark eyes, protected by heavy brows; well-kept moustache and beard of dark brown colour and just proportions. The expression is grave and thoughtful; it is the face of a sensitive but self-contained man. It is not a happy face; and, in fact, the owner was not a happy man. No one constituted as he was could be happy for any continuous length of time. That “sublime repression of himself” which he practised all his life was carried too far, and, it seems to us, had a natural re-action in his latter years, when the proud, sensitive soul, afflicted by many sorrows, began to feel that his affections had met with a cold return, that his acts and his motives had not been understood or appreciated, and he could no longer conceal his heart-wounds with that mantle of calm, dignified reserve which he had hitherto worn.

All his life La Marmora had one chosen friend, who was his confidant, and who knew the full depth and tenderness of his heart as, perhaps, no one else did, not excepting his loved brothers and sisters. This friend had predicted, when they were both at the Military Academy, that Alfonso would be a great man, and bring honour to his country; and their correspondence lays bare his character in its mingled strength and weakness, and enables the reader to form a

judgment more correct and true than any description of him could. The cruel accusations of Prince Bismarck called forth many gallant defenders of his fame in Italy, both before and since his death in 1878. One who deserves particular mention is Captain Chiala, to whom the public is indebted for the interesting private correspondence of the General during the Crimean War. The last and most important publication on the subject by the famous biographer, Massari, we have taken as a text for our brief notice of his life ; but as it describes only the public career of the hero, we will not confine ourselves to its pages.

Alfonso was the fourth son of the Marquis della Marmora and Prince Masserano ; his three elder brothers were distinguished soldiers, the one next him, Alessandro, being the founder of the fine corps called Bersaglieri. Alfonso, obeying the genius of his race, devoted himself with extraordinary zeal to the improvement of the Piedmontese army, and to that end he travelled much in foreign countries in order to profit by studying the different systems of each nation. When not much past thirty he was appointed military tutor to the Princes Victor Emmanuel and Ferdinand, a post once occupied by his friend Dabormida. He did not desire the office, and felt it to be a heavy responsibility ; but, having undertaken it, he gave himself heartily to the work, and a close and warm friendship grew up between him and his royal pupils. Though wayward and fond of pleasure, Victor had such fine qualities, such a princely, magnanimous spirit, that every one loved him. The Duke of Genoa's more serious and less impulsive character, however, was in sympathy with that of La Marmora, and their relations were consequently more easy. The young men were much given to " discuss questions," and as they were all three very tenacious of their own opinion, they often spent a whole evening in passionate argument, which a stranger might imagine would lead to a

quarrel, but which, in reality, never caused more than a momentary ruffling of temper. Next morning they met with serene countenances, and laughed over the excitement of the evening before.

La Marmora was the most sincere and honest of counsellors: his chivalrous loyalty, which was part of his very being, did not hinder him from expressing his opinion and giving his advice with perfect frankness to the princes—nay, it impelled him to do so; he had their welfare too much at heart to play the courtier, and they knew it and loved him. An officer once related a story to the princes about one of his companions, who had made a journey in the mountains and was supposed to be lost in the snows of Mount St. Bernard, and a friend of his, not waiting for aid, had gone alone to seek him, and saved his life at the imminent peril of his own—this friend being La Marmora. “Even before you named the officer I knew it must have been our Alfonso!” exclaimed the Duke of Genoa.

In 1848 La Marmora saved the life of Charles Albert by great presence of mind and intrepidity. The Milan mob, persuaded that the king had betrayed them, surrounded the palace, throwing stones and firing shots through the windows and threatening to set fire to the building. Alfonso's eldest brother, the Prince of Masserano, was there, and he had sent a gallant young officer to seek assistance from the garrison outside. But obstacles delayed him, and our hero not being aware of the order given by his brother, and seeing the danger increase momentarily, rushed out into the street, and, by sheer intrepidity, forced his way through the populace, called together a body of troops, with which he returned and carried the King off before young Torelli had been able to get back with the necessary escort. When they returned to Turin the Queen asked to see Colonel La Marmora.

“Monsieur le Chevalier, vous avez sauvé le Roi; j'en

garderai un souvenir éternel!" she exclaimed, with trembling emotion, as La Marmora raised her hand to his lips with the deep respectful sympathy which seldom found expression in words. "It was not only the King I wished to save," he said to a friend, "but the Milan populace from the perpetration of a horrid crime, the consequences of which would have been fatal to Italy."

Novara soon followed, and on that disastrous battlefield Charles Albert, who had sought death in vain, laid down sword and sceptre:—

Stripped away

The ancestral ermine ere the smoke was cleared,
 And, naked to the soul, that none might say
 His Kingship covered what was base, or bleared
 With treason, he went out an exile, yea
 An exiled patriot: let him be revered.

* * * * *

For he was shriven, I think, in cannon smoke,
 And taking off his crown, made visible
 A hero's forehead. Shaking Austria's yoke
 He shattered his own hand and heart.

La Marmora's grief at the issue of the campaign may be imagined, but he did not despair or waste time in vain lamentations. His country still remained, and her independence, her very existence, depended on the strength of Victor Emmanuel's throne; all true patriots rallied round the monarchy; the republicans, who were rioting in Genoa, cannot be called such, as nothing could be more disastrous for their country than the policy they then pursued. They were for the most part a set of disappointed political adventurers, collected from all parts of Italy, and had chosen Genoa as a convenient centre. La Marmora's first service to his new King was the painful one of reducing the rebel city to obedience; and he was in all the more haste because he feared Austria would make the disorders a pretext for intervening, as she did in all the other States of

Italy. La Marmora (now General) took the city by storm, arrested Garibaldi, proclaimed martial law—taking great care, however, that the peaceful citizens did not suffer in any way—and finally, by his delicate tact, won the respect and goodwill, almost friendship, of his revolutionary prisoner, and sent him on a Government mission to keep him out of harm's way. "It was a great error not to have made use of him," he wrote to Turin; "should another war arise, he is the man to employ."

When the smoke of battle had cleared off and the General had time to renew the amenities of life, he was pleased to find that amongst those who welcomed him to Genoa was Miss Mathews, an English lady, who was a close friend of one of his sisters, and whose acquaintance he had made some time before. Their relations soon became more intimate, and after overcoming some not unnatural misgivings on account of the fact that the lady had become an ardent Roman Catholic, and was in the hands of the Jesuits, who had converted her, he made her his wife. As might have been expected, no little unhappiness to them both resulted from the part which La Marmora felt bound to take in the crusade which the Government of Victor Emmanuel had just begun against clerical immunities and abuses. But the Signora who had to hear from her Jesuit friends that her husband was a sacrilegious monster, a heretic, and so on, had the best opportunities of judging his character for herself; and she soon learned to admire and love him as he deserved.

La Marmora was Cavour's colleague for seven years, and when the grand idea of the Crimean alliance began to be mooted he opposed it strongly. "And where will the money be got?" he asked, when Cavour had successfully assailed and overcome his objections. "England will think of that," replied the Premier: "A subsidised army! The model troops, whose *morale* he had laboured so hard

to elevate, were they to be reduced to a band of mercenaries, and he, their leader, to be at the command of a foreign Power? La Marmora's proud spirit started back from the proposition like a fiery war-horse who feels the touch of a hand, not his master's, on his bridle. They should fight as equals and allies, or not at all. And so a loan was substituted, and the dignity of the Sardinian army saved. La Marmora requested instructions from the Government as to how he was to behave towards the Allies. "He does not require instructions," said Cavour; "he will know how to act according to circumstances."

At the last moment, when the friends were saying adieu, the General asked once again: "In fine, how am I to regulate my conduct? Give me the instructions."

"Exercise your own ingenuity," replied Cavour, as he embraced him. Instructions met him subsequently at Constantinople, which were not to his taste, but he accepted them, using his own discretion, as he had a right to do, with regard to their interpretation. He behaved with great tact and judgment, and was highly esteemed by both English and French officers.

Before they had a chance of distinguishing themselves the Piedmontese army fell a prey to cholera, and this misfortune caused the General indescribable pain and anxiety. His brother, Alessandro, of whose military talent he had a high opinion, accompanied him to the Crimea, and ably assisted him in his duties. They were fondly attached to each other, and Alfonso's modesty and delicate regard for the feelings of others were pained by the fact that he was in a higher position than his elder brother; and when he was promoted at Genoa he concealed it on this account till after his return to Turin. The heaviest blow that had yet befallen him now came in the death of General Alessandro. But he bore it like a Spartan. Two hours after he had closed his brother's eyes he was

walking through the hospitals, attending to all the minute regulations for the comfort of the sick with as much if not more than usual care, and the suffering soldiers who looked with respectful sympathy into the calm melancholy face of their commander, could not read there the anguish of his soul, or know what it cost him to appear always "serene and resolute and still." In the evening he sent a telegram to Cavour:—" *Quel malheur ! mon frère est mort !*"

In his overwhelming sorrow he found relief in pouring out his feelings without reserve to his friend and confidant, General Dabormida, to whom, for thirty years, he had been bound by ties of the closest affection. In one of his letters he complains that in his package from Turin he found no word of sympathy from Cavour, which he had eagerly sought for among the heap. "You only," he writes to his favourite, "have understood my immense grief and my sore need of comfort in these woful conditions." But it was only Dabormida who knew how he suffered, and how keenly he felt the slightest neglect. From the rest he was careful to conceal his sensitiveness, and at the end of the same letter he sends his customary kind messages.

In time the cholera began to disappear, and then came that glorious day for the Piedmontese, the 16th of August, on which was fought the battle of the Tchernaya. It is probable that this would not have been a victory for the Allies if it had not been for the vigilance of La Marmora, who espied the approach of the enemy before dawn. All Europe rang with his fame, and he was described by the Allies as one of the ablest generals living.

Count Cavour to the Signora La Marmora.

Madame,—The Minister of War has received to-day, at three o'clock, the following dispatch from Alfonso:—

"Kamara, August 16.

"This morning the Russians attacked our lines with 50,000 men. The telegraph will tell if the Piedmontese are worthy to

fight beside the English and French. We repulsed the Russians with cries of *Vive le Roi! Vive la Patrie!* The Piedmontese have been very brave. General Montevecchio is dying. We have lost 200 men. The loss of the Russians is considerable. From the French despatches you will learn the rest."

These lines, dictated by La Marmora, will tell how our soldiers and their chief have covered themselves with glory, and that your husband has acquired a new title to the gratitude and affection of his fellow-citizens. You may feel proud of being his wife, as I am proud of being his friend.

Receive, Madame, the assurance of my respectful devotion.

C. CAVOUR.

Let us give a line or two picked out of the voluminous correspondence with Dabormida:—

The French were admirable for the intrepidity with which they repulsed twice, and in some places thrice, the numerous columns of Russians who had already mounted their positions. But they allowed themselves to be surprised, and (*entre nous*, be it understood), if it had not been for our advanced posts, which held firm for about an hour, they would have been late. "I did everything to make them pursue the enemy. (Strictly confidential, I entreat.) I pushed forward the Trotti Division across the Tchernaya, and had the vexation of seeing it turned back—once at the instance of General Morris, and again by Pelissier himself. . . . But to return to ours. I have to praise all in general, but in particular Trotti, Mollard, and that brave Montevecchio, who believed himself to be dying, and edified every one by his firmness, and the noble sentiments he expressed. We have now some hope of saving him.

We must quote a brief passage from Dabormida in reply:—

The letters that came from the English and French camps, as well as ours, are all agreed in recognising the honours acquired in this field by you and yours, and they supply the want in Pelissier's too laconic reports (in that which concerns us), and your too modest ones, a modesty of which I approve however. But the journals will inform you of the enthusiasm which this feat of arms has awakened, not only here, but in Paris and London. . . . I have said your report was

modest ; but permit me to say also that you are very sparing of praise. Could you not say in it of Trotti, Mollard, and Montevecchio what you said to me in your letters ? Could you not say a word of Ricotti and his battery, or mention the expressions of the dying Montevecchio ? You, my friend, place duty above all things, thereby proving the loftiness of your own soul ; but men in general, when they have done that duty well, like to be caressed and encouraged.

Great ovations awaited La Marmora when he returned to attend the Peace Conference at Paris. Cavour's carriage was at the station, and Cavour himself on the platform, determined to be the first to welcome "il nostro Wellington," as he was the last to bid him God-speed. He, too, had suffered much anxiety, feeling the terrible responsibility of the war ; but now that all had turned out as he had hoped, he gave free vent to his happy nature, and he was radiant with joyous triumph when he came forward to greet his friend. The embrace was cordial on both sides. La Marmora could not but feel gratified at the hearty enthusiasm of his welcome and the genuine delight Cavour took in hearing his praises. Later, when he returned with the troops from the Crimea, the ovations were renewed ; the King loaded him with honours and made him commander-in-chief of the whole army. The Queen of England, the Emperor of the French, the Queen of Spain, the Sultan of Turkey bestowed orders upon him. He bore his honours modestly, and shrank from the popular demonstrations.

"I hope this will end all the *fêtes* in our honour," he said to the King, as he was marshalling him to a thanksgiving service in the Piazza, for Victor loved to have the Church's blessing when he could get it. "They have been more than our deserts, and as much as we can bear."

He resumed his seat in the Cabinet, rather contrary to the King's wish, but Cavour insisted upon it, for he had a very high opinion of La Marmora's ability, and unlimited

confidence in his prudence, and he was the only one who was aware of the negotiations going on between the King and the Emperor of the French, of which Cavour was the medium. The Count wrote all particulars to him, and we have some interesting letters that passed between them at this time. Here is a passage from one just after the interview at Plombières :—

The only point not settled is that of the marriage of the Princess Clotilde. The King has authorised me to conclude it only in case the Emperor makes it a *sine qua non* of the alliance. The Emperor not having pushed the matter to that extreme, I felt bound in honour not to make the engagement. But I am convinced that he attaches great importance to this marriage, and, if the alliance does not depend on it, its final success does. It would be a great error, very great, to unite with the Emperor and at the same time give him an offence which he would never forget, and it would be a serious mischief for the King to have by his side in the bosom of his counsels an implacable enemy, all the more to be feared as Corsican blood flows in his veins. I have written very warmly to the King, praying him not to place in danger the finest enterprise of modern times for the sake of some musty aristocratic scruples. I entreat you, if he consults you, to add your voice to mine. Let us not attempt an undertaking in which we risk our King's crown and the fate of our people without due consideration, but if we risk them, for the love of heaven, let us leave nothing undone to secure success in the struggle. I left Plombières with a more tranquil mind. If the King consents to the marriage, I have the hope, I should almost say the certainty, that within two years you will enter Vienna at the head of our victorious columns.

Not quite so far, Count Cavour! The astute, far-seeing diplomatist reckoned without his host on this occasion. But how could he imagine that the Emperor could be so weak and irresolute as to turn back from the enterprise at the moment of his most brilliant victory?

Signor Massari destroys somewhat the romance attaching to the famous *grido di dolore* by relating the particulars of

the preparation of the King's speech, but we can forgive him this for the sake of the flashes of light he throws on the characters of the two pillars of the State in their private conferences—Cavour giving out his deeply pondered schemes with an air of gay and reckless daring, La Marmora fulfilling the legitimate mission of a Conservative by pouring cold water on them, not to sweep them away, but rather to cleanse them from useless rubbish. He hesitated long about the policy of pushing matters to an extreme with Austria; but when the decisive moment arrived the cautious statesman disappeared, and he was all the soldier—fearless, resolute, indefatigable, full of a subdued fire. "Austria is a formidable enemy, but our cause is just; the public opinion of Europe will be with us. We shall do our duty," he said.

And bravely he did it; not as a soldier only, but as the King's adviser. The Emperor had wished La Marmora to have the supreme command, but the Parliament had willed that the King should lead his own army, and the general would not put himself in comparison with his sovereign. He refused, therefore, any military post, and accompanied Victor Emmanuel to the field in the character of a councillor. They quarrelled at the outset of the campaign because of La Marmora's energetic remonstrances with regard to Victor's reckless exposure of his life; and again about a retreat which the King had decided upon without consulting him, and of which he disapproved so much that he burst into the royal presence in defiance of the servants' orders to admit no one. If Victor Emmanuel had been a tyrant with the power and the will to cut off his head for this offence, he would have spoken his mind and gone to the block serenely, with a sense of fulfilled duty. As it was, the King listened with a dark brow and haughty bearing to his expostulations, and then replied that it was bootless to complain, as the order had been given and the

troops were already in motion. La Marmora then entreated him with great earnestness to repeal the order, and answered the King's arguments with such force that Victor's patience gave way, and he commanded him to be silent—he would hear no more. La Marmora, very much excited, but always respectful in tone, continued: He could not, he would not, be silent when his duty to his King obliged him to speak; his majesty might have him arrested and put under a court-martial—have him shot, if such were his royal pleasure, but speak he would; and the passion which agitated his soul made him eloquent. "Friends and enemies will have the right to despise us," he said at last; "we shall be dishonoured! I shall not move, for I prefer to fall into the hands of the Austrians rather than be the scorn of the French." The concluding words were not calculated to allay the King's natural anger, but he controlled it, and after a brief consultation with Canrobert, who was present, consented to revoke the order. If Victor Emmanuel let the sun go down on his wrath, it seldom rose on it again. The morning brought him information which showed him that his general had been right in his judgment, and prompt to acknowledge a wrong, he wrote with his own hand:—

Cher Général,—Je vous envoie la proclamation de l'Empereur. Dite moi si vous allez trouver le Maréchal Canrobert à Valence. Je vous remercie de ce que les troupes ne sont pas parties hier au soir. A vous revoir.

*Votre très-affectionné,
VICTOR EMMANUEL.*

When Cavour resigned in a fit of furious anger about the peace of Villa Franca, and La Marmora took up the reins of government unwillingly, at the King's bidding, he did his utmost to bring about a reconciliation between his former chief and the offended sovereign. He consulted him constantly, and begged him to return to office.

"I cannot," said Cavour one day, when he was beginning to recover from the terrible blow; "the place is filled."

"I will resign it to you willingly," was the quick reply.

"No," said Cavour; "if at all, I will serve under you."

"Impossible!" cried the General, whose modesty was startled by the proposition.

"Do you mean to say, Alfonso, that you would not work with me?" asked the Count, with his sly, humorous smile.

This was the time when the central provinces of Italy had thrown off their princes, and offered themselves as subjects to Victor Emmanuel, and his Government hesitated about concluding any engagement on the subject. Massimo D'Azeglio got out of patience with the delay, and wrote a stirring article, with his signature, pointing out its duty to the Ministry. La Marmora, with his delicate feeling, quickly appropriated all the implied blame to himself, and he wrote in a sad but not resentful spirit to his cousin:—

General La Marmora to Cavaliere D'Azeglio.

Turin, September 17, 1859.

Dear Massimo,—Notwithstanding the very bad state of my sight, I have read and re-read with increasing interest your stupendous article in the *Opinione* of the 16th, on *Piedmont and Central Italy*. You justly remark that a grave responsibility rests with the present Government, and you end by saying that the moment is supreme, and that on the resolutions now adopted depends the confirmation or the loss of the noble conquest. These observations of yours are very true; and so true, also, that other one, that "*only great characters save States*," that I feel it my duty to make you a proposition. You know with what repugnance I accepted the Presidency of this new Ministry. Now I feel myself incapable of conducting it, because I do not please the King, because I have public opinion against me, having not done enough for Italy, and little good for the army; and because—I confess it—I do not possess one of those characters which save States. Therefore I propose, without further prelude, that you take my place. After your memorable article, you will be carried in triumph. I await your reply before

speaking to the King or my colleagues, and I earnestly entreat you to send it in the affirmative, and quickly.

www.libtoo.com Your very affectionate friend,

ALFONSO LA MARMORA.

This letter, which is written in the familiar, brotherly, second person singular, elicited a prompt reply from the critic of his policy. "Lookers on are good wrestlers," says a vulgar proverb, the truth of which strikes one often in political affairs.

Cavaliere D'Azeglio to General La Marmora.

Cannero, September 19.

Dear Alfonso,—I receive at this moment, starting for Turin, your letter, which seems to me to show that you are exactly one of those characters indicated in my article, so strongly does it bear the stamp of the loyal-hearted, honest man upon it. How could you want me to become Minister, with my health, &c., &c.? But you know that I have always been your friend, although you sometimes make me angry. To-morrow I shall be at Turin, and if I can serve you in any way, you shall see that I will do it like a friend. The rest when I see you.

MASSIMO

La Marmora seized the earliest opportunity to resign, on a trifling pretext, and the King at once recalled Cavour to office, when there was a cordial reconciliation. This was what La Marmora wished, as he had tried hard to coax his former chief back to his duty. He went to a ball that evening, and enjoyed himself, saying there was a great weight lifted off his mind. Cavour and La Marmora had always got on very well together, in spite of the over-sensitiveness of the one and the commanding will of the other. Their intercourse was marked by personal attachment and unbounded confidence.

It was a pity that this delightful friendship should have been overcast by a cloud at the last. Cavour and La Marmora found themselves opposed to each other on some home questions; and angry words had been spoken in the

heat of debate. The Count accused the General of writing against his Government in the press; the suspicion was an insult to the knightly spirit of our hero, and he was on the point of resigning all his offices in a moment of fiery indignation. Cavour would not have allowed the estrangement to last long, for he was the most generous-minded of men, but his sudden death—an unparalleled disaster for his country—left no time for a reconciliation.

Four years later La Marmora was summoned by the King to his aid when affairs seemed in a hopeless muddle; and here it is only just to remember that La Marmora never had what might be called a fair chance to display his ability except in the Crimea. When affairs were prosperous some one else was in office; when troubles multiplied, and the burden of power was too much for those who sustained it, then the King, who knew the high-souled loyalty, the self-abnegation, of the man, appealed to him, and never appealed in vain. So now, in 1864, when Rattazzi had to beat a retreat before the enraged Turin citizens because of the French Convention, the General was once more called to the head of affairs. He had not approved of this Convention, but it was made, and must be fulfilled to the letter. "The King's signature is there; that settles the question," he said, resolutely, in the Chamber. He braved unpopularity willingly, and always threw himself, so to speak, into the breach between the King and the people. He was the scapegoat that Prince Bismarck pretends to be.

In 1866 he had not the sole command in the war. The King and Cialdini shared it, but La Marmora had to bear the obloquy of the defeat of Custoza. When Victor Emmanuel and his general found themselves in a hopeless position in front of a powerful enemy, they felt constrained to sue for an armistice without waiting to communicate with the other members of the Government. They both

felt bitterly the humiliation and the heavy responsibility of acting without advice. Victor Emmanuel loved his popularity, as was natural for a King elected by the suffrages of the nation ; and La Marmora, after honour, prized most his stainless name. He knew the heaviest blame would fall on him, but he was willing to bear it all to shield his beloved prince ; and it is to Victor Emmanuel's honour that he would not accept such sacrifices as many selfish monarchs, in times past, accepted as their divine right. " They may call me a traitor, they may impeach me ; I do not care in the least," said our hero, almost in the same words in which he had defied the King in 1859. " I take all the responsibility, your Majesty ; it is mine." Victor Emmanuel was deeply moved. With moist eyes, he pressed the General's hand, as he again protested with, " No, dear La Marmora ; I must have my share."

All La Marmora's great troubles date from this unfortunate war. He was Prime Minister when the negotiations of an alliance with Prussia were carried on previous to the declaration of hostilities, and Count Bismarck, not knowing the man he had to deal with, revealed himself too openly to the Italian statesman ; and when he found his mistake he hated him. La Marmora and the King had been offered Venice free on condition of their detaching themselves from the Prussian alliance, then not formally concluded ; but the enormous bribe could not tempt the *Re Galantuomo* or the *Chevalier sans peur et sans reproche* to be guilty of a shadow of disloyalty. Later, however, they found that their slippery ally regarded the matter as Miss Flora Macfimsy did her betrothal—

This is a sort of engagement, you see,
Which is binding on you, but not binding on me.

We cannot here enter into the long and complicated case of La Marmora *versus* Bismarck. It would be impossible,

in our limited space, to convey even a faint idea of all the provocation, the long-suffering under slanderous reports, which La Marmora endured before he at last broke silence and published his volume, *Un Po' Piu di Luce*, in which he revealed enough unpleasant facts to make the most powerful man in Europe his deadly enemy. He was accused of playing into the hands of Austria at Custoza, falsifying dispatches, betraying his allies, and doing everything base and wicked that a public man could be guilty of. In Germany his name became synonymous with treachery, and his own Government publicly deplored the publication of his book as offensive to a friendly Power. He spoke on the subject in the Chamber on one occasion. "I do not want to pass down to posterity as a great captain or a great diplomatist, but I hold to living and dying as an honest citizen, as a soldier without a stain." He had devoted friends, however, particularly in the army, who would have shed their blood in defence of the honour of their revered chief. The persecution of slanderous tongues rendered him very unhappy; but he had his moments of triumph and his consolations. On one occasion, in the Chamber, when the controversy was at its height, the brilliant young diplomatist, General Govone, a man of La Marmora's stamp, pronounced an improvised and thrilling eulogy on him, till the subject of his eloquence, covered with confusion, stopped the excited orator by a gesture of entreaty and prohibition. His constituencies refused absolutely to allow him to retire, and persisted in electing him over and over again in spite of himself. The Venetians, who are a grateful people, remembering that he prepared the way for their redemption, sent him a warm address, regretting his absence on the great occasion of the King's entrance, saying they missed on that happy day "the dignified and noble form of one of their best friends."

And how came La Marmora to be absent on such an occasion? He had not been invited by the King to be present in proper time. Not till Victor Emmanuel was in Venice did he think of telegraphing to Florence for him, and then the General respectfully declined. He was too deeply wounded by his sovereign's neglect of him at the restoration of the Iron Crown, a public ceremony at which, of course, all the makers of Italy were assembled. "Would you believe it," he wrote, "the King never addressed a kind word to me?"

Notwithstanding our great admiration and affection for the memory of the Re Galantuomo, it must be confessed that he did not treat La Marmora as he deserved. The fact is, his nature was of a coarser texture, and he did not always understand him, or know how much he felt a slight neglect. Then, the General was proud and reserved, and in order not to compromise the King with his powerful allies, the Prussians, he kept out of the way, and avoided any intimate intercourse with the royal family. Victor Emmanuel, though a most generous-minded and democratic king, was still a king, and had his dignity to maintain. He would most probably have welcomed warmly any advance towards a better understanding, but the General made none; he hugged his wrongs in silence, and let them eat into his brave, tender heart. The proverbial ingratitude of princes does not apply to Victor Emmanuel. He was never known in any other case to be forgetful of faithful services, and his chivalry in defying "diplomacy" for a friend in trouble was often exemplified. We are induced, therefore, to believe that other reasons than that of selfish policy were at the bottom of his coldness to La Marmora. He was impatient of his "touchiness," irritated by the unpleasant noise excited by the revelations in *Un Po' Piu di Luce*, and *Segreti di Stato*; and, above all, being a man of an expansive and open nature, he did not know the depth

of the affection which La Marmora cherished for him under his cold and distant bearing. For him

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Loyalty was still the same,
Whether it win or lose the game;
True as the dial to the sun,
Although it be not shone upon.

One day at a dinner, seeing that the King's health was not proposed, he wrote on a card, which he passed to the Prefect, that if the Syndic did not intend to do it he would go away; and when the King had a bad fever in 1869, his friend tells us that when he called to see him, he was informed by his wife that he was reposing, being tired from having "wept all night."

It is right to mention that Margherita and Umberto were true to him, as far as Court etiquette permitted, under the circumstances. On their marriage the Princess sent him her portrait, with the lines, written in her own hand, "*To my father's faithful friend. Margherita di Savoja.*" And in the autumn of 1877, when the Prince learned that La Marmora's health was broken down, he sent by telegraph a cordial message of regret, and of hope for his speedy recovery, with an expression of most sincere friendship and regard.

As soon as Victor Emmanuel was made aware of his illness he wrote in his old familiar, kindly tone; and the poor General was consoled also by the many marks of sympathy and esteem that were showered upon him from all parts of Europe as well as from his own people in these last months of his life. His "glorious enemy," the Archduke Albert, had a special regard for him; they had met in friendly guise three months after Custoza, and discussed the war, when La Marmora, who was the guest of the prince, reproached him gently for the unjust accusation of want of faith which he made in a proclamation. By some mistake, owing probably to the difference of the time

of their respective watches, the Austrian commander was under the impression that the Italians had begun hostilities before the expiration of the hour named in the declaration of war, and hence the offensive allusion to the "disloyal foe" in the proclamation. When La Marmora explained saying, "I was standing on the *middle* of the bridge beside His Majesty with my watch in my hand when I heard a clock strike the hour," the Archduke left him, and having made inquiries into the matter, returned, saying La Marmora was right, and tendered an apology for his hasty accusation. He treated him with the greatest consideration always, having sought his acquaintance perseveringly; when he heard that his late enemy was travelling *incognito* in Austria he sent an officer with an invitation, and would take no excuse. La Marmora shrank from meeting him, and pleaded that he had no uniform with him, and could not present himself to his Imperial Highness; but the next day brought a more urgent message, and he felt it would be too uncourteous to persist in a refusal. Perhaps these friendly relations with Austrians, so soon after the war, gave colour to the accusations of the Prussian Chancellor.

La Marmora's wife died about a year before himself, to his great grief. The large fortune she left him, which he never touched in her lifetime, he hastened to bestow on benevolent institutions, for he had no children.

To the Conte Arese.

Florence, 1876.

You cannot imagine, dear Arese, what I have suffered, seeing the suffering and death of my poor wife. Notwithstanding our different way of thinking on some things we loved each other deeply, and during her long and painful illness I was more than ever convinced that that noble woman never had any serious affection but for me.

To the Contessa Matilde Arese.

Oh, what a blow! what a tremendous disaster for one who had, one by one, lost seven brothers, five sisters, four brothers-

in-law, three sisters-in-law, and who never thought of being left a widower, the only survivor of the generation to which I belong. Of twenty-one I only remain.

The General was already in bad health from all the trials he had undergone, and he grew gradually worse after the loss of his wife, so that the last year of his life was a period of great physical suffering. Death was not unwelcome to the brave old soldier, who was worn out with trouble ; but he was not impatient or disagreeable. He read his favourite authors, conversed with his friends, was made happy by the reconciliation with the King, and in the intervals of pain was bright and cheerful. He never made much profession of faith, but he was a believing Christian, and his last look was turned on the crucifix as he sank gently into repose. The national mourning for the illustrious soldier was soon swallowed up by a heavier grief. Alfonso and Victor Emmanuel had been bound together by the accident of birth ; their lines of life had crossed, and their deaths occurring within four days of each other make the association of their names inseparable in Italian history—names of which any country might well be proud, and to which posterity perhaps will do more justice than did their own generation.

G. S. GODKIN.

POOR LAW RELIEF AND PRIVATE CHARITY.

“IT'S very hard that we should have both to pay the Poor Rates and to subscribe to Charity Organisation and Relief Societies.” So says or thinks many a well-to-do ratepayer at the present day, and as there are the strongest reasons why he should continue to pay both these contributions, it is well to understand what are his objections, that we may try to remove them from his own mind so far as they are ill-grounded, and remove their causes so far as they are well-founded. His main objection seems to be simply this: That it is employing and paying two sets of men to do the same or similar work. The costliness of the machinery connected with the administration of relief is one of the readiest and most popular charges that a hostile critic can take up. People wish to see their money go direct to relieve want and suffering, and grudge the amount absorbed by intermediate agents. All the more do they ask why there should be two sets of offices, one for the Board of Guardians and one for the private charity committee; two sets of officials, the parish relieving officers and the paid visitors of the private society; nay, why should two sets of good and able men be called upon to give up valuable time to form, one, the Board of Guardians, the other, the private charity committee.

The answer to these questions is to be found in the fact that different and incompatible duties devolve upon Poor Law relief and private charity, and that any attempt to

combine their functions and assimilate their methods is fatal to their efficient discharge of these duties.

We must go back to the period before 1834, when the new Poor Law came into operation, to learn what harm may be done by a good-natured administration of Poor Law relief. The subject has been well illustrated in recent books,* from which we will quote only a few instances, but they will be enough to prove the truth of the statement "that all the injury inflicted upon the labouring classes by the deliberately hostile legislation of Plantagenet or Tudor statesmen was but as dust in the balance compared with what they suffered from the benevolent measures of some of the best men that have ever ruled in England. As it has been well expressed: 'The poor might well say, We can deal with our enemies, only save us from our friends.'"

In 1783 the Poor Law expenditure amounted to £2,004,238; in 1817 it reached its maximum of £7,870,801. How heavily this pressed upon the ratepayers with a population of only 11,000,000, and most unequal distribution of the burden, can easily be imagined. The report of 1834 tells us: "In one parish the rector was required to employ 62½ men at 10s. a-week, besides his poor rate of £420, an amount which was about double the value of his benefice." At Cholesbury, in Buckinghamshire, the rates in 1801 were £10 11s.; in 1832 they had mounted up to £367, "when they ceased, owing to the impossibility of collecting them. The poor rate had swallowed up the whole value of the land, which was going out of cultivation." "It sometimes happened that the overseer called for rates upon men who had at that moment nothing to eat in the house. As one witness said, 'Poor is the diet of the pauper; poorer is the diet of the small

* *Dispauperisation*. By J. R. PRETTYMAN, M.A. London: Longmans. 1878. *The Poor Law*. By T. W. FOWLE, M.A., Rector of Islip. London: Macmillan. 1881. English Citizen Series.

ratepayer; poorest is the diet of the independent labourer.” Meanwhile the demoralisation of the labourer proceeded step by step with the increase in the rates. Men were paid for standing idle in the pound; when they were set to work “most of the day was spent in idleness, and an attempt to put a superintendent over the work was promptly met by a successful threat to drown him. The paupers claimed a right (before the justices) to work less hours for the parish than for private employers, and in many places received higher pay than they could earn as wages. If a man showed signs of doing his task work, the obvious remark of his companions was, ‘You must have your money whether you work or not.’” Farmers were often compelled to hire a fixed number of pauper labourers, and thus induced to discharge their regular hands in order to find room for the new comers. The man who had saved money would be left without work till his savings were spent; men who put off marrying had not the same chance of employment as youths with families. It was a regular practice with employers to reduce wages far below starvation point, because they would then be supplemented out of a rate to which others besides employers contributed; and the total income of the inferior workman was often made equal to that of his superior workmate. The female sex received its special degradation when the amount of money paid to the mother of two or three illegitimate children “enabled her to live more comfortably than most decent families, more especially in the very common case where the children were utterly neglected; nay, she was ‘considered a good object of marriage on account of these weekly payments.’”

In the case of Indoor Relief, the abuse could hardly grow to so great an extent, but the food given was generally superior, both in quality and quantity, to what independent labourers could afford. “Everywhere the Kentish pauper

has three, four, or five meat days a week ; his bread is many degrees better than that given to our soldiers ; he has vegetables at discretion ; and in the larger houses the boast is, ' We gives 'em as much victuals as ever they can eat.' " In one contract that was actually printed and published, the contractors engaged to provide the workhouse with " warm, wholesome, sweet, clean, comfortable beds ; servants to cook and serve the victuals, and attend on the poor ; good, sweet, wholesome fat meat, good sound small beer, best flour, good Gloucester cheese, good and clean butter." Pork and salt meat were forbidden. Bacon and fish were allowed as a variety. The fires were to be good, and kept up in certain rooms at all hours, so that the paupers might boil their tea-kettles. Lastly, the contractors were " to provide *wigs* for such as wear them or require them."

These instances, all taken from Mr. Fowle's excellent little manual of the Poor Law, will suffice to show the general violation of the canon of Poor Law Relief: *that the condition of the pauper ought to be, on the whole, less eligible than that of the independent labourer*. They will help us to understand the depth of the degradation to which the " independent " (!) labourer has been reduced, and how the English nation, with all its industry and good sense, has been trained to become one of the most unthrifty in the world.*

* The following case is no extreme instance, but is sadly typical of the way in which hard-earned wages are often spent. I called one Monday at a house where I had sometimes received a little money for the Liverpool Provident Society, but where I was generally told they were too poor to lay by. Here I found them all drinking ; the daughter, a young married woman, having broken the pledge she had taken with us a few days before. I called again the next day to see if anything could be done, but was simply told that those I wanted were " not at home ;" and from a neighbour I learned what it all meant. A brother had come home from a fourteen months' voyage, during which he had been employed as a sailmaker, at the rate of £5 10s. a month. Now he was spending the whole sum he had earned, about £20, in drink and dissipation ; and till it was all gone, and the pawnshop

For these intolerable evils a remedy was sought and found in a series of measures, the purpose and effect of which may be summed up in the one word "stringency." The new Poor Law of 1834 introduced better methods of administration, and executed a sweeping reformation of abuses, with results which, as far as statistics go, were eminently satisfactory. The total expenditure was soon diminished by one quarter. The expenditure per head of population fell from 8s. 9½d. in 1834 to 5s. 5d. in 1837; the percentage of paupers to the whole population has decreased more slowly, but to a still greater extent; and when, say about 1871, it was evident that some of the old evils were creeping back, this fact was observed and led to an increase in "stringency," which is once again giving us statistics which show the same kind of satisfactory decrease in numbers and percentages. It is the boast of the upholders of the new Poor Law system that the giving of relief can be made so disagreeable to the recipients as effectually to keep down their numbers, and that without making the physical penalties of pauperism more severe than public opinion will permit, the moral stigma and degradation may be so cultivated by judicious "stringency," as to become most powerful deterrents.

But if we now turn our attention away from generalities, from big totals, percentages, and averages, and look closely into a few typical cases—cases of actual living men and women—our own flesh and blood, all unfortunate and suffering, and most of them, even when the fault is technically "their own," brought up under conditions of terrible temptation to folly and sin, then the results of "stringency" are not found to be so satisfactory. The instances in which people die of starvation rather than go to had again received everything that had been redeemed, there would be no speaking to any of the household; they were drunk as early as half-past seven in the morning; indeed, talking to them, said my informant, was "like pouring water upon a drowned rat."

the parish are more common than they are supposed to be, for it is only the glaring cases on which inquests are held. But, leaving out of view all that may be regarded as sensational or sentimental, the incurable vice of the whole system is this: *the pains and penalties of pauperism now fall heaviest on those who least deserve them.* Light as a feather to the dissolute, half-criminal tramp, they weigh like lead upon the soul of the decent, striving poor; they hang like the sword of Damocles over the heads of those who just avoid them year by year, who, after making every effort, find their strength growing less and less, and employment more and more precarious, and so have to end at last by submitting to what has been the dread of half a lifetime; they afford the pleasing excitement of a safe and stirring encounter to those who regard the relieving officer as their natural foe and the parish as their natural prey, and devote to the task of extracting relief an amount of ingenuity and industry that might fairly have earned them an honest livelihood. This is one side of the question of "stringency," when looked at closely. And here is an instance of the actual meaning of reduced expenditure. A widow who had had a large family, and was very respectably connected, but is now childless, and almost without relatives, lives in an attic, for which she pays 1s. 3d. a week. To get to it you pass through a bird and rabbit shop, the smell of which is intolerable to unaccustomed nostrils, and ascend two flights of stairs, perfectly dark, save when a door is opened, steep, winding in an irregular corkscrew, and sometimes broken. Up these stairs, from a cellar kitchen, she has to bring every drop of water she uses, and often all her coals. The room itself is tolerably large and clean, but the furniture is of the poorest and most meagre description. She can earn a little by sewing, but her health is very poor, and she is often confined to her bed. The parish allowance was 2s. 6d. a-week,

but in a fit of economy the Guardians have just reduced it to 2s., which, when she has paid her rent, leaves her 9d. a-week to live on. Friends who know how deserving she is have in her instance come forward to give her help; but there seems something indescribably petty in the whole business; especially as it is only a recurrence to a reduction which the Guardians made once before, and a little later, in a more lenient mood, reversed, as they very likely will do again. Here is another case which has come under my own notice: An aged couple were deprived of their parish money, at the instance of a relieving officer, who was shortly after himself dismissed for drinking and misconduct, when they soon got their money back again. In their case it is 2s. 6d. a week, and just pays the rent; their earnings are practically *nil*, and they live upon what they beg from former employers and others, and a little help irregularly and grudgingly given by a relative. Their objection to go into the House is mainly that, though quite old and infirm, they would be separated.

Of Indoor Relief or the Workhouse little need be said here beyond testifying to the dread and hatred with which it is regarded by all who have not wholly lost their self-respect and love of freedom. No distinction is allowed among its inmates on the ground of conduct or character previous to entering; they are simply classified according to age and sex; but as paupers with a good character generally get outdoor relief, those admitted, except they be too infirm to live out, must necessarily be a very low class, and to join their ranks a cruel degradation to the more respectable poor. It is difficult to see what harm would be done by allowing superior treatment for those who can prove by the evidence of employers, ministers of religion, and savings-banks, that they really had tried to work, to keep respectable, and to save, and who had been brought low chiefly by undeserved misfortune. A sort of almshouse

retreat* for such would surely be a more fitting national provision than the miserable outdoor dole which is all for which they can at present hope and manœuvre.

Of course, no one expects paupers to be grateful for what they get. It is not given them out of kindness, but because they have a legal right to relief. The guardians have no business to be generous—with other people's money, and, to say truth, very seldom attempt to be. The relieving officer is practically the paupers' great enemy; he represents the defenders of the citadel they try to storm. No doubt he may have his favourites, and, so far as favouritism exists in or out of the workhouse, certain selected individuals may feel grateful for privileges denied to their brethren, while others bitterly resent the injustice; but so long as the Poor Law is worked with rigid impartiality and the indispensable "stringency," so long is there an absurdity, not to say a manifest impropriety, in expecting paupers to be thankful.

And yet we here lose what is the greatest redeeming power which has ever been applied to rescue the fallen and raise the degraded. When we are tempted to turn away from the miseries of the world, utterly sick at heart from seeing how benevolence has multiplied the evils it tried to cure, how fatal it is to rashly meddle with the "struggle for existence" and the "survival of the fittest," how dangerous it is to save the "weak" from going to the wall, and the "hindmost" from being overtaken by their natural fate, then there is only one thing that can keep us to our work, one trust which experience never puts to shame, and that is, *faith in the power of love*. On one condition, and one condition alone, can "stringency" safely be relaxed, and that is that its place be taken by the ties of personal affection. When the poor are relieved by

* Well-managed almshouses are often admirable institutions, but there are often most of them where they are least wanted. Far too plentiful in Warwick, they are almost entirely wanting in Liverpool.

one whom they know to be a real, true friend, one who has proved his friendship in other ways than merely giving money, one who has given time and thought, and what is still more efficacious, time and kind feeling, one who is of a sympathetic nature, and has freely let this sympathy appear, when the money gift is little more than an accidental outcome of the friendship, when it is given with spontaneity and taken with reluctance, then, and not till then, does almsgiving rise to Christian charity, and instead of tending to pauperise, forms one of the strongest incentives to self-help and self-reliance. It makes one ashamed of one's kind to hear the way in which people talk of the ingratitude of the poor. The poor are ready enough to be grateful for real kindness, for anything which they can feel is kindly done or even kindly meant, for anything done really *for their sakes*, and at the cost of some genuine self-sacrifice to the doer. No true-hearted worker among the poor who has heard Wordsworth's lines will fail to frequently admit their force :—

I've heard of hearts unkind, kind deeds
With coldness still returning ;
Alas ! the gratitude of men
Hath oftener left me mourning.

Now the desire to show this gratitude, to prove worthy of the help, or rather of the friendship which prompted the help, the wish not to disappoint the friend who has done so much and been so good, these are motives which may be roused to action in almost the very lowest. Nothing is so likely to lift a man or a woman out of hopeless despondency, nothing will give them such strength to resist the recurring demons of temptation which re-enter any empty heart to make the last state worse than the first, as to know that a real true friend will be grieved by misconduct and be made happy by faithful perseverance. Higher natures may be influenced in this way by a knowledge of the joy in

heaven and the love of God; those who know nothing of God or heaven will feel the same stimulus when the Holy Spirit acts solely through a human friend.

The motto for all such work among the poor may be found in Acts iii. 7, "And he took him by the right hand and raised him up." The whole scene thus described is full of significance for us. The apostles are entering the Temple by the gate, Beautiful; there lies a lame beggar soliciting alms. "And Peter, fastening his eyes upon him, with John, said, Look on us. And he gave heed unto them, expecting to receive something from them. But Peter said, Silver and gold have I none; but what I have, that give I thee. In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, walk. And he took him by the right hand and raised him up." There are many beggars to-day who look to us for alms; to speak to them in the name of Jesus Christ is to deal with them in his spirit. "What I *have*, that give I thee," becomes "What I *am*, that can I give." In proportion to the amount of earnestness, patience, and love that we possess and exhibit, shall we be successful in taking the degraded by the right hand and raising them up.

It is not meant that this will be easy work, or that the power of kindness will have sufficient force to readily overcome all obstacles. What is maintained is that in true Christian charity, as distinguished from almsgiving, we have the one alternative to "stringency." Either let the law of Natural Selection work freely and exterminate those who are not fit to survive, or else make them fit to survive by work done in the spirit and with the love of Christ.* Mere

* We have not yet recovered from the demoralisation caused by the free distribution of relief at the time of the Lancashire Cotton Famine, and there are kind and generous men who maintain that, even in that extreme case, the money given away did more harm than good. If this be so, it is terribly sad, but what may be urged is this, not that the relieving hunger should have been left undone, but that more should have been done since then to encourage thrift and foster self-respect.

good-nature is worth very little ; anything done merely to relieve the impulses of a transient benevolence, or to avoid a shock to sensitive nerves, or to keep the poor quiet, anything given really *for the sake of the donor*, comes under the ban which Christ pronounced upon all righteousness done in public in order to be seen of men. *It has its reward.* The trail of hypocrisy is over it ; it is tainted, and breeds the foul parasites which are the pests of civilisation.

It may be well to give some practical instances of the way in which the poor have, as a matter of fact, been helped with money, and where the success of the help was certainly due to a friendly relation. I, therefore, quote the following from my Report for 1880 to the Committee of the Liverpool Domestic Mission.

“ It [the Poor’s Purse] has enabled several of our old and present Sunday scholars to have a fortnight, or longer, at the Convalescent Homes of Woolton or Southport, at times when such a change was urgently needed, and otherwise quite out of reach. A good deal, too, was naturally spent on coals during the recent period of hard frost and double prices ; milk for sick children, other nourishment for the sick which the superintendents of the nursing districts could not give without infringing salutary rules ; the timely present which proved sympathy at a crisis when mere words would seem mere mockery ; all these have made large calls upon the fund, and show the purposes to which it may safely be put. Rather as an experiment I have recently advanced a loan out of it under the following circumstances :—A man with whom we had been for some time acquainted, and who had suffered a good deal from illness, as well as from want of work when well, lately made a great effort to procure a pony and cart with which to go about selling coals. He had hardly commenced business when the cart wheels broke down, and the whole thing was found not worth mending. He was quite unable to purchase

another, and the chance of earning an honest livelihood seemed slipping altogether away. I therefore purchased a cart and am letting it out to him at five shillings a week, on condition that when he has thus paid me back the purchase-money without interest (£5 10s.), the cart shall become his own property." I would add that the cart was thus paid for every week with perfect regularity, and has long been the man's own. In the same way two mangles are being more slowly paid for; the present of a wringing machine to another woman with a blind husband proved the turning-point in their fate, and we are now helping a man by a loan of £6 to become owner of the cab and horse which he drives. In all these cases if good has been done, it is due to the constant friendly intercourse kept up with those who have been assisted.

In considering what practical measures are suggested by the above facts, it is hardly necessary to emphasize the distinction between Indoor and Outdoor Relief, between admittance to the workhouse and the payment of a weekly allowance to those who may go on living in their own homes. With Indoor Relief it will be impossible to dispense—at any rate, as far as we can forecast the future. A wealthy and humane nation is bound to make some national provision for its poorest citizens, and to take some care that they do not die of starvation and exposure, whether or not their condition is due to their own fault; it would not be well to make "being sent to prison" the only way of securing food and shelter when all other means have failed; practically, the total abolition of the Poor Law would lead to an increase in mendicity which it would be impossible to check or even control. It is hard to resist the impulse to give to beggars now, when you know that there is legal provision made for their relief; it would be still more difficult to refuse when the reply would be, "Well, then, ma'am, if you don't give me anything, I must really knock

you down and steal your purse in order that I may be sent to gaol." The fact seems to be that admission to the work-house has already been made too humiliating and degrading, that its atmosphere of "cheerless comfort" is too much like that of a prison, and that the reform here needed is to introduce more classification and greater difference in the treatment of inmates, especially in the way of allowing past conduct and character to count in determining their *status*, and, if possible, to establish a rank of "first-class inmates" (corresponding to the "first-class misdemeanants"), admission to which should depend on having made really strenuous and honest efforts to keep off the rates.*

If this were done, it would become easier to abolish Outdoor Relief altogether, and it is to be noted that the desirability of doing this is the cry of all Poor-Law Reformers, even as its amount (especially proportionately to Indoor) is confessedly the great blot on the present working of the system. The fundamental and incurable vice in all Outdoor Relief is this: the outdoor paupers are at liberty, and are expected to do all they can to earn their own subsistence, but their earnings are supplemented by a small weekly pension; consequently the canon of Poor-Law Relief is necessarily violated; the condition of the pauper is rendered *more* eligible than that of the independent labourer of the same class; the former has every chance that the latter has and a pension besides. The consequence is that when once the Guardians have decided that a certain

* The sort of privileges we would ask for such a class would be seclusion from degrading company; liberty for aged couples to live together, and for members of families to see more of one another; freedom to go out every Sunday and see their friends, and attend their own place of worship, perhaps permission to attend week-day mothers' meetings, penny entertainments, and the like; these privileges, of course, to be withdrawn if abused. All the evils which *might* spring from such relaxation of rules already exist in connection with outdoor relief, and would be far more easily detected and controlled under the system here suggested.

class of persons, say widows having to support more than one child, shall receive outdoor pay, they almost compel every member of this class to apply for such relief. Those who receive it can afford to work for less wages than those who do not; and it is a well-known fact that the wages of widows are generally lower than those of other women, so that, practically, we have got back to the old intolerable evil of wages being partly paid out of rates, and every discouragement thrown in the way of independent industry.

There can be little doubt, moreover, that the prospect of getting Outdoor Relief, not of being admitted into a work-house, furnishes the hope which is so terribly destructive of thrift, and inspires the trust which so fatally undermines British self-reliance. There can be little doubt that from the day when a decree should go forth absolutely abolishing Outdoor Parish Relief, there would be a fresh incentive to industry and economy, such as may be remembered by those who can remember 1834, but has found no parallel since then. Can Outdoor Relief be abolished without producing worse evils than those which at present exist, and seem likely to exist and grow? This is the great problem of Poor-law Reform.

The answer which is here maintained is that Outdoor Relief may be abolished, and its attendant evils greatly mitigated, if private charity is organised and trained to take up its responsibilities and do the work which its disappearance will leave for a time, at any rate, to be done; and the whole force and worth of this answer lies in the contention that Christian charity has, by showing kindness and eliciting gratitude, a power which may be safely trusted to do almost unmixed good when Parish Relief does almost unmixed harm. Parish Relief weakens and destroys self-respect. Christian charity may strengthen and build it up. The Relieving Officer is generally hard and stern in his manner, as, whatever his natural disposition may be, any official will

inevitably become who has daily dealings with every variety of imposition and degradation. He scolds the poor in a way they bitterly resent, while they dare not show their feelings, and, of all causes which destroy a man's self-respect, perhaps none are so potent as the putting up with insults from the low motive of fear. To abuse the applicant, and then grant the application, is as common a custom as it is efficacious in producing the pauper spirit. Christian charity is always gentle and considerate of the feelings, and seeks to make an applicant think better of himself, whether the application is granted or refused. A refusal is due either to physical impossibility, or to deliberate judgment, acting under a high sense of duty, never to partiality, petty spite, or gross stupidity; and though there may and will be much misunderstanding and misrepresentation, the presence of justice and sympathy, and the absence of the qualities which curse so many homes and workshops, will tell in the long run—nay, before the run is very long. When relief is granted it comes as a free gift, not claimed or yielded as a right—given because kind hearts and generous hands so willed it, not because the law of the land has provided it. It is conditional on a certain amount of good behaviour; at any rate, of good intention, and its renewal is dependent on the way in which good intentions are fulfilled. Much patience, much willingness to overlook the fact, much hopefulness will be needed, but charity is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil, beareth, believeth, hopeth all things.

If this distinction of function were finally made, and the Poor-law confined itself to providing Indoor Relief, while properly organised charity undertook all Outdoor Relief, there would cease to be any overlapping of agencies. The Guardians, too, would cease to have to decide the great question, which it is admitted they do not always decide rightly, and which is often decided differently according to whom happen to be present, viz., whether the applicant shall have Outdoor

or Indoor Relief, *i.e.*, be condemned to a dreaded imprisonment, or blessed with a small pension. The duties of Guardians would then be almost entirely of a routine character, though not unimportant, because they would have to see that the Poor-law system was properly carried out; and men good at routine work would make the best Guardians. Meanwhile, men who have faith in individual action and divided responsibility, who are able to visit among the poor, or are, at any rate, in close and friendly communication with those who visit, would find their proper place, and very different duties, on a Central Charity Committee, or on one of many freely-working local committees, which will try their own experiments and profit by their common experience, and generally bring to the work all the individual interest and freshness of sympathy which in matters of education are displayed by the voluntary managers of Board Schools, and by the Council of Education in Liverpool. No doubt some of the evils of Outdoor Relief would reappear if numerous little pensions were paid by private charity. But (1) this could not be counted upon in a way so destructive of thrift as Poor-law Relief; (2) the vastly greater elasticity of the system would enable each case to be decided upon its proper merits, and with a variety of results that would be far less prejudicial to independent labour than a fixed sum practically paid in aid of wages; and (3), what is by far the most important, there would be room for the introduction of the *personal* element, the feelings of gratitude and friendship, which may be trusted to counteract the possible ill effects of giving any relief whatever.

It is not intended to suggest here any elaborate scheme by which this change may be effected. The fact is, a great deal is already being done in this direction, and much more will have to be done quietly here and there before public opinion is ripe for legislative action. Every Charity Organisation Society is doing something to render the

change feasible and easy ; and the important thing at present seems to be to strengthen their resources and extend their operation.

One word of caution may be added in regard to a danger which the Central Relief Society of Liverpool has certainly incurred, and which it takes no active steps to avoid. It has a system much too like the Poor Law system itself ; at any rate, in the eyes of those it assists. It gives or refuses relief, entirely through the agency of paid officials—very excellent and painstaking men, full of experience and great in common sense—but from the fact of their official position, the extent of their responsibilities, the number of cases in their charge, the absence of other interests and occupation needful to keep sympathy with suffering fresh and living, *not* adequate as agents of Christian charity. Only when the Christian Churches are organised for the work, when thousands of kind-hearted visitors know their place in a wisely-planned system, and labour in the way best suited to their powers ; when with great principles fixed and faithfully observed, large liberty of action is allowed in administrative details, and human interest is kept keen and strong, by encouraging individuality and welcoming originality ; only when the charge of those too poor and too degraded for independence is taken up as the first duty devolving upon Christian charity, will it be seen how much better a method is here of helping the poor than any administration, lax or stringent, of Poor Law Relief.

H. SHAEN SOLLY.

JANE AUSTEN AND CHARLOTTE BRONTË:

A CONTRAST.

"I HAD not seen 'Pride and Prejudice' till I read that sentence of yours, and then I got the book. And what did I find? An accurate daguerreotyped portrait of a commonplace face; a carefully-fenced, highly-cultivated garden, with neat borders and delicate flowers; but no glance of a bright vivid physiognomy, no open country, no fresh air, no blue hill, no bonny beck. I should hardly like to live with her ladies and gentlemen in their elegant but confined houses."

This is the judgment which one great authoress passed on another, and that other the same of whom Macaulay has told us (without one voice of importance uttering a dissentient word) that she was a "woman of whom England is justly proud;" the same, too, whose especial talent Sir Walter Scott describes as "the most wonderful I ever met with," adding, with the modesty of a truly great man, that her "exquisite touch, which renders commonplace things and characters interesting from the truth of the description and the sentiment, is denied to me."

And yet the judgment of Charlotte Brontë is not wonderful, is hardly even surprising. Her genius and that of Jane Austen were of opposite types. It was natural that one should judge the other hardly, and the one to pronounce the harshest sentence was likely enough to be the lesser genius of the two.

The experiences of these two women were as different as their talents, with some curious apparent resemblances. Both were the daughters of clergymen; both wrote novels; both passed the greater part of their lives within the quiet precincts of a country parsonage, and each died within a space of two years from her fortieth birthday.

Life was, however, actually very different for them. We can read so much in their writings without needing to turn to their biographies. Charlotte Brontë required the consciousness of passionate joy and attachment, at some time or other, past or present, to console her for the passionate pains of which her life was full. That life had not been well ordered by those who had the care of it; so intense a nature, struggling continually towards the right amid so many strange influences, could not struggle without suffering. Death played a large part in the drama of her existence; she saw those she loved depart one by one, leaving her alone at last with the strange old father. Her own health was shattered then, all buoyancy of spirit had departed from her, and her surroundings offered to her nothing but monotony and melancholy. Who that has visited her old home, and looked out along the hideous stretching valley, with hardly a tree and with many an ugly building on its undecorated sides, has not felt the misery of gazing day after day into such a scene, where Nature is neither homelike nor picturesque? It was probably better in her days; the buildings were fewer; perhaps the hills were less dreary. We know that she loved her native moors, and behind her home they have just a hint of beauty; but *before* it! Mrs. Gaskell gives us no idea of the dreariness, the simple, bare monotony of those green slopes. Charlotte Brontë loved them, as she loved nearly all the persons and things interwoven in her life's story. She found possibilities of beauty there which no stranger would suspect; she cherished thoughts about them which no stranger

could imagine. But, all the same, when we look upon that dreary, stony, manufacturing valley, we fancy that we see how its reflection would mirror itself as a terrible depression on her vividly-impressible mind. We cannot wonder that she felt isolated, low-spirited, uninspired for work, when she looked out alone on the view from the parsonage windows.

Such a world to look at!—uncultured enough for solitude, peopled enough for cheerfulness; yet possessing neither the wild beauty of a lonely place, nor the redeeming civilisation of a populous district. The people out there, who built stone mills and houses, and did not encourage a plant to grow about them; the nature out there, that reared hillsides against the sky, and hardly produced a tree to grow upon them, were they worth writing about or living for? Yet she managed so to write that the whole world read, and wondered what manner of wild scenery this must be among which the author lived, and what manner of original characters with whom she passed her time.

She had witnessed, too, a terrible tragedy of temptation and sin in her own household. It had destroyed the character, genius, and life of her brother. She had known what it was for a home to be no covert from the troubles of the world, but only a hiding-place, a terrible secret dungeon in which to conceal the dreadful family disgrace and trouble. When she and her sisters went home and shut the door of the parsonage behind them, during the last years of Branwell's life, they did not shut out their worst dread and sorrow; they shut themselves inside with it.

There was hardly, then, any trial of life which Charlotte Brontë had not tasted, and tasted so strongly that it left a flavour of bitterness and futility in all her after success. Existence was emptied for her of its hope, its buoyancy, its health; and then the consolation of a wonderful renown was offered to the lonely, tried, and disheartened woman.

No such melancholy picture of life is woven round the

figure of the other clergyman's daughter, who died when Charlotte Brontë was a year old. She was well nurtured, and carefully taught; she dwelt in a happy home, enjoyed cheerful social relations, moved amongst pleasant scenes, was never brought into close contact with passion or crime; and whatever sorrows of life reached her did not come without the consolations of self-restraint in those around her and of serenity in her own heart.

No passionate disappointments had for her turned the word love into a symbol of anxiety and pain; she had not learnt that to possess was suffering, and to have possessed a perpetual desolation. We see her always a sweet, serene figure—kindly, cheerful, unimpatient, unambitious; willing to be put aside among the middle-aged while she was yet young, yet bright enough in spirit to have remained youthful when she had become actually old. Although personally very much more attractive than Charlotte Brontë, we do not hear that she actually received so many offers of marriage. Whatever offers she did receive were rejected, and there never seems to have been any consequent regret in her heart in after times. Nothing touched her of that bitterness, or that melancholy, or even that oddity, which so many men still believe (all the men of the last century seemed to be sure of it), must characterise any woman who is unfortunate enough to remain unmarried.

We cannot suppose that Jane Austen was a woman without tenderness; her letters and her novels prove her to have been the reverse; and, doubtless, if she had met among her acquaintance a Churchill or a Darcy, who had known how to commend himself to her so as to make her feel as well as to perceive the excellences of his character, she would have married him, and made him a good and happy wife.

Not meeting such a man, or not meeting him in the right way at the right time, she was incapable of longing for what she had not, or regretting what she had given up. She con-

tained all the necessary elements of her own happiness in her own character, and did not require a particular combination of circumstances to bring out her capabilities of usefulness or content. Being so complete a woman, having the perception that there is hardly any relationship of life into which we cannot, if we choose, weave a sufficiency of affection and interest to keep our own lives healthy, she was independent of most of the chances and conditions to which the weaker of us are bound.

Her genius was not unlike her character—self-sufficing, unambitious, serene. It is only actual genius that can afford so to be ; that need not long, strive, or struggle ; that simply *is*, and so is excellent. It is like Nature in that respect—sure of itself, unanxious about opportunities. It can afford, like Nature, to possess numerous unexercised and unapparent capabilities ; because it exists to answer, out of the fullness of its own capacity, the needs of its own time and place. It does not require, like a smaller thing, that the requirements of the whole world should be adjusted to meet the development of its narrow talent. It is, therefore, independent of chance, certain of opportunity, and does not live in perpetual danger of failure and disappointment.

Jane Austen found subject enough for her genius in her own quiet experience. She never had to search for material, to stretch her imagination, or to reach beyond the limits of her natural sphere in an effort to be great. She probably knew that she *was* great, but we are confident that she never tried to be, and also that she was cheerfully indifferent to the indifference of a world that had not learnt to recognise her according to her merits. It was real success that she desired, the achievement of good work rather than the praise of it.

Get leave to work

In this world—'tis the best you get at all.

And Jane Austen lived out the idea before it was spoken.

She had that unconsciousness of virtue which it is impossible to acquire. As soon as we are sufficiently awake to admire it, the chance of it for ourselves is gone. It is George Eliot who speaks of "that controlled self-consciousness which is the expensive substitute for simplicity;" and this is all that the majority of us can attain.

Jane Austen lived serene without longings, and die content without regrets; whereas Charlotte Brontë, to whom life had brought so much suffering, relinquished it with passionate reluctance. Throughout nearly the whole of her bitter experience, happiness was only a possibility, something she had touched in the past, or might reach in the future. She naturally thought that it was actually in her hands when life was taken from her; for we find the most persistent (although not the most cheerful) hope in the most unhappy. Jane Austen seems to have realised the blessed secret that happiness *is* and is everywhere. It was abundant enough, like Nature or her own genius, to destroy all cause for anxiety lest an early death should deprive her of a little of the small portion allotted to her, if she lived out the usual term of life.

Since her death, Charlotte Brontë has been exalted into a literary heroine. More than one popular history of her life has been written, and the church where she was buried came to be regarded chiefly as a monument of her genius.

It is not so with Jane Austen. No pilgrims wander to her grave as to a shrine; no curious literary studies can be made of her life or her character; and the number of her readers is, even yet, smaller than that of the readers of "Jane Eyre."

It is doubtful, indeed, whether a book was ever written of more absorbing interest than "Jane Eyre." All its peculiarities, all its exaggerations, all its limitations of vision tend to the deepening of the charm in which the reader is

held. We cannot wish that Charlotte Brontë had modified herself when she wrote this book. She threw the whole strength of her genius, the whole original force of her character into its composition; and we accept it gladly, as it is, without wishing that she had altered or improved anything in it.

The only justification of advice offered to genius is its successful result. Pope is said never to have quite forgiven Addison for giving his counsel against any alteration from the earliest form of "The Rape of the Lock," although his advice had, in this case, been actually sought for. Addison's opinion proved a mistaken one, but it was, at any rate, given in a spirit of appreciative admiration.

We can hardly say this so positively of Mr. Lewes' advice to Charlotte Brontë (the advice which provoked her to a depreciative expression of opinion on the subject of "Pride and Prejudice") that she should "follow the counsel which shines out of 'Miss Austen's mild eyes.'" And if the novelist's instincts had not, in this case, revolted against the suggestion; if she had been foolish enough to follow the mistaken counsel, its error would have been made patent enough, as indubitably evident as Addison's was. We should have lost our Charlotte Brontë, but we should have gained no second Jane Austen. "Jane Eyre," denuded of its extravagances, would not have become "Emma." The peculiarities of Charlotte Brontë's style carried their own apology in accompanying power, and possessed their best modifier in the authoress's sincerity. The sensationalism of "Jane Eyre" is not a sensationalism artificially produced or with difficulty dragged in to suit the vitiated tastes of the public. It is entirely the production of the intense excitement and profound interest with which the authoress has come to regard her heroine's fortunes; and, as such, it is a legitimate picture. If the authoress erred in presenting such a picture, the fault was in her mind and not in her

manner. The only cure for it was an annihilation of her wonderful genius.

That very intensity of feeling, which sometimes carried Charlotte Brontë beyond the usual limits of subjects on which women wrote in those days, made her more sensitive to criticism and rebuke than those who were less reckless about provoking them. There is something very characteristic in her strong desire to have the question of sex left out of the criticism of her works—to be spoken of as a writer, and not as a woman. And we should have thought more highly of the delicacy of judgment of her critic in the *Edinburgh Review* of January, 1850, if he had spared her the pain of a discourse on this point, especially since he had chosen to enter himself in the list of her private correspondents, and to add the claims of personal friendship to those of literary courtesy. He took a different view, however, and could even apply the adjective "cavalier" to the style of Charlotte Brontë's very generous second letter to him on the subject.

Another contemporary critic of distinction—Harriet Martineau—objected that the passion of love held too large a place in Charlotte Brontë's writing. To describe that passion with an intensity and reality hardly ever reached before was, however, Charlotte Brontë's speciality; and, indeed, the quality of her genius, its weird imaginativeness, its wild fervour of feeling, could not have worked so well on any other subject than this; for love, with its self-deceptions, its sudden awakenings, its uncertain issues, and the strange positions which it may develop, is, as a certain critic has told us, more capable of dramatic interpretation than any other sentiment which is common to the human race.

Charlotte Brontë excelled in suggestions of natural scenery. She gave us none of the lengthened descriptions which are fashionable to-day, and in which colours are used as lavishly as in a painter's crudest study of a sunset; but there was a

fitting relationship between her personages and the scenes in which they moved, so that each reflected a picturesque light upon the other.

Her command of language, also, was very great, and conscientiously used, although here—as sometimes in her sentiment—there is a tone of exaggeration. We feel that it is too rich, too mellifluous for nature, which has a touch of ruggedness in its sweetest sounds and sights.

As a character-painter she did not attain a very high place. She loved to make studies of particular feelings or interesting situations; and this naturally limited her choice of persons and things, though the studies produced might surpass in interest any possible character-drawings. All her sketches of persons were too strongly biased by her own feelings and experiences to form a representative picture of any time or any place. The fact that so many of her characters were drawn from real life detracted from their value as permanent types. She had not the highest artist's calmness and impartiality; she might be dowered with the poet's "scorn of scorn, and love of love;" but, although she depreciated the style of Jane Austen as wanting in poetry, she had not herself reached the level when she could say,

Poets become such
Through scorning nothing.

In all the characters which she created, and whose fortunes we have followed with so vivid an interest, there is not one for whom she did not indulge some strong personal feeling, whether of like or dislike. There is a tinge of bitterness in her description of disagreeable people which misses the highest tone of literature, if not of morals. The highest artist has learnt patience, and is wholly calm. Bitterness is a different thing from indignation, which may be found among the finest examples of poetical pictures. It is something just a little smaller and a great deal more personal. Our sympathies follow hers in the matter. We do

not disagree with the opinion suggested; only, from an artistic point of view, the opinion had better not have been there. We want no personal colouring in our perfect illustrations of human life; the artist must be out of sight, and the picture should not be painted on toned paper.

It is in this that Jane Austen so much excels Charlotte Brontë. She has found enough to write about without the intrusion of any prejudices or disappointments of her own. When we look at the world through her eyes the atmosphere is wholly clear. The picture is so perfect that we forget to praise the artist; it is simply quite natural, quite true, and so, perhaps, for some persons, wholly without interest. For there is a large class of readers to whom nature does not speak plainly enough, for whom real life is not intense enough. They fail to find in the one the beauty the poets describe, and in the other the passions they depict. Life and nature must be translated for them into plainer expressions by some other mind, and the more theatrical light the other mind throws into these expressions the more satisfactory they are considered. Day by day we all walk through the same scenes without observing half the details of them; and if we are compelled to grope for the first time in the dark along often-trod pathways, we come unexpectedly on hitherto undiscovered objects innumerable. It is only when some new light is thrown upon a well-known scene—the sudden flashes in a thunderstorm, or the red glow of a great fire—that our attention is roused to things habitually passed over unseen.

Some persons walk as blindly through life itself. They require a cleverer mind than their own to throw a background of fantastic colour behind the objects among which they move. Only so can they perceive their true significance.

Such persons cannot be expected to appreciate Jane Austen's delicately-tinted pictures of human life. Perhaps

they must not even be required to realise what we mean when we are foolish enough to praise Shakespeare. A very intelligent young man of to-day, who reads novels with interest and attends theatres with pleasure, is so convinced of the absence of any surpassing merit in the mighty dramatist that he allows himself to believe that the enthusiasts for the poet are all pretending!

Another man, an elderly clergyman (also of to-day), an M.A. of Oxford, in early years a botanist and a dabbler in the natural sciences—a man who thinks he appreciates Virgil, and has got everything out of the poets that can be got by an intelligent mind—has been heard to express, in a kind of confidential disgust at the stupidity of the world, the following astonishing sentiment: “Shakespeare? Shakespeare is a very much overrated man. I can’t understand what people profess to see in him. But it’s no use saying anything.” So he leaves us all to our blindness.

It is not to such men that we must recommend the study of Jane Austen’s works, with their quiet humour, their quaint reality, their trenchant but good-natured criticism, their sober and unexaggerated tone, and that manner which, Macaulay has told us, approaches somewhat near to Shakespeare’s own. There is such an absence of exciting scenes in Miss Austen’s books that, with the exception of those passages in “Sense and Sensibility” designed to illustrate the weakness of the heroine’s sister, we can hardly remember any occasion of actual weeping; agony and wild passion are altogether excluded. We may complain a little of want of the pathetic, which can less easily be spared than the exciting element; but even here we may be wrong to demur. In the present age, when most of the powerful writers employ their power in harrowing our feelings painfully, in weaving miseries out of circumstances which seem improbable, by means of actions which strike us as unnatural; in a time when the chief end of talent seems to be to pile up

the agony sufficiently high, without caring about the reasonableness of the foundation on which it rests, we may well hesitate before expressing a regret that, in a series of half-a-dozen delightful novels, there is not one distressing death, not one terrible domestic tragedy, not one horrible crime, not even one irresistible temptation. All can be good if they choose, and nearly all may be happy if they will.

We may say of these books that they are simply and entirely delightful. The cheerful reality of interest and the genial spirit of laughter which pervade them carry us on through pleasant and instructive pages to a pleasant and satisfactory end. We know none, except Jane Austen, who, by a few delicate touches, can so completely satisfy us concerning the disposal of a heroine at the close of a novel. After passionate quarrels the reconciliation generally seems tame; but we are wholly content with the fate of Emma in the novel which bears her name, of her favourite Lizzy in "Pride and Prejudice," and of the gentle heroine in "Persuasion."

There is no respect of persons in the works of this writer. A charming impartiality and candour are to be found in all her portraits of friend or foe. Jane Austen delights us as much in depicting the peculiarities of a pleasant old woman as in relating the fortunes of a blooming young one.

And the most extraordinary thing is that at a time when every other writer thought it necessary to write in another way, and to depend upon incident and plot for his interest, Jane Austen ventured to write in this way, and has so commended herself to this generation beyond her more brilliant contemporaries.

Even the king of novelists, Sir Walter Scott, whose wonderful masterpieces of fiction we have all read with absorbing delight and interest, must, in some points, as he has himself so generously acknowledged, bend his head before this quiet and unobtrusive young woman, who never made,

and never seemed to wish to make, a sensation of any sort.

The fact that so little of the interest of Jane Austen's works depends on her incidents is in favour of a repeated perusal of these delicate etchings of human life. The characters she depicts are less romantic than is, or was, usual in fiction; but then they are much more real—with the reality not of stupid commonplace, but of pleasant familiarity, intelligently and suggestively unveiled to us.

Her style seemed prosaic to Charlotte Brontë, and her characters uninteresting. Life was full of meaning to the younger authoress, and even the minor incidents in her novels are stamped with the impress of some strong feeling, or carry a reflection of some intense personal experiences. But Jane Austen's belief in the seriousness of life went beyond Charlotte Brontë's; and the author of "Pride and Prejudice" found the drama of human existence so full of meaning that she dared to leave it to explain itself.

A. ARMITT.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

DARWINIANISM AND RELIGION.—A NOTE ON MR. GRAHAM'S 'CREED OF SCIENCE.'

IS the doctrine of Evolution, as stated by Darwin, essentially and fundamentally in antagonism with the first principles of religion? is a question raised in the reader's mind by Mr. Graham's 'Creed of Science.'* In the absence of any single and universally acknowledged authority on all problems of faith and doctrine, Mr. Graham takes "the consensus] of scientific opinion" amongst the highest authorities on each particular article, and treats this "as the orthodox teaching of science,"—as what would have been the decision had all such authorities met together in council to fix the faith. His book is not the shriek of frightened ignorance: it bears no trace of ecclesiastical resistance to the removal of old landmarks. It is marked by careful study of the scientific thinkers who are criticised, by great willingness to accept facts, and by the dignity of devout conviction.

I do not propose to examine its general course of argument, but to ask for a reconsideration of the description given of the Darwinian hypothesis when looked at from a religious point of view.

What strikes Mr. Graham most in reading Darwin's marvellous story "of the origin and process of manufacture of Nature's living forms," is the seemingly *chance affair* it all was.

We are not permitted, on Darwinian principles, to suppose that there was any prevision or forecast of what was to come resident in Nature's blind bosom. There was no conception, not even the vaguest dream, on

* *The Creed of Science, Religious, Moral, and Social.* By WILLIAM GRAHAM, M.A., author of 'Idealism: an Essay, Metaphysical and Critical.' London: Kegan Paul and Co. 1881.

the part of Nature, at the commencement of the cosmic process, of the forms of life that should emerge in the sequel. . . . Nature had no special aims in view; anything, in fact, might have happened. She did not aim particularly at life or the human consciousness. When life first resulted, it was an accident, lucky or unlucky, as we choose to regard it. When the first rudiments of that wonderful revealer of Nature, the eye, were laid, they came by chance, and by further repeated processes the eye was improved. It was improved as a telescope is improved, by slow degrees, only, unlike the telescope, it was improved not by an inventor or maker, but by natural selection, which preferred the animals with good eyes, and elected them to continue the advantage to the species. What has resulted need not have resulted, for Nature neither knew, nor cared, nor directed (pp. 25, 26).

This identification of the Darwinian hypothesis with *chance* pervades the book. Man, on that hypothesis, is called "the child of chance." Mr. Graham admits that in Darwin's 'Origin of Species,' a Creator is placed at the commencement of the process of organic evolution, but considers that his most eminent followers are justified, "on Darwinian principles," in setting this intelligent Creator aside. It is distinctly stated that "the real and most important issue raised to-day by Darwin, as in ancient times by Democritus," is "whether chance or purpose governs the world" (p. 50). Natural selection is described as a method requiring "little reflection or genius," and as "a rule of thumb" (p. 321).

I submit, however, that the Darwinian hypothesis in itself, and considered in its strictly scientific character, is entirely distinct from any doctrine of chance, and does not necessarily involve unpurposed accident in the slightest degree.

In treating of variations dependent upon constantly changing circumstances, it is extremely easy to speak of them as "accidental," or even as connected with "chance," through the limitations of human language, and the difficulty of restating a profound hypothesis in connection with every illustration. It is the language of some one looking on, from the outside, not an account of the conditions under which changes take place. All that is strictly and scientifically involved when even Darwin himself may incidentally use the word chance or accident, is the fact that slight variations of specific forms take place in manifold directions unanticipated by the observer.

The title of Darwin's book clearly states its substantial doctrine. It is "the origin of species by *means* of natural selection." Natural selection is the means by which the origin of new

species has been secured. It is a *method* by which an *end* has been attained. Darwin bases upon actual observation certain statements concerning the method which has been pursued in the introduction of more and more complex forms of life into the world; all the mighty problems regarding the nature of the power of which this method is a manifestation, these statements leave untouched.

In the struggle for existence the fittest *have* survived. Any peculiarity by which advantage has been gained *has been* inherited, and *has* become a specific characteristic. These are facts. Upon these and kindred points Darwin records what actually has taken place. The conclusion that an endless variety of species has been produced by the operation of certain laws, no more implies a belief in "chance" or "accident" than does the acceptance of the law of gravitation. When it is said that a certain kind of eye has been produced by "natural selection," it does not mean that "natural selection" is a living being, preferring animals with good eyes, and electing them to continue the advantage to the species, but that as a matter of fact special peculiarities are transmitted with certain definite results. Why this method of evolving complex forms from more simple ones should be taken, and by what authority it is sustained in daily action, are questions which the naturalist does not attempt to answer.

It is perfectly true, as Mr. Graham suggests, that a slight alteration of conditions at a critical moment in the history of any one species might have caused things on earth to have taken a wholly different course. It does not in any way follow, however, that there is no Supreme Being who has cared, known, and directed. The importance of infinitesimal changes in an animal's surroundings does not imply the predominance of chance, but emphasizes the sublime watchfulness of a controlling will.

"The more we read the story of Darwin (writes Mr. Graham) the further and further the notion and the possibility of mind recedes" (p. 37). The question respecting *mind* as evidenced by the phenomena of the universe, is this: Can we or can we not detect the action of forces of a character akin to those we term *mental*, when they come within the range of personal experience?

How does "the story of Darwin" adversely affect the argument? It tells us that all living creatures are connected by physical ties, and that the struggles brought about by their

relationships to each other, together with the constantly-occurring variations in their surroundings, have ended in the appearance upon earth of man—a being capable of thought and love and duty. It tells us further that slight deviations from common types will end in specific and generic divergences; and that the beginning of the life-history of the world may possibly be traced back to some few primordial cells.

The hypothesis may be true or false; but it is difficult to understand how it excludes the action of faculties which, when we see them applied to human affairs, are known as faculties of mind. That a myriad apparently petty and insignificant changes should have so harmoniously co-operated as to end in the existence of such a richly-endowed being as man, proves that mental power must have been exerted over their direction as clearly as any work ever performed by man himself is a sign of his own intelligence.

Those who believe—as under the Darwinian hypothesis it is perfectly legitimate to believe—that an Infinite Wisdom has been manifested by degrees, unfolding more and more of its nature from epoch to epoch, cannot justly be charged with resolving creation into the hap-hazard play of unintelligent forces. The growth of a flower from a seed does not disprove the creative activity of a God; neither would it exclude God from the universe were it certain that all the stars of Heaven sprang from one wave of force, and all plants and animals from one cell, and even that cell itself from the primeval wave of force.

Mr. Graham argues that the Creator in *The Origin of Species* has nothing to do.

The Creator in *The Origin of Species* seems introduced more for ornament than for any serious work that He has to do; or at least, rather to conciliate the mass of hostile theological prejudice certain to be aroused by the other doctrines than to satisfy any logical demands in the system. He has nothing to do at the beginning, save to endow "one or a few primordial forms" with the lowest degree of elementary life, leaving the rest of the work to natural selection and the ordeal of battle; and He has had nothing to do ever since (on the earth, at least) but to sit passively by and watch laws which execute themselves, without need of any interference on His part. He is "a Monarch that reigns but does not govern," like the sovereigns under our Parliamentary régime (p. 45).

This passage is pervaded by the assumption that a believer in "natural selection" necessarily thinks of "natural selec-

tion" as a living force, capable of taking action on its own account. Natural selection is only a phrase gathering together a number of observed facts, which are so persistently conjoined in nature as to constitute a rule or method of procedure. A law of nature has no power in itself. It is only a statement of an observed association of special facts as antecedents and sequents.

By what supreme authority this association is rendered constant and universal we are not told, when a simple law of Nature is explained; but laws of Nature can no more execute themselves than can the laws of Great Britain and Ireland.

One or a few primordial forms endowed with the lowest degree of elementary life would necessarily have remained primordial forms for ever had the "Monarch"—the central and Supreme Authority of the universe—sat passively by and watched them in His solemn ease.

The evolution of form from form reveals incessant creative activity. The philosophy of Darwin, so far from dispensing with a God, demands a Creator who never ceases to create, and in whose unslumbering and unresting energy all things live and move and have their being.

HENRY W. CROSSKEY.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

PROFESSOR SHAIRP'S 'ASPECTS OF POETRY.'*

THIS volume is a noteworthy contribution to contemporary literary criticism. It is questionable if any lectures delivered from the Oxford Chair of Poetry have been of greater value than those which are here brought together by Professor Shairp. Whether they were successful as lectures, in the sense of attracting crowds, is another and an inferior matter. Some of them are, doubtless, better as essays to be read than as addresses to be listened to; but they will do more than anything their author has previously written to enhance his reputation, and—what he will, doubtless, regard as of greater consequence—to promote the study of the subjects he has discussed. The fruit of varied scholarship and mature insight, they are full of suggestiveness and full of wisdom; and they open up, in a new way, many tracks of thought which will be pursued by sympathetic readers for themselves. The title is a fortunate one—definite and modest. If the volume wants the spell of genius and the fascination of the deft literary criticism, which its author's predecessor in the Oxford Chair imparted to all his essays, it is a book far more serviceable to the mass of readers, and will probably send them back to the poets themselves, with more enthusiasm appreciation and delight.

In dealing with the poets it is of less consequence to point out their shortcomings or what they fail to do for us, than to appraise their merits and to signalise their excellences; but in estimating a volume of literary criticism, appreciation by itself is of little value, and one of the excellences of this work, by the professor of poetry, is the way in which it will rouse the critical instinct of the reader. Every one must feel that Professor Shairp is one of those writers with whom it is a pleasure alike to agree or to disagree. Now, in these lectures he desires to put philosophy and philosophical definitions aside. Philosophy has to him no glory, because of the glory in poetry that excelleth it; but he is compelled, at the outset, to fall back on a philosophical definition of poetry

* *Aspects of Poetry.* Being Lectures delivered at Oxford, by JOHN CAMPBELL SHAIRP, LL.D., Professor of Poetry, Oxford; Principal of the United College, St. Andrew's. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1881.

and throughout the volume to take up and defend a very definite philosophy of the universe.

The distinction between "defining poetry" and "noting some of the characteristics of the poetic nature" is a real one; but in the course of the latter process a definition emerges. Professor Shairp has pointed out that the poet must have a large, open, sensitive, and intense nature; that the intellect of the poet must be kindled by feeling, and by a wide range of sympathy. He finds that the limitation of the poet's domain to the field of beauty is too narrow, and says that "the whole range of existence, when imaginatively apprehended, may be transfigured into poetry." "Nothing that exists, except things ignoble and mean," is alien to the poet. But it has been pointed out by many critics that poetry can be extracted even from that which is here excepted. Probably Professor Shairp would not really except it. And he remarks most truly, that "as each age modifies in some measure men's conceptions of existence, and brings to light new aspects of life, before undreamt of, so poetry, which is the expression of these aspects, is now changing, in sympathy with the changing consciousness of the race." In the same lecture we have some most excellent remarks on the need of catholicity in appreciation, of openness to recognise new forms of poetic insight; and some things, equally admirable, are said on the functions of the imagination, on how "imaginative insight kindles and deepens emotion," as well as on its penetrative glance, and its harmonising and embodying power. But in all this—and in the statement of the aim of poetry, to give insight much more than to give pleasure—we have some very distinct approaches towards a definition of its nature. The definition which is explicitly disowned, is implicitly essayed; and yet it may be doubted if it is altogether successfully accomplished. If, therefore, instead of excluding the ignoble and the inharmonious from the field which poetry traverses, suppose we say that its function is, not to deal with beauty alone, but *to pursue beauty as marred by deformity*, then the imaginative area swept by the poet is seen to be as wide as the universe; and we have an explanation of much in his vocation, and in the products of his genius, that is otherwise obscure. As a matter of fact, deformity is intermingled, in a subtle manner, with all existing beauty. We are surrounded with discords in the midst of harmony; but it is the highest function of the imagination to reconcile the two. May it not, therefore, be more appropriately said, that the poet deals, first of all, with the real as he finds it—beauty blent with ugliness, discord in the midst of harmony, sorrow in the midst of joy, good commingled with evil—and that he strives to transform it, to transfigure the reality and to harmonise the discord, by means of poetic idealisation?

It was almost inevitable that in these lectures the doctrine advanced by Mr. Arnold, that poetry is "a criticism of life," should be dealt with, less or more. But there is possibly some misconception of Mr. Arnold's meaning by his critic. Probably they make use of the word "criticism"

in totally different senses. If it is thought of as formal analytic handling, as logical manipulation, cross-examination and scrutiny, Mr. Arnold's maxim may be an extreme, if not an erroneous one. But if it is construed as divining tact or intuitive instinct, the maxim is indubitably true. That the divining tact, or instinct of the poet, pierces to the very heart of problems addressed to the intellect, and which the intellect merely manipulates, is self-evident. It cuts through layers of formal criticism, and annihilates the barriers which these erect, at a single stroke, by a flash of inspiration. Doubtless it is criticism sublimated, criticism glowing and impassioned, but it is at the same time adequate, penetrative, and true. It is not prosaic analysis, or calculating scrutiny; it is critical vision; and, as the judgment of the seer, it may be quite unerring in its verdict, as to the substantive meaning of life, and the underlying spirit of the universe. In fact the poet, just because he is a poet, is at the same time a critic. He is a critic in being a poet; although he does not construct his estimates of men and things by the aid of logical formulæ; and it is in this sense that he often sees deeper or further than the philosopher.

Another question of great interest discussed in this volume is the distinction between Poetry and Prose. Professor Shairp thinks that in modern English literature, at least, the distinction has been gradually abolished, while the distinction between Verse and Prose has been gradually intensified. Surely it would be more correct to say that the margins of the two spheres of Poetry and Prose have increasingly overlapped; that there is (as there has always been) a poetical prose and a prosaic poetry, while the distinction between a poem (however prosaic) and a prose writing (however poetical), remains clearly, and even sharply, defined. A poem is a unity. It produces its most distinctive effect by its self-inclusion, by its rhythmical completeness, and by the singleness of the impressions it evokes. Like a statue by Phidias, or a Madonna by Raphael, or a sonata by Beethoven, it must be gathered up into an imaginative whole, and it must return to its keynote. It must stand out to the eye and to the imagination, as a great mountain or a simple flower, as a sunset or as a constellation in the heavens—varied indefinitely in content, but with clear outlines, and recognisable boundary lines, with a definite framework, and a completed purpose. There is no reason why any passage of poetical prose, on the other hand, should end where it does end. It might go on indefinitely far on the same lines, or in the same strain, without ceasing to be poetical prose. Take, as an illustration of the fundamental difference, one of Coleridge's exquisite prose marginalia to his 'Ancient Mariner,' and any of the single stanzas of the poem itself. "In his loneliness and fixedness he yearneth towards the journeying moon, and the stars that still sojourn, yet still move onward; and everywhere the blue sky belongs to them, and is their appointed rest, and their native country, and their own natural homes, which they enter unannounced, as lords that are certainly ex-

pected; and yet there is a silent joy at their arrival." Compare this specimen of prose poetry with the verse,—

Still as a slave before his Lord,
The ocean hath no blast;
His great bright eye most silently
Up to the moon is cast.

or, with the verse,

It ceased; yet still the sails made on
A pleasant noise till noon,
A noise like of a hidden brook
In the leafy month of June,
That to the sleeping woods all night
Singeth a quiet tune.

and the difference between the unity of effect, the imaginative whole, that is in all poetry, and the indefiniteness of structure, the diffuseness of form that characterises the most poetical prose, is obvious.

There are some deep questions raised in these lectures (such as the relations of morality to art) which are touched rather than discussed. They are most suggestively dealt with, but they are handled rather than wrought out; appreciatively and dexterously written about, rather than philosophically treated, or explained to their farthest recesses. And so we find that while the philosopher is thrown out, and philosophy cast aside, the critic has to fall back on a philosophy of his own after all. Once, at least, Professor Shairp falls back into idealism, pure and simple; while, throughout the book, his polemic against any system of phenomenalism is keen, and constant, and very able. But how, if speculative philosophy as a pursuit is slighted, or as a body of knowledge disparaged, can the literary critic turn validly round *against* that particular "philosophy which had been dominant for the last thirty years"?

In the essay on 'The Spiritual Side of Poetry' four gradations of feeling and insight excited by Nature are acutely characterised; the first, that of mere physical exhilaration; the second, the enjoyment of form and colour; the third, that stage in which physical beauty adumbrates moral truth; and the fourth, when it leads to the rapture of religious feeling. It may be a mistake to arrange these in a necessarily ascending scale; and it may be equally erroneous to affirm that without a belief in a future life, and in our personal relations to the Divinity in whom we live and move and have our being, poetry is shorn of its highest power. Doubtless these "twin convictions" have added immeasurable wealth to the poetic products evoked by them; but in point of mere intensity and power, those poems which have kept to the mundane side of things, and dealt with the elemental relations of man to man, and man to nature, have probably been as effective as those which have dealt with the transcendental and the divine.

One of the most characteristic essays is on 'The Poet as a Revealer.' Most true, and deep, and noble are the teachings of this lecture, because there is a whole side of Nature and of human life which the poet interprets for us, while the philosopher is dumb; and, whether he is dealing with

Homer, or Æschylus and Sophocles, with Virgil, or Wordsworth, or Walter Scott, the author is equally felicitous and successful. It is, however, in what, (without disparagement of the others) we may call his minor essays, that Professor Shairp's chief insight is shown. We have a delightful study of Virgil; one that will be new to the majority of English readers on 'The Poetry of the Scottish Highlands;' and another on 'Modern Gaelic Bards and Duncan Macintyre.' But in the two lectures devoted explicitly to Wordsworth—the former on 'The White Doe of Rylstone,' and the latter on 'The Three Yarrow's'—Professor Shairp is at his best. These essays recall the wisdom and the vision of the paper on Wordsworth, published many years since in the *North British Review*, and are only the latest proof of the inexhaustibility of the theme discussed.

The whole volume is full of varied interest and helpfulness. It is a book which will instruct, where it does not convince; and while its judgments on individual poets and poems, and on special problems, will not satisfy every reader (they would have little merit if they did), they will assist many a student to new and fruitful views of the nature of poetry in general, and of the characteristics of our English poets in particular. If a perusal of the book leads to a full and enthusiastic study of the poets themselves, its main end will have been accomplished, and the aim of its author thoroughly fulfilled. No more notable book of its kind has issued from the British press within recent years.

W. K.

ONESIMUS.

THE Epistle to Philemon purports to be sent by the hands of one Onesimus; and the reader gathers that Onesimus was the escaped slave of Philemon, that Philemon himself was an old friend and disciple of Paul, that Paul had even now won over the fugitive also to confess the name of Christ, and that the Apostle desired to restore Onesimus to his master, "no longer as a servant, but more than a servant, a brother beloved." The Revised Version brings out the tenderness of Paul with fresh simplicity and pathos; and fills us with renewed surprise that any Christian minister should ever have found in this touching letter an apostolic precedent for the infamous Fugitive Slave law of the United States. The balance of critical opinion assigns the Epistle rather to the Roman than the Cæsarean imprisonment of St. Paul, and the Epistle to the Colossians contains a reference to Philemon, which has led the commentators to place his establishment in the City of Colossæ, at the foot of the Laodicæan hills. If the radical question of Pauline authorship be raised, it must be said that the document is so slight as to afford no decisive indications either way; but even Baur places it in the second rank, next to the great Epistles themselves in probability of authenticity.

The Epistle implies that Onesimus had robbed Philemon, not only of his own services but of something further, and makes mention of a Church meeting in Philemon's own house. On these and one or two other slight indications, the distinguished writer, who prefers, in this connection, to be known simply as "the author of *Philochristus*," has constructed the imaginary autobiography of the bondaman, Onesimus.*

Onesimus lacks the absorbing interest which many readers found in *Philochristus*. The bright central person of the Nazarene no longer radiates from the page, and Paul does not play so prominent a part in this volume as his Master did in its predecessor. Nor when Paul does appear, is his the speech or the countenance or the thrilling presence of the Christ himself. Yet the figure of the Apostle is sufficiently striking when it first passes across the scene. The child Onesimus sees a band of merchants coming along the Iconian road.

Somewhat in the face of one of the travellers held me fast, I know not how, so that I fixed my gaze on him perforce, even as a bird fascinated by a serpent; and indeed I thought myself to be bewitched and spat thrice; but yet I stood still gazing upon him. At that time he was not yet bald, he had a clear complexion, a nose hooked and somewhat large; he was short of stature, and as he walked he bent his head a little forward, as if not able to discern things clearly; his eyebrows were shaggy and met together; but what most moved me was the glance of his eyes which were of a penetrating brightness, as though they would pierce through the outside of things even to the innermost substance (p. 3).

This is the first acquaintance of Onesimus with his future spiritual father, and they do not meet again for many years. There is great power in the narrative of the young man's conversion. Despairing of truth, stung to the quick by the false suspicions instilled into the heart of Philemon by one Pistus, a false-hearted professor of Christianity, above all mad with grief at the death of Eucharis, his betrothed, Onesimus, once a philosopher and a lover of the right, has abandoned himself to the most reckless life. For a time a minister of Cybele, with her gross and sensual worship, he has now become a diner-out at Rome. Falling in by chance with Paul, he feels the power of the man, and is bent with his whole mind upon escaping from an extorted engagement to meet him in a Christian household where the saints are to hear him preach the word. He has been playing the buffoon at some rich patron's board with a wilder and more wanton wit than was his wont, and is staggering along the streets after the feast, when a hand is laid upon his shoulder from behind, and the voice of Paulus says, "My son, thou art not in the right way."

Fain would I have made some excuse, or have fled at once without excuse; but neither could my tongue avail for words, nor my feet for flight. So I went on with Paulus even as a captive, and he took me by the hand and led me unresisting into a house where was a large congregation of the Christians already assembled and expecting his presence; through the midst of whom

* *Onesimus: Memoirs of a Disciple of St. Paul.* By the AUTHOR OF *PHILOCHRISTUS*. London: Macmillan and Co. 1882.

I walked, crowned as I was with roses, and dripping with unguents and staggering in my gait (p. 201).

The mighty force of the speech of Paul slowly penetrates his mind, and clears the fumes of debauch from before his soul, till the great words "I am persuaded that neither death nor life" (Rom. viii. 38, 39) thunder at his heart, and the brightness of the Lord Jesus bursts in a flood upon his spirit.

While the personal narrative in these 'Memoirs' is most skilfully woven, and the resources of a rich scholarship are brought with a light and graceful hand to illustrate the life and surroundings of the young Gentile in many varied scenes, there is no doubt that the most important interest of the book centres in its philosophical and critical discussions. These become very real and living in the minds and mouths of Onesimus and his friends. With some boldness of anachronism, Epictetus, Maximus of Tyre, Ælius Aristides, Celsus, and even Justin Martyr and Irenæus, are made to contribute to the conversations and correspondence in which Onesimus takes part — only Epictetus, however, *proprio nomine*. But the editor pleads that in germ the thoughts of these men already floated in the air in A.D. 60, and that the mind of the inquirer would have to reckon with them long before they found overt and formal expression. The reader will probably be impressed with the profundity of the scepticism which affected the world of thought in that momentous age, compared to the shallowness of the shoals in which the modern doubter flounders. No pole-star shone over that ocean; and however hard it be for the mariner to pilot his boat to-day, few drift so helplessly on the chartless waves as poor Onesimus.

But much more than the philosophical, the critical disquisitions of the volume will attract attention and stimulate reflection. As the geologist exploring the tufa-beds of Derbyshire may behold rocks in the making, so our editor has conceived the bold idea of placing us at the spot where we can see the oral Tradition of the first generation of disciples swelling and radiating and crystallising towards the elaborated form of the completed Synoptics. To do this with full effect it has, indeed, been necessary to endow Onesimus with all the shrewdness of the contributor of the article, "Gospels," to the new edition of the "Encyclopædia Britannica;" and we should find it almost as hard to persuade ourselves that Onesimus really foresaw the maturer shape of the Tradition, and predicted "the end from the beginning," as that Isaiah or Micah actually prophesied the manner or the place of the birth of the Messiah. But we must not quarrel with the accomplished resuscitator of the Colossian bondsman for this. We can conceive no method of presenting the problem of Synoptic criticism more likely to convince the reader that the Gospel narratives have indeed gathered together, cohered, and grown after strict laws of mental evolution, than that so skilfully elaborated in the Third Book of these ingenious Memoirs. We have Onesimus, for example, listening to a discourse in which Hebrew prophecy is freely applied to the circumstances of the death of Christ.

and immediately bringing the speaker, "a man of some discretion," to book, and on questioning him whether all the details of the prophecy have corresponding details in the then recorded Tradition, wringing from him the answer, "It is not, indeed, so handed down in our Tradition; but it *may have been so*." But "an honest and illiterate leather-cutter," whom Onesimus puts through the same catechism, boldly declares that it *was so*,—not that he remembers anything of the sort in the Tradition, but "*because it must needs be that all things that are written in the Law and the Prophets should be fulfilled in Christus*." And Onesimus shrewdly surmises that, not the "discreet" speakers, but the "illiterate leather-cutter" and his kin will prove the progenitors of the Tradition held by the succeeding generation (p. 85).

Before the martyrdom of Onesimus, the Synoptics are fully formed, even to the prodigies of Matthew I., II. But when Onesimus would remove the after-growth from the Tradition received of the first disciples, and disabuse the minds of the people, Philochristus, from far-off Britain, then, it seems, as now, the native soil of the Broad Church theory, writes to him:—

"Be thou content. 'But,' sayest thou, 'they err in certain traditions concerning the Lord.' Well, then, they err. But which is better, that they should love the Lord and be in some error, or that they should be free from error and void of love? Better to have wheat with tares than no tares and no wheat. Let both stand till the harvest; and in the day of knowing of the Master, a separation shall be made" (p. 285).

R. A. A.

DR. DAVIDSON'S 'INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE NEW
TESTAMENT.' *

A VETERAN writer like Dr. Davidson does not wait for his reputation upon the verdict of critics less competent than himself. More than thirty years have elapsed since the appearance of his *Introduction to the New Testament*, and his qualities as a Biblical scholar have long been familiar to those who are interested in the studies which he has chosen as his own. During that considerable period he has not been content to rest passively in the results which he so carefully elaborated and defended in earlier days, but has kept his mind open to fresh investigations, and gradually changed his point of view, so that arguments on which he formerly relied are no longer able to convince him, and difficulties in the way of the traditional belief, which he once regarded as inconclusive, present themselves now with a magnitude and force which he is unable to resist. In process of time his opinions became so largely

* *An Introduction to the Study of the New Testament, Critical, Exegetical, and Theological.* By SAMUEL DAVIDSON, D.D., of the University of Halle, and LL.D. Second Edition, Revised and Improved. London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1892.

modified, that it was undesirable to bring out a second edition of his original work; and accordingly, in 1868, he published a new treatise, entitled *An Introduction to the Study of the New Testament, Critical, Exegetical, and Theological*, in which he sought to supply an acknowledged want by providing the English reader with a compendium suited to the existing state of knowledge. Of this work a second edition, "revised and improved," has just appeared, containing important modifications of some of the judgments previously expressed, and exhibiting the ripest fruit of the author's scholarship and thought. One could wish that the process of change had been brought before the reader, and that when Dr. Davidson discards as "traditionalism" an opinion maintained in the earlier edition he had marked the alteration, and distinctly explained why reasons, which at a comparatively recent date appeared insufficient, are now able to command his assent. This would add to the interest of the volumes, and afford a useful training to the critical faculty of the student; and if the frank acknowledgment of change left on the minds of the injudicious the impression of a vacillating judgment, or an uncertain critical method, the more discerning would appreciate the vigour of thought which even in advancing years refuses to stiffen into unalterable moulds, and the candour which abandons a position that, long defended, seems at last to be untenable.

We cannot in a short notice discuss any of the difficult questions raised by an Introduction; but it may be interesting to point out some of the more important differences of view which distinguish the two editions. The arrangement of the books in what is conceived to be their chronological order facilitates comparison, and serious variations are immediately apparent. In the first edition 2nd Thessalonians is placed at the head of the list, and Dr. Davidson holds strongly to its Pauline authorship, assigning it to about 52 A.D. He now introduces it after the Epistle of James; and though he still allows it a comparatively early date, about 69 A.D., he does not bring it within the Apostle's lifetime. He does not, however, absolutely reject its Pauline origin, but thinks "it may be called authentic, *with modifications*," the latter having been made in it by a Pauline Christian, ii. 1—12 especially being an addition. Carrying our eye down the list we are next struck by the disappearance of Colossians from its position between Philemon and Philipians. In 1868 Dr Davidson, though not unconscious of difficulties, still believed that the preponderance of internal evidence favoured the genuineness of the epistle, and that it was written at Rome in 62 A.D. We must suppose that the arguments of Baur, though dismissed as inconclusive, silently persisted in asserting their force, for our author now bestows upon this question a completely fresh treatment, and argues strongly against the authenticity of the letter. He relies especially on the developed Christology and the evidence afforded by the epistle of an active, if still incipient, Gnosticism, and arrives at the conclusion that the work proceeded from a Pauline Christian living in Asia Minor, probably about 120 A.D. Ephesians, which is so obviously related to Colossians, had been already rejected from

the list of Paul's genuine epistles, but still allowed a place upon the borders of the Apostolic age. In the first edition its author is supposed to be an inhabitant of Rome and a stranger to the Church at Ephesus, and the year 75 is fixed upon as the nearest approach to its real date. The arguments which induced Baur to bring it down to the Gnostic period are reviewed, and declared to be unsatisfactory. In the second edition all this is changed. We now learn, as though no competent and unprejudiced scholar had ever been of a different opinion, that "it is easy to see that it originated in the Gnostic period;" its composition is transferred from Rome to Asia Minor, and its date is fixed between 130 and 140 A.D. In the treatment of the Pastoral Epistles, Titus now comes between 2nd and 1st Timothy, instead of being regarded as the earliest of the three; but they are all assigned to about the same date as before, between 115 and 125 A.D.

If we pass to the Catholic Epistles, we find that that of James is placed a year or two later, and therefore after, instead of before, Revelation; but Dr. Davidson's view of it is substantially unaltered. His opinion of 1st Peter has undergone a more serious change, though even in the first edition its Apostolic origin is denied. A comparatively early date, between 75 and 80 A.D., is there accorded to it; and the opinion of Schwegler and Baur that it referred to the calamities in Trajan's reign is rejected because the trials alluded to "are too general to admit of restriction to one period in particular." This opinion is now accepted, and the epistle, believed to have been written by a Roman Christian, perhaps in 113 A.D., is placed in the list between the Gospels of Luke and Mark. Jude, which was formerly regarded as an authentic production of the Lord's brother, and referred to the year 80, is now set aside as supposititious, because "the description of the men who had crept in among the readers suits antinomian Gnostics only." It is supposed to be "not much later than A.D. 140."

In regard to the historical books, we need only observe that the old chronological order is retained,—Matthew, Luke, Mark, Acts, and John; and that, notwithstanding recent investigations, Mark is still represented as dependent on Matthew and Luke.

From this brief survey it is apparent that the work has been revised in both its form and its substance. Alterations are numerous, and many parts have been rewritten. The revision, however, sometimes betrays marks of haste. Thus we are told that a quotation in 1st Timothy is taken from Luke, and then follows the strange inference, "Hence Luke's gospel, which preceded the present epistle, was not written till the second century."* What is obviously intended is that the Epistle cannot be earlier than the second century, because it is subsequent to a Gospel which belongs to that century. The argument is correctly given in the first edition. On the next page it is stated, on the authority of Holtzmann, that the number of words occurring in the Pastoral Epistles, and nowhere else in the New Testament, is 171, and yet the words unknown

* II. p. 58.

to Paul's authentic Epistles are set down as only 183. Holtzmann's statement is perhaps misleading; but his lists show that the 183 ought to be added to the 171. In the first edition the numbers are not given, but instead there is a useful list of the words themselves, which is now omitted. A few lines further on the curious remark is retained that ἐκρέβεια is "a post-apostolic production." It is meant, presumably that it is not found in undisputed Apostolical writings. That this circumstance is accidental may perhaps be inferred from the use of ἀκρέβεια and ἀκρεβή, in Romans. It is amusing to find Dr. Davidson expressing a devout faith in the book of Tobit. He says, "if it was believed that angels appeared in the form of men, as we know they did from the book of Tobit."* Doubtless his real meaning would require the substitution of "it was" for "they did." The Epistle of Polycarp receives unequal treatment. As a testimony to 1st Thessalonians, and on many other occasions, it is cited as though it were genuine †; but when we come to 2nd Thessalonians we are informed that the Epistle is not authentic, ‡ and the same statement is repeated elsewhere. § When we seek for further information, we learn in one passage that Ritschl has shown that its date is between 160 and 170 A.D., after Polycarp's death, || and in another that Ritschl "supposes interpolation in various places," and that its date is between 147 and 167. ¶ These casual instances may show that the work would bear a little revision; but allowance must be made for the very condensed form in which the necessary matter has to be imparted, and for the inevitable occurrence of slight oversights in volumes replete with such a multiplicity of detail. We may not be able to acquiesce in all Dr. Davidson's judgments; but his work will be indispensable to the student who wishes to know the present state of the criticism of the New Testament and has not yet acquired facility in the use of German, and the more advanced scholar will weigh the author's conclusions with the care and respect which are due to the conscientious devotion of so many years to such important and difficult investigations.

JAMES DRUMMOND.

MR. BURGESS'S NOTES ON THE HEBREW PSALMS.**

THE writer of these volumes has carefully limited the scope of his work. He does not offer a treatise on the Psalm-book, regarded as a whole, and hence he takes no heed of the problems concerning the origin of its collections, or the circumstances and date of its completion. Nor does he attempt any full account of the separate poems, and he

* I. p. 256.

† I. pp. 9, 41, 85, 117, 157, &c.

‡ I. p. 337.

§ II. p. 207; see also II. p. 166.

|| II. p. 36.

¶ II. p. 328-9.

** *Notes, chiefly Critical and Philological, on the Hebrew Psalms.* By WILLIAM ROSCOE BURGESS, M.A. Vol. I., 1879; Vol. II., 1881. London: Williams and Norgate.

rarely drops any observations on their probable authorship. He has for the most part confined himself to annotations on difficult passages, chiefly of a grammatical and philological kind. These give ample evidence of long and devoted study of the text; and many of the suggested emendations have a probability about them which entitles them to respectful consideration, while they are certainly the fruit of laborious meditation. In some of his criticism he has, no doubt, been anticipated by other writers; but this need not lessen their independent merit, as it appears doubtful how far the author is familiar with the later exegesis of foreign scholars. His results are often announced with great modesty; but some of those about which he expresses a confidence almost amounting to demonstration seem unlikely to gain general assent. Thus in Ps. xl. 7, he proposes to read *asham* for *oznayim*. This suggestion is founded on several considerations, of which the two chief are—(1) That the word *asham* is needed to complete the list of sacrifices named in the verse; and (2) That it will, at least, explain, if not justify the rendering $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$, in the LXX., “adopted by St. Paul in Heb. x. 5.’ These considerations touch two of the weak places in Mr. Burgess’s method. As for the LXX., to which he generally appears to ascribe a critical value far above its deserts, he does not notice that all the other Greek versions, and even many MSS. of the LXX. itself, read $\acute{\epsilon}\rho\tau\alpha$, while the Vulgate has *aures*, which implies that the word $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ is of very doubtful parentage (see Hupfeld’s note *in loc.*). The constant use of the LXX. without adequate critical safeguards, tends sometimes, we think, to lead Mr. Burgess astray. Next, however, and more seriously, the endeavour to vindicate a place for the word *asham* is connected with a theory of the Pentateuchal sacrifices which recent research cannot be said to sustain. Mr. Burgess treats the Levitical law as if it were undoubtedly Mosaic, and attaches to the narratives of patriarchal sacrifice a significance which we are convinced they will not bear. He attempts on this basis to establish a theory as to the meaning of certain Levitical ordinances, which he then applies to this and other Psalms (*e.g.*, Ps. li.); and this is regarded as a key to what the author represents as the complex relations between Yahveh and his people. The subject is a large one we can only express our total dissent from the author’s fundamental conceptions. The Pentateuch and the Psalms cannot be employed for mutual illustration until the innumerable questions attending the rise and form of the laws and the dates of the poems have been at least partially solved. Mr. Burgess finds the uncertainty all on one side. He is commendably free from undue adherence to traditional titles; but he is content to support the claim advanced on behalf of Ps. xc. to Mosaic authorship by reference to the so-called Song of Moses, in Deut. xxxii. Mr. Burgess professes that he does not understand the “higher criticism” of Ewald; but till he has, at least, seen that it has a meaning, and must be answered, instead of peremptorily dismissed, we fear that much of his patience and labour will fail to win the success which they deserve.

J. E. C.

CANON KENNEDY AND SIR E. BECKET ON THE REVISED NEW TESTAMENT.

CANON KENNEDY'S Lectures* on the Interpretation of the Bible, the Revised Text of the New Testament, and the Revised Version, having been delivered before a cathedral congregation presumably ignorant of Greek and of the technical matters of Biblical criticism, have some features of their own which entitle them to a recognised place in the ever-increasing literature of comment and criticism of the Revised New Testament. While popular in style and treatment, and necessarily rather slight in structure, they have a solid foundation of sound learning and scholarship, and they set forth in a fresh and effective way some of the special points of interest in New Testament criticism and interpretation.

In discussing the merits of the Version, Canon Kennedy, being himself a member of the Company of Revisers, naturally selects for comment passages which he considers strikingly improved by the process which they have undergone. He gives, amongst other things, a detailed defence of the much-abused change of "charity" to "love" in 1 Cor. xiii. There is another piece of careful criticism in the Appendix, where he considers the different renderings of Rom. ix. 5, defending, as the only true and unobjectionable one, "And of whom is the Christ after the flesh. He who is over all is God, blessed for ever." The argument is an excellent specimen of the author's habitually candid and scholarly treatment of subjects into the discussion of which theological prejudices and heated partizanship are apt to be imported. Indeed, the calmness, moderation, and frankness which mark the whole volume are in refreshing contrast with the tone which is so often assumed in the severe course of criticism which the Revised Version is undergoing; and the modesty, amounting almost to diffidence, with which one of the most eminent of Greek scholars applies his learning, and avoids the very appearance of *ex cathedra* dictation, demands cordial recognition. The very full and carefully-compiled list of Select Textual Corrections, given at the end of the volume, containing all that are of any conceivable significance, will be a great convenience to the English reader who wants to know what the alterations in the text really amount to.

The answer of the Chancellor and Vicar-General of York to the question whether the Revised New Testament should be authorised,† takes the form of a resolute and emphatic renunciation of the revisers and all their works. In some respects Sir Edmund Becket has an

* *Ely Lectures on the Revised Version of the New Testament; with an Appendix containing the Chief Textual Changes.* By B. H. KENNEDY, D.D., Canon of Ely. London: Bentley. 1882.

† *Should the Revised New Testament be authorised?* By SIR EDMUND BECKET, Bart., LL.D., Q.C., L.R.A.S., Chancellor and Vicar-General of York. London: Murray. 1882.

advantage in coming into court after the first great outburst of theologico-critical wrath in the *Quarterly Review*. His style, always smart and incisive, often satirical, sometimes contemptuous, appears reasonable and polished by comparison. He goes nearly as far as the Reviewer in accusing the revisers of literary offences of the most heinous kind; but he refrains from charging them with ignorance, want of scholarship, absolute dishonesty, and even defective orthodoxy, being content with exposing what he considers their presumption and bad taste, their inability to write good English, and their general recklessness and wanton love of change. He contends that they have wilfully disregarded their instructions, and that the greater part of the alterations which have been made are unnecessary and injurious. He finds in the revision only "that kind of exactness of construing which is expected from schoolboys who have only to show their knowledge of Greek and have their words forgotten next minute; not to write an English book to last for ages, and be heard and read by everybody to whom the spirit and substantial meaning of the original is infinitely more important than the letter." There are some good remarks on the injurious results of attempting to apply a rule of "uniformity of rendering" which is based on the false assumption that the corresponding words in two different languages must cover the same meaning, or be used invariably in the same sense. No doubt this studied uniformity is less inconsistent with good and intelligent translation in the case of the New Testament writings than it would be in that of works of more purely literary quality, and with a wider intellectual range. But it must have a tendency to stiffen the more flexible elements of the original, while it is, at the same time, often fatal to a good English style; and it is far from being the necessary alternative to the studied variety which King James's translators aimed at. It must be allowed, also, that the revisers have shown a certain amount of pedantic grammatical precision where no such precision existed or was intended in the original. But, after making every reasonable admission of this kind, we feel that the relentless critic enormously and even ridiculously exaggerates the mischief done when he characterises the version as one "of exact verbal construing, sometimes into harsh and bald language, and such as no man ever used, literate or illiterate; with strange confusions of tenses, and articles, and phrases never heard before, and sometimes approaching and actually reaching nonsense." After thus opening his case, Sir Edmund Becket undertakes to prove it in detail by an examination of some of the chief changes made in three entire books, the Gospel of S. Matthew, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Apocalypse. As may be supposed, he is prepared to dispute almost every alteration, and he does it with much acute literary criticism; and although a large part of it is only the expression of a pure, unyielding literary conservatism, he certainly makes out a very good case as against many instances of changes which do not appreciably affect the sense, while they do spoil the rhythm and destroy the harmony of many a familiar phrase. His examination of the three books will be

of much service as a definite statement of the passages to which the conversative critics take exception. However far he may carry his readers with him, we think that very few impartial judges will admit that he has justified his final decision that there are from 1,000 to 1,200 distinctly bad alterations in the whole New Testament; and further (and worse) that "the Revisers' harsh, prosaic, uncomfortable, confused, undignified, pedantic, unidiomatic, and sometimes nonsensical English, is so ingrained into the whole book that it is impossible to treat the defects as occasional blemishes which might be picked out and cured one by one, as the infinitely fewer mistakes in the Authorised Version could be."

An attack so determined and elaborate as Sir Edmund Becket's challenges and requires a full and detailed defence. A vigorous rejoinder like that of Canon Farrar in the *Contemporary* serves its purpose as far as it goes. But, in the end, there will be nothing for it but to publish an authoritative, detailed statement of the grounds on which every substantial alteration has been made. Meanwhile, most Churchmen will acquiesce in Sir Edmund Becket's negative answer to the question, "Shall the Revised New Testament be authorised?"

We may mention in this connection a little book* which is the product of an enormous amount of laborious drudgery and of a certain kind of learning, and which may be described as a sort of caricature, or *reductio ad absurdum*, of the Revisers' rules for uniformity of rendering, and for marking the tenses, the article, and so on. Dr. Young has been hard at work for several years at the task of reducing the inconsistencies of the Authorised Version to a minimum, and he is not satisfied with what the Revisers have done in this direction. Amongst other things he finds that they have neglected the imperfect tense in five hundred cases; and recognising only one way of expressing the imperfect past in English, he tells us, for instance, that 1 Cor. xiii. 11, is *lit.* "As an infant I was speaking, as an infant I was thinking, as an infant I was reasoning; but when I have become a man I have made useless the things of the infant." (!) Dr. Young makes, when he can, an etymological analysis of the Greek words, and puts down what he calls the *literal* meaning. Accordingly we have, "*held together* by various diseases," "*setting ourselves together* to every conscience of men;" "the momentary lightness of our *pressure*," "*Superintendent, superintendent!*" (in Luke viii. 24); "*be easy minded*, O heavens," "God being over all, *well spoken of to the ages*." All this is seriously commended by the author "to the careful study of the children of God scattered abroad, in their researches into 'the oracles of truth,' as a help to a FUTURE REVISION."

* *Contributions to a New Revision; or, a Critical Companion to the New Testament.* By ROBERT YOUNG, LL.D. Edinburgh: G. A. Young and Co. 1881.

CANON WESTCOTT'S 'REVELATION OF THE RISEN LORD.'

THE "short studies" of which Canon Westcott's new volume* consists, are intended to serve as an Introduction or a Supplement to his previous work, *The Gospel of the Resurrection*. His aim in writing them was, he says, "to realise as distinctly as I could the characteristic teaching of each manifestation of the Risen Christ both in relation to the first disciples and in relation to ourselves." The result is, he thinks, "to place in a fuller light the circumstances under which the fact of the Resurrection was apprehended and the nature of the fact itself." This may be the result for those who share in the author's freedom from doubts or uncertainties as to the historical character of even the smallest details of the events and sayings here discussed. But no one who has appreciated the consequences of the application of the principles of historical criticism to the Gospel documents, and especially to those portions of them with which Canon Westcott is here dealing, need expect to find in these pulpit studies much help towards solving the difficult problems which they present. To the orthodox divine the different reports of the reappearance of Christ after his crucifixion are absolutely authentic and exact, and the various manifestations, so far from being in any way difficult to harmonise, or indeed to conceive at all, arrange themselves in well-ordered sequence, each being a special revelation, with a new lesson once given and never repeated.

It is impossible here to enter upon the difficult and far-reaching questions connected with the whole subject. We can only say that we agree entirely with Canon Westcott when he says that at the present stage in the progress of religious thought we need "to realise with a historical, no less than with a spiritual insight, what lessons [the Bible] conveys, and in what shape." While we fail to discover many signs of real historical insight in his present work, there is much of the spiritual sort; and any religious-minded reader may find food for thought, and spiritual lessons which do not depend on the authenticity of the events and sayings with which they are here connected. In successive chapters each recorded manifestation is made to yield a special lesson. The appearance to Mary in the garden is the Revelation through Love; the walk to Emmaus is the Revelation through Thought; the story of the miraculous draught of fishes gives the Revelation in the Work of Life; and on these and the other topics he treats of Canon Westcott has much that is wise and good to say. In one of his chapters he quotes the well-known beautiful legend of the appearance of Christ to Peter, who was hurrying along the Appian Way to escape from the death to which he had been doomed. "Lord, whither goest thou?" he asks [with the same absence in the narrative of "emphasis and surprise" which Canon

* *The Revelation of the Risen Lord*. By BROOKS FOSS WESTCOTT, D.D., D.C.L., Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge; Canon of Peterborough. London: Macmillan. 1881.

Westcott notes in the records of the Resurrection]; and the Lord replies, "I go to Rome to be crucified afresh for thee." Next morning the prisoner was found by the keepers in his cell, from which he was to go forth to his martyrdom. It seems to us that Canon Westcott's observation on this beautiful and significant story, that "the tradition may be, only a thought clothed in an outward dress," may be applied to some, at least, of the other traditions which he has been considering, and which lose little of their beauty or significance when they, too, are regarded as a thought, a faith, an inward spiritual truth, clothed in an outward dress.

MR. WALTER LLOYD'S ESSAY ON UNIVERSAL REDEMPTION.*

NOW that the Churches on all sides are beginning to wake up from the false and hideous dream of everlasting torment inflicted by a God of never-dying vengeance, every earnest and effective word which is spoken on behalf of the Gospel of love and hope is sure to gain a hearing. In the devout, earnest, and thoughtful pages of Mr. Lloyd's essay, the cause of a high and hopeful faith is pleaded in a spirit with which we find ourselves in entire sympathy. It betrays no sectarian bias, and the author's theological position is one which does not require him to exercise his ingenuity in reconciling the dictates of conscience and the spirit of the Gospel with the language of mediæval dogmas and ecclesiastical formulas, Anglican or other. He will not be listened to, indeed, as was Canon Farrar, whose glowing rhetorical descriptions and appeals were so stimulating, and whose preaching of what his hearers often must have found it hard to distinguish from Universalism, had the advantage of being delivered in a cathedral pulpit. Canon Farrar has since taken pains to explain, define, and qualify what he was popularly understood to have taught in his sermons on the Eternal Hope; and he has shown that in some respects he does not fully appreciate his own position, or measure the extent and depth of the convictions which his own teachings have done so much to awaken. Mr. Lloyd says, naturally enough, that Canon Farrar does not go far enough for him; and he is able to consider the great controversy and its issues in a much freer and more consistent way. His purpose, indeed, is not a controversial one, and he does not spend his time in attacking and exposing over again the immorality and impiety of what we may happily begin to hesitate about calling the "popular" doctrine of eternal punishment. He seeks rather "to advocate a definite and hopeful scheme of universal redemption." A *definite scheme*, however, is too much (or we might better say too little) for any one to attempt who is as alive as our author is to the danger of narrowing our view and materialising our conceptions of the unseen life. And we do not, in fact,

* *The Hope of the World: an Essay on Universal Redemption.* By WALTER LLOYD. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co. 1881.

find that he has any definite scheme to propound, but rather a faith and a hope which are founded on our own spiritual experiences and moral convictions, and which reconstruct for us a future far less definite than that which is presented in the current creeds of Christendom, which are, in large measure, formed by the literalising of figure and parable, and the materialising of mystic visions of the New Jerusalem. The true hope of the world is in a future of spiritual order and happiness, of spiritual progress; and this, as Mr. Lloyd shows, is the hope which the Gospel gives to men when they enter into its spirit and the inner truth of its teaching. He forcibly contrasts the deadening effects of fear and despair, with the redeeming influences of hope and trust; and, in a thoughtful chapter on "The Judgment," he shows how we sit in judgment on ourselves now, and how, to one who knows what it is thus to arraign himself at the bar of conscience, the judgment which is represented as following death will be no strange experience, while it is "reasonable and pious to believe that it will be a starting-point for a new career under clearer light and with increased advantages." This is the natural conclusion to draw from our moral experience here; and on the same grounds we may conceive of conscience as still giving its warnings and its verdicts in the future state, in which case the so-called Last Judgment would certainly present itself to the mind in a different light from that in which it appears in the New Testament as ordinarily interpreted.

The value of Mr. Lloyd's thoughtful and earnest teachings consists less in his treatment of the Scriptural texts which are the centres of controversy on the subject of future punishment, than in his successful attempt to present the great question with which he deals in its relation to our actual moral experience, and in the sympathy and insight with which he discerns the essential grounds of the immortal hope. He shows what we may be allowed to call a sort of spiritual common sense and reasonableness which must gain the attention of the reader whom he may fail to entirely satisfy; and when he makes his appeal to reason and conscience as the final arbiters of the great momentous question, he happily does not draw back, as some less consistent and far-seeing teachers have been inclined to do from the consequences of his own appeal, but accepts frankly and enforces earnestly the decision which reason and conscience pronounce.

THE GREAT SCHOOLMEN OF THE MIDDLE AGES.*

A BOOK like the present can only claim notice here as a sign of the interest which the Protestant sects are beginning to take in forms of thought remote, if not alien, from their own. Some time ago the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge so far extended its horizon

* *The Great Schoolmen of the Middle Ages.* By W. J. TOWNSEND. Hodder and Stoughton. 1881.

as to produce a set of volumes describing "Non-Christian Religious Systems;" and now we have an Evangelical Nonconformist reopening a phase of Christian thought hardly more akin to the opinions he himself professes. He has even a more ambitious object. He wishes not only to enlighten us as to the development of the Scholastic system, but "humbly seeks to aid in the reversal of the general verdict of condemnation passed on the Schoolmen," and to show "that, as contributors to the philosophical thought of Christendom, they aided enormously the cause of human progress" (p. 18). More moderately expressed we have not a word to say against such a scheme, provided only that the author be himself a philosopher and a competent Latin scholar, not to say an Orientalist. Mr. Townsend, however, is a mere compiler, relying, with scarcely an exception, upon second-hand authorities; and when he attempts to be original, simply proving his unfamiliarity with the rudiments of scholarship. German he does not profess to know, and sad havoc is made of the common authorities on the history of philosophy written in that language, when the translation comes to be adjusted and decorated afresh, after the usual manner of unintelligent book-makers. From English authors Mr. Townsend draws liberally. Passage after passage is boldly diluted from Milman—all his rhetoric expanded into bombast, and every telling phrase altered, as though with the help of a dictionary of synonyms.

Yet, however faulty in style and—we may add—grammar, and however restricted the authorities on which it is based, such a book, if carefully manufactured, might do good service in opening a little-known chapter in the history of thought to a wider circle of readers. Mr. Townsend's book, however, can only serve as a warning to compilers. To take a single instance, Albertus Magnus is said (p. 167) to have been "summoned to attend the Council of Lyons, and to aid in the deposition of the Emperor Frederick II.," who had been dead by this time twenty-four years. Mr. Townsend is ignorant of the previous Council (of 1245), which has the dubious credit of this act. After this one is not surprised to read that in 1272 "the Chair of St. Peter had been vacant about fifteen years" (p. 189), the compiler having innocently confounded the fifteen cardinals with the three years during which their quarrels prevented any election to the see. But the real objection which makes this book worse than useless, is not its uniform inaccuracy, but the animus by which it is inspired. Regardless of the differing needs of society in different ages, perhaps hardly conscious of them, Mr. Townsend denounces everything Roman Catholic, and every State Church—root and branch. But his violence against both the parties in the great question of Ecclesiastical politics, which runs through the Middle Ages (p. 82), is a little indiscreet, since all his heroes took one side or the other in it; and when he shows an unmistakable admiration of some whose pantheism is, to him, commendable, solely because it was contrary to the religion of Rome, we cannot but be reminded of the Monophysites of Egypt, who betrayed their country to the Mohammadan invaders rather than combine with

their Christian rivals and co-heretics—the Monothelites. Mr. Townsend, in fact, for the same reason delights in exhuming the forgotten heresies even of men like St. Anselm; and, although he utters a passing warning against “the errors of Hegel,” makes no secret of the more energetic vitality of his own polemical Protestantism than of his Evangelical orthodoxy. But we are making too much of Mr. Townsend and his opinions. Let it only be added that the book contains the lives of the leading Schoolmen—starting from Alouin, of all people, whose “scholastic” activity was strictly that of a schoolmaster—with an arid recital of their views, an eternal ringing of the changes on Universals and Individuals, Realism and Nominalism, with none of the life with which their teaching truly was animated, and treated without perspicuity or discrimination. It is, perhaps, a truism, but one of which the justice is repeatedly suggested by books like this, that only a master can make a difficult subject at once plain and popular.

As a contrast to this superficial performance, we may be allowed to point to three lectures on *Wyclif's Place in History* by Professor Montagu Burrows,* doubly valuable just now, both as containing a clear and interesting sketch of perhaps the greatest of the schoolmen, and as drawing attention to the importance of the publication of his complete works, a task for the execution of which we are happy to observe that a Wyclif Society is on the point of foundation. It is to be hoped that this society, which Mr. Furnivall (8, St. George's Square, N.W.) is organising, will meet with the wide and national support which it deserves.

R. L. P.

THE MAKING OF ENGLAND.†

THIS important book has a singular interest from its bearing upon the previous work by which Mr. Green exerted so astonishing an influence upon the popular appreciation of our history. Readers of his *Short History of the English People* are aware that its earlier portions represent the author's most careful researches, and, indeed, stand alone in the imagination and freshness with which they illuminate a period which we are accustomed to pass over summarily and with the baldest treatment. The life which Mr. Green kindled in his subject was so novel, that with many of our stricter scholars he provoked a strong prejudice against what he no doubt regarded as the best part of his book; and it is curious to note that when he enlarged the *Short History* to the compass of four volumes he stripped the earlier pages of not a little of

* *Wyclif's Place in History*. By MONTAGU BURROWS, M.A., Chichele Professor of Modern History at Oxford. W. Isbister, Limited. 1882.

† *The Making of England*. By JOHN RICHARD GREEN, M.A., LL.D., Honorary Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford. Macmillan and Co. 1881.

their remarkable individuality. The plan of the work did not allow of foot-notes, and Mr. Green perhaps came to feel that it was unfair to make such large demands on the confidence of his readers without detailed justification. This justification, indeed, he possessed, but ill-health prevented him from completing it in a shape fit for publication. At length, in the volume before us, we are offered an instalment, reaching as far as the union of the English kingdoms under Egbert; and if we are too often interrupted by symptoms of haste and want of care, it must not be forgotten that the old excuse unfortunately still holds good, and the date of the preface from Mentone may silence criticism of the trivial errors, discrepancies, and irregularities (for instance, in the spelling of proper names) which abound in the book.

Its relation to the *History of the English People* may be briefly pointed out. Seventy-two pages of the first volume of that work are now augmented six-fold; but the most striking difference is the copious apparatus of references by which the new book is supported. At the same time, though the bulk of the former is reprinted with little change, the arrangement, and, indeed, the whole scope, of the latter, however similar, is new and on a larger scale. It starts not from the English home in Schleswig, but from Roman Britain: it is not only a study of the growth of the several tribes of invaders into one "English People," but also a geographical history (if the term may be used) of the land itself.

This geographical treatment is one of Mr. Green's principal excellences. His power of grasping and reproducing the local situation and the local necessities of events reminds one constantly of Dean Stanley, with whom, however different his style, he has in common a delight in allusion and reminiscence, always suggestive if occasionally far-fetched. The course of the English immigration and the gradual settlement are worked out with exquisite skill. Mr. Green makes one see precisely the "lie" (as he would say) of the ground, how far progress was possible, the lines where it *must* have been arrested by natural obstacles, equally with those at which we know it to have been checked by the arms of the British. Such a reconstruction of the stages in the settlement, as lucid as it is sensitive, must once for all replace the bare catalogue of dates and names which has hitherto stood for our earliest history. But in other respects the book cannot claim so universal an acknowledgment. Mr. Green, as a thorough-going disciple of Mr. Freeman, refuses to allow any appreciable mixture between the British inhabitants and their German conquerors, at least until the period of the later overthrow of the natives of the West of England. He relies solely upon the very scanty records of the invasion, and leaves out of view the opposite and unanimous testimony of anthropology, to say nothing of the problems involved in the development of the national character, which is nearly inexplicable unless we consider its Celtic admixture. Even should we accept Mr. Green's conclusions, it is unpardonable that he should not even mention the existence of any other view of the question, and the frequent references to Dr. Stubbs should certainly be guarded by the

admission that he cannot be cited as an uncompromising supporter of the theory which Mr. Green advocates. Dr. Stubbs is far too learned to be a dogmatist, especially on such doubtful ground.

Important as is this question of the survival or extermination of the Britons, its decision does not influence more than a small fragment of Mr. Green's book. For the rest our admiration hardly needs qualifying. It may be said that the book would gain in unity if it were not so long and consequently had fewer repetitions. But it is a wonderful feat to have succeeded in such a task as Mr. Green set himself to, and to have sustained throughout his unflagging energy, which stirs the dullest incident into life, and a charm of style, which not even his many affectations can seriously impair. If we were to single out passages (not in his former works) specially illustrative of his peculiar power, we would point to his account of the old civilisation and Christianity of Ireland (pp. 277—290), or to pieces of local exposition such as those relating to the Forest of Arden (pp. 847—851) and the British stronghold of Elmet (pp. 254—256).

R. L. P.

PROFESSOR BAIN'S STUDIES OF JAMES MILL AND JOHN STUART MILL.

IT would not be easy for any biographer to infuse much human interest into an authentic account of what can be known of the personal history of James Mill; and it is certainly no reproach to Professor Bain that he has failed to do this. While duly acknowledging the laborious and conscientious research of which we have the fruits in the first of the volumes before us,* we cannot help feeling that what we may call the personal, as distinguished from the literary and the social and political parts of the biography, have proved but a poor reward for the pains expended on them. There was not, after all, much that could be ascertained about Mill's career up to nearly his thirtieth year, and the story has to be eked out by "plausible conjectures" such as that "he must have been distinguished [at school] in the three R's," that he must have got on very rapidly, &c., &c. When we come to his college days we are chiefly told what he may be presumed to have done. Knowing who some of his fellow-students were, we may conjecture what friendships he may have contracted, and "may readily imagine his conversational encounters." What we do learn about him in his early Scotch home, and afterwards at the head of his own family in London, cannot be said to present him to us in a genial and attractive light. In fact, we grow indignant at what Dr. Bain very candidly reports of the demeanour of the philanthropist and reformer towards his wife and children, and we do not wonder that his biographer thinks it necessary to guard against the

* *James Mill, A Biography.* By ALEXANDER BAIN, LL.D., Emeritus Professor of Logic in the University of Aberdeen. London: Longmans, 1882.

inference that the children were made "entirely unhappy" by their father's system. At his best there is always something dry and pedantic about him. He was, as Professor Bain scientifically describes him, "chiefly a compound of Intellect and Will,"—a very effective combination, no doubt, for getting the work done which he and his fellow-Radicals set themselves to do, but forming a character which we may respect and admire, but certainly cannot feel any personal liking for.

The chief value of Professor Bain's study lies in the very full and detailed account which he gives of the thirty years or so of earnest, successful work which Mill did in London, and in the estimate we are enabled to form of the part he played in bringing about the first great effectual movements in the direction of reform in Education, Jurisprudence, Prison Discipline, Personal Liberty of Speech and Action, Parliamentary Representation,—and, in fact, in nearly every department of social and political life. Dr. Bain has not the art of presenting a very vivid or life-like portraiture of the men whose well-known names appear in his pages in connection with that of the hero of his story. But it is made evident that Mill was second to none of his associates in persistent energy, unswerving faith in his theories, and stiff adherence to principle; and he made his influence felt very effectually by some of his fellow-workers whose achievements fill a more conspicuous place in the literary and political annals of the time. We have a detailed account and analysis of all his more important articles in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, the *Westminster* and other Reviews, and of the books and pamphlets in which he promulgated his doctrines and defined the methods of giving effect to them. There were few of the burning questions of the time on which James Mill had not something to say, and his opinion was always a weighty one. There was a sort of dry intellectual enthusiasm about him, and a clear-headed intentness of purpose, which carried him through an immense amount of successful work. That work belongs essentially to a past stage in our national life, and though many of the principles so clearly laid down are permanently valid, the social and political writings in which they are embodied have not the intrinsic literary quality which would give them a continuous vitality. Dr. Bain, however, shows very clearly the historical interest they possess in connection with the movements which they influenced so much. It does not enter into Dr. Bain's scheme to give any detailed account or critique of James Mill's system of philosophy, though this would have been especially in his line. He says but little, therefore, of the *Analysis of the Human Mind*, giving a slight sketch of its contents, and a brief indication of what he considers its most signal merits and defects. It is curiously edifying to be reminded that "the section on the family affections is replete with the ideal of perfect domestic happiness."

It was well that the record of James Mill's strenuous life-work should have been made; and if in some respects it might have been set down with a more genial and picturesque pen than Dr. Bain usually wields, and if we might have desired in addition to the detailed information and

special criticism some more broad and general view of his work and estimate of his influence, we still cordially recognise the value of the book as it stands, and acknowledge our indebtedness for the service which no one else, perhaps, would have done for us with anything like the same conscientious thoroughness and accuracy.

The life and writings of John Stuart Mill are, in so many respects, of more present interest and lasting importance than those of his father, that Dr. Bain was bound in his case to undertake either a work on a more extensive scale, or else one with a more limited aim. He has chosen the latter course, and does not profess to give more than a criticism,* with some biographical details and reminiscences, designed to supplement the picture drawn in the Autobiography. A few minor additions and corrections to Mill's account of his early education are supplied, and in the pages which have more special interest, the author draws upon his own recollections of the second half of his friend's life. The last chapter is devoted to a critical estimate of Mill's character and influence, and there are some analyses of his mental composition, and observations (in relation to his marriage) on the causes of mutual attachment and other matters, which are very characteristic of the author of certain well-known class-books of mental and moral science. Professor Bain is a careful critic and by no means an indiscriminate admirer, and though we could wish, as in the case of his other study, for a greater breadth of view and living portraiture, he has given a contribution of considerable importance to the study of one of the representative thinkers of our time.

MR. COOKE'S 'LIFE AND WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON.'

MR. COOKE'S purpose in writing this very entertaining and serviceable account of Emerson † has been to furnish not so much a detailed biography as an introduction to the study of the works of this eminent essayist and poet. He has evidently given to his work much care and labour, and certainly not less love and enthusiasm.

The details of Emerson's connection during some years with the Unitarian ministry are very interesting, and naturally suggest the question whether he would have found it necessary to resign his pulpit if liberal Christian congregations had at that time entertained the views which are now widely prevalent among them as to what constitute the essentials of Christianity. The reason assigned for his giving up his congregational charge is that he and his people differed in regard to the celebration of the Lord's Supper. He was willing to conduct a comme-

* *John Stuart Mill: a Criticism; with Personal Recollections.*

† *Ralph Waldo Emerson: His Life, Writings, and Philosophy.* By GEORGE WILLIS COOKE. London: Sampson Low and Co. 1882.

morative service, but declined to partake himself of the bread and wine. So many members in almost every Free Christian congregation now share Emerson's scruples on this matter, that it would probably not be necessary in the present day for congregations and ministers who were otherwise in cordial sympathy with each other to sever their connection on this ground alone. Still less would Emerson's rejection of physical miracle and of all essential difference of kind between Jesus and other men necessitate in the present day his withdrawal from the ministry. If that most eloquent address to the senior class of the Divinity School of Harvard University which in 1838 so startled and distressed Henry Ware, jun., Andrews Norton, and other conspicuous Unitarian divines were to be now delivered for the first time before an assembly of Unitarian students and teachers, it is probable that the preponderant emotions which it would awaken would be those of admiration and sympathy. At all events, the features in it to which some of us might still take serious exception would not be those which chiefly pained and alarmed the Unitarian mind of 1838. It would be the Pantheistic element which peeps out here and there which would now perhaps cause some Free Christians to doubt whether Emerson's mind is in hearty agreement with the essential idea and spirit of the teachings of Jesus. The liberal theologian of the present day would rejoice to be reminded that "the excellence of Jesus, and of every true teacher, is that he affirms the Divinity in him and in us—not Christ himself between it and us;" and he would heartily endorse Emerson's doctrine that true self-reliance is only another name for self-renunciation, seeing that it is the rejection of all selfish aims and purposes in reverent obedience to that Divine Self in each of us, which is the indwelling Father, the Universal Mind, the Oversoul, harmony with whom is the soul's true health and wealth. So far Emerson's teaching appears to be in perfect accord with the inmost heart of Christianity.

It is when we seek to ascertain his views on the nature of *Sin*; it is when we ask what account he gives of that act of free choice whereby the human spirit may voluntarily reject the guidance of the Oversoul, and knowingly and deliberately seek its own pleasure in conscious violation of the sentiments of purity and justice which are the felt presence and authority of the Father within us, that the utterances of the Concord sage appear to us to become eminently unsatisfactory, and no longer to harmonise with the teachings of Jesus, or with the facts of our own moral consciousness. No writer more eloquently and earnestly urges upon his readers the infinite importance of obedience to the moral law, and the infallible certainty of just retribution.

Life (he truly says) invests itself with inevitable conditions, which the unwise seek to dodge, which one and another brags that he does not know; that they do not touch him; but the brag is on his lips, the conditions are in his soul. If he escapes them in one part, they attack him in another and more vital part. If he has escaped them in form, and in the appearance, it is because he has resisted his life, and fled from himself, and the retribution is so much death.

Surely the sinful act of choice by which the soul thus deliberately alienates itself from the Universal Mind is of all the acts of the soul the most momentous, and the most positive in its results, and yet Emerson tells us that "evil is merely privative, not absolute; it is like cold, which is the privation of heat." The same vein of thought shows itself in Emerson's agreement with Eckhart that the man who is tortured by self-reproach for some mean or dishonest act should not wish not to have sinned, for "man, though in brothels, or jails, or on gibbets, is on his way to all that is good and true." If this only means that the Universal Spirit of love and wisdom is ever over-ruling to good the effect of man's sinful choices, securing that the sin shall do uncompensated harm to no one save the sinner himself, and that for the sinner himself there will open out of the very desolation and agony that sin entails a renewed opportunity of reconciliation with the Indwelling Father, then we should say that this teaching is in harmony with the spirit of the Gospel of Jesus; but in such case we must add that Emerson's mode of expression is almost certain to mislead his readers, and not only to mislead them intellectually, but also to weaken that very consciousness of the infinite importance of right conduct which forms the burden of so many of his wisest and noblest writings. But we hardly think that Emerson's words are intended to have the above interpretation. Though he tells us that man can elect to obey or disobey the moral law, it would seem that he holds at the same time that the actual world of human society has passed through and is passing through the very best experience, and, indeed, the only possible experience; and though from the point of view of the Conscience it seems that very much which now is fearfully repulsive in society might have been, and would have been, absent if man had not, in the exercise of his free will, elected to obey his lower rather than his higher self, nevertheless, from the point of view of the Intellect (or, as we should rather say, from the point of view of a certain questionable metaphysical theory) every item in the life of individuals and nations is just as it should be, and the reflective man from this higher stand-point of the intellect may complacently look back upon his mean and selfish deeds as necessary rounds in the ladder whereby he is mounting Godward and heavenward. If this be Emerson's meaning—and this certainly is the meaning which many of his admirers attach to his words—then it would really seem that he is not wholly in accord with the inner spirit of Christianity, and it is hardly to be wondered at that religious associations, based on such principles, should speedily collapse for want of organic connection with the vital currents of Christian thought and feeling.

It is with great diffidence that we express dissent from so profound and honest a thinker as Emerson, but the present writer must make bold to say that, while the works of Emerson, and especially his poems, have been for thirty years among the books which he has most read and most loved, yet the conviction has grown upon him that Emerson is

mistaken in regarding sin when seen from the point of view of the Intellect as at all different from sin seen from the point of view of the Conscience. The unsophisticated intellect and the conscience give precisely the same verdict, and where the verdict appears to differ, it is because a false philosophical theory has supplanted the soul's intuitive perception and judgment. Neither from the stand-point of the intellect nor from that of the conscience is it other than absolutely bad and mischievous for the soul to choose a path which it knows to be forbidden by its higher self, and which can only be entered upon at the cost of conscious alienation from the Universal Mind. With very much of the mystical side of Emerson's teaching we thoroughly and thankfully sympathise. It is only when he carries his mysticism so far as to appear to obliterate altogether the independent causality, and therefore the true responsibility, of man that we are unable to follow him; for then he seems to us to leave the solid ground of healthy Theism, and to mount into the unsubstantial cloudland of a Pantheism as enervating as it is fascinating.

Mr. Cooke, however, gives a very different reading of Emerson's doctrine on this matter, and confidently classes him in the same distinctly Theistic category with Theodore Parker and F. W. Newman. Though we cannot agree with this opinion, we heartily recommend to our readers the careful perusal of the thoughtful chapters which form the conclusion of Mr. Cooke's treatise, and which treat successively of Emerson's views concerning Nature, Mind or the Oversoul, Intuition, Fate and Freedom, Immortality, and the Religion of the Soul. In these chapters ample materials are given for forming a judgment as to whether Mr. Cooke's or our account is most in accordance with the facts.

Mr. Cooke adverts to the report that Emerson has of late years drawn nearer to Orthodox Christianity, and, as a complete refutation of it, he cites a decisive letter from Emerson's son, Mr. Edward Waldo Emerson. There can be no doubt that the report is wholly groundless, but judging from the tone of Emerson's last utterance on religion, namely, the lecture on "The Preacher," printed in the *Unitarian Review* for January, 1880, we should be inclined to think that Emerson's hopes in regard to such religious societies as those of the Free Religious Association, which professedly dissociate themselves from Christianity, have undergone some such modification as that which Mr. O. B. Frothingham lately announced as the result of his experience.

We have taken up nearly all the space at our disposal in these thoughts concerning Emerson's attitude to Christianity, because it is on this point alone that serious difference of opinion can arise as to the accuracy of Mr. Cooke's representation. When he tells us of the stainless purity and beautiful simplicity of Emerson's character, of his unwearied diligence in the pursuit of truth, of his warm affection for his fellow men, of the marvellous synthesis in his nature of shrewd practical common sense with mystic insight into the deep things of the spirit, all must

admit the reality of these excellences so vividly depicted. It is pleasant, too, to read that amid all the ferment of novel schemes for the regeneration of society which characterised the state of New England thought during the decade which began about 1840, such as the establishment of Brook Farm, &c., Emerson is always found speaking the words of truth and soberness.

"While he saw," says Mr. Cooke, "much that was good in each of these reforms, gave to them his sympathy, fully entered into the spirit of the protest against old abuses and institutions that narrow and hinder, yet to him they were deficient and wrong. His demand was that men should trust in themselves, sit alone, and read the laws of their own natures. His method was the method of Jesus, making clean the inward life, seeking interior strength and renewal."

To the movement against slavery Emerson early gave his sympathies, and Mr. Cooke's readers will thank him for having culled for them many choice passages from his brave speeches on this exciting topic; nor will they be less grateful for having almost in full Emerson's admirable address on occasion of the assassination of Lincoln, in which he gives full expression to his thoughts about the war and the victory of the North, and his great love for the President whose loss he felt so keenly.

The chapter devoted to Emerson's poetry is very attractive, and the high praise given to this part of his literary creations does not seem to us excessive. Very interesting, too, is the description of Emerson's literary method, that is, the mode in which his spoken lectures were composed, and how these were afterwards condensed into the form in which they now appear in the printed volumes.

Taking Mr. Cooke's book as a whole, it is both carefully and attractively written, and will be found exceedingly useful both to those who have long been familiar with Emerson's thought, and also to those who feel tempted to make acquaintance with the thinker whom Carlyle so warmly loved, and to whom Professor Tyndall and other eminent men have expressed their deep indebtedness. The treatise we are describing is not a critical estimate of Emerson's true place as a thinker and writer (the time for such an estimate has not yet arrived), but it is what it aims to be, a genial and faithful guide and introduction to the study of Emerson's writings.

C. B. U.

VIGNOLI'S 'MYTH AND SCIENCE.'

THE Essay on 'Myth and Science'* is a noteworthy volume in *The International Science Series*. The author, an ardent Evolutionist, accepts in the main the views of Tylor and Herbert Spencer as to the genesis of primitive ideas of nature, but believes that he can trace the

* *Myth and Science; an Essay*. By TITO VIGNOLI. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co. 1882.

operation of the myth-forming faculty to an earlier source than previous writers have been able to do. He claims for his Essay two original features—1st, the discovery that it is to the pre-human animal kingdom that we must look for the primal source of myth; 2nd, the doctrine that myth and science are in their origin fundamentally the same. The originality of the second of these views is open to question, and with regard to the former we do not see that the author has satisfactorily established it, though no doubt in his endeavour to do so he says much that is instructive and suggestive. His opinion is that every animal by its psychical constitution ascribes to the objects that affect its senses a conscious life of the same kind as its own. The following passage will give some idea of his position:—

The primitive and constant act of all animals, including man, when external or internal sensation has opened to them the immense field of nature, is that of *entifying* [to *entify*—to regard as a substance or entity] the object of sensation, or, in a word, all phenomena. Such *entification* is the result of spontaneous necessity, by the law of the intrinsic faculty of perception; it is not the result of reflection, but it is immediate, innate, and inevitable. It is an eternal law of the evolution of the intelligence, like all those which rule the order of the world. . . . The animal therefore accepts the idea, suggested by his spontaneous and subjective nature, that phenomena are alive. Grass, fruits, plants, water, the movement of material bodies, ordinary and extraordinary meteors, all are implicitly apprehended by him as subjects endowed with will and purpose after the manner of mankind.

The reasons alleged for ascribing to the lower animals this faculty of personifying the objects of nature are by no means conclusive. It is very true that animals

turn against any object which has chanced to hurt them, or which has annoyed them by regular and repeated motions, and that they start at the sudden appearance or oscillation of some unlooked-for thing, at an unusual light, a colour, a stone, a plant, at the fluttering of branches, of clothes, or weathercocks, at the rush of water, at the slightest movement or sound in the twilight or in the darkness of night.

But all this may be accounted for by the play of association, and does not, we think, necessarily imply any feeling or judgment that the objects are self-conscious beings. For a mental act of this kind *voluntary* attention appears to be indispensable, and the only attention of which animals seem capable is *involuntary* or automatic attention. Vignoli maintains the complete identity of animals and men; but adds, "I believe the superiority of man to consist, not so much in new faculties as in the reflex effect upon themselves of those he possesses in common with the animals." It is strange that the same writer, who contends for the mental identity of men and animals, should yet hold that man is differentiated from the lower animals by "his deliberate *will*, which does not only immediately command his body and his manifold relative functions, but also the complex range of his psychical acts." Surely, the exclusive possession by man of this self-determining *will* utterly overthrows the assumed intellectual identity of animals and men; and it is this very will, this power of voluntary attention and self-determination, regarded

by Vignoli as wanting in the animals, which appears to be the indispensable condition of the recognition of a power other than one's own, and therefore of that personification of external objects, which Vignoli believes to have its source low down in the animal scale. But if our author has not made good his contention that mythology begins in the præ-human stage, he has yet done good service in tracing the progress of this personifying tendency in man, through the various phases which pass ultimately into the monotheistic idea. Nor is there much to take exception to in the chapter in which he seeks to show the common origin of science and of myth. The soundness of his argument becomes far more questionable when he maintains that the reflective process which has led to our present scientific conception of nature gradually but inevitably annihilates the mythological or superstitious view that nature is the expression of will and intelligence. We should rather say that in the primitive period of human thinking the phenomena of nature impressed the human mind in a two-fold manner, awakening, on the one hand, the sense of awe and wonder in the presence of a power or powers which the mind could not but conceive of as personal; and, on the other, the impulse to learn the method of action of this personal but super-human energy. Out of the first of these emotions has grown Religion; out of the second has grown Science. But while these two tendencies have worked, side by side, and have reciprocally affected each other, neither has in the slightest degree shown itself competent to perform the other's function, so that this other might be dispensed with. In the history of thought there has probably never been a time when it was more widely and deeply felt than it is now, that nature is only comprehensible when referred to spirit or thought as its cause or substance; and this view is by no means confined to professional theologians, but is constantly gaining ground with profounder thinkers, in both the scientific and the philosophical field.

C. B. U.

JAMES HINTON'S 'PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION.'

READERS of the article on 'James Hinton as a Religious Thinker,' which appeared in our pages (*Modern Review*, October, 1881, pp. 661-687) will recognise in Miss Caroline Haddon's volume* the first instalment of the selection from Mr. Hinton's unpublished papers, which was there mentioned as in preparation. It can have been no easy task to go through the great mass of unclassified memoranda of thoughts on the deepest questions of religion, ethics, and philosophy, which, we are told, Mr. Hinton would jot down, wherever he might be, in the street,

* *Philosophy and Religion, Selected from the Manuscripts of the Late James Hinton.* Edited by CAROLINE HADDON. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co. 1881.

in society, at a concert, at church, to be written out clearly in the evening. Whether this habit of constant self-inspection and thought-registering is altogether wholesome may be open to question; but it resulted, in this case, in the accumulation of an immense store of the materials out of which religions and philosophies are made. The selection which we have in the present volume is from the four large volumes (containing 2,500 closely-filled pages) which Mr. Hinton printed, but did not publish. The still more laborious duty remains to be fulfilled, of going through an equal mass of writings still in manuscript, which represent the later and more mature mind of the author in relation to those same questions which he was for ever looking at and turning over and over again; recording not merely the settled conclusions at which he arrived, but the mental processes by which he reached them.

A recently published criticism of one of the doctrines propounded in the volume before us, followed by some correspondence on the subject, suggests some doubts as to the judiciousness of selecting for publication, without any note or comment, passages which embody only a transient phase of the author's thought, while they put it in the form of the distinct assertion of a religious or philosophical doctrine. It may be a good mental discipline for an intent thinker and devoted seeker after truth to write down his daily reflections, and note the different stages of opinion by which he makes his way towards the truth; and if he is willing to place the entire register at our disposal *en masse*, he provides us with matter for a highly interesting psychological study. But when we have before us not the whole record but a particular portion chosen out and arranged for our convenience, we require some guide as to which are "processes" and which are "results," or, in other words, which are the opinions and speculations which were in the end modified or rejected, and which really express the writer's maturest conviction. No doubt we have such a guide in the Life of Mr. Hinton and in certain of his published writings; but this new representative book should speak for itself, and not require qualification and explanation from extraneous sources. It is not every reader who would understand all the bearings of the editorial remark in the preface, that "many of the things in these papers may seem at variance with the later utterances of the writer;" and Miss Haddon would have only done justice to the author if she had at least supplied a hint here or there as to which things these are.

The extracts given in the present volume are grouped under the titles—Metaphysics, Nature Known by the Moral Emotions, Mental Physiology, The Art of Thinking, The Self and Consciousness, The Bible, Holiness, Ethics. It would have been an additional help to the reader if the special subject of each passage had been noted in the margin, or at the head of the paragraphs, as well as in the list of the contents of each section. It requires considerable familiarity with Mr. Hinton's philosophy, and with the peculiar sense in which he uses certain words and phrases, to enable us to grasp his exact meaning, even when we *feel* the truth of what he says or

suggests. In what is most original and characteristic of our author there is a curious blending of the mystical with the scientific or rationalistic way of treating the problems of existence, which is likely enough to puzzle sometimes any one who comes to him fresh from the teachings either of the older mystics or the modern exponents of science. But he can seldom fail to set us thinking, putting old topics of debate in new lights, and boldly applying the principles of his philosophy to all the phenomena of Nature and of Life. It is essentially a religious philosophy, centred in the fact of a living God who is *known* by faith and love; and this inner vision and power of faith is insisted on with all the enthusiasm and fervent conviction of a mind fully possessed by the religious idea. The book is rich in the fruits of spiritual experience and moral insight, full of wise and noble teaching. No one whose faith has in it a vein of that mysticism which is inherent in Christianity, and is expressed in the beatitude, "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God," can help being drawn into sympathetic communion, both spiritual and intellectual, with the mind which has been so frankly self-revealed. And no one who has this sympathy can fail to gain much by practising under such guidance "the art of thinking" on subjects of the highest interest and the greatest moment.

CAROLINE FOX'S MEMORIES OF OLD FRIENDS.

THIS singularly delightful and attractive book* is one which no longer needs any introduction to our readers. It has been received with the heartiest welcome, on all hands, and it would be superfluous now to undertake the pleasant task of describing or criticising it. We gladly take the opportunity, however, of mentioning with unqualified commendation the new edition which has lately appeared, in which the only improvement which seemed possible has been made. It is published now in two moderate sized volumes, instead of the original quarto, which, comely as it was to look upon, was not convenient to handle; and it would not fit into its proper place on the shelf with our other special favourites. It would be as difficult now to find a fault in its outward form as it has been from the first to find one in its fascinating contents. The editor could not have done his part with more skill or sympathetic tact. There are no indiscreet confidences, or harsh or unkind judgments; indeed, we do not believe any would have been found if the whole of the record had been published. All is so natural and genuine, so full of bright intelligence and keen appreciation of whatever is true and good, clever, genial, and amusing, that the charm is irresistible; and we find ourselves at once in that mood of thorough sym-

* *Memories of Old Friends; being Extracts from the Journals and Letters of CAROLINE FOX, of Penjerrick, Cornwall. From 1885 to 1871. Edited by Horace N. Pym. Second Edition. To which are added Fourteen Original Letters from J. S. Mill, never before published. In two vols. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1882.*

pathy with the writer, which makes reading such a book as this almost like forming a personal friendship. This gentle Quakeress, "joining to the fine purities of her sect," as Carlyle said of the family at Penjerrick, "a reverence for human intelligence of all kinds," was happily gifted with that sense of humour which seems almost essential to the appreciation of the varieties of character, and which is usually associated with a talent for making vivid and picturesque memoranda of men and things. Even when there is only a brief mention of some one she had seen or met, we have generally some cleverly-sketched portrait or characteristic saying; and the fuller records of nearer acquaintance and more intimate friendship, as in the case especially of John Sterling, John Stuart Mill, and Mr. and Mrs. Carlyle, are of real importance, as contributions to our knowledge of persons of whom everything authentic that we can hear is interesting.

The new edition contains, in an Appendix, fourteen additional letters from J. S. Mill to Mr. Barclay Fox. They have not so much in them of personal interest as has the one which had already been published; but they are well worth reading, and they help to complete the accounts of the writer's intercourse with the Fox family.

THE POET'S BIBLE. NEW TESTAMENT SECTION.*

MR. HORDER'S collection of poems, designed to set forth and illustrate the scenes and characters of the New Testament, is in many respects a beautiful and interesting volume. It appears in a very attractive outward form, and its contents are so chosen and arranged as to give a clear view of what our literature, with some comparatively unimportant contributions from foreign sources, can furnish in the way of poetical illustration and exposition of the Gospel history. The editor's rule of excluding from his pages anything that would "indicate the ecclesiastical preferences of the writers" has, of course, limited his choice very considerably in many quarters; and the pieces chosen from any writers (with one exception) before the present century, may almost be counted on the fingers. The exception is Crashaw, of whose Sacred Epigrams no less than forty-eight are included, a good many of them being the translations by Dr. Grosart and others, from Crashaw's Latin. The point of the greater number of these epigrams consists in nothing more than a "conceit," often a mere play upon words; and Mr. Horder might well have largely reduced his list by the omission of such specimens of sacred wit as this, on the Miracle of the Loaves :

Now, Lord, or never, they'll believe on Thee;
Thou to their teeth hast prov'd Thy deity.

* *The Poet's Bible.* Selected and edited by W. GARRETT HORDER, Editor of 'The Book of Praise for Children.' *New Testament Section.* London: W. Isbister 1881.

It is difficult to see how this sets forth or illustrates the scene it refers to.

It is not till he comes down to the last half-century, beginning with the publication of the *Christian Year*, that the editor finds any copious sources from which to draw the poetic material which exactly suits his purpose; and a large number of the names which appear in his pages are those of writers still living, or but lately dead. Amongst them there are few who are in the first rank among the poets. Tennyson is unfortunately absent, because the editor could not obtain permission to print the stanzas on Mary and Lazarus, from 'In Memoriam,' and those on Stephen, in 'The Two Voices,' to which might have been added the tragically pathetic song of the little maid, in 'Guinivere,' "Late, late, so late!" We have Mrs. Browning's 'The Virgin Mary to the Child Jesus;' the three fine sonnets on St. Peter's Betrayal; and the exquisite one which the editor has chosen to entitle, 'The Unchanging Christ,' instead of 'Comfort,' which is its title in the original. Robert Browning's wonderfully subtle study, 'Karahish, the Arab Physician,' appears in the Appendix, in company with two pieces translated from Jacopone da Todi, by Mr. J. A. Symonds, which also "travel a little beyond the limits of the sacred story." The great bulk of the poems which make up the volume are works, not of genius and the highest literary art, but of fine poetic faculty, religious feeling and insight finding utterance in expressive verse which has often much beauty and artistic quality. The names of Keble, Newman, Trench, Alford and MacDonald, Lynch, Moultrie and Mansell, are all, to some extent, representative names among the writers of sacred poetry; and another poet and divine, whose name appears frequently in this volume—Dean Plumptre—will certainly hold a conspicuous place among those who have contributed to the store of poetical illustration and interpretation of Scripture. Mr. Horder has been fortunate in having at his disposal Dr. Plumptre's collection of unpublished poems on the 'Gospels and Epistles;' and the pieces he has chosen from it are among the most striking specimens the volume contains, showing the touch of a skilled religious artist and thoughtful interpreter. We shall look with much interest for the appearance of the complete series. Almost as new to the majority of readers will be Dr. George MacDonald's series of poems on the Gospel women. The volume in which they were published some eighteen years ago has been, we believe, for some time out of print, and while placing them at Mr. Horder's disposal, the author has almost rewritten them. We think that Dr. MacDonald's literary power is most conspicuous in his best prose works; but many of these short poems are marked by a true poetic feeling and spiritual insight, which entitle them to a distinguished place in this collection.

The chief point in which we should be inclined to question the editor's discretion is the inclusion of a good many pieces which are somewhat weak and diffuse in expression—pretty rather than beautiful. A poetical version of a Scripture scene is apt, except in the most skilful

hands, to be a weaker expansion of the original text, taking its essential beauty and truth, and thinning and spreading it out over a certain number of verses. Such pieces as those of Mr. N. P. Willis, for instance, while they have an undeniable grace and delicacy of expression, have a prevailing element of diffuse pictorial fancy which distracts the attention from the central significance of the scene he describes, and directs it too much to accessories and multifarious details, many of which indeed are purely imaginary. We could have spared, too, some of the poems, which are mainly didactic, consisting chiefly in an "application" of the chosen text, and doing little in the way of actual illustration and interpretation of the original. Probably if the collection had been reduced by about one-fifth, the remainder would have made a more complete and harmonious whole. But as it is, it is full of interest and religious value, and the editor has thus far executed his pleasant task so successfully, that he has every encouragement to complete it in the volume which is to deal with the Old Testament.

MR. MORLEY'S 'ENGLISH LITERATURE OF THE REIGN OF VICTORIA.'*

IN publishing, as the two thousandth volume of his English series, Mr. Henry Morley's sketch of our modern literature, Baron Tauchnitz has done a service not only to the readers of the previous one thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine volumes, chiefly novels, but to all who can appreciate a very pleasant and readable account of the literary fruits of home growth during the last half-century. To no more thorough expert than Mr. Morley could the task have been committed of sorting out, describing, and appraising our rich and varied gains which have been accumulating since the accession of Queen Victoria; but it remained to be seen whether he could accomplish it with any satisfaction to himself and his readers within the scanty limits of a Tauchnitz volume. He has succeeded in producing a work of considerable permanent value, and of unmistakable present interest. Avoiding the danger of making his little book the mere catalogue of a long series of works which he has such scanty room to describe or criticise, he has selected for special notice the really important writers, and has managed to tell us enough of most of them to give a personal interest to his sketch, and to make his criticisms intelligible and suggestive. In certain cases, indeed, we think he has been led to devote too much of his limited space to a more detailed biographical account than his scheme required. For instance, Carlyle has twenty-two pages allotted to him, chiefly biographical; and a fifteenth part of the whole extent of Mr. Morley's canvas seems too much to devote to this one

* *Of English Literature of the Reign of Victoria. With a Glance at the Past.* By HENRY MORLEY, Professor of English Literature at University College, London. Tauchnitz Edition, Volume 2,000. With a Frontispiece. Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz. 1881.

figure, strikingly picturesque as it is. Wordsworth's life, too, which (with Southey's) did not properly belong to the Victorian period, occupies a good many pages; and we would rather have had, in such cases, less narrative and more criticism. There is a disproportion between the three pages and a half given to Thomas Campbell, and the two dozen lines (ten of which are quotation) in which Mr. Ruskin is disposed of. James Montgomery, again, has nearly two pages, while Matthew Arnold is allowed four lines, Dante Rossetti two lines and a-half, and Swinburne still fewer. It is rather surprising that no attempt should have been made to give an estimate of any kind of Tennyson's genius and influence; and that Mr. Swinburne, the founder of a distinct school of poetry, and the centre of a host of imitators, should have been dismissed with the perfunctory remark, that "he has long since taken his place among the poets." No doubt it is difficult to decide what names have a claim to be included in a handbook of this sort, after those which are in the first ranks of our literature; but, considering how many of minor importance are to be found here, some of the omissions are rather strange. There are certainly some who have a slighter claim than Aubrey de Vere, A. H. Clough, Coventry Patmore, Charles Tennyson Turner, W. Bell Scott, Robert Buchanan, among the poets; and in the various departments of prose literature we might have expected to find the names, at least, of Leslie Stephen, Goldwin Smith, W. R. Greg, Max Müller, Adolphus Trollope, J. A. Symonds—to mention only the first half-dozen which occur to us. In the preliminary chapters the author gives a "glance at the past," with a brief account of the leading epochs of our literature, in connection with the course of our national history—a *résumé* which he is peculiarly qualified to make. The little book is very pleasant reading, from the first page to the last, and it may be cordially recommended to that large circle of readers to whom the chief names in our literature have a familiar sound, but who have a very vague idea, if any, of the personages and the works to which they belong.

MATABELE LAND.

MR. C. G. OATES need not have had the misgivings which he expresses in his Preface, as to the advisability of preparing this transcript of the brief opening chapter of his brother's work as a traveller and naturalist—the opening chapter, and, unhappily, the closing one too.* The book, in spite of the inevitable loss to the reader in not having the traveller's own completed record of his experiences, has many features of special interest. It is one in which we can read "between the lines;" and we should value it were it only for the introduction it gives us to the fine, manly young fellow—so frank, brave, and open-

* *Matabele Land and the Victoria Falls. A Naturalist's Wanderings in the Interior of South Africa.* From the Letters and Journals of the late FRANK OATES. Edited by C. G. OATES, B.A. London: Kegan Paul. 1881.

hearted, who is self-pictured in the unaffected pages from his letters and diaries. From these his brother has compiled such record as could now be given of the "little trip," as he called it, which was to have put him in training for future explorations beyond what is now the more or less beaten track of twelve hundred miles or so, between Durban and the Zambesi Falls. As far as the accounts of the expedition are concerned, the main interest lies in the impression they give us of the ordinary toils, difficulties, and annoyances, and occasional dangers of travel through the territories of the South African tribes who have been obliged to tolerate our presence, and allow us a right of way. We get a good deal of insight into the manners and customs and general character of the people, both natives and settlers, on whose good will and service the traveller has to rely. In every case of hindrance and threatened mischief, Mr. Oates displays all the best qualities of a plucky Englishman, and by patience, tact, and fair play, makes his way through difficulties that were often disheartening enough. Unhappily, there were various vexatious delays, and there were irresistible temptations to crowd too much into one journey, and to linger in the new fields of interest which opened out to the traveller as he went; and when he arrived, at last, at the goal of his long expedition—the Zambesi Falls—the unhealthy season had set in, and he fell a victim to the fatal malaria—a sadly premature ending of a career that had opened with so much bright promise. He was but thirty-five years of age when he died.

From the brief memoir of Mr. Frank Oates which his brother has prefixed to the volume, we get a clear and strong impression of his character. "There was something singularly winning about him," wrote a friend, upon his death; "that peculiar combination of courage and gentleness, which is one of the finest traits of character." "His name," the Dean of Christ-Church wrote, "must be added to the list of those devoted and enterprising Englishmen, who 'scorn delights and live laborious days,' who, by their frank love of truth and justice have made our name respected from one hemisphere to another." That our name is, among the tribes we undertake to civilise and govern, always respected for those particular qualities we may indeed, with some shame, confess to be doubtful. And we can only say that if among our explorers, settlers, and governors, there were more men of the stamp of Frank Oates, we should have better reason to pride ourselves on our national repute. There are few readers of the pages which show so clearly what he was, and make us think regretfully of what he might have accomplished, who will not, with Dean Liddell, "grieve to think that so much manly spirit has so soon been quenched."

We have not room for any more detailed account of Mr. Oates's journey and its fruits. His letters and diaries are simple, unstudied memoranda of his daily experiences, which would no doubt have been largely supplemented by his own recollections if he had prepared his work for the press. What we especially miss is any adequate account of his natural history observations. Indeed, this main object of his journey

occupies but a small proportion of his pages, and the copious detailed catalogue of the scientific results of the expedition, in a rich collection of birds, insects, and botanical specimens, comes upon us almost as a surprise at the end. The hundred pages of Appendix, in which this is contained, is the part of the book which will have the most permanent value. Dr. George Rolleston has done the Ethnology, Mr. Bowdler Sharpe the Ornithology, Professor Westwood the Entomology, and Professor Oliver the Botany. The birds and insects are especially commended as being excellent representative collections; and the reader cannot help regretting that such a diligent collector and accurate observer had not enriched his journals with more systematic accounts of this part of his work. The book is illustrated with numerous wood engravings, and some copies, in chromo-lithography, of water-colour drawings done on the spot. These latter give an idea of the kind of scenery which the traveller in those regions makes acquaintance with,—not often, it would seem, very striking, or even interesting, and not seldom dull and ugly. Mr. Oates had been on his way for eight months before he came to the spot where he could at last “fancy that South Africa may have much fine scenery.”

FOREIGN CLASSICS FOR ENGLISH READERS.

MR. SIME'S account of the life and writings of Schiller* forms one of the most acceptable and satisfactory of the volumes yet published in the series of 'Foreign Classics.' The successive periods of the poet's literary activity are clearly characterised, and there is a sufficient description of his chief works to give the English reader a very good idea of their quality. The chapters that treat of the plays which the young student of German generally makes his first acquaintance with as an exercise in translation and parsing, may be strongly recommended as an antidote to the dry grammatical treatment to which they must be subjected; and the whole forms an excellent introduction to the study of Schiller, the use of which will certainly not be limited to those “English readers,” for whose benefit the series is primarily intended. In describing the Prose works, Mr. Sime makes the very safe remark that “they are generally acknowledged to have sterling merits,” and that the author's endeavours “to make ordinary readers feel the charm of history” “were attended by considerable success.” He does, however, subsequently criticise and discriminate; and when he comes to the prose writings which are of the most permanent value—the essays and letters in philosophy and literary criticism—he gives a careful and instructive estimate of them. The little book shows throughout what good work a biographer and critic, who really knows his subject, can do, even when “cabin'd, cribb'd, confin'd,” within the limits of a hand-book.

* *Schiller*. By JAMES SIME, M.A., Author of 'Lessing: his Life and Writings.' Edinburgh and London: Blackwood. 1862.

Jean de la Fontaine and the French fabulists who were before and after him furnish matter for, at any rate, a very entertaining volume,* and Mr. Collins has told as much as the ordinary reader is likely to care to know about works which, after all, cannot be said to fill a very distinguished place among the Foreign Classics. The opening chapters contain much curious and amusing information about the earlier forms of some well-known fables, and the sources from which La Fontaine got his subjects. Those who desire a fuller and more accurate knowledge of the whole matter will go to the writers whose literary labours have relieved Mr. Collins from the trouble of making much serious research on his account.

SOME NEW BOOKS FOR SUNDAY SCHOOLS.

WE can cordially recommend to those who are in want of Sunday lessons for young children three little books recently published by the Sunday School Association.† Mr. Bartram has followed up his *Stories from the Book of Genesis* (noticed in the *Modern Review* last year) by a not less successful attempt to apply the same "rational" method of treatment to the traditions of the life of Moses, without too much disturbing the impressions of the *naïf* freshness and picturesqueness of the original stories. The little book will be, like its predecessor, of real service to those who are unable any longer to "teach the Bible" to their children or scholars on the old lines, and yet who wish them to feel the charm of its early pages, and to enter afterwards into the varied meaning and interest of the national history to which they are the introduction.

The short and very simple and practical sermons by three experienced Sunday-school teachers are excellent specimens of what such addresses to children, especially the younger ones, should be. They are directly concerned with the experiences and ideas of the average Sunday scholar, and if other young people hear or read them at home, they must not be too critical when they happen not quite to meet their own case.

Mr. Vizard has taken a number of the more frequent and striking similes and metaphors occurring in the Bible, and made a study of each of them, bringing together into one view the different truths suggested by the figure as originally used, and taking it as the text of a religious or moral lesson of present application. The idea is a good one, and is well carried out; and any intelligent teacher ought to be able to use the book as the author intends it to be used, not as a mere series of chapters to be read in class, but as notes of lessons to be given according to the teacher's own method and experience, in his own language and with his own illustrations.

* *La Fontaine and other French Fabulists*. By the Rev. W. LUCAS COLLINS, M.A. Blackwood, 1882.

† *Stories from the Life of Moses*. By RICHARD BARTRAM.—*Short Sermons to Children*. By THREE COUSINS.—*Sacred Similes; being Notes for Teachers of Bible Classes and Others*. By P. E. VIZARD. London: Sunday School Association, 37, Norfolk Street, Strand. 1882.

THE MODERN REVIEW.

JULY, 1882.

THE BOOK OF WISDOM.*

THE books of the Apocrypha have suffered a curious neglect in modern times. The Protestant reformers are not really to blame for this. True, they followed the authority of the more critical of the Fathers in excluding them from the same dignity with those monuments of Israelite literature of which the originals exist in Hebrew or Chaldee; but the Church of England, for instance, never entirely banished the Apocrypha from her lectionary, and the now forgotten, though still statutory, Homilies, are actually full of citations from the books, on an equal level with the Hebrew Testament. The Book of Wisdom was to Cranmer, as it is still to the Roman Catholic Church, "the infallible and undeceivable Word of God." The Articles of the English Church are, however, more guarded in their language, and simply declare that "the other books (as Hierome saith) the Church doth read for example of life and instruction of manners; but yet doth it not apply them

* *Σοφία Σαλαμὼν*: *The Book of Wisdom, the Greek Text, the Latin Vulgate, and the Authorised English Version*: with an Introduction, Critical Apparatus, and a Commentary. By WILLIAM J. DEANE, M.A. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press. 1881. Quarto.

to establish any doctrine."* It is impossible not to connect the revulsion which changed this qualified acceptance into an unfriendly suspicion, with the decree of the Council of Trent which ordered the Apocryphal books to be received by the faithful under pain of anathema. From that day among decided Protestants the Apocrypha has been ignored; except in the High Church schools, it has hardly been read, never certainly studied. In the present century the British and Foreign Bible Society resolved to discontinue its publication, since the object of the Society was limited to the dissemination of the inspired word. The decision called forth a weighty and earnest protest from the present Bishop of Lincoln; but the controversy which followed had no effect, unless in arousing public interest in the condemned books. Uncultivated people still look upon them as something dangerous, and the present writer can remember, as a boy, the spurious books of the New Testament—more harmless, if possible, because making less claim upon one's confidence—being rigidly kept away from him as likely to affect his nascent Protestantism.

It is remarkable that even in so scholarly an edition as that which lies before us there is a continual apologetic tone with reference to, perhaps, the least exceptionable of the Apocryphal books. Mr. Deane holds that "the absence of sufficient proof of canonicity, and not any internal marks of error or inferiority, is the chief ground for assigning to" the Book of Wisdom "a lower place than the other writings of the Old Testament."† In this ambiguous middle position he is concerned to show "its perfect accordance with the word of God," and to defend it resolutely from any suspicion of foreign taint, as from Platonism; at the same time, he is much perplexed by the appearance of prophecy in it, and no less so by the circumstance that it is treated, as he thinks, by writers in the

* Articles of Religion, vi.

† Prolegomena, p. 39.

New Testament in this same lofty sense.* For instance, in the famous passage describing the persecution of the righteous,† he notices that "the Fathers have generally seen a prophecy of the Passion of Christ; and there are some wonderful coincidences of thought and language between it and the Gospel. . . . But the similarity may be owing partly to the Old Testament quotations embodied in the text, partly to the recurrence of each typical form of reproach in the Passion of Christ" (p. 120).

It must be confessed that this sort of treatment is a little disappointing after the promise held out in the preface. There Mr. Deane says, "In elucidating the text I have endeavoured to give the plain, grammatical, and historical meaning of each passage, illustrating it by reference to the writings of Philo, Josephus, the Alexandrian writers, and early Fathers; but I have been sparing of quotations from Christian authors, not from want of materials, but because I did not wish my work to assume a homiletical form, or to be burdened by reflections which an educated reader is able to make for himself."

But the fact is that the commentary is entirely Patristic: when the Fathers are not themselves cited Mr. Deane turns Father, and comments after their fashion. Of the Old Testament he hardly professes to have any knowledge; certainly none going deeper than the Septuagint and Vulgate versions. His interest is rather in what opinions have been held as to the meaning of his text than in the meaning which the writer himself intended. Thus "the restoration of Adam," after his fall, "was a very general

* The most eminent Apocrypha scholar living, Professor Fritzsche, totally denies this. See his article 'Apokrypha' in Schenkel's *Bibel-Lexikon*. However, I suppose it would be difficult to find a closer parallel in thought as well as language than between Wisdom xiii. 1—10 (especially verse 6), and Acts xvii. 24—29.

† Ch. ii. 12—20.

opinion, both among the Jews and Christians, and occasioned a plentiful crop of legends. S. Augustine says, 'It is rightly believed that Christ released Adam from Hell . . . when He preached to the spirits in prison.' This is stated as a past event by the author of Wisdom, as the Psalmist says, 'they pierced my hands,' referring to a future event."* It is difficult to say which is the more uncritical, the assumption that the sage was acquainted with a future event, doubtfully hinted at in one of the most disputable of the books of the New Testament, or the reference to one of the most puzzling passages, both as to sense and reading, in the Old. Or take this piece of illustration. In ch. xi. 23, we read: "Thou hast tormented them with their own abominations," *i.e.*, "objects of idolatrous worship. . . . All the plagues were directed against the idols of Egypt. 'Against all the gods (*θεοίς*) of Egypt I will execute judgment' (Ex. xii. 12)."† The editor has not noticed that the place he quotes refers only to the last plague, and that moreover "the gods" are only mentioned as a further specification, after "all the first-born of Egypt, both man and beast."

Mr. Deane's slender acquaintance with the Old Testament is, however, a fault which vitiates more his own exegesis and illustration than his grammatical criticism of the text. There is no reason to suppose that the author of the Book of Wisdom used the Scriptures in anything but their Greek dress; and Mr. Deane's grammatical knowledge of the Septuagint is considerable. Very valuable is also his thorough knowledge of the Greek of the rest of the Apocrypha. Philo he has studied, but not exhaustively; here his old pre-occupation with the canonicity of the book is always disturbing his critical sobriety. Wherever Philo is cited (unless for a mere grammatical comparison) Mr. Deane's object is regularly to educe a distinction between the thought of that

* Commentary on x. 1; p. 165.

† Commentary, p. 178.

philosopher and the author of the Book of Wisdom. A semi-inspired work *cannot*, in his view, draw, as Philo draws, from foreign sources. If a phrase of Plato's is adopted, it is in a different sense: "the author uses philosophical terms to express orthodox doctrine."*

It is a pity that a scholar of Mr. Deane's industry and capacity should have needlessly hampered himself in this commentary. He was under no obligation to defend the infallibility of the book, but, as it seems, from courtesy to an old Church tradition, he has felt himself bound to consider it as an expression of truth, imperfect because not proved to be inspired, but never actually false. It seems almost to imply a contempt for the intelligence of our readers to insist on the fact that the value of the Book of Wisdom does not gain by this treatment. The interest of the book is primarily that which belongs to a transitional period in the history of Jewish religion. Its retrospect to the Hebrew literature, which it knows only through a version, is subsidiary; not so its view as a development, under foreign influence, of Hebrew thought. In this relation no work has greater value, expressing as it does a phase of Alexandrian philosophy, soon to be absorbed into the Christianity of the Fourth Gospel, and partly into that of the Epistle to the Hebrews. How does Mr. Deane handle this, the most important question with reference to his book, the relation of the wisdom of Solomon to the older philosophy of Israel, to the philosophy of Greece, and to the philosophy of Christianity?

We open his introduction with a sanguine expectation of an exhaustive study, for the first chapter comprises a "Sketch of the Progress of Greek Philosophy." Nor do we complain of its being professedly a compilation from George Henry Lewes and other authorities, including, oddly enough, Mosheim's translation of Cudworth's

* Comm. on vii. 22, p. 150; cf. proleg. p. 10.

“Intellectual System of the Universe.” An intelligent summary of this sort we may expect to draw to a focus the various lines of thought that found their home in the heterogeneous schools of Alexandria. But Mr. Deane hardly attempts any application of the facts he adduces. He gives us merely an abstract, careful enough in itself, but irrelevant, because he does not attempt to trace the bearing of Greek philosophy, in its Alexandrian development, upon the book with which he is engaged. The next section on the “Jewish-Alexandrian Philosophy” is quite inadequate. The Book of Wisdom is just alluded to, as displaying Greek learning and “the writer’s acquaintance with Western Philosophy,” but only to show “that he was well acquainted” with certain opinions of the schools, while his statements are “grounded on the language of Scripture.”* Mr. Deane quickly gets to Philo—a full century and a-half, according to the editor’s dates, later than the Book of Wisdom—and forthwith addresses himself to those who are anxious to be persuaded that Christianity has adopted nothing from pagan systems; and treats at length of Philo and his connection, or want of connection, with the New Testament. This is no doubt an interesting inquiry, but it is, as we have said, totally irrelevant, and has, moreover, been done far better, and in a calmer and more philosophic spirit, by Mr. Jowett in his invaluable dissertation on “St. Paul and Philo.”† It is like writing an introduction to St. Augustine’s *City of God* which should contain a comparison of Plato’s *Republic* and More’s *Utopia*, without a mention of the Bishop of Hippo.

The Book of Wisdom indeed stands in a double relation, and its direct descent is plainly traceable to that school of

* Proleg., p. 10. The references in Note 7 to support the belief in the pre-existence of souls by Jeremiah and the younger Isaiah are eminently patristic.

† *The Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians, Galatians, Romans.* Vol. I., pp. 368—417.

Sages—if we may follow Jeremiah and the Book of Proverbs in giving a collective name to what was perhaps really so detached and indefinite—which flourished in Israel from the early days of the Hebrew monarchy. From the two, often conflicting, classes of Prophets and Priests—the preachers whose allegiance was to the ever-expanding “spirit” of the religion, and the ministers of the traditional “letter”—these Humanists, as they have been happily designated, held somewhat aloof. They busied themselves rather with the deeper problems of ethics that underlay the religion. Much of their teaching took the shape of wise saws and adages, such as form the bulk of the collections that make up the Book of Proverbs, and are plentifully distributed through the Wisdom of the Son of Sirach. In the universal spirit of the sages of antiquity, it was their special pride to observe the phenomena of nature, the signs and prognostics of the outer world equally with the moral and social action of the world of man. Here, as in so much else, they claimed descent from the wise king who “spake three thousand fables,* and his songs were a thousand and five,” who “spake of trees, from the cedar-tree that is in Lebanon even unto the hyssop that springeth out of the wall: he spake also of beasts, and of fowl, and of creeping things, and of fishes.”† Thus, too, the writer of the Book of Wisdom says:—

He hath given me true knowledge of the things that are,—
 To know the constitution of the world and the operation of
 the elements,
 The beginning, and the ending, and mean of time,
 The alterations of the solstices and the change of seasons,
 The cycles of years and the positions of stars,
 The natures of animals and the passions of wild beasts,

* This is probably the meaning of *mashal* here. In the English version it is indifferently rendered “proverb” and “parable.”

† 1 Kings iv. 32 f. (in the Hebrew, v. 12 f.).

The powers of spirits and the reasonings of men,
 The diversities of plants and the virtues of roots,
 And whatsoever things are secret or manifest, them I know.*

But natural philosophy was but a part of the business of the Wise Men, whose aim was to pursue knowledge everywhere. Speculation on the nature of man and his relation to God matured, if it did not create, a new element in theology. The striving towards wisdom was felt to be due to the working in man of a divine energy, the wisdom of God. It is important for our understanding of the Book of Wisdom to see how far this process of discriminating the energy from the person of the deity had gone, before Hebrew thought came into contact with that of Greece.

Once the Israelite had felt the human breath, the sign of life, or speech, the power which distinguished him from the brutes, to be the fittest symbol of God's communication with man. "It is a spirit in man, and the breath of the Almighty, that giveth them understanding," says Elihu;† even as "while the spirit of God is in my nostrils"‡ is a synonym for remaining in life. The "spirit of God" gives skill to the craftsman§ and nerve to the warrior, Othniel or Gideon or Jephthah.¶ But it is on the prophets that it is poured out in peculiar measure, and to them chiefly is revealed the "word of God." Here the two symbolical expressions seem to run together, but there is always this difference, that the "spirit" is the revealing agency, the "word" the revelation itself. Both are in time overtaken and absorbed by the conception of "wisdom." We see

* Wisdom vii. 17—21. It is a great advantage to be able to arrange the parallelisms of the text—that most interesting note of the writer's Hebrew genius—according to a consensus of ancient authority. Mr. Deane prints the Greek in the *στίχοι* of the Codex Alexandrinus.

† Job xxxii. 8.

‡ Job xxvii. 3.

§ Ex. xxxi. i. 3, xxxv. 31.

¶ Judges iii. 10, vi. 34, xi. 29.

this process already begun in the Book of Job, where Wisdom appears as the creative energy of God—

Where shall wisdom be found?
 And where is the place of understanding?
 Man knoweth not the way* thereof,
 Neither is it found in the land of the living.
 The depth saith *It is not in me* :
 And the sea saith *It is not with me* . . .
 Whence then cometh wisdom?
 And where is the place of understanding? . . .
 God understandeth the way thereof,
 And he knoweth the place thereof . . .
 When he made a decree for the rain,
 And a way for the lightning of the thunder;
 Then did he see it and declare it ;
 He prepared it, yea, and searched it out.

We may notice incidentally for future application, that this Wisdom discovered in the prime ordering of the universe, has, like all the other attributes of God, its reflection in the nature of man—the “image” of him; and human wisdom only exists in so far as its reflection of the divine is true. Wisdom in man is purely religious and ethical, as the next lines proceed to state—

And unto man he said,
 Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom :
 And to depart from evil is understanding.†

One of the Books of Proverbs recognises the activity of the Wisdom of God in a sense similar to that in Job, but more distinct. Wisdom speaks as a person—

The Lord formed me in the beginning of his way,
 Before his works of old.
 I was wrought from everlasting,
 From the beginning, or ever the earth was . . .
 When he prepared the heavens, I was there ;
 When he set a compass on the face of the depth . . .

* Reading with the Septuagint, *וידע* instead of *יודע* (Dillmann).

† Job xxviii. 12—14, 20, 23, 26—28.

There I was by him, as a craftsman ;
 And I was daily his delight,
 Rejoicing alway before him.*

The extension of the sphere of this energy is marked by its being no longer confined to the work of creation. To the passage quoted is immediately subjoined, " My delights are with the sons of men," or, as is stated a little earlier in the speech—

Counsel is mine and sound wisdom :
 I am understanding ; I have strength.
 By me kings reign,
 And lords decree justice.
 By me princes rule, and nobles,
 Even all the judges of the earth.

The representations here and in Job are doubtless highly influenced by poetical licence, and it would be unsafe to conclude as a certainty that Wisdom was already, possibly before the sixth century, B.C., regarded as a person. It is not until Judaism had been shaken to its base by the mastering force of Greek rule, with its attendant influences in thought and manners, that such a conception is approached, if not fully realised. In Ecclesiasticus, as in Proverbs, Wisdom " praiseth herself"—

I came out of the mouth of the Most High,
 And covered the earth as a cloud.
 I dwelt in high places,
 And my throne is in a cloudy pillar.
 I alone compassed the circuit of heaven,
 And walked in the bottom of the deep.
 In the waves of the sea, and in all the earth,
 And in every people and nation, I got a possession.

Then, in terms closely moulded on those of the older sage,
 He created me from the beginning, before the world,
 And I shall never fail.†

* Proverbs viii. 22 f., 27, 30.

† Ecclesiasticus xxiv. 3—6, 9. A similar conception is contained in the Book of Baruch, iii. 15, 29 f., in a section, however, that does not appear to claim a Hebrew original, and is, moreover, so directly modelled on the passage in Job already quoted as to be of less independent value.

But the all-pervading power of Wisdom is now described with more and more distinctness:—

He created her, and saw her, and numbered her,
 And poured her out upon all his works.
 She is with all flesh according to his gift,
 And he hath given her to them that love him.*

Wisdom, if not actually a person, has become the accepted name, not only for the ideal creation antecedent to the world of sense, but, more widely, for the principle of communication between God and the created universe, the principle of revelation. To her is due whatever is good in man, uprightness towards God and his neighbour. The wisdom of man is the corollary of the wisdom of God. The idea has absorbed that of the Spirit of God: Wisdom herself is "a loving spirit" (*φιλόανθρωπον πνεῦμα*) says our Book of Wisdom (i. 6), and so we reach the Alexandrian phase of the conception.

But the change of language, certainly not the least of the changes which influenced the progress of Jewish thought in the Egyptian capital, restored one element to its philosophy, the Word or Logos; an idea which quickly grew to the greatest prominence, and determined in a momentous way the formulation of Christian belief. "The Greek language supplied the word *λόγος* with its happy ambiguity of reason and speech, 'outward and inward word,' itself a mediator between two worlds. The Alexandrian recognised as readily as a modern German philosopher, that thought and language were but two aspects of the same thing. How natural an expression was this of the relation between the outward and visible and the inward and spiritual, to men who had not either the consciousness of fixed laws of nature or the strong sense of human individuality like ourselves."† The expression and the idea are present in the Book of Wisdom;

* Ecclesiasticus . 9, 10.

† Jowett, *Epistles of St. Paul*, i. 389.

but as yet the term sanctioned by the tradition of Hebrew sages holds its supremacy.

Wisdom, which is the worker of all things, taught me, says the author of the Book :

For in her is a spirit intellectual, holy,
 One only, manifold, subtil,
 Active, penetrating, undefiled,
 Sure, not subject to hurt, loving good, keen,
 Which cannot be letted, ready to do good, kind to man,
 Stedfast, secure, free from care,
 Having all power, overseeing all things,
 And passing through all intellectual,
 Pure, and most subtil, spirits.
 For Wisdom is more moving than any motion;
 She goeth and passeth through all things by reason of
 her pureness.
 For she is the breath of the power of God,
 And a pure emanation from the glory of the Almighty :
 Therefore can no defiled thing fall into her.
 For she is the brightness of the everlasting light,
 The unspotted mirror of the working of God,
 And the image of his goodness.
 And being but one, she can do all things :
 And remaining in herself, she maketh all things new :
 And in all ages entering into holy souls,
 She maketh them friends of God, and prophets.
 For God loveth none but him that dwelleth with Wisdom.
 For she is more beautiful than the sun,
 And above all the order of the stars :
 Being compared with the light, she is found before it.
 For after this cometh night :
 But vice prevaieth not against wisdom.
 She reacheth from one end to another mightily :
 And sweetly doth she order all things.*

Very admirable is the skill with which the author of the Book has woven into the Hebrew fabric of his thought strains derived from the manifold schools of Greek philosophy. The stuff is still Hebrew, but shot, as it were,

* Wisdom vii. 22—viii. 1.

with hues reflecting the light of western speculation. Some of the terms,—the “intellectual” spirit, and its nimbleness and immateriality, “passing through all intellectual, pure, and most subtil spirits,”—are borrowed from the vocabulary of the Stoics; others recall the exalted views of Plato, of the essential goodness of the creative energy, and the ennobling power of Wisdom. It does not fall within the scope of the present essay to follow the later fortunes of the matured conception, in the Book of Henoch, where Wisdom is driven back from earth by the injustice of mankind and takes her dwelling again in the heavens,* or in Philo where the Word of God has once more resumed the supremacy, as the “image of God,” the “first-begotten Son,” the *δεύτερος θεός*—the agent of creation, but, only by means of inferior spiritual “powers,” the instrument of communication with man.† We may however here collect a few specimens of the influence of Greek thought upon the Book of Wisdom. Already it is the *Timæus*, the most perplexing of the Platonic writings, which is beginning to exert that influence which continually waxed stronger, and became through long centuries the absolute ruler of Western thought. To our writer, as to Plato, the world was created “out of shapeless matter” (*ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης*, xi. 17); the soul is of itself good and has an existence antecedent to its dwelling in the body (viii. 19, 20), which is to it an oppressive burthen (ix. 15 †); “temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude” are things “than which men can have nothing more

* “Wisdom came to dwell among the children of men, and found no dwelling place: Then returned Wisdom back to her place, and took her seat among the angels.” Ch. xlii. 2.

† Deane, proleg. p. 13.

‡ *φθαρτὸν γὰρ σῶμα βαρύνει ψυχὴν, καὶ βρῖθει τὸ γέωδες σκῆνος νοῦν πολυφροντίδα*, a remarkable verbal correspondence with Plato's saying of the body, *ἐμβριθὲς δὲ γε τοῦτο οἰεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γέωδες καὶ δρατὸν· ὃ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἢ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεται*, *Phaedo* p. 81, c., cited by Mr. Deane, p. 161; who also notes other terms suggestive of Platonic study, such as *σύστασις κόσμου* (vii. 17), p. 148, *πρόνοια* (xiv. 8), p. 184.

profitable in life" (viii. 7). It is the same school of thought which conceives wisdom as "an emanation from the glory of the Almighty" (vii. 25); "the spirit of the Lord filleth the world" (i. 7), "is in all things" (xiii. 1); then, in phrase that seems to herald the later notion of the Logos, "Thy almighty word leaped down from heaven out of thy royal throne . . . and it touched the heaven, but stood upon the earth" (xviii. 15, 16).

But without comparison the most remarkable feature in the Book of Wisdom, which distinguishes it from the purely Hebrew sapiential literature, and which makes it the final completion of that literature, is its recognition of immortality as the solution of the problems of human experience. "Righteousness is immortal" (i. 15); this is the groundwork of the writer's ethical system. In this way he finds an answer to the question which had occupied and disquieted all the sages of Israel from the beginning, the question which is as new now as in the days of Job: "What profits it to be good? How is it possible to justify the ways of God to man?" The reply of the Psalmist was found to be contradicted by experience, when he said,

I have been young, and now am old ;
 Yet have I not seen the righteous forsaken
 Nor his seed begging bread. . . .
 I have seen the wicked in great power,
 And spreading himself like a green bay-tree,
 And I passed by,* and lo, he was not ;
 Yea, I sought him, but he could not be found.†

Many sought a solution in the idea that a good man's reward was sometimes reserved for his children, while the posterity of the wicked was cut off. It was a common and bitter complaint, "the fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge." The question is discussed in all its varieties in the Book of Job, and in the

* Reading with the Septuagint ⲁⲓⲛⲁ for ⲁⲓⲛ (Hitsig).

† Psalm xxxvii. 25, 35 f.

end the poet can only appeal, as to something beyond and above our faculties of judging, to the power of God manifested in nature, precisely as St. Paul, reasoning on the diverse destinies of nations, breaks off an argument to which there is no adequate conclusion, with "Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? . . . Hath not the potter *power* over the clay. . . ?" * It is a confession of the impotence of human reasoning to reach the bottom of such problems: God's might is right.

Brought face to face with the speculations of Western philosophy, this result can no longer satisfy the author of Wisdom. The test accepted by the Psalmist he puts in the mouth of the wicked, who say of the righteous,

Let us see if his words be true :

And let us prove what shall happen in the end of him . . .

Such things did they imagine, and were deceived :

For their own wickedness blinded them.

And they knew not the mysteries of God :

Neither hoped they for the wages of righteousness,

Nor discerned a reward for blameless souls.

For God created man to be immortal,

And made him to be an image of his own self (ii. 17, 22 f).

"God made not death . . . but ungodly men with their works and words called it to them," or, as it is phrased in another place, "through envy of the devil came death into the world" (i. 14, 16 ; ii. 24). But death has no mastery save over the body :

For the souls of the righteous are in the hand of God

And there shall no torment touch them. . . .

For though they be punished in the sight of men,

Yet is their hope full of immortality.

And having been a little chastised they shall receive great benefit ;

For God proved them and found them worthy for himself † "

We are here at the threshold of Christianity. Under the

* Rom. ix. 20.

† Ch. iii. 1, 4 f.

glory of the light of immortality all the troubles and sufferings and oppression of life fade away as a spark before the sun. In this new confidence the author almost, like the apostle, glories in tribulation. To the old Hebrews the measure of a man's goodness was in length of years and seeing his children's children; now, the righteous who dies young is to be accounted an object of God's peculiar favour; he is "in rest" (iv. 7). In the eternal life of the soul its dwelling upon earth fills but a small space. Its life is independent of time, its earthly sojourn reckoned not by years but by progress in Wisdom. He who "is prevented by death," "being perfected in a short time, fulfils much time" (iv. 13). Immortality is the dower of Wisdom (viii. 17), as death is of wickedness (i. 16). The wicked "have no hope;" their end is "horrible," with profitless "repenting, and groaning for anguish of spirit" (iii. 18 f., v. 3). Their after-existence does not deserve the name of life. Thus the wise man justifies the seemingly capricious allotment of good and ill to man on earth. The argument from the supreme excellence of Wisdom becomes in turn a reason for its supreme expediency.

Wisdom, then, is the theme of our Book. It is presented partly in the traditional form of aphorisms, partly in sustained periods of poetic ecstasy. The writer assumes the person of Solomon, the reputed chief of Hebrew sages. He relates his love for Wisdom, his search for her, his marriage with her. In the same exalted character—though the disguise at times sits loosely upon him*—he addresses and reproves kings; and the first division of the book closes with a prayer for the guidance of Wisdom in ruling Israel:—

O send her out of thy holy heavens,
 And from the throne of thy glory,
 That being present she may labour with me,
 That I may know what is pleasing to thee (ix. 10).

* In ch. viii. 10, 11, for instance, he does not claim any position except by virtue of wisdom.

The second half (ch. x.—xix.) is occupied in tracing the work of Wisdom in the past history of the world. Wisdom here is the objective force that leads men right, the correlative of the inner "faith," by which they accept it, in the parallel retrospect of the Epistle to the Hebrews. Here, too, there is a tendency to allegorical treatment, though, as Mr. Deane justly points out,* hardly a symptom of the wild "reading into" the text, which characterises the later method of Philo. The Book ends with the Israelite oppression in Egypt, and the lessons against idolatry taught in the plagues of Moses. The close is a little abrupt, and it has been supposed by some editors that the review originally was carried on through the fortunes of the people in the promised land. But it may well be that the history of Israel in the writer's mind divided itself into cycles, the Egyptian captivity in the first answering to that in which he himself lived: so that there is an implied prophecy in stopping short before the exodus, a promise of deliverance from the exile of his own day; "For in all things, O Lord, thou didst magnify thy people, and glorify them; neither didst thou lightly regard them, but did assist them in every time and place" (xix. 22).

That there is an organic unity in the Book no one now seriously disputes. In the exuberance of early rationalism it was discovered to be nothing more than an anthology. Then Bretschneider ingeniously separated three distinct compositions, one originally Hebrew (extending as far as ch. vi. 8) of the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, the other two (one continuing to the end of ch. x., the other from ch. xii. to the end) by Alexandrian contemporaries of Christ. These latter he further discriminated according to the superior cultivation evinced by the author of ch. vi. 9—x. 21 over the more commonplace notions of his successor. Ch. xi. was discarded as an insertion. Such criticisms have

* Proleg. p. 33 f.

only retained an antiquarian interest: the question which is still agitated is not whether the Book is one or several, but when the author lived.

His age is partly determined by the use of the Septuagint version; but the origin of this is so obscure that it can only decide the Book of Wisdom to be not earlier than the second century B.C. The further limit is fixed by the relation of the Book to Philo and to Christianity. To some it has appeared nothing more nor less than a Christian composition, as though the doctrine of immortality without the doctrine of the resurrection were not sufficient to exclude the hypothesis. A curious compromise, suggested by Noack and worked out by Dean Plumptre,* gives its authorship to Apollos, whose ripened thought, after his conversion, is held to be reflected in the Epistle to the Hebrews. But the attribution of the epistle to Apollos, while it is difficult to refute its possibility, is one of those things which never can be proved, and which any one can accept or decline according to his fancy. It is obviously hazardous to saddle a theory, already so infirm, with a burthen weighted with conjecture, and only relieved by correspondences rather of phraseology than of thought. Another criticism—a criticism which Jerome himself mentions as ancient—ascribes the Book to Philo, regardless of the immense interval which separates our author's intellectual view from that of the Jewish Platonist. It remained, however, the accepted opinion through the Middle Ages† and down to the time of Luther. One of the best supported theories about the composition of the Book of Wisdom converges to the same date, the reign of Caligula or a little earlier: but it is difficult to follow Grimm in allowing this conclusion. Mr. Deane, we think rightly, declares in favour of as early a date as possible, though we differ from him as

* In two articles in *The Expositor*, vol. i.

† See, for example, John of Salisbury, *Epist.* cxliii.

to what is the earliest possibility. Arguing that the Book of Wisdom was written in a time of trouble for the Jews, he offers two eras as compatible with the descriptions of the Book, the reigns of Ptolemy Philopator (B.C. 221—204) and Ptolemy Physcon (170—117). The tyranny of the latter, he says, extended over the whole population, and so could not be a subject of peculiar complaint on the part of the Jews; the reference must be therefore to the "atrocious persecutions" of them by Philopator, on his return from Syria in the year 217, and the production of the book must be between this date and 145, the epoch "rendered memorable by the enormities" of Physcon. The earlier persecution, however, rests upon the totally fabulous account in the third book of the Maccabees—Mr. Deane, indeed, admits that it is "highly coloured"—relating to a time when the Jews really stood in high favour under the Ptolemies.* Their troubles did not begin until the second half of the reign of Ptolemy Physcon, or the very date which Mr. Deane considers the ultimate limit within which the book could have been composed. We conclude, therefore, by making this the *terminus a quo*; the book was written after the year 145—some time, probably, between then and the end of the reign.

If in our review of the subject of this book we have taken exception to Mr. Deane's method of treating it, we would not have it inferred that he ignores any other way than his own. He is always candid in noticing traces of Greek philosophical influence, though he almost uniformly denies their being more than verbal. The prolegomena are the weakest part of the edition. Mr. Deane has studied his author, text by text, with reference to the New Testament and to the interpretations of the Fathers, rather than conceived his position as a whole. For philological purpose

* Proleg., p. 82. Compare Professor Oort's criticism of this argument, in the *Theologisch Tijdschrift*, xvi. p. 278, March, 1882.

the commentary is exact and complete. As a textual critic the editor is less successful. Indeed, we can hardly understand the object of reprinting, as he has done, the Greek, the Vulgate, and the English Version, without an attempt at restoring the text of the original. The grammar of the rest of the Septuagint, as we have before said, he knows well; but with the palæographical questions connected with the text he displays no acquaintance whatever. His own Book he prints from Vercellone and Cozza's great edition of the Codex Vaticanus, from which he varies "in very few instances, which are duly noted." The collation of the Sinaitic, of the Codex Ephraemi, and apparently of the Alexandrian, are borrowed from the sixth (posthumous) edition of Tischendorf; but the extent of Mr. Deane's knowledge of the character of his manuscripts may be judged by such statements as that the corrections of the great uncials, "by first or second hand," "are in my edition noted S¹, S²," &c.,* as though the age and value of these alterations had not been minutely analysed and ascertained. From Parsons and Holmes he gets the readings of one more uncial and ten cursives; but the latter are very sparingly given. He also collates the Aldine and Complutensian editions, the Syriac and Arabic Versions from Walton's Polyglot, and the Armenian from Reusch. The Vulgate, or rather the older Latin version (the so-called *Itala*) which Jerome left untouched, is printed, as we have said, in full, but without a hint of what text is followed, and without notice of a single variant (excepting a few in the Commentary at the end). For critical purposes, therefore, Mr. Deane's edition is of comparatively small value. Certainly he adds nothing to our knowledge of the text. At the same time, lest we should appear too unthankful—how-

* The denotation, however, of his digest of readings is quite vague; in p. 79, for instance, we find insertions like "om. S. add S. corr.," "V. a Sec. Man."

ever much we may regret the incompleteness of Mr. Deane's work whether as critic or interpreter—it must be confessed that it is a great boon to have the Greek and Latin lying open before us side by side, in whatever text, nor would one deny that his commentary preserves throughout the sterling merits of conscientious and scholarly labour.

REGINALD LANE POOLE.

TENNYSON'S 'DESPAIR.'

READERS of Dante will recollect the passage at the beginning of the third canto of the "Inferno," in which he tells us that written over the gate of Hell are the words: "All hope abandon, ye who enter here." The poet speaks of that hopeless city of endless pain as the work of highest Wisdom and of primal Love ("*la somma sapienza e il primo amore*"), and holds it his duty to steel his heart against all pity for the "souls accurst" ("*la perduta gente*") for ever imprisoned within it.

Thirteen hundred years before Dante's time a poet of another order, though of kindred genius, breathed a very different spirit. The heart and conscience of Lucretius rose in revolt against a pagan hell with its threats of everlasting pains after death, appealing from mythology to the great Cosmic order, and dreaming too fondly that in his "golden work" he had

Told a truth
That stays the rolling Ixionian wheel,
And numbs the Fury's ringlet-snake, and plucks
The mortal soul from out immortal hell.

Now, when we compare Lucretius with Dante, a pagan Tartarus with a mediæval Inferno, it is not surprising, if we fix our thoughts on this point of comparison alone, that men should ask, some scornfully and bitterly, some sadly, what hope or alleviation for human destiny had all those Christian centuries lying between Lucretius and Dante brought to men?

The fact must be admitted. Ages after the revelation of a Father of mercy through a Divine Son, the endless hell against which Lucretius protested was a living belief to Dante, and, later still, to Milton, whose Gehenna, like Dante's Inferno, is a place where "hope never comes that comes to all, but torture without end still urges"—"a fiery deluge fed with ever-burning sulphur unconsumed." In a higher sense than that in which Lucretius spoke may we borrow his language, and say that no rays of the sun or glittering shafts of day had dispelled this darkness and terror of the mind.

Yet poets are as the mountains on which the morning is spread while the plains are still dark. Like the fine-strung, nervous organism that feels afar off the forecast of weather change, the poet has the presentiment of changes of thought and of belief, while science still lags behind and criticism is halting on its way. Ages before the advent of science, Lucretius "rejoiced to see its day, and saw it, and was glad," beheld through the rifts in the clouds, too soon to close over the world again, the shapes of cruel superstition vanishing before the light of knowledge. It was a poet who, in Calvinistic Scotland, dared to breathe a hope even for the Devil, in whose personal reality he believed as fully as any of his contemporaries, having the heart and the courage to suggest that "auld Nickie Ben" "might still have a stake," grieved to "think upon yon den" even "for his sake." And, yet later than Burns, another poet of Scotland wrote, in his "Devil's Dream," words that would have gladdened the heart of Origen :—

A low sweet voice was in his ear, thrilled through his inmost
soul,
And these the words that bowed his heart with softly sad
control.

* * * * *

"No hand hath come from out the cloud to wash thy scarrèd
face ;

No voice to bid thee lie in peace, the noblest of thy race ;
 But bow thee to the God of love, and all shall yet be well,
 And yet in days of holy rest and gladness thou shalt dwell.
 And thou shalt dwell midst leaves and rills, far from this torrid
 heat,
 And I with streams of cooling milk will bathe thy blistered feet ;
 And when the troubled tears shall start to think of all the past,
 My mouth shall haste to kiss them off and chase thy sorrows
 fast ;
 And thou shalt walk in soft white light with kings and priests
 abroad,
 And thou shalt summer high in bliss upon the hills of God."

When poets thus sing in darkness, dawn is not far off. Thomas Aird wrote in the former half of the present century. In 1850 was published the "In Memoriam" of Alfred Tennyson. In that work occur some lines which stand in marked, even startling, contrast with the short poem of "Despair," recently given to the world in the *Nineteenth Century*. Well as these stanzas of "In Memoriam" are known, they will bear quotation if only to illustrate the contrast :—

Oh, yet we trust that somehow good
 Will be the final goal of ill,
 To pangs of nature, sins of will,
 Defects of doubt and taints of blood :—

That nothing walks with aimless feet ;
 That not one life shall be destroyed,
 Or cast as rubbish to the void,
 When God hath made the pile complete :—

That not a worm is cloven in vain ;
 That not a moth with vain desire
 Is shrivelled in a fruitless fire,
 Or but subserves another's gain.

Behold, we know not anything ;
 I can but trust that good shall fall
 At last—far off—at last, to all,
 And every winter change to spring.

* * * * *

I falter where I firmly trod,
And falling with my weight of cares
Upon the great world's altar-stairs,
That slope through darkness up to God,

I stretch lame hands of faith, and grope
And gather dust and chaff, and call
To what I feel is Lord of all,
And faintly trust the larger hope.

Thirty years separate "In Memoriam" from "Despair." The difference between the tone of the two poems is the difference between dawn and midnight. Faith in a Lord of all and a larger hope for human destiny was the inspiration of the earlier poem. Despair, if the creed of the Calvinist be true, despair, if the creed of the Agnostic be true, with scarcely a hint of the possibility of an intermediate faith which might make some brighter thing of all theology, overshadows the later poem from beginning to end. "In Memoriam"—only slightly veiling the poet's personality—is a confession of faith; "Despair," a dramatic monologue, as he himself calls it, is a gage of battle flung down on behalf of his earlier trusts, not an expression of personal faith, but a judgment on the tendencies of the day.

Two extreme types of belief are presented in this "Dramatic Monologue." These, for the sake of convenience, may be termed Calvinism and Agnosticism—the one as the type of belief in a God who, in the poet's language, "made everlasting hell;" the other the type of all negation of God. The extremes themselves exist in their naked horror, and much that is taught as Christianity and much that is taught as philosophy tends towards these extremes, although the true character of each, and of Calvinism in particular, is veiled in these latter days. Of set purpose apparently, with full design of exhibiting both without extenuation or disguise, the poet has selected the darkest type of popular religion, and brought it face to face with

the strongest negations of unbelief, to show how between the two the poor human creature is ground to powder.

This appears to be the drift and aim of the poem. It is a prophetic warning—evoked possibly by the recent discussions on the "Eternal Hope"—as to what the Churches may expect if their theologies be permitted to kill the Christ and to darken in the future, as they have darkened in the past, the face of the heavenly Father—blank, hopeless negation of God, culminating in its acute forms in madness and suicide, passing in its milder forms into "the grey set life and apathetic end." Theologians are warned to set their house in order, as the Pharisees of old were warned to discern the signs of the times.

Mr. Tennyson tells us how "in the chapel there over the sand" a man and his wife, "nursed in the dark night-fold of a fatalist creed," listened to the preacher who "bawled the dark side of his faith and a God of eternal rage." He tells us, too, what was the result.

We broke away from the Christ, our human brother and friend,
For he spake, or it seemed that he spake, of a hell without help,
without end.

Hoped for a dawn and it came : but the promise had faded away,
We had passed from a cheerless night to the glare of a drearier
day.

He is only a cloud and a smoke, who was once a pillar of fire,
The guess of a worm of the dust, and the shadow of its desire.
[And] we poor orphans of nothing ; alone on that lonely shore,
Born of the brainless Nature, who knew not that which she
bore.

What—I should call on that Infinite Love which has served us
so well ?

Infinite wickedness rather, that made everlasting hell—
Made us, foreknew us, foredoomed us, and does what He will
with His own :—

Better our dead, brute mother who never has heard us groan.

Atheism is the shadow of Calvinism ; the negation of God is the inevitable result of a doctrine which is at war

with human conscience and affection. Such, it can scarcely be doubted, is the meaning of the lines just quoted. And the poet is right. There is a real, though not always an apparent or even a direct, relation between the theology which makes incredible the Love and the Righteousness of God and the spirit which questions His very existence.

It is no part of the design of this article to discuss the truth or falsehood of the belief in the endless duration of the punishment of sin. This Dr. Farrar has done, with exhaustive learning, in his recent work, *Mercy and Judgment*. But since the victim of despair in the poem says of Christ that "he spake, or it seemed that he spake, of a hell without help, without end," and since the popular doctrine does unquestionably profess to base itself on the words of Christ, we may be permitted to indicate briefly on what slender grounds the superstructure rests.

Our Lord spoke in Aramaic.* Our only Aramaic gospel has perished,† and we know the words of Christ solely in their Greek dress as presented in the Synoptic Gospels, based, indeed, on original sources, oral or written, but not constituting them. These *memorabilia* give us the words of the Christ in such different forms, in such different order and connection, and with so many variations, that while the general drift of his ethical and spiritual teaching can scarcely be mistaken, some uncertainty must always hang around special points. But even taking the record of his

* See, for a discussion *pro* and *con.* of this subject, Diodati, *De Christo Græce loquente*, and Rossi, *Della Lingua propria di Cristo*. Compare also what Josephus says of his own knowledge of Greek, *Antiq.* lib. xx. 11, 2, *ad finem*. *De Bello Judaico*, Proem 1. *Contra Apion.* lib. i, c. 9. See Grätz, *Geschichte der Juden*, iii. 437. Reuss, *Histoire Évangélique*, pp. 11, 12. Davidson, *Introduction to the Study of the New Testament*, vol. i., p. 380 (Ed. 1882). There is a recent discussion of this subject in *The Expositor* which I have not seen.

† A full discussion of this question may be seen in Dr. Davidson's work cited above. Even if the Aramaic Gospel of patristic tradition referred to the "Gospel according to the Hebrews" (see Nicholson, *The Gospel according to the Hebrews*, p. 17, 20), the implication of the text needs but slight modification.

words as it now stands, upon what a slender basis does this stupendous dogma rest. It is built, in the first place, upon the use of the phrase, "the Valley of the Son of Hinnom," in its corrupt Hellenistic form, *Gehenna*—a phrase occurring in the gospels not quite a dozen times, and some of these in parallel passages; a phrase clearly figurative, and in the Talmudical literature, as Dr. Farrar and others have shown, never carrying with it, necessarily, the implication of an endless and irreversible doom*: it is built, further, on the use of the word *aiōnios*, which, as Hebraistic Greek, denoted indefinite but not endless duration, for which numerous Greek words, with the unambiguous meaning of endless, might have been used, and into which Justin Martyr and Minucius Felix imported from Plato and their own Greek modes of thought the idea of endlessness; and it is built, lastly, on a few Parables, deeply coloured by the reporters' expectation of the visible coming of Christ to judgment in their own lifetime, and the meaning of which we unconsciously warp by our fixed ideas associated with the phrase "The Valley of the Son of Hinnom" and the word *aiōnios*.

It is, therefore, questionable, on critical grounds only, that "our human brother and friend" "spake of a hell without help, without end." At least, we have not sufficient proof that He did. But, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that from the second century onwards this doctrine has been the popular belief. It is found in Justin Martyr and Minucius Felix, who seem to have derived it rather from Plato than from Christ,† and through that "fierce African" Tertullian, the material grossness of whose theology ‡ handed on the torch, kindled from subterranean

* See *Wünsche, neue Beiträge zur Erläuterung der Evangelien aus Talmud und Midvasch*, s. 50 (1878).

† Justin, *Apol.* i. 8; Minucius Felix, c. 35; cf. Plato, *Phædo* (Jowett, I. 464); *Republic*, x. (Jowett II., 458).

‡ "Nihil incorporale nisi quod non est."—*De Carne Christi*. Cf. Milman, *Latin Christianity*, I. 49, n. (Cabinet Edition.) Gieseler, *Ecclesiastical*

fires, to the Church of succeeding centuries,—extinguishing the light of Origen with the extinction of civilisation by barbarism,—it passed into the reformed and Puritan theology. What came of the development of this dogma during the Middle Ages, mediæval art and mediæval literature, such as they are, distinctly enough declare. They were ages in which, to borrow the language of Mr. Lecky, “men who were sincerely indignant with pagan writers . . . for representing their divinities . . . like men of mingled characters and passions, unscrupulously attributed to their own divinity a degree of cruelty which may be confidently said to transcend the utmost barbarity of which human nature is capable.” What came of the development of this dogma in the Puritan literature of England and America, readers of the works of John Owen and of Jonathan Edwards well know. It is a doctrine preached at this hour, sometimes in its unmitigated horrors, sometimes in softened language,* in Wesleyan chapels, in Calvinistic meeting-houses in England and Wales, in Evangelical pulpits in the National Church, whether of Scotland or of England; and even at this day it would not be impossible to justify by selections from popular tracts and sermons the vehement indignation of Mr. Tennyson’s language, or the words of John Foster, nurtured in the creed which he describes as “such a theory of the Divine attributes and government as seems to delight in representing the Deity as a dreadful King of furies, whose dominion is overshadowed with vengeance, whose music is the cries of victims, and whose glory requires to be illustrated by the ruin of His creation.”

History, I. 255. At the same time I should be the last to question how much there is in the writings of Tertullian which breathes a far different and a far higher spirit than the unfortunate passage which Gibbon has made popular. For a just estimate of Tertullian, and indeed of the Montanists, see the excellent monograph of the Rev. John De Soyres, *Montanism and the Primitive Church* (1878).

* Certainly it is a significant fact that in a revised edition of the *Catechism for Children of Tender Years*, recently issued by the Wesleyan Conference, the language of the 5th Section of the former edition is considerably softened.

To this doctrine, eclipsing as it does the character and government of God, misrepresenting and darkening at once the nature of man and the nature of God, the poet attributes the recoil, which in its fatal backward movement plunges the man into the abyss of total unbelief. The very fact that this doctrine is preached by so many divines as taught by Jesus of Nazareth, and is popularly believed to be based upon his teaching, has obscured in the minds of many men and women of our time the glory of that Divine Life, and made bitter, as with wormwood and gall, the sweet river of His influence. The witness of His perfect manhood to God is thought incredible, and the love and reverence which He has evoked are dried up and withered.

In saying this it is not meant that the Augustinianism which has overshadowed for so long the Churches of the West is solely responsible for the Agnosticism or Secularism, the Materialism or Atheism, which far and near darken all our fields. It would be a shallow interpretation of such facts as these which should seek for their origin and prevalence in a single cause, or even in one set of causes. The conditions are too complex; the web is too tangled and is woven out of too many threads, intellectual, ethical, and spiritual, to admit of so simple a solution. Many and various causes have been at work to produce this partial or total alienation from Theism and from Christianity, on both sides of the Atlantic, in our time.

The destructive criticism of Strauss, in shattering the idol of biblical infallibility, has been too hastily thought by many to dissolve the person of Jesus in mythological dreams, and to thrust God Himself out of the universe. The doctrine of Evolution—though not in fact atheistic, but at bottom profoundly theistic—has so bewildered many that they substitute the order of phenomena for the primal Cause of that order, and for the living force which breathes in it—regarding Evolution not as a divine process, but as itself a blind, unintelligent god. Physical

science is thought to fill the sum of things with atoms and ether, leaving no room for soul or for God. Physiology translates mind into nerve-force, and questions or denies the very possibility of a continued, conscious life after death. Pessimism, child of human misery, clothes itself in the dress of philosophy. Such purely intellectual causes as these must be taken into account when we are striving to understand the attitude of so many towards Theism and towards Christianity. We should be unjust if we refused their due weight to the intellectual forces which, through fresh readings of history and through fresh discoveries in science, are upheaving the world of mind. That a too exclusive devotion to the realism of physical science should shut out from even strong intellects the hemisphere of ideal and spiritual truth, that still more numerous weak intellects should become bewildered and rush blindly into negation of all that they cannot touch and see, is the price paid for the reinvestigation of the past and the reconstruction of belief.

But men are not purely intellectual machines. Emotion, too, counts for something, and in matters of religious faith ought to count for something. It is scarcely possible to doubt the fact that what Dr. Martineau calls "the mutinous deserters of church theology," largely swell the ranks of those who doubt or deny God. It is not difficult to gather in any large city of the United States or of England crowds of well-dressed people who are animated by a fanatical hatred of Christianity. Many who would not avow hatred are silently alienated from its faith and worship. Could we learn the secret of this hatred or alienation, should we not find the dogma of an endless hell at the bottom of it? It is indeed a creed of despair which leaves to man nothing to worship but himself or "the brainless Nature," "the idiot Power," which flung on the desolate shore of earth its sensitive and conscious offspring—shipwrecked before they were born—to suffer and to die; but even this seems pre-

ferable to that conception of the great cosmic Power which knowingly consigns His creatures to a doom in which "the duration of the torment is without end," and to the conception of a world designedly called into being in which "men walk over the pit of hell on a rotten covering and there are innumerable places in this covering so weak that they will not bear their weight, and these places are not seen."*

Dogma like this predisposes men to welcome any philosophy which clears it out of the way. If Christianity has lost its hold upon the conscience and affections—if, in point of fact, what has been taught as Christianity has shocked and outraged both—the intellect becomes the ready prey of some philosophy, which, like the telescope of Lalande, sweeps the fields of space and finds no God. Christianity easily comes to be regarded as "the dream of hysterical women and half-starved men." Encyclopædism and Voltairism drew their inspiration from hatred of Rome, and their shallow empiricism was built on antagonism to moral falsehood. *Ecrasez l'infâme*—the Church, not the Christ, as Carlyle has proved—was a phrase that seemed to justify all hasty assumptions about historical or physical fact. Nor would it be difficult to show how deeper thinkers than Voltaire and Diderot have been biased, unconsciously in most cases, in their philosophy of human life, by their moral revolt against much that has passed current as theological truth. Men like Hume and the two Mills, like the late Professor Clifford, and even so calm a thinker as Herbert Spencer, betray the repellent influence of those misconceptions of God and of Christ, which have rendered their attitude towards religious faith studiously neutral, when not overtly hostile.

The very life-blood of Christianity is the spiritual power with which it appeals to "the hidden man of the heart"—to "the Christ in us"—to those affinities with the Divine and

* Jonathan Edwards, *Sinners in the Hand of an Angry God* Works, Vol. VI., p. 489. Leeds: Baines, 1811.

the Human in Him which are the deepest springs of our nature. As Mr. Browning has said:—

Love, hope, fear, faith—these make humanity,
These are its sign and note and character.

The signatures of our kinship with God and of our immortality are often enough hidden out of sight—buried beneath the sin and the custom

. . . . which lie upon us with a weight
Heavy as frost and deep almost as life.

But they are there ; and to these the Christ appeals. The dogma, not of a future retribution which a healthy conscience demands, but of an endless hell, counteracts that appeal and must be shaken off before the heart of Christianity shall be set at liberty to win back to God the heart of man.

We have made large use in this paper of the poets—often better and truer teachers than the theologians. We may be permitted to conclude it with a few lines of Coventry Patmore, which sum up our best thoughts of God. The poet has struck his disobedient child, and sent him from his presence “with hard words and unkissed.” Visiting his bed, he finds the sleeping child’s face wet with tears, and his playthings, “to comfort his sad heart,” ranged by his side:—

So, when that night I prayed
To God, I wept and said :
Ah, when at last we lie with tranced breath,
Not vexing Thee in death,
And Thou rememberest of what toys
We made our joys,
How weakly understood
Thy great commanded good,—
Then, fatherly not less
Than I whom Thou hast moulded from the clay,
Thou’lt leave Thy wrath, and say—
“I will be sorry for their childishness.”

CHARLES SHAKSPEARE.

THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN FRANCE.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MODERN REVIEW.

YOU ask me to give your readers my views on the religious situation in France. The question is a wide one, very difficult to consider in all its aspects; and it needs some boldness to respond to your appeal. However, I will attempt to do so, if it be only to offer you a proof of my warm sympathy with the work which you have undertaken.

Wellington said, I think, that it is as difficult to give an account of a battle as to describe a ball; for each of the actors in it sees only the very narrow space in which he plays his part. But there at least we have to do with facts, with actions which take place within the range of our senses; whilst the religious evolution of a people, or of a generation, cannot be determined or measured by means of mere outward observation. The things we see or hear may lead us into error; for what appear on the surface are the broken branches and the faded leaves, the institutions or the beliefs, which have fallen to the ground; while the roots of the new plants are hidden deep down in the earth, the germs of the new harvest sleep in the furrow, in the depths of those minds which cannot even give any clear account of the revolution of which they are the scene. The cries of those who are pulling down, or the noise of falling things, startle us, like the wind of autumn, which breaks off the dead branches and strews the ground with yellow leaves,

whilst nature in her modesty hides from us the mystery of the life which is preparing and moulding a new creation. The negative side of an evolution of humanity is the most accessible, the most apparent; but we should be guilty both of precipitation and of injustice, if we were to judge a moral situation from so narrow a point of view. To use the phrase of Marcellus in *Hamlet*, "something is rotten" in the religious conscience of our country; and not in that of our country alone. All Europe is drawn into the same crisis, and is struggling with the same problems. The crisis may, perhaps, appear more acute in France because it is not confined to the discussions or studies of specialists, of theologians or scholars, but comes to the front in parliamentary debate, and in public meetings.

Since 1789 France has been striving to realise the idea that the State is a lay-institution—is ecclesiastically neutral,—and in doing so she comes into collision with the Catholic Church, which Church has always insisted on her claim to inspire the governing powers, and to receive from them the homage and privileges which cannot be refused to that divine organisation which is commissioned to guard throughout the ages, and to interpret in an authoritative manner, the eternal principles of human conduct and faith. It is hard for you in England to realise the difficulties and obstacles which Catholicism has put in the way of the establishment of liberty in this country. Your political customs and traditions were formed at a time the recollection of which has to some extent faded from the memories of our contemporaries. Still it must not be forgotten that during the period in which the political liberty of which you have a right to be proud was taking root in your country, you did not give the Catholic Church "fair play" amongst you. In these days, when habits of self-government are consecrated by custom, and pervade the atmosphere in which Catholics themselves move, you can afford to

consider with a calmly critical eye the display of the Catholic hierarchy and pomp. Your national life and the security of your liberties are not threatened by it, at least not in the near future; and you may abandon yourselves to the refined pleasure of the archæologist, or the artist, who observes with curiosity the activity of this Church, the nurse of humanity, who would fain take it up again in her arms to lull it to sleep to the sound of her plaintive litanies. But for France Catholicism is the shirt of Nessus, from which she is striving to free herself. Every effort, every failure, makes her more wrathful and less capable of self-control. It would, however, be supremely unjust to take these noisy and extreme manifestations as evidence of the settled state of our national conscience, and to proclaim that the people has stifled in itself all religious feeling. We do not judge the character of a soldier by his bearing, or by his shouts in the fray; we wait till he has come forth from the furnace, till he has regained his self-possession.

Without attempting to go over the whole of contemporary history, let us be content to carry ourselves back to the year 1848, and to that great movement of expansion which spread itself over all Europe. We witness at that time in Paris one of those generous impulses which in the life of peoples are like the return of the winds of spring-time to the bosom of nature. The heart of the nation was enlarged and lifted up by enthusiasm and goodwill. The harp of the poet seemed to have given the tone to the first act of the drama; and the Catholic clergy were surrounded with respect and sympathy, as apostles of the gospel of brotherhood which seemed to herald a new era to humanity. Neither religion nor the Church was looked upon with distrust; the democracy felt that the "Carpenter's Son" was one of them, and they gladly allowed the minister of the religion of love to be a partaker in the festival of liberty. Whenever the Church has not confounded

her cause with that of authority and government, and whenever the jealousy or the enmity of power has thrown her back into opposition, she has thereby developed and renewed her Christian feelings, and has deserved the sympathy of the nation. Never was the Catholic Church more Christian, never did she represent more faithfully the spirit of the Gospel, than when she defended the inalienable rights of conscience against the victorious captain, and suffered persecution rather than submit to the will of the despot.

On the fall of Louis-Philippe, the Church managed very cleverly to take a new departure and to conciliate the popular favour. In a long seclusion, far from the excitements of the forum, she had succeeded in erasing the sinister recollections of the alliance between the throne and the altar. She had even opposed the monarchy of July, which was never in real sympathy with her in spite of the estimable piety of the queen Marie Amélie, and the very marked influence which Catholicism had, since 1840, been successful in gaining over the royal counsels. The attack on the University was made under the banner of liberty. Lacordaire reconstituted the order of St. Dominic, and brought back the white robe of an acknowledged religious order into the pulpit of Notre Dame ; and he deeply stirred the youth of his time by an eloquence which did not shrink from invoking the spirit of liberty. So, when the throne of July fell amidst general disaffection, the Legitimist party and the clergy, who always stood secretly in relations of mutual understanding, very cleverly seized the opportunity which was offered them by this event to come forth from the shade and their state of inaction, and to rejoice with the people over the downfall of tyranny. They did not scruple to use this strong language ; it chimed in with their own embittered feeling, with their desire for revenge, and it put them in unison with the popular impulse. Accordingly

the clergy came forward in public to bless the trees of liberty, and to celebrate the advent of universal suffrage. The Republicans forgot for the moment that universal suffrage had been proclaimed by an authorised organ of the Legitimist party, in the burning struggles which were kept up against the policy of "no surrender" by the Liberals, to whom were joined by an impulse of destructiveness the most admired chiefs of the Legitimist party, such as Berryer. In the state of ignorance in which the greater part of the nation had been kept, and with our country's monarchical and catholic traditions, an imposing majority might fairly have been counted on if the whole nation had been consulted, without any restriction as to suffrage. But the victory was fatal to the Catholic party. Alarmed at the zeal of a Democratic party, which foretold for it a speedy defeat, it endeavoured to profit by the power it still possessed, and by the panic of the middle classes, to establish its own supremacy on the intellectual slavery of the people; and got that law of primary instruction passed which delivered over the school and its teacher to the superintendence and tyranny of the priest.

Afterwards, when the *coup d'état* had dispersed the representatives of the people and overthrown the tribune, the majority of the party, the bishops and the *Univers*, notwithstanding the protests of certain stubborn members, such as M. de Falloux, were won over by the fine-sounding advances of the Prince President, and threw themselves at the feet of the new power, glorifying this bloody restoration of authority. From that day the word of destiny was spoken. The Church, which had seemed ready at one moment to make an alliance with the young democracy, and to renew the ardours and charities of primitive times, was chained to the car of Cæsar, and as a just punishment for its treachery, was received with an ever-increasing murmur of insult and contempt. To-day the light is come,

she is found out; judgment is passed upon her. The Church is the stay and support of despotism; and all who care for the liberty of their country, and who wish to see the exercise of liberty and the passion for liberty take deep root among us, look with distrust and indignation upon that sanctuary whence have issued so many benedictions on perjury, and so many intrigues which have threatened the integrity of the Liberal programme and the very existence of Liberal government. This must be borne in mind by those who would gain any insight into the strange state of things in which a people seems maddened by the very sight of the black gown of a priest, as a bull is enraged by a red rag. The movement of the 16th of May, though it was able to avail itself of all the forces and seductions of the administration, succumbed under the title of "*Gouvernement des Prêtres*," with which it had been branded.

The noisy demonstrations that are made by certain newspapers and societies against every religious idea must not disconcert us so as to make us forget the motive which inspires these declamations and induces an excited public to accept them. If, as the proverb says, "We cannot see the wood for the trees," with still greater truth may it be said that the Frenchman cannot see God for the priests, and a retrospective fear of the reign of equivocation and hypocrisy still disturbs that contemplative mood in which the mind turns inwards and hears accents which come from a remoter world than that of sense.

The worst feature in the moral condition of France is the fact that political parties and religious beliefs are determined by considerations of social rank, by interests and by passions. Those who have risen to a good position in the world, or have been born to one, those who have descent or wealth, range themselves on the Conservative side and among the defenders of the Church. Those who are making their way and are desirous of rising, and those who have

grievances to complain of, belong to the Republican party. Religion is looked at from two opposite sides, by friends and by enemies, as imposing a restraint and marking a limit. Those who think that the time has now come to lock the wheels and to stop, and whose chief concern is for their own safe enjoyment, receive it with acclamation and conform to its observances; while those who feel the pinch of poverty, who are ambitious of improving their lot, who want to disperse the clouds which routine and superstition have gathered over their heads, who desire to see clearly, and to break the fetters which hinder their progress, distrust religion and the clergy who represent it, and register the oath of Hannibal against them. The nature and aims of religion have been falsified and perverted. It is no longer the "Gospel preached to the poor," the comforter, the joy of the lowly, the inspirer of progress, or the bearer of hope for the future; it is an opiate for dulling activity of thought and effort of will, and above all it is a guarantee given to those who possess the good things of the world. Thus while the ruling classes which, under the Restoration, were so penetrated with the spirit of Voltaire, are becoming more and more pietistic, and keep the observances of religion with unflagging zeal; while the attendance at the services of the Church is the best introduction to polite society;—the *people*, who once were simple and devout believers, are withdrawing themselves more and more from public worship; they do not look upon the priest as their advocate and defender, but distrust him and avoid him as the enemy of their independence and dignity. The Gospel appears to them as an insidious charm for turning them aside from the pursuit of their own well-being, and for securing the powerful and fortunate of the day against any unpleasant competition; and they are soon led to suppose that the promise of a better world is a great illusion offered to their credulity to silence their claims on society. The

moral condition of our people is a terrible accusation against the manner in which they have been brought up.* It is clear that religion as it has been taught consists before all things in unreserved submission, and that the great art of the religious teacher is to bend the proud soul into a subjection the merit of which consists in subscribing to it knows not what. Those who love the order, the regularity, and the obedience of a regiment, may applaud this powerful instrument of repression and levelling; but those who have a passion for liberty, who cannot acquiesce in the existing state of things, but are longing for something better, cannot persuade themselves that such a religion is capable of producing fine types of character and making heroes.

It cannot be concealed that this hatred of the Catholic Church influences men's actions and manners more and more every day, especially in the large towns. The number of civil burials and of marriages which do not ask the blessing of religion, goes on increasing, and can no longer be set down to mere individual eccentricity. It is true that the manner in which the Catholic clergy have exacted their fees for these ceremonies, with the encouragement which they have given to costly and ostentatious display at funerals, explains the popular repugnance to call for the intervention of the clergy. We may well wonder that the outrageous contrast between the rich man's funeral and the poor man's, and the burdensome charges which justify the accusation so often brought against the Catholic Church that she represents and preaches the religion of money, should not have provoked sooner and more widely a thorough-going feeling of disaffection. The law which aims at taking the management of funerals out of the hands of the ecclesiastical

* This fact is not denied by Archbishop Treppel, who expressly says in one of his charges:—"Whilst in those families which are most favoured by intelligence and fortune religion has made in our days most remarkable progress, among the masses of the people, on the contrary, indifference and unbelief tend to gain ground step by step."

corporations may be regarded with some uneasiness by the clergy, because it threatens their revenues. But it is in fact favourable to their reputation and their popularity, since it disembarrasses them of those disputes about fees, which are so painful to families in their time of mourning, and relieves them from that suspicion of greed which has weighed upon the Church ever since her chalices of wood were changed for chalices of gold.

Of course we must not make too much of all the insulting and all the extravagant language which has been used of late years in the exercise of a liberty which had been so long desired, or take it as the accurate expression of public opinion. But many hatreds and grievances must have accumulated, and must have awakened in the masses of the people an answering echo before any one could have gone so far as to maintain that that article of the penal code should be applied to the clergy, which sentences to fine and imprisonment swindlers who promise credulous people things which they cannot possibly give them. The Church has, in her teaching, so much abused the argument drawn from the fear of punishment and the hope of reward, she has brought into her reasoning so intemperate a dogmatism, that she has thrown into the arms of Positivism even those minds who are most jealous of their independence, and who have only seen in this doctrine the condemnation of the imprudent assumptions of the Church about the origin and destiny of mankind. They have not been deterred by the clearly-announced object of the founder of the school, of organising Society under the teaching of authorised representatives of science; and, eager to escape the tyranny of the Priest, they have not seen what is perhaps the still heavier yoke which they have taken upon themselves. It is surprising that such a politic mind as M. Gambetta should not have hesitated on a solemn occasion to enrol himself publicly under the banner of a school which has just originality enough to combine

the Catholic organisation and its authoritative method with the results of experimental Philosophy, while it limits itself to a diocese which certainly cannot embrace the whole of France.

The Republican party has so often been frustrated in its claims and in its attempts at reform by being continually put off to a better world, that it has shown a peculiar respect for M. Littré, in spite of his cautious policy, which more than once wounded the revolutionary feelings of his party, because he eliminated from the sphere of common life the habit of looking to the eternal and the absolute.

The gravity of the religious situation in France is connected with the education which she has received under the discipline of the *régime* of authority. She appears violent and intractable because she has not been taught to walk, and because, with chains on her feet, she sometimes tries to pursue a vision of liberty and progress which allures her. To all those who have not been taught by criticism the processes by which the human mind attempts to draw near to truth and to grasp it more closely, the Church, with the utmost tactical skill, proclaims the danger of modifying any part of the traditional creed; and she holds them back by cleverly taking advantage of the fear of losing everything if they dare to deviate by a hair's breadth from the doctrines and precepts consecrated by tradition. Faith is compared to a rosary, the beads of which will be scattered on all sides if the thread on which they are strung is broken. "All or nothing" is not only the motto of the gambler, but also the talisman of the systems of authority. No doubt this is an unwholesome moral system, and one which points to irremediable ruin in the future, because it does not accustom men's minds to the conditions of the pursuit and attainment of truth, and because it does not teach them how to replace rotten supports by solid foundations. But this style of argument retains its hold on timid minds which are

more pious than conscientious, and the sway of the Church is guaranteed for a longer or shorter time. There are many people who are afraid either that they may have to sleep in the open air, or that they may be called upon to take a trowel to repair the building of their faith; and in order to retain that odour of sanctity which they like to perceive in the air they breathe, they are contented to continue in submission to the priestly body or to the official system which, at any rate, does not hinder the ordinary flow of their thoughts and wishes.

The movement which Père Hyacinthe inaugurated by such a valiant act of conscience might have availed to snatch France from this fatal dilemma which is presented on both sides, with so much stress and in so abrupt a manner—"Catholic or Atheist." But this movement, which, in its origin, was greeted by the noblest sympathies, has lost itself in the sand, in spite of the remarkable eloquence of its originator, to whom a new era had seemed to be dawning. It seems amazing that a sincerity and a courage like that of Père Hyacinthe should not have cut the cable which held his thought fast to the old moorage; and that, anxious as he was to free his country from the odious yoke of Ultramontaniam, he should have persisted in appearing before her in the character of a priest and a monk. How is it that he did not see that the name and the idea of priest were enough to repel those who might have accepted him as a pioneer and initiator, without pledging themselves to all the shades or inconsistencies of his thought? By hanging this badge about the neck of his effort towards reform, he strangled it in its cradle. The man, the orator, will always be received with applause, when he lends his eloquent voice to the protests of conscience, to the hopes and fears of patriotism; but his work has never succeeded in enlisting the sympathy of the French public. All hope of reform in the Catholic Church, all

hope of change, seems lost ; and we find ourselves looking down one of the most tragic vistas of history. It seems that the tares must be mown down, and the earth must be wrapped in the desolation of winter, before a new seed-time can be looked for. There are old tree-trunks which depend no longer on their roots, but are held up by their bark till the storm throws them down, and leaves the ground free for a more vigorous growth.

Since the proclamation of the dogmas of the Immaculate Conception and Papal Infallibility, Catholicism has been bound hand and foot with grave-cloths ; it can no longer move, but is cramped into the attitude of submission, and can only look backwards and repeat the echoes of the past. Judgment has already come upon it. The falsity and the danger to religion of a system of authority are proved by a *reductio ad absurdum*. Fetichism, the most materialistic ritualism, and the most ignorant pietism flourish in it. Its decay seems irremediable when we compare the Catholicism of our time with that of the seventeenth century. Observe the *piquant* portrait which the Duchess of Orleans, Princess Palatine, sketched in a letter which she wrote in 1701 to the Raugrave Amélie Elisabeth :—“ You must not imagine that the French Catholics are as foolish as those of Germany. With us things are quite different—one might almost say that it is not the same religion. Who likes may read the Holy Scriptures, but no one is any more obliged to believe in trifles, or absurd miracles. Here the Pope is not held to be infallible ; he is not adored ; no value is set on pilgrimages and the like. In all this we differ entirely from the Catholics of Germany, as well as from those of Spain and Italy.” Since that time all differences have been levelled, uniformity reigns in all countries ; it spreads from below at the expense of the Christian spirit. Is this not the precursor of death ? When a living body can no longer renew itself, and carry

on the incessant evolution of life, must we not expect decay?

If it be true, as the physiologist tells us, that a man does not die—he kills himself—how much more must this observation apply to the institutions, the beliefs, and the religions which are the spontaneous production of humanity in its highest aspirations. Violence and force, criticism and attack from without do not suffice; often they cause a renewal of life and fertility by bringing back the system threatened into fresh contact with those principles of which it was originally the outcome. Religions dig their own graves when they isolate themselves, and no longer know how to assimilate the elements of life in the medium in which they develop; when they wrap themselves in their own shadows, and resist all influence from without. Theirs is the fate of the insect which disappears from sight and shuts itself up in its chrysalis without hope of a return to life. They have expended their vigour and the power of renewing their youth. Contemporary Catholicism has all the appearance of a stiff and frozen thing which blocks the way, and has no longer the attractiveness and charm of life. It has but that touch of poetry which ruins have, and already it exhales an odour of death which poisons the air. That it continues to live is due solely to the complicity of its enemies who put nothing in its place, and condemn the human soul and its aspirations to a perpetual fast. Its rule still seems all powerful in the country districts, where habit and tradition weigh so heavily upon the peasant. But, alas! if its regulations are outwardly respected, if its observances continue to be kept, the spirit and the flame of Christianity are quenched. The old litanies are repeated mechanically, the old rites are observed through a vague instinct—through a kind of awe of the mystery of things; but the inspiration of life, and the rule of conduct, are no longer sought and found in religion. Catholicism may

still pride itself on the proofs it receives of outward submission, but where is Christianity? The peasant has lost the simplicity of ignorance; his wits have been sharpened; the mocking spirit of the towns, carried by cheap newspapers even into the smallest hamlets, has destroyed all feeling of respect for anything which is beyond the horizon of his material interests, and there only remains a vulgar utilitarianism, with a servile feeling towards acquired position.

All those who exercise a serious influence on public opinion, politicians or savants, are in open opposition to the Church, and to all religion. The former indulge in a coarse and abusive polemic which is favourable neither to the elevation of character nor to the progress of intelligence—for it knows no restraint, and gives us invective or sarcasm, instead of reasons; the latter, less blinded by the passions of the day, more accustomed to general views, protest their respect for religion, and maintain that their only anxiety is to see the victory of the principles of '89, and the complete neutrality of the State in all religious questions. But these declarations, sincere as they may be, sound a little hollow; for we perceive behind them minds estranged from any religious beliefs, and professing, as regards their own requirements, to be entirely independent of any religious society. The position they personally take up greatly diminishes the authority of their declarations, and the public at large finds it difficult to believe in their great solicitude for interests which are not their own; and these politic men, who pride themselves on remaining neutral in the midst of the religious conflicts of the day, are soon ranged under the banners of the enemies of religion. A woman of great tact and consummate experience of the world observed that "those who profess in our presence to belong to no party, are not of our party."

It must be acknowledged that while the most fanatical

of the revolutionists, the Jacobins, were the disciples of Rousseau, and that Deism was the religion of the Convention, the politicians of our time all belong, with certain differences of language and attitude, to the Positivist tendency. And the populace, who identify themselves with every anticlerical declamation, who applaud to the echo every argument which tells against spiritual aspirations, do not perceive that if the ideal is a chimera, and if man is the fated product of circumstance and descent, progress loses at once its spur and its inspiration, and social inequalities become as legitimate and as irresistible as the fixed order of Nature, where the small and the weak are always the prey and the victims of the strongest. Some few designing persons have, it is true, made capital out of Spiritualism at the expense of triflers who allow themselves to be charmed by their dexterity. But if the austere faith in "The Categorical Imperative," if the hope of a progressive victory over the unfavourable conditions under which the individual enters on the struggle of life, if the belief in a perfect mind which provides an ideal standard for human effort were to disappear from the conscience of mankind, those who have to grapple with the difficulties of existence will not have much reason to regard with complacency the approach of that night which will descend on a society abandoned to the sway of unbridled appetite. If the Girondins did not succeed in keeping in power, must we not seek the cause of their failure in that dainty scepticism which enervates and wears away all energy? By treating as "Tartuffes" those who spoke to the people of Providence, did they not quench enthusiasm on its own hearth, and destroy the power to attempt the impossible? And, in the absence of faith in a superior power working together with the efforts of man, did they not become the mere sport of circumstance? The Jacobins, on the other hand, had something of that faith which removes mountains, because they were convinced that man

must rise superior to circumstances, and control them, instead of allowing himself to be fashioned by them. A turbid faith, indeed, mixed with much vanity and ignorance, but one which lifted them out of their mediocrity, and made them firm as granite in resistance to the evils of their day.

It would argue great narrowness of mind to refer the religious condition of France to a single set of considerations; and whatever be the preponderance which must be given to political motives, there are others which we must not ignore. The teaching of the Christian Churches has not profited by the solemn admonition of Diderot: "*Elargissez Dieu.*" Like Conservative powers, who will accept nothing from their adversaries, the Churches would not listen to this wholesome advice. They continued to speak of God as of "the man in the next street," or the monarch whose chamberlains know all his secrets, and to treat religion and God's counsels as a small affair, all complete and rounded off—a thing to be whispered into the ear of a child, and to be learnt by heart. Hence, when once the scientific spirit has taken hold of men's minds, and put an end to the reign of that romanticism which had been captivated in a very superficial way by the beliefs and art of the middle ages; when once the idea of justice has taken the place of the absolutism and favouritism of the *ancien régime*, and the results of scientific observation have spread among the people, and the constant order of nature is closed against the chance of special intervention, the god of theology and miracle has appeared petty, arbitrary, and quite unequal to the rule of this immense universe. As the Hebrew conscience, by help of the light of accumulated experience, came to realise the frightful contradiction that is to be found between the moral character of the individual and his worldly prosperity, so the modern conscience is today disabused of the often-disappointed expectation of the direct intervention of God in nature and in the drama of

humanity. The axis of the religious life must be changed, under penalty of putting religion into evident contradiction with the most firmly established facts. This effort to adjust religious feeling to the new conviction, gives rise to misunderstandings and hasty judgments, which misapprehend the meaning and the extent of the religious crisis. Every time that the idea of God has undergone a change in human thought, a cry of "atheism" has been raised, so strongly is man inclined to attribute to religious symbols the eternity which belongs to the object of adoration, and to confuse the unchangeable and perfect Being with the finite and changing forms under which he contemplates and tries to grasp Him who eludes the grasp of our senses and our reason. Orthodoxy has been so intent on striking the imagination of man, and making God pass before his eyes, that it has accustomed us to look for the proofs of His presence and action chiefly in the departures from the order of the universe; and the consequence is that these visible signs having failed us, we experience a bitter feeling of deception, and are tempted to conclude that the heavens are empty and God is speechless. Nowadays all shades of freethought triumph over this narrow-minded and ignorant way of interpreting religion, and, with ill-disguised satisfaction, point out all the contradictions which science and history can show in this conception of the Deity and His relations to the world. The discourses and writings of freethinkers have not the calmness and weight of independent and deliberate thought. They are only the violent reply, and one which overshoots its mark, of those who were yesterday the disciples of tradition, and who, still dragging behind them the fragments of their chains, grow furious when they hear them clanking on the ground. They are the passionate accusations brought against a religion which will not change or adapt itself to the new conditions of human knowledge and feeling; but they cannot be accepted as the final sentence which puts an

end to an error or an injustice. There always remains the grand fact of a succession of religions through history, the origin of which we must explain, and which is an undeniable proof of the need which humanity has to raise itself to a higher something which rules it, and to console its griefs and fears by a Love which rises above our darkness and failures. That which appears more dangerous than that iconoclastic fury and that contempt for the Christian religion with which some of the newspapers try to feed the populace, is the affectation which certain proud minds have of reviving a high-flown stoicism in the midst of the general moral laxity of our time. We are to content ourselves with the solemnities of moral conflict, in face of an adverse and pitiless Nature—with offering a strenuous resistance to all that is vile and degrading. A man of learning and genius, who lately rendered touching homage to the last Prefect of the Department of the Seine, affirmed that religions are no longer the stems on which morality can bloom, but that they are rather the parasites which live upon and vitiate all the sap of morality, and that they can no longer be the school and the forge in which characters and virtues are fashioned. This point of view will not astonish those who have not forgotten the noble teaching of Kant, and who have replaced the pyramid on its base, and founded religion on moral consciousness. But shall man on the heights of his moral life only hear the lamentations of the great hearts who always find themselves below their ideal, and shall they be condemned to wander on those giddy summits in a frozen atmosphere without discovering the deep well whence humanity has drawn the desire for perfection, and the everlasting hope of the triumph of Goodness and Love? Does it show a knowledge of humanity to condemn it to march unceasingly onwards, and to curb its lower passions, without allowing it to worship, above its own acts and efforts, the completed Perfection which attracts and inspires it—with-

out allowing it to adore in its eternal and powerful reality the supreme Ideal which calls back humanity from its wanderings to melt and reconcile all discords and contradictions in an ineffable harmony? As the intellect can never rest satisfied with this breathless hurrying from cause to cause in a never-ending circle, the human conscience cannot keep itself from affirming the existence beyond and above itself of that Goodness and Truth for which it yearns; and whether men be impatient of the *name* of God or not, still it will be in Him, by whatever name He is called, that humanity will find its rest.

The defenders of religion sometimes persuade themselves that these requirements of the scientific mind are only shared by a few chosen spirits, and that the mass of the faithful feeds on a coarser kind of diet. Not only, however, is it difficult to fix any boundary lines in this time of democracy and free trade, when the most carefully worked out results, and even the most daring hypotheses, are brought every morning into the public market; but we cannot hide from ourselves that the intellectual atmosphere in the midst of which young minds are awakened is crossed by keen and icy currents which are not very indulgent to the rather clumsy affirmations of traditional faith. It is astonishing to see the dislike and opposition which are roused by stories of miracles in young minds who thirty years ago received the traditional teaching with more submissiveness, and asked no questions. Without pretending to pronounce an opinion on the theory of heredity which accumulates and transmits the experience of generations, we cannot refuse to recognise that the critical spirit influences in our time every intellect which is awakened to reflection, and that there would be very great imprudence in stamping out this spirit instead of giving it satisfaction. An enforced respect would not be slow to produce a formidable revolution. If dogmatism will recognise this, and submit to terms, it may

for a time delay the catastrophe; but the downfall will come, and on the heap of rubbish which the avalanche will leave behind it much trouble and many efforts will have to be expended to restore the fruitful earth, which shall yield a new harvest.

In spite of all the lamentations of the Jeremiahs and the anathemas of priests, in spite of the sarcasms and triumphant cries of freethinkers, the careful observer distinguishes below the troubled surface unmistakable signs of the religious need which exists in the midst of our people. If the idea of the world which orthodoxy still teaches seems no longer to satisfy minds which cannot continue to make the earth the centre of the universe and of Divine history; if Providence cannot any longer be understood after the fashion of early ages which made of it a perpetual thaumaturgy—with much excuse, since the idea of a constant order was not then accepted; we can perceive by a general feeling of uneasiness which sometimes bursts out into imprecations on a discredited past, that science, applauded as it is, does not satisfy souls, and that the minds which are least credulous, and most familiar with scientific methods, seek beyond the systemisation of facts, and beyond the tangible universe, for the origin and end of those ideal aspirations which are the glory and the anguish of our race. That religion which tries to bribe God in order to obtain the fulfilment of some private wish, or one of those interferences which would disturb the ordinary course of the clouds, or stop the work of decay in an organ on which life depends, that religion, suited to those resorts of pilgrimage where miracles are manufactured, has no longer any hold on the joyous faith of our generation. And this generation, wearied of the barren worship offered in the spirit of the beggar and of the courtier, has not comprehended the value of that true worship which aims at the ennobling of man, and by the adoration of Moral

Beauty raises the selfish and sensual to a disinterested intellectual life. But, as Quinet perceived, man will not rest satisfied with traversing the various stages of life with no other *viaticum* than the affirmation of a law which is equally valid for all living things. He will not easily resign himself to being born and dying, like the leaf, without any glimpse of the ideal and eternal. One who declaims against poets and religion cannot deny himself the pleasure of seeing his daughter attend her first communion in that very church which seemed to him the stronghold of reaction. It is said that more than one fierce democrat of Paris delayed sending his children to the lay schools which had just been established by the municipality, that he might give them time to complete their preparations for their first communion; fearing lest their being registered in a lay school might prejudice their reception. This festival of youth calls up a tender and thoughtful feeling in families, which infuses a religious tone into the least pious minds; and it seems difficult to do away with it, or to take from it the halo of mystery which surrounds and protects it. When Sainte Beuve died, and commanded by his will that there should be silence round his grave, a well-known writer, who is certainly not reputed a mystic, expressed, under a rather trivial form, the feeling of sadness and void which such a ceremony called up in those present—"ça manquait de musique." Yes, it was wanting in the sweet and thrilling melody which rises from the noblest parts of our being, and calms that home-sickness for the Infinite which takes hold of us as we stand by the grave and weep. And only yesterday the same writer, in narrating the baptism of a child in a masonic lodge, or a political society, did homage to that same need which urges our contemporaries to surround human life with a sweeter and brighter light than the common day of stern physical fact.

As to the people of Paris, who are pictured as affording the finished expression of irreligion, can it be forgotten with-

out injustice that they are the least utilitarian, the most idealistic of people? What is the polemical passion which denounces the God of the sacristy but the irreconcilable protest of a soul craving for justice against a conventional order which is imprudently placed under the guarantee of a sovereign mind? Was not Theodore Parker right in maintaining that the greatest impiety consists in being indifferent to the existence of God? Are not anger and rage signs of betrayed affection? And when religion is represented as the most profitable of speculations, and the safest of investments, does not the most mocking doubt show a truer feeling for the ideal nature of man? If the essence of religion consists in sacrificing the real to the ideal, the visible to the invisible, can we accuse the people of Paris, full of irreverence though they be in respect to priests, of being entire strangers to religious feeling? The misfortune of the people of Paris is that they confound religion with politics, and that they are bent on realising immediately that somewhat confused vision of ideal justice, of truth, of happiness, and of a brotherhood ready to obliterate the dividing lines of proprietorship, which used to inspire souls at the dawn of Christianity!

Those who are really responsible for a state of things which is so full of misunderstanding, so dangerous to the brain of the people, are the favoured prophets of the nation who predict only pleasant things, and who make unwholesome fumes of foolish incense mount into the head of an impressionable people. The great poet who claims to be the teacher of his contemporaries has no right to expend the resources of a mystical vocabulary in celebrating the greatness of Paris; and it is deeply to be regretted that a national historian should have forgotten his stern duty so far as to say that, "*France is a religion.*" This is the poison which must be driven out of the national conscience; this is the mischievous bombast which she must give up unless she would die the death of those vain souls who expect to see their own image worshipped. What is wanting in our people is not

emotion, not fire, not enthusiasm, it is that serious study and culture which saves men from the foregone conclusions and sharp antitheses which will admit of no higher reconciliation. A better education will train men's minds and fill them with a critical spirit, and give them habits of analysis, and will teach them to be more modest in their affirmations; for in this country characters are naturally gentle and sociable, and it is mainly on the side of intellect that men are prone to violence and extravagance. The soil, whatever may be said of it, is not too light to bear a harvest; it is the method of agriculture that needs reform.

Unfortunately we have not in our literature a single book, at once a popular and a standard work, from which the people can, as Quinet says, receive without danger their first moral education. The Bible has been withheld from popular use; it has not for our people the charm of first impressions and fresh enthusiasm, it is not the clear spring from which we have drunk deep draughts of love for ideal things, and in which the purity of the heavens has been reflected before our wondering eyes. It has remained the book of the priest; and now that special divergent characteristics of culture and race are more generally acknowledged, we have no longer a living interest in "translating the Semitic into the Japhetic." We do not feel the necessity of harmonising the thoughts of manhood with the recollections and piety of childhood. If we do not make haste to offer this impatient and busy generation a happy selection from the pages of that Bible which has expressed in an inimitable manner and a classic style so many of the experiences and intuitions of the human soul, Christian tradition will very soon fail to awaken any echo in this people who will learn to know the Bible only from the outside, and will throw it aside as a sour fruit!

But the Protestant Church, you ask with a kind of relief, cannot that satisfy their needs? Has it not spread the use of the Scriptures widely, and will it not be able to prevent these things from happening, and to preserve among the

people an understanding of and love for the Bible? I answer that, besides the fact that the Catholics, even after having renounced Christianity, retain an instinctive feeling of ill-will for the Protestant Church, our disputes and divisions, which no sense of shame has made us conceal, have estranged, or held at a distance from us, many sympathies which were beginning to be awakened, and the Protestant Church has not exercised any powerful attraction on that part of the public which Catholicism has repelled. For a long time the Protestant Church remained within its own quarters, finding enough to do in avoiding collision with the Government; and when the opportunity came for speaking to the people it offered them a Christ whose embrace was too narrow to include them all.

Vinet, who has remained one of the Saints and Apostles of orthodoxy, in 1846 wrote to Erskine, one of your fellow-countrymen, whose piety is celebrated in the strictest circles, the following words, which will give us the secret of the failure of Protestant preaching:—"The Christianity which has been preached during the last twenty-five years is a *réchauffé* which has by this time already grown decidedly cold. It may have been original in the time of Luther, but to-day the people do not know what it means." The misfortune of the Revival movement in French-speaking countries has been that it was a fruit of foreign importation. It was the followers of Wesley who came over to the continent after the peace of 1815 and brought us what Wesley, towards the end of his life, weary of theological opinions, called the vain repetition of the doctrine of justification, and with it that spirit of over-conscientiousness which will always remain antipathetic to French character, even when most impressed with the stern obligations of the moral life.

Franklin, with his petty receipts, and synoptical tables for arranging our spiritual book-keeping by double entry, found no response amongst us. We carry our artistic tem-

perament into moral things, and we look upon life as a work of art which should be elevated and animated by a generous feeling, without its being necessary to pull our guide-book from our pocket at every step, or to take out our scales to determine the proportions of good and bad in one of our actions. On the other hand, these missionaries did not show much tact, or consideration for the rights of others. They mixed a certain worldly wisdom with their earnest piety, and they exhibited towards those pastors who would not subscribe to their shibboleth something of that contemptuous rudeness which the Jews showed the Philistines, or the Catholics the heretics. Their narrowly Scriptural point of view, such as Dr. Talmage still holds in our day, inspired them with a profound disdain for all that was not the "*Word of God*," as they called it, ignorantly confounding the collection of Holy Scriptures with the truth which they contain. This way of reducing the whole spiritual activity of the Christian to the reading of the Bible, might please ignorant and uncultured people, whose vanity and stupidity were thereby flattered, and who displayed a lofty compassion for those who would not consent to become the men of one book; but it has given to Protestant piety a sectarian stamp which has prevented it from becoming popular among a spirited people who will never consent to wear blinkers, and cannot resist looking over the fences. This invasion of English piety did not help to dispel the suspicions with which the Reformed religion has been regarded since its birth, nor to restore to it its essentially French character. The importation was complete; we have had even the Puritanical twang and the accentuation of your language which is so contrary to the spirit of ours. And so, as the mayor of one of our large towns said to me lately, "French Protestantism has failed in its mission." In fact, the great aim of Protestantism has been to establish the reign of uniformity in all churches, to restore the institutions of the

past, and to proscribe all doctrine that has not the right ring in it. It thought that its work was accomplished when it had pruned Catholic piety of some of its observances; it hesitated and drew back from the legitimate consequences of its own principles; and it did not permit any development of the Christian life outside traditional formulæ. Protestant piety has not boldly claimed any other attractions, or spoken in any other accents than Catholic piety, and the people, who generalise and are not given to drawing fine distinctions, are inclined to include all Churches and all religions in the same condemnation. The Protestant people have not been kept from this mischievous confusion, and the pastor has not seldom ended in becoming a priest. The saying of Milton is repeated with a terrible irony, "New presbyter is old priest writ large."

In conclusion, I repeat that the religious situation of France is a threatening one. A deadly struggle has been entered into between Catholicism on the one hand, which has gone bodily over to Ultramontanism, and the most thorough-going freethought on the other. Among the taunts and defiances which are exchanged, which only feed passion without touching the real issues, no other voice can make itself heard. Perhaps it is necessary that one of the two adversaries should be defeated, that a new order of things may arise. The people, who are without guardians, as Gérusez said, and who have allowed themselves to be devoured by superstition, need, in order to be purified, and to have their health restored, to pass through a glacial period where all that has lived shall be destroyed, before the new seed can stir in the furrow under the warm breath of spring-time. We have not yet reached that time; and we anxiously repeat the cry of the prophet, "*Watchman, what of the night? Watchman, what of the night?*"

ERNEST FONTANÈS.

CHARLES DARWIN; HIS LIFE AND WORK.

IT happened, some months ago, that, having been present at an Address delivered by the then President of Sion College, on 'The Best Mode of Combating the Prevalent Unbelief,' in which the Doctrine of Evolution was treated as one of the modern heresies to be especially put down by the more forcible reassertion of the doctrines of Orthodox Theology, I was requested to bring forward the other side of the question, by the delivery of an Address of my own in the same place, 'On the Doctrine of Evolution in its Relations to Theism.' I was preparing this, with a more particular view to the Evolution of the Physical Universe (which, as it seemed to me, would afford the more suitable basis for my argument), when, by the death of Charles Darwin, the world lost the great constructor of the doctrine of Organic Evolution. I did not on this account think it expedient to change the plan of my Address, which, when delivered, on the 15th of May, at Sion College, drew forth a much more general expression of accordance with the Evolution-doctrine, than I had been at all prepared to expect. It had been the intention of the Editor of the *Modern Review* to insert this Address in the present number; but, in accordance with his strong desire that I should preface it by a notice of Darwin's Life and Work, based on my own relations with him, I have prepared the following Introduction, the unanticipated length of which necessitates the postponement of my Address at Sion College until the October number.

The haste with which this notice has been prepared must be my apology for its imperfections. It has been quite out of my power to draw even an outline-sketch of Darwin's Life and Work; all that I could attempt to portray, in accordance with the Editor's request, being such aspects of both as seemed to me most likely to interest the readers of this *Review*.

Charles Darwin's grandfather—Dr. Erasmus Darwin, first of Lichfield, and afterwards of Derby—was the contemporary and ally of Priestley; sharing alike his enthusiasm for scientific research, and his liberality of thought on religious subjects. These two, with Boulton, Watt, Wedgwood, and a few other residents in the Midland counties, of kindred tastes, formed a little Society, the members of which used to hold monthly meetings at each others' houses for the free discussion of philosophical questions. Of these meetings, a very interesting account was given in an Autobiography published some years ago by Mrs. Schimmelpenninck, of Bristol, the daughter of Samuel Galton, a leading Quaker of Birmingham and himself a member of the "lunar" Society, two of whose grandsons, my friends Mr. Francis Galton and Capt. Douglas Galton, are distinguished Fellows of the Royal Society. Dr. Darwin acquired some literary distinction by the publication, in 1781, of a poem entitled *The Botanic Garden*; which, though now so far forgotten as not to be even mentioned in Ward's *English Poets*, has been said to abound "in passages that have seldom been excelled for their elegant and forcible description of natural objects in poetic language." But he became better known among scientific men as the author of *Zoonomia*, a treatise on the Laws of Organic Life, in two volumes quarto, of which the first was published in 1793, and the second in 1796; and which was followed in 1800 by his *Phytologia*, or Philosophy of Agriculture and Gardening

I have never myself studied these works, though I have frequently looked into the *Zoonomia*; but I have reason to believe that the following characterization of their author, drawn many years ago by a competent and unprejudiced writer, may be accepted as just :—

“Dr. Darwin was a man of a highly original turn of mind; he was unusually well read in the physics of his day; he had a singular aptitude for seizing and illustrating natural analogies; and above all he was fully impressed with a sense of the important truths of a universal simplicity and harmony of design throughout the whole creation. It is true that his analogies are often imaginary, his theories untenable, and his illustrations overstrained; but many of his errors were inevitable in the state of natural history in his day, and the others are by no means sufficient to overbalance his claims to fame as a clear-sighted, ingenious, and often profound physiologist. . . . Many of his ideas were too far in advance of those of his contemporaries to be much esteemed when they appeared; but they are singularly in accordance with opinions which now are either altogether recognized, or are under discussion with a strong probability of being finally adopted. For instance, he particularly insisted on the close analogy between Plants and Animals in their functions; showing that the difference between the two kingdoms is the necessary consequence of the difference between their wants, necessities, and habits of life.”—(Knight's *English Cyclopædia*.)

It is clear, therefore, that Charles Darwin's line of thought had been in some degree marked out by his Grandfather; who seems to have speculated (as many had done before him) upon the development of the whole series of Animal and Vegetable forms from a few originally simple types. But while the Grandfather pursued the subject too much in the spirit of a poet, grasping at fanciful analogies, and often satisfying himself with reasoning of the loosest character, it is the glory of his illustrious Grandson to have worked out his conclusions in the spirit of the truest philosophy, laying a sure basis of fact for every stage of his reasoning, always distinguishing clearly between what might be regarded as

proved and what is merely probable, but keeping ever in view the great fundamental principle (familiar to all who have studied the science of Evidence) that a proof no less cogent than direct demonstration, may be afforded by *the convergence of separate and independent probabilities.**

The son of the author of the *Zoonomia*, Robert Waring Darwin, whose wife was a daughter of Josiah Wedgwood, established himself as a physician at Shrewsbury; there Charles Darwin was born February 12th, 1809, and there he received his early education. The family habitually attended the Unitarian Chapel, of which the Rev. George Case (the father of my late friend William Arthur Case, a man greatly loved and esteemed by all who knew him) was minister; and several members of it were baptized by him (their names appearing in the register of that chapel), although Charles Darwin was baptized by the parish clergyman. It was from Mr. Case that Charles Darwin received his early education, up to his entrance into the Shrewsbury Grammar School, the then head master of which was the distinguished scholar Dr. Butler, afterwards Bishop of Lichfield. It can scarcely be doubted, says Mr. Myers (the present minister of the same chapel), "that among the lanes and lovely walks which were found in every direction round this town, he must have received his first impression of the sweets and delights of nature which he loved so dearly; and have commenced, and to some extent carried on, those pursuits as a student of nature, which, in after years, have become so marvellous and wonderful in their results." For the Rev. John Yardley, the present vicar of St. Chad's, Shrewsbury, who was his schoolfellow under Dr. Butler, thus speaks of him:

* For example, no unprejudiced person who looks at half a dozen characteristic "flint implements," can entertain the least doubt of their having been shaped-out by a succession of blows struck by human hands with a definite purpose; although each one of the chippings *taken by itself* might be fairly attributed to accident.

—"In my mind's eye I still see him as he was when a schoolfellow—cheerful, good-tempered, and communicative. I can picture Darwin to myself when sitting near him. He used to appear among his class-fellows learning the lessons which were appointed by the master of that royal foundation of King Edward the Sixth. But no sooner had Darwin any leisure time after school hours, than the innate desire of the young naturalist lost no time or opportunity in examining the petals of a flower, or the leaves and properties of plants. I can imagine Charles Darwin holding up lilies in his hands, and saying to his companions, not in so many words, but in expressions of similar meaning—

" ' See these lilies of the field,
" ' How their leaves instruction yield.' "

Though the Vicar of St. Chad's now claims the man who was formerly branded as an Atheist by all "orthodox" Churches, as having been there "received into Christ's flock" by baptism, I have no doubt that Mr. Myers is correct in describing the early religious impressions by which his character was shaped, as consisting in "a reverent belief in God, a personal fidelity on man's part to what he believed to be true, the doing of duty, the being good and doing good in practical life." "In so far as the Churches taught this, he was in harmony with them; but in respect to their dogmas, their theologies, and religious speculations, he simply had nothing to say about them. And thus, like his father and grandfather, while in a certain sense he belonged to all Churches, yet none could claim him as distinctively its own."

On leaving Shrewsbury Grammar School, in 1825, at the age of sixteen, Charles Darwin was sent to the University of Edinburgh, of which his father and grandfather were Medical graduates, with the view, it is believed, of preparing himself to follow their profession; but after remaining there

for two years he removed to Cambridge, where he took his B.A. degree in 1831. During his studentship it was his good fortune to fall under the influence of Prof. Henslow, who fostered not only his taste for Natural History, but his ardent love of truth; and impressed upon him that strictness of method in the pursuit of it, for which, with the noblest moral nature, the most genial temperament, and the most ardent philanthropy, the memory of Henslow will be kept green among those who knew and loved him as long as their own lives last. The master could not have had a more apt pupil, or the pupil a master better fitted to train the genius which might otherwise have strayed like that of his grandfather. In after times, as we shall presently see, these relations were reversed.

It was at Prof. Henslow's instance, that when Capt. Fitzroy (who was about to proceed on a four years' Surveying Voyage) was on the look-out for a volunteer Naturalist to accompany him, Charles Darwin offered himself for the post and was accepted. The results of the marine surveys executed by Capt. Fitzroy during the 'Voyage of the *Beagle*,' are impressed on the copper plates from which our Charts are printed; but the life-work of Charles Darwin, of which the fundamental conceptions were formed, and the actual commencement made, during that voyage, constitute a "*monumentum ære perennius*," which will give it a place in the history of Mankind not less distinguished—as having opened out a New World of Thought—than that accorded to the memorable voyage in which Columbus discovered America. I well remember the delight with which I read Darwin's *Journal of Researches into the Geology and Natural History* of the various countries he had visited, first published in 1839; and still more his *Structure and Distribution of Coral Reefs*, which appeared in 1842, giving a doctrine of their formation, which, based upon a most careful observa-

tion of facts, completely revolutionised all previous ideas upon the subject, and led up to that great conception of "areas of subsidence" and "areas of elevation," which was at once recognised by Geologists as of fundamental importance in their science. He next published a description of the Volcanic Islands visited during the expedition; in which the relation of the areas of elevation to volcanic activity was further developed. And he then worked out, chiefly on the basis of his own observations, the Geological History of South America, of which his account was published in 1846. It was whilst this work was in preparation, that it was my privilege first to become personally acquainted with him; for the microscopic researches I had published on the Structure of Shells, led him to request me to examine for him some specimens of the great Pampas formation, the results of which inquiry are recorded in his work (pp. 77, 99). And after its publication, when he was turning his attention to Zoological and Botanical study, I had the pleasure of being able to aid him in providing himself with instruments for Microscopical research. He was at that time one of the Secretaries of the Geological Society, and had been elected a Fellow of the Royal Society; and I therefore enjoyed frequent opportunities of meeting him.

The effect of his voyage, however, was in one respect very prejudicial to him; for the sea-sickness from which he constantly suffered left behind a permanent dyspepsia, which greatly impaired his power of scientific and literary labour. But I am not at all sure that this was otherwise than really beneficial to Science. For the infirmity of his health led him to withdraw altogether from the whirl of London life, and to pass his time in the tranquil seclusion of his country residence; where—fortunately possessing an ample competence, blessed with a wife (a Wedgwood cousin) in every way fitted to be his companion, and happy in a rising family, whose members, as they successively grew up under his

watchful care, came to be his efficient helpers in the collection of observations and the performance of experiments—he could calmly excogitate and mature his great ideas, *thinking about them** the more, because he was able to *do* so little.

With most men such solitary contemplation, alike in Scientific as in other matters, is dangerous. The importance of continually “comparing notes” with others, is attested by all experience. But there was no such danger of going wrong in Charles Darwin’s case. For, in the first place, he was thoroughly on his guard against it, as the following passage in one of his subsequent letters to me shows:—“When I think of the many cases of men “ who have studied one subject for years, and have persuaded themselves of the truth of the foolishlest doctrines, “ I feel sometimes a little frightened whether I may not be “ one of these monomaniacs.” But, however bold his speculations, he ran no risk of going persistently wrong; because he had so disciplined his mind in habits of exact thought and loyalty to truth, that he was constantly testing his conclusions, step by step, as he elaborated them, by their conformity, not with the views of other men, but with the teachings of Nature. His mind was omnivorous for facts; and the feebleness of his digestion of bodily food seemed even to invigorate his power of assimilating mental *pabulum*. To use a common proverb, “All was fish that came into his net.” Nothing in Nature was too mean or trivial to interest him; he could utilise the most casual observation to fill up some gap in his fabric of thought.

The history of his *Origin of Species*, as told by himself in his original Introduction to it, shows that what he had himself observed during the voyage of the *Beagle*, as to “certain “ facts in the distribution of the organic beings inhabiting

* It is told of Newton that when some one asked him how he came to make his great discoveries, he replied, “By always thinking about them.”

“ South America, and in the Geological relations of the present to the past inhabitants of that continent, seemed to throw some light on the origin of species—that mystery of mysteries, as it has been called by one of our greatest Philosophers;” and that on his return home it occurred to him “ that something might perhaps be made out on this question, by patiently accumulating and reflecting on all sorts of facts which could possibly have any bearing on it.” “ After *five years' work*,” he continues, “ I allowed myself to speculate on the subject, and drew up some short notes; these I enlarged in 1844 into a sketch of the conclusions which then seemed to me probable; from that period to the present day (1859) I have steadily pursued the same object.”

But while keeping this continually before his mind, he was at the same time applying himself, in spite of his infirmity of health, to the investigation of the very difficult group of *Cirripedia* (Barnacles and Acorn-shells), to which he was led in the first instance by his desire to describe an abnormal type that he had found on the coast of South America. The Monograph of it which he produced after several years of laborious study, is a master-piece of Anatomical skill, Physiological acumen, and Zoological completeness; leaving nothing to be done for the exhaustive treatment of the group (as then known), save the study of its early Embryology, which neither the materials at Darwin's disposal, nor the methods of microscopical research then in use, could have enabled him to carry further. During the same period he also had in train a number of distinct series of researches, bearing in various ways upon the great idea which was ever before his thoughts: as, for example, his own investigations into the fertilization of Orchids; and the experiments on the breeding of Pigeons and Fowls, in carrying on which he engaged the assistance of my old fellow student, Mr. Tegetmeier. And it was known to his intimates

that he had it in contemplation to produce, as soon as he should feel himself prepared to do so with such completeness of proof as he thought required, a comprehensive Treatise, in which the question of Species should be firmly grappled with, and a determined effort made for its solution.

What has been the effect upon educated thought of Charles Darwin's elucidation of this difficulty, may perhaps be best apprehended by looking back to the state of perplexity in regard to it, which prevailed at the date of the publication of the 'Origin of Species.'

In my own student-days, the "fixity of species" was the generally accepted doctrine among Zoologists and Botanists: much greater stress being laid upon points of *difference*, than upon points of *agreement*; and far more credit being attached to the *multiplication* of species by attention to minute differences, than to the *reduction* of their number by such a careful comparison of numerous individuals as proved these differences to be inconstant and gradational. So, again, it was the general creed of the older Palæontologists, that each Geological period had a Fauna and Flora of its own, every member of which *must* be specifically distinct from that which preceded and followed it; *a complete extinction* of all the types of life then existing having taken place at the end of every such period, and *an entirely new creation* having ushered in the next. This school was represented among Continental Naturalists, down to a recent period, by men of such eminence as M. D'Orbigny and Prof. Agassiz; but in Britain it died out long since. For all our most esteemed Zoologists and Botanists had for some time been studying the *range of variation** of each reputed species, as

*Thus Mr. Bentham, in his *British Flora*, had reduced the number of species of British Flowering Plants from the 1,571 of Hooker and Arnott, and the 1,708 of Babington, to 1,285; and this mainly by the study of the range of variation of the three most diversified generic types, the Rose, Willow, and Bramble. So among the *Foraminifera*, certain types of which

one of the most essential features of its character; whilst our ablest Palæontologists had laboured with success in tracing the identity of numerous species, whose remains occur in Formations stratigraphically distinct. It was, indeed, a favourite doctrine of the late Prof. Edward Forbes, that there was a constant relation between the range of any species in *Space* and its range in *Time*; i.e., that in proportion as the constitution of any species adapted it to diversities in climate, food, &c., so as to permit its extension over a wide *Geographical area*, in that proportion would it have been able to accommodate itself to changes in the same conditions, so as to hold its ground through successive *Geological periods*. Further, it had come to be perceived that where the *Stratigraphical continuity* is the closest, there is the greatest resemblance between the successive Faunæ—as in the case of the different members of the Cretaceous series; and that where there is an interruption to such continuity in one locality, the gap is often bridged over elsewhere. And even as regards those great separations which were reputed to mark the terminations of the Palæozoic and of the Mesozoic series respectively, it was generally believed by Geologists of the newer school that the interruption was more apparent than real; depending merely on the want of the intermediate beds in that small portion of the Globe which has been hitherto explored. A Geologist who should have formed his notions of Stratigraphical succession from a country where Tertiary strata immediately overlie Silurian, would find that tremendous *hiatus* in great degree filled up by the intermediate series presented in England alone; and in like manner, if the British Geologist could carry his researches into areas which were submerged when Palæozoic and

had been for several years the objects of my own special study, I had shown not only that vast multitudes of the species, but even many of the genera, created by D'Orbigny, had no existence as permanently distinct types.

Cretaceous Europe were above the sea, he could doubtless find abundant evidence of gradational passage to the Mesozoic and Eocene. Such gradations, it is now well known, are not wanting within the limits of Europe, and are very obvious elsewhere.

Even in the Pre-Darwinian epoch, then, many of our most thoughtful Naturalists were disposed to admit (1) that no definite limits can be assigned to the variation of any species, without the careful collection and comparison of examples of the type throughout the entire extent of its Geographical and Geological range; and (2) that a very considerable amount of *genetic continuity* existed between the Faunas and Floras of successive strata, extending in all probability to what are known as *representative species*, as well as to types between which the gradational passage could be *shown* to be complete. And if these doctrines be admitted, it becomes obvious that the range of any true species in Geological time would be determined only by the degree of its capacity to accommodate itself to changes in the conditions of its existence; and that there is no *a priori* reason why Marine types, having a large capacity of this kind, should not maintain their existence through a long succession of Epochs. That existing species of *Mollusca* are met with even in the earliest Tertiary strata, and in increasing proportion in the later, had been demonstrated by M. Deshayes, and made by Sir C. Lyell the foundation of his classification of the Tertiary series. And that numerous types of *Foraminifera* and *Diatomaceæ* characteristic of the Cretaceous period are existing at the present time, had been shown by Prof. Ehrenberg. Messrs. Parker and Rupert Jones, again, had shown the identity of even Triassic *Foraminifera* with types still inhabiting the Mediterranean.

However limited in scope were these Pre-Darwinian views, as compared with those developed in the 'Origin of

Species,' they had taken the same direction, and in some degree prepared the way for their reception; as had also the application to Palæontology of Von Baer's great law of *Development from the general to the special*, based on a recognition of numerous cases in which the earlier forms of certain great types presented *generalised* combinations of characters, which subsequently became more and more distinctly *specialised* in the progress of Geological time. But this was considered merely as an expression of the *plan* according to which the succession of Animal and Vegetable forms had been created; not as indicating any genetic continuity between the earlier and the later.

The doctrine of Evolution by *genetic continuity* was advocated (under the designation of 'Creation by Law') in a remarkable book published in 1844, entitled, 'Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation.' But whilst the general doctrine was advanced with an ingenuity and plausibility that made a considerable impression on the public mind, it gained no adherents among those really qualified to judge of it; the author's data proving to be often so inaccurate, and his reasoning so unsound, as to render his conclusion altogether destitute of claim to be accepted as a valid scientific hypothesis. Whilst severely criticising it, however, from the scientific point of view, I had myself taken occasion to say that I could not see the least objection, either philosophical or theological, to the doctrine of Progressive Development, if only it could be shown to have a really scientific basis; since the development of the very highest type of Animal life from the very lowest, during the long succession of Geological ages, did not seem to me less credible than the fact of the development of that same type from a minute formless particle during a nine months' gestation. And I had further argued that it really involves a far higher idea of Creative Design, to believe that a small number of types of Organic Life originally introduced were continuously

evolved in the course of Geological Ages, according to a definite and unchanging plan, into a countless variety of forms suitable to the "conditions of existence" at each period, and finally into the Flora and Fauna of the present epoch, than to suppose that the changes which successively took place in those conditions necessitated *interferences* from time to time on the part of the Creator, in compensating, by the creation of new species, for the extinction of the old.*

Such were not merely my own views, but those of many thoughtful men with whom I was in intimate relation; and among these I may specially mention Dr. (now Sir Joseph) Hooker, Mr. Herbert Spencer, and Prof. Baden Powell; the treatment of the subject by the two latter of whom is thus characterised by Mr. Darwin himself:—

"Mr. Herbert Spencer (in an Essay originally published in March, 1852) has contrasted the theories of the Creation and the Development of organic beings with remarkable skill and force. He argues from the analogy of domestic productions, from the changes which the embryos of many species undergo, from the difficulty of distinguishing species from varieties, and from the principle of general gradation, that species have been modified; and he attributes the modification to change of circumstances. The author (1855) has also treated Psychology on the principle of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation."—"The 'Philosophy of Creation' has been treated in a masterly manner by the Rev. Baden Powell, in his Essays on the 'Unity of Worlds,' 1855. Nothing can be more striking than the manner in which he shows that the introduction of a new species is 'a regular, not a casual phenomenon,' or, as Sir John Herschel expresses it, 'a natural in contradistinction to a miraculous process.'"

It is well known that Mr. Darwin was, in a manner, forced

*These views were embodied in a series of Papers on the Harmony of Science and Religion, which I contributed to the *Inquirer* thirty-seven years ago; and I found them fully confirmed by the study of the *Foraminifera*, on which I was then engaged. For this study greatly extended my views as to the Range of Variation of Species; which I made the subject of a Lecture delivered at the Meeting of the British Association at Glasgow in 1855.

into a publication of his views which he himself considered premature, by the sending to the Linnæan Society of a paper on the same subject, written by Mr. A. R. Wallace, who was then pursuing his admirable Zoological and Botanical researches in the Eastern Archipelago. By these researches, Mr. Wallace had been led, in common with Mr. Darwin, to the idea of the "survival of the fittest" as furnishing the conditions under which *specific* distinctions, arising originally by natural variation, have come to be apparently fixed and permanent; but he did not venture to push his conclusions further. It was Mr. Darwin's Geological training in the school of Lyell, that showed him how, if adequate *time* could be allowed, the same might be assumed of those greater diversities, which differentiate genera, families, orders, and classes; and that led him to contend that "the imperfections of the Geological record" sufficiently accounted for the absence of those "missing links," which, on this view, must have intervened between types now widely separated. I shall have occasion presently to note (p. 519) in what a remarkable degree this contention has been justified by subsequent events. And I shall now briefly recall some of the incidents which followed the publication, in 1859, of the mere outline-sketch of the Author's views *On the Origin of Species by Natural Selection*, of which the several treatises that have since appeared constitute the filling-up, each contributing to complete some particular portion of the picture.

To those who had been following the line of thought I have just indicated, the publication of this work was soon felt to be the inauguration of a new era in Biological Science. It gave a distinct shape to ideas on which many of us had been pondering as vague speculative possibilities. It put the doctrine of Progressive Development into the form of a definite Scientific Hypothesis; in favour of which a vast mass of evidence could be adduced, whilst the objections to its acceptance were shown to arise chiefly out of that

“imperfection of the Geological record” which we were fully prepared to admit. It showed that, on general grounds, the probability of a *genetic continuity* of Organic Life throughout the geological series,—the Fauna and Flora of any epoch being the product of “descent with modification” from that which preceded it,—is far greater than that of successive new creations. And to such as admitted this, it was plain that the conclusion can scarcely be evaded, that, as the tendency throughout has been clearly one of *progressive differentiation* or *specialisation*, the number of original types might have been very small; perhaps even a single primordial “jelly-speck” being the common ancestor of all.

The high scientific character which Darwin had acquired by his previous labours in Geology and Zoology, and the knowledge that in Botany also he had solved problems (in regard to the fertilization of Orchids) which had baffled even Robert Brown, ought to have secured a fair and candid consideration for the doctrine which he had so patiently and carefully worked out. And among such Men of Science in this country as were not trammelled by Theological prepossessions, he soon made more converts than he had expected. Every one who applied himself in good earnest to the study of the *Origin of Species*, found it to be composed of material very different from that of the *Vestiges*; for while many had spoken of having read through the latter as they would a novel, a single chapter of Darwin was found to be quite as much as any one could properly digest in a day. It happened that as I was thus slowly working my way through it, I several times met Prof. Henslow, who was similarly engaged; and as we discussed together the effects it was producing on each, we found them singularly accordant. At last Henslow expressed to me his full and complete acceptance of Darwin's doctrine, not as *proved*, but as *highly probable*; and he never shrank from publicly avowing this, even when

such avowal was enough to draw down upon him, as a benedicted Clergyman, no small amount of the *odium theologicum*. It was most interesting thus to find the *quondam* Master not only learning from his pupil, but taking up arms in his defence.

But neither he nor I could attach the importance which Mr. Darwin seemed to do, to the doctrine of "Natural Selection," or the "survival of the fittest," as *in itself* an adequate explanation of the progressive modifications that have produced the long and diversified succession of Animal and Vegetable forms, which have peopled our globe from the first appearance of life on its surface to the present time. For it seemed obvious to us, that Natural Selection can only take effect in perpetuating certain varietal modifications *already existing*; and that it gives no account of their origination. That "like produces like" is certainly the rule; and it cannot be justly said that any exceptional variations which the offspring may present are "spontaneous." Every such effect requires a cause; and Natural Selection cannot assuredly be the *cause* of what existed before it could operate.* Consequently we must look to *forces* acting either *within* or *without* the Organism, as the real agents in producing whatever developmental variations it may take-on. Of the action of such forces, we at present know scarcely anything; but Mr. Darwin has himself most fully recognised the need of them. His latest utterance on the subject is that "at the present time there is hardly any question in Biology of more importance than that of the nature and causes of Variability." I

* It is, I think, greatly to be regretted that some of the more ardent advocates of the Evolution-doctrine are continually (by neglect of this important distinction) leading their disciples to look at "natural selection" as the *cause* of particular adaptations of structure to function; whereas it simply expresses the *fact* that the creatures in which those adaptations *had come to exist*, would be the fittest to survive, and would be likely to transmit them hereditarily. How they came to exist, natural selection does not in the least explain.

cannot, then, be accused of undervaluing Darwin's work, in pointing out that what I originally felt to be its weakest part still remains incomplete.

But further, the instances adduced by Mr. Darwin as results of *artificial* selection, were cases of *varietal* modification only; and he was unable to prove that the character which most strongly marks what the Naturalist had been accustomed to accept as a true *species*,—namely, its incapacity for producing with any congener an intermediate self-sustaining race,—is otherwise than fixed and permanent. He was able, indeed, to show that *varieties* placed under artificial conditions, may come to be so far differentiated constitutionally, as to breed together with difficulty. But of the actual origination of what a philosophical Botanist or Zoologist would accept as a *true species*, incapable of breeding except with its own type, he was unable to produce any instance whatever. If, then, “Natural Selection” could not be shown to have produced a new species, still less could it be looked to as a *vera causa* for the establishment of still greater differences. And this was triumphantly put forward by his opponents, as an objection of sufficient weight to overthrow his whole doctrine.

Their triumph, however, was short-lived; for whilst Darwin was able, in his subsequent publications, to cite many instances in which the protracted influence of new conditions on the successive generations of a Race, has actually produced most remarkable modifications, not only in external characters, but in internal structure and physiological habit, the prosecution of Palæontological inquiry, under the influence of the doctrine of Genetic Continuity, soon began to accumulate a mass of evidence in its favour, which has now become simply overwhelming. It may be safely affirmed, indeed, that every new Palæontological discovery tends in this direction. This is especially seen in

the gradual divarication of the Ruminant and Pachyderm Orders, and of the Family subdivisions of the latter, which can now be continuously traced through the Tertiary and Quaternary series. Every Naturalist knows that the *Anoplotherium* and other Mammals whose fossil remains occur in the Eocene Tertiaries of Paris, presented most remarkable combinations of Pachyderm and Ruminant characters, which are completely separated and specialised in Pliocene and Post-pliocene genera. Some years ago, a remarkable collection of Mammalian fossils of Miocene age was discovered at Pikermi in Greece; and the study of these, most carefully prosecuted by M. Gaudry (of the Jardin des Plantes), showed that they supplied such a number of "missing links," that the Genetic derivation of the later more specialised types from the earlier more generalised could scarcely remain a matter of doubt to any Naturalist not previously wedded to the doctrine of Special Creations. On the basis of a very careful examination of the whole series as completed by recent American discoveries, Prof. Huxley has been able to construct a "Pedigree of the Horse," so complete that nothing is now wanting to its entire continuity from the Eocene period to the present.

Again, the Deep-Sea researches in which it has been my privilege to bear a part, have shown that a large number of Cretaceous *Echinoderms*, *Corals*, *Sponges*, and *Foraminifera*, as well as of Tertiary *Mollusca*, supposed to be extinct, survives in the depths of the Ocean at the present time; these types being in some instances specifically identical, whilst in others the modification they have undergone is of such a limited kind, as to justify their being accounted representative species. This has been the result, not merely of the Dredging Expeditions conducted by my colleagues (Sir Wyville Thomson and Mr. J. Gwyn Jeffreys) and myself, but also of the like explorations carried on by the United States Coast Survey in the Gulf of Mexico and else-

where. One of the most characteristic examples of it is presented in the little *Rhizocrinus Lofotensis*; the discovery of which, by G. Sars, off the coast of Norway, in 1866, gave the start to our own work. For this is clearly a dwarfed and deformed representative of the highly-developed *Apiocrinus* (Pear-encrinite) of the Bradford Clay (Wiltshire Oolite); which, as my friend Wyville Thomson said, "seems to have been going to the bad for millions of years," under the influence of a reduced temperature.

To most English Naturalists it seems premature at present to attempt to construct a pedigree of the Animal Kingdom generally, as has been done by Prof. Haeckel and other Naturalists in Germany. The Palæontological as well as the Developmental history of each group must be much more completely ascertained, before any save tentative arrangements of this kind can be formed. But every addition to our knowledge points in this direction. Thus, while some of us found no difficulty in believing that all existing Birds have arisen from one common stock, the derivation of that stock from a common *stirps* with the Reptilian at first appeared almost inconceivable; Birds and Reptiles being *physiologically* almost the antitheses of each other. But the discovery of the *Archæopteryx* first showed that a true Bird may have a prolonged and distinctly jointed tail. The careful comparison made by Mr. Seeley of the skull of the *Pterodactyl* with that of the Fowl, led him to conclude that the former must have had a development of brain scarcely inferior to the latter, and was likely, therefore, to have had a circulation as vigorous and complete as that of Birds. And the researches of Prof. Marsh in the Cretaceous strata of North America have brought to light a vast number of "missing links," in the form of *Pterodactyls* which resemble Birds in the want of teeth, and of Birds which correspond with Reptiles in the possession of them. Further, the development of the *Struthious* Birds, which

were formerly supposed to have the closest Mammalian affinities, is now found to be much more Reptilian than Mammalian; while certain Dinosaurian Reptiles present distinct indications of progress towards Birds. And thus the evidence now in course of accumulation already affords adequate support to the idea of the descent even of Birds and Reptiles from a common Ancestor. Many other instances might be adduced of the like character.

It is one most remarkable characteristic of this doctrine, that it suggests new inquiries which would otherwise have not been thought of,—just as when the “perturbations” in the movements of the Planets, which were predicted as necessary results of their mutual attraction, came to be recognised so soon as they were looked for with adequate observing power; the results of these inquiries being always in its favour. “Whoever,” said Mr. Darwin, in his preface to a work published not long before his death (Dr. Weissmann’s ‘Studies in the Theory of Descent’), “compares the discussions in this volume with those published twenty years ago on any branch of Natural History, will see how wide and rich a field for study has been opened up through the principle of Evolution; and such fields, without the light shed upon them by this principle, would for long or for ever have remained barren.”

It was fortunate for the Darwinian doctrine, that it at once secured the powerful advocacy of Prof. Huxley; whose vigorous pen and trenchant speech proved him a match for the ablest of those opponents, whose Theological prepossessions led them to test its truth by its conformity with the Biblical record; and whose Palæontological studies have since furnished a large body of additional evidence in its favour. By Lyell, our most philosophic Geologist, and by Hooker, our most distin-

guished Botanist, it was at once provisionally accepted ; and whilst the 'Quarterly' and the 'Edinburgh' condemned it in no measured terms, I strove to defend it in the 'National' and 'Medico-Chirurgical' Reviews, for my articles in which I had the pleasure of receiving Darwin's cordial thanks,—my acceptance of his views being especially valued by him as the testimony of a Physiologist. The letters which I had from him at this period express the greatest solicitude for the fair consideration of his doctrines, and the warmest gratitude to those who had taken up the advocacy of them ; while from any personal bitterness against his opponents, they are entirely free. "I have "been of late," he wrote to me, "sufficiently well pitched "into about my book to please anybody. But I care "very little ; which I entirely and absolutely owe to the "generous and kind support of a very few men. When I "reflect (as I often do) that such men as Lyell, "yourself, Hooker, and Huxley, go a certain way with "me, nothing will persuade me that I am so wholly and "egregiously in error as many of my reviewers think." An eminent Botanist of the United States, Prof. Asa Gray, early expressed not only his entire acceptance of Darwin's views, but his complete repudiation of the atheistic character which "orthodox" Theologians were attributing to them. The outcry which was raised among these, afforded another proof of the narrowing and perverting influence of any dogmatic systems which men pledge themselves to uphold. There is no need now to go back over the melancholy story of the slanderous attacks which were made on the greatest interpreter of the "Order of (Organic) Nature" who has ever stood between its Author and Man ; but they ought to be remembered as a lesson to the Theologians of the future. No one has *now* ventured to throw a stone at Darwin's grave ; since for any to do so, would bring down upon him general condemnation. The revolution in the public

feeling of this country, which has been silently and almost insensibly going on, but of which his departure from among us has brought out the manifestation, has been a surprise no less to his friends, than it must have been to his former opponents. The highest eulogies have been pronounced upon him from pulpits in which he was once reviled; and his life, no less than his work, has been held up as a model for imitation, where his character as a man was formerly included in the depreciation of his achievements as a philosopher.

I cannot but believe that this remarkable change is due in no small degree to that which has always forcibly struck me in his mode of dealing with opponents,—his entire unconcern as to personal calumny; which seemed to affect him only as it might militate against the fair consideration of his views, or give pain to his family. Of any *scientific* arguments which he deemed worthy of attention, he would always take full cognizance. Sometimes he could readily dispose of them, by showing that they either had a wrong basis of fact, or were unstably built-up on a right one. But sometimes they started what he frankly admitted to be difficulties; and then, instead of evading these, he would give them their fullest weight. No testimony could be stronger or warmer than that which is borne by his honourable opponent, M. de Quatrefages (in the obituary notice which he drew up at the request of the President of the French Academy of Sciences), to Darwin's full recognition of the facts and reasonings which militate in favour of those who still uphold the doctrine of the "fixity of species":—"Il s'empresse de les leur signaler avec une loyauté qui a "quelque chose de chevaleresque. . . . Cette bonne foi "constante donne à certaines pages de Darwin un charme "particulier. On suit avec intérêt, jusque dans ses écarts, "ce penseur, tout occupé de vous imposer ses croyances, et "qui n'en met pas moins entre vos mains, avec un véritable

“ candeur, les armes les plus propres à les combattre. On “ pose ses livres avec un redoublement de haute estime pour “ le savant, d’affectueuse sympathie pour l’homme.” Those only who have been themselves the objects of similar obloquy, can fully appreciate the dignified self-restraint which kept him silent under imputations which most would have burned to repudiate, and scornful taunts which would naturally call forth no less scornful replies. But he would never be turned by these from the “ even tenor of his way:” deeming it more for the interests of Truth that he should devote all his energies to the fuller exposition of his doctrine, the collection of further evidence in its support, and the removal of the scientific difficulties that impeded its progress; than that he should waste his strength in personal recrimination, which would never extort justice from such as were determined to put him in the wrong, and would but weaken, instead of strengthening, his scientific position. This self-restraint seems to me to have formed the climax to the most exalted nature it has ever been my happiness to encounter. Those who knew Charles Darwin most intimately, are unanimous in their appreciation of the unsurpassed nobility and beauty of his *whole* character. In him there was no “ other side.” Not only was he the Philosopher who has wrought a greater revolution in human thought within a quarter of a century than any man of our time—or perhaps of *any* time,—and has given what is proving the death-blow to Theological systems which had been clinging yet more tenaciously about men’s shoulders because of the efforts made to shake them off; but as a Man he exemplified in his own life that true *religion*, which is deeper, wider, and loftier than any Theology. For this not only inspired him with the devotion to Truth which was the master-passion of his great nature; but made him the most admirable husband, brother, and father; the kindest friend, neighbour, and master; the genuine lover, not only of his fellow-

man, but of every creature. Of no one could it be more appropriately said :—

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“ He prayeth best who loveth best
All things both great and small ;”

for the whole attitude of his mind was that of humble reverence for the Great Power which “made and loveth all.”

WILLIAM B. CARPENTER.

WORDSWORTH'S TWO STYLES.*

THE essential feature of Wordsworth's Poetry has been described by the greatest of our living critics in language that none of our Society are at all likely to forget. After speaking of Goethe's experience of the Iron Age, Matthew Arnold says of Wordsworth :—

He, too, upon a wintry clime
Had fallen, on this iron time
Of doubts, disputes, distractions, fears.
He found us when the age had bound
Our souls in its benumbing round ;
He spoke, and loosed our heart in tears.
He laid us as we lay at birth
On the cool, flowery lap of earth,
Smiles broke from us, and we had ease ;
The hills were round us, and the breeze
Went o'er the sunlit fields again ;
Our foreheads felt the wind and rain.
Our youth returned ; for there was shed
On spirits that had long been dead,
Spirits dried up and closely furled,
The freshness of the early world.

Ah ! since dark days still bring to light
Man's prudence and man's fiery might
Time may restore us in his course
Goethe's sage mind, and Byron's force ;
But where will Europe's latter hour
Again find Wordsworth's healing power ?
Others will teach us how to dare,
And against fear our breast to steel ;

* Read before the Wordsworth Society, May 3rd, 1882.

Others will strengthen us to bear ;
 But who, ah ! who will make us feel ?
 The cloud of mortal destiny,
 Others will front it fearlessly,
 But who, like him, will put it by ?

I think this is rightly chosen as the characteristic of Wordsworth's poetry, that he puts by for us the "cloud of mortal destiny," that he restores us the "freshness of the early world," that he gives us back the magic circle of the hills, makes us feel the breath of the wind and the coolness of the rain upon our foreheads; and touches both the vigour of youth, and the peace of age, with more of that serene lustre which dew gives to the flowers, than any other poet. But the same great critic has assured us that, properly speaking, Wordsworth has no style, "no assured poetic style of his own;" and this though he freely admits that "it is style, and the elevation given by style, which chiefly makes the effectiveness of 'Laodamia.'" For my part, I should have said that as to Wordsworth's blank verse Mr. Arnold is right; that in his blank verse Wordsworth is so dependent on his matter, that he runs through almost all styles, good and bad. But in his rhymed verse, I should have preferred to say—though the admission may, perhaps, be used on behalf of Mr. Arnold's drift—that Wordsworth had two distinct styles, the style of his youth and the style of his age, the elastic style of fresh energy, born of his long devotion to Nature's own rhythms, and the style of gracious and stately feeling, born of his benignity, of his deep-set, calm sympathy with human feeling,—the style of "The Solitary Reaper," and the style of "Devotional Incitements." Surely the style of the verse—

Alone, she cuts and binds the grain,
 And sings a melancholy strain ;
 Oh ! listen, for the vale profound
 Is overflowing with the sound,

is Wordsworth's, in as true a sense as the style of

~~www~~After life's fitful fever, he sleeps well,

is Shakespeare's. Or again, is there not the personal stamp of Wordsworth indelibly imprinted on every line in the "Song at the Feast of Brougham Castle"?—

No thoughts hath he but thoughts that pass
Light as the wind along the grass!
Can this be he who hither came
In secret, like a smothered flame?

Less personal, certainly less indelibly branded with Wordsworth's hand, is what I call the later style. Still, I think such lines as these, in the "Devotional Incitements," describing the comparatively slight power of Art, when compared with Nature, to excite reverence, have on them an indelible impress of Wordsworth's developed genius, in its gracious, pure, and serene solemnity:—

The priests are from their altars thrust,
Temples are levelled with the dust,
And solemn rites and awful forms
Founder amid fanatic storms.
Yet evermore, through years renewed,
In undisturbed vicissitude
Of seasons balancing their flight
On the swift wings of day and night,
Kind Nature keeps a heavenly door
Wide open to the scattered poor.

The most characteristic earlier and the most characteristic later style are alike in the limpid coolness of their effect,—the effect in the earlier style of bubbling water, in the later of morning dew. Both alike lay the dust, and take us out of the fret of life, and restore the truth to feeling, and cast over the vision of the universe

The image of a poet's heart,
How bright, how solemn, how serene!

But the earlier and the later styles, even in their best specimens, do this in very different ways, while the inferior specimens of each are marked by very different faults. As models of the two styles at their best, I would take, for instance, "The Daffodils" for the earlier, and "The Primrose of the Rock" for the later; "Yarrow Unvisited" for the earlier, and "Yarrow Revisited" for the later; "The Leech-gatherer" (or, as Wordsworth rather cumbrously called it, "Resolution and Independence") for the earlier, and "Laodamia" for the later style. The chief differences between the two styles seem to me these:—That objective fact, especially when appealing to the sense of vision, sometimes utterly bald and trivial, though often very commanding in its effects, plays so much larger a part in the earlier than the later; that the earlier, when it reaches its mark at all, has a pure elasticity, a passionless buoyancy (passionless, I mean, in the sense of being devoid of the hotter passions) in it, almost unique in poetry; and, lastly, that in the greater of the earlier pieces emotion is uniformly suggested rather than expressed, or, if I may be allowed the paradox, expressed by reticence, by the jealous parsimony of a half-voluntary, half-involuntary reserve. In the later style, on the other hand, objective fact is much less prominent; bald moralities tend to take the place of bald realities; and though the buoyancy is much diminished, emotion is much more freely, frankly, and tenderly expressed, so that there is often in it a richness and mellowness of effect quite foreign to Wordsworth's earlier mood. The ruggedness of the earlier style is what one may call one of knots and flinty protuberances; there is an occasional bleakness about it; the passion with which passion is kept down, though often exalted, is sometimes hard; there is a scorn of sweetness, an excess of simplicity which frequently touches *simplesse*; and though the depth of feeling which is dammed up, makes its surging voice heard

in the happier instances, yet in the less happy instances the success of the operation is only too great, and leaves us oppressed with a sense of unexpected blankness.

In the later style all this is changed. The keenness of sheer objective vision is still felt, but is less dominant; while emotion, no longer restrained, flows naturally, and with a sweet and tender lustre shining upon it, into musical expression. I may illustrate the general differences between the two styles, so far as regards the degrees of their direct expressiveness, by a characteristic change which Wordsworth made in his later editions in the beautiful poem entitled "The Fountain." The poet, it will be remembered, there remonstrates with the schoolmaster whom he calls Matthew, for speaking of himself as unloved in his old age:—

" Now both himself and me he wrongs,
The man who thus complains.
I live and sing my idle songs
Upon these happy plains.

" And, Matthew, for thy children dead,
I'll be a son to thee."
At this he grasped his hands, and said,
" Alas, that cannot be !"

In the later editions, Wordsworth altered this to,—

At this he grasped my hand, and said,
" Alas, that cannot be !"

The earlier reading looks like hard fact, and no doubt sounds a little rough and abrupt. But I feel pretty sure, not only that the earlier reading expressed the truth as it was present to Wordsworth's inner eye when he wrote the poem, but that it agreed better with the mood of those earlier years, when the old man's wringing of his own hands, in a sort of passion of protest against the notion that any one could take the place of his lost child, would have

seemed much more natural and dignified to Wordsworth, than the mere kindly expression of grateful feeling for which he subsequently exchanged it.

Now, I will go a little into detail. Contrast the power, which is very marked in both cases, of the poem on "The Daffodils," with that on "The Primrose of the Rock." You all know the wonderful buoyancy of that poem on the daffodils,—the reticent passion with which the poet's delight is expressed, not by dwelling on feeling, but by selecting as a fit comparison to that "crowd and host" of golden daffodils, the impression produced on the eye by the continuousness of "the stars that shine and sparkle in the Milky Way," the effect of wind, and of the exaltation which wind produces, in the lines,—

Ten thousand saw I at a glance,
Tossing their heads in sprightly dance ;

and in the rivalry suggested between them and the waves,—

The waves beside them danced, but they
Outdid the sparkling waves in glee.

You all know the exquisite simplicity of the conclusion, when the poet tells us that as often as they recur to his mind, and

—flash upon that inward eye
Which is the bliss of solitude,

his heart "with pleasure fills, and dances with the daffodils."

The great beauty of that poem is its wonderful buoyancy, its purely objective way of conveying that buoyancy, and the extraordinary vividness with which "the lonely rapture of lonely minds" is stamped upon the whole poem, which is dated 1804. Now turn to "The Primrose of the Rock," which was written twenty-seven years later, in 1831. We find the style altogether more ideal; reality counts for less,

symbol for more. There is far less elasticity, far less exultant buoyancy here, and yet a grander and more stately movement. The *reserve* of power has almost disappeared; but there is a graciousness absent before, and the noble strength of the last verse is most gentle strength :—

A Rock there is whose homely front
 The passing traveller slights ;
 Yet there the glow-worms hang their lamps
 Like stars, at various heights ;
 And one coy primrose to that Rock
 The vernal breeze invites.

What hideous warfare hath been waged,
 What kingdoms overthrown,
 Since first I spied that primrose-tuft,
 And marked it for my own ;
 A lasting link in Nature's chain,
 From highest heaven let down !

The flowers, still faithful to the stems,
 Their fellowship renew ;
 The stems are faithful to the root,
 That worketh out of view ;
 And to the Rock the root adheres,
 In every fibre true.

Close clings to earth the living Rock,
 Though threatening still to fall ;
 The earth is constant in her sphere ;
 And God upholds them all ;
 So blooms this lonely plant, nor dreads
 Her annual funeral.

It will be observed at once that in "The Daffodils" there is no attempt to explain the delight which the gay spectacle raised in the poet's heart. He exults in the spectacle itself, and reproduces it continually in memory. The wind in his style blows as the wind blows in "The Daffodils," with a sort of physical rapture. In the later poem, the symbol is everything. The mind pours itself forth fully in

reflective gratitude, as it glances at the moral overthrow which the humble primrose of the rock,—and many things of human mould as humble and faithful as the primrose of the rock,—has outlived. In point of mere expression, I should call the later poem the more perfect of the two. The enjoyment of the first lies in the intensity of the feeling which it somehow indicates, without expressing, of which it merely hints the force by its eager and springy movement.

Now, take the earliest and latest Yarrow, and note the same difference. How swift, and bare, and rapid, like the stream itself, as Wordsworth chooses to describe it:—

—a river bare
That glides the dark hills under,

is the verse in which he depreciates the reality, in order to enhance the treasure of an unverified vision! Yarrow is represented as a fit home chiefly for the country people who go to market at Selkirk, and for the wild birds and ground game which fly and burrow beside it:—

Let Yarrow folk frae Selkirk Town,
Who have been buying, selling,
Go back to Yarrow, 'tis their own ;
Each maiden to her dwelling !
On Yarrow's banks let herons feed,
Hares couch, and rabbits burrow ;
But we will downward with the Tweed,
Nor turn aside to Yarrow.

The charm of that is the charm of a perfectly bare representation of a perfectly simple scene, enhanced by the suggestion which lurks everywhere that the common facts of life are pretty certain to seem common, unless, indeed, you bring an imagination strong enough to transfigure them ; while if you do, the poet insists that the true magic is in you, and not in the scene, since it is independent of

the actual vision on which the mind seems to feed. The beauty of the verse is almost all confined to the thought itself; the only touch of extraneous beauty is the careless suggestion that "the swan on still St. Mary's Lake" may, if it pleases, "float double, swan and shadow," without tempting them aside to see it; and even that seems put in only to suggest, as it were, how greatly the power of vividly imagining even such a sight as this exceeds in significance the power which the mere eyes possess of discerning loveliness even where they have taken in the forms and colours which ought to suggest it. The whole beauty of the verses is in their bareness. The poem may be said to have for its very subject the economy of imaginative force, the wantonness of poetic prodigality, the duty of retaining in the heart reserves of potential and meditative joy, on which you refuse to draw all you might draw of actual delight:—

Be Yarrow stream, unseen, unknown !
 It must, or we shall rue it ;
 We have a vision of our own,
 Ah ! why should we undo it ?

And the style corresponds to the thought; it is the style of one who exults in holding-over, and in being strong and buoyant enough to hold-over, a promised imaginative joy. A certain ascetic radiance,—if the paradox be permissible,—a manly jubilation in being rich enough to sacrifice an expected delight, makes the style sinewy, rapid, youthful, and yet careful in its youthfulness, as jealous of redundancy as it is firm and elastic. This was written in 1803. Turn to "Yarrow Revisited," which was written twenty-eight years later, in 1831. The rhythm is the same, but how different the movement; how much sweeter and slower, how many more the syllables on which you must dwell, sometimes with what the ear admits to be an over-emphasis; how much richer the music, when it is music;

how much more hesitating, not to say vacillating, the reflection; and how the versification itself renders all this, with its sedate pauses,—pauses, to use another poet's fine expression, "as if memory had wept,"—its amplitude of tender feeling, its lingerings over sweet colours, its anxious desire to find compensation for the buoyancy of youth in wise reflection !—

Once more by Newark's castle gate
 Long left without a warder,
 I stood, looked, listened, and with thee,
 Great minstrel of the Border !

Grave thoughts ruled wide on that sweet day,
 Their dignity installing
 In gentle bosoms, while sere leaves
 Were on the bough, or falling ;
 But breezes played and sunshine gleamed—
 The forest to embolden ;
 Reddened the fiery hues, and shot
 Transparency through the golden.

For busy thoughts the stream flowed on
 In foamy agitation ;
 And slept in many a crystal pool
 For quiet contemplation :
 No public and no private care
 The free-born mind entralling,
 We made a day of happy hours,
 Our happy days recalling.

.

And if, as Yarrow, through the woods
 And down the meadows ranging,
 Did meet us with unaltered face,
 Though we were changed and changing ;
 If, *then*, some natural shadows spread
 Our inward prospect over,
 The soul's deep valley was not slow
 Its brightness to recover.

The expression there is richer, freer, more mellow ; but the

reserve force is spent; all the wealth of the moment—and perhaps something more than the wealth of the moment, something which was not wealth, though mistaken for it—was poured out. One cannot but feel now and again that, as Sir Walter said of his aged harper,—

His trembling hand had lost the ease
Which marks security to please,
And scenes long past of joy and pain
Came wildering o'er his aged brain.

Mr. Arnold places almost all the really first-rate work of Wordsworth in the decade between the years 1798 and 1808. I think he is right here. But I should put his highest perfection of style much nearer the later date than the earlier; at least, if, as I hold, the "Song at the Feast of Brougham Castle," touches the very highest point which he ever reached. "The Leech-gatherer" was written in the same year, though its workmanship is not nearly so perfect. Let me contrast its style with that of "Laodamia," of which the subject is closely analogous, and which was written only seven years later, in 1814; though these seven years mark, as it appears to me, a very great transformation of style. Both poems treat of Wordsworth's favourite theme,—the strength which the human heart has, or ought to have, to contain itself in adverse circumstances, and the spurious character of that claim of mere emotion to command us by which we are so often led astray. "The Leech-gatherer" has much less of buoyancy than the earlier poems, and something here and there of the stateliness of the later style, especially in the noble verse:—

I thought of Chatterton, the marvellous boy,
The sleepless soul that perished in his pride;
Of him who walked in glory and in joy,
Following his plough, along the mountain side;
By our own spirits we are deified;
We poets in our youth begin in gladness;
But thereof come in the end despondency and madness.

But on the whole, the poem is certainly marked by that emphatic visual imagination, that delight in the power of the eye, that strength of reserve, that occasional stiffness of feeling, and that immense rapture of reverie, which characterise the earlier period, though it wants the more rapid and buoyant movement of that period. Take the wonderful description of the "Leech-gatherer" himself:—

Himself he propped, limbs, body, and pale face,
 Upon a long grey staff of shaven wood ;
 And, still as I drew near with gentle pace,
 Upon the margin of that moorish flood
 Motionless as a cloud the old man stood,
 That heareth not the loud winds when they call,
 And moveth altogether, if it move at all.

Or take the description of the reverie into which the old man's words threw Wordsworth:—

The old man still stood talking by my side ;
 But now his voice to me was like a stream
 Scarce heard ; nor word from word could I divide.
 And the whole body of the man did seem
 Like one whom I had met with in a dream ;
 Or like a man from some far region sent,
 To give me human strength by apt admonishment.

In turning to "Laodamia," we see that a great change of style—a great relaxation of the high tension of the earlier power—and with it a great increase in grace and sweetness has come. When Protesilaus announces that his death was due to his having offered up his own life for the success of the Greek host, by leaping first to the strand where it was decreed that the first comer should perish, Laodamia replies:—

"Supreme of heroes, bravest, noblest, best !
 Thy matchless courage I bewail no more,
 Which then, when tens of thousands were deprest
 By doubt, propelled thee to the fatal shore ;
 Thou found'st, and I forgive thee—here thou art—
 A nobler counsellor than my poor heart.

“ But thou, though capable of sternest deed,
 Wert kind as resolute, and good as brave ;
 And he, whose power restores thee, hath decreed
 Thou shouldst elude the malice of the grave ;
 Redundant are thy locks, thy lips as fair
 As when their breath enriched Thessalian air.

“ No spectre greets me,—no vain shadow this ;
 Come, blooming hero, place thee by my side,
 Give on this well-known couch one nuptial kiss
 To me this day, a second time thy bride ! ”
 Jove frowned in Heaven : the conscious Parcae threw
 Upon those roseate lips a Stygian hue.

“ This visage tells thee that my doom is past ;
 Nor should the change be mourn'd, even if the joys
 Of sense were able to return as fast
 And surely as they vanish. Earth destroys
 Those raptures duly,—Erebus disdains :
 Calm pleasures there abide, majestic pains.

“ Be taught, O faithful consort, to control
 Rebellious passion : for the Gods approve
 The depth, and not the tumult, of the soul ;
 A fervent, not ungovernable love.
 Thy transports moderate, and meekly mourn
 When I depart, for brief is my sojourn.”

There is certainly an air of classic majesty and a richness of colour about this which contrasts curiously with the strong sketch of the lonely Leech-gatherer, though there seems to me a fitness in the fact that the style of the poem which paints the excess of unregulated feeling, is full of almost artificial grace, while the style of the poem which paints the humble self-reliance of desolate fortitude, is for the most part cast in the mould of a bare and almost bleak dignity.

But I must come to an end. The later style has, I think, this advantage over the earlier, that where its subject is equally fine,—which, as I admit, it often is not,—the

workmanship is far more complete, often almost of crystal beauty, and without the blots, the baldness, the dead-wood, which almost all Wordsworth's earlier works exhibit. Where, for instance, in all the range of poetry, shall we find a more crystal piece of workmanship than the sonnet—written, I think, as late as 1835—addressed to Mrs. Marshall, in her seventieth year, with which I may conclude this paper :—

Such age, how beautiful ! O lady bright,
Whose mortal lineaments seem all refin'd
By favouring nature and a saintly mind
To something purer and more exquisite
Than flesh and blood ; whene'er thou meet'st my sight,
When I behold thy blanched, unwithered cheek,
Thy temples fringed with locks of gleaming white,
And head that droops because the soul is meek,
Thee with the welcome snowdrop I compare ;
That child of winter, prompting thoughts that climb
From desolation toward the genial prime ;
Or with the moon conquering earth's misty air,
And filling more and more with crystal light,
As pensive evening deepens into night.

RICHARD HOLT HUTTON.

ELIZABETH STUART, QUEEN OF BOHEMIA.

PART II.

THE next great event which was of vital moment for Europe and for Elizabeth was the advent, from overseas, of the great *Schwedenkönig*, Gustavus Adolphus. In July, 1630, the Swedish deliverer landed on German soil. He had completed his conquest over Poland. He knew well that the Polish war had been fomented, he knew that Sigismund had been supported by Austria; he knew that, if Wallenstein could create a fleet, the House of Hapsburg, eager for universal dominion, and then in the zenith of its power and success, would attack him in Sweden itself; and he defended his kingdom by attacking her enemies. The very successes of Ferdinand drew down Gustavus Adolphus upon him; the supineness of the German Protestant Princes called forth the great Swedish defender of Protestantism. "Universal monarchy must be repressed by neighbouring nations at great hazard and inconceivable expense, provided such nations are only protected by a small interposition of ocean." Wallenstein and Spain were preparing a fleet to attack the navy of Sweden when that navy bore Gustav Adolf and his army to German soil.

Nor was it by any means the safety of Sweden alone which called Gustavus into the field. *Mich treibt ein anderer Geist*—"I am actuated by other motives," said the King. It was the cause, the great cause, of Protestantism and of true religion, that weighed most heavily upon his soul. Hear him for a moment; his voice still seems to

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speak vitally to us across the abyss of two hundred and fifty years. "I embark in a war, far from my own dominions, and seem to court those dangers and difficulties which another man might labour to decline; but the Searcher of the Human Heart will see and know that it was neither ambition that tempted me, nor the avarice of extending my dominions, nor the appetite of fighting, nor the mischievous temper of loving to interfere in my neighbours' concerns. Other object I have none than to support the afflicted and oppressed, to maintain the religious and civil liberty of society, and to bear my testimony against a tyranny over the whole human race."

And Gustavus described his lofty motives truly. If the Protestant Princes of Germany were supine, her Protestant people were worthy; nor could the King endure the spectacle of Jesuit rule, through Kaiser and through Pope, carried out by means of blood and fire, of force and fraud; of infrahuman persecution by the priest. Gustavus is a singular historical apparition in respect that he combined the earnestness of a Cromwell with the graces of a cavalier. He was not *Gott-betrunknen*, or God-intoxicated, as Novalis said of Spinoza, but he was God-inspired. A hero of conscience, he was also a hero of charm. He could not only command the reverence, but also win the love of men. In him force was tempered by sweetness. Intense as clear, there was nothing gloomy or morbid about the strong bright Gustavus. No cause ever had a nobler champion; but his kingly and knightly mind was expressed through his broad lofty forehead; through his well-opened, blue and steadfast eyes; through a figure and bearing which approach to an ideal of great manhood. His religion was that of a royal man; his politics those of a noble king. Fervent, and even rash in fight, generous in victory, the first captain of his time, he fought for an abstract cause and defended oppressed humanity. Stern where sternness was necessary,

he was full of "flowing courtesy" and princely manners. His army was well paid and was restrained within the limits of strict discipline. It was a moral force, which paid, and did not plunder its way through the territory of friend and foe. In this respect the Swedo-German army differed from those of the Liga, of the Empire; and even from the troops of Mansfeld. *Der Krieg müsse den Krieg ernähren*—"War must support itself," said Wallenstein; and the armies of Tilly, of Wallenstein, of Mansfeld, simply devastated any territories that they had to occupy.

In earlier years, Gustavus had been a half suitor for the hand of Elizabeth Stuart, and was therefore likely, being of noble mould, to have a kindly feeling toward an olden love. The light of the North, the Aurora Borealis of the Baltic, was now happily married to Maria Eleanora, sister of the Kurfürst Johann Georg. Gustav was born on December 9th, 1594.

James I. died in 1625, and had been succeeded by his son, Charles I. Charles was her brother, and Elizabeth might, perhaps, hope more from a brother than even from a father.

Charles was very willing to do anything to help his sister—so long as the doing involved no action. So soon as Gustavus appeared victoriously upon the scene, Charles tried to delegate to him the task of restoring Elizabeth to the Palatinate.

On November 7th, 1632, Sir Henry Vane, successor to Roe, met the Swedish King at Würzburg, and Vane thus reports Gustavus' answer: "If Charles wished sincerely to bring about the restitution of the Palatinate (no question more of Bohemia) and wished it in good faith, he must afford such assistance as justly merited the appellation of royal." If Charles contributed money and an English army of 12,000 men, he, Gustavus, "would never sheath his sword until the Palatinate should be recovered." Vainly did Gustav expect anything royal (except, perhaps, the

portraits of Van Dyck) from Charles, who was negotiating with Vienna when he should have been fighting side by side with Sweden. If he had really wished well to his sister's cause, there was no way to help her but by fighting. Spannheim records that James I. felt, in his last days and hours, some compunction and remorse with respect to the Palatinate. Forty-eight hours before his death, James charged his son Charles, "as he hoped for a parent's benediction and that of Heaven," to exert all his powers in order to reinstate his sister and her children into their hereditary dominions; for (said James) *it was my mistake to seek the Palatinate in Spain.* The italics are ours.

Charles was as incapable as had been his father of clear and noble action.

"My God, Sire!" exclaimed Sir Richard Glendale, to the Pretender, when that Prince landed "for a hunting expedition," in *Redgauntlet*—"of what great and inexpiable crime can your Majesty's ancestors have been guilty that they have been punished by the infliction of judicial blindness on their whole generation!" In this indignant burst of Sir Richard Glendale, Walter Scott summarised the essence of the career of the Stuarts.

Ferdinand never refused to negotiate. Negotiations, as for instance that for the restoration of the Palatinate, amused others and did not hurt him. Besides, while people were negotiating they were not likely to act; and this was true of Charles as it had been of James. Conscious of his violent aggression in the Palatinate, the Emperor was ready to restore that—if any one could or would compel him to do so—but he would never give it up to mere negotiation. Charles's ambassador at Vienna, Sir Robert Anstruther, had been instructed to say to Ferdinand (22nd of July, 1630) that "the King, his master (Charles I.), acknowledged with grief and shame that his brother-in-law, the Elector Palatine, disregarding *his* opinion and concurrence, had acted

formerly in reference to the crown of Bohemia, not only rashly, but unadvisedly; which imprudent measures ought chiefly to be attributed to the ambition and inattention of youth; and that it would highly become the Emperor, consistently with his accustomed clemency, to receive Frederick's submission, and reinstate him in his own dominions, inasmuch as such an act of free and gratuitous favour would oblige the Kings of England to all posterity."

To amuse Charles, a counter proposition was made from Vienna to the effect, that Frederick should resign the Upper Palatinate for ever to Bavaria; that he, Frederick, should receive a small pension for his own life; that his eldest son should be bred a Catholic at Vienna, and then, having espoused an Austrian Archduchess, be reinstated, at his father's death, in the Lower Palatinate. Further, that Frederick should, on his knees, ask pardon of the Emperor.

It was clear that Charles, who was incapable of royal or other decisive action, desired to lean upon Gustavus for the reinstatement of his sister.

Charles urged Elizabeth to allow her son to be educated as a Catholic in Vienna, but the Ex-Queen, whose character was much more positive than that of her unstable brother, replied with noble anger that, "sooner than see her children brought up as Catholics, she would kill them with her own hand." Both Elizabeth and Frederick remained always steadfast in their religion, nor could any prospect of advantage ever lure them from it.

All that Charles could do was to permit—but not as King—English volunteers to fight for the Palatinate; and the Marquis of Hamilton led some 6,000 volunteers, who did not do very much, to Germany. These were speedily reduced to one English and one Scottish regiment, and, after a quarrel with Banier, Hamilton resigned and his force melted away.

We cannot spare space to follow the great Swedish King

through his glorious campaign. He would have recovered the Palatinate in due time, as he did recover for his kinsmen the Duchy of Mecklenburg which Wallenstein had seized ; but Gustavus could not turn aside from his main purpose, which was to prevent the extirpation of Protestants and Protestantism in Germany, in order merely to recover the Palatinate without help from Charles. Making it a condition that Frederick, if reinstated, should tolerate Lutheranism in his dominions, Gustavus sent to Holland for Frederick to join his armies. Frederick was unfit for any command in the warlike monarch's forces, but he " was present " at Nürnberg, and at that memorable passage of the Lech, at which Gustavus's valour and strategy so completely defeated the veteran Tilly. After Breitenfeld, the King thought that the Palatinate cause was hopeful, and wrote to that effect to Charles, requiring from the English King "magnanimous resolution," an assistance in men and money, and the despatch of a fleet to cope with the fleet that Spain was sending to the Baltic.

Charles refused the necessary co-operation, but explained that he was ready to negotiate.

And now Gustavus and Wallenstein, the two great captains of the age, each at the head of an hitherto unconquered army, met, for the first time, as opponents in actual war on the fatal plain of Lützen. The battle was indecisive in result, though victory leaned to the Swedes, as the imperialists vacated the field and retreated on Leipzig ; but the battle involved the most terrible loss that could have happened to the Protestant cause—Gustavus Adolphus fell in the arms of victory.

With the fall of Gustavus the cause of the Palatinate seemed to be hopelessly lost. What other champion could replace the "Lion of the North" ?

After Lützen, Frederick became a prey to deep dejection. He died of a broken heart, of utter despondency, away

from wife and children, at Mentz, on November 17th, 1636. His coffined corpse, after many wanderings, found its final resting place in Sedan.

His son and heir, Henry Frederick, a prince of promise, had pre-deceased his father. On January 17th, 1629, father and son went to see the trophies of Peter Hein as they floated in Dutch waters at Rotterdam. The small boat in which they sailed was run into by another craft, and speedily sank. Frederick was saved, but his heir was drowned. The son's last vain cry was, "Save me, father!" That last despairing cry of the sinking prince rings still pathetically through history. Thus Karl Ludwig, the second son, became the representative of the banished Palatine family.

Elizabeth and Frederick were united by a sincere affection and by a numerous progeny. Misfortune borne in common, a faith thoroughly shared, strengthened their union. Frederick's nature was capable of a deeper tenderness than was that of his wife. His fondness for her was unquestionably great. Many of his letters to her (see Bromley's Royal Letters) are still extant. In one he writes, "Would to God that we owned some little corner of the earth in which we could live together happily and in peace!" It were to be wished that his prayer could have been answered. As private persons, they would have been most estimable, most happy; but they were elevated into positions high above their capacities. Frederick constantly addresses his wife, "Mon très cher Cœur."

Elizabeth passed her widowhood at the Hague, or at Rhenen, in the province of Utrecht, secure under Dutch shelter. She was fond of hunting and of gardening. Her children grew up around her, and the still lively lady became the centre of a small but cultured circle of friends. Elizabeth's little court was a model of social gaiety, and flatterers called it the "home of all the muses and of all the graces."

Her elastic temperament was cheerful under misfortune. She could always enjoy any pleasure that the present moment offered. Once, when hunting, she was nearly seized by some Spanish soldiery, but escaped owing to a fleet horse and her good riding. Henrietta Maria had been a bitter opponent at the Court of England of the interests of Elizabeth; but when Henrietta Maria, herself a fugitive, came to Holland, Elizabeth received and comforted her. Both were Stuarts, the one by birth, the other by marriage; and their interests in Great Britain were imperilled by the same foes. There may have been policy in Elizabeth's kindness. Her eldest surviving son, Karl Ludwig, who had been educated by Frederick's brother, grew up headstrong, selfish, and avaricious. When in England, he sided with the Parliament, and even sat in the Westminster Assembly of Divines.

He ultimately obtained from the English Parliament a yearly grant of £10,000—£8,000 for himself, £2,000 for his mother; but Elizabeth was deeply grieved at her son's departure from the traditional and even natural politics of the house of Stuart. Her next sons, Rupert and Maurice, fought, as is well known, and with distinction, on the royal side, and this was some comfort to the daughter of James and sister of Charles. Ever after the execution of her brother, Elizabeth wore a mourning ring (a picture of which is now before me) on which a crown surmounts a skull and cross-bones, while both are encircled by a lock of Charles's hair.

Cousin Max, who thought that all misfortunes arose from tolerance to Protestants, was getting on with the conversion to Catholicism of the upper and lower Palatinates. His plan was simple and direct; every person who would not become a Catholic was driven out of the territory. Max was fully determined to root out heresy.

The "counter-Reformation" in Germany was being carried out with incredible cruelty and ruthless persistency. The hopeless and hapless "peasant's war" was extirpated with terrible inhumanity. Protestant parents were expelled, and their children detained to be brought up as Catholics. Sötl, speaking of the oppression then exercised upon the unhappy Protestants, says, *davon schweigt die Geschichte*—on that subject history is silent. In Bavaria the popular threat to an enemy remains to this day—*Ich will dich schon Katholisch machen!*—"I will force you to become a Catholic!" and this threat to tame and to compel dates from the counter reformation under the House of Hapsburg. The Jesuit view was, that heretics should be subjected to a yoke intolerable, but yet not to be shaken off. The Papal Ambassador, Caraffa, agreed with the Emperor that heretics should be rooted out without pity and without scruple.

On February 12th, 1637, Ferdinand II. died, and was succeeded by his son, Ferdinand III., who carried on the lines of his father's policy. *Mi Fili, parvo mundus regitur intellectu*, said the wise Oxenstierna.

The great war dragged its slow length along, but we cannot spare space to follow its fortunes.

Among the partisans who were attracted, in part by her personality, to the cause of Elizabeth, the most distinguished and the most constant was William, Lord Craven, afterwards Earl Craven. Christian of Brunswick died May 6, 1626, and Prince Maurice, of Nassau, had passed away on April 23rd, 1625. Craven first met Elizabeth when she was already a refugee in Holland, and he quitted the Dutch service in order to devote himself to that of the ex-Queen of Bohemia. History contains few instances of a more chivalrous, romantic, self-sacrificing friendship. His purse and person (Craven was rashly brave) were both zealously devoted to the service of his

royal mistress. Munificent in outlay, indefatigable in military activity, reckless in contempt of danger, Craven might well have adopted Christian's motto, "all for glory and for her;" the only difference being that Craven thought more of her than he did of glory. In Christian the passions had been mixed. Gustavus himself paid a compliment to Craven's valour; and of all the volunteers—Reay, Hepburn, and others—who fought for her, and for the Palatinate, Craven was animated by the purest devotion. He was entrusted by Elizabeth with the care of the fiery young Rupert, when both were taken prisoners by the Emperor. Craven paid for his freedom a ransom of £20,000. Rupert was detained for three years in mild captivity, the object being to convert him to the Church of Rome. During the dark days—days dark for the Stuarts—of the Protectorate, Craven's estates were sequestered; though they were restored to him at the Restoration; but he found means still to help his mistress. In Elizabeth's saddest hour, when she seemed to be abandoned of all men, the faithful Craven remained by her side, and he returned with her to England. There is no evidence of such a fact (indeed evidence on the subject would be very hard to procure), but history whispers that the pair were privately married. Certain it is that nothing could detach Craven from her side, and that his life and fortune—all that he had—were unceasingly and loyally devoted to her comfort and her service. In 1661 Pepys saw Elizabeth in London, "brought by my Lord Craven" to the Duke's Theatre. A Paladin of romance, Craven remains one of the noblest instances in history of a knightly, generous, unswerving devotion to a woman and her cause.

Let us now glance for a moment at the domestic relations of Elizabeth.

She had around her, in Holland, four daughters—Elizabeth, born 1618; Luise, born 1622; Henrietta Maria, born

1626; Sophia, born 1630; and her two younger sons, Edward and Philipp, were also for a time with her.

Elizabeth, the eldest daughter, was the plainest of the sisters. She was quiet, melancholy, absorbed in study. In 1636 Ladislaus of Poland proposed for Elizabeth, but she peremptorily refused to marry a Catholic Prince. Des Cartes (born 1596) was the friend, the tutor, the correspondent of this learned daughter of Frederick and of Elizabeth, who remained unmarried and ultimately became Abbess of the Protestant *Stift* of Herford, in Westphalia. She died in 1680.

Of Henrietta Maria there is no vivid record, but she married, 1651, Prince Ragoczy von Siebenbürgen.

Luise was pretty, and was lively. She was a paintress of repute in her own little circle, and seems to have loved gaiety and society.

Sophia—the ablest and most beautiful of the daughters—“one of the handsomest, the most cheerful, sensible, shrewd, accomplished of women,” says Thackeray—married, 1658, Ernst August, Bishop of Osnabrück, and brother of the Duke of Brunswick. This lady, called in our history books “the Electress Sophia,” is the direct ancestress of our present Royal Family. In 1672 her husband succeeded to the possession of Hanover, and to the Electoral dignity. In 1714, a few weeks after his mother's death, her son, George Ludwig, succeeded Anne on the throne of Great Britain, as George I. This boorish, ungraceful prince recalled no suggestion of his bright mother, but seemed to have absorbed a terribly large infusion of the characteristics of his ungainly father. The English nation specially settled the succession on Sophia and her Protestant descendants, while passing over the claims of all her brothers and sisters.

Her brother Edward, and his brother Philipp, were sent to Paris to “finish their education,” a plan which was not

attended with happy results. They were probably glad enough to go, and to escape from the weary routine, from the intrigues, littlenesses, spites, of their mother's mock Court in Holland.

Elizabeth does not seem to have been very successful in educating or in securing the love of her children. Her daughters, Elizabeth and Sophia, voluntarily left their mother to go to Kassel or to Heidelberg. In 1645 her son Edward married Anna, daughter of the Duke of Nevers, and turned Catholic; his apostacy being doubtless a serious sorrow to his mother. Karl Ludwig wrote very angrily to his recusant brother; but the life of Edward was thereafter lived apart from the main current of the career of his family. It is certain that Edward married in Paris, where he found favour and countenance, without his mother's knowledge or consent, and that this step and his perversion were a sore surprise to her. Philipp had a quarrel in the Hague with a certain debauched *Sieur d'Epinaÿ*; and on the day following, January 20th, 1646, Philipp, assisted by his myrmidons, killed *d'Epinaÿ*; for which offence he had to fly Holland. In 1655 Philipp was killed at the siege of Rethel.

In 1644, the noble Luise Juliane, the generous mother-in-law of Elizabeth, died.

The conduct of Rupert and of Maurice in the Civil Wars had alienated the English Government from Elizabeth Stuart, and, to some extent, she had become an object of dislike to the nation. During the late years of the Protectorate her allowance from England seems to have been withheld.

One child only, her daughter Luise, remained to cheer the solitary mother. After some shadow of scandal, into the details of which history now vainly tries to pierce, Luise, one morning, was found to have left—to have fled from her lonely mother; but a few lines informed the distracted

Elizabeth—"I have gone to France, there to be reconciled to the true Church, and to enter a cloister." This was a heavy blow to the still fervently Protestant widow of Frederick. Luise became Abbess of Maubuisson; but hers was no austere, cloistered seclusion. She lived gaily, went to Court in Paris; and had, as Sötl tells us, "many children." Her conversion brought with it no retirement from the world, no asceticism of the cloister.

Her last child having thus left her, Elizabeth could turn for comfort only to Lord Craven. We must now pass at a leap, and without regard to the tangle of petty events, to the peace of Westphalia, which, in 1648, virtually concluded the Thirty Years' War, and settled, among so many other things, the question of the Palatinate.

The primary cause of that memorable peace was the thorough exhaustion of the combatants, and especially of the Catholic Powers. Exhaustion only, inability to continue the conflict, could have constrained Rome, Spain, Austria, to grant toleration to German Protestants. The result of thirty years of wastefully wicked war; of a war in which oceans of blood were unnecessarily shed, and in which unspeakable human misery was caused, gave to Protestantism that for which it had contended at the beginning; and Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist had to live together in mutual toleration, each belief holding its own as best it could in Germany. Henceforth the disciples of Loyola could not kill, oppress, or extirpate the followers of Luther or of Calvin; and worn and wasted Germany, which had been for so long the scene of civil war, the battlefield of ruin, was no more subject to the lust of Hapsburg universal dominion, or to the bloody tyranny of priestly rule.

Despite of angry protests, and of much "negotiation," Karl Ludwig could obtain no more than this—the restoration of the Lower Palatinate; while the Upper Palatinate remained annexed to Bavaria. Both Max and Karl Ludwig

were Electors; Bavaria being the eighth electorate, and ranking above *Kurpfalz*. The spirit of Gustavus had been at work up to the close of the sad, long war. It is noticeable that the Swedes were the strongest force then left in the field with power to fight. Wrangel (with whom was associated in command, Turenne) was the last Swedish General. He entirely overran Bavaria, and, that done, no barrier stood between his victorious army and the gates of Vienna. This crowning success induced Maximilian, and compelled the Emperor, to agree, on equitable terms, to a Peace. When Max demanded an armistice, he was, at first, held at Vienna as a *Majestätsverbrecher*, or traitor guilty of high-treason; but it was soon seen that Max had not capitulated without very sufficient cause. He wished to stipulate that the Lower Palatinate, if he had to cede it, should remain Catholic; but to this the victors would not agree. To the last, Sweden did good service to Protestantism. When the terms of peace became known, the Catholics were furious; the Reformers were obstinate; but maugre all objections, necessity had dictated an enduring treaty. Maximilian of Bavaria died at Ingolstadt the 27th of September, 1651.

And so, as *Kurpfalz*, though with sadly shorn territory, Karl Ludwig, the son of the *Winterkönig*, returned to Heidelberg, and to his desolated, wasted, miserable land. Even the great Library of Heidelberg had been transported to the Vatican. Karl Ludwig married, 22nd February, 1650, Karoline, daughter of the Landgraf Wilhelm V., of Hessen. On the 10th of April, 1651, a son, Karl, was born to Karl Ludwig; and in 1652, he became the father of a daughter, Elizabetha Charlotta. When first he resumed residence in the Old Palace of the Palatinate, his sisters Sophia and Elizabeth were with him in Heidelberg. The new Palatine's marriage was not a success. He entered into an undisguised intrigue with the *Horäulein*, or Maid

of Honour, Degenfeld, and his wife left him in indignation, and returned to her father in Kassel.

Karl Ludwig was the most hateful of the children of Frederick and Elizabeth. He withheld from his brother Rupert Rupert's inheritance. He would not allow his mother to come to Heidelberg, nor would he pay to her the money that was justly her's. He refused her her jointure, and would not give her her dower of Frankenthal. He was *karg und geizig*, mean and avaricious. There is something pathetic in Elizabeth's letters to Karl Ludwig. They express a mother's indignation at having to apply for her own to her own son, and then the sense of her necessities lends poignancy to her piteous appeals. It seems that she received 1,000 guilders a month from Holland. She writes to Karl Ludwig, August 23rd, 1655, "I do not ask you much. I pray do this for me; you will much comfort me by it, who am in so ill condition as it takes all my contentment from me. I am making my house as little as I can so that I may subsist by the little I have, till I shall be able to come to you; which since I cannot do because of my debts, which I am not able to pay, neither the new nor the old, if you do not as I desire I am sure I shall not increase. As you love me I do conjure you to give an answer."

In writing from the Hague to Prince Rupert on April 29th, year not given, she says (Bromley's Royal Letters) "The next week I hope to hear Louysa's justification against all her calumnies."

The years just preceding 1660, were times of trial for the poor ex-Queen, who found herself in sore straits and without much hope of better times. The battle of Worcester was a very real fact; the Restoration was very uncertain. The Stuarts were much dispersed over Europe. Rupert and Maurice were pursuing their adventurous careers as corsairs; and she was soon to lose Maurice, who was drowned at sea. Elizabeth's debts increased; and creditors

became pressing. She was too poor to visit Rhenen. Widowed, childless, friendless (but for Craven), and hopeless, her last years before the Restoration must have been, even to her, sorrowful and lonely.

But the Restoration came, and her nephew sat upon the throne of Great Britain. Elizabeth desired at once to return to her native land, but Charles II. urged her not to think of coming to England. His comprehensive tenderness for women did not include any fondness for an aged aunt, impecunious, unfortunate, importunate. The money that he wanted to spend upon the female sex was required for Mrs. Palmer and others of that sort. But Elizabeth was not to be deterred. She had determined to return to England, and on May 17th, 1661, she landed at Margate, and travelled on to London. Her arrival was little noticed. Her old friends were all gone, and her popularity had vanished also. She had outlived the contemporaries of her youth, and a generation had arisen that knew her not. She was slightly regarded, with an indolent curiosity, as the titular Queen of a remote country, which was all but unknown to Whitehall.

The England to which she returned was for Elizabeth a changed England. Between her youth and her age stood the great shadow of the Protectorate, and the mighty mage of Cromwell separated her brother and her nephew. Craven alone remained ever tender, ever true. She lived in Drury House, Drury Lane. From that mansion she moved to Leicester House, Leicester Square, and there, five days after her removal to the new dwelling, on February 13th, 1662, Elizabeth Stuart, dowager Electress Palatine and titular Queen of Bohemia, died.

German literature contains very many works of authority and research about the great Thirty Years' War, but no one historian has set his mark upon the subject. Germany separates in such matters more carefully than we do. She

keeps poet and historian as things apart ; we mix the two qualities and functions.

The great historian, resembling in that respect the poet or the dramatist, must, when depicting a personage, create a character. The hints of history are the equivalents of the suggestions of imagination. The historian must see clearly both outside and inside the person that he would portray, and must combine into an art-whole the complete portraiture, round and finished, of the hero or heroine of history. This task is the duty of every true historian, but it can, necessarily, be discharged but by few ; since to fulfil it satisfactorily requires qualities which nearly rival those of the poet or creator. Carlyle is the one man in the domain of history who, through many absolute creations, really fulfils the ideal requirement ; but yet another instance may be cited in Froude's picture of Mary Queen of Scots. In its higher aspects, history needs an imagination only just below that required by a great poet.

To piece out the imperfections of evidence ; to read, by insight, the motives of action and the depths of character ; to feel, by instinct, the passions that once fired a man or woman, long since dead, and but imperfectly depicted by the chronicler—these are difficulties which can only be overcome by a man of high and penetrating imagination, who possesses also a judicial power of criticism. It is given but to few to realise, with any objective force, the body, form, and presence ; the true and living images of human beings that once existed ; of times that are past. The great historian must possess a touch, at least, of the poet ; and we, in England, have been most successful in developing this ideal historian.

Elizabeth can never have been beautiful. Pepys, who may be credited with some critical judgment of female charms, saw her in Holland when he went with his patron to bring over Charles II., and records of the Queen of

Bohemia, that "she seems a very debonair, but a plain lady." Mr. Pepys hits the mark. Her pleasant, lively manner would last into her age, and the loss of youth would only render the fact plainer. Four portraits of her are known to us. The one by Honthorst, in the National Portrait Gallery, is a performance of little mark or likelihood. There are two at Hampton Court; one (No. 128) is a full length, also by Honthorst, in which she is depicted in a dark dress with a large ruff; the hair red, the face rather pointedly oval, with an expression of some shrewishness, caused, apparently, by sorrow. The mouth is thin and tightly compressed, and the expression is scarcely lovable. The other Hampton Court work (No. 765) is by Derick, a good painting, badly hung, and the *youngest* portrait of Elizabeth that is extant. The face is round, like that of James in youth, and the expression is happy. It is the Princess Elizabeth, with all life opening in hope, when the young Count Palatine has crossed the sea to woo her for his bride. Honthorst was teacher of painting to the Princess Louisa.

To the Royal Academy we owe those recent exhibitions of the works of the "Old Masters," which are the delight alike of the art critic and of the historical student. In the winter exhibition of 1880 appeared a portrait of Elizabeth (No. 127) by Mierevelt, which belongs to the highest class of portrait art, and which is the best existing portrait of the Queen of Bohemia. It was painted in Holland, and represents Elizabeth at about the middle of her career. Beneath the veneer of femininity we recognise the ignoble features of James. The modelling of every feature resembles that of her father's face. He had very protruding eyes; they are seen, softened, in this portrait. The aspect is serious; the face is painted in repose, but is full of character, and the spectator feels that he stands in the presence of the true Elizabeth. Her hair is red and the com-

plexion is opaquely white. The lips are ugly, thin, and are closely compressed. The forehead is poor and narrow. Obstinacy, rather than firmness, is expressed. The shape of the face is oval, with a somewhat pointed chin. The dress is a study of a royal costume of the period. The portrait is full length, and gives the physiognomy of the whole figure. The bearing is that of a woman accustomed to play the Queen ; the hands are fine ; and the totality of the being expressed agrees fully with all that we know, or can divine, of the superficial, though amiable character of the pleasure-loving but unfortunate daughter of the House of Stuart. This portrait is quite admirable and masterly. The face, in its still gravity, is not altogether lovable or attractive. You retain an impression of shrewdness and vivacity, coupled with a mean intellect, and with a calculating heart.

Elizabeth and Frederick were light, trivial characters, and were, it must be admitted, somewhat shallow weaklings ; but the romance of history may still regard with a certain tender interest their lives, their loves, and their misfortunes. Behind and around their careers stands the great portent of the Thirty Years' War, with all its crowd of historical figures, with all the turmoil of its important events.

To the general public in England, the Bohemian royal couple have subsided almost into mere names, vaguely realised through the mists of a by-flown time. They were set to sink or swim in a period, and among conflicting powers that were too terrible and too powerful for their small idiosyncrasies. Hence, in part, the pathos of their story. In India, in the country in which deadly snakes do most abound, the natives walk about with bare legs ; and Frederick and Elizabeth had no armour that saved them from being easily bitten by the poison of ambition and the venom of vanity. Aggression, to be successful, must be backed by mental power and by warrior prowess—they had neither. Ambition should be made of sterner stuff than

that of which they were composed. Vanity impelled them into ambition; impotence reduced them to misfortune; but they bitterly expiated their faults, and their miscalculation of their own means or of the help of others.

James, owing to weak legs, had to lean upon the shoulders of men; Frederick and Elizabeth, owing to their want of mental and physical force for great enterprises, were compelled to depend upon the help of others, and they leant upon broken reeds—as on the German Protestant Princes, the Union, James and Charles. Heavy losses and serious sorrows punished their errors and their deficient judgment; but neither duplicity nor treachery, even in such a distracted and immoral day, can be charged against them, nor can they be accused of cruelty or found guilty of tyranny. The impression that they leave, if thin, is pure. His nature, if weak, was tender; her character, though shallow, was clear. They were nobly steadfast in the faith, and they resisted the temptations of interest to deny their religion.

Frederick was, at least, a gallant, gentle, and accomplished carpet-knight. Elizabeth was graceful and gracious as Princess and as Queen. Their conjugal fidelity and true attachment render them models, as royal married lovers, in their dissolute century. They had vanity without ability, ambition without success. Their capacity, though but small, was equal to that of Ferdinand; was certainly superior to that of Philip II. Circumstance made the difference of success, and caused the revolution of their wheel of fortune. For many reasons we have thought it good to try to snatch them from a submerging oblivion, and to place on record a brief, if imperfect, picture of that English Princess who was once Queen of Hearts and Queen of Bohemia.

H. SCHÜTZ WILSON.

JUSTIN'S USE OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

THEOLOGIANs have been too much in the habit of assuming that, if they can prove that Justin was acquainted with the Fourth Gospel, it necessarily follows that he accepted it as authoritative and apostolical. In the first place, they urge, he must have known this Gospel, because he wrote his Dialogue with Trypho the Jew about 150 A.D., and we know that this Gospel was "abundantly" used—so Irenæus tells us—by the Valentinian Gnostics before 178 A.D., if not by Valentinus himself (about 140 A.D.), and Basilides (120 A.D.). Again, Ephesus is both the source of the Gospel and the scene in which the Dialogue is laid. Moreover, between 150 A.D. and 170 A.D. this Gospel was so highly esteemed by Justin's own pupil Tatian, that he placed it in his Diatessaron on a level with the three earlier Gospels; and is it likely, they ask, that a document so prized by the pupil in 150-70 A.D. should have been absolutely unknown to the master in 150 A.D.? Most important of all, Justin wrote a treatise "Against all Heresies" (*Apol. I.* 26), and among heresies he certainly (*Dial.* 35) included those of Basilides and the Valentinians, of whom he speaks as being one of four established sects; now, since Justin attacked these Valentinians, and since they appealed to the Fourth Gospel, it is said to follow conclusively that Justin also knew it and accepted it as authoritative. Apart from all this external evidence, the same conclusion is said to be demonstrated

by a coincidence of words and phrases too striking to be explained as merely accidental.

But what does all this external evidence prove? Because the Valentinian Gnostics (and possibly other earlier heretics) "abundantly" used a certain document or Tradition, does it therefore follow that the same Tradition was accepted as authoritative and apostolical by the man who assailed these heretics? Tatian, it is true, placed the Fourth Gospel in his Diatessaron; but this seems to have been after Tatian had become a heretic: at all events, Theodoret (*Haer. Fab.* i. 20) "tells us that Tatian, who is supposed to have prepared the Harmony after he became a Gnostic Encratite, 'cut away the genealogies and such other passages as show the Lord to have been born of the seed of David after the flesh.'"^{*} Now, just as it would be manifestly unfair to argue that Justin, because he had once been Tatian's teacher, must have approved of Tatian's "cutting away the genealogies" and other passages of similar tenor, so it is no less unfair to argue that Justin must necessarily have placed the Fourth Gospel on a level with the other three, because it was so placed, perhaps twenty years afterwards, by a former pupil, after that pupil "became a Gnostic Encratite."

Those who really wish to ascertain what Justin thought of the Fourth Gospel, must turn from this presumptive evidence to the testimony afforded by Justin's own works, and must ask how often and in what terms he quotes it; what thoughts he borrows from it; by what

^{*} The quotation is from Dr. Ezra Abbot's *Authorship of the Fourth Gospel*, p. 52. The Harmony of the Gospels, composed by Ephraemus Syrus and edited in a Latin translation by Moesinger (1870), was in all probability based upon Tatian's Diatessaron, although there is no internal cause for believing, and much internal cause for disbelieving, that Ephraemus omitted the Genealogies. It is probable that Ephraemus supplied the larger deficiencies of Tatian, including the Genealogies, but left unaltered minor traces of heterodoxy, such as the omission of the title "Son of David" applied to Christ.

title he mentions it; whether he classifies it with the earlier Gospels; or whether, if he distinguishes it from them, he ascribes to it superior or inferior authority. If he quotes it as often, and with the same marks of respect, as the other Gospels, we shall admit that he agreed with his Valentinian adversaries in recognising their favourite Gospels as authoritative. If he does not quote it, but if it appears that the absence of quotations can be explained because the nature of Justin's subject-matter leads him to refer solely to the Synoptists, then we must be content to draw no inference at all. But if Justin's works are shown to cover the very same ground which is occupied by the Fourth Gospel and not by the Synoptists, and if, in spite of this identity of subject, he is found seldom or never to quote it (so that even on such matters as the pre-existence and divinity of Christ he uses the most inapposite quotations from the Synoptists instead of the most apposite from the Fourth Gospel), we must then infer that he either did not know it, or did not accept it as authoritative. Subsequent evidence may prove that he was acquainted with it. Our conclusion must then be, that he did not accept its authority.*

To Justin's works we therefore proceed, taking in order all the passages that have been alleged, with any decent show of reason, as proofs that he accepted the Fourth

* Of course, it may still be fairly contended that Justin was eccentrically antagonistic to [the general sentiment of the Church, if he rejected the Fourth Gospel; that the virulence of his hostility to the sects who "abundantly" used it, may have induced him to regard it with an unjust suspicion; or that he may have met with some inferior and corrupt shape of the Ephesian doctrine, and not with the version of that master mind which is responsible for the shape it assumed in our Gospel.

All this is matter of conjecture. But the object of the present paper is to pass by conjectures, and to demonstrate from facts that (in whatever shape he may have known the doctrine of the Fourth Gospel) firstly, there is no evidence that he regarded it as on the same level with the Synoptic Gospels; secondly, there is ample evidence that he placed it on a lower level.

Gospel as authoritative.* It will be found that whereas Justin quotes the First Gospel fifty times, he is not even alleged to quote the Fourth Gospel more than once; that this single quotation is introduced with a preface which he never uses except to introduce Apocryphal or Traditional quotations; that in the context he apparently introduces other Traditional teaching said to come from "the Apostles," but not found in our Gospels; and that he omits from this so-called quotation words so useful for his purpose (if he had known them), that it is very improbable that he had the text of the Fourth Gospel before him, and much more probable that he was merely quoting a Tradition differently embodied in that Gospel. Reserving this unique passage for detailed consideration, we will take first those phrases which, though they are introduced without any mention of a Gospel or any signs whatever of quotation, are nevertheless held to be evidence that Justin believed the Fourth Gospel to have been written by an Apostle. They may be divided into two classes—first, those which appear to borrow thoughts; second, those which merely borrow words.

I. RESEMBLANCES IN THE DOCTRINE OF THE LOGOS.

First in the former class of passages come those which refer to Christ as the Logos, begotten of the Father from the beginning, and therefore existing before the Incarnation. For example, Justin says that "the Logos being made flesh became man" (*σαρκοποιηθείς ἄνθρωπος ἐγένετο*, *I. Apol.* 32); and elsewhere, "he existed previously and submitted to be born a man of like passions with us, having flesh" (*πρῶτον ἦρχε, καὶ γεννηθῆναι ἄνθρωπος ὁμοιοπαθῆς ἡμῖν, σάρκα ἔχων . . . ὑπέμεινε*, *Dial.* 48), and elsewhere he

* For a clear and succinct statement of these passages and the inferences derived from them, I am indebted to Dr. Ezra Abbot's *Authorship of the Fourth Gospel*, Boston, 1880.

repeats the expression *σαρκοποιηθείς* (*I. Apol.* 32, *ib.* 66), and repeatedly describes the Logos as "having become man," *ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος*, or *γένονε*, *Dial.* 57, 68 *bis*, &c. (and see the Apologies also). Again, whereas John declares that "all things were made" by the Logos (*πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο*, *John* i. 3), Justin similarly says that "through him God created all things," *δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἔκτισε* (*II. Apol.* 6, *Dial.* 56). Besides the evidence of these similarities, it is argued that "while Justin's conceptions in regard to the Logos were undoubtedly greatly affected by Philo and the Alexandrine philosophy, the doctrine of the *incarnation* of the Logos was utterly foreign to that philosophy, and could only have been derived, it would seem, from the Gospel of John;" and "since the Fathers who immediately followed Justin, as Theophilus, Irenæus, Clement, Tertullian, unquestionably founded their doctrine of the Incarnation of the Logos on the Gospel of John, the presumption is that Justin did the same."

The latter part of this reasoning will not convince any one who is not already, on other grounds, prepared to receive the Fourth Gospel as Apostolic. Before we can make such an assumption, we must first ascertain that the theory of the incarnation of the Logos could not naturally spring up in the Church from the influence of Alexandrine philosophy on Christian doctrine. It is highly probable, if not certain, that any Jew of the Alexandrine school, becoming a believer in Christ, must necessarily have accepted the doctrine of the incarnation of the Logos. As soon as the Church became convinced, with St. Paul, that Christ had been the Son of God before the incarnation, and that He was the first-born of Creation, it became necessary to acknowledge that this divine Son had not been inactive from the moment of heavenly generation till the time of the incarnation, but that He had been God's agent from the first, not only in his dealings with Israel (*1 Cor.* x. 4, "that

Rock was Christ"), but also in the Creation itself (*Heb.* i. 1, "by whom also he made the ages"). Now the divine Wisdom of God was recognised by every Jewish reader of the Scriptures—although the Alexandrine Jews laid special stress upon the doctrine—as having been "with God" at the Creation, delighting in His presence: "The Lord made me the beginning of His ways for His works. . . . Before all the hills He begetteth me. . . . When He was preparing the heavens, I was with Him, I was that in which He delighted, and I rejoiced daily in His countenance in every season" (*Proverbs* viii.). More often in the Jewish Scriptures the divine Agent is described as the "Word of the Lord," by whom the "heavens were made" and the prophets inspired. Who then can fail to see that, when the Christian disciples of St. Paul had been taught to recognise that Christ was God's Agent from the beginning, and when they combined herewith the Scriptural doctrine that the divine Agent was God's Wisdom or Word, they would inevitably be driven to say that Christ was that same Wisdom or Word, or, as the Greeks expressed it, the Logos of God, who, having been "with God" at the Creation, afterwards became incarnate on earth?

We are not left to conjecture on this point, for we find Justin (*Dial.* 61) quoting the very extract from Proverbs which we have given above, as being the utterance of "the Word of Wisdom, who himself is this God begotten from the Father of all, both Word and Wisdom, and Power and Glory of Him that begot him;" and he infers from it that "God has begotten from Himself a certain Logos-Power" (*δύναμιν τινα ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ λογικῆν*) who is also called Glory of the Lord, but sometimes Son, sometimes Wisdom, sometimes Angel, sometimes God, sometimes Lord and Word; and this Logos-Power Justin asserts to have "become man" in obedience to the will of the Father. All this being perfectly clear and explicable without the inter-

vention of the Fourth Gospel, it follows that we cannot infer Justin's indebtedness to that document unless it can be shown that in his statement of the doctrine he has departed from the phraseology of the book of Proverbs and of Philo, and conformed with remarkable similarity to the thought and language of the Gospel. So far is this from being the case that, with the exception of the recognition of the fact that Christ was the Logos, Justin's theory has nothing that is peculiar to the Fourth Gospel, whereas he exhibits abundant differences; on the other hand, he will be shown to have very much in common with Philo, where Philo differs from the Gospel.

First, as regards the alleged similarities between Justin and the Gospel, it must be noted (1) that Justin, instead of using the Gospel phrase, "the Word was with (πρὸς) God," (John i. 1), prefers to use *συνῆν*, "lived with, conversed with," an expression more similar to that in Proverbs viii. 27, *συμπαρήμην*, "I was present with him;" (2) he always avoids the phrase *σὰρξ ἐγένετο* (John i. 14), "became flesh," and prefers *ἄνθρωπος γέγονε*.* Again (3) whereas the Gospel says *πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο* (John i. 3), "all things were made by him (the Logos)," Justin prefers the expression (*II. Apol. 6*), "God created and ordered (*ἔκτισε καὶ ἐκόσμησε*) all things by him;" † and speaks of the Logos as being (*II. Apol. 6*) "in the act of being generated at the time when God made all things" (*γεννώμενος ὅτε*

* This divergence is explained (*Authorship*, p. 42) on the ground that Justin would naturally "prefer the term 'man' to the Hebraistic 'flesh.'" But it seems strange that, in arguing with a Jew who was proud of being a "Hebrew," he should avoid a Hebraistic phrase sanctioned by Apostolic authority, and use another phrase not found in the Proem of the Gospel, nor indeed, elsewhere, except applied to John the Baptist "*ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος*" (John i. 6); nor does there seem sufficient reason why he should express the same thing elsewhere by a different word (*σαρκωθείν*) if *ἐγένετο σὰρξ* had become as familiar to him as it is to us.

† But in the *Ad Græcos*, 15, there is "by whom (*δι' οὗ*) the heaven and earth and all creation were made (*ἢ πάντα ἐγένετο κρίσις*)."

ἔκτισε).* Be it remembered that the sole question here is, not of doctrine, but of phraseology. The doctrine that God made the world by the Logos cannot be alleged by any to be originated by the Fourth Gospel; and the only reasons for supposing that Justin borrowed it from the Gospel must be therefore based on similarities of expression. In the absence of such similarities, the hypothesis of borrowing falls to the ground.

Lastly, even though we do not accept the Epistle of Diognetus as being Justin's, we have evidence that Justin held an Alexandrine and undeveloped view of the agency of the Logos. For Bishop Lightfoot (*Colossians* i. 16) has shown that Philo, sometimes regarding the Logos as a merely passive instrument, allows himself to use the instrumental dative (ῶ) to describe the relation of the Logos to the Creator, "which mode of speaking is not found in the New Testament." Now besides being found in the Epistle to Diognetus (ch. 7), ῶ τοὺς οὐράνους ἔκτισε, this Dative is also apparently found in *Dial.* 75: "If then we know that God has been revealed by him (ἐκείνῳ—for which

* Although Professor Drummond, in his careful and valuable paper on Justin and the Fourth Gospel (*Theological Review*, April, 1877), dissents from this interpretation, which is adopted by Otto, it seems to me demanded by the Greek.

This doctrine seems to lie half-way between (1) that of Philo (I. 6), who declares that the world, regarded as perceptible to the intellect, is the Logos, apparently making the existence of the Logos simultaneous with Creation; and (2), that of the Fourth Gospel, which indicates that the Logos was co-eternal with God.

The intermediate opinion of Justin (which was also adopted by some later writers, e.g., Theophilus, *Ad Autol.* ii. 10, 22), appears to have been that, although the Logos existed in God's mind from the beginning (to express which Theophilus uses ἐνδιδότος, but Justin, less fitly, borrows σὺνῆν from the συμπροσῆμην of Proverbs viii. 2), yet God begot the Logos as a separate existence when He purposed to create the world, and contemporaneously (ἄτε) with creation. This is not, perhaps, inconsistent with the statement (*Dial.* 48, 61), that the Logos was "before the ages," just as it is not inconsistent to say that the clouds produced the lightning when they produced the thunder, and yet to say that the lightning preceded and made the thunder; but, if it were inconsistent, it would not be Justin's single inconsistency.

ἐκείνον has been unnecessarily suggested) to Abraham, Jacob, and Moses." It is also found in *I. Apol.* 59 (ὥστε λόγῳ θεοῦ γεγενῆσθαι τὸν πάντα κόσμον), "where," says Professor Drummond, "λόγῳ is most probably used in its special sense."* Thus, even in the alleged similarities between Justin and the Evangelist, there are dissimilarities not easy to be explained on the supposition that Justin regarded the Fourth Gospel as authoritative.

Further, it can be demonstrated that Justin's whole theory of the Logos is not so developed as that of the Gospel, and approximates more closely to that of Philo. The Logos in the Gospel is the sole Mediator between God and man. But in Philo mention is made of other Logoi, Powers or Angels which are mediators and umpires (μεσίται καὶ διαιτηταί λόγοι, *I.* 642)†; when the three angels appeared to Abraham to predict the destruction of Sodom, one was the Logos, who "had a body-guard of two of the highest Powers" (δορυφορούμενος ὑπὸ δυνάμεων τῶν ἀνωτάτων δυνάμεων, *I.* 173); and when Isaac met God, it is asserted that he met "not God, but the Word of God" (*I.* 631); whence it is inferred that he met with "holy Words" emitted by the Supreme when directing visions that came not from Himself, but from the Powers next to Him" (μηκέτι τὰς ἀφ' αὐτοῦ τείνων φαντασίας ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν μετ' αὐτὸν δυνάμεων). God's Powers are in earth, air, and water, but that Power which established and ordered the Universe is truly called God (*I.* 425). Elsewhere the Logos is spoken of, not as the chief of these Powers, but as the collective mass, or "fulness" of the immaterial Powers or Attributes of God (ὁ θεῖος λόγος, ὃν ἐκπεπλήρωκεν δι' ὅλων ἀσωμάτοις δυνάμεσιν αὐτὸς ὁ θεός), "the divine Word whom God himself has

* *Theological Review*, April, 1880. But, if we accept Bishop Lightfoot's explanation of the instrumental dative, we shall be unable to regard as adequate Professor Drummond's comment that "there is here no room for advance upon the view contained in the Gospel."

† The references to Philo are to the volume and page of Mangey's edition.

filled altogether with immaterial Powers." Of all this there is no trace at all in the Fourth Gospel, but there are distinct traces in Justin. Christ is, with him, the sum of all the Logos-Power that has been from the Creation. The philosophers and all good men have had portions of the Logos (λόγος σπερματικός); but Christ is "the entire Logos" ο πᾶς λόγος (II. *Apol.* 8) or "the entire Logos-element," τὸ λογικὸν τὸ ὄλον (*ib.* 10).^{*} He, like Philo, asserts that the Logos appeared to Abraham (*Dial.* I. 56) "with the two angels in his company." He speaks of the Being (the Logos) who appeared to Moses in the flaming bush as a "Power" (*Dial.* 128) generated by the Father and distinct from the Father, and as "the first Power" (*I. Apol.* 32); and even claims for these Powers or Angels some kind of worship (*ib.* 6): "Both Him (God) and the Son who came from Him and taught us these things, and the host of the other good Angels that follow him and are conformed to him, and the Prophetic Spirit, we revere and worship."† This is intelligible as a remnant of the undeveloped Philonian doctrine, wherein the Logos is but the eldest and foremost of a number of Words, Angels, or Powers; but it is quite unintelligible on the supposition that Justin borrowed his Logos-theory from John.

The great difference between Philo and the Fourth Gospel is, that whereas the former regarded God as unknown and unknowable in His absolute essence, and the revelation of the Logos as inferior to that of the Supreme

* So Philo (I. 122). The soul of the more perfect is nourished by the entire Logos (ἐλεγε τῷ λόγῳ); but we should be content were we nourished by a part of it. Professor Drummond, who makes no mention of Philo's strikingly similar passage, regards this as one among several instances showing how "the clear doctrine of the Fourth Gospel is unfolded with greater amplification and precision by Justin."

But Philo, no less than Justin, recognises the cosmopolitan character of the "wise man," whose mind (I. 692, II. 661) is the "home of God."

† No other translation appears reasonable, unless the text is to be altered. See Otto's note on the subject.

Father or Maker of all, the Gospel on the other hand teaches us that we can see and know the Father in seeing and knowing the Son. Although the Son on one occasion (John xiv. 28) avows that the Father is greater than He, yet for the most part the Gospel insists rather on their identity of will and on the perfect revelation of the Father which can be conveyed to men by the Son: "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father" (John xiv. 9). Justin, of course, parts company from Philo here. Yet it cannot be said that he has attained to the doctrine of the Gospel. His position is half-way between the two stages. He acknowledges the importance of the revelation conveyed by the Son, but he has not realised the necessity of speaking of it as all-sufficient, and the danger of using words which might encourage a belief that the Father had not been fully revealed by the Son, or that there are two Gods, or that one of the divine Persons is before or after the other. Hence he still imitates Philo in speaking of the Father as not only "unbegotten" (Philo, I. 173; Justin, *II. Apol.* 13), but also as "unspeakable" (*ἀρρήτων*, Philo, I. 580; *II. Apol.* 12). It is the peculiarity of the Supreme, says Philo—commenting on Exodus xxxiii. 23, "I am that I am"—to have no name. Even the ministering Powers do not reveal their full (*κύριον*) name, but still more is this true (I. 580) of Him "whose nature is to be, not to be called." Commenting on the same text, Justin says similarly (*Cohortatio ad Græcos*, 21) that "no name can be fully given (*κυριολογείσθαι*) for God." Philo says that God cannot be named because He is "*older than existing things*" *τῶν ὄντων πρεσβύτερον* (I. 580). Justin, using a similar argument, and the identical word, declares that a name cannot be given to the Father of all, for that which names is *older* (*πρεσβύτερον*) than that which is named. Philo (*ib.*) says that in order not to deprive men of some "appellation" (*πρόσρησις*) of

Himself, He revealed Himself as God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; Justin (*ib.*) similarly says that Father and God and Creator and Lord and Master are not names but "appellations" (*προσρήσεις*). It will hardly be denied that Justin has imitated Philo here; nor is the imitation a mere matter of words. The result is to leave on the reader the impression that God is put further away from men by these two authors than by the author of the Gospel. Calling the "Father" a mere "appellation," Justin naturally does not show that preference for it which is manifest in the Gospel, and, as if to supplement its insufficiency, he frequently adds Master—"the Father of all and Master." This is alien from the character of the Fourth Gospel, which not only lays special stress on the term "Father," but also rejects the term "servants" as applied to disciples (xv. 15).

But if Justin and Philo agree in calling the Father unnameable, they also agree in attaching a long list of names to the Logos, so many indeed as somewhat to obscure His personality, and the mere mention of the names is enough to prove that the later author borrowed from the former. "Let a man," says Philo (I. 427), "strive to conform himself to God's first-born Logos, the Angel, Eldest, as it were Archangel, having many names; for he is called Beginning, and Name of God, and Logos, and *the Man according to the (Divine) Image*, and 'Israel seeing (God)'" (*καὶ ὁρῶν Ἰσραήλ*). Elsewhere he speaks of the Wisdom, or Logos, as (I. 82) "the Rock;" he also (*Confusion of Tongues*, 14) applies to the Logos the words of Zachariah vi. 12, "Behold a Man whose name is the East." Justin similarly says (*Dial.* 61) that Christ is the Beginning, Logos-Power, the glory of the Lord, Son, Wisdom, Angel, God, and Logos, and elsewhere (*Dial.* 126) he calls him "the Rock," "Israel," "Jacob," and declares that the Logos "took upon himself the *Man according to the Likeness and Image of God*" (*Ad Græcos*, 38).

Justin also thrice (*Dial.* 106, 121, 126) applies to Christ the words of Zachariah, "The East is his name."*

Again, it has been noted by Bishop Lightfoot (*Colossians*, p. 146) that "the Christian Apostles, in speaking of Christ, preferred the title *πρωτότοκος* to *πρωτόγονος*, which, as we may infer from Philo, was the favourite term for the Alexandrians." The reasons for this preference may have been, in part, a desire to convey a Messianic allusion (which seems to have been generally understood in Ps. lxxxix. 28, *ἐγὼ πρωτότοκον θήσομαι αὐτόν*), partly perhaps to avoid a slight apparent inconsistency in "first-begotten" and "only-begotten;" but, in any case, the preference is undoubted, and *πρωτόγονος*, though common in Philo, is not found in the New Testament. Justin, however, not only calls the Logos *πρώτον γέννημα τοῦ θεοῦ*, "the first-begotten child of God" (*I. Apol.* 21), but also uses the non-apostolic word itself (*Ib.* 58), "God the Maker and the First-begotten Christ" (*τοῦ πρωτοτόκου χριστοῦ*). Though Justin elsewhere uses the more orthodox *πρωτότοκος*, this deviation from Apostolic to Philonian usage tends—like the other Philonian imitations already enumerated—to show that the Logos-theory and vocabulary had not yet become defined.

Again, nothing is more noticeable in the Fourth Gospel than the spiritual discernment with which the statement of the Divine nature of the Son is prevented from passing into any suggestion that there are *two Gods*, or two Lords, or

* Professor Drummond sees a similarity between Justin, *Dial.* 69, where Christ is described as "a fountain of living water," and John vii. 38, 39, and also John i. 4 ("in him was life"). But he does not mention Philo's comment (*I.* 249) on the "fountain" in Genesis ii. 6: "Even so the Word of God giveth drink to the virtues; for this (*viz.*, the Word) is the source and fountain of good deeds." It is also remarked by Professor Drummond that Justin, like the Fourth Gospel, gives to the Logos the name of Light; but it should have been added that Philo's works are pervaded with the recognition that the visible light is the image of the invisible Light, which is "the image of God," the divine Wisdom or Logos (*I.* 7).

that one God is before or after another. The doctrine of the Gospel is, not that we adore the Son *next to*, or *after*, the Father, but that we adore the Father through, or in, the Son. But Justin, although he asserts that the Logos never did or said anything (*Dial.* 56) save what the Father willed that he should say and do, nevertheless does not disclaim the task set him by Trypho, who twice challenges him to prove that there is "another God beside the Creator of the Universe" (*Dial.* 50, ἄλλος; 55, ἕτερος). On the contrary, he undertakes to prove (*Dial.* 56) that "there is, and is said to be, another (ἕτερος) God and Lord, subject to the Maker of all," although he explains that he means "other in number, not in purpose." Herein he resembles Philo, who speaks (*Questions on Genesis* ii. 62) of "a second Deity (secundi Dei) who is the Word of God."* And just as Philo speaks (*I.* 631) of the inferior visions of the divine nature which are not of the Supreme but of the Powers *next to Him* (τῶν μετ' αὐτὸν δυνάμεων), so Justin (*II. Apol.* 13) says "we adore the Logos *next to God* (μετὰ τὸν θεόν)," and speaks of the Logos as (*I. Apol.* 32) "the first Power *next to* (μετὰ) the Father of all," or as (*Dial.* 56) "*under* (ὑπὸ) the Maker of all." All these phrases, if not absolutely incompatible with the theology of the Fourth Gospel, seem to be at least less developed and more Philonian than the latter. And Justin's close imitation of Philo, in his account of the origination of the Logos by the Supreme, may be seen from the following identical illustration by which Philo explains the transmission of the Spirit from Moses and its division among the Seventy Elders,

* Justin is not always consistent with himself, as might indeed be expected in the days when the Church was first feeling its way toward the reconciliation of the Philonian doctrine of the Logos with the Christian creed. For whereas he here undertakes to prove that there is "another God," he has before (*Dial.* 11) assured Trypho that "there never will be, nor was from eternity, another (ἄλλος) God, except Him who made and ordered this universe."

while Justin illustrates the emission of the Word: (1) Philo I. 266, "Do not suppose that the transmission (*ἀφαίρεσις*, *lit.* taking away) takes place in the way of severance (*κατὰ ἀποκοπήν*) and sundering, but as would happen from fire, which, even though it kindle ten thousand torches, remains in the same condition, in no respect diminished"; (2), Justin, *Dial.* 61, "He has begotten a certain Word-Power from Himself. . . . For when we emit a word, we beget a word, *not in the way of section* (*κατὰ ἀποτομήν*), so that the words in us (*i.e.*, the faculty of speech in us) should be diminished. And as, in the case of fire, we see another fire coming into existence, though that from which the kindling has taken place is not diminished but remains the same."*

So much for the supposed similarity between the doctrine of the Logos in the Logos and the Fourth Gospel. It is not, of course, denied that Justin differed from Philo in his treatment of the Logos in all statements that bear upon the doctrine of the Incarnation, *e.g.*, *Dial.* 128. -But even as to these, it has been shown that there are no grounds for assuming that Justin borrowed from the Gospel; and, as to the general doctrine, it appears that he dissents from the Gospel and agrees with the earlier author Philo.

II. OTHER THOUGHTS APPARENTLY BORROWED BY JUSTIN FROM THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

We have shown that Justin's theory of the Logos is that which any Christian student of the school of Philo might naturally have formed, when first the Philonian doctrine was vivified by the recognition of the Incarnation of the Logos, and the identification of the Logos with the Messiah. Both in thought and in phraseology the theory

* Professor Drummond, who makes no allusion to Philo, regards this passage of Justin as a development of the doctrine of the Fourth Gospel; but to this opinion the Philonian passage appears a sufficient answer.

of the Gospel has been shown to be a more spiritual and harmonious development than that of Justin, whose comparatively crude doctrine retains many clear traces of the thought and language of Philo. Reserving for future treatment minute similarities of language, we will now discuss three passages in which Justin appears to have borrowed thoughts from the Gospel. They are (1) the illustration of the Crucifixion by the Brazen Serpent of Moses; (2) the vindication of the non-observance of the Sabbath from the fact that the Sustainer of the world is Himself always-working; (3) the mention of Abraham in connection with the pre-existence of Christ. These topics are altogether unmentioned in, and alien from, the Synoptic Gospels; and they appear so unlikely to have occurred independently to two authors, that an ordinary reader of the Bible may be pardoned for reasoning thus: "Since these three subjects are found in Justin and John, and since they could not have been derived independently by these two authors from the Old Testament, one must have borrowed from the other, and the probability is that Justin was the borrower."

We shall prove, however, that these three topics are treated by Philo (though, of course, without any reference to Christ) in such a mystical manner, and with such details, as make it probable that Justin borrowed his treatment of them either from Philo, or from some tradition of the Philonian school; and in any case it will be shown conclusively that the similarity between Justin and Philo is much greater than the similarity between Justin and the Gospel.

(1) The Serpent of Moses, in Philo, represents Temperance, and is contrasted with Eve's Serpent, which represents Pleasure. For those who are poisoned by the fangs of the Serpent of Pleasure, and thereby imbued with passion, there is no healing save through the creation of the hostile Ser-

pent Temperance, which he describes also as meaning the material expression of the gifts or graces (*χαρίτες*) of God: "If the mind, when bitten by Pleasure, *Eve's Serpent*, is able to discern with the soul the beauty of Temperance the Serpent of Moses, and, through this, God Himself, he will live" (*Allegories*, II. 20). Now the Fourth Gospel (iii. 14) merely says, "As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have eternal life." But Justin much more closely imitates the original in Philo by retaining the contrast between the two serpents, and in one passage expressly mentions the evil serpent in connection with Eve, as Philo does. God thereby proclaimed, he says (*Dial.* 94), "that he would break the power of the serpent which occasioned the transgression of Adam, and to those that believe on . . . him that was destined to be crucified, deliverance from the bites of the serpent, which are wicked deeds and other unrighteous acts;" again (*ib.* 100) he says that the Logos became incarnate by the Virgin "in order that the disobedience which proceeded from the serpent might receive its destruction in the same manner in which it derived its origin. For Eve, who was a virgin and undefiled, having conceived the word of the serpent, brought forth disobedience and death."

These passages afford surely no grounds for supposing that Justin imitated the Gospel. The contrast between the evil Serpent and the good Serpent being once originated by Philo, how natural for Christians sprung from the Alexandrine Jewish school to say that the good Serpent who destroyed the power of the evil Serpent was a type of Christ! It is a common saying with St. Paul that the salvation of Christ is "the gift or grace of God" vouchsafed to men. If therefore Philo had desired to prepare the way for a Christian to identify the Serpent with Christ, he could

hardly have described it better than as the "corporeal expression of the incorporeal graces of God." But it may be said that the Gospel introduces the notion of "belief," which is not contained in Philo, and that Justin must have borrowed this, at all events, from the Gospel. A closer examination, however, of Philo will show that "belief" is implied when he says that the sufferer was to "discern the beauty of Temperance, and, through this, God Himself;" and so natural is it to presume some mental act of faith in the gaze of the sufferer upon the Serpent, that Justin (*I. Apol.* 60), quoting Numb. xxi. 8 (*πᾶς ὁ δεδηγμένος, ἰδὼν αὐτὸν, ζήσεται*, "every one that hath been bitten, seeing it, shall live"), actually puts "belief" into the mouth of Moses: "It is written . . . that Moses said to the people, If ye look on this image and *believe*, ye shall be saved therein." The element of faith being therefore implied in Philo, and, indeed, necessitated by any spiritual interpretation of the incident, may be set aside in discussing the question of originality; and there remains the contrast between Eve's Serpent and the hostile Serpent, which suffices to show, if not that Justin borrowed from Philo, at all events that he approaches more closely to the Philonian traditions on this point than to the doctrine of the Fourth Gospel.*

The next point is Justin's reference to the unceasing action of God, in defence of the Christians for not keeping the Jewish Sabbath, viz. (*Dial.* 29), "God has carried on the same administration of the Universe during

* If Justin had accepted John iii. 14 as apostolic, he might naturally have appealed to it, on the question of *fact*, to show that this type was "not only predicted by the prophets but also taught by Jesus" (*Dial.* 48). But he makes no such appeal, and argues for the type of the serpent as being on the same footing as the types of the scape-goat and the outstretched hands of Moses. Professor Drummond,—while he admits that the use of this type "can hardly prove Justin's dependence on the Gospel, as he seized with avidity every type which a torturing exegesis could extract from the Old Testament,"—makes no mention of the previous very similar use of this type by Philo.

that day as during all others ;” and this is said (*Authorship*, p. 50, quoting Norton’s *Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels*) to be “a thought so remarkable that there can be little doubt that he borrowed it from what was said by our Saviour when the Jews were enraged at his having performed a miracle on the Sabbath :—‘ My Father hath been working hitherto, as I am working.’ ” But Philo has precisely the same “thought” (I. 44). “God never ceases from making something or other, but as it is the property of fire to burn, and of snow to chill, so also is it the property of God always to be creating ;” and elsewhere, speaking of the Sabbath (I. 155), “that which rests is one thing only, God. But by *rest* I do not mean inaction, since that which is by nature active, that which is the Cause of all things, can never desist from doing what is most excellent.”

Moreover Justin himself *declares that he is indebted for this thought to oral Tradition*. For in a passage (*ib.* 23) preceding the above, introducing the same argument, “Do you see that the elements are not idle, and keep no Sabbaths ?” he calls it “the divine message” “which I heard from *that man*,” and going back (*ib.* 3) we find “that man” described (though not named) as an “elder of meek and venerable appearance,” who accosted him in his solitude by the seashore, and who, after kindling in his heart the desire of seeking Christ through the prophets, went away and was never seen by Justin again. But it may be suggested that this “elder” is a mere fiction of Justin, and may possibly represent the Apostle St. John. Yet how improbable that an argument known by Justin to be ascribed by one of the leading Apostles to our Lord Himself in a written Gospel should be ascribed by Justin—and this, too, when arguing with an adversary who had read the Gospel (*Dial.* 10, 18)—to a casual

conversation with a nameless "elder" whom he saw but once in his life! * Much more probably the doctrine came to Justin either from Philo's works or from some one of the school of Philo—perhaps from some nameless teacher in the very manner in which he describes.

(3) The third point is the connection between Abraham and the pre-existence of Christ as the Logos. The Fourth Gospel says (viii. 56): "Abraham your father rejoiced to see my day, and he saw, and was glad. The Jews then said to him, 'Thou art not yet fifty years old, and hast thou seen Abraham?' Jesus said to them, 'Verily I say unto you, before Abraham was, I am.'" We cannot, it is true, infer from the words of the Jews, "hast thou seen Abraham?" that Jesus meant to imply by "see my day" that Abraham had seen Him (the Logos) in a pre-existent state; for this may have been one of the misunderstandings of "the Jews" which the Author of the Fourth Gospel delights to introduce in his dialogues. But, by replying that He was "before Abraham," Jesus certainly encourages the Jews in believing that He meant that He had "seen Abraham." Thus much, at least, cannot be denied, that this passage connects Abraham with the Logos in a statement of the pre-existence of Christ before the Incarnation. Now the same two subjects are mentioned in the same connection by Justin. In answer to Trypho's challenge (*Dial.* 48) to prove that "Christ existed as God before the ages" (a challenge repeated under a different form, *ib.* 55), he undertakes to prove (*ib.* 56) that Christ, as Logos, appeared to Abraham.

Here then, undoubtedly, there is a certain similarity

* Trypho says (*Dial.* 10) that he has taken care to read the precepts in the so-called Gospel (*τὰ ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ εὐαγγελίῳ παραγγέλματα*), and Justin replies (*ib.* 18), "Since, Trypho, as you yourself confessed, you have read what was taught by our Saviour, I do not think I have done amiss in mentioning some of his short sayings in addition to those of the prophets."

of thought between the Gospel and Justin which requires explanation. But the explanation is that both the Gospel and Justin borrowed this tradition from Philo, or from some doctrine of Philo's school; and here, as elsewhere, Justin approaches much more closely than the Gospel to the original from which both were derived. The narrative (Gen. xviii. 2) speaks of "three men." Justin argues that one of these was the Logos with the two angels in His company, sent to judge Sodom by Another (*i.e.*, the Supreme) who ever remains in the supercelestial-regions, and who never appeared or conversed, in His own person, at any time with any one, and that this God is "distinct numerically from Him who made all things." Similarly Philo considers that one of the "three men" (Gen. xviii. 2) was the Logos, and makes mention of the two accompanying angels in a passage in which he describes the appearance as "God attended by His two highest Powers" (I. 173). Moreover, the antithesis found in Justin—"not the Creator, but the Logos"—is repeatedly insisted on in Philo (I. 631), "Isaac met, not God, but the Word of God, even as Abraham," and again (I. 581) "the expression, 'the Lord appeared to Abraham,' is not to be understood as though the Causer of all shone forth and manifested Himself to him, but as though one of the Powers that attend Him, viz., the Kingly Power, shone forth;" and Christ being once recognised as the Logos, it was natural that Christians should adopt the doctrine of Philo, or Philo's school, concerning the "three men" who appeared to Abraham, as a proof of the pre-existence of Christ. This application by Justin affords, therefore, no proof at all that he borrowed it from the Gospel; and, on the other hand, the antithetical way in which both Philo and Justin introduce the subject, and the mention in both of the "three men" as being the Logos accompanied by two

angels, afford strong proof that Justin is here borrowing from Philonian doctrine.*

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III. SIMILARITIES OF LANGUAGE BETWEEN JUSTIN AND THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

Before discussing other similarities between Justin and the Fourth Gospel, a few remarks on Justin's method will be of use in preventing misunderstanding. The two treatises (if we consider the two *Apologies* as one) from which most of the following quotations will be taken, are addressed, the one (the *Apologies*) to the Roman Emperor and Senate, the other (*The Dialogue with Trypho*) to a Jew who has read the Gospel. In both there are two principal objects. The first is to show that Christ, before becoming incarnate as Jesus, pre-existed as the Logos, being begotten of God, and God. Some, he says, do not believe this; but he does not agree with them, because he gives less credence to the teaching of men than to the things predicted by the prophets and taught by Jesus (*Dial.* 48). The second is to show that Jesus is the Christ, not from his miracles, but from the prophecies fulfilled by Him, the argument running thus (*Dial.* 53): "It was predicted by Jacob and Zechariah that the Messiah should ride on an ass; the Memoirs of the Apostles relate that Jesus did thus ride; therefore Jesus was the Messiah."

This summary of one of Justin's arguments will show how far it came within his province to quote the Gospels. Quotations from them, as authoritative for *argumentative* purposes, would be useless in arguing with antagonists who did not recognise their authority. Justin can

* Professor Drummond regards this as an instance in which an "obscure intimation of the Fourth Gospel is unfolded with greater amplification and precision by Justin;" but he makes no mention of the similar passage from Philo.

only quote them as testimony to *facts*, 1st, to show that the things "predicted by the prophets" were also "taught by Jesus"; 2nd, to show that the predictions of the prophets were fulfilled in the birth, life, sufferings, death, and resurrection of Jesus. Arguing with the Roman Emperor and Senate—who would, of course, be entirely ignorant of Christian documents and traditions—he will naturally make but a sparing use of the Gospels even as testimony to facts; but in the Dialogue with Trypho the Jew, who had read the Gospel, he may be expected to use them more freely. With this preface, we will now discuss in order the several passages alleged to prove that Justin accepted the Fourth Gospel as Apostolical.

(a) "There are some of our race," says Justin to Trypho (*Dial.* 48) "who confess that he (Jesus) is Christ, but declare him to be man, born of men; to whom I do not assent; nor would very many, agreeing with me, say (so) [οὐδ' ἂν πλείστοι πάντα μοι δοξάσαντες εἶποιεν] since we have been commanded by Christ himself to give credence not to human teaching but to *the truths that were proclaimed by the blessed prophets and taught by him.*" It is asserted that this passage demonstrates Justin's use of the Fourth Gospel. For, "as Canon Westcott observes, 'the Synoptists do not anywhere declare Christ's pre-existence.' And where could Justin suppose himself to have found this doctrine *taught by Christ* except in the Fourth Gospel?" (Dr. Ezra Abbot, *Authorship, &c.*, p. 43).

According to this argument, if we can point to a passage where Justin asserts that Christ *revealed to His disciples that pre-existence to which the prophets bore testimony, and where He quotes the Gospels in support of that assertion*, it will follow that Justin must quote, not from the Synoptists, but from the Fourth Gospel, because "the Synoptists do not anywhere declare Christ's pre-existence." The following is such a passage (*Dial.* 100). After quoting Matt. xi. 27,

“No man knoweth the Son save the Father and those to whom the Son revealeth Him,” he continues: “He therefore revealed to us all things, as many as we have also inferred (*νενοήκαμεν*) from the Scriptures by his grace, having ascertained that he was the *First-born of God, and before all creatures, and the son of the Patriarchs*—since through the Virgin, who had sprung from their race, he, being made flesh and becoming an unsightly man, endured to be dishonoured and liable to suffering.” Justin proceeds first to justify one part of this statement by showing that Christ revealed Himself as the “Son of the Patriarchs through the Virgin”; this he does as follows: “Whence also in his words he (Jesus) said . . . ‘The Son of man must needs suffer many things, &c.’ He therefore called himself Son of man either from his birth through the Virgin (who was, as I have said, sprung from the race of David, Jacob, Isaac, and Abraham), or because, &c.”* This will appear to many a very inadequate argument of Justin’s, the fact that Jesus called himself “Son of man” being quite insufficient to “reveal” that He was born of a Virgin or descended from the Patriarchs; but as the Synoptists nowhere represent Jesus as teaching this doctrine at all, Justin was forced to take the nearest approach to it that he could find. In any case, the argument, though weak, is clear. “We have ascertained from the Scriptures—*i.e.*, the Old Testament—that Christ was to be the son of the Patriarchs, through the Virgin. But all things that we have ascertained from the Scriptures about Christ, Christ himself

* The passage continues, “or because Abraham himself is the father also of those who have been enumerated, from whom Mary traces her descent; for also we know that the progenitors of female offspring are (considered) fathers of the children born to their daughters.” Some have proposed to substitute “Adam” for “Abraham,” but there is no authority for the change, and in any case there seems no doubt that Justin asserts (1) that Jesus called Himself Son of man because He sprang from the Patriarchs through the Virgin, and (2) that in thus calling Himself Son of man, He “revealed” His descent to the disciples.

revealed to us. Accordingly, Christ revealed to us in his words that he was the Son of the Patriarchs through the Virgin. How? By calling himself "the Son of man" in the Synoptic Gospels."

Having quoted the Synoptic Gospels in support of the assertion that Christ "revealed" His descent from the Patriarchs through the Virgin, what part of the Fourth Gospel will Justin now bring forward in order to justify the second part of his statement—viz., that Christ "revealed" that He was "the First-born of God and before all creatures"—in other words, that Christ taught His own pre-existence? Here, if anywhere, the Fourth Gospel must surely be quoted: "Before Abraham was, I am"; "I and the Father are one;" "I came forth from the Father, and have come into the world," or one of the many other passages in which the Fourth Gospel represents Jesus as teaching His Divine nature, and Eternal Sonship, from which His pre-existence follows as a necessary consequence. But instead of bringing forward any of these passages, Justin actually quotes those very Synoptists who—as Canon Westcott truly says—"do not anywhere declare Christ's pre-existence." In order to show that Christ revealed Himself as being "the First-born of God before all creatures," he can bring forward no other proof than that, first, Jesus blessed St. Peter for calling Him the Son of God; and, secondly, that He is entitled Son of God in the Memoirs. As this may seem hardly credible, it will be well to give the exact words: "For also when one of his disciples, formerly called Simon, recognised him, in accordance with the Father's revelation, as being Son of God (and) Christ, he changed his name to Peter. And whereas we find him written down in the Memoirs of his Apostles as Son of God, and whereas we call him Son, we have inferred (or understood, *νενοήκαμεν*) that he is,

and that before all creatures he came forth from the Father, &c." Here, again, the argument is as clear as it is weak. Justin wishes to quote from the "words" of Jesus some which shall show to this Jew who "has read the precepts (of Christ) in the so-called Gospel," that Jesus Himself taught His pre-existence; and he proceeds to omit that Gospel which abounds in this doctrine, and to quote from those Gospels which, by confession of our most orthodox scholars, contain no such doctrine. Why? Obviously because the Fourth Gospel, if known to him, did not seem to him to be a sufficient authority for quoting the words of Christ. Half conscious of the failure of his argument, Justin finally shifts his ground, and when at last he comes to the point—viz., that Jesus is "before all creatures, and came forth from the Father," he no longer appeals to the "words" of Christ but to inference (*νενοήκαμεν*) from the Synoptic title, "Son of God." Thus whereas he began with a promise to show that what was *inferred* from the Scriptures was *revealed* by Christ, he ends by declaring that what was *inferred* from the Scriptures may be *inferred* from an expression of Christ's. Is it possible that so complete a logical collapse could have been made by a disciple who accepted the Fourth Gospel—that rich storehouse of the doctrine of Christ's divinity and pre-existence—as an apostolic narrative written by the Disciple whom Jesus loved?

Returning, therefore, to the passage (*Dial.* 48) first quoted, wherein Justin refuses to believe that Christ is "man, born of men," and grounds his refusal on "the truths that were proclaimed by the blessed prophets and taught by him," we shall conclude that this by no means justifies us in supposing that he had the Fourth Gospel before him. It is a common-place with Justin that the same Logos who taught in Jesus, predicted in the prophets (*II. Apol.* 10), so that the predictions of the prophets are necessarily

identical in spirit with the teaching of Jesus. Hence, it being a settled belief with him that Christ *must* have taught "the truths proclaimed by the prophets," he is ready to strain each word of the Synoptic Memoirs to the uttermost so as to extract from them the essence of some prophecy; and as he believes that the prophets taught the pre-existence of Christ, he is bound to believe that "Christ taught" the same doctrine—and this even at the cost of arguing that "Son of man" implies "descended from the Patriarchs through the Virgin," and that "Son of God" implies "born before all created things."*

(b) The following passage (*Dial.* 103) is quoted as showing that Justin refers to the Fourth Gospel as "Memoirs," his customary title for the Gospels:—"For that he was the 'only-begotten' of the Father of all, having been begotten by Him in a peculiar manner as His Logos and Power, and having afterwards become man

* It has been urged that from the non-quotation of the Fourth Gospel we can infer no more than from the non-quotation of the Apocalypse, which was recognised by Justin as written by John the Apostle (*Dial.* 81), and which calls Christ "the Word," "the beginning of the creation of God," "the first and the last and the living one" (Rev. xix. 13; iii. 14; i. 17). But (1) Trypho had "read the precepts of Christ in the so-called Gospel," so that Justin might more naturally quote any works that were current in the Church under this title of "Gospel"! The Apocalypse, on the other hand, Trypho appears not to have read. It is at all events introduced by Justin, merely to show the currency of a belief in the millennium, as being written by "a certain man among us whose name was John, one of the Apostles of Christ" (*Dial.* 81), and Dr. Ezra Abbot himself admits that "he (John) is here introduced to Trypho as a stranger." (2) Justin is here attempting to prove that "Christ taught" His pre-existence. The passages in the Apocalypse might suffice as a proof of doctrine current in the Church; but they could not prove anything to Trypho as to Christ's teaching.

Again, if the Fourth Gospel in these times stood on as high a level as the Synoptic Gospels, it is not clear why Justin should assume that Trypho, who had "read the precepts of Christ in the so-called Gospel," had not read the Gospel written by "the disciples whom Jesus loved;" so that he feels it necessary here to introduce John to Trypho, not as "the author of one of the Gospels, which you, Trypho, have read," but as a "stranger."

through the Virgin, as we learned from the Memoirs, I showed before."

Justin has been previously quoting from the 22nd Psalm the words, "Deliver my soul from the sword, and my Only-begotten from the hand of the dog," and he now desires to show, in accordance with his usual method, that what was "predicted by the prophets" was "taught by Christ," or else fulfilled in His life. Now if Justin had recognised the Fourth Gospel as one of the Memoirs, he might have appealed to it thus: "For also in his words Jesus said, speaking of himself, God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son, that whoso believeth in Him should not perish" (John iii. 16), or to another passage (*ib.* 18), in which Jesus appropriates this epithet. But as he did not thus recognise the Fourth Gospel, instead of appealing to it, he appeals to a preceding chapter, in which he says he has proved that Christ was the "Only-begotten." This preceding chapter is almost certainly the one quoted above (*a*), where Justin (*Dial.* 100) declares that Jesus revealed Himself "in his words" to have been Son of the Patriarchs, by calling Himself "Son of man," and also revealed Himself to be "the First-born of God and before all creatures" by blessing St. Peter for calling Him "the Son of the Living God." But as we have seen above, both these statements are supported by reference to the Synoptists, nor is there in the context any reference whatever to the Fourth Gospel.

Therefore, so far from supporting the view that Justin used the Fourth Gospel, this passage has the opposite tendency. It shows that the omission to quote the Fourth Gospel in proof of the eternal Sonship of Christ was not an oversight in chapter 100; for now, in chapter 105, recurring to the same subject, he has no

better proof to give than before, and though the epithet "only-begotten" of the Psalmist appears absolutely to necessitate a reference to the only Gospel which contains it, still that Gospel remains ignored.

Lastly, let it be noted that here, as above, Justin is reduced, by his avoidance of the Fourth Gospel, to a proof from inference when the Gospel could have given him a proof from the very words of Jesus. The main burden of *proof* lying on the Old Testament, and the Memoirs being only quoted to show the conformity of the acts and words of Jesus thereto, Trypho could have accepted the "words of Jesus" about His own nature quite as readily as a statement in the Memoirs about Him. There can be therefore no reason why—instead of proving indirectly that Jesus was "only-begotten" by referring to a previous proof showing him to have been "begotten in a peculiar manner"—he should not have proved it directly by quoting the words of Jesus about Himself. In chapter 100, he quotes to Trypho the words of Jesus about Himself extracted from the Synoptists, and strains their meaning to make them suit the words of prophecy: why should he not in the same way, without any straining, have quoted the words of Jesus about Himself extracted from the Fourth Gospel? The argument could then have run thus: "The Psalmist, speaking of Christ, says, Deliver my soul from the sword and my only-begotten from the-hand of the dog. But that Jesus taught his disciples that he was the only-begotten we know from the Memoirs, wherein it is written that he himself said, speaking of himself, God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son, that whoso believeth in him should not perish." From Justin's point of view, could there have been a more complete proof that "what the prophets predicted Jesus taught"? And does not this omission, like others, tend to show that Justin, while

sympathising with some of the traditions embodied in the Fourth Gospel, was not aware of the existence of it as an Apostolic document?*

The other instances of similarity of language, and the unique quotation alleged to have been made by Justin from the Fourth Gospel, must be reserved for subsequent discussion.

(To be continued.)

* Whatever be the rendering of this passage, the argument from the omission to quote John iii. 16 remains unaltered. But it is possible that the passage should be punctuated thus: "That he was the 'only-begotten' of the Father of all, having been begotten by Him in a peculiar manner as His Logos and Power—and (only) afterwards having become man through the Virgin, as we learned from the Memoirs—I showed before." Should this punctuation be adopted, it would follow that the Memoirs are referred to only for the proof of the birth through the Virgin; and all grounds would disappear for supposing that by Memoirs Justin meant the Fourth Gospel.

*THE TEMPLE OF SORROW.**

THE Minster glory lies engulfed in gloom,
With mournful music throbbing deep and low,
And all the jewelled joy within her eyes
Slumbers suffused ; the saint, the warrior
On tomb recumbent, kneeling panoplied,
Blend far away mysterious presences
With a wide-seething multitude, alive
Through all the pillared grandeur of the nave,
A human sea ; the gorgeous full pomp
Of civil, militant, imperial pride,
And sacerdotal splendour, cloth of gold,
Chalice bejewelled, silks imbued with morn
Flow in blue twilight of a perfumed air,
Flow flashing into momentary gleam
By altar and shrine, for lustre of the lamps,
Silver and gold suspended, or mild shine
Of tall white wax around a central Night
In the mid-transept : there the Catafalque,
The Shadow dominates, reigns paramount
O'er all the temple ; 'tis the hollow Heart,
Dispensing Darkness through the frame supine
Of that colossal Cross, which is the Fane.
The huge vault under yawneeth, a deep wound,
Filled full with Horror ; Death abideth there :
Aye, with our lost Ideals, our lost Loves,

* Suggested by the funeral of some of the poorer victims of the recent great fire in the Ring Theatre, Vienna, when to their relatives, as chief mourners, was allotted the post of honour in the Cathedral.

Baffled Aim, palsied Faith, Hope atrophied !
 All the circumfluent glory-glow of Life
 Mere tributary to the awful throne
 Of this dread Power ; all cast their crowns before It.
 Yea, as blithe waters from the abysmal womb
 Of caverned Earth dance buoyant into Day,
 So here from fountains of primeval Night
 In very deed Life seemeth effluent.

And some there be most honoured in the crowd,
 For whom illustrious prince, with emperor
 And noble stand obeisantly aside.
 Who are they ? for they wear no bravery,
 Nor badge of high estate within the realm,
 Whose garb uncourtly sombre shows and mean.
 No confident bearing, claiming deference,
 As of right full conceded, suns itself
 Proudly on these ; we judge them of the herd
 Of rugged toilers, whom the stroke of Fate
 Despoils of floral honours and green leaves,
 Fells for rough use, not leaves for leisured grace,
 Or putting forth the loveliest that is theirs.
 Lowly their port, whose dull and earthward eyes,
 Heavy with weeping, droop beneath rude brows,
 Whose light is with their heart, quenched in the abyss
 That holds their best beloved, torn from them
 In fierce embraces of devouring fire ;
 Whose souls were so inextricably involved
 With these that perished, in the ghastly fall
 They too were wrenched low from the living light
 Of placid, self-possessed familiar day
 Down to a desolate disconsolate wild,
 Haunt of grim Madness, hollow Doubt, Despair :
 Only the dead, more happy, seem to glide
 Lower to nether caverns of cool sleep.

Grief is their patent of nobility ;
 Sorrow the charter of their right to honour.
 Smitten to earth, behold them cowering,
 Mocked, buffeted, spurned, spat upon, effaced
 Under the blood-red executioner,
 Whom some name Nature, and some God, the Lord.
 These do but threaten feebly with a mouth
 Or hand, more feeble than a delicate beast,
 Lashed for hell-torment by a learned man,
 Lashed for hell-torment in the torture-trough ;
 The unregarded Sudras of the world,
 Bleeding to slow death from an inward wound,
 Deep and immedicable evermore.

To these the proud and prosperous of earth
 Pay reverent homage ! it is marvellous !
 And yet no marvel ! such fate-stricken men
 Are armed, and robed imperially with awe !
 Who flame sublime to momentary wrath,
 Peal with mad mirth, then grovel impotent ;
 Who affirm not their own selves, who falter lost,
 Like foam blown inland on the whirlwind's wing
 From ocean, there dissolving tremulous
 Where kindred foam evanished only now,
 So they in the lapsed being of their dead.
 They are one with these they cherished and adored,
 Not separate, individual any more :
 Lieges are they of Sorrow, pale crowned Queen
 Over man's miserable mad universe.

What might have been fair Body grows to Soul :
 From false-appearing palace halls of sense
 They are delivered, into mournful worlds
 Of Peradventures all unfathomable,
 Forebodings infinite, wild hope, surmise,
 Faith, Love, sweet longing ; yea, they are disturbed

From dull content with earth's inanities
By revelation of what hollow hearts,
And loathly shapes they hide ; afire with thirst,
Now will they sound the eternal deeps within
For living water, clouded and disused,
Cumbered with ruin ; their dull eyes are roused
From low rank plains to interrogate the height
Of perilous attainment, or endeavour,
Where snows hold high communion with stars,
Where from aerial eyrie sails the eagle,
Calm in clear air, familiar with Heaven.
They are made free of God's eternal spirit,
Ever abounding, inexhaustible ;
Consumed, that they themselves may truly be.

Behold! the Minster cruciform and grand,
Grows human, more than human, as I muse,
The Holy House of Life, the Crucified !
What seems the World, the Body of the Lord !
Expanded arms, and frame pulsate with blood,
Close-thronging individual lives ; His Heart,
Death, haloed with pale anguish and desire.
Even so the Sun eclipsed, a sable sphere,
Is ringed around with his corona flame,
Wherein appear weird members of red fire.
But as the Sun behind this ominous orb,
That is the spectral shadow of our moon,
Smiles evermore beneficent, so Love
Veils Him in gloom sepulchral for awhile,
That we who sound the abysses of Despair
May weave pure pearls, Her awful bosom hides,
Into a coronal for our pale brows,
And He Himself, descending to the deep,
Bearing our burden, may win lovelier grace
Of Love's own tears, which are the gems of God.

Ever the plangent ocean of low sound
Fills all with midnight, overwhelms my heart.
Lit tapers faint around the Catafalque,
And fair-wrought lamp in sanctuary and shrine.
The wan expanse seems labouring confused
With what feels like some glutinous chill mist,
Close cobweb-woof; the great Cathedral quakes,
As from sick earthquake throes; the pillars tall
Heave, like huge forest-peers, that agonize
In tides of roaring tempest; will the pile
Vanish anon to assume an alien form?
For all the pillars hurtle aloft to flame
Flamboyant, cloven, pallid, while the roof
Reels riven; yet there is not any sound.
Lo! every Christ on every crucifix
Glares with the swordblade glare of Antichrist!
While on the immense-hewn flanking masonry,
Scrawled, as by finger supernatural,
As in Belshazzar's banquet-hall of old,
Behold the "*mene! mene!*" but the realm
Divided is the royal realm, the soul!
The guilty soul, ingorged by the dim fiend
Of loathsome, limbless bulk, Insanity!
In dusk recesses how the shadows wax
Palpable, till they palpitate obscene,
Clinging, half-severed; our sick souls are ware
Of some live Leprosy, that heaves and breathes
Audibly in the impenetrable gloom.

Hear ye the moans of muffled agony
By yonder altars of the infernal aisle?
Marmoreal pavements slippery with blood!
While all the ghastly-lit ensanguined space
Quickening teems with foul abnormal births;
Corpse faces scowling, wound about with shrouds,

Sniffing thick orgy fumes of cruelty,
Steal out, or slink behind in the shamed air.
Vast arteries of the dilating pile
Pulsate with ever denser atom-lives
Unhappy ; do mine eyes indeed behold
Those holy innocents, whom she of yore,
The Voice in Ramah, wept so bitterly,
Rachael, sweet spirit-mother of their race ?
They are holy innocents of many a clime,
And many a time, some murdered yesterday,
And some still languishing in present pain :
Dumb women, with marred faces eloquent,
Hold their wan hands ; while all around, beneath,
Among their feet, what seems a harried crowd
Of gentle beings, who are man's meek friends.
They in the reeking shadow yonder fawn
Upon dyed knees of things in human shape,
All hell's heat smouldering in lurid eyes,
And Cain's ensanguined brand upon their brow,
Who on Christ-altars, prostitute to sin,
Offer these innocents to fiends whose names,
Obsequious to the inconstant moods of man,
Vary elusive, and deluding ; now
They are called Moloch, Baal, Ashtaroth,
Hatred, Revenge, War, Lust, Greed, Might-is-Right,
Now Church, the Truth, the Virgin, or the Christ,
But in a later time Expediency,
Weal of Man, Nature, Lust of Curious Lore.
The accurst oblation of fair alien lives,
None of their own, they pour to satiate
The hydra-headed, demon brood obscene.
These are devoured with ever subtler pangs
Cunningly heightened, fuelled, nursed, prolonged
By cold, harsh hearts, one adamant to woe,
Or cruel, infamous appetite of pain.

Ay, and of horrors loathlier than these
The verse dares name not, thrust on beautiful
Maidens and babes defenceless, of such feasts
The God-deserted souls are gluttonous—
All Nature pales at Satan's carnival!

Who are the lost souls? Legion is their name.
Noble, pope, cardinal, king, refuse vile
Of crime-infested cities. I beheld
Borgia, Caligula, Napoleon,
Marat, De Retz, and he that did to death
The royal child, who heard the angels call
Him home, soft singing, dying, ere he died.
And some are here who cumber earth to-day
Flesh-girt; their name shall not profane the page.
There go seducers, they who lightly break
Warm simple hearts who trust them; there are some
Who wither women slowly with harsh looks,
Ill words, or blows, inflamed, obsessed by fiends,
Wearing the semblance of a flask of fire.
Yonder fair dames white-bodied and dusk-souled!
Mothers, we find, who can withhold unshamed
The high and holy dues, that all beside
Of animated nature punctually,
With rapturous devotion, consecrates,
The dear debt to the fruit of our own womb,
What strength owes to dependent feebleness,
Reason full-orbed to shyly-opening sense,
Confided and confiding: even now
Their mothers gave themselves for these, and God
Bestows Himself on every living thing
For ever: these will starve, or drown their babes,
Enthral them to a ghastrier than death,
That he may work on them his loathly will,
Corrupting soul and body. Drop the veil!

All here, foul traitors ! all betrayed the trust
 Nature imposed, while only dyed less deep,
 Who, passing, drawled, " Am I my brother's keeper?"

White victims, immolated for the world !
 Ye tyrants, ye alone are miserable !
 For whom Hate hath left loving, though a beast,
 Is nearer God than you, removed from Him
 By all the hierarchies of all worlds !
 But these have fallen to abyssms of pain,
 And you to sloughs of inmost infamy,
 That all the spheres may learn for evermore
 The treachery of sweet ways that are not Love.
 Yet if some God be lingering in you,
 Your own eternal selves consenting not,
 (Which are by lapse, and by recovery)
 Touching the lowest deep ye shall recoil !
 When in the furnace heated sevenfold
 More than the wont, fierce furnace of God's wrath,
 Blasted ye shrivel, your inhuman pride
 Stern, stubborn metal swooning to weak air
 In the white heat of Love's intolerable,
 Ah ! then will not the innocence ye wronged,
 Leaving her own bliss for you, fly from heaven
 To heal you by forgiveness ? May it be !

Yea, there are fleeting gleams from the All-fair,
 Playing of children, larks, and lovers gay,
 Beautiful image, grand heroic deed,
 Cheery content ; but ah ! the grim World-woe
 Absorbs all vision, overwhelms the heart !
 A few, with seraph pity in clear eyes,
 And flashing sword retributive unsheathed,
 Sore-pressed and wounded, wrestle with the foe,
 Defeated, slain, delivering ; while aloft

We seize anon some glimpses of august,
Benignant countenances, with white wings,
As of Heaven's most invisible drawn up
For battle ; but I know not who prevail.
A few pale stars in chasms of wild storm !
Aliens, alas ! no potentates of ours.
We are in the power of Darkness and Dismay,
Anguishing God-forsaken on the cross !
Yea, sons of Belial with jaunty jeer
Ask where Thou hidest, Lord ! the Avenger ! God !
Devils a priestly scare to them, who know not
Devils allure them blind into the pit.
Could they but hear low ghastly mirth convulse
Shadowy flanks of these live Plagues in air !

Mine eyeballs seared with horror, and my heart
One writhing flame, I prayed that I might die,
And lay me down to sleep with *him* for ever !
A sevenfold darkness weighs upon my soul :
I hear no groans, no music ; all is still,
Even as the grave : one whispers of the Dawn :
Once I surmised the morning gray, not now :
Nor in the chancel, whose wide wakeful orb,
Solemnly waiting, ever fronts the East,
Nor in the cold clerestories of the nave.
One whispers of the lark ; I hear no bird.
And yet I know the seraph eyes of Dawn
Find in her last, lone hollow the veiled Night.

Hearken ! a long, low toll appals the gloom !
Like a slow welling blood from a death wound
In the world's heart, that never will be staunch'd,
Crimsoning the void with waste expense of pain !
Another, and another, vibrating !
A phantom bell tolls in the abysmal dark

The funeral of all living things that be.
 I, turning toward the Catafalque, desire,
 Plunging within the gulf, to be no more. . . .

When, lo! some touch as of a healing hand.
 For while I knew the mourners only saw
 Flowers on fair corses and closed coffin-lid,
 I grew aware of souls regenerate
 Afar, sweet spirits raimented in white,
 Who leaned above the Terror with calm eyes ;
 And for a moment their purged vision cleared
 Earth-humours from mine own, till I beheld
 No deadly Dark—a lake of living Light,
 A mystic sphere, the Apocalyptic main !
 Heaving with happiness that breathes, a home
 For all dear spirits of the faded flowers
 Outrageous men have pulled and thrown away ;
 Clouds in blue air reflected in a mere,
 Or roseflush in roseopal, a shy dawn
 In lakes at morning, so the souls appeared.

My little children, do I find you here ?
 All here ! Among you smiles our very own.
 Each little one hath, nestled in his bosom,`
 A delicate bird, or elfin animal.
 White-clustered lilies, beautiful as morn,
 In wayward luxury of love's own light
 Eddying, abandoned to love-liberty !
 Joy-pulses of young hearts unsulliable
 Weave warbling music, a low lullaby.
 I fancy they have syllabled a song :

We are fain, are fain,
 Of mortal pain,
 We are fain of heavenly sorrow,

As a gentle rain,
 She will sustain,
 Wait only till "to-morrow!"

Among death-pearls
 Of dewy curls,
 O little ones in anguish!
 The Lord hath kissed,
 I would ye wist
 For all the world ye languish!

The loveless world
 Lies love-impearled
 From innocency weeping;
 Wan wings be furled,
 And you lie curled
 In Love's warm haven sleeping.

For when ye know
 What glories flow
 For all from childly sorrow,
 A flower will blow
 From your wan woe
 Within the wounded furrow.

We are fain, are fain
 Of mortal pain,
 We are fain of heavenly sorrow;
 As a gentle rain
 She will sustain,
 Wait only till to-morrow.

So pure, pellucid fays enjoy the calm
 Of summer seas, and woven waterlights
 In faëry cavern, where the emerald heart
 Lies heaving, or blue sheen on a warm wave.

And ye are fair surrounded with lost Love,
Celestial Vision, vanished Hope, Desire,
Lovelier recovered, gloriously fulfilled
With a Divine fulfilment, more than ours.

There, in the midst, the likeness of a Lamb,
That had been slain, whose passion heals our hurt,
Wearing a thorn crown, breathing into bloom !
Lo ! if ye listen intently by the light,
Ye hear a winnowing of angel wings,
Nearing, or waning : while from far away,
I'the Heart of all, what revelation falls ?
A sound, oh marvel ! like a sound of tears !

Pain ever deepens with the deepening life,
Though fair Love modulate the whole to joy.
A myriad darkling points of dolorous gloom
Startle to live light ; subtle infinite nerves
Of world-wide Anguish glow, a noonlit leaf.

All vanish : there is dawn within the fane ;
Born slowly from the wan reluctant gloom
Conquering emerges a grand Cross of Gold,
And all the nations range around serene.

RODEN NOEL.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

THE LAW OF PARSIMONY AND THE ARGUMENT OF DESIGN.

IN a Review of Dr. Roux's work on *The Struggle of Parts in the Organism*, which appeared in *Nature* a short time back, Dr. Romanes refers to the problem presented "by the endless number and complex variety of apparently purposive adaptations of structures to functions which are everywhere met with in Organic Nature," and proceeds to say:—

"Until within the last few years the solution of this problem was all but universally sought in the hypothesis of a Designing Mind, and as no other cause had been suggested as adequate to produce such a multitude of seemingly teleological effects, it became a habit of philosophical thinking to regard these effects as evidences of a Creating Intelligence." This tendency "attained to its highest level in the Argument from Design, as elaborated by the natural theologians of the past generation. Then, with a suddenness only less surprising than its completeness, the end came; the fountains of this great deep were broken up by the power of one man; and never in the history of thought has a change been effected of a comparable magnitude or importance."*

This led first to a controversy in the pages of *Nature*, in which the Duke of Argyll and Dr. Carpenter took part; and then to the publication, in the *Fortnightly Review*, of an article by Dr. Romanes on "The Scientific Evidence of Organic Evolution," in the course of which, and elsewhere, he lays down the following propositions:—

1. Innumerable illustrations of the adaptations of organisms to their environment occur in Nature.
2. There are *only* two hypotheses to account for these phenomena—Intelligent Design manifested in Creation, or Natural Selection operating through the countless ages of the past.

* *Nature*, September 29, 1881.

3. Either of these hypotheses accounts for all the facts of the case.

4. By the law of Parsimony the operation of lower causes, excludes the operation of higher causes. Hence, if physical causes are deemed adequate, there is no residual effect to be carried over to metaphysical design.

5. To affirm that there is, is to be guilty of childishness, of the prostitution of the rational faculty, of superstition, of fetishism.

Now, if all these premises are true, and if the law of Parsimony is properly applied in this case, I contend that the logical force of the reasoning is irresistible, and that the denunciation of the Argument of Design as superstition is just. Unfortunately, however, during the last twelve months and more, Dr. Romanes has denied every one of his premises except the fact of adaptation in Nature; he has resisted his own conclusions; he has deprecated his own anathemas.

In the first place, he has deprecated his own anathemas, when issuing from the lips of others. In a Review of Dr. Aveling's *Student's Darwin*, he takes Mr. Bradlaugh and Mrs. Besant to task thus:—

“Several months ago we reviewed the first volume of this series, and now, in reviewing the second, we are still of opinion that the promoters of the series are mistaken, so far as they may have the interests of science at heart, in associating their endeavours to render science popular with their systematic onslaught against theistic beliefs.”*

But, surely, if it be “childish to rush into a supernatural explanation wherever a natural explanation is found sufficient to account for the fact”; † and if a natural explanation is possible in the case before us; if it be “a very prostitution of the rational faculty” to say that the phenomena of Nature may be accounted for by Intelligent Design as well as by Natural Selection; if, by neglecting the law of Parsimony, “we use the logic of Superstition instead of the logic of Science;” if “natural theologians can no longer adhere to the arguments of such writers as Paley, Bell, and Chalmers, without deliberately violating the only logical principle which separates Science from Fetishism” (p. 743), ought not these things to be denounced? Why should the warning voice be withheld? Can the interests of science be promoted by such silence?

* *Nature*, September 8, 1881.

† *Fortnightly Review*, Dec., 1881, p. 741.

As the result of the application of the law of Parsimony, Dr. Romanes asserts that the theory of Natural Selection excludes the theory of Design in Nature. If the material universe is sufficient to produce all things which we see without and experience within, then, so far as Nature is concerned, the idea of God is excluded. Mr. Leifchild says:—

“By Naturalism I mean the explanation of Nature by natural causes entirely, or nearly so. It looks at things only, and always on their natural side; and though it may not absolutely exclude the name or idea of God, makes little or no use of it. Thus Nature, which is merely a summary expression for a scheme of things to be explained, itself becomes the general explanation of all its special phenomena. Strict Naturalism is, therefore, equivalent to Atheism; but the latter term is courteously disused. Of course there are degrees and differences in Naturalism; but strict Naturalism dispenses with Personal Deity.”*

But rather than draw this inference, Dr. Romanes throws the law of Parsimony to the winds. From this denial as a scientific man he shrinks, because it is not the function of Natural Science to deal with such a subject at all. “In itself Science has no necessary relation to any such (*i.e.*, theistic) belief. It is neither theistic nor atheistic; it is simply extra-theistic.” †

The effect of Dr. Romanes' argument is to charge the advocates of the Design Argument with childishness, with prostitution of the rational faculty, with superstition, with fetishism; and yet in another place he admits the difference between himself and them to be a legitimate difference.

“The question is, whether the new light which science has shed on biology by the theory of descent is compatible with the older theory of design, and, if so, to what extent. It is useless in these columns to discuss this question, because it is one upon which opinions differ, and may legitimately differ through all points of the intellectual compass.” ‡

The argument which we are considering depends altogether upon the sufficiency of the theory of Natural Selection to explain all the phenomena. “As all these cases of apparent design consist only in the adaptation which is shown by organisms to their environment, it is obvious that the facts are covered by the theory of Natural Selection no less completely than they are

* *The Higher Ministry of Nature*, p. 341. Note.

† *Nature*, Sept. 8, 1881.

‡ *Nature*, May 5, 1881.

covered by the theory of Intelligent Design" (p. 741). "The evidence in favour of Natural Selection as a cause is simply the evidence in favour of organic Evolution as an effect" (p. 742). But elsewhere Dr. Romanes says:— . . . "It soon became apparent that Natural Selection alone was not adequate to explain all the facts of adaptation that are met with in organic Nature. . . . Many cases of adaptation which occur in the parts of individual organisms cannot possibly be explained by the theory of Natural Selection as this is applied to explain cases of adaptation which are presented by specific types."*

"Even Mr. Darwin himself does not doubt that other causes besides that of Natural Selection have assisted in the modifying of specific types" (p. 743). Yet in this article, "written to be spoken rather than printed," Dr. Romanes says:—"For the sake of simplicity I shall not go into this subject." He must have relied greatly on the simplicity of his former hearers and present readers. His whole argument depends upon the sufficiency of Natural Selection to explain all. He admits that it does not explain all; but, for the sake of simplicity, will take for granted that it does, or rather argue as though it did.

Nor can Dr. Romanes be considered happy even in the phrase which he uses to convey the idea of the sufficiency of Natural Selection. "Let us then weigh the evidence in favour of organic Evolution. If we find it wanting we need have no complaints to make of natural theologians of to-day; but if we find it full measure shaken down and running over we ought to maintain that natural theologians can no longer adhere to the arguments of such writers as Paley, Bell, and Chalmers, without deliberately violating the only logical principle which separates Science from Fetishism" (p. 743). In the Quarterly Statement of the Palestine Exploration Fund (October, 1881, p. 325) Dr. Romanes will find a description of the process to which he refers—how the professional measurer uses his wooden *timneh*; how, seated cross-legged on the ground, he shovels in wheat or barley till it is partly full, then shakes it from side to side, and twirls it round, repeating the process till it is full to the brim, when the corn is firmly pressed down and the measurer proceeds to build a cone of corn on the well-filled *timneh*. difference of 3lb. weight, involving a loss of 6 per cent. to the purchaser, can be made by the skilful operator. But this is cunning manipulation, not accurate measurement; and the writer

* *Nature*, Sept. 29, 1881.

who passes off Natural Selection as accounting for *all* the facts of the case, and rears thereon a most damaging argument, while elsewhere he admits that the theory will not explain all things, has built his cone very cunningly, and I have no doubt very innocently, but not so carefully that from the apex of it he is justified in denouncing the fetishism of Paley, Bell, and Chalmers.

Dr. Romanes asserts that there are only two possible hypotheses to account for the phenomena of Nature; one of these being, "Intelligent Design manifested in Creation" (p. 742). He defines "*created*," as "*suddenly* introduced into the complex conditions of their life." Thus, the whole question between Natural Selection and Supernatural Design resolves itself into this: Were all the species of plants and animals separately created, or were they slowly evolved?

Any candid reader of the passage (p. 742-3) must admit that "Intelligent" and "Supernatural" are used as interchangeable terms, and that we have to choose between sudden creation by an Intelligent Being on the one hand, and gradual development without an Intelligent Being on the other. So far as the article in the *Fortnightly* is a refutation of this exploded idea, all must heartily agree with it who are at all conversant with the subject. The evidence is simply overwhelming. The structural affinities of related organisms, the modification of structure in cases which need such modification, the dwarfed and useless representatives of organs which, in other and allied kinds of animals and plants, are of large size and functional activity, the fossil remains which are intermediate links between species now living, the progressive development to which geology bears testimony, the geographical distribution of animals and plants; and last, but certainly not least, the series of changes undergone by the embryo previous to its birth—all these leave upon the mind an indelible impression that the doctrine of the sudden creation of the fully-developed plant or animal, completely adapted to the circumstances in which it was placed by the contriving intelligence of the Creator, is no longer tenable. Hence if the doctrine of Sudden Creation be untenable, and if this be the only form of conceiving the action of Intelligent Design in Nature, then we are compelled to deny the existence of Intelligent Design there. But Dr. Romanes comes, himself, to the rescue. We may, if we please, according to him, believe in ultimate Design. "Whether or not, there is an ultimate design pervading all Nature—

a *causa causarum*, which is the final *raison d'être* of the cosmos—this is another question, and one which I take to have no point of legitimate contact with Natural Science” (p. 737, Note).

Again, Dr. Romanes emphatically assures us that it is only sudden creation which the doctrine of evolution positively condemns:—“The name (evolutionist) therefore has no direct reference to any ulterior belief or opinion as to whether behind the natural causes producing evolution there is any supernatural design, provided only that this design is not supposed to display itself by breaking out into miracles or interference with these natural causes.”*

In the third place, it should be observed that while Dr. Romanes defines creation with emphasis, as a sudden operation, he also recognises the possibility of a creation which takes place by slow processes. “The best idea of the whole process will be gained by comparing it with the closely analogous process whereby gardeners and cattle breeders create their wonderful productions; for just as these men, by always selecting their best individuals to breed from, slowly, but continuously, improve their stock, so Nature, by a similar process of selection, slowly, but continuously, makes the various species of plants and animals better and better suited to the conditions of their life” (p. 740). So that instead of one conception of Design in Nature—Intelligent or Supernatural Design, in the sense of instantaneous creation—we have ultimate Design, the hypothesis that Mind is behind the evolution of Nature, with which Science, as Science, has nothing whatever to do; and human Design, working through the slow processes of animal Growth, affords the best idea of the whole process of Nature.

The present writer has spent many weary hours in trying to ascertain what Dr. Romanes means. But this, at least, is certain: in the argument based upon the law of Parsimony he attempts to exclude all design: in the body of the article in the *Fortnightly Review*, he opposes only one kind of Design, the design of a Creator who introduces highly organised beings into the World at once, which is a Doctrine that no one but the believer in the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures would now maintain, while in the introductory note to that article the possibility of ultimate Design is admitted. Whether there was any use in urging the law of Parsimony so long as the theory of

* *Nature*, May 5, 1881.

Natural Selection does *not* explain all the facts; whether, in an article published "to place in a tolerably clear light the bearing of Darwinism on the doctrine of Design," it was fair, in the body of the paper, to dwell upon one form of Design, as shown in the instantaneous creation of highly-organised beings, as though that were the only method of Design; whether the law of Parsimony, *which forbids all theories of Design*, and the profession of faith in ultimate Design and in metaphysical Design, are consistent with one another, are questions which we would leave to the candid consideration of the reader.

Let us now sum up, in another order, some of the statements of Dr. Romanes, which go far to overthrow the argument based on the law of Parsimony.

I. The most wonderful adaptations of organisms to their environment abound in Nature.

II. No scientific theory, nor any combination of scientific theories can, on physical grounds, account for the phenomena of Nature.

III. If we could account for all phenomena on physical grounds there would be no residual effect to carry over to what is called metaphysical Design.

"If the physical causes are deemed adequate to furnish a scientific explanation of the effects, then there is no residual effect to be carried over for explanation by any metaphysical theory of Design."*

The converse of this argument ought to be true. And if Science does *not* explain all on mere material considerations, then there is a residual effect requiring explanation.

IV. That solution is indicated when it is averred that the best explanation of the processes of Nature is to be found in the methods of the florist and the cattle-breeder—*i.e.*, in a method in which *intelligence* is the *directing influence* of vegetable and animal growths.

In formulating these opinions, it seems as though the Balaam who had come to curse had been constrained to bless; as if the critic who had accused us poor defenders of the Argument of Design, of childishness—of the prostitution of the rational faculty, of superstition, of fetishism—had said all that he could, almost more than he had a right, by his own showing as a scientific man, to say, to assist the work of the natural theologian, and through the desert of material atheism to make straight a highway

* *Nature*, Nov. 10, 1881.

to our God, and for our God, by which the soul of man may journey through Nature to the Will and Mind, which are the ultimate explanations of Nature.

CHARLES CLEMENT COE.

THE ORIGIN OF THE NAME "JEHOVAH."

TO the student of Israel's earlier religious history there is perhaps no inquiry which can surpass, or even rival, in interest and importance the questions relating to the origin and significance of the name "Jehovah." I speak of the name "Jehovah," for usage and association still plead for this familiar word. Without at all maintaining its formal correctness, there is yet sufficient reason for ordinarily employing it. *Jahveh*, or *Yahweh*, may be far superior in approach to accuracy; but the sound and pronunciation seem likely to offend our ears for a good while to come. According to the narratives of Genesis, the employment of the name began in the earliest times (Genesis iv. 1, 26). But, apart from other considerations, philology forbids us to regard the statements of these verses as literally true. Whatever may have been the origin of language, we can no longer conceive of paradisiacal conversations in Hebrew. And as to the famous passage in Exodus (iii. 14) the opinion seems to be gaining ground that it gives an adaptation of the name rather than its true etymology and meaning. Thus Professor Robertson Smith remarks, in his work just published, *The Prophets of Israel*, "It must, of course, be remembered that Exod. iii. 14 does not give the original sense of the name *Iahvé*, which is still obscure, but an adaptation of the name, so that we need not be surprised to find a little awkwardness in the expression" (p. 387). And Dr. Friedrich Delitzsch observes in his recent work, *Wo lag das Paradies?* (1881) that the name of no Semitic deity could have originally conveyed so abstract an idea as that of Being or Existence. And Dr. Kuenen says in his *Religion of Israel*, "In the eighth century that name was already regarded by many, rightly or wrongly, as a derivative of the verb *to be*" (vol. i., p. 42, Eng. Trans.)

Recent scholars, too, have evinced a tendency to seek the source of the name in some branch or family of the Semite race

other than the Hebrew, or even to find for it an extra-Semitic origin. Thus, on grounds apparently not very substantial, it has been regarded as a Canaanitish name (Land), or, as it would seem, scarcely with better reason, the Jehovah-cultus has been looked upon as transmitted from the Arabian Kenites (Tiele).^{*} Certainly this theory finds a very slender basis in such poetical passages as, "God cometh from Teman, and the Holy One from Mount Paran" (Hab. iii. 3); and "Jehovah, when thou wentest forth from Seir, when thou marchedst from the land of Edom" (Judges v. 4). In relation to the former passage the context (Hab. iii. 7—15) makes pretty apparent an allusion to the journeying of Israel from the Desert. Comp. also Deut. xxxiii. 2—5. Dr. Fried. Delitzsch, in his recent work already mentioned, traces the name to a supposed Accadian designation of deity, *i*, which, in the mouth of the Babylonian Semites, became *Ia-u*, a name which, however, he admits, has not, from some accidental cause, been yet proved from actual evidence to have been used as a Babylonian name of God. This admitted fact is of great importance, considering the number of tablets already examined, and the antiquity of some of them. Moreover it tends to show that the name "Jehovah" cannot have been from the first common to the Semites. But Dr. Delitzsch's Accadian foundation for the name (*i*) cannot be allowed to pass unquestioned. Dr. Tiele in the March number of the *Theologisch Tijdschrift* regards this Accadian theory as a daring hypothesis maintained on weak and insufficient grounds.

To connect *Jehovah* with *Jov-is* is no new thing; but this appears to have been done for a good while with no very solid or adequate reasons. The analogy, however, assumed a new aspect when *Jov-is* was traced back to its Sanscrit and Aryan ancestry (J. G. Müller, *Die Semiten in ihrem Verhältniss zu Chamiten und Japhetiten*, 1872). To this view I am strongly disposed to assent, only I should very specially connect *Jehovah* (*Yahweh*) with the divine name *Dyaus* found in the Vedic hymns—a name on the important and interesting character of which Prof. Max Müller has, it will be recollected, strongly insisted (comp. *Chips from a German Workshop*, vol. iv. p. 221; *Hibbert Lectures* for 1878, pp. 216, 276). Looking at the widely-diffused words and names derived from *Dyaus*—as *Jupiter*, *Dispiter*, *Jovis*, *Zeus*, *Dios*, *Ziu*—it would seem that there must have been a time

^{*} Mr. Cheyne also appears to regard this view with favour. See *Encyclopædia Britannica*, New Edit., art. "Circumcision."

when *Dyaus* had, in view of the Aryans, a prominence of personality greater than that which the Vedic hymns would suggest. And the difference of the derived forms just mentioned would be sufficient—if refutation were needed—to refute any objection based on the want of perfect formal agreement between *Dyaus* and *Yahweh*, *Jahveh*, *Jah*, *Yahu*, *Jo* in *Jochebed*, etc. And as to the final letter of *Dyaus* (which is not an essential part of the name), its disappearance would entirely accord with the process which has resulted in the terminations of *Moses*, *Esaias*, and many other names, though in these cases the process is, of course, reversed. The fact is, that *Dyaus* would tend, in accordance with a well-known law, to become conformed to the usage and analogy of the language into which it had been introduced, and so to assume the garb of an indigenous name. But, it may be asked, is not such a theory out of harmony with the dissimilarity between Semitic Monotheism and Aryan Polytheism? And, besides, in what way can we reasonably suppose that the Aryan name was introduced? What historical indications are there agreeing with the idea of such introduction? These questions will be found, I think, to admit of answers more satisfactory than may, perhaps, at first sight seem probable.

First, as to a supposed fundamental Semitic Monotheism, this alleged distinctive belief of the Semites might have been plausibly maintained, perhaps, in the days antecedent to cuneiform decipherment; but the numerous deities of the Babylonian pantheon whose names are recorded on tablets referring back to a high antiquity, have now given the matter quite a different complexion. Nor do the monuments, so far as I know, discover any very marked and distinctive tendency to Monotheism. If such a tendency is inferred from the designation of any particular deity as highest or supreme, we may with equal reason speak of an Aryan tendency to Monotheism as manifested by the supremacy ascribed to Zeus in the Homeric poems. Moreover—and the fact is an important one—the many gods of the Babylonian records agree perfectly with the statement of Jos. xxiv. 2, “On the other side of the river dwelt your fathers of old, Terah, the father of Abraham, and the father of Nachor; and they served other gods.”

Then, with regard to the means or channel by which the name *Dyaus* was introduced, if there is really any difficulty, it is far, indeed, from insuperable. The original abode of the Hebrews is spoken of in the passage from Joshua just quoted, as “on the

other side of the river," meaning, of course, the Euphrates. In Genesis the locality is more precisely described as "Ur of the Chaldees," a place which, whether it be identified, in accordance with the opinion of Sir Henry Rawlinson, with Mugheir, or with Warka, was not very far from the Persian Gulf; and three or four thousand years ago the distance was probably much less than at present. To the Indus and the country of the Rig Veda, the Punjab, access might be had either by land or sea; and the distance cannot be regarded as forming any insurmountable obstacle. Moreover, Taylor, in his explorations at Mugheir, found what appeared to be Indian teak.* And Mr. Rassam recently informed me that he also had found Indian wood at or near Babylon. He mentioned also the shortness of the journey from Kurrachee, and the fact of the Indian elephant being represented on the black obelisk of Shalmaneser. M. Lenormant, in his recent work, *Les Origines de l'Histoire d'après la Bible*, etc., ascribes to relations which had been established for purposes of commercial intercourse, the resemblance of the Indian form of the deluge tradition to that which existed in Chaldea (Part I., p. 429).†

That the Jehovah-cultus in the family of Abraham was something new and strange is entirely in accordance with the passage from Joshua, and still more clearly with the tradition as given in Judith v. 6-9: "This people is of the offspring of the Chaldeans; . . . wherefore, forsaking the ceremonies of their fathers, which consisted in the worship of many gods, they worshipped one God of heaven, who also commanded them to depart from thence and to dwell in Charan."‡ And, according to the Jewish tradition, religious persecution preceded the departure of the Abrahamides

* "Just below the cylinder were two rough logs of wood, apparently teak, which ran across the whole breadth of the shaft."—*Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. XV., p. 264.

There are interesting collateral questions as to the alleged intercourse in ancient times between Egypt and India, or Ceylon, and also as to the destination of Solomon's Tarshish-ships in their triennial voyages (1 Kings x. 22).

† It is not unlikely that a communication by sea with foreign countries is implied in the myth recorded by Berosus of an amphibious animal, Oannes, who came up daily from the sea to teach the inhabitants of Chaldea letters, science, and the arts of civilisation.

‡ Following the Latin version. The Latin and Greek texts, as is frequently the case in Judith, differ considerably; but the Greek text adds that the Chaldeans "cast them out from the face of their gods."

from Chaldea—a result not unlikely to ensue from the worship of a new and foreign Deity. And that Jehovah and his worship were thus new and foreign is not disproved by the occurrence of a few proper names compounded with “Jehovah” among peoples contiguous to the Hebrews in Palestine, as at Hamath, where we find, according to the Assyrian monuments, a king *Yahu-bidi*, or *Jahu-bidi*. Similarly we read in 2 Sam. viii. 10 of *Joram*, son of the Hamathite king, *Toi*. But such cases as these have been well explained in accordance with the supposition that the name and worship of Jehovah were, in course of time, introduced from the Hebrews—an explanation which does not at all necessarily imply the abandonment of deities previously worshipped at Hamath or elsewhere.

It is, at least, a curious fact that the first occurrence of the name Jehovah (Gen. ii. 4) is in close proximity to the mention of the land of Havilah, producing gold, *bedolach*, and the *shoham* stone, and encompassed by the Pishon. The Pishon was regarded by Josephus as denoting the Ganges. More recently, and with greater probability, it has been identified with the Indus—a view which suits very well the theory I have been maintaining, though exact geographical knowledge is not, of course, to be required of the writer in Genesis. It is certainly difficult to recognise either of the products mentioned as exclusively Indian, but the quadri-literal word *bedolach* has been, with probability, referred to an Indian origin.

If Jehovah is connected with *Dyaus*, the god of heaven, of the bright sky, then the perplexing expression, *Jehovah Tsebaoth*, “the Lord of hosts,” will lose, perhaps, somewhat of its difficulty. Looking at the “hosts” as the stars, and other heavenly bodies, there will be a fitness in the combination, which is wanting if *Jehovah*, according to the common view, has the fundamental signification of Being, or Self-existence. Whether the *Dyaus* of the Rig-Veda could be similarly connected with the starry hosts, it is not, perhaps, necessary to inquire. But that Jehovah was actually conceived of as dwelling above the firmament seems clear (comp. Gen. xix. 24, *al*). And thus his supremacy over the starry hosts would seem naturally to follow (comp. Isa. xl. 22, 26).

At first sight the derivation from *Dyaus* may possibly appear scarcely congruous with those feelings of reverence with which the name “Jehovah” is usually regarded. But this seeming incongruity may be diminished, or may possibly disappear, if

Dyaus is regarded as the name by which the early Aryans recognised a Great Father of mankind, dwelling in the shining heavens. Besides, it should be recollected that in St. Paul's address at Athens, as given in Acts xvii., God is identified with *Zeus* in a quotation from the Greek poets (ver. 28). And the ordinary New Testament word for God, *θεός*, is derived, if not from *Dyaus*, in all probability from *deva*, a word of kindred signification.*

The solution thus presented of one of the most difficult problems within the range of Biblical science may be regarded as a probable hypothesis which, if not as yet absolutely and finally proved, may at least serve to show that the problem need not be abandoned as one altogether desperate and hopeless.

On the supposition that "Jehovah" is of extraneous origin, the name must, it seems to me, have had two or more significations assigned to it as a Hebrew word, and with results of high importance to the History of Religion; but into this department of the subject I cannot now enter.†

THOMAS TYLER.

* This derivation of *θεός* (which also connects it with *deus*) seems in every way probable, notwithstanding the objections of some philologists.

† As to the probability of *Jehovah* having thus two or more significations, compare, for example, the interesting passage, Gen. xxx. 23, 24, where there are probably implied two distinct etymologies of the name *Joseph*.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

M. RENAN ON ECCLESIASTES.*

IN a postscript to the article on Ecclesiastes, in the last number of this Review, we were enabled to append, from the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, the conclusions of M. Renan, with regard to the three fundamental questions concerning this very interesting portion of the Old Testament. Having discussed these questions with some fulness, we do not think it necessary to revert to them in connection with M. Renan's work on Ecclesiastes, which has since appeared. The work consists of a translation of the Book, accompanied here and there by scanty notes, and preceded by an Introduction, which is identical substantially with the article in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* already alluded to. That this Introduction is a most brilliant piece of French writing need scarcely be said. It is from the pen of M. Renan. But beyond this we are afraid that the work has very scanty claim to the regard of either scholars or the public.

In M. Renan's opinion Ecclesiastes is, as to its general drift, not at all difficult to understand. It is a work of elegant scepticism, apparently with a rather strong Gallic flavour. In its relation to the general contents of the Bible, Ecclesiastes resembles a little *brochure* of Voltaire, which has lost its way among the folios of a theological library. And as to the passage on old age, towards the end of the book—a description, M. Renan says, full of enigmas and allusions, resembling the dazzling passes of a professor of legerdemain juggling with sculls—one might think it to be the workmanship of Banville or Théophile Gautier. But, while Ecclesiastes is thus so remarkably French, it is also, strange to say, fundamentally and profoundly Jewish. Its author very much resembles the modern Israelite, the Israelite of that class which the great commercial cities of Europe have come to know so well during the last fifty years. The Proteus-like Koheleth does, indeed, here assume a new form, or rather, we suppose, appears at last in his true colours. His philosophical pride and contempt of worldly pursuits were but a sham.

* *L'Ecclésiaste, traduit de l'Hébreu, avec une Étude sur l'Age et le Caractère du Livre.* PAR ERNEST RENAN, Membre de l'Institut, etc. Paris: Calmann Lévy. 1882.

Trafficking in *Rentes* would have been his delight; he would have found a true home in Capel Court. The modern Israelite, M. Renan himself tells us, *ne croit plus qu'à la richesse*.

Ecclesiastes being a profoundly Jewish work, it was reserved, according to our author, for Jewish critics to discern its character and meaning. Mendelssohn and Luzzatto understood it a great deal better than the Protestant theologians. But it was for Graetz to make the most considerable advance in the exegesis of the book. M. Renan does not, however, accept Graetz's Herodian theory, nor his explanation of the two last chapters. If this explanation were true, *Ecclesiastes* would become a book of immoral tendency, not merely one of elegant, or even free and bold, scepticism. Of English interpreters of *Ecclesiastes* M. Renan makes no mention; but we doubt whether this proceeds from his being altogether ignorant of what has been done in this country for the elucidation of the book. In more than one place we discerned coincidences with Dean Plumptre's recent work, which seem somewhat remarkable, if they are accidental.

Of the performances of previous translators M. Renan seems not to have a very high opinion. To render literally a book like *Ecclesiastes* may be, he thinks, the worst of treasons. A pedantic translation in heavy theological prose is as bad as turning Béranger into homilies, or the Sermons of Bossuet into madrigals. M. Renan has certainly not erred by translating too closely and literally, nor has he adhered too tenaciously to the ordinary text, which, in his judgment, swarms with errors of copyists. To the presentation of the book, partly as prose and partly as poetry—as M. Renan presents it—there can scarcely be any valid objection, except that which arises from the difficulty of determining the form which should be sometimes adopted. M. Renan, however, goes very far beyond all reasonable limits when he renders xii. 11, after the following fashion:—

Les direx des sages
Sont des aiguillons,
Des clous qui soulagent
Les efforts volages
De l'attention.

Le concile antique
Nous les a transmis
Comme œuvre authentique,
Vraiment canonique,
D'un unique esprit.

This is, indeed, like turning the Discourses of Bossuet into madrigals; but to call it translation would be absurd. The Authorised Version renders the passage thus:—"The words of the wise [are] as goads, and as nails fastened [by] the masters of assemblies, [which] are given from one shepherd." This is not very poetical; but it may be doubted whether the Hebrew, in this verse, ought to be regarded as poetical in

form, though there is true poetry in the rural imagery of the "goads," the "nails," and the "one Shepherd." The "one Shepherd," the great ἀρχιποιῆς, has become, in M. Renan's version, *un unique esprit!* The reading of the present Hebrew text, we are told, *n'est pas satisfaisant*; but we doubt whether M. Renan's arbitrary alteration will satisfy a single competent scholar. There is at the end of the volume an appendix giving some forty or more critical alterations, to be referred to by the reader, with regard to places where M. Renan's version differs from the received text. But the reader is likely to consult it not unfrequently in vain. Take, as an example, the last part of ii. 8: *Je me procurai des troupes de chanteurs et de chanteuses, et toutes les délices des fils d'Adam de quelque genre que ce fût.* The student may wonder how *shiddah veshiddoth* can possibly mean *de quelque genre que ce fût*; but he will refer to the appendix in vain for information. In other places readings pregnant with significance are suppressed or changed into trivialities. The verses iv. 15, 16 of the present text may be thus translated: "I saw all the living that walk under the sun, with the second child who is to stand in their stead. There is no end to all the people; as to all that was before them, even those who come next rejoice not therein; so that this also is vanity, and a pursuit of the wind." The general subject of the fourth chapter may be said to be, that men are left to themselves in the world; that there is no evidence of a Divine Agent, caring for men and providing for their wants. The down-trodden and oppressed have no comforter. Success and prosperity excite the unsocial passion of envy. When united, men are strong; but the solitary individual falls alone, with none to help him up. The old and foolish king who shuts himself off from the lessons of experience is not restrained from inflicting mischief on his subjects. There is no all-pervading harmony, no equable adjustment in the world; it is a world of disorder and disorganised isolation. We are now in a position to understand the verses quoted above. On a survey of three generations ("all the living . . . with the second child") Koheleth observes that the number of the people is not designed and definite, but seemingly unlimited: "There is no end to all the people." The successive generations are not moulded into one whole; but each with its separate interests is isolated from the rest: "As to all that was before them, even those who come next rejoice not therein." Now, let us turn to M. Renan:—*J'ai vu tout le monde s'empresse à la suite du jeune héritier qui doit succéder au vieux roi. Infinis ont été les maux qu'on a soufferts dans le passé; mais, dans l'avenir, on n'aura pas plus à se réjouir de celui-ci. . . . Toujours vanité et pâture du vent.* M. Renan is certainly not alone in supposing the passage to speak of an obsequious attendance on the heir or successor to the throne. But if this view were in other respects unobjectionable, one would be tempted to ask, Why should the heir be spoken of as "the second child"? M. Renan, however, gets over this difficulty by suppressing the word "second" and giving us *du jeune*

héritier.* Instead of "There is no end to all the people," and its reasonable accord with the context, we have *Infinis ont été les maux qu'on a soufferts dans le passé*; to gain which sense, or something approaching it, the text has to be violently altered. We were intending to discuss another of M. Renan's conjectural emendations, at viii. 10, *on entend faire l'éloge de ces misérables dans la ville, etc.*, instead of (in accordance with the present text), "They were forgotten in the city," etc., the word "forgotten" having probably a special emphasis. But we forbear. M. Renan's performance does not suggest the conclusion that he has given to Ecclesiastes that special and long-continued study which its difficulty and profundity of thought demand. Other onerous undertakings may have prevented his so doing. But, however this may be, we fear that his work, whatever its charms of style and diction, can scarcely be regarded as other than a failure.

THOMAS TYLER.

LENORMANT ON THE ORIGINS OF HISTORY.†

THE first instalment of M. Lenormant's second volume on the ancient sources of the myths in the early part of the Book of Genesis contains only four chapters; but they are rich in learning and suggestiveness. Each constitutes, in fact, a dissertation by itself. The first comprises a discussion of Ararat and Eden, and the investigation of the original locality of Eden and its mysterious rivers. In the second a series of comparisons brings before us the various fathers of humanity from India to Greece who may be placed by the side of Noah; while a striking, if adventurous, set of combinations carries back the forms of his three sons into the recesses of the earliest mythology of Babylonia. The third chapter, which is very short, lays down the general principles on which the Table of Nations in Genesis x. must be interpreted. The fourth and last is devoted to three of the sons of Japhet, Gomer, Magog, and Madai. Here are, as before, the same affluence of illustration, the same command of the literature of the vast ranges of mythologic lore, the same brilliance and dash in the solution of difficulties, the same prodigious industry of accumulation, the same ardent zeal for the advance of truth. The rapidity of M. Lenormant's productiveness and his fertility of suggestion naturally lead him occasionally into conjectures which riper thought sets aside. Thus, for instance, he withdraws (p. 72)

* Dr. Ginsburg, who, of course, would not treat the text as M. Renan has done, gives the extraordinary rendering "the sociable youth." Dean Plumptre feels the difficulty, and remarks, "The clause may point either to the wise young ruler of the previous verse, as succeeding (*i.e.*, coming second) to the old and foolish king, or possibly to his successor"—a rather awkward alternative. A more reasonable conclusion would have been, that this view of the passage is altogether erroneous.

† *Les Origines de l'Histoire d'après la Bible, et les Traditions des Peuples Orientaux*. PAR FRANCOIS LENORMANT. Tome 2me, 1ère partie.

the assimilation which he supported ten years ago of Moriah with the great mountain of Indian mythology, Meru. But in these retractions, or, rather, in the tentatives which give occasion to them, there is nothing to regret. It is by such bold proposals that thought is stimulated, and from the conflict of ideas a more stable view emerges.

The result of M. Lenormant's investigations into the story of the Garden of Eden is, perhaps, somewhat different from what might have been anticipated. He allows, indeed, that it is immediately derived from Babylonian sources, though he rejects the tempting identification of Gan-Eden with Gan-Dunyas (p. 106). But he does not regard the myth as native to Mesopotamia. He lays great stress on the difficulty of finding any satisfactory equivalents for the Pishon and the Gihon in the neighbourhood of the Tigris and the Euphrates, though he thinks it probable that the missing names will yet be discovered in the cuneiform inscriptions (p. 115). This theme is enforced in an interesting appendix dealing with the treatise of Dr. Friedrich Delitzsch on the site of Paradise, and it is rather surprising that, under these circumstances, M. Lenormant should be in such haste himself to supply a possible Assyrian representative for Havilah by the audacious conversion of it, through Havlah and Harlah, into the Assyrian Aralu, near the mountain of the north (p. 137). Its wealth of gold certainly corresponds to one necessary element in the description; but, to say nothing of the orthographic assumptions by which the change is effected, the fact that Arali is the land of the dead seems to mark it off from proximity to any of the Eden rivers. M. Lenormant's general conclusion is that the existing representation contains two historical strata superposed one over the other; the older marked by the names Pishon and Gihon, and the later by the Hiddekel and Prath. The story was transported to Babylonia, and there localised much in the same way that the Musulmans placed one of their four earthly paradises between Lebanon and Antilebanon. In this he does but follow the views slowly elaborated by a long series of his predecessors, among whom he finds himself most in accord with M. Renan, regarding the Pishon as the Indus, and the Gihon as the Oxus. M. Lenormant cannot, however, handle even this well-worn topic without adding fresh suggestions of his own. Accordingly, after comparing the Indian and Iranian stories of the sacred mountain, and the mysterious rivers issuing from it, which formed the cradle of humanity, he points out that though the narrator in Genesis is silent on the subject, yet Ezekiel (xxviii. 13 sqq.) identifies Eden with "God's holy mountain" sparkling with precious stones. From this, by a series of dexterous transitions, we are led to the deluge mountain, on which the ark rests. Here M. Lenormant notes that whereas the Chaldean account places it in Mount Nizir, east of the Tigris valley,* the Elohist

* So, thinks M. Lenormant, did the Yahvist also. But this is an inference of his own from the translation of *miqqedhem*, "from the east" (Gen. xi. 2). It seems probable that this should rather be "eastward," as in Gen. xiii. 11, which would make against M. Lenormant's view.

narrator fixes it at Ararat. Resisting the temptation to derive this name (with Renan and others) from Iranian sources, inasmuch as it appears on cuneiform inscriptions of the ninth century anterior to the establishment of any Aryan population in Armenia (p. 87), he still regards it as an adaptation by the Elohist of the Iranian Airyaratha, or Aryāratha, and offers a striking example of the introduction of Iranian names into Babylonia in the seventh century B.C., by referring to a cuneiform inscription where the gloss *Mitra* accompanies the name of the sun-god. The result is that Eden and Ararat must be sought in the same places as the Meru of the Brahmanic Indians and the Airyana Vaedja of the Mazdean books; and the group of ideas common to the inhabitants of Mesopotamia and the dwellers north and south of the Hindu Kush, points to their origin on the great highland plateau not far from the steppes of Pamir. M. Lenormant frankly places the Elohist in the period of the Captivity; but he claims for the Yahvist story of the Garden of Eden an antiquity anterior to the migrations of the Terahites to Syria (p. 68). His vague allusions to the familiarity of the prophets with its details do not, however, lend any support to this early appearance of the story in Palestine. The only references are in Ezekiel, in the second Isaiah, and in Joel, all three comparatively late in date, and exposed to powerful foreign influences; and though M. Lenormant endeavours to maintain the Isaianic authorship of Isaiah xiv., with its striking allusions to the "mountain of assembly" in the far north (p. 121), not many, probably, will find this an adequate guarantee of the possession of the Eden story by the remote ancestors of the Hebrew people.

The discussion on the significance of Noah and his three sons is conducted with the same wide outlook. In this M. Lenormant's method differs from that of other writers on Hebrew mythology such as Dr. Goldziher. He does not rely nearly so much on purely etymological considerations; he compares groups of traditions, instead of analysing single names. Sometimes, indeed, he seems to throw out hints which can hardly be taken for serious views. Thus he compares Noah with one of the Indian progenitors of humanity, Nahusha; admitting, certainly, that the names are not philologically identical, yet suggesting their ultimate unity in some primitive tradition, from which different peoples had adopted them (cf. the resemblance of Eden and Udyāna, p. 59) in their own way. We cannot think this a sound method, particularly when the end of Nahusha's story—viz., his transformation into a serpent—immediately suggests an assimilation with the Hebrew *nachash*! In establishing a connection between Japheth and Japetos our author stands, doubtless, on firmer ground, though we are not convinced that he is right in deriving the Semitic figure from the Aryan, as neither the Indian nor the Iranian books present any counterpart to the Titan of Hesiod and Homer.

Perhaps the most brilliant portion of the present volume is that in which M. Lenormant endeavours to penetrate to the origins of the story of Noah's three sons amid the dim hints of the Chaldean and Mazdean

mythology. Three half-divine brothers who divided the world between them, loom through the fragments of Berosus, through the stanzas of the Zend Avesta, and the national histories of Armenia. They are pursued by our author through a succession of changing forms, till they are provisionally identified with the three great Chaldean gods of the upper cosmic triad: Anu, Bel, and Hea, presiding over the three divisions of the world—heaven, earth, and the abyss. Their struggles represented various forms of elemental strife, but in the Biblical narrative these mysterious personalities are reduced to human level, and no conflicts mar their good understanding. What historic truth, however, can such stories possess? M. Lenormant does not shrink from a frank declaration of his opinion. His business is that of a critic, employing the best aids of his science; the results are beyond his control. In a striking note (p. 265 sqq.) he pleads earnestly as a Catholic for his right to the independent study of the Scriptures, and affirms his belief that it cannot in any way alter the religious, dogmatic, and moral authority of the Bible. No candid inquirer can any longer maintain that the existence of Babylonian, Phœnician, or Iranian myths corresponding with those of Genesis, is any confirmation of their historical reality. Wherein, then, lies the special character of the Hebrew stories entitling them to be received as inspired? In their monotheistic character, in the profound difference of their animating spirit, in the unconscious selection out of the mass of ancient material of such narratives as possessed deep moral or religious significance, or served as the obvious parables and allegories of higher truths. In this way M. Lenormant slips through the declaration of the Vatican Council, that the Scriptures, “written by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, have God for their author.” At present, Rome is indulgent to her somewhat wayward child. But her forbearance may be too severely strained. The seventh of the erroneous propositions condemned in the Syllabus of Pius IX. asserted that the books of both Testaments contained certain mythical stories. M. Lenormant’s bold analysis of the opening chapters of Genesis leaves no doubt about his belief that one book of the Old Testament unquestionably contains such stories. How far will the Church tolerate such a view? We may at least hope that as M. Lenormant’s first volume has done no worse than excite here and there a little suspicion of his orthodoxy, he may be able to pursue his labours undisturbed.

J. E. C.

SEYDEL ON THE GOSPEL OF JESUS IN ITS RELATIONS TO THE TRADITION
AND TEACHING OF BUDDHA.*

THIS book is an elaborate essay in Comparative Religion, having for its special subject the parallels of Buddhist and Christian legend. The main theme is introduced by two preliminary essays, on the Chris-

* *Das Evangelium von Jesu in seinen Verhältnissen zu Buddha-sage und Buddha-Lehre.* Von RUDOLF SEYDEL. Leipzig, 1882.

tian right to a free comparative history of religion, and on the tendency of every religion (which the author erects into a general law) to carry back its origin to deities worshipped within it, and to attribute to this origin various miraculous events, especially at the birth of those who serve as media of revelation. The writer next passes to a dissertation on the "Gospels of Buddhism," with the view of determining approximately the age of the components of the Buddhist Scriptures. The Southern Buddhist Canon, as it is preserved in Ceylon, is shown to contain the oldest elements, and the date of its final redaction is placed at about 80 B.C.; while place is found for the Northern tradition as an independent stem, at an earlier period, though the actual composition of the *Lalitara Vistara* is assigned to a hundred years later. We may not stay to criticise the details of this scheme. It is sufficient to say that the general priority of the Buddhist legend to the Christian no doubt can be entertained. This preliminary investigation was necessary, however, for our author's purpose. No profitable comparison between the details of two great groups of stories can be instituted in his fashion as long as there is any uncertainty about their chronological relations. Many other questions must also be determined, if any fruitful result is to be reached; but until this has been decided all such labour is vain. The way is clear, therefore, for the main object of the book.

For this end the writer pursues his way through the Gospels, elaborating through upwards of fifty sections what he ventures to call a "Buddhist-Christian Harmony of the Gospels." The incidents of the Birth Stories, as is well known, present numerous resemblances; but many of the other points selected for illustration are either too general, such as must of necessity be common to all religious teachers travelling from place to place, or they have no point of contact whatsoever. For instance, § 19 is headed "the Baptism," with references to Matt.iii.18 sqq. and parallel passages. Beside this is set the story of the Buddha's bathing in the river Nairanjana after he had abandoned his ascetic life. It is plain at once that there is no real correspondence here at all. Such moral significance as the Buddha's act possesses is totally different from that implied in the baptism administered by John, and the attempt to connect them can result in nothing but delusion. In the case of the bread and wine chosen by Jesus as the symbols of his body and blood (§ 46), the author, finding no parallel in Buddhism, is obliged to resort to Parsee elements, boldly makes Antioch a centre of Mazdean influences, and finds his analogue in the rites of the Haoma sacrifice! Learned trifling such as this sends the critic impatiently onward to know what results can be founded upon it. Seydel sums up his resemblances under three heads (p. 296), (1) those explicable without difficulty from sources and motives common to each; (2) those which show such sudden and unexpected harmony that the explanation from the similar working of like causes appears too artificial, so that the dependence of one on the other must be naturally assumed; (3) those in which the origin can only be conceived within one circle of religious ideas, or at

least is more easily explained out of one, so that the relation of dependence is here clearly fixed. Of these it is plain that the third group are the most important; they supply the real test cases. We look with some interest to see what they are. There are five. (1) The presentation in the Temple, for which the author finds in Luke's Gospel no sufficient occasion, while the story in the Lalita Vistara has quite a natural motive.* (2) The forty days' fast of Jesus in the desert, quite contrary to his real attitude towards the abstinence of John the Baptist; while Buddha's asceticism found a natural point of departure within the Indian religion. But with the forty days' sojourn of Moses on Sinai and the forty days' journey of Elijah to Horeb, it is not necessary to go off to the Ganges for an explanation, and Seydel wrongly emphasizes the fast as if that were the essential element in the story of the Temptation, whereas its place is quite subordinate. (3) The pre-existence of Jesus "before Abraham." It is difficult to see why this should be specified, as our author himself admits that its direct filiation is with elements of the Hellenistic philosophy, and that it can be only remotely linked to Oriental influences; while it may be added that even if such influences were in operation, which is highly doubtful, there is no reason for regarding them as exclusively Buddhist. (4) The fig-tree. The legend represents Gotama as assuming Buddhahood, after his final struggles, under a fig-tree. So Jesus at the beginning of his ministry sees Nathaniel under a fig-tree, and this is accepted by Nathaniel as a sign of marvellous knowledge which only Messiah could possess (John i. 46). Why a fig-tree? Why not a palm or a sycamore? It is a trace, replies Seydel, of a foreign origin, of a far-off connection with the Buddhist tree of knowledge! (5) The question, "Has this man sinned?" in the story of the man born blind (John ix). The circle of ideas in the Old and New Testaments yields no explanation of this, while the doctrine of transmigration interprets it at once.

These are the crucial instances of Seydel's scheme. Having thus established, to his own satisfaction, a clear relation of antecedence and sequence, he excites no surprise by throwing the large number of resemblances between Buddhist and Christian legend, which may be read either way, into the scale of Buddhist originality. The story of Gotama had made its way to the countries round the Mediterranean, and exerted a powerful influence on the early traditions about Jesus. These took their shape out of the type thus presented, and in addition to the primitive elements out of which our synoptical Gospels were constructed, our author con-

* This story relates that the elders of the Sakya race ask the king that the child may be solemnly conducted to the temple of the Gods. The king consents, but the child smiles at the proposal, saying, "Is there a God that is higher than I, who am the God of Gods?" The procession is formed, and a hundred thousand Gods draw the infant Buddha's car. When it reaches the temple, an earthquake takes place, heavenly music sounds, showers of flowers fall, and the statues of the Gods, including those of Indra and Brahma, leave their places to come and do homage to the new arrival. And this is the origin of Luke ii. 22—24!

jectures that there was a sort of poetic-apocalyptic work belonging to the earliest age, in which the material supplied by the reminiscences of disciples was cast into the mould of Buddhist legend. In order, however, that this transforming power might be exerted, it is at least necessary to prove that it was actively in the field. This Seydel, in our judgment, wholly fails to do. He advances no new evidence beyond that proffered by Lassen and Weber, and in triumphantly stationing his intelligent followers of Buddha at Antioch, Athens, and Rome between the reigns of Augustus and Claudius he ascribes to the possible presence of one or two Buddhists on small Oriental embassies an energetic influence of which contemporary history exhibits not a single trace. The book must be pronounced, in spite of its author's pains, a piece of wasted labour. He has not studied the gospels with sufficient critical discernment, but alights accidentally on this resemblance or that, without exhaustively seeking out the roots of the incidents which he discusses in the circles of thought and feeling whence the gospels sprang. We say this with regret; for his evident aim, as his thoughtful concluding section shows, is to relieve Christianity of fictitious accretions, and restore it to its simplest form, as it sprang from its founder's mind and was realised in his life and teachings. His comparison of the fundamental motives of Buddhism and Christianity contains many true and searching thoughts. But the weakness of historical criticism cannot be covered by the perception of spiritual differences, however keen and clear, and it must be frankly recognised that the fundamental object of this book is not achieved.

J. E. C.

RECENT ENGLISH BOOKS ON KANT AND HIS PHILOSOPHY.

IN welcoming another volume* of Blackwood's 'Philosophical Classics,' we venture to say that the only fault of Dr. Wallace's admirable treatise is that there is not enough of it. It is to be regretted that Messrs. Blackwood and Sons have somewhat marred the execution of their well-conceived idea by insisting that all the treatises in the series shall be limited to a little over two hundred pages, so that they may be uniform in price. It is self-evident that adequate presentations of the life and teachings of different philosophers cannot all be forced within the same amount of letterpress; and the application of this Procrustean method must often be as vexatious to the writers as it is injurious to the interest of their readers. In this volume, for example, we miss the exposition of Kant's views on religion, as set forth in his noteworthy treatise, *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, and we can only suppose that this important topic was crowded out by reason of the

* *Kant*. By WILLIAM WALLACE, M.A., LL.D. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons. 1882.

too narrow space to which Dr. Wallace was confined. It can hardly be doubted that to many readers an account of this essay would have been very acceptable, both by reason of its intrinsic worth, and also because, as Dr. Wallace mentions in the biographical portion of his book, its rationalism brought down upon Kant the King's rebuke, a rebuke to which Kant humbly submitted, with the solemn declaration, that "*as his Royal Majesty's most faithful subject*, he would henceforth, both in lectures and in writings, completely refrain from all public deliverance on the topic of religion, natural as well as revealed." Kant adds, in a note: "I chose the words in italics purposely, so that I did not resign the freedom of my judgment on this religious question for ever, but only during the life of His Majesty." On this incident Dr. Wallace remarks:—

It is clear, at least, that in Kant's opinion there was in this reservation no quibbling, nothing that was morally unjustifiable. And yet the language leaves behind in the reader a feeling of dissatisfaction and disapproval. There is sophistry in the argument, and unnecessary surrender in the attitude. The old man, so courageous in his books, was a coward before his King. Let age and infirmity plead for him; and let his teaching wipe away the evil of his example.

This undue reverence for kingly authority, which Kant thus displays in his seventy-first year, is the only unattractive feature in Dr. Wallace's graphic sketch of the orderly, industrious, conscientious, and kindly life of the sage of Königsberg. It is pleasant to read of Kant's insatiable love of all kinds of knowledge, of his mastery of the natural sciences, of his interest in current events, of his habit of having a few guests daily at his dinner-table, with whom he spent three or four hours in conversations "in which politics was a frequent subject; but anything of the nature of metaphysics was rigorously excluded." His servant—Martin Lampe, an old soldier, who waited on him for forty years—forms a picturesque figure in the story of the philosopher's life.

Kant, we are told, grew deeply attached to this old servant. When some of his friends said, jestingly, one day, that they feared Kant would leave them in the next world, and seek more congenial society among the departed philosophers, he replied, "None of your philosophers; I shall be quite happy if I have the society of Lampe."

Heinrich Heine, in his brilliant essay, *Religion and Philosophy in Germany*, with sarcastic humour, suggests that it was mainly for the sake of poor old Lampe, who couldn't be happy without a belief in God and Heaven, that Kant considerably resuscitated through the "practical" reason the theistic notions which the "pure" reason had so pitilessly slaughtered. Dr. Wallace shows, however, that Kant's religious views were an integral part of his philosophical system, and that the *Criticism of Pure Reason* does not disprove theological beliefs, but simply maintains that the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are questions that lie outside the scope of scientific evidence. "Around the ideas of religion his metaphysics throws the bulwark of invisibility; and the sword of the sceptic, and the battering-ram of the materialist, fall harmless on vacuity."

Kant's own religious belief rested upon his moral consciousness, and his theological position was evidently not far removed from that of many Unitarians, though his faith, from its too exclusively ethical character, appears to have missed in some measure that spiritual element of personal communion with the in-dwelling Father, which enriches the religious utterances of Channing and Martineau. That he took no part in public worship is no doubt to be explained from the circumstance that he could find in Königsberg no congregation with whose forms and ideas he was in sympathy.

"Of the Church," writes Dr. Wallace, "he had a noble idea; but he did not find it realised in the Churches of his day. Sacerdotalism, even in its mildest forms, was as abhorrent to him, on the one hand, as a superstitious and sensuous supernaturalism was on the other. . . . To the free soul of Kant the sectarianism which had an eye for nothing higher than professional interests in its performance of the sacred duties of keeping body and spirit sound, could only be abhorrent in the extreme."

Dr. Wallace's exposition of Kant's philosophy is as clear and complete as the too limited space allows. 'Kant's Speculative Physics and Biology,' is the subject of a very interesting chapter, and the relation of his views to recent doctrines concerning Force and Evolution is very ably presented. The philosophical environment of Kant is also well described, and the chapter in which Kant's great Kritik is expounded is quite a model of perspicuous exposition. We were struck particularly with the account of the Schematism of the Categories, for this difficult portion of the Kritik becomes, we think, decidedly more intelligible in Dr. Wallace's presentation of it than it is in the original.

We could have wished for a more complete sketch of the contents of the *Criticism of the Practical Reason*, and Kant's doctrine on the Freedom of the Will certainly calls for fuller treatment than the passing notice which Dr. Wallace accords to it; but, taken all in all, this little book seems to us to be by far the simplest and clearest English introduction to the Kantian philosophy, and the reading of it will probably awaken a desire to pursue the subject further in the more detailed expositions of Adamson, Stirling, and Edward Caird.

Mr. Andrew Seth's *Essay** on 'The Development from Kant to Hegel' is the work of a scholar who is not only well read in recent German philosophy, but is also gifted with no small amount of talent for metaphysical investigation. This essay and the companion essay by Dr. Schurman, which we shall presently notice, were written while their authors were Hibbert Travelling Scholars, and each treatise seems to us to be a really valuable contribution to philosophical and theological literature. The present influence of Hegel's writings on

* *The Development from Kant to Hegel, with Chapters on the Philosophy of Religion.* By ANDREW SETH, M.A., Assistant to the Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, and late Hibbert Travelling Scholar. Published by the Hibbert Trustees. Williams and Norgate. 1882.

British and American thinking is not, perhaps, over-estimated by Professor William James, when he says, in the April number of *Mind*:— www.libtool.com.cn

Hegelianism, so entirely defunct on its native soil that I believe but a single young disciple of the school is to be counted among the privat-docents and younger professors of Germany, and whose older champions are all passing off the stage, has found among us so zealous and able a set of propagandists that to-day it may really be reckoned one of the most potent influences of the time in the higher walks of thought. Not only in heavier books by professors, but in magazine literature, anonymous book-reviews, and the like, we cross the trail of its path.

It may be added that most recent expositions and critical treatises on Kant's philosophy which have appeared in this country have been written by Hegelians, and the late Professor Green's profound Introduction to David Hume's philosophical writings can hardly be understood without some acquaintance with Hegelian ideas. There is needed, then, for English readers, a clear and reliable sketch of the development of philosophical thought from Kant to Hegel, and this desideratum Mr. Seth's treatise opportunely supplies. He appears to be himself a pronounced disciple of Hegel; but he does full justice to the views of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, and his account of the organic connection between these four philosophies displays much philosophical insight, and seems to be in the main correct.

The second half of this essay, in which the Philosophy of Religion is discussed, is also a very serviceable piece of work, which will help to supply the chief omission in Dr. Wallace's book. Mr. Seth first treats of the ethical foundation of Kant's religious philosophy, and then gives a very good analysis of Kant's above-mentioned treatise. Passing over the special views of Fichte and Schelling as being of secondary importance, he proceeds to expound the main features of Hegel's religious philosophy, and to indicate its characteristic differences from the Kantian view.

The relation, he says, of Hegel to Kant in his theory of religion is, indeed, an exact parallel to the relation between them, in respect of the doctrine of knowledge. In both cases the sameness is more striking than the difference. Kantianism seems everywhere on the point of casting off the presuppositions which bind it to the old metaphysic. In evidence of this it is only necessary to specify in the present case, Kant's whole attitude to positive religion, his treatment of the Fall, and even, to some extent, of the idea of Reconciliation. But the new metaphysic, developed by Hegel out of Kantianism, does away with the abstract distinction between God and man, which still remains at the Kantian standpoint. God is recognised, Hegel says, "not as a Spirit beyond the stars, but as Spirit in all spirits;" and so the course of human history is frankly identified with the course of divine self-revelation. The culmination of this religious development is reached in Christianity; and Christianity reveals nothing more than that God is essentially this revelation of Himself. In this connection it is that a new significance is given to the doctrine of the Trinity, which thereby becomes fundamental for the Hegelian Philosophy of Religion. This attitude towards the course of history, and towards Christianity in particular, is the only one which is permissible to an Absolute philosophy. However fenced about with explanations, the thesis of such a philosophy must always be—"The actual is the rational."

In estimating Kant's doctrine of Moral Freedom Mr. Seth follows the Hegelians. Admitting that Kant's attempt to reconcile Liberty and Necessity is a failure, and that it must be conceded that man is either phenomenally free or not free at all, he accepts the latter term of the alternative, and holds that though man is self-determined, there is only one line of self-determination possible, and consequently man could not have acted otherwise than he has done. Yet Mr. Seth seems to feel that this view is not altogether satisfactory; for he allows that it appears "to leave no room for that possible alienation from God which is the subjective root of religion," and he adds that "where there is no estrangement, reconciliation, in the ordinary sense of the term, can have no function."

The chief strength of Dr. Schurman's able treatise * lies, we think, in the direction in which we find the main weakness of Mr. Seth's criticism. Dr. Schurman gives an excellent exposition and criticism of Kant's ethical theory, particularly in reference to the doctrine of Moral Freedom. He shows that the Kantian doctrine that man is phenomenally determined, but metaphysically free, is inconsistent and untenable, and that it was bound to lead to that doctrine of thorough-going Determinism which appears in the later German philosophies. The Kantian view can only be made consistent with itself by accepting the hypothesis put forth by Schelling that the moral choice which determines the character of a man's life does not fall in time, but in eternity. What man now is in time he is in virtue of his own act out of time. In the original creation (teaches Schelling), when the eternal yearning gave birth at once to God and nature, man, who now appears determined, was an undetermined being, and by an act of his own he took to himself the definite character with which we now find him here. What he was to be he alone could, and did, decide, and though all memory of this act be vanished, a consciousness of it yet remains in man's self-accusation and remorse. Dr. Schurman remarks that on this theory "freedom must be held as a mere idea of the reason which, however valuable for the speculative thinker, has no worth or validity for the moral agent, and can have no bearing on our life and conduct, which follow necessarily the laws of the natural world!"

As this view, which thus banishes freedom to a timeless creation, and delivers this life wholly over to necessity, affords no satisfaction to the moral consciousness, and yet is the only view that a Kantian can consistently hold, Dr. Schurman rejects the doctrine of Kant on this subject, and, accepting the opposite alternative to that taken by Mr. Seth, maintains that man's personality is really free, that is, exercises original causation in its acts of moral choice. His reply to Kant is quite in the

* *Kantian Ethics and the Ethics of Evolution*. A critical study by J. GOULD SCHURMAN, M.A.Lond., D.Sc.Edinb., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Acadia College, Nova Scotia, and late Hibbert Travelling Scholar. Published by the Hibbert Trustees. Williams and Norgate. 1881.

spirit of Kant's own teaching; for whereas Kant declares that the mind imposes the category of necessary causation or phenomena, Dr. Schurman very pertinently asks on what rational ground Kant can apply to the acts of the mind that category of necessity which owes its very existence to the mind's own act.

This criticism of the Kantian Ethics is followed by a constructive section in which Dr. Schurman sets forth his own ethical doctrine.

While he agrees with Kant that "the perfecting of the will through the reason is the final cause of our existence," he regards Kant's Categorical Imperative as merely formal, empty, and subjective. "According to Kant (he says) the individual is supposed to be the source and standard of all moral good, and no account is taken of morality already existent in the world. But this wholly ignores the development of the individual consciousness, which is made up for the most part of the moral and intellectual substance it has assimilated from its environment. *Unus homo, nullus homo.*" So far as we can understand Dr. Schurman's theory (which he regards as in the main at one with the ethical teaching of Aristotle) he appears to hold that the inner activity of reason in the soul responding to the objective conscience already embodied in social institutions, fashions in the mind an ideal of the true end of humanity, and to this advancing moral standard man feels that he ought to conform his life.

Believing that every true system of Ethics is driven to a teleological conception of the universe, Dr. Schurman proceeds, in the concluding section of the Essay, to criticise, under the title 'Evolutionistic Hedonism,' Mr. Herbert Spencer's 'Data of Ethics,' which rests on the mechanical conception of the universe. At the outset he protests against "the illogical method of importing into the sphere of morality an hypothesis of causation taken from physical phenomena." He then attacks in succession all the main positions laid down in the 'Data of Ethics,' and we are acquainted with no criticism of that work in which the attack is conducted with greater fairness or with greater success. As one of the most forcible of his strictures on Mr. Spencer's ethical doctrine we may mention his examination of Mr. Spencer's attempt to find a passage in his theory from *prudential* self-restraint to *moral* self-restraint, where Dr. Schurman shows quite conclusively, we think, that no such transition is possible from the restraint of the savage to the restraint of the evolutionist except on assumptions quite foreign to Mr. Spencer's theory.

We cannot in this short notice do justice to this thoughtful essay; but we would recommend it to the earnest attention of those who fancy that old-fashioned ethical ideas have been entirely overthrown by recent science.

C. B. U.

HEINE'S 'RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY.'

THE substance of the work under notice * was originally contributed in a series of articles to the *Revue des deux Mondes* in 1834. These articles were afterwards republished in a German dress by Hoffmann and Campe, of Hamburg, in 1835, but in so mutilated a form, owing to the action of the Censor of the Press, that a second German edition was necessitated. This second German edition was, however, never revised by the author; while the French work was probably, judging from the practice of Heine in other cases, not the sole and unassisted work of Heine himself. The problem, therefore, presented itself to the translator, which edition should form the basis of the English version. He has practically solved the problem as follows. He has used the French version, finally revised by the author, as decisive in cases of discrepancy in regard to the question, what was the definitive form in which he desired the work to appear, but the actual translation in all other cases has been made rather from the German than from the French. Whatever opinion may be held as to the justice and wisdom of this course, the result is one of the raciest and most amusing volumes that have for a long time appeared on the most serious of all questions that could engage the human mind.

Another circumstance lends interest to the book. Between 1835 and 1852 Heine had recanted his atheism (if that be the term which properly describes his negative attitude towards the popular Deism of his day), and announces himself a Deist. But all the same δ γέγραφα γέγραφα is still his motto, and beyond a warning word in the preface, nothing in the second German edition of his work appears to intimate his recantation. Perhaps he was dimly conscious that his strength lay after all rather in his criticisms than in his affirmations; that Heinrich Heine was Heinrich Heine, and that his personality was of far more value than his particular opinions. And this is probably the truth. Heine's judgment may be often at fault; his wit is never so. The good things which cram this volume would admit of being diluted to the advantage of many hundred ordinary books. Let the following extracts suffice as examples:—

By France I mean Paris, and not the provinces; for what the provinces think is of as little consequence as what one's legs think. It is the head that is the seat of our thoughts. I have been told that the French of the provinces are good Catholics. I can neither affirm nor deny it. The men of the provinces with whom I have conversed have impressed me like milestones bearing inscribed on their foreheads the distance, more or less great, from the capital. . . . In Paris itself Catholicism ceased, in fact, to exist at the Revolution, and long previous to that event it had lost all real importance. It still lay in wait in the recesses of the Churches, crouching like a spider in its web, ready to spring precipitately from its retreat, whenever it had a chance of seizing a child in its cradle or an old man in his

* *Religion and Philosophy in Germany: A Fragment.* By HEINRICH HEINE. Translated by John Snodgrass. Trübner and Co. 1882.

coffin. It was only at these two periods of life, on arriving in the world and on quitting it, that a Frenchman fell into the hands of the Christian priest. During all the intermediate period of his existence he was the servant of reason, and laughed at holy-water and consecrated oil.

This is in the preface to the first French edition. At its close Madame de Staël is dismissed as the "grandmother of doctrinaires." Some people hold that the true wit never makes a pun, but surely when Heine wrote in German "Feige Feigenblätter," which we presume to be the original of Mr. Snodgrass' "cowardly figleaves," on p. 11, he meant a pun, and not a bad one either, as such things go. The language in which he describes his conversion to Deism is so redolent of his own inimitable humour, for Heine was humorous as well as witty, that we cannot forbear quoting it at some length:—

This fine-spun Berlin dialectic (he means the Kantian philosophy) is incapable of enticing a dog from the fireside. It has not power to kill a cat, how much less a God. I have in my own body experienced how slight is the danger of its killing. It is continually at its work of killing, and yet folk remain alive.

The doorkeeper of the Hegelian school—the grim Ruge—once obstinately claimed that he had slain me with his porter's staff in the *Halls Chronicle*, though at that very time I was strolling along the Boulevards of Paris healthy and gay, and more unlike dying than ever. Poor worthy Ruge! He himself, at a later period, could not restrain the most honest outburst of laughter when I made him the confession here in Paris that I had never so much as seen that terribly homicidal journal, the *Halls Chronicle*; and my full, ruddy cheeks, as well as the hearty appetite with which I swallowed oysters, convinced him how little like a corpse I looked. In fact, in those days I was still healthy and sleek. I stood in the zenith of my fat, and was as arrogant as Nebuchadnezzar before his fall. Alas! a few years later a physical and mental change began to take place. How often since those days have I thought of the history of the Babylonian king, who esteemed himself no less than God, but who, having miserably fallen from the summit of his infatuation, crawled like an animal on the ground, eating grass, which would, no doubt, be salad! This story is to be found in the grandiose and splendid book of Daniel—a story which I recommend to the edifying contemplation not only of the worthy Ruge, but to that of my far more unregenerate friends, those godless self-gods, Feuerbach, Daumer, Bruno Bauer, Hengstenberg, and whatever else be their names.

Scarcely less charming than the above extraordinary collocation of men like Feuerbach and Hengstenberg, in which there is as much truth as satire, is the following:—

Besides this one there are, indeed, many other beautiful and noteworthy narratives in the Bible, as, for example, just at the beginning there is the story of the forbidden tree in Paradise and of the serpent, that little private tutoress [we suppose *Privat-docent* is the word] who lectured on Hegelian philosophy six thousand years before Hegel's birth. This blue stocking without feet demonstrated very ingeniously how the absolute consists in the identity of being and knowing; how man becomes God through cognition, or, what is the same thing, how the God in man thereby attains self-consciousness. This formula is not so clear as the original words: When ye eat of the tree of knowledge ye shall be as God. Mother Eve understood only one thing in the whole demonstration—that the fruit was forbidden, and because it was forbidden the good woman ate of it. . . . O Paradise! Strange that as soon as woman attains reasoning self-consciousness her first

thought is of a new dress! . . . Pious souls thirsting after a miracle have desired to know whether, like Saul on the way to Damascus, I had seen a light from heaven, or whether, like Balaam, the son of Beor, I was riding on a restive ass, that suddenly opened its mouth and began to speak as a man. No, ye credulous believers; I never journeyed to Damascus, nor do I know anything about it, save that lately the Jews there were accused of devouring aged Franciscans; and I might never have known even the name of the city had I not read the Song of Solomon, wherein the wise king compares the nose of his beloved to a tower that looketh towards Damascus. Nor have I ever seen an ass—at least, any four-footed one—that spake as a man, though I have often met men who, whenever they opened their mouths, spake as asses. . . . I owe my conversion simply to the reading of a book.

This book, it is needless to say, was the Bible, and we recommend to the British and Foreign Bible Society an expurgated account of this wonderful conversion from atheism. It is pretty plain that Heine had never read the Bible before, and that for him, in his unregenerate condition, it had at all events the rare charm of novelty. So, too, we think has his subsequent treatment of the sacred narrative for his readers. Equally curious is the fact that previous to his conversion Heine would appear to have read almost everything except the Bible, and conducts his French readers in a most edifying manner through the entire course of ecclesiastic history down to the time of the publication of Kant's 'Critic of Pure Reason.' We have only space for Heine's brilliant characterisation of the relation of Kant's "Practical Reason" to the rest of his philosophy:—

You fancy, then, that we may now go home! By my life, no! There is yet a piece to be played. After the tragedy comes the farce. Up to this point Immanuel Kant has pursued the path of inexorable philosophy. He has stormed heaven and put the whole garrison to the edge of the sword. The theological, cosmological, and physico-theological bodyguards lie there lifeless. Deity itself, deprived of demonstration, has succumbed. There is now no all-mercifulness, no fatherly kindness, no other-world reward for renunciation in this world. The immortality of the soul lies in its last agony—you can hear its groans and its death-rattle—and old Lampe [Kant's *famulus*] is standing by with his umbrella under his arm, an afflicted spectator of the scene, tears and sweat-drops of terror dropping from his countenance. Then Immanuel Kant relents, and shows that he is not merely a great philosopher, but also a good man. He reflects and, half good-naturedly, half ironically, he says: "Old Lampe must have a God, otherwise the poor fellow can never be happy. Now, man ought to be happy in this world. Practical reason says so [does it, according to Kant?].—well, I am quite willing that practical reason should also guarantee the existence of God."

After this Heine is unkind enough to suggest that Kant brought about this resurrection not merely for the sake of old Lampe, but also through fear of the police.

Reading Heine's estimate of Schelling in his later development, we are forcibly reminded of the hackneyed proverb about glass-houses and throwing stones. When Heine accuses Schelling of having "slunk back to the religious kennels of the past," and goes on to say that his conversion proves nothing but that man "turns to religion for support when

he is old and weary, when his physical and intellectual powers fail him, when he can no longer enjoy or reason," one wonders how he could have the face to write his second preface to the German edition of this work, in which he glories in his own recantation of atheism.

The close of the book is at once the most eloquent and the most prophetic, but as with all truly prophetic visions, the seer's perspective is somewhat confused. This fact, if the authorship were ever to become doubtful, would save it from suspicion of being a *vaticinium post eventum*. Heine evidently looked forward to a great democratic upheaval as the prelude or the accompaniment, rather than the sequel, to the renewal of German nationality. But this twist in the perspective of his forecast, so far from divesting it of interest, rather suggests the question, May we not well look forward, perhaps at no distant date, to the fulfilment of so much of his prophecy as yet remains unfulfilled, seeing that the rest has been realised in so remarkable a manner? We will conclude this notice with one more extract, which, for splendour and force of diction, ranks, even in Mr. Snodgrass' translation (which, as far as we can judge in the absence of the original, seems exceedingly well done), among the finest specimens of modern prose.

Christianity—and this is its fairest merit—subdued to a certain extent the brutal warrior ardour of the Germans; but it could not entirely quench it, and when the cross—that restraining talisman—falls to pieces, then will break forth again the ferocity of the old combatants. . . . The old stone gods will then arise from the forgotten ruins, and wipe from their eyes the dust of centuries; and Thor, with his giant hammer, will arise, and he will shatter the Gothic cathedrals. . . . When ye hear the trampling of feet and the clashing of arms, ye neighbours' children, ye French, be on your guard, and see that ye mingle not in the fray going on amongst us at home in Germany. It might fare ill with you. . . . Smile not at my counsel—at the counsel of a dreamer who warns you against Kantians, Fichteans, Philosophers of Nature. Smile not at the fantasy of one who foresees in the region of reality the same outburst of revolution that has taken place in the region of intellect. The thought precedes the deed, as the lightning the thunder. German thunder is of true German calibre. It is not very nimble, but rumbles along somewhat slowly. But come it will, and when ye hear a crashing such as never before has been heard in the world's history, then know that at last the German thunderbolt has fallen. At this commotion the eagles will drop dead from the skies, and the lions in the farthest wastes of Africa will bite their tails and creep into their royal lairs. There will be played in Germany a drama compared to which the French Revolution will seem but an innocent idyl. At present, it is true, everything is tolerably quiet, and though here and there some few men create a little stir, do not imagine these are to be the real actors in the piece. They are only little curs chasing one another round the empty arena, barking and snapping at one another, till the appointed hour, when the troop of gladiators appear to fight for life and death. . . . Take heed then! I mean it well with you. Therefore it is, I tell you the bitter truth. Ye have more to fear from a free Germany than from the entire Holy Alliance, with all its Croats and Cossacks.

Is not, however, the converse equally true, that Germany has more to fear from Republican France than from either Czars or Napoleons?

E. M. G.

LEOPARDI'S ESSAYS AND DIALOGUES.

THE seventeenth volume* of the 'English and Foreign Philosophical Library' is an eminently readable book, and likely to suit the taste of the day, but whether this fact is to our credit, and whether many people can possibly be the better for reading the book, are altogether different questions. It is a bright and lively exposition of pessimism, set forth with all the inventive fancy and vivid colouring of one of Italy's really great poets. His conclusions are sufficiently dark and depressing: "The universe is an enigma, totally insoluble. The sufferings of mankind exceed all the good that men experience, estimating the latter in compensation for the former. Progress, or, as we call it, civilisation, instead of lightening man's sufferings, increases them, since it enlarges his capacity for suffering, without proportionately augmenting his means of enjoyment." Such are the results arrived at by one who distinguished himself alike as a philologist, a philosopher, and a poet. We naturally want to know something of the life of the man, to see if it will at least partially explain his beliefs, and we are grateful to Mr. Edwardes for the biographical sketch he has prefixed to the present volume, and only complain that it does not give us more detailed information.

In the character of Arthur Schopenhauer, with its impetuous impulses continually overpowering his better judgment, it was easy to find the origin of his philosophy. The temperament and the career of Byron go a great way towards explaining the one-sidedness of his views of life; and if people will ask the question, "Is life worth living?" we are inclined to think no better answer will ever be found than "It all depends upon the liver." Certainly in Leopardi's case there is no difficulty in connecting his pessimism with his character and fortune. His family was very noble and very poor; his father was a martinet of the "old school;" his mother a shrewd housekeeper; neither of them appreciated the brilliant powers of their son, who was made miserable by being forbidden to leave the obscure country town in which the family resided. He early began to study hard, setting himself when eight years of age to read in chronological order the Greek authors in his father's library. In 1815, when seventeen years of age, he wrote a long "Essay on the Popular Errors of the Ancients," in which he quotes more than 400 authors; he shows how the various philosophers opposed and contradicted one another, "while the truly wise laughed at them all. The people, left to themselves during this hubbub, were not idle, but laboured silently to increase the vast mound of human error." He ends this essay with the declaration that "To live in the true Church is the only way to combat superstition." But for him the true Church meant the Church of Rome, in Italy, in the early part of the present century; and we do not wonder

* *Essays and Dialogues of Giacomo Leopardi.* Translated by Charles Edwardes. London: Trübner. 1882.

that Leopardi gave up his first intention of becoming a priest of that Church, and in so doing cut himself off, as far as we can judge, from all religious hope and trust. Living this solitary studious life in a thoroughly uncongential atmosphere produced its natural consequence. He writes, "Added to all this is the obstinate, black, and barbarous melancholy which devours and destroys me; which is nourished by study, and yet increases when I forego study. I have in past times had much experience of that sweet sadness which generates fine sentiments, and which, better than joy, may be said to resemble the twilight; but my condition is now an eternal and horrible night. A poison saps my powers of body and mind."

A very dangerous thing, that "sweet sadness which generates fine sentiments." But his whole health was now most seriously affected by "seven years of immoderate and excessive study," and it is not too much to say that he had thrown it all away by the age of twenty, and that from then till the day of his death, in 1837, he was a permanent invalid, and seldom free from suffering. In 1819 he published two odes, one addressed to Italy, the other on a monument to Dante, which at once secured him a place among the greatest of his country's poets; but it was not till three years later that he first extorted permission to leave home. Five months spent at Rome disenchanting him of all his illusions concerning the Eternal City. He derives no pleasure from the great things he sees, because he knows they are wonderful without feeling them to be so. The great scholar is discovered to be a conceited, wearisome pedant; nothing is cared for there but archæology; living thought is nowhere beside a bit of ancient stone or copper. Some really eminent men at Rome, Niebuhr, Reinhold, Mai, highly esteemed Leopardi, and tried to procure him an official appointment; but Papal intrigue and prejudice were too much for their influence. He did some work cataloguing Greek manuscripts, and discovered a hitherto unknown fragment of Libanius, but even this little ewe lamb of credit was stolen from him, and he resolved to leave a place of which he writes:—"I visited Tasso's grave, and wept there. This is the first and only pleasure I have experienced in Rome."

The rest of his life is spent in wandering about in Northern Italy, earning what money he can by literature, sometimes the poetry and essays which have made his fame, sometimes much drudgery for bread. At the last he finds friends, a brother and sister, who devote themselves to taking care of him, put up with his habits of turning night into day, breakfasting at three p.m. and dining at midnight, disobeying his doctor and clinging to old clothes; they take him from place to place in search of health, and tenderly nurse him during his last illness at Naples. He never married, though, if one may trust his poetry, he loved deeply and unsuccessfully. Certainly, he had an affectionate nature, which craved for a return of affection; he writes thus from Rome to his brother Carlo, the only one of his family with whom he seems to have had much real sympathy, "Love me, for God's sake. I need love, love, love, fire, enthusiasm, life." He did crave for: life, full, eager, sensational life, as

affording what he defines as the only constituents of pleasure in existence. But "his body proved little else than the sensation of suffering. All his vitality was concentrated in his mind." He suffered much from cold, but could not bear fire, and passed "the winters three parts submerged in a sack of feathers, reading and writing thus the greater part of the day."

Under conditions of life such as these the only wonder is that his philosophical essays and dialogues are written in a bright and lively style. Here his literary genius asserted itself, and compelled him to become interesting, but it is a profoundly melancholy fact that such powers were not devoted to higher purposes. One good may indeed come from the study of pessimistic writings. They show how untenable is any theory of life which makes happiness the main object of existence. We hear comparatively little of utilitarianism now; it shrivels up in the presence of pessimism. Who can work with ardour to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number if it is a fairly debatable question whether civilisation does increase the sum of human happiness? Who can be content to regard happiness as the highest good after all optimistic dreams are rudely dispelled? You are likely enough to come to the conclusion that "'tis better not to be," that this is a bad world and tending to become worse, unless you have a stronger faith and a higher inspiration than utilitarianism can afford. And the cure for pessimism, where is that to be found? Surely only in the perception of a higher good than happiness, in the recognition of an aim so desirable that it may be sought through and in spite of much misery, in the consciousness that, given human free-will, much misery is a needful means to the attainment of that great end, a righteous soul that loveth righteousness. Armed with this interpretation of life, one may stand in the presence of much suffering, and experience some share of it oneself, without losing faith in the divine greatness and goodness. It is terrible to witness the sufferings caused by depression in trade, but it is still more terrible to see high wages causing increased intemperance, and, from the moral point of view, none need regret the check our national prosperity received after the days in which "we drank ourselves clear of the *Alabama* indemnity." The pessimist should listen to the confession often made in wretched homes, "I brought it on myself; it's my own fault; I've no one to blame but myself;" still better is it to witness the unconscious heroism by which suffering is turned into a school of fortitude, of resignation or renewed endeavour, of faith either to do or to bear. It is most noteworthy that our pessimistic philosophers should be men of little knowledge of the actual existence of their fellow-creatures, and that it is possible to turn to the recorded experience of many who have the closest acquaintance with the daily conditions of life's struggle for the great mass of humanity, to find the most hopeful views of progress, and the most thankful testimony to the way in which all things, even things evil, are made to work together for good.

H. SHAWN SOLLY.

41—2

HARTMANN'S 'RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS OF HUMANITY.'*

WITH the exception of Mr. Herbert Spencer, there is, perhaps, no English writer with whom Dr. von Hartmann may be compared. Indeed, these two philosophers stand alone in an intellectual range which, combined with a flexibility and complexity of grasp, can only be described as encyclopædic. Horace's advice of *nonumque pre-matur in annum* does not apply to such men, for, however quickly done, all they write is not only worth reading, but demands attention, whether friendly or otherwise.

The remarkable structure known as the Philosophy of the Unconscious may now be said to be fairly complete. Having shown us how the unconscious Absolute is manifested in the intellectual and moral worlds, v. Hartmann now proceeds to point out in what way it is made known to us in the evolution of the religious consciousness.

Unlike most writers on the phenomenology of religion, v. Hartmann finds it to consist of naturalism and supra-naturalism. By the former he means a more or less complete identification of God with nature, by the latter, not what one is accustomed to understand by it, namely, an immediate and supernaturally-given revelation of God, but the qualification of Deity as "the sublime cause of nature," "the One spiritual Absolute or the One absolute Spirit." The chief stages of naturalism are, he considers, but modifications of what is known as *henotheism*, a phase of religion first worked out by Max Müller, and called by him *kathenotheism*. By thus extending the meaning of henotheism so as to include "the æsthetic refinement of Hellas," "the utilitarian secularisation of Rome," and "the tragico-ethical religious glow of our Teutonic ancestors," to say nothing of its "systematisation" in the "naturalistic monism" of Egypt and the "seminaturalism of the Parsis," our author seems to us to have defeated the very object for which the term was framed. The three phases through which supra-naturalism passes are—abstract monism, or the idealistic religion of emancipation; theism; and what v. Hartmann calls *concrete monism*, which, if we start from an ontological basis, amounts to little more than the religion of Humanity.

On the hypothesis of man's evolution from some lower organism, the question naturally presents itself, Is a pre-human religious consciousness possible, or, have the animals religion? And here it seems to us that our author looks at the subject too much from an anthropopathical point of view, which leads him to confound the "natural virtues" with "right reason," to overlook the fact that, owing to its lack of verbal symbols, animal consciousness must necessarily be too fleeting for the attitude of even a domestic pet towards man to be of a religious nature.

Curiously enough, Dr. v. Hartmann accepts the degeneration-theory as

* *Das religiöse Bewusstsein der Menschheit im Stufengang seiner Entwicklung.* VON EDUARD VON HARTMANN. Berlin: C. Duncker. 1882.

regards what are known as the savage forms of religion. Ancestor-worship, fetishism, and the rest, are looked upon as a decline of the naturalistic process. Accordingly it is only in historical man that the life and growth of religion can be observed. In naturalistic henotheism we may, he thinks, distinguish three principal cycles of divinity, which alternate and interact—namely, the cycle of heaven and earth, that of sun and moon, and the weather-cycle. This stage of identification of God and nature is succeeded by “zoomorphisation,” in which every striking natural phenomenon is looked upon as assuming an animal shape. Upon this follows “anthropomorphisation,” with its gods in human form. At this stage the separation of the god from nature is in no way definitive, but it is felt that the human is a form more adequate than the animal to express divine attributes. Ere long, however, henotheism is destined to lapse into polytheism and polydæmonism. Then comes the re-action. With the progress of human wisdom naturalism wanes, and we enter upon supra-naturalism.

The transition was effected in India, “where, on account of the peculiar tendency to speculative depth of thought, the religious consciousness of the most pious and cultured could no longer be content with the plurality of the nature-gods, but found the Divine, which had been manifest in the nature-gods only in a gross and half-hidden way, immanent in the inmost being of its own devotional fervour.” In passing to the supra-naturalistic stage we find the type of abstract monism in Brahmanism or Acosmism, and in Buddhism or Absolute Illusionism, and, of the chapters on these two great forms of Asiatic faith, particularly as regards the doctrine of the *Maja*, it may be truly said that they are masterpieces of philosophic exegesis.

Theism is the next theme. Under this head are discussed—1. Primitive monotheism; 2. The religion of the law or the religion of heteronomy; and, 8. The realistic religion of salvation.

Nowhere is v. Hartmann more interesting than in his exposition of Judaism and Christianity, and yet it is precisely here that he is specially open to criticism. In the first place we are told that “there is not the slightest ground for the assumption that the ancestors of the Israelites in Egypt worshipped other gods than those of the Hyksos, of whom they formed part. Accordingly, the name of their chief divinity at that time must have been Seth; and, indeed, this name is met with in the genealogical table of the Elohist immediately below Adam.” We are then informed that Adam himself was an older sky-god! What mythologist, philologist, or anthropologist would be prepared to admit this? On the whole, we are inclined to doubt whether our author is sufficiently acquainted with the latest Dutch researches in the field of Israelitism. But the revolution worked by the Prophets is brought out with a wonderful delicacy of literary skill.

As regards that “sweet Galilean vision” to which we would turn with reverent eyes, v. Hartmann is much in the dark. In so far as it is a universal religion, he tells us, Christianity is the creation of St. Paul, who

never thought either of what Jesus was or taught, except in so far as it agreed with his own standpoint. The religion of Judaism being that of the Father, the higher development of the religious consciousness v. Hartmann calls the religion of the Son and the religion of the Spirit. Hitherto, he says, men have been satisfied with the religion of the Son, but they must now turn to that of the Spirit, which, indeed, has been immanent all along, though they have been "unconscious" of it.

Shall it then be the Spirit of Man, as he would have it in "concrete monism"? Nay, in God's name, let it be the Spirit of God.

H. M. BAYNES.

DR. RITTER ON LEIBNIZ'S DOCTRINE OF MONADS.*

THIS essay on Leibniz's Monadology is the *opus juvenile* of a distinguished Leiden student, Heer Pierre Henri Ritter, by which he has obtained the degree of Doctor of Divinity. Of the three sections into which it is divided, the first describes the transition from Descartes to Spinoza, the second treats of the monadology of Leibniz, and the third gives us a criticism of idealism generally, and more particularly of the monistic evolutionary theory.

Now, what is Leibniz's place in the history of philosophy, and what value has his monadology for our time? In order to answer these questions we must know his intellectual ancestors, and what was said before him on the questions which never fail to disturb the philosophical atmosphere, whether of our own or other days. That is to say, if we want to understand Leibniz we must go back to Spinoza and Descartes. Leibniz's celebrated saying: "Spinoza aurait raison, s'il n'y avait point de monades," shows at once that he had grappled with the great monistic thinker, and had broken loose from the spell of the *ἦ καὶ τᾶν*. In Spinoza's grand and beautiful system Leibniz felt that the great principle of *individuality* had been overlooked; individual beings were not mere modifications or affections of an endless and everlasting God-world. Nor did he find Descartes' solution of the problem more satisfactory. Admitting the permanent gain to philosophy made by the Cartesian starting-point, he was nevertheless unable to believe in a gulf between mind and matter, or thought and extension, which could only be bridged over by a *concursum divinum*. Leibniz was, therefore, led to postulate, not one substance, like Spinoza, nor the two—or rather three—of Descartes, but an infinite number of what he called *monads*—a term first used in philosophy by Giordano Bruno. In the *Principes de la Nature et de la Grace*, we read: "La substance est un être capable d'action. Elle est simple ou composée. La substance simple est celle qui n'a point

* *De Monadenleer van Leibniz*: academisch Proefschrift, door P. H. RITTER. Leiden: Doesburgh. 1882.

de parties. La composée est l'assemblage des substances simples ou des Monades. Monas est un mot Grec, qui signifie l'unité, ou ce qui est un." The Monads, which are the elements of things, are all different, yet have they neither extension, form, nor divisibility. Since nothing outside can affect the Monad, we must admit an "internal principle," which effects the continuous monadic changes. In this way we arrive at the various stages of the monadic evolution, which Leibniz describes as *perception*, *apperception*, and *appetition*.

All this is clearly and forcibly put by Dr. Ritter, and we cannot but congratulate him upon the careful and scholarly way in which he has done his work. As regards a system of philosophy there are, as he points out, two kinds of criticism which are applicable. The first endeavours to find out, from the standpoint of the system to be judged, its internal contradictions; the second places itself outside the system, and passes judgment objectively. Employing the first method, Dr. Ritter finds that a system which affirms:—

1. That it gives a clear conception of Being,

2. That a clear conception of Being can never be possessed by any one,

is a system which annihilates itself.

In discussing the origin of the Monads, Leibniz contradicts himself. He says:—

1. That the Monads can only arise "*tout d'un coup*," that they must have been created (*Mon. 6*); and yet he affirms,

2. That the Monads are born by "*fulgurations continues*" of the Deity.

Similarly, with regard to his theology, Leibniz expressly says that God is not the central Monad of the world, the *anima mundi*, and yet he calls Him "centre par-tout."

Nevertheless, Leibniz did excellent service to philosophy. He laid the foundation for a better view, a juster interpretation, of nature. With him everything was living force, and in everything he perceived an organism, an evolution. Whoso has known the depths of the wisdom of Spinoza's "love to God" will find it difficult to pass on to a world of Monads, which changes the "because" into the "in order that;" yet, as Dr. Ritter so well says: "If we may translate the word 'poetry' by 'comprehension,' then Leibniz has fully earned the lovely name of *poetic philosopher*."

H. M. BAYNES.

MR. RODEN NOEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF IMMORTALITY.

MR. RODEN NOEL is one of the poets of these latter days who feel the stress of modern thought and speculation on the great problems of existence, and who have striven to give expression in their verse to the real significance of the revolution that is going on, partly in

the forms, partly in the substance, of faith and knowledge and belief. In his book on 'A Philosophy of Immortality,'* he has taken up one of the great questions in debate, and made it the subject of a prose treatise; and when he leaves off singing, and begins to argue, he asks from us a more sustained attention, and also puts us into a more argumentative and critical attitude with regard to what he has to say.

Mr. Noel has taken very seriously to heart the conditions of the problem, a solution of which he endeavours to give or to suggest, and there is much that is original, sometimes in the doctrines he propounds, and sometimes in his way of putting them. After reading the whole treatise carefully through, however, we confess that what is of most value seems to us to be that which is least new, either in substance or in form; and we have found less profit in the endeavour to follow him in what constitutes the main topic of about three-fifths of the book, a more descriptive title of which would have been 'A Philosophy of Spiritism, in its Relations to the Doctrine of Personal Immortality.' After defining his principal purpose as being "to furnish some arguments for what is by Materialism denied, and by Agnosticism doubted, the *permanent reality of human personality*," the author goes on to say that his attention here "has been largely directed to that branch of the evidence derived from phenomena, known in England as *spiritualist*, and on the Continent by the preferable name of *spiritist*—offering a contribution toward a philosophy of these from an idealistic standpoint." He thinks that "the evidence published in connection with them is sufficient to convince an unprejudiced person of their genuineness—that they are not all conjuring tricks." "They fitted," he says, "into the scheme of thought which had independently commended itself to me on other accounts, and in their turn threw light upon the general system of belief to which I had gradually been impelled by the combined influence of reason, feeling, and external circumstance." Accordingly Mr. Noel discusses, or brings in by way of illustration (amongst other things), the Soul-Body, Materialisation, Obsession, Re-incarnation, Psychic Force, Psychography, and all the familiar phenomena and theories of modern spiritism. It is true he does not base any of his arguments on them. He is an idealist, believing in the validity of the moral intuitions and spiritual aspirations, by which comes a real faith in personal immortality, and an individual consciousness of it. But, to our mind, he does not do much to clear up and illustrate his position by the use he makes of the alleged facts of spiritism. Whatever may ultimately be ascertained and accepted with regard to them, it seems premature, as yet, to treat this obscure field of human experience as furnishing any facts which safely can be assumed as data of a philosophic argument. Mr. Noel, no doubt, may say, and does in effect say, that the force of his argument does not in any way depend on his reader's acceptance of the theories of spiritism which he

* *A Philosophy of Immortality*. By the Hon. RODEN NOEL, author of 'House of Ravensburg,' 'A Little Child's Monument,' &c. London: W. H. Harrison. 1882.

propounds. He writes very much in the potential mood. *If* certain things are so, *it may be* that they are evidence of certain other things; and, generally, *it is his philosophy* which prepares him to accept these things as facts, reinforcing the evidence of his own senses and the testimony of other observers. If you don't believe them, he would say, or are in doubt about them, leave them out of the question, and consider my philosophical scheme apart from them, and on its own merits. We think, however, that for the unbelievers or sceptics in this matter the effect of the whole is weakened by the very close interweaving of the spiritist speculations into the texture of so large a proportion of the argument. It is only in the last three chapters, forming about one-fifth of the book, that we get fairly clear of the more disputable matter, and find ourselves on the purely moral and philosophical ground. And we fear that Mr. Noel's book, earnestly and carefully as it has been thought out, will be read with cordial satisfaction and intellectual assent by few who are not either unhesitating believers in spiritism, or, at least, are strongly inclined to believe it. There are many ingenious suggestions and hypotheses put forth in the book, which may be considered on their own merits; but there are many the exact point of which is difficult to perceive without a somewhat minute acquaintance with the literature of spiritism.

It is impossible, in the course of such a brief review as we can here give, to go into any of the questions which the author raises with regard to the alleged outward manifestations from the spirit world; and without some such discussion it would not be much use bringing forward instances of the way in which Mr. Noel uses his materials for his special purpose. We should be glad to believe, with him, that by the working of "the spiritualism inaugurated by the raps in the house of the American Fox family, some thirty-six years ago, in America," "the long self-complacent reign of Materialism is going to break up in confusion;" but much of the current "spiritism" seems to us in some sense (not altogether a paradoxical one) the offspring of the materialism which has no faith in that which "eye hath not seen nor ear heard;" and whatever conclusions respecting it may ultimately be established, it hardly shows, as yet, much sure sign and testimony of having been sent of God to liberate the soul from the fetters of sense to clear the inner vision.

While accepting Mr. Noel's book, then, as a thoughtful and original contribution to the argument for personal immortality, we think it is unfortunate that he has weighted it with so much matter which will long be in more dubious debate than the position which he uses it to illustrate. The attention of the reader is likely to be diverted from the surer grounds of faith and hope with regard to the unknown future, which we come to when the appeal is made to our inner experience, our moral intuitions, our affections, and spiritual aspirations. These moral grounds for faith and hope in a future life are, in the later pages of the book (and, incidentally, elsewhere), set forth so clearly and effectively, that we cannot help wishing that the author had devoted more space to

the development of his subject in this direction. So far as his general argument and the underlying principles of his philosophy are concerned, his work cannot fail to be of service in the great controversy concerning the origin and destiny of the human soul.

DR. ROBERTSON SMITH ON THE PROPHETS.

WE have another volume of lectures * from Dr. Robertson Smith, and we are given to understand that the subject-matter may probably be taken up and continued by him on a future occasion. We heartily congratulate both the "large popular audiences" who listened to these lectures "in Edinburgh and Glasgow," and the larger but less popular audience now addressed in print, on the aids which Dr. Robertson Smith has given and is to give them towards understanding and appreciating the prophets. The author is no ordinary scholar, and the lectures are no mere popular presentation of results already familiar to students. They contain the fruits of a study singularly patient, minute, and penetrating, in which an exhaustive knowledge of the labours of others serves only to direct and in no way to encumber the powerful and original investigations of the author himself.

In the present volume the prophets dealt with are Amos, Hosea, Micah, and Isaiah. Each one of these is presented in living colours. The portions of the prophetic work common to them all and those characteristic of each individually are pointed out with masterly precision; and the reader, having been prepared by the introductory chapters to understand the religious atmosphere in which the prophets had to work, is made a participator in the movement of the national life with which they stood in relation, and feels the impress of each one of their personalities stamped upon his heart as they appear successively upon the field. Where the author touches upon controversial questions of criticism, his brief utterances are invariably weighty; and he has a wholesome dread of laying down the law or asking his readers to take anything on trust, which, in his case, is happily combined with a rare power of concise and clear controversial statement. Thus the objections he urges to the theory of a double invasion of Judæa under Sargon and Sennacherib (supported by the Assyriologists and adopted by Cheyne), and his defence of the substantial authenticity of Isaiah xix., though very brief, are extremely forcible.

Most readers will be impressed in this as in former works of the same author by the very unusual combination of a perfectly frank and fearless criticism, accepting the historical as well as the literary results of modern scholarship, with a conscientious use of the terminology of the old scriptural school and a doctrinal orthodoxy which appears to be unimpeachable. "A mechanism is studied by taking it to pieces, an

* *The Prophets of Israel and their Place in History, &c.* By W. ROBERTSON SMITH, LL.D. Edinburgh: A. and C. Black. 1832.

organism must be studied by watching its development from the simplicity of the germ to the final complexity of the finished structure," says our author (p. 6), and this pregnant sentence might be taken as the motto of his whole theory of "revelation." But in becoming an "organism" rather than a "mechanism," the "revelation" which Dr. Robertson Smith expounds with such profound insight and sympathy remains in his eyes something essentially distinct from the process by which religious and moral truth became and becomes known, in some measure elsewhere than in Palestine. In what this distinction consists, however, we are not told. In an admirably lucid passage in the first lecture (p. 12) we read, "All true knowledge of God is verified by personal experience, but it is not exclusively derived from such experience. There is a positive element in all religion, an element which we have learned from those who went before us. If what is so learned is true we must ultimately come back to a point in history when it was new truth, acquired as all new truth is by some particular man or circle of men, who, as they did not learn it from their predecessors, must have got it by personal revelation from God Himself." But on page 14, our author continues, with almost incredible naïveté, "It is not necessary to encumber the argument by comparing the way in which individual Divine communications were given to Israel with the way in which the highest thinkers of other nations came to grasp something of spiritual truth." Until Dr. Robertson Smith "encumbers his argument" by answering the question, why when an Israelite acquired a new religious truth he "must have got it by personal revelation from God Himself," whereas a high-class thinker of another nation may have acquired a new religious truth by some other means, into which it is unnecessary to inquire, and until he further encumbers his argument by precisely indicating how and why—in this case, and in this alone—the *acquiring* faculty is something other and more than a higher degree of the *verifying* faculty, it appears to us that his "argument" is simply no argument at all.

It must, however, be added at once that his doctrine of revelation does not prevent our author from pointing out in great detail, and with keen spiritual discernment, the living connection between the personal temperament, experiences, and surroundings of each prophet, and the special aspects of Divine truth which he more especially apprehended. Those who adopt a truly "organic" view of the growth of religion and the acquisition of religious truth will find a guide in Dr. Robertson Smith whose theory they may dispute, but on whose observations and directions they will hardly ever be able to point out that that theory has exercised an undue—or, indeed, any perceptible—influence.

In one case, however, we cannot help thinking that Professor Robertson Smith's uncertainty of fundamental position has told upon his treatment of the subject matter. In Isaiah's time, he says, the preservation of the Judæan community was a religious necessity. Isaiah saw this, and, therefore, confidently foretold the failure of the Assyrian attempt on Jerusalem. In Jeremiah's time, on the other hand, the captivity was

in its turn a religious necessity, and Jeremiah accordingly confidently foretold the success of the Babylonian attempt on Jerusalem. Now we are never quite clear as to whether and in what sense our author holds that there really is a direct causal connection between the religious requirements and the military results of any special situation; but this is not our present point. The fact is that Micah, a contemporary of Isaiah, nevertheless agreed with Jeremiah. Dr. Robertson Smith makes an attempt to disarm this remarkable difference between the two prophets, Micah and Isaiah, on a point which he has explained to be essential, by maintaining that Micah did not really mean to predict a total suspension of the national life of Israel, and that to Isaiah the fall of Jerusalem would have involved this; but here his argument appears to us strained and unconvincing. On the contrary, when he shows how this difference of view was connected with the personal surroundings and the social positions of the two prophets he carries us completely with him.

In the treatment of the "Messianic" passages in Isaiah our author is at his best, and the fine analysis of the essential difference between Isaiah's hopes of a nation collectively "righteous" under existing forms of life and the New Testament conception of individual "re-birth" makes us look forward with keenest interest to his treatment, in a future volume, of Jeremiah's "new covenant."

PHILIP H. WICKSTEED.

A SHORT PROTESTANT COMMENTARY.*

A SHORT Protestant Commentary on the Books of the New Testament answers well to its name. It is short—indeed, only too short to be always entirely satisfactory—and it is Protestant, not vangelical, in the sense of being unbiassed by theological assumptions of any kind. The Preface to the first edition, by Professor von Holzen-dorff, is itself a protest against the tendency which for a long time prevailed to "take the Bible as a single divine utterance, delivered, as it were, in one unbroken discourse," while the admirable Introduction, by Professor Paul Wilhelm Schmidt, after tracing the origin of the different New Testament writings, and pointing out the circumstances under which they were composed, goes on to affirm that "the literal historical method of interpretation is the only one that has any proper place in the Protestant Church." It is on these lines, then, that the entire work is written. The reader will not expect to find in it elaborate attempts to reconcile the two contradictory legends of the childhood of Jesus, or to establish the authenticity of both the genealogies; nor will he be

* *A Short Protestant Commentary on the Books of the New Testament, with General and Special Introductions.* Edited by Prof. P. W. SCHMIDT and Prof. FRANZ VON HOLZENDORFF. Translated from the Third Edition of the German by Francis Henry Jones, B.A. Vol. I. London: Williams and Norgate. 1882.

surprised to find the temptation compared to the choice of Hercules, or to be informed that the census in Luke, unhistorical at that particular time, has been introduced simply for the sake of bringing Mary from Nazareth to Bethlehem, or that the mention of Lysanias as tetrarch of Abilene, seeing that, according to Josephus, he was a King of Iturea who died as early as 86 B.C., is an error of the evangelist. But he will find, compressed into a small compass, nearly everything that is essential for the elucidation of the text, while the introduction prefixed to each book, or (as in the case of the Synoptic gospels) set of books, will enable him to understand the writer's point of view and the object which he proposed to accomplish. Such a work as this, written in a calm, critical, and perfectly reverent tone, and intended to encourage a rational study of the Bible, as remote from idolatrous worship of the letter on the one hand, as from contemptuous rejection on the other, is a *desideratum* in this country. The work has reached a third edition in Germany, and it will be a good sign if Mr. Jones's well-executed translation attains a like success in this country.

R. B. D.

A DEFENCE OF THE REVISED GREEK TEXT OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.*

THIS is a temperate and conclusive reply to the charges brought against the New Testament Company by the *Quarterly Reviewer*, especially in his first article—'The New Greek Text.' The Two Revisers sufficiently refute the allegations of wilful eccentricity in the choice of readings, on the one hand, and of a blind following of Westcott and Hort, on the other. But the pamphlet is more than a defence of modern critical procedure against the attacks of a scholar who estimates a MS. as corrupt in direct proportion to its divergence from the Received Text, and suspects that the preservation of our oldest codices has been due to their having been, immediately on their first appearance, condemned and withdrawn from use, as hopelessly depraved. It is the best and clearest exposition we have seen, at once scholarly and popular, of the Revisers' work, in so far as it was concerned with textual details; and we heartily commend it to a widening circle of intelligent readers, now turning, we believe, with a new interest from the Version to the Text of the New Testament.

J. E. O.

MR. FROUDE'S LIFE OF THOMAS CARLYLE. †

"MR. CARLYLE expressed a desire in his will that of him no biography should be written. I find the same reluctance in his Journal. No one, he said, was likely to understand a history, the secret

* *The Revisers and the Greek Text of the New Testament.* By Two Members of the New Testament Company. London: Macmillan and Co. 1882.

† *Thomas Carlyle: A History of the First Forty Years of his Life (1795-1835).* By JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE, M.A. In two volumes. With Portraits and Etchings. London: Longmans. 1892.

of which was unknown to his closest friends." These words of his biographer might seem a curious introduction to nine hundred pages of a history of the first forty years of Carlyle's life, reminding us, as they do, of his saying, "How happy it comparatively is for a man of any earnestness of life to have no Biography written of him; but to return silently with his small, sorely-foiled bit of work, to the Supreme Silences, who alone can judge it or him, and not to trouble the reviewers, and greater or lesser public, with attempting to judge it. The roll of 'fame,' as they call it, posthumous or other, does not inspire one with much ecstasy in these points of view." With regard to his own life, however, Carlyle was forced to recognise that there were would-be biographers waiting to tell his story, with more or less of inevitable guess-work or misunderstanding; and "since a 'Life' of him there would certainly be, he wished it to be as authentic as possible." "If he was to be known at all, he chose to be known as he was, with his angularities, his sharp speeches, his special peculiarities—meritorious or unmeritorious—precisely as they had actually been." Accordingly Carlyle made over to Mr. Froude a mass of personal *mémoires pour servir*, including letters, journals, and memoranda, and the ever-memorable *Reminiscences*, to be used as he might think good.

"In the papers thus in my possession," Mr. Froude says, "Carlyle's history—external and spiritual—lay out before me as a map. By recasting the entire material, by selecting chosen passages out of his own and his wife's letters, by exhibiting the fair and the beautiful side of the story only, it would have been easy, without suppressing a single material point, to draw a picture of a faultless character. When the Devil's advocate has said his worst against Carlyle, he leaves a figure still of unblemished integrity, purity, loftiness of purpose, and inflexible resolution to do right, as of a man living consciously under his Maker's eye, and with his thoughts fixed on the account which he would have to render of his talents."

And this fairly describes the portrait which is drawn in the two volumes before us, especially if we allow the personal memorials which the biographer gives us, in the form chiefly of letters and extracts from Mr. Carlyle's journal, to tell their own story, and if we do not always accept the inferences and generalisations which Mr. Froude himself has drawn from them. We certainly think that in some way his anxiety to "extenuate nothing," to soften none of the shadows, has induced him unconsciously to exaggerate some of the faults which he discovers, and to make the harsher features of Carlyle's rugged nature more repellent than they really were. Especially in his comments on the relations between Carlyle and his wife, the story of which forms a prominent feature in Mr. Froude's pages, he seems to us determined to minimise the brighter aspects of the case. He has a theory that if two people of genius marry they must be content to do without happiness; and he presents the story of Mr. and Mrs. Carlyle's married life as an illustration of this theory. And if he only means that they were not happy, "in the roseate sense of

happiness," there is nothing more to be said. But one would be inclined to imagine, if the grounds for modifying this conclusion had not been supplied in his own pages, that the six years spent in the solitudes of Craigenputtock were years of almost unmitigated loneliness of spirit, and of wearying toil and household drudgery, for the bright, refined, and delicately-nurtured woman, who, after years of agitation and anxious doubt, had bravely ventured to cast in her lot with that of the grim genius, whom she began by admiring and reverencing, and whom she ended by loving truly and well. We feel very strongly, however, that Mr. Froude has not altogether succeeded in getting at the inmost truth of the situation. He lays hold of all the indications of the trials and hardships which had to be endured in the long and often disheartening struggle against actual poverty, with the determination to maintain a proud independence while waiting and working towards better days; and he makes too little of the frequent glimpses of the brighter side of it all, given especially in some of Mrs. Carlyle's own letters. In one of them, for instance, written after four years of her banishment, she gives an amusing picture of the sufferings of the "fine lady who should find herself set down at Craigenputtock, for the first time in her life left alone with her own thoughts—no 'fancy bazaar' in the same kingdom with her; no place of amusement within a day's journey; the very church, her last imaginable resource, seven miles off." And then she says: "For my part I am very content. I have everything here my heart desires that I could have anywhere else, except society, and even that deprivation is not to be considered wholly an evil . . . My husband is as good company as reasonable mortal could desire. Every fair morning we ride on horseback for an hour before breakfast." Then follows a description of her household occupations, which certainly does not countenance Mr. Froude's dismal picture of her "being obliged to slave like the wife of her husband's friend Wightmann the hedger, and cook, and wash, and scour, and mend shoes and clothes for many a weary year." These rides together (Carlyle on Larry "the Irish horse of genius," and his wife on her pony, Harry), which are several times mentioned, Mr. Froude reduces to "an occasional ride;" and in the same way—with no foundation, apparently, except Miss Jewsbury's story, published in the *Reminiscences*, of a winter's adventure, when the servant had been prevented from coming home, and Mrs. Carlyle amused herself with scrubbing the kitchen floor, after fetching a chair for her husband to sit and watch her while he smoked his pipe—we are told that "It might happen that she had to black the grates, or even scour the floors, while Carlyle looked on encouragingly with his pipe."

That Mrs. Carlyle had in many respects a hard and trying time of it, a life burdened by anxieties and saddened by ill-health, and one which her husband might have made lighter for her, is plain enough; and his biographer is right in not extenuating his want of consideration, and his failure to reconcile his devotion to his great idea, with a more minute and tender care for the woman who so nobly upheld him in his long

effort of renunciation. But when we put Mr. Froude's mere assertion to the question, we certainly find no justification, in all the intimate personal revelations which he has thought fit to publish, for such statements as that Mrs. Carlyle's life at Craigenputtock "had been a life of menial drudgery, unsoled (for she could have endured, or even enjoyed, mere hardship) by more than an occasional word of encouragement and sympathy from her husband." Or, again, "Her life was the dreariest of slaveries to household cares and toil." Mr. Froude, we feel sure, has made too much of the expressions that do occur of loneliness and disappointment; and he only occasionally stumbles upon the idea that she may have found a higher happiness in the sacrifice she so nobly made to her husband, and *with* him, than in that life of ease and pleasant things, the loss of which the good, kind-hearted Jeffrey thought such a terrible thing for her.

With regard to the whole of the very full and detailed account that is given of the relations between Carlyle and his wife both before their marriage and afterwards, we cannot help feeling that we have no right to be reading all this revelation of what in most lives would be the inner secrets of two hearts, which could not be divulged without desecration. Perhaps Carlyle himself had said at least as much as could with propriety be told to the world about the woman who had so faithfully shared his life-work, encouraged his aspirations, and lightened his burdens, and who, even more completely than himself, had learned the deepest meaning of his great word "renunciation" (*Entsagen*). Even then we had a sort of uneasy feeling in overhearing the words of "tenderness and infinite pity and repentant love" uttered by an old man in his deep sorrow; and there is surely a want of natural reserve in the way in which the whole story is now told by his biographer, with the private history of Jane Welsh's first passionate love for Edward Irving, the analysis of her feelings towards Carlyle, the details of their painful heart-searchings, their doubts of themselves and of one another, almost up to the day of their marriage. We cannot help asking ourselves whether it is probable that Carlyle would have been altogether satisfied with the way in which, in this part of the history, his friend has exercised that discretion to which he entrusted all his secrets; or, still more, whether Mrs. Carlyle would have tolerated it. It is all deeply interesting, but had we any right to know it all?

Another chief interest of the book, which had also been in some measure anticipated in the *Reminiscences*, we can enjoy without any drawback. We may have smiled at Carlyle's declaration that he should have found it difficult to say whether his father or Robert Burns had the greater natural faculty; but no one could forget the picture of his early home, with his vivid portraits of all the different members of the family. Between himself and his mother the tie was peculiarly close. A good many of their letters to one another are given by Mr. Froude. It is delightful to hear of the old peasant mother, whose knowledge of literature had not gone much beyond the Bible, sitting down to read

her "son Tom's" translation of "Wilhelm Meister," and, if not actually *learning* to write, yet getting over the difficulties of it for the sake of keeping up a *correspondence with him*. His letters to his brother John are full of various interest, the earlier ones generally abounding in brotherly counsel, with not unfrequent admonition, made palatable by offers of ever-ready pecuniary help in his studies and struggles. Carlyle was always as generous in *giving* such help, even in his own most anxious days, as he was always stiff and proudly independent if his best friend ventured to press a favour upon him.

The record of the forty years embraced in the present volumes only brings us down to the beginning of Carlyle's assured and successful career of literary work. It is full of high discontents and unrest and "judicious desperation." It shows very impressively indeed the hard conditions of his long struggle for utterance of the truths which he felt he must either speak in his own way or for ever hold his peace. At one time, indeed, there seemed to be some risk that he would be condemned to do the latter. For, when *Sartor Resartus*, after two years' weary quest for a publisher, began to come out in bits in *Fraser's Magazine*, it met, as the editor told him, with "unqualified disapproval"; and though his earlier chapters on German Literature, and other Essays now included in his *Miscellanies*, had found decided favour, and had helped him to live, all the editors began to be afraid of having anything to do with him, unless he would condescend to write like other people to suit the literary fashion of the day. The ever friendly and generous Jeffrey, especially, tried hard to cure him of the extravagance which made him "intolerable to many, and ridiculous to not a few," and to persuade him that he had no *mission* on earth, whatever he might fancy, "half so important as to be innocently happy." Such advice was certainly thrown away on a man who "had said a thousand times that the trade of literature was worse as a trade than that of honest street sweeping," and who had declared, "I know not how a man without some degree of prostitution could live by it, unless he were situated like me, and could live upon potatoes and point if need were." As to Publishers and Editors! there was "the infatuated Fraser, with his dog's-meat tart of a magazine;" Cochrane, "what one might call an *Editing Pig*, as there are learned pigs, &c.," and generally, "Dog's-meat bazaar, which you enter muffled up, holding your nose, with 'Here, you master, able editor, or whatever your name is, take this mess of mine and sell it for me—at the old rate, you know!'"

This, indeed, was not the way to make literature "answer;" and it was only by his faculty of what he called "judicious desperation," that the proud determined spirit won the fight at last, unaided except by the splendid devotion and heroic faith of his wife. As Mr. Froude says, in his concluding estimate of Carlyle's character and work:—

He had imposed conditions on himself which might make the very keeping himself alive impossible; for his function was sacred to him, and he had laid down as a fixed rule that he would never write merely to please,

never for money, that he would never write anything save when specially moved to write by an impulse from within; above all, never to set down a sentence which he did not in his heart believe to be true, and to spare no labour till his work, to the last fibre, was as good as he could possibly make it.

It is impossible within the limited scope of a necessarily brief review to give any detailed criticism or description of the many other points of interest which Mr. Froude's volumes contain. There are numerous extracts from Carlyle's journals, in which he often wrote down the thoughts which afterwards were embodied in his published writings, besides many personal records which help to illustrate and explain his own opinions and purposes. Mr. Froude says that he has found ample verification of the accuracy of all the details mentioned in the *Reminiscences*, except in the case of one matter of small importance. It is less satisfactory to find that the harsh and intolerant sayings about the people he met, which appeared in the *Reminiscences*, have many parallels in Carlyle's letters and journals from very early days. Our admiration for the essential characteristics of his strength and greatness cannot blind us to the intellectual arrogance and wilful prejudice which so constantly warped his judgment and cramped his sympathies. He was ready to set down a man's character in some half-dozen incisive words on the strength of a few traits which had struck him at a first encounter; and, considering how eloquently and persistently he has preached, as the first of all duties, absolute loyalty to the inner truth of things, it is strange what little pains he seems to have taken to verify the correctness of his first impressions.

The history of Carlyle's life after he had left "the wilderness" and settled in the home at Chelsea, where he spent his last forty-seven years, has yet to be told, and it is to be told in a singularly interesting way. He had, as mentioned in the Preface to the *Reminiscences*, collected his wife's letters, covering the whole of the period of his settled literary work, from 1884 to the time of her death in 1886, and "prepared them for publication, adding notes and introductory explanations, as the last sacred duty that remained to him in the world. He intended it as a monument to a character of extreme beauty, while it would tell the public as much about himself as it could reasonably expect to learn." The publication of these letters is not to be long delayed, and we look forward to them with the keenest expectation. To complete the record, Mr. Froude will add a brief account of Carlyle's last years, during which he was in constant intercourse with him. We are not informed yet what is to be done with the "many thousands of letters" which are in the editor's hands; but we suppose that some manageable proportion of them will be given us in due course.

For one who would fain have been allowed to commit his life-work to the "Supreme Silences," and to have spared the reviewers and the greater or lesser public the trouble of judging it, there is a sort of irony of fate in the discordant judgments which were provoked almost, we

might say, by the very side of Carlyle's grave. The present volume will hardly do much in the way of reconciliation; but we wait for the conclusion of the whole matter.

REMINISCENCES, CHIEFLY OF ORIEL AND THE OXFORD MOVEMENT.*

“THE story of the Oxford Movement has yet to be told,” says Mr. Mozley, in his Preface, “and there is much reason to fear that it never will be told as it should be. The greater part of those at all concerned in it, whether as friends or as foes, or as spectators, and likely or competent to contribute matter for the historian, have passed away—many of them, indeed, long ago. Of the survivors nearly all have disqualified themselves, more or less, one way or another. They may make most praiseworthy, most interesting, and most valuable contributions; but those contributions will have to be most carefully sifted and largely discounted, and a mean will have to be struck between their conflicting utterances.” When Mr. Mozley's own contribution to the yet unwritten record comes to be put through the sifting process, it will be found to supply a good deal of material which will be most useful to the historian. If we find in his pleasant volumes few new and unexpected revelations, and if we might have looked, perhaps, for a little more light occasionally on the deeper principles which were involved in the movement in which he had a part, we are impressed by the moderation and candour which mark the whole record. We should say of Mr. Mozley that he was mixed up in what was going on, was on friendly and more or less intimate terms with the leaders and many of the active workers in the movement, falling in with their views and helping in their schemes, rather than that he was one with them, or was ever really carried away by enthusiasm, or had a full appreciation of what it all meant, and what it involved. After reading, with the greatest interest, these reminiscences of the period which to his memory “is as a golden age,” we feel that he has not done himself any injustice in his own description of the position he had taken up.

But why did I go so far, and why did I not go farther? Why enter upon arguments and not accept their conclusions? Why advance to stand still, and in doing so commit myself to a final retreat? The reasons of this lame and impotent conclusion lay within myself, wide apart from the great controversy in which I was an intruder. I was never really serious, in a sober business-like fashion. I had neither the power nor the will to enter into any great argument with the resolution to accept the legitimate conclusion. Even when I was sacrificing my days, my means, my prospects, my peace and quiet, all I had, to the cause, it was an earthly contest, not a spiritual one. It occupied me, it excited me, it gratified my vanity; it identified me

* *Reminiscences, Chiefly of Oriel and the Oxford Movement.* By the Rev. T. MOZLEY, M.A., formerly Fellow of Oriel, Rector of Plymtree, Devon, and Rural Dean of Plymtree and of Ottery. In two volumes. London: Longmans. 1882.

with what I honestly believed to be a very grand crusade ; it offered me the hopes of contributing to great achievements. But, good as the cause might be, and considerable as my part might be in it, I was never the better man for it, and, not being the better, I never was the wiser. In fact, it was to me all, or most of it, an outside affair.

Perhaps we may say that Mr. Mozley's interest in the whole movement was founded in sympathy and admiration for the men who were engaged in it, rather than in any overpowering zeal for the cause itself. And we may add that this, instead of being a disqualification, is what gives his recollections of the "golden age" their own peculiar value as a new contribution to an old story. He is an impartial and, in some respects, a critical observer, and, at the same time, is genuinely interested in what he describes. He was in close personal relations with John Henry Newman, having been his pupil at Oriel in 1826, and having become, ten years later, his brother-in-law ; and he appears to have been on terms of intimacy and frequent correspondence with him ever since. Newman, however, was not one who would be likely to divulge his secret thoughts even to those most closely connected with him, and, in any case, Mr. Mozley has used his knowledge of his friend's mind with a reserve and discretion which cannot be too highly commended, even when they slightly disappoint us. It is naturally round the central figure of John Henry Newman that the reminiscences chiefly gather. He keeps re-appearing as the leading spirit, the man to whom all looked up, and under whose guidance, or silent influence, the work went on. Mr. Mozley helps us to form in some respects a clearer picture of the personality of the author of the *Apologia* than we could get from that memorable spiritual autobiography, and it would be very interesting to extract from his pages, and to group together, the many "characteristics" which are recorded of the future Cardinal. The pleasant task, however, must be left to our readers ; and in the course of it they will find themselves interrupted and delayed, and very agreeably entertained, by constantly occurring bits of character sketching, of amusing anecdotes, and remarks connected with a whole host of familiar or unfamiliar names.

One chief charm of the book is that the writer, looking back over a long and varied experience, sets down his recollections of a multitude of men and events belonging to a state of things in both Church and State which is rapidly passing out of living memory. There is a quaint and amusing chapter about Joseph Pickford (one of the men "who are interesting from their associations, but whom no associations can redeem") in which we are told how he was induced to spend the Long Vacation in helping to arrange the Oriel books in the new library, and nearly became a victim to the dust raised, "the result of long fermentation, secretion, humectation, exsiccation, and all kinds of natural processes." From that time he hated books. "He found it necessary to wash down the dust" which had established itself in the tissues of his throat, "at least to try to do so, for the necessity increased—nay, it never ended." Another character is Joseph Dornford, once a tutor of

T. B. Macaulay, "a lank, shy, awkward, pale-faced boy, with whom he could not get on." Dornford, after joining the Rifle Brigade and serving in the Peninsular war, became one of those militant rectors who expect to rule their parishes; and he was constantly at war with his parishioners. He fatally offended his village choir by unceremoniously taking advantage of a pause in the music to cut short one of those never-ending anthems in which such choirs were wont to rejoice; and the performers not only refused to enter the church again, and committed various outrages in the way of abstracting the candlesticks from the altar, and destroying choice shrubs in the parsonage grounds, but they actually fired guns over the hedge to frighten a courageous sympathiser with the rector in his musical difficulties, and they did it so effectually that she died a few days after. The whole sketch of this warlike parson is one of the best and most characteristic in the book.

Another Oriel man was Samuel Rickards, of whom a charming sketch is given, which helps us to appreciate the story that is told of a young lady who, feeling some painful misgivings about her marriage, which was to take place the next day, confided them to Mrs. Rickards. "My dear," said she, "the day before I married I was the happiest of women." "Oh! but you were going to marry Mr. Rickards!" the expectant bride innocently exclaimed. The redoubtable George Anthony Denison comes on the scene, with "his handsome figure, his pleasant smile, his musical voice, and his ever ready wit." Our graver readers will, no doubt, condemn us for enjoying, and still more for repeating here, the absurd reminiscence of Denison's rage at a rhubarb tart being sent up hot instead of cold, one day to the Hall dinner, the cook being ordered up and stormed at for ten minutes. "I felt myself smitten," says Mr. Mozley, "by these reproaches, for I think I rather sided with Mr. King [the cook] on this momentous question; but I saw clearly that it was because I had not been in high society. No doubt dukes, and that sort of people, eat their rhubarb tarts cold. In later years it has frequently occurred to me whether there be not some occult relation between hot rhubarb tarts and the conscience clause."

Of the men and the scenes more immediately connected with his own Oriel days and later Oxford experiences, Mr. Mozley has much to say; and we meet, amongst others, with Whately and Blanco White, Keble, and Richard Hurrell Froude, and his brother Anthony, the Wilberforces, Hartley Coleridge (the subject of brief and painful chapter, which hardly need have been written), and Hampden, with a rather full account of the celebrated Bampton Lecture controversy, especially in some of its personal bearings.

In three chapters devoted to some former fellow-Carthusians, Mr. Mozley carries us further back than his Oriel days, and gives some amusing recollections of Charterhouse. Referring to the associations of his still earlier education, he remarks that "in those days actual, indeed inevitable, Liberalism was the rule of English society. In the all-important matter of Education there was no help for it. For

two years, from 1811, I went to the only good day-school at Gainsborough. It was kept by a Socinian brother and sister, assisted by the widow of an Independent minister. . . . One of my godfathers was a Socinian. We were on the most intimate terms with the Socinian minister, and his children were our chief nursery friends. The Evangelical curate was found one day standing in the vestibule of the Unitarian chapel to pick up strange utterances, and great was the storm that fell on him." In the year 1817 he and his brother were going to the only classical school at Derby, kept by the Unitarian minister "a friend of Tom Moore, and the prophet, teacher, and guide of the Strutt family."

Going on to the next step in his education, we are introduced to one who was in many ways a remarkable and original man, but whose name will be chiefly remembered in connection with that of his son, Herbert. George Spencer, who acted as private tutor in various branches of learning to a large number of the young people of Derby and the neighbourhood,—the present reviewer amongst them,—had a special talent for training his pupils in the art of thinking, and for developing in them any faculty and originality of character they might possess. "From him," Mr. Mozley says, "I had derived a constant repugnance to all living authority, and a suspicion of all ordinary means of acquiring knowledge. From him I had learnt to believe that what you were simply taught you did not really learn; and that every man who wished to know things really must rummage them out for himself in all sorts of ways, the odder, the more out of the way, the more difficult, all the better."

Perhaps it is, at least in part, due to the influences of early training and association, that Mr. Mozley is moved to make the curious and interesting confessions and speculations on the subject of the orthodox doctrines of his own Church, which occupy the closing chapters of his book. They contain a mixture of sound good sense and wholesome sentiment, with that amount of mild casuistry and half-conscious sophistry which was required to enable him to act as an energetic distributor of the "Tracts for the Times," to do duty as a country clergyman, and for a time as editor of the "British Critic," and frequent writer in it, without coming to any very decided conviction on many subjects on which a clergyman, and one of the intimate associates of Newman, might have been supposed to have made up his mind. Some strong opinions, indeed, he has consolidated out of the results of his long experience; but they are hardly those which we should expect in a clergyman to whom "it was a passion and a pride to be orthodox." He cannot remember the time when he liked the Thirty-Nine Articles; and he does not think that any one else likes them. The Catechism is a millstone tied to the neck of the Church of England. "The notion of an eternal and hideous punishment, not for one's own sins alone, but for the misfortune of being descended from Adam, lay, for at least half my life, as an incubus on my soul." To the doctrine of the Trinity a separate chapter is devoted, and

its seven pages are full of heretical applications of reason and common sense. With regard to the word "Person," as applied to the God-head, he ventures to confess that the word has often suggested to him, "that the evil being who has certainly much to do in the affairs of the Church, has intruded this word as the most effectual difficulty language and thought could supply to the simple and proper reception of divine truth." Or again, he asks "where the idea of Threeness is expressed in the New Testament with a doctrinal sense and force. Where is the Triune God held up to be worshipped, loved, and obeyed? Where is He preached and proclaimed in that three-fold character?" "To me," he presently says, "the whole matter is most painful and perplexing; and I should not even speak as I now do did not I feel on the threshold of the grave, soon to appear before the Throne of all Truth." The conclusion, however, to which we are brought to is that "in religious matters everybody expects to be called on to say what he does not understand; and they who impose the words evidently are the last to wish them to be intelligible." The whole of Mr. Mozley's theological discussion affords a curious study of a mind so frank and almost unconscious in its self-portraiture, that we feel we need hardly say a word of moral criticism or judgment on the positions assumed. He speaks with much feeling of the period of doubt and difficulty, both intellectual and spiritual, through which he has passed, and out of which he at one time thought of escaping to seek rest in the Church of Rome, "distracted and wearied with discussions above my measure, my faculties, and my attainments." He chose the more usual part, the *via media*, believing, as it is so easy and convenient to do, that he was called by Providence to stay in the position in which he found himself, and which it required a mighty effort to advance or to recede from, and only an uncertain amount of continual self-repression and self-effacement to retain. It is not every one, however, who would have the courage to state and discuss the position so openly and simply as Mr. Mozley has done.

Our readers will find that we have only been able to touch on a few of the interests which crowd the pages of this genial and original book. We can safely predict that its reception will be registered among the pleasantest of the author's reminiscences.

SOME OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED.

AMONG the books which have been forwarded to us for review, we note the following:—*Capital and Population: A Study of the Economic Effects of their Relations to each other.* By FREDERICK B. HAWLEY. New York: Appleton. 1882. (Contains an argument for *Protection*, founded on Mill and Ricardo, and is "substantially a critique upon Mill's 'Principles.'")—*The Scientific Basis of National Progress, including that of Morality.* By G. GORE, LL.D., F.R.S. Williams and

Norgate. 1882. (Present knowledge only enables us to maintain our present state, and national *progress* is the result of *new* ideas, and the chief source of new ideas is original research.)—*Evolution, Expression, and Sensation, Cell Life and Pathology*. By JOHN CLELAND, M.D., F.R.S., Professor of Anatomy in the University of Glasgow. Maclehose. 1881. (Lectures, Addresses, and Articles republished from Scientific Journals.)—*Modern Metrology: a Manual of the Metrical Units and Systems of the present Century*. By LEWIS D'A. JACKSON. Crosby Lockwood. 1882. (Copious and minutely-accurate tables; with a vast amount of useful information.)—*Chapters from the Autobiography of an Independent Minister*. Williams and Norgate. 1882. (Amusing, and partly descriptive of real persons and events, but wants the impress of genuineness.)—*The Perfect Way; or, the Finding of Christ*. Field and Tuer. 1882. (A curious and puzzling mixture of natural religion, mythology, science, hermetic philosophy, ultra-symbolical and mystical interpretation of Scripture, &c., offered as the one reconciling religion of the future.)—*A History of the Christian Religion to the Year Two Hundred*. By CHARLES B. WAITE, A.M.. Chicago: C. V. Waite. 1881. (A collection of translations of some of the chief documents connected with the history of Christianity in the first two centuries. Must be used with due critical discrimination.)—*The English Revisers' Greek Text, shown to be unauthorised except by Egyptian Copies, discarded by Greeks, and to be opposed to the Historic Text of all Ages and Churches*. By G. W. SAMSON, President of the Bible Workers' College. New York and London: Trübner. 1882. (The famous *Quarterly Reviewer* may accept Mr. Samson's conclusions, but even he will hardly be satisfied with all his statements and arguments.)—*Christian Doctrine in the Light of New Testament Revision*. By ALEXANDER GORDON, M.A. Christian Life Publishing Co. 1882. (The substance of a popular Lecture, rewritten and expanded. The author finds that the main features of Unitarian Theology are vindicated and cleared all through the revised version.)—*Recollections of Twenty Sunday Afternoon Addresses*. By JOHN PAGE HOPPS. Williams and Norgate. 1882. (Contains not the "skeletons," but the soul and spirit of some simple and earnest religious addresses.)

NOTE.

THE Editor regrets the unavoidable postponement of an Article on Ralph Waldo Emerson, by his intimate friend of many years, the Rev. W. H. Channing, who has been prevented by indisposition from completing his promised contribution in time for the present number.

THE MODERN REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1882.

THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION IN ITS RELATIONS TO THEISM.*

[The following Address had been in preparation, by request, as a reply to one previously delivered by the then President of Sion College, before Mr. Darwin's death. I purposely dwelt chiefly on the *Cosmical* Evolution, as a matter on which scientific men are now generally agreed; and did not attempt to do more, in regard to *Biological* Evolution, than show that the same general doctrine applied also to it.]

THE subject on which I am to address you can only be profitably discussed, when the ground has been previously cleared of all misconception as to the relative claims and limitations of Science and Theology, and the boundaries of the two have been distinctly marked out. Dr. Martineau has told us that the object of Science is to determine the *Order* of Nature, whilst it is the function of Theology to determine its *Cause*; but this definition would not be accepted by those who find in the interaction of the *physical forces* a sufficient account of the phenomena of Nature; and I should rather define the province of *Science* as the interpretation of the phenomena of Nature from the stand-point of Physical causation, whilst Theology interprets them from the stand-point of Moral causation.

* An Address delivered at Sion College, May 15th, 1882.

Now, although the two conceptions we thus frame differ essentially in their aspect and character, yet, as I shall endeavour to show, they are perfectly consistent with each other.

The Scientific conception of Causation has recently undergone a remarkable change, which has scarcely yet received its formal recognition. Most of you, I presume, are familiar with the discussions by which the minds of the logicians of the last century and the first half of the present were exercised, as to its real nature. While Hume and his followers admitted nothing but invariable and unconditional *antecedence*, as the "cause" of a phenomenon, excluding altogether that notion of *force* or *power* which was expressed by the term "efficient cause," there has always been a school of scientific men, who have maintained that this notion is not only accordant with the fundamental instincts of the human mind and the uniform teachings of human experience, but is justified by the highest scientific reasoning. And I hold it to be not the least of the vast services rendered to Science by Sir John Herschel, that by constantly keeping this great principle in clear view, he prepared the way for that general recognition of it, which has latterly come about almost insensibly, as a result of those researches into the mutual relations of the Physical Forces, which have culminated in the general doctrine of the Conservation of Energy. For even John Stuart Mill, who was the most powerful upholder of the Hume doctrine, had come, in his later years, to perceive (what I had frequently urged upon him at an earlier period) that when the assemblage of antecedents is analysed, they are always found resolvable into two categories—the force or power which *produces* the change, and the material collocations which constitute the *conditions* of its exercise. Thus—to use one of Mill's own illustrations—although we speak of a man's fall from a ladder as "caused" by the slipping of his

foot or the breaking of a rung (as the case may be), the efficient cause is the attractive force of the Earth, which the loss of support to the man's foot brings into operation. And now that Heat, Light, Electricity, Magnetism, Chemical Affinity, and Vital Agency, are universally admitted to be only varied expressions of different kinds of movement among the *particles* of matter, sustained by the same agency as that which, when it acts on *masses* of matter, produces or resists mechanical Motion, the "efficient cause" of every phenomenon in Nature is sought in the action of one or other of these Forces, and the determination of the conditions of that action becomes the primal object of scientific inquiry.

The first result of this study is the recognition of *uniformity* in the action of these Forces; like results happening under like conditions; and diversities in the conditions being attended with corresponding differences in the results. And it is from observation and comparison of the conditions of the phenomena of Nature, that the materials are obtained for those general expressions of them which are termed *laws*. Thus, by letting fall weights from different stories of the leaning tower of Pisa, and accurately noting the times of their respective descents, Galileo was able to frame that very simple expression of the uniform relation between the space fallen through, and the square of the time occupied in the fall, which constitutes the Law of Terrestrial Gravitation. This enables us to predict, with what we call scientific certainty, how many feet a heavy body will fall-through in a given period of time; but this certainty has no other basis than our own confident expectation, that what has always (so far as our knowledge extends) proved true in the past, will prove equally true in the future. For the "law" has no power *in itself*; only by a false analogy with the law of a State, can it be said to "govern" or "regulate" the phenomena which it enables us to predict. In short, though

perhaps ninety-nine persons out of a hundred would reply to the question why a stone falls to the ground, "because of the law of gravitation," this answer would be only tantamount to saying, "Because *all other stones*, if unsupported, similarly fall to the ground," which is obviously no explanation at all. But when we express this general fact "in terms of force," taking as a fundamental fact of human experience the downward pull which we feel the Earth to exert upon every body which we raise above it by our own effort, we bring it home to our own consciousness of personal agency, which, as I shall presently show, constitutes the connecting link between the Scientific and the Theological conceptions of Nature.

The attributing to "properties of matter" the phenomena which we witness in the Universe around us, is only another mode of expressing the fact of those uniformities, which Science finds it convenient to employ, and does not give any other "explanation" of any one of them, than that which consists in showing it to be a particular case of a general fact. Thus, when the genius of Newton recognised in the deflection of the Moon's motion from the straight path into an elliptic orbit round the Earth, a phenomenon of the same order as that which brings to the ground in a parabolic curve a cannon-shot fired obliquely into the air, and extended the same conception to the orbital revolution of the Earth and other Planets round the Sun, he perceived that even these were only cases of the still more general fact, that *all* material bodies attract one another with forces proportional to their respective masses, and inversely as the squares of their distances, which expression is known as the Law of Universal Gravitation. Now the attributing this general fact to a universal property of mutual attraction inherent in every particle of matter, is really but another mode of expressing the same thing, a mere figure of speech, which no more *accounts for* the phenomenon,

than does its similarity to any number of other phenomena.

Let me illustrate this by reference to a "property" which is not universal. I might place before you two bars of iron, exactly resembling one another in every particular of which our senses can directly inform us, such as size, weight, external aspect, and internal texture, as shown by fracture; and yet one of them, under certain conditions, exerts powers of which the other shows itself to be altogether destitute. When brought near to a piece of iron, it draws it to itself with a force of which we become conscious in endeavouring to resist it; and even from a considerable distance it deflects a compass-needle from its true position, in a manner altogether dissimilar to that which happens when the other bar is brought near it. From observation of these facts, I can predict that if both these bars be buoyed-up so as to float on water, one of them will soon settle itself in a north and south direction, and will return to that direction whenever deflected from it; while the other will remain in any position in which it may be placed. And I distinguish the former as having "magnetic properties" of which the latter is destitute. Further, my knowledge of the laws of magnetic science enables me to predict that by moving the magnetic bar in a particular manner over the non-magnetic bar, I can render the latter also magnetic, or, as may be said, can impart magnetic properties to it; but as this cannot be done to a bar of gold or silver, copper or lead, we say that iron is distinguished from metals generally by its capacity for being magnetized. Now, this is clearly no *explanation* of the phenomena which we trace to the action of magnetic force; it is simply a general expression of one of the conditions under which that force is exerted; and the embodiment of our knowledge of those conditions into such general expressions, enables me to predict other phenomena at first sight

having no relation to them. Thus we have the scientific certainty that the magnetic bar, when moved within a coil of copper wire, will generate in that wire an electric current, which, when conducted to any distance, and made to pass in a coil of wire around a soft iron bar, shall render it capable of attracting iron, deflecting the compass-needle, and so on. Thus, to say that a piece of iron has magnetic properties, is only another way of saying that it is a magnet; but whilst the ancients only knew of a magnet as having the power of attracting iron, we know that it is capable of doing many other things; and of this capacity, the phrase "magnetic properties" is nothing more than a convenient expression, embodying the general fact that the piece of iron which is shown to be possessed of any one of them, possesses all the rest.

I might follow the same train of reasoning into every department of scientific inquiry, and show that what has been called the "promise and potency" of matter is nothing else than a phrase embodying a general conception of the various uniformities observable in its actions, and not helping us in the least degree to an explanation of those uniformities. But as the real significance—or, rather, *unsignificance*—of the term "property" becomes most apparent when it is used to designate the respective potentialities of different species of organic germs, I shall defer until the latter part of my address what I would further say upon this point.

One of the most remarkable among the many doctrines which have been recently propounded to account for particular groups of Physical phenomena, is that known as the Kinetic Theory of Gases; to which the eminent ability of the late Professor Clark Maxwell gave such a remarkable development, that, according to the statement of one of its ablest expositors (Professor Tait), it is "capable of explaining almost everything that we know with reference to the

behaviour of gases, and, perhaps, even of vapours." The application of high mathematical reasoning to the facts of observation seems not only to justify, but to necessitate, the conclusion, that the ultimate particles of all kinds of gaseous matter are constantly darting about in all directions, with enormous rapidity, and impinging not only against each other, but against the walls of any space in which any portion of gas may be enclosed; the rates of movement of the particles of different gases, and the number of their impacts against each other, being very diverse, though constant for the particles of each gas so long as its conditions remain the same. Thus the particles of hydrogen are moving at the rate of something like 70 miles in a minute, and every particle has an average number of 17,700 millions of collisions with other particles, by each of which its course is changed; whilst in atmospheric air (in which the mixture of oxygen and nitrogen has become so complete that it behaves itself in this respect like a single gas), the particles have an average velocity of only one-fourth of that of hydrogen, and the number of collisions for each particle is only half as great. But though the hypothetical assumption of these molecular movements in the gaseous particles, is said to "explain" all their sensible actions—such as their escape from the vessels in which they are imprisoned, and the uniform diffusion of one gas through another—it really does nothing more than carry us a step higher in generalisation. For supposing we accept this hypothesis as a fundamental fact in Physics, the question remains as to the *source* of the movements, and the nature of the *force* by which they are sustained. And it does not help us in the least to attribute them to an inherent activity of matter; seeing that our only conception of that activity is based on observation either of the movements or of the phenomena from which those movements are inferred; just as the old notion that "nature abhors a vacuum," merely expresses the general fact that air or water will rush in to

fill a void space, without giving us any understanding of why it does so.

It is not a little instructive to find that two such masters in the philosophy of science as Clark Maxwell and Sir John Herschel, agreed in the view they took as to the *ultima ratio* of any attempt to explain the constitution of the Universe by the "properties" of its component atoms. For any such attempt—as Sir John Herschel long since pointed out—lands us in the conception of a very limited number of *groups* or classes of atoms, distinguished by their several attributes; each group, however, consisting of an almost infinite number of *individuals* precisely resembling one another in their properties. "Now, when we see a great number of things precisely alike, we do not believe this similarity to have originated except from a common principle independent of them; and this conclusion, which would be strong even were there only two individuals precisely alike in *all* respects and *for ever*, acquires irresistible force when their number is multiplied beyond the power of imagination to conceive. If we mistake not, the discoveries alluded to effectually destroy the idea of an *eternal self-existent matter*, by giving to each of its atoms the essential characters at once of a *manufactured article* and a *subordinate agent*." *

Thus, then, whenever we witness any change in the material world for which we desire to account, we are led by scientific reasoning to seek for the *force* which produced it; and only when we have succeeded in finding this, do we consider that we have rationally explained the phenomenon. But whence the Force? Science now teaches us to look for the source of it in the transformation of some other kind of energy; as when the production of heat by the burning of coal is turned, in the steam engine, to the maintenance of mechanical motion, which, communicated to a dynamo-machine, generates an electric current, which, in its turn,

* "Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy," p. 38.

may be made to produce heat, light, mechanical motion, or chemical action. But, as Sir John Herschel pointed out, "In our own performance of a voluntary movement, we have a consciousness of *immediate and personal causation* which cannot be disputed or ignored; and when we see the same kind of act performed by another, we never hesitate in assuming for him that consciousness which we recognise in ourselves."

The Physiologist, above all others, is forced, as it seems to me, by the experience of every day, of every hour, and even of every minute, to recognise the mutual convertibility of Physical and Moral Agency;—the pricking of our skin with a pin producing a change in our state of feeling; and a mental determination calling a muscle (or set of muscles) into a contraction which generates mechanical power. And thus a bridge of connection is established between Physical and Moral Causation, which enables us to pass without any sense of interruption or inconsistency from the Scientific to the Theological Interpretation of Nature, as here formulated:—

PHENOMENA OF NATURE.

SCIENTIFIC INTERPRETATION.

Physical Causation.

FORCES OF NATURE.—Designations of varied modes of operation of *one force* acting under diversified physical conditions.

LAWS OF NATURE.—Generalised expressions of past uniformities observed in the action of the Forces of Nature, leading to the expectation of similar uniformities in the future.

THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION.

Moral Causation.

POWERS OF NATURE.—The designations of varied modes of manifestation of one and the same Personal Agency throughout the Material Universe.

ORDER OF NATURE.—The expression of the continuous and uniform action of a Supreme Intelligence, as apprehended by the intelligence of Man.

With these views of the relations between Science and Theology, I have never myself been able to see why anything else than a complete harmony should exist between

them. True it is that there have been, from time to time, Men of Science, who, from what I believe to be an equally limited and illogical conception of the subject, have drawn the conclusion that there is "no room" for a God in Nature; the "properties of matter" being, in their view, all-sufficient to account for the phenomena of the Universe and for the powers and actions of the Human Mind. But this seems to me only a natural reaction against what all history teaches, as to the constancy with which, ever since Science emancipated itself from Theology and set up for itself, it has been hampered and impeded in its search for the truth as it is in Nature, by the restraints which Theologians have attempted to impose upon its inquiries. The Romish Church, adopting the philosophy of Aristotle into its own theological system, opposed as heretical every attempt to call in question the authority of Aristotle, even as to matters of fact; and while it could not repudiate the proof afforded by the experiments of Galileo, that a weight of 10 lb. does *not* (as affirmed by Aristotle) fall ten times faster than a weight of 1 lb., it judicially condemned him as an impious heretic, for daring to teach that the Earth moves round the Sun. And Protestant divines in this country, equally taking their stand upon infallible authority, but shifting its basis from the Church to the Bible, have no less vehemently opposed any scientific inquiry which might throw a doubt upon the literal accuracy of the Book of Genesis. Thus it is within the remembrance of many of us, how the conclusions of Geologists as to the long succession of changes which had taken place in the crust of the Earth, and in the races of plants and animals which had peopled its surface, before the advent of man, were denounced as destructive of all religious faith; how, when obliged by the logic of facts to admit that the beginning of the world must be antedated indefinitely, theologians took a fresh stand upon the modern origin of Man, and did their utmost to discredit the evidence

crowding-in from all quarters as to his remote antiquity and the low condition of our primeval ancestors ; and how, when this evidence could no longer be gainsaid, they tried to uphold the universality of the Noachian Deluge,—with the miserable result of an ignominious surrender.

But I rejoice in the conviction that the true genius of Protestantism is now coming to be generally recognised as consisting, not in its opposition to the claims of the Church of Rome to infallible authority, but in its protest against any infallible authority whatever ; in its readiness to submit the basis of its religious system to the most searching criticism ; in its cordial welcome to every truth of science or criticism which has been accepted by the general voice of those most competent to decide upon its claims ; and in the freedom with which it surrenders such parts of its dogmatic systems, as prove to be inconsistent with those great fundamental verities of moral and physical science, whose domination over the educated thought of Mankind constitutes the basis on which alone the religion of the future can securely rest. It is not, in my view, by their re-assertion, with any amount of positiveness, of doctrines from which the educated thought of the age is drifting away, that the teachers of Religion will best combat what they designate as the “prevalent unbelief ;” but by showing themselves ready to profit by the lessons of the past, in regard to the futility of all attempts either to check the progress of inquiry or to stifle its results, and by placing themselves in hearty sympathy with the spirit of the present. Of that spirit, the noblest manifestation is to be found in the life of that great man whose departure from among us has drawn forth an expression of reverential sorrow, the universality of which speaks more eloquently than any words of the world-wide influence exerted by his thought. For in Darwin—as has been well said by one who knew him best—the *love of Truth* was more than his

animating motive, it was the *passion* of his intellectual nature. And its ultimate prevalence—whether including the acceptance or involving the rejection of his own system—was the firmest and most deeply-rooted of his convictions.

It is in this spirit that I ask you to follow me through the inquiry which constitutes the purpose of our present meeting.

I need scarcely tell those whom I am addressing that the general idea of Evolution is by no means new. A notion that the universe has not endured for ever in the form and aspect it now presents, has been entertained in all ages, and by all peoples of whose thoughts on the subject we have any record. In the Chaos of the old Greeks we have the type of confusion and disorder; in the void and formless waste of the Hebrews, the attempt to represent a primeval condition which could only be characterised by negations,

—a dark

Illimitable ocean, without bound,
Without dimension, where length, breadth, height,
And time and place are lost.

Out of this Chaos, divine power evoked order and harmony; the void and formless waste was made first to take definite shape in the separation of the firmament from the earth; the great lights were set in the one; the other was first clothed with vegetation, and then peopled with animated forms, beasts of the field, fowls of the air, fish of the sea; and last of all Man was called into existence, and dominion given him over all other creatures. And even those who at the present time regard the Mosaic Cosmogony as having an authoritative claim on their acceptance, are bound by it to regard Creation, not as an *immediate* but as a *progressive* act,—a gradual development, not the sudden springing of a complete universe out of nothingness. And this is equally the case whether the

“six days,” each with its evening and its morning, are received in their literal sense, or are lengthened into indefinite periods of time.

Lucretius and other “atomic” Philosophers attempted to give a definite shape to this conception; but it first found really scientific expression in the “Nebular Hypothesis” of modern Astronomy, the combined doctrine of Laplace and the elder Herschel. According to this, the original condition of the universe was a diffused “fire-mist” of unequal tenuity; the mutual attractions of whose particles would cause its denser portions to gather round them the rarer matters of the intervening spaces, would draw together the smaller collections thus formed into larger clusters, and would thus “evolve” out of the universally but unequally diffused nebular matter a limited number of separate substantial masses. At the same time, the inequality in the movements of the different parts of the condensing fire-mist would impart rotary motions to the clustering masses, just as whirlpools are formed in water, or whirlwinds in air, by the action of opposing currents; and such rotation would lead to the detachment of the outer parts of the clusters, which would then draw together into planetary masses. These would retain their rotary motion round their original centres, whilst acquiring, in the act of concentration, a rotary motion around centres of their own, and in their turn giving off their outer portions to form satellites.

As regards the Stellar Universe, this hypothesis mainly rests on the observations of the elder Herschel, which led him to the conviction that besides the nebulae which the power of his telescope enabled him to resolve into clusters of stars, there are some which are still in the condition of patches of diffused faintly luminous matter, in which the process of condensation has scarcely begun; others smaller but brighter, whose central parts look as if they would soon form into stars; others, again, in which stars had actually

begun to form ; and finally star-clusters, in which the condensation is complete. Among the nearer stars, again, which he considered to form part of our own particular cluster, he distinguished many which are not clear points of brilliant light, but are surrounded by a more or less extended bright haze, such as would be given out by an atmosphere of nebular matter in a state of progressive condensation. And he pointed to what are known as "variable" stars, as affording evidence that the heavenly bodies are not permanently what they seem to us at any one moment, or within the limited period of our observation of them, but are undergoing progressive changes, the several stages of which are presented to us in the various bodies now visible in the firmament,—just as the several stages of any one human life from infancy to old age are presented by the members of a single community.

Now Laplace did not begin, like Herschel, with the Stellar Universe ; but aimed to give a scientific account of the evolution of the Planetary system from the atmosphere of nebular matter, which he, in accordance with Herschel's ideas, supposed to have originally surrounded the Sun ; and the train of reasoning by which he worked this out on the lines I have already indicated, was one of mechanical deduction from the Newtonian laws of mutual attraction and motion. That these deductions were not only in accordance with the ordinary conditions of the Planetary system, but were also applicable to the exceptional cases of the ring of Saturn, and to the intervention of a multitude of Asteroids, in the place of a single Planet, between Mars and Jupiter, seemed to afford the same kind of confirmation to Laplace's theory, that Herschel's had derived from the different degrees of condensation observable among the Celestial bodies. And the wide basis of observation on which the Nebular Hypothesis of Herschel was erected, commended it to the minds of many who viewed with dis-

trust the reasoning process by which Laplace deduced the Solar System from the supposed nebular atmosphere of the Sun.

I have never been able to understand why this doctrine should have been the subject of so much Theological opposition. It was said to have been framed by Laplace with the express purpose of "doing away with the necessity for a Creator;" but though others may have used it (as many are now using the Darwinian doctrine) as an instrument of attack on Theistic belief, there is no trace, in his own exposition of it, of any but that purely scientific conception of orderly sequence, under the constant and uniform action of Physical Forces, in which there is assuredly nothing Anti-theistic. Let it not be forgotten that Newton, the devoutest Man of Science that ever lived, was reproached by the Theologians of his time for setting up forces of his own invention as a substitute for the Power of God; a charge of which every one now sees the absurdity. And yet Laplace merely extended the Newtonian doctrines of Force and Motion into the past, by showing how, under their continuous operation, a diffused nebulosity would evolve itself into a Solar System. Whence came the mutual attraction of its particles, which aggregated them into masses, and gave these masses their movements of rotation, it was not for him—any more than for Newton—to explain. To Laplace it must have been apparent, as it is to us, that the whole of this process of evolution implies a *commencement*,—that however far back we go in time, we come to a point at which the mutual attractions must have *begun* to exert themselves,—and that as a universal but *perfectly homogeneous* "fire-mist" (the only condition under which it could have existed from eternity) could not of *itself* have broken-up into separate parts, some account has to be given of its *heterogeneousness*, the existence of which has to be assumed as the starting-point

of the process. Hence it is obvious that, however remote that point to which we trace in thought the history of our Universe, we are still confronted with the impossibility of accounting by Physical Causation for its commencement; and further, that if we find our only explanation of this commencement in Moral Causality, we do not exclude the subsequent perpetual agency of Creative Will, because in scientific reasoning we speak of it in the language of Physical force. To the clear-seeing Theologian, the evolution of an orderly Cosmos, not by a fortuitous concourse of atoms, but by the continuous operation of mutual attractions according to a law of sublime simplicity, should furnish (as it seems to me) the sublimest exemplification of an Infinite Intelligence, working out its vast designs "without variableness or the shadow of turning."

But, it may be objected, the Nebular Hypothesis of Herschel and Laplace has been disproved by subsequent research. One after another of the Nebulæ, which Herschel regarded as consisting of unconsolidated "fire-mist," has been resolved by the superior power of modern telescopes into clusters of stars; and the mathematical reasoning of Laplace has been found not to stand the test of a rigorous scrutiny. This may be freely granted; and yet the general doctrine that the material universe has come into its present condition by a *process* of immense duration, and not by a single creative *act*, has received such a vast amount of support from new and unexpected sources, that I have no hesitation in affirming it to be accepted by all who are most qualified to judge, as having been now placed beyond the reach of discussion. Instead of starting from a hypothetical postulate, modern science reasons *backwards*,—in Astronomy as in Geology,—from phenomena presenting themselves to our own observation; and I shall briefly notice the *orders of facts* which seem to me of the greatest evidentiary value.

First in importance among these, is the certain distinction which the Spectroscope now enables the Astronomer to draw, between the nebulae which are clusters of stars, and those which consist of glowing gas. To the latter class belongs that great nebula of Orion, which was long considered a sort of "crucial instance" whereon the fate of the nebular hypothesis was to turn. The prolonged and minute study which the late Lord Rosse had made of this nebula, with the unequalled power (for that particular object) of his six-foot reflector, had previously led him to this conclusion; but Spectrum-analysis has placed it beyond doubt; and the fact acquires a new importance when the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy is brought to bear upon it. For "a nebulous body, in order to shine by its own light, must be hot, and must be losing heat through the very radiation by which we see it. As it cools, it must contract; and this contraction cannot cease, until it becomes either a solid body, or a system of such bodies, revolving round each other." (Newcomb.)

Another fact of supreme importance, resting not only on the indications given by the Spectroscope, but on chemical analysis of the Meteorites, which have now been ascertained to be planetary bodies revolving in regular orbits round the Sun, but to be deflected from these by the Earth's attraction when we cross their path,—is the *identity in elementary composition*, not only among the bodies included in our Solar System, but throughout the innumerable solid and vaporous masses of which the Stellar Universe is composed. And it is not a little curious that a link between these two orders should be supplied by those wandering bodies—the Comets—of which many seem to belong to both; not properly belonging to our System, but presenting themselves within it as occasional visitors from the celestial spaces. Not only does this identity add immensely to the strength of the presumption as to the identity in Physical origin of the

entire Universe, but it also gives an entirely new meaning to the facts previously determined by Astronomy in regard to the relative specific gravities of the Sun and Planets. For whilst the Earth weighs more than five and a half times as much as a globe of water of the same bulk, Mercury rather more in proportion, and Venus and Mars nearly as much, the specific gravity of the Sun is only one-fourth that of the Earth, that of Jupiter a little less, that of Uranus and Neptune only a little above that of water, and that of Saturn so much *below* it, that if his globe were thrown into water it would float like a cork. Now so long as nothing whatever was known about the chemical composition of the heavenly bodies, it might be not unreasonably surmised that the several Planets might be composed of different materials. But now that we have evidence of their identical composition, their differences in density suggest differences in degree of condensation. And this suggestion derives a most remarkable confirmation from the fact, that the *greatest* density shows itself in those *smaller* planetary bodies which would have cooled the most quickly, and which have therefore more or less nearly reached their final stage; whilst the *least* presents itself in the *larger* masses, whose slower loss of heat would retard their condensation. The smallest planetary body of whose constitution we have any knowledge,—the Moon,—is the one whose consolidation is most complete; even the gases and vapours which form atmospheres round the Earth, Mars, and Venus, being fixed in its solid substance. And of the relative rapidity of its cooling, we have further evidence of the most convincing nature, in the intensity of the former volcanic activity, which shows itself in the multitude of gigantic extinct craters by which its surface is now made rugged,—that activity having been due (there can be no reasonable doubt) to the rapid contraction of a solidified crust upon a still molten interior. In the ring of

Saturn, on the other hand, we have a no less striking exemplification, not only of the mode in which the detachment of the peripheral parts of the planetary masses may be presumed to have given origin to their attendant satellites, but of that earlier stage of condensation which consists in the aggregation of nebular matter into such assemblages of small solid separate masses as form the Meteor-streams with which we are now familiar, and also (there is reason to believe) the trains of Comets. For mathematical investigation has demonstrated that the ring of Saturn, or rather the system of concentric rings, cannot possibly be *solid*,—that it is in the highest degree improbable that it can be *fluid*,—whilst all the conditions of its continuous equilibrium are satisfied by the hypothesis of its consisting of streams of separate small solid masses, revolving as satellites round their primary, which may itself be presumed, from the specific lightness of its mass, to be still in a somewhat similar stage of incipient condensation.

Again, an entirely new series of mathematical investigations is now being followed out, as to the effects at present produced by *tidal* action in retarding the Earth's rotation, and the conclusions that may be justifiably drawn from the backward projection (so to speak) of that retardation, so as to apply it to an earlier stage of the history of our globe and its satellite. And one of its results affords so striking a confirmation of the doctrine that the existing state of things is the resultant of a long sequence of previous continuous change, that I shall ask your special attention to it. Assuming that the Moon was once in a fluid state, the Earth's attraction must have exerted a most powerful tidal influence upon it; and the retarding effect of these lunar tides would gradually diminish the rate of that rotation of the Moon upon her own axis, which theory would lead us to suppose that she must have originally performed. At present, as every one knows, she always turns the same face

towards the Earth, in virtue of a rotation on her axis which occupies exactly the same time as her orbital revolution. Now, this phenomenon has been a standing puzzle to Astronomers. Of course, it may be said that the Creator, when he set the Moon in the firmament, ordained that she should for ever turn the same face to the Earth. But no man of scientific habits of thought could rest satisfied with such a notion. The probabilities were many millions to one in favour of some *physical* cause for so singular an effect; and such a cause has recently been discovered by Helmholtz, who has shown that the continuous retardation produced by ancient tides would at last bring the Moon into the only attitude it could permanently retain without being subjected to further incessant disturbance.

One more important evidentiary fact I have still to adduce, which forms the connecting link between Astronomical and Geological Evolution, and brings what may be now designated as the scientific certainties of the past history of our own globe, to bear on the history of every other body in the Universe. I refer to the determination of the *high internal temperature* of the Earth, which now rests upon so wide a basis of concurrent observations, that no one capable of scientifically appreciating their value any longer entertains the smallest doubt as to the fact. And this fact can only be rationally accounted for, as the result of gradual cooling of the entire mass from a temperature higher than that now possessed by its hottest interior, by the radiation of heat from its surface. For, as Sir William Thomson has tersely remarked, "If we were to find a hot stone in a field, we could say with entire certainty that this stone had been in the fire, or some other hot place, within a limited period of time."

Astronomical Evolution, then, lands us in the idea of a globe of molten matter, over whose surface a crust is beginning to form; and it is at this point that Geology takes up

the inquiry, and aims to give a consistent history of the long succession of changes which that crust has since undergone—in other words, to trace the “Evolution” of its existing from its primitive condition. Here, again, two distinct lines of inquiry may be pursued. One of these, leading us onward in Time from the assumed beginning, furnishes us with those great Dynamical conceptions, that help us to account alike for the vast movements whose evidence we trace in the elevation of continents and of mountain-chains, and for the local developments of heat which have shown themselves in volcanic action and in the metamorphism of sedimentary rocks; showing these to be the mechanical results of such inequalities of the rate of cooling of different parts of the surface, as may well be conceived to arise from the conditions of the previous condensation. The other, leading us *backward* from the present to the past, brings the various agencies which we know to be at present modifying the Earth’s surface to bear upon its previous history; enabling us “in the fall of rain and the flow of rivers, in the bubble of springs and the silence of frost, in the quiet creep of glaciers and the tumultuous rush of ocean-waves, in the tremor of the earthquake and the outburst of the volcano, to recognise the same play of terrestrial forces by which the framework of our continents has been step by step evolved.” (Geikie.)

I cannot suppose any one I am now addressing, to be ignorant of the doctrine as to which modern Geologists are now, I believe, in universal accord—that of *continuity* of change (not necessarily of uniformity in its rate) throughout the entire period of the Earth’s history. The old notion of universal interruptions, has given place to that of local changes analogous to those of which we have present experience; that of vast sudden convulsions, to slow progressive elevations or subsidences. The regular succession of stratified deposits, while interrupted in one portion of the earth’s

surface, is found to be completed in another. And the same proves to be the case in regard to the succession of those organic forms, whose remains are preserved to us in those deposits. For Palæontologists have long since been forced, by the "logic of facts," to abandon the idea that in each of the successive "periods" marked out by the earlier stratigraphical Geologists, the Earth was peopled by a set of Plants and Animals peculiar to that period—many of these forms being traceable with certainty, in the same spot, from one "formation" to another; whilst, when they disappear in one locality, they may often be found to have migrated to another. And thus, before the introduction of the Darwinian doctrine, the old notion of a succession of entirely new creations of Plants and Animals, to replace the Floras and Faunas which had, one after another, been swept away from the entire surface of the globe, was giving place to the notion of *continuous succession*—certain species dying out from time to time, as they have done even within our own limited experience, and these being replaced by others, of whose origin, however, Science could give no account.

Now, putting aside for the moment the question of the origin of new forms of Organic life, I would ask you to consider what is the real Theological bearing of this general doctrine of Continuous Evolution, whether Astronomical or Geological. As I have endeavoured to make clear to you, the very fact of its *beginning* implies a Moral cause for that beginning; and the experience we derive from our own sense of effort in producing physical change, justifies us in regarding the action of what we scientifically designate the "Physical Forces," as the expressions of a continuously acting Will. Now, I fearlessly ask, which is the higher Theological conception,—that of the progressive unfolding of a plan conceived in the first instance by the Infinite Wisdom whose counsels have not changed because the end has been seen even from the beginning, and of the continuous exertion,

with persistent uniformity, of an Almighty Power, which "fainteth not neither is weary" during these countless ages through which we are carried back by our cultured Scientific Imagination; or the anthropomorphic figment, conceived in the lowest stage of religious development, of an Artificer beginning the work of Creation (according to Archbishop Usher's Chronology) on the 23rd of October, 4004 B.C., proceeding with its successive stages for six days, and then, fatigued with his labours, taking a Sabbath day's rest, during which the newly-created world had to go on as it best could?

Passing, now, from the Evolution of the Inorganic Universe to that of the Organic forms with which our globe is at present peopled, I must content myself with the general statement, that no one who possesses a competent knowledge of the facts brought to light by the ever-widening extension of Palæontological research, can do otherwise than admit that they tend strongly and unmistakably in the direction of the doctrine of *continuity*—maintained by "descent with modification"—in opposition to the doctrine of successive creations *de novo*. And this doctrine is found to be in such singular accordance with the converging indications furnished by every department of Biological research, that, to almost every unprejudiced mind, its truth seems almost irresistible. Thus the Zoologist and the Botanist, who have been accustomed to classify their multitudinous and diversified types of Vegetable and Animal life according to their "natural affinities," find a real meaning in their classification, a new significance in their terms of relationship, when these are used to represent what may be regarded with probability as actual community of descent. The Morphologist, who has been accustomed to trace a "unity of type" in each great group, and especially to recognise this in the presence of rudimentary parts which

must be entirely useless to the animals that possess them, delights in the new idea that gives a perfect *rationale* of what had previously seemed an inexplicable superfluity. And the Embryologist, who carries back his studies to the earliest phases of Development, and follows out the grand law of Von Baer, "from the general to the special," in the evolution of every separate type, finds the extension of that law from the individual to the whole succession of Organic Life, impart to his soul a feeling of grandeur, like that which the Physical philosopher of two hundred years ago must have experienced when he came to recognise the full significance of Newton's law of Universal Gravitation.

I find myself quite unable to understand why the doctrine of Organic Evolution should have been stigmatised as Atheistic. We have before us the every-day *fact* of the "evolution" of Plants and Animals of every type from germs of a common simplicity; and, scientifically speaking, we must assign to each of these germs a determinate capacity for a particular mode of development, in virtue of which one evolves itself under certain conditions into a Zoophyte, and another (not originally distinguishable from it) into a Man. But if we do not, in so describing the process, set aside the Creator—any more than in scientifically describing the self-formation of a crystal—why should we be charged with doing so, if we attribute to the *primordial* germ that capacity for a particular *course of development*, in virtue of which it has evolved the whole succession of forms that has ultimately proceeded from it,—these forms constantly becoming more complex in organisation and more elevated in the scale of being? Attach what weight we may to the *physical* causes which have brought about this Evolution, I cannot see how it is possible to conceive of any but a Moral Cause for the endowments that made the primordial germ susceptible of their action. And of a *beginning*, we have even clearer evidence in the Organic than in the Inorganic world; since

it may be accounted as certain that there could have been no *Life* upon our globe, until its surface had so far cooled down that water could remain as a liquid in its depressions. And in the so-called *laws* of Organic Evolution, I see nothing but the orderly and continuous working-out of the original Intelligent Design.

There are some, however, who feel no difficulty in accepting the doctrine of Evolution as regards the Animal and Vegetable Creation generally, but nevertheless cannot bring themselves to believe that it is equally applicable to Man; whose place in Nature, it is contended, is *psychically* so far above that of the creatures which most nearly approach him *physically*, as to justify his being placed on a different platform. Now, I recognise to its fullest extent the weight of this objection; for whilst freely admitting (as the result of my own life-long study of Comparative Psychology) the possession, by many among the higher animals, of reasoning powers and moral attributes which are of the same *kind* as those of Man, however much below his in *degree*, I hold firmly to the conviction that Man, in his condition of fullest development, is essentially distinguished from them all, *first*, by his possession of a *self-directing power*, and *second*, by his *capacity for unlimited progress*. "The soul," says Francis Newman, "is that part of our nature which is in relation with the Infinite;" and I do not know what better definition could be given of it. And I should regard the possession of this "soul" as fully justifying the exemption claimed for Man, if it could be shown to be something distinctly added-on, at any given moment of his existence, to his previous capacities. The very contrary, however, is the fact, as I hope now to satisfy you.

Every human infant born into the world, began its existence nine months previously in the condition of a "jelly-speck," not to be distinguished by any recognisable

characters from what we may suppose to have been the primordial germ of the Animal World in general. This first evolves itself into an aggregate of cells, corresponding with that which represents a higher stage of Protozoic life ; and long before it shows any trace of the Vertebrate type of organisation, this aggregate shapes itself into a *gastrula* or primitive stomach—the common possession, at this stage, of all animals that rise above the protozoic condition, which is permanently represented in the Zoophyte. It is in a certain spot of the wall of this *gastrula*, that the foundation is laid, in all Vertebrate embryos, of that which is to become the brain and spinal cord, with its bony investment ; and this “primitive trace” of what is to constitute the essential part of the Human organism, does not differ in any essential particular from that of a Fish, a Frog, a Bird, or any ordinary Mammal. So, the early development of the Circulating and Respiratory apparatuses proceeds upon a plan common to all Vertebrates ; even the early Human embryo possessing the gill-arches which are to sprout into gills in Fishes and Amphibia, though they afterwards disappear in Man (as in Reptiles, Birds, and Mammals) with the development of the lungs and the diversion of the blood-circulation into them. When, in the progress of development, the distinctively Mammalian type comes to present itself, there is still nothing distinctive of Man ; in fact, the general configuration of the body is shaped out, and most of the principal organs have shown their characteristic structure, before the embryo presents any feature by which it could be certainly distinguished as *human*. And I may specially notice the fact that the *cerebrum*, whose great size and complexity of structure constitute Man’s most important differential character, is evolved as a sort of offset from the chain of Sense-ganglia, which is the real basis of the brain in all Vertebrates, and continues to represent it in Insects ; that it at first presents the small relative size

and simple organisation which we find permanently retained in the Kangaroo or Rabbit ; that, as embryonic life advances, it comes more to resemble the brain of a Dog or Cat, and then that of a Monkey,—the distinctly Human type manifesting itself last. This is marked, not only in the backward as well as forward extension of the cerebral hemispheres, but in the number and depth of the convolutions which extend the surface of their outer ganglionic layer, and bring it into closer relation with the capillary blood-vessels, on whose supply of oxygenated blood its whole subsequent activity is dependent.

Now, I cannot suppose any one of you to be ignorant of the fact, that the Human infant at its entrance into the world is *de facto* a mere automaton—its life-movements for some time being of a purely “ reflex ” character, such as may be carried on without even any exercise of consciousness. And for long after the child has begun to receive and register sensory impressions, has learned to understand articulate speech, and is acquiring knowledge of *ideas* as well as of objects of sense, any parent who attentively compares its psychical manifestations with those of an intelligent Dog will recognise the close correspondence between them. The uncontrolled dominance of impulses to action shows itself in both alike ; and in the training of one, as of the other, we have to make our appeal to the strongest motive. But the time comes when we can fix the attention of the Human child on the motive which he knows *ought* to prevail ; and in proportion as he acquires, by habitual effort, the power of regulating the exercise of his intellectual powers, and of controlling the action of his moral and emotional forces, in that proportion does he become responsible for his conduct, and capable of further self-elevation.

Thus, then, it is *a simple matter of fact*, revealed by continuous observation of the history of the Human indi-

vidual, that the very highest grade of humanity is only attained by a process of *continuous evolution* from the very lowest and simplest. For while his *bodily* evolution takes place in accordance with the plan common to the whole Animal Creation, the same is equally true of his *psychical*. The infantile condition is the same in all races of Mankind, and child-nature presents itself everywhere under an aspect essentially the same; but whilst in some races an arrest of development causes that nature to be retained through the whole of life, others present an ascending series of stages, that culminate in what we regard as the highest products of mental and moral culture. But even among the races which as a whole are most advanced, we find not individuals only, but grievously large numbers, in whom a bad heredity and depraved surroundings have tended to foster the lower animal nature at the expense of that which is distinctively human; and thus to rear a set of creatures which are morally far nearer akin to the brute, than they are to more elevated types of humanity. In these degraded outcasts we have the true types of *fallen* man; but it is now coming to be generally recognised by scientific men, that the early history of the Race generally, as now revealed by the study of its primeval conditions, has been one of *upward* progress; and that the time required to bring it up to the capacity for recording its doings, even by picture-writing, must be measured by thousands—not of years—but of centuries.

If, then, we have to trace back *our own* ancestry to a primeval type now represented by races whose limited capacity makes them incapable of receiving any culture much higher than their own (save through an education prolonged through many generations), why should we shrink from attributing to these last the ancestry to which *their* bodily and mental organisation distinctly points? And why should we assume, in the case of Man, a special *creative* exertion

of Divine power, when everything points to a *continuity of the same original plan of action*, that has previously manifested itself in the progressive evolution of the highest Mammal from the primordial jelly-speck?

To myself the conception of a continuity of action which required no departure to meet special contingencies, because the plan was all-perfect in the beginning, is a far higher and nobler one than that of a succession of interruptions, such as would be involved in the creation *de novo* of the vast series of new types which Palæontological study is daily bringing to our knowledge. And in describing the process of evolution in the ordinary language of Science, as due to "secondary causes," we no more dispense with a First Cause, than we do when we speak of those Physical Forces, which, from the Theistic point of view, are so many diverse modes of manifestation of one and the same Power. Nor do we in the least set aside the idea of an original Design, when we regard these adaptations which are commonly attributed to special exertions of contriving power and wisdom, as the outcome of an all-comprehensive Intelligence which foresaw that the product would be "good," before calling into existence the germ from which it would be evolved. We simply, to use the language of Whewell, "transfer the notion of design and end from the region of facts to that of laws," that is, from the particular cases to the general plan: and find ourselves aided in our conception of the Infinity of Creative Wisdom and Power, when we regard it as exerted in a manner which shows that not only the peopling of the globe with the Plants and Animals suited to every phase of its physical conditions, but the final production of Man himself—the heir of all preceding ages, with capacities that enable him to become but "a little lower than the angels"—was comprehended in the original scheme.

And, lastly, I would point out that the doctrine of

Evolution presents its greatest attractiveness, when viewed, not merely in its Scientific aspect, as the highest form of the Intellectual interpretation of Nature, but in its Moral bearings—as one which leads Man ever onwards and upwards, and encourages his brightest anticipations of the ultimate triumph of Truth over Error, of Knowledge over Ignorance, of Right over Wrong, of Good over Evil,—thus claiming the earnest advocacy of every one who accepts it as scientifically true. And it is under this conviction that I have now brought the subject before you ; in the hope of, at any rate, weakening what I cannot but regard as the prejudices of some, and strengthening in others that disposition to regard it favourably, which its cordial acceptance by many of the ablest leaders of Religious Thought may have already engendered.

WILLIAM B. CARPENTER.

*DR. KUENEN'S HIBBERT LECTURES.**

DR. KUENEN ingeniously discovered an unappropriated, but most important, aspect of the history of religions, from which to regard it in the course of Hibbert Lectures, delivered by him last spring. Dr. Max Müller had gone deeply into the question of the essence of religion, of its origin, original character, and subsequent development, till it reached the stage of nature-myths exhibited in the early Indian Vedas, which were his proper theme. Yet in all those preliminary chapters we look in vain for any allusion to a division of existing religions into those limited to one nation, and those that spread from one nation to be adopted in an unlimited circle beyond. And Mr. Rhys Davids, while treating of Buddhism, one of the universal religions that sprang up on the soil of one of the typical national ones, does not, as far as I can see, emphasize the distinction in question. To have avoided this precise aspect of the religious systems of the world is no reproach to either lecturer. They had abundant and overflowing matter without it; and Dr. Max Müller's object was to classify religions according to their internal character, not according to their history. But the consideration that so many courses had already been delivered on the history of religions without any discrimination of the national and the universal, makes us rejoice that

* *Lectures on National Religions and Universal Religions.* Delivered in Oxford and London. By A. KUENEN, LL.D., D.D., Professor of Theology at Leyden. Hibbert Lectures, 1882. Williams and Norgate.

Dr. Kuenen has seen fit at once to supply the want. It is a distinction on which all speculators on the history of religion will find it profitable to ponder, and which may therefore well be found fruitful by future lecturers on this foundation. It is here introduced, in the most natural combination, in connection with a course dealing with the pre-eminently national religion—Yahwism,* or the religion of the Old Testament, and with the universal religion that sprang from it—Christianity; illustrating the subject by a subsidiary treatment of the two other known universal religions—Buddhism and Islám.

All religions begin by being national, if indeed even this is not too extensive an appellation to bestow on the small tribe held together by the same religious ideas. The tribe speaks the same language, and therefore holds the same ideas, for ideas are conterminous with words. Others, however near geographically, not having the same words, cannot hold the same ideas. The religious ideas and the practices resulting from them must in the primeval age have been extremely few and simple. Every family, indeed, in patriarchal times, when the family-bond—in far later

* This term is perhaps the best that could be adopted for the religion of the Old Testament—the worship of Yahweh. Mosaism means the system of the Pentateuch; Judaism, the post-exilian system of the tribe of Judah, when they became “Jews.” But the spelling, at least, is open to question. It is my strong opinion that changes in orthography should be made systematically (in all words of similar formation or origin) or not at all. Until, therefore, we are prepared to transliterate the Hebrew י and י in all proper names by *y* and *w* (writing Yoseph, Yoel, Yirmeyahu, Yeshayahu for Joseph, Joel, Jeremiah, Isaiah, and Hawwah, Washti, Ewil-Merodach, Awwin for Eve, Vashti, Evil-M., Avim), we ought not to introduce confusion by writing exceptionally *Yahweh* instead of *Jahveh*; if we do so, we obliterate all similarity to other names similarly formed from the imperfect tense (Jeremiah, Joseph, &c.), and act as perversely as one who should coin a new English word, based on a Latin in *afio*, and spell it *ashyun*, or *aishun*. Even as to pronunciation, there is no more reason for pronouncing the *j* correctly (i.e., as *y*) in *Jahveh* than in *Joseph*; or if any of us think there is, it should be done through special instruction about the word *Jahveh* being exceptional, just as is done without difficulty in the analogous case of *Hallelu-Jah*.

times regarded as the germ of the state-bond—actually was the state-bond, must have had its distinct religious rites. Of this we have many proofs wherever the separate life of the family has not been eclipsed by the later combination of many families to form a larger state—in the Latin gentes, the German and Norse clans, the Arabic families. When such adjacent clans had in progress of time found their common interest in dropping their separate existence, and gradually losing their dialectic differences of speech, and began to be fused into a larger nation, their language was enriched by the adoption into the common speech of words that had been the exclusive property of one only of the former clan; and, similarly, the ultimate religion was an amalgamation of the religions of all the clans. Thus a more complicated religion is the resultant, in which we shall not be surprised to find several distinct gods to represent each of the powers of nature or of the mind, and many distinct forms of ritual to propitiate the divine powers. In later times the separate origin of these deities, with similar attributes from distinct clans, is likely to be forgotten, and then systematising mythologists will attempt to discriminate them by their attributes—against the true history, if it could only be known; or, again, of two names, one will be accepted as the only true name, and the other explained away as an epithet. With such difficulties is the investigation of religions everywhere beset. As the original ideas, and even the language, of the early clans are generally pre-historic, or at best known only in very general outlines, it must in most cases be extremely difficult now to disentangle the complicated system. Who can say, for instance, what elements of the Roman religion are derived respectively from the Romans, the Latins, and the Sabines? or even what the Greeks owed to the Æolians, the Dorians, and the Ionians? Yet when once we recognise the fact that what we call the Religion of the Romans has been

brought together from these different sources, and is in no sense an organic whole, something can and must be done in this direction. Greater difficulties on the field of ancient history have been surmounted in epigraphy and in the recovery of lost languages.

It seems to result from this explanation of the origin of a national religion, that Dr. Kuenen's conception of it, while practically extremely useful in differentiating it from a universal religion, is not philosophically correct. If a national religion did not exist in the same form and extent from the beginning, but was itself the result of the fusion of many smaller religions—in which fusion, it ought to be observed, many earlier discordant elements perished altogether—then who shall set a limit to its power of absorbing new elements, even from perfectly foreign nations? We know that the Roman religion, especially under the Empire, did admit Syrian, Egyptian, and other foreign deities with their cultus; and it might be difficult to frame a rule by which these would be treated as extraneous accretions, while the earlier receipts from the Etruscans, or even the Sabines, would be admitted as essential factors; yet, if the latter are cast out, what is left to represent the Roman national religion? The solution of the difficulty seems to be found in objecting to the term National Religion as a description of any class of religions, or at least of those of highly civilised nations. It is to be objected to because it ignores the essential principle of Growth. A religion which has ceased to grow, to alter itself, to develop new forms, and to cast away dead and useless ideas and rites, is no longer a religion at all, but a superstition in the strict sense of the term—*superstes* from the time of its true life. The Nation itself does not exist through all centuries with the same dimensions; it grows on one side, falls off on another, according to natural affinities; and its religion is even less capable of being held

permanently within the same bounds. Indeed, the same impropriety attaches to a National Religion as to a National Church. The Church, as the institution embodying the religious ideas, appeals to the support of all souls united by a common faith, and experiences a loss of spiritual power as soon as she is tied down to one nation and made the instrument of one political constitution, no matter how enlightened or how generously disposed towards her.

The history of the formation of national religions, however, does not form the subject of Dr. Kuenen's lectures. He takes the term as *de facto* true of many religions which have never overleapt, or have never been calculated to overleap, the bounds of the nation in which they had their birth. And the only national religion whose history he actually presents to us in its full extent is that which is the most incontestably national of all—the Religion of Israel, from which was born in the fulness of time the most universal of all—Christianity. This is a connected history of the noblest types of religious thought and feeling known to the world, first national and then universal; it occupies the three middle lectures, and is preceded by an account of Islám, and followed by one of Buddhism—the two other religions which most plausibly contest with Christianity the title of Universal. The final summing up reminds us of the estimate previously made of the three great religions, and concludes with the comforting assurance that Christianity is the only one which is truly universal in principle and in spirit, and whose part in the religious influences in the world is not only not played out, but is destined to have a still greater future.

I shall not say much of Dr. Kuenen's treatment of Islám. He shows how much Mohammed owed to Judaism, and how he claimed to be restoring the ancient religion of Abraham. At the same time Mohammed cannot have had

any accurate knowledge of the Jewish Scriptures, for while he uses the names of Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac and Jacob, he betrays ignorance of their relation to one another, calling Isaac and Jacob sons of Abraham, and classing Ishmael as a prophet with Elisha and Jonah; besides which he speaks of the book-rolls of Abraham and Moses, as if he supposed Abraham to have been a writer and legislator like Moses. The results of recent criticism on the Qorán enable Dr. Kuenen to distinguish between its earlier and its later chapters, and thus to discover changes of view during the lifetime of its author, which are often historically important. The Qorán, Dr. Kuenen asserts, is the work of Mohammed alone, and his alleged teachers have no real existence. Further, Islám itself cannot be regarded "as the result of a national, though not universal, longing for something higher and better in the matter of religion. If such a need was felt at all, it was only in a very small circle, and in a very small degree. In one word, remove Mohammed, and neither Islám nor anything like it comes into existence." Indeed, "Islám is in a high degree, and far more than most other religions, the product not of the time or of the people, but of the personality of its founder." The explanation of the success of Mohammed, though he seems not to have been a specially creative genius, appears in the fact that his nature was truly religious, and that he was fired by the indignation aroused by his countrymen's polytheism, superstition, scepticism and irreverence, to speak with irresistible force like an old Hebrew prophet in the name of Allah, claiming for his Qorán a place among the sacred books. Thus he regarded his mission as directed not to the Arabs alone or pre-eminently, but to all without distinction, and expected the adhesion of the Byzantine emperor and the king of Persia, so that in its conception in the mind of its author Islám is truly universal. But, in fact, it turned out very different. Mohammed was an Arab of the Arabs—

his eye saw nothing beyond his own country and the adjacent states and religions of the Eastern Christians, Jews and Persians; and his utterances are directed solely to the elevation of the ideas of those around him, and the correction of the abuses he knew of; and, worse still, he is tempted to allow, in his would-be universal system, mere ceremonial matters which were firmly established among his own people and could not be easily uprooted, but which give to Islám a narrow and local character which is certain to prevent its ever attaining to universality: so for example he makes the Ka'ba or black stone at Mecca the central sanctuary, to which it is the duty of every Moslem to undertake a pilgrimage. And by attempting to confine his entire system within the bounds of his book, he quite prevented any further development of religious thought. When, therefore, his religion was adopted by or forced upon nations who had already distinct ideas of their own, no real blending or assimilation was possible; and Islám becomes in Java "the official cloak that is stretched over native society," and in Persia co-exists with the ideas of the old Zoroastrian faith. More than this,

Though Allah is called by preference "ar-rahmánó 'r-rahímó," the Compassionate and Merciful, yet he is "a god afar off." The people knows no other than Him, and, therefore, observes the religious duties imposed by Him, and appears at the stated time in His house of prayer; but this does not satisfy the wants of the heart, and the people therefore makes itself a new religion. At the graves of its saints it seeks compensation for the dryness of the official doctrine and worship.

The same judgment must be pronounced, Dr. Kuenen says, on Sufism, or mysticism, as upon the worship of saints. It was necessary to satisfy the religious aspirations of some souls, but it is rather a divergence from, than a legitimate growth out of, the principles of Islám. Similarly the Free-thinkers called Mo'tazilites, who maintained that the Qorán

was *created*, and who endeavoured to establish Islám as an ethical religion, in opposition to the orthodox view of the uncreated Qorán and the God who was subject to no other rule than his own caprice, failed to move the already stereotyped religion in a direction which might have led to universality. And, lastly, the modern movement called Wahhábism is an attempt to weed out all later accretions, and revert with the greatest strictness to the precepts of the Qorán alone ; of which Dr. Kuenen says :—

The Wahhábites have been called the Puritans of Islám. The comparison is not unjust. But whereas no serious historian would ever dream of simply identifying Puritanism and Christianity, Wahhábism really is Islám itself—Islám, the whole of Islám, and nothing but Islám. And this is the very reason why it bears such strong evidence against the universalism of Islám. A religion which can be restored in such a shape, with a well-founded appeal to its genuine sources, may meet the wants of the inhabitants of the desert which witnessed its birth—but there are other and higher demands which it cannot satisfy ; indeed, it wants the power so to transform itself as to meet the requirements of a higher type of life which in its present form it cannot satisfy. At a given period it becomes a hindrance to that development of the spirit which it must actually choke if it [the spiritual development] be not strong enough to cast it [the religion] off.

It may appear, on considering this line of argument, as if Dr. Kuenen bore rather hard on Islám. Why should the worship of saints, Sufic mysticism, and Free-thought be treated here as illegitimate accretions, whereas under Christianity the identically same phenomena, together with monachism, the Papal system of having a permanent head of the Church, and other developments of which the Founder and the New Testament know absolutely nothing, are allowed as modes of expansion natural or necessary to a religion whose aim is to be universal? If those accretions to Islám are to be pronounced illegitimate because Islám is not universal in spirit, whereas similar additions to early

Christianity are to be received because Christianity is, then *cadit quæstio* about universality. But obviously Dr. Kuenen cannot intend anything so one-sided or so foolish. His contention that Islám was the product of one mind, and its possibilities were shut up deliberately by the founder himself within the corners of one book, justifies him, he considers, in pronouncing movements whose aim is to satisfy longings which are either not named or condemned in the Qorán, illegitimate, and in declaring a movement which would bring back the simple dry literalism of the sacred text, to be of the very essence of Islám itself. Undoubtedly Islám stands in this respect on a very different basis from Christianity. Jesus did not write a book; and his companions, if they wrote the books attributed to them, produced no fixed and complete system of Theology—very little, indeed, which can fairly be used for dogmatic purposes—only very imperfect biographical notes, and a number of letters on certain religious needs of some of the earliest Christian congregations. If therefore it is fair to judge Islám by the precepts of the Qorán, by which it was to stand or fall, then at least Christianity is not tied in any similar way. And Dr. Kuenen decides that it is fair to judge Islám thus. He is undoubtedly right from a legal point of view. Mohammed did what he could to restrain the free development of religion by making his religion co-extensive with his book. But is it altogether right to regard the entire subsequent development of Islám from the standpoint of the wishes of the "pious founder"? Movements, political as well as religious, continually outrun the calculations of those who set them going; but we do not therefore condemn the founder, or say that his principles were wrong because they led to a fuller development than any that he could foresee. So here, though it may be true that the Sufites were mystics rather in spite of, than through, their adhesion to Islám, and likewise that in

Mohammed himself and his book there was very little of a mystic character, yet I should hesitate to declare Sufism an illegitimate accretion. Mystically disposed souls will find anywhere something that they can read in a mystic sense, and the Sufites did find such even in the Qorán. In the Christian world, if there had not chanced to be among the early converts some one to write the Gospel attributed to St. John, the mystic element, which was to play so important a part in medieval Christianity, would be judged to be without any ancient justification. The capacity of, and the possible development inherent in, a religion which has a long history must be judged *a posteriori* by the facts of that history; the intentions of the founder, even when documentarily reduced to writing, as in the case of Mohammed, cannot have anticipated every possible development, and visited it beforehand with sanction or disapproval. It is indeed quite possible to go further, and to contend that the limitation of view was the necessary fault of the age and the locality, and that the same Mohammed, living in the nineteenth century, would omit many of the sayings which sound to us the most bigoted, cruel, or foolish, and speak in a different—a higher and purer—tone. Though it is impossible to prove the truth of such speculations, yet justice demands that we should not lose them altogether out of sight.

Dr. Kuenen next approaches the more generally interesting, and, intrinsically, also more important, subject—Judaism and Christianity. His contributions to the interpretation of the Old Testament, and especially to the true historical sequence of the forces which combined to form the religion of Israel, are well known in this country, first through the work of Bishop Colenso, who used largely his early work, "*Historisch-kritisch onderzoek naar het opstaan en de verzameling van de boeken des Ouden Verbonds*" (Historical and

critical investigation into the origin and collection of the books of the Old Testament), and still better through his later book (in which his views are modified and matured), translated as "The Religion of Israel." The historical principles which guide him in his investigations are mainly these: When he finds in the historical books apparent inconsistencies, anachronisms, evidence of plurality of authorship, and of partisanship, which seems to throw doubt upon the truthfulness of the historian, he takes refuge in other books—especially in the Prophets, whose authorship is known and whose evidence is above suspicion—in which incidentally a good deal of history is contained, and endeavours to reconstruct the history from them. The result thus obtained is then compared with the picture given in the historical books, in order to discover the relation between the two classes of books, to discover the standpoint of the latter, and the reasons for their divergence from the picture presented by the former. With the historical books may be classed the Pentateuch, which exceeds all in the divergence of teaching of its different parts, and upon which scholars have worked hard in speculation for more than a century to classify its contents and assign them to their several authors. It might be expected that a perfectly independent source, such as the Prophets, would throw much light upon the composition of the Pentateuch; and this is really the case. It has done more important service here in a few years than the speculations of the previous century, which had no such solid historical basis. It has rendered antiquated even the arrangement of the Pentateuch made by Ewald, and essentially adopted by Colenso, and by Dr. Kuenen himself in his "Onderzoek." Dr. Kuenen's principles of historical investigation will be recognised as essentially the same as those of New Testament critics, who study the undoubted Epistles of Paul as the oldest reliable documents of Christian history, and proceed with the facts thence elicited to determine the

age and authority of the more doubtful Gospels and Acts of the Apostles. It is obvious that his method could not have been tried while the authorship of the entire Pentateuch by Moses was an article of the creed of all critics. But it is no less evident that no advance in historical criticism was possible until some such mode of investigation as Dr. Kuenen's could be tried. And it need not surprise those who know anything of the innumerable inconsistencies of fact and of legislation discovered long ago in the Pentateuch, that Dr. Kuenen finds it to be not the product of one man nor of one age, but to be a complex, containing some of the most ancient sayings current in Israel, and constantly added to till the very latest age of the Hebrew history found in the Bible. Hence in these lectures but little use is made of the Pentateuch; more of the books of the Kings (Samuel and Kings), but most of the Prophets, whose age is known.

It has been said that Jahveh was the national god of Israel. No satisfactory theory derives him from any foreign people; and the prophets rely so constantly and confidently on the assertion that Jahveh is Israel's god, and Israel his people, that we feel bound to admit him to be the native conception of the Deity. Of course we deal solely with the historical period, commencing with the settlement of Israel in Canaan. Temples were erected to him in the earliest period at many places—Jerusalem, Beth-el, Dan, Shiloh—and ruder structures called "high places" all over the country; at all these sacrifices were offered, and at first any Israelite might perform the rite, but later there was a recognised order of priests to do it. In the regular domestic life Jahveh was remembered at all seasons: on the Sabbath, at new moon, at the feast for the rejoicing over the harvest, and at that for the shearing. Moreover, they consult Jahveh on every important event of life by means of an oracle, which is given by either a priest or a

prophet. Another sign, indicating how closely the idea of Jahveh as their god and protector was entwined with the whole existence of the Israelites, is the fact that their names were generally compounded with that of their god. This is the case with all the names that end in *jah*, and nearly all those that begin with J; to which class belong the great majority of the names of the Kings of Judah. This picture shows Jahveh to have been the national god, whom every class acknowledged, and to whom every individual in Israel testified in some way or other. Whatever evil might be said of Israel, it could not be affirmed that they failed to honour Jahveh.

But this is not the idea of the history of Israel that passes generally current. The current conception is that which the historian (especially of Judges and Kings) expresses when he moralises on the acts of a reign (as 1 Kings xv. 3-5, 2 Kings xv., &c.), and notably in the summary of the history at its commencement, in Judges ii. 7-23, and at the dissolution of the kingdom of Ephraim, in 2 Kings xvii. This conception is as follows:—A compact or covenant of mutual fidelity was made between Jahveh and Israel. To this the people remained faithful under Joshua; but after his death they went astray and served Baalim, were punished by Jahveh, repented under the force of affliction, and returned again to his service—to repeat the same process again and again. In Ephraim it was still worse; the people persistently worshipped the idols, would not listen to prophets who warned them of their folly, made two metal idols in the form of calves, performed idolatrous worship to Baal and the host of heaven, and sacrificed their children to Molech. And Judah imitated Ephraim in all this. The Chronicler gives essentially the same picture. According to this view the people were constantly idolatrous, and abandoned the service of Jahveh for that of Baal, Molech, Asherah, and other deities of neighbouring

nations, and a majority of their kings are distinctly named as taking the lead in these bad practices. Jahvism, therefore, is here *not* the national religion, but rather an ideal, conceived by prophets and exceptionally good kings, but too exalted for the common people. The national religion is pronounced by these authorities to be some form of idolatry.

The explanation of the discrepancy is not difficult. The prophets (to whom mainly we owe the former picture) are far from being satisfied with the religious condition of the people, although they do not generally accuse them of abandoning Jahveh. But while the object of their worship was the right one, the mode of worship and the spiritual condition of the worshipper might be all wrong. And this is exactly what the prophets are never tired of saying. Without repudiating sacrifices and other ceremonies in honour of Jahveh, they declare that what he loves is mercy, and not sacrifice; that he even hates their ceremonial feasts in honour of him when the heart is foul and the hands full of blood; and that he threatens to destroy them if they return not from their wicked ways. The authors of the latter picture, on the other hand, which represents the sin of the people to be not an irreligious spirit pervading their worship of Jahveh, but apostasy from Jahveh, take the law of the Pentateuch, and especially Deuteronomy, for their measure of right and wrong in religious matters. Now that law confines offerings and feasts in honour of Jahveh to the Temple of Jerusalem, and imposes many vexatious and troublesome conditions. Those, therefore, that had presented their offerings in an irregular manner had not presented any that the legalists could allow for a moment—they could only be treated as idolatrous, or as going after other gods. Hence these legal historians describe the people as false to Jahveh himself. This is perhaps a sufficient account of the discrepancy; but what *we* want is to

penetrate to the actual truth of the case, not merely to account for the different opinions held by different writers. In this the prophets are our safest guides.

Priests existed as an order from the first, though without the exclusive privileges afterwards accorded to them, since at first any Israelite might offer sacrifices. They were all of one family, and called themselves sons of Levi, the tribe to which Moses and Aaron belonged; and all Levites were priests, not the "sons of Aaron" only. The priests' special duty is to teach the people the ordinances of Jahveh, to determine the cleanness of sacrificial beasts, and to adjudicate in the matter of slaves, lost property, &c. The crime of the priests in Ephraim, according to Hosea, was that, being the instructors or interpreters of the will of Jahveh, they had not given the necessary instruction (*thorah*). But besides priests there were also prophets of Jahveh, who were not necessarily priests, though Samuel and some others were both priests and prophets. The prophets were a recognised, but not an hereditary order; they were distinguished by moral earnestness and courage. They gave the strongest proof that the worship of Jahveh was a real, genuine, and living faith, and prevented its degenerating into a mere official system of an *opus operandum*. Their strong faith in the power and the desire of Jahveh to reward the good and the pious, and to punish the wicked and the idolatrous, led them to utter prophecy, often of the nature of warnings or threats on the one side, and of exhortations and promises of good on the other. Hence it is very natural that in the eighth century the prophets began to write down their words, thereby furnishing us with the most remarkable religious literature that has been preserved from the ancient world. The theme of it all is, that Jahveh is Israel's god, Israel Jahveh's people. Amos anticipates a restoration of the house of David, after which Jahveh will never pluck the people out any more.

Isaiah says, Jahveh will gather together again the scattered remnants of his people. Jeremiah says, Jahveh will make a new covenant with his people, and this time will write his word upon the living tables of their hearts, that it may never be forgotten. But these glorious results are only to be obtained through a radical reformation of character, which they all urge as primarily necessary. The prophets preach strongly against the conduct of the people, and demand repentance from the unjust judges, declaring that only the righteous and truthful shall be safe. In short, they give to Jahveh an abiding ethical *character* in accordance with which he must act. The moral *attributes* assigned to him by the people are much less impressive, and do not so strongly impel him into action. To the prophets therefore righteousness is higher than patriotism, and they can conceive of Jahveh taking part with Israel's foes to administer a much-wanted chastisement; thus the Assyrians are called the rod of his wrath, and Nebuchadnezzar Jahveh's servant. We may also observe a change of view introduced by the prophets. At first Jahveh had been the god of Israel—believed by the Israelites to be the most powerful of the gods, but still only one among many gods of the nations—Moab had Chemosh, and Ammon Molech—the existence of whom it did not concern them to deny. But in the prophets' eyes Jahveh was not so much mighty as *holy*, and this conception, ennobled by the higher ethical meaning given by them to holiness, raised him to a different order of being from the heathen gods, and thus brought about the conception that he was the Only God, while the heathen gods were merely Vanity—*i.e.* Nothingness—or had no existence at all. This monotheism is taught explicitly in Deuteronomy and Jeremiah in the last quarter of the seventh century B.C.

The Assyrians first brought Israel into close contact with the politics and the influences of the great outer world.

The effect was to introduce heathen rites under Ahaz and Manasseh. But the prophets stuck firmly to Jahveh; when it appeared as if his power was gone, they declared that his power was as great as ever, and that he was only chastising the kingdom of Israel for their sins through the Assyrian, and anticipated a day of glory for Jahveh when foreign nations would serve him; and the second Isaiah prophesies that the "servant of Jahveh"—the faithful in Judah—would be a "light to the heathen." The same prophet advances further into details, and describes Cyrus as the "anointed of Jahveh," "Jahveh's friend, who shall accomplish all his good pleasure," and before whom, as Dr Kuenen paraphrases the passage, "Jahveh will clear away all obstacles, and will give him wealth, in order that he may acknowledge that Jahveh, the god of Israel, calls him by his name." And the exaltation of Israel was to be accomplished not only by the humbling of his foes, but also by the general acknowledgment of Jahveh; as the same prophet says, "My house shall be called a house of prayer for all nations." Thus had the purely national conception of Jahveh been gradually enlarged in the minds of the greatest of the prophets into Universalism.

But the minds of the people were not ripe for any such conclusion. Hezekiah's measures for purifying the worship vanished at his death without a trace. A more important attempt was made by Josiah, in whose reign a new *Thorah*—law, or divine instruction—the book of Deuteronomy, was suddenly announced to have been just found in the Temple—which modern historians interpret to mean (what is clearly the fact) that it had been recently composed. "Here," Dr. Kuenen says, "the prophetic aspirations of the time had found complete expression." But the writer, while making no change in the character of the sacrifices and feasts in honour of Jahveh, introduces one important novelty; probably through the experience that

the high places had served the purpose of maintaining a mingling of Jahveh-worship with the adoration of other gods, he confines the worship of Jahveh to the temple at Jerusalem. Yet this great attempt at reform, pressed by the king with all his authority, failed. Josiah was killed on the battle-field of Megiddo, and none of his few successors till the fall of the monarchy and the Exile supported it. In the Exile the ideas of the Deuteronomist made no way; and at the Return a very different system of legislation, drawn up not by prophets, but by priests, and conceived throughout in the sacerdotal interest (contained in the books of Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers), was read aloud and solemnly accepted. This was the establishment of Judaism. The universalism of the *Israel* of the prophets was extinguished, and the particularism of the *Jewish* creed had triumphed.

Judaism—the religion of the Jewish people from Ezekiel to Ezra—was manipulated by the priests. It does not entirely set aside the works of the prophets, for there are points of contact between them—both insisting on the severe greatness of Jahveh, though the priest thinks less of his goodness, and puts him further off from man. Still, the religion of the priests differed greatly; its highest conception is that of holiness, which is another word for purity; and this includes material chastity or cleanness, and consequently means of expiation for uncleanness, which brings in a whole system of expiatory sacrifices, in which the priests themselves are the necessary agents. In spite of the greatly-increased power thus acquired by the priests, Dr. Kuenen considers, rather oddly, that the prophetic idea has really triumphed:—

The conflict between the two conceptions of Jahvism has disappeared. If in the days of Jeremiah they still stood off one from the other so sharply that they might be called with no great exaggeration two religions, they are now reconciled. And

it is the conception of the small minority that has triumphed. It is true that it has not issued unscathed from the conflict. Something of its idealism is lost, and it has been forced to clothe its spiritual ideas in a material form. The victory has been dearly purchased, but who shall assure us it could have been won on any other terms? We may rest content with the actual result. And yet in one respect we feel that we can hardly do so. Was not the religion of the prophets on the very point of spreading its wings to pass beyond the boundaries of Israelite nationality?

Dr. Kuenen's mind, it is obvious from this extract, is almost evenly balanced. It may well surprise some of us that his conclusion is not the opposite. I, at all events, will not "rest content," and cannot but regard the fact expressed in the last sentence as outweighing all that may be said in favour of purchasing peace by sacrificing the most life-giving principles of the prophets.

The Jews now became truly a peculiar people; they separated themselves from the people of the land, and allowed no intermarriage with these. Their principles became apparently rigidly national; yet not entirely so, since religion and nationality no longer went necessarily together, and the former retained the adherence of many who were indifferent patriots, and preferred to live in foreign countries. But the religion was simply the *Thorah*, now understood as the Mosaic law; and it became more and more legal with time, and demanded learned *Scribes* to interpret every precept. Now that Jews were spread over many foreign countries, the *Synagogue* had its origin, probably in Babylonia, either during the captivity, or after it among the Jews who preferred to remain there. It is to be noted that Judaism now adapted itself much more than previously seemed possible to the conditions of various countries—to the Greek civilisation especially at Alexandria, to Rome, to Babylonia. Notwithstanding its sanctity, the *Thorah* itself was translated into Greek.

Still, while the Jewish religious system was advancing so rapidly in the direction of legalism and exaggerated veneration for the Torah, the ideas of the Prophets also were not forgotten; the Scribes perpetuated their books by copying, and read and preached from them in the synagogue. And we find them to be by no means unknown; on the contrary, Jesus, son of Sirach, glorifies Isaiah, and expressions implying the universalism of the prophets are found in late Psalms. Strangers to the race of Israel are now by the sacerdotal Torah allowed to form part of the political community, though not received into Israel. And probably many did settle there, as they are henceforth known by a special term, *Proselytes*.

The conditions are now approaching which enabled a religion of universalist principles to be developed out of Judaism. Although it may be said that the Judaism of that age grew into Talmudism, yet it is equally true that Christianity was developed out of it. The Judaism of the age of Christ was its indispensable antecedent. It is an important question, which kind of Judaism it was that produced Christianity—Palestinian or Hellenistic? Dr. Kuenen, appreciating highly the philosophical ideas of the Hellenistic Jews, especially Philo, considers, nevertheless, that they have a certain artificiality and affectation which makes them utterly unable to be the source of a religion, although they might, and did, strongly influence the theology of that religion not long after it was once established. The Essenes are next to be considered, and these also Dr. Kuenen rejects still more summarily, mainly on the ground that "the formation of a small and strictly closed society to realise the ideal of ceremonial purity has nothing Christian in it; and conversely the Christian propaganda for the rescuing of sinners is in no way Essenic." The centre of Palestinian Judaism is found in the Pharisees. They were the diligent followers of the teachings of the Scribes, whose

prime endeavour was to observe the law most strictly, and realise righteousness through its precepts. It must not be supposed that the Scribes cared not for general ethical principles, such as those of the prophets: many very fine sayings are quoted from them; but they were not really free to act upon them, as they were pledged to the observance of all the minute precepts of the Law, and the breadth of the one was quite incompatible with the narrowness of the other. The Pharisees and Scribes, however, while so careful about their personal habits, do not seem to have undertaken missionary work to make their poor and ignorant brethren understand their ideas of religious duties; on the contrary, they were only a few thousand people, highly respected for doing what they themselves believed that all ought to do. Still, the more spiritual prophetic religion was not extinct, and was doubtless often preached by the Scribes themselves to the poor ignorant multitude that knew not the Law. The Messianic idea is prominent in these times, being retained especially among the Pharisees and their followers. It has an inspiring effect, and nerves the Jews to great efforts and to great personal sacrifices, even death for the faith, or rather the Law. Proselytism is a new feature of the time; great numbers, especially in heathen countries, joined the Jews. The wall of partition seemed to be broken down; Judaism was ready to undergo a transformation into a world-wide religion. The other essential factor in the production of Christianity is the personal character of Jesus, of whom Dr. Kuenen simply says that, the prophetic ideas having proved themselves, after all the struggles, the permanent ones,

It seems then to lie in the nature of the case, that in the transition from the national to the universal the chief part is reserved for the prophet. What Amos, Isaiah, Jeremiah and "the great Unknown" had begun, it was reserved for Him to finish.

I have here summarised Dr. Kuenen's survey of Hebrew history; even in this epitome it will be found very suggestive, since, although it deals with a history which we have all read, it puts so new a face on it that it is difficult to recognise it as the same. But, when recognised and understood, it may be found to show the cause and effect of things which before seemed very arbitrary; and to distinguish as mutually opposed things which we had been taught to consider of similar character and equally good—the precepts of the priests and of the prophets, for instance. The full account, and the justification of the assertions, must be sought in the book itself, which abounds with references to sources, and has several important notes at the end. I must however touch on one or two points which surprise me in Dr. Kuenen's exposition—I cannot say on which I hold a different opinion, for I estimate so highly his learning and his sobriety of judgment, that I fancy even here that he may be right in a way that I understand not.

The explanation of the discrepancy between the prophets' and the priests' conceptions of the history seems to me questionable. Would the author of the Book of Kings have treated sacrifices offered to Jahveh, but in an irregular way, *i.e.* at an improper place, as equivalent to sacrifices offered to idols, and have said with reference to them that the people left the service of Jahveh? I think not; and on the evidence of his own words. He does not confuse together all forms of worship which fail to come up to his highest standard under one general term, such as idolatry; on the contrary, he discriminates very carefully between various grades of impropriety. Thus, of the nineteen Kings of Judah after Solomon, he pronounced eleven to have been bad, and eight good. But of those that he calls good, he allows only two (Hezekiah and Josiah) to have been as good as David, in that they destroyed the high places (which he

does not pretend were used for idolatrous worship, but implies that they were seats of Jahveh-worship, 2 Kings xxiii. 8, 9; the high places in v. 13 he distinguishes from these as idolatrous), and abolished all idolatry and paganism. The six others are allowed to be good, but in a lower degree, because while not addicted to idolatry (and Asa is expressly stated to have removed the idols), they had not interfered with the high places; and two, Amaziah and Jotham, are stated to have been each as good as his father. Among the bad kings a gradation seems also to be observed. The palm of wickedness is borne by Rehoboam, Ahaz, and Manasseh, who were the most actively and conspicuously idolatrous, and this in an accelerating ratio from the first to the last. The others were bad by imitation—Abijam acting like Rehoboam, Jehosam like the Kings of Israel, Ahaziah like the house of Ahab, Amon entirely like Manasseh, Jehoahaz, Jehoakim, and Jehoachin according to all that their fathers did, and Zedekiah like Jehoakim. Among the kings of the northern kingdom also, though they are more uniformly pronounced bad, a discrimination is also observable. The first, Jeroboam, is bad because he led the revolt which divided Israel, but especially because of the two golden calves which he placcd as objects of worship at Beth-el and Dan, and because he set up non-Levitical priests. Almost all the others are pronounced bad because they “departed not from the sins of Jeroboam,” which are defined in 2 Kings x. 29 to mean the golden calves. These calves in a certain sense correspond to the high places in Judah; they do not seem to imply actual pagan worship, and have been supposed by some with much probability to represent an idolatrous form of Jahveh-worship. Indeed in the case of Jehu, their retention is almost condoned; he is not called bad, and he was zealous in abolishing idolatry, but yet sinned, like Jeroboam, in respect of the calves. Jehoram also, though called bad, is stated not to have been bad like the terrible idolaters

Ahab and Jezebel; and he put away the image of Baal, though not the calves. And the last King, Hoshea, is called bad, though not in the same way as the Kings of Israel before him. From all this we see that the historian, though looking at the history with the eye of a priest of the Levitical order, had not so lost the sense of proportion among offences of a religious nature as to condemn all alike who offended against the Levitical rules of worshipping only in the Temple at Jerusalem. I rather marvel at his taking such pains to decide the exact amount of praise or blame to be attributed to acts which in his view were all criminal. The worship of Molech (making one's son to pass through the fire) he justly, on purely moral grounds, regards with the most horror of all; next to that comes the worship of Baal, then the Asherah, then idolatry in general; while, as we have seen, the high places in Judah and the golden calves in Israel are only very slightly condemned. If the "discrepancy" is not to be explained in Dr. Kuenen's way, I do not know that we are bound to explain it at all. It exists as a fact; the prophets' picture of the religion is the older and more credible, as has been shown by no one better than Dr. Kuenen; while the priestly history is a retrospect in which the priests very naturally read into old times the ceremonial laws under which they themselves lived, as is the case (to take a far more flagrant instance) with the Levitical legislation of the Pentateuch, by them actually ascribed to Moses!

We should observe also the use which Dr. Kuenen makes of the Psalms. The titles prefixed to most of them, naming David and others as authors, form no part of the Psalms themselves, and are of uncertain date and authority; most modern scholars reject their authority for determining date or authorship. Thrown upon the allusions in the text for fixing the date, critics have, as might be expected, diverged into both extremes—some assigning many to the earliest

possible date, that of David, and others believing that a large proportion belong to the age after the Captivity and down to that of the Maccabees. Dr. Kuenen quotes freely from the Psalms, and even from some which are usually set down to an early date, in illustration of the state of things after Ezra; Ps. xxii., xlvii., lxxviii., and lxxxvii. are so used. He is, therefore, in favour of a late origin; we should like to know whether he considers the frequent allusion to the "House of Jahveh" always to refer to the second Temple, and if so, why there are no psalmists in the period of the Kings to celebrate the Temple of Solomon? I do not venture here to pronounce an opinion, but wish only to call attention to an interesting historical and literary question that is certainly not settled.

I cannot follow the ingenious argument which Dr. Kuenen uses with respect to Malachi, to prove that in i. 11—

The reference is distinctly to the adoration already offered to Jahveh by the peoples, whenever they serve their own gods with true reverence and honest zeal. Even in Deuteronomy the adoration of those other gods by the nations is represented as a dispensation of Jahveh. Malachi goes a step further, and accepts their worship as a tribute which in reality falls to Jahveh, —to Him, the Only True. Thus the opposition between Jahveh and the other gods, and afterwards between the one true God and the imaginary gods, makes room here for the still higher conception, that the adoration of Jahveh is the essence and the truth of all religion.

In Deuteronomy such universalism might, from the prophetic spirit of the book, not surprise us much, as it might seem to be in accordance with the general mercy and care for the rights of others so conspicuous there; but in truth the three passages quoted thence seem not to bear this interpretation except by a very forced induction. Deut. iv. 19, which warns the Israelites against worshipping the

host of heaven, does not say that Jahveh has given these to other nations *as objects of worship*, but that he has assigned them to *all nations under the whole heaven*, therefore including Israel (but evidently not for worship). And as to Malachi, such universalism seems to be in direct contrast with his teaching. He represents Jahveh, more strongly perhaps than any other writer, as favouring Israel specially, notwithstanding Israel's undeservingness (i.), and as determined to hold a great judgment, and to punish the wicked (iii. 5, &c.), and yet to retain his favour to Israel (iii. 6—12). And while accusing the priests of all possible greed and venality (i. 6—ii. 10), he promises to purify their order, not to destroy them (iii. 3, 4). Verse i. 11 (the verse quoted as showing universalism in this very narrow and priestly writer) certainly seems to stand very oddly in the midst of this argument:—"For from the rising of the sun to its setting, my name is great amongst the heathen, and in all places is incense offered to my name and a pure sacrifice, for my name is great among the heathen." One thing is clear: that it is the name of Jahveh *as opposed to heathen gods*, which is here declared to be venerated in heathen countries. Jahveh says here—"Though ye, whose god I am, contemn me, and do not even bring clean sacrifices, yet I am a great god, and am acknowledged as such in heathen countries." This must refer to the growing respect for the Jewish religion in the time of the second Temple—perhaps to proselytism in foreign countries, and rather to a growing respect for the Jewish god in his own person than to a declaration that he is after all much the same as Ahuramazda or Zeus. The incense and sacrifice offered in foreign countries would of course not be according to the Levitical law; but foreign proselytes would not know that.

Dr. Kuenen's last lecture contains a survey of Buddhism,

that great world-religion which has so far outrun the nation of its origin, and spread itself so wide without finding any impediment from national characteristics, that it seems to contest with Christianity the epithet Universal. I cannot enter into the details, which will scarcely bear epitomising, but will only give his general results and the instructive parallels or contrasts which he draws between Buddhism and Christianity. The legendary life of the Buddha he treats as purely imaginary, or at best only to be partly inferred from the tone of the community that he founded. This community he shows to be a purely monastic institution, the principle of which was seclusion from the world, with its strife and troubles, and the cultivation of a spirit of quietism, which had no longer any desires nor any preference for one thing rather than other, even in the realm of morals, since such preferences are the source of mental excitement and dispute, and therefore inconsistent with true toleration and true quiet of spirit. He sums up—

Buddhism sprang from an Indian monastic order. Asceticism—more specifically the Brahmanic contemplative asceticism—was the connecting link between the national and the universal religion. . . . Buddhism has succeeded in taming barbarians, and still shows itself admirably calculated to assist in maintaining order and discipline ; but has it ever supported a people in its endeavours after progress, in its recuperative efforts when smitten by disaster, in its struggle against despotism ? No such instances are known. And indeed we had no right to expect them. Buddhism . . . *turns away* from the world on principle. Let us reckon fully with the meaning and the ultimate consequences of this principle. It must and it does result in absolute quietism—nay, even indifferentism. . . . Buddhism raises the rejection of every affirmation to the rank of a principle. . . . We gratefully observe that at first compassion overbore quietism. But that quietism, in its turn, has at last maimed compassion, who shall wonder ?

Dr. Kuenen thus expresses the contrast between Buddhism and Christianity—

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In Buddhism there is monasticism from the first. In Christianity it appears later on, and only gradually; and, in the face of opposition, wins the place which it occupies in Catholicism. And this is no mere chronological difference. There could be no Buddhism without "bhikshus" [begging friars]—there is a Christianity without monks. . . . But it is not only as regards its *form* that the special characteristic of Christianity is explained by its origin. To its birth from the *Jewish*, in distinction to every other nationality, it owes an essential portion of the *content* to which it has never been untrue amidst all the changes which it has undergone. . . . Buddhism, in the first place, misses the aggressive character which Christianity has always displayed—outwards towards the unbelievers, and inwards towards the heretics. Why so? Whence comes it that Christianity, in contradistinction to Buddhism, has too often been promulgated by force, and has failed to characterise itself, like the other, by unlimited toleration? Because the Christian's God was Israel's Jahveh, "compassionate, gracious, long-suffering, and plenteous in mercy," aye, the Father in heaven, but yet "a jealous God," who will endure "no other gods before his face," is "of purer eyes than to behold iniquity," and still from time to time "a consuming fire." . . . We cannot regard the combative character of Christianity as a simple defect and disaster. Let us reflect that Buddhism would never have been, as it was, toleration itself, had it been any less sceptical and quietistic. . . . But whatever difference of feeling may remain as to this point, we shall all be at one with respect to the second inheritance from Israelitism. It is the belief in the triumph of Jahveh over everything that opposes him, the expectation of the kingdom of God, the confident trust in the realisation of the moral ideal. This is what Buddhism does not possess, and therefore cannot give. It is a blank which cannot be filled, and which nothing can compensate! The conception of the kingdom of God, one of the chief factors in the genesis of Christianity, remains through all the ages its best recommendation and its greatest might.

And, in conclusion—

Universalism as a fact and as a quality;—if we bear this distinction in mind, and proceed to review the three religions of the world, noting not their extension and the number of their confessors, but their character, we can have no hesitation in pronouncing Christianity the most universal of religions; and that because it is the best qualified for its moral task—to inspire and consecrate the personal and the national life.

RUSSELL MARTINEAU.

JUSTIN'S USE OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL.—II.

III. SIMILARITIES OF LANGUAGE BETWEEN JUSTIN AND
THE FOURTH GOSPEL (*continued*).

(c) It is inferred from the following passage (*Dial.* 88) that, since Justin puts into the mouth of John the Baptist the words, "I am not the Christ, I am the voice of one crying," he must have had before him John i. 20, 23: "And he confessed . . . *I am not the Christ.* Then said they unto him, Who art thou? . . . He said, *I am the voice of one crying* in the wilderness, Make straight the way of the Lord."

The context of the passage is of importance, and may be summarised thus: After the baptism of Christ, when he went down into the water, not only was fire kindled on the Jordan, but also, when he rose up from the water, the Apostles of this very Christ of ours wrote that the Holy Spirit, as a dove, hovered over (or, flew to) him (*ἐπιπρῆναι ἐπ' αὐτόν*). And when men began to suppose that John the Baptist was Christ, he cried to them, "*I am not the Christ, but the voice of one crying* : for there shall come he that is stronger than I, whose sandals I am not fit to bear? Also when Jesus came to the Jordan and was supposed to be the son of Joseph the Carpenter, and appeared devoid of beauty (*ἀειδοῦς*), as the Scriptures predicted, and was thought to be a carpenter—for when he was among men he wrought the following carpentry, viz., ploughs and yokes, thereby teaching symbols of righteousness and an active life—

hereon, I say, the Holy Spirit both lighted on him (*ἐπέπτη αὐτῷ*) for the sake of men, as I said above, and at the same time there came a voice from heaven, which had also been uttered by David, Thou art my son, this day have I begotten thee, declaring that his generation took place for men" [*i.e.*, possibly, so far as the knowledge of men was concerned] "at that time from which the knowledge of him was destined to begin."

Justin here tells us (besides recording the descent of the dove, for which he expressly appeals to written and apostolic testimony) (1) that a fire appeared on the Jordan; (2) that John described himself as the Voice, and denied that he was the Christ; (3) that Christ was devoid of beauty; (4) that he made yokes and ploughs as a carpenter; (5) that the voice from heaven declared that Christ was that day begotten of God. Of these five traditions the fifth is expressly contrary to the testimony of the Synoptists; the first, third, and fourth are apocryphal;—what conceivable grounds, then, does this passage afford for supposing that one only of these five traditions, the second, was believed by Justin to rest on the authority of a document composed by one of the foremost of the apostles?

One of these traditions (which might naturally have arisen from the connection of the baptism of Jesus with "the Holy Spirit and fire") is found in the seventh Sibylline book, probably composed after the time of Hadrian in the second half of the second century (*i.e.*, about the time of Justin's writing), wherein (vii. 84, and vi. 6) the poet described how the Holy Spirit "hovered over him" (*ἔπτατο πνεῦμα ἐπ' αὐτῷ*), and also connects the baptism of Christ in both cases with "fire" (*σὸν βάπτισμα δι' οὐ πύρρος ἐξεφάνθης*), and a similar tradition is said by Epiphanius (*Hæres.* xxx. 13) to have been contained in the Gospel of the Ebionites that "a great fire shone round the place." But will any one consequently maintain that this

passage proves that Justin regarded as Apostolic the sixth or seventh Sibylline book, or the Gospel of the Ebionites? The fifth tradition arose naturally from a desire to suit the voice from heaven to the words of Psalm ii. 7, which are quoted by Justin above, and which were so early interpolated into the text of Luke that they are bracketed by Westcott and Hort in the margin. The third tradition, that Jesus was "without form, i.e., beauty" (*ἀειδής*), is easily derivable from the language of prophecy of Isaiah (liii. 2) that the Messiah "had no form or comeliness" (*οὐκ εἶχεν εἶδος*). The fourth, that Jesus "made yokes," may be easily explained from its suitability to the Carpenter who said to mankind, "Take my yoke upon you." These four traditions, then, being thus easily explicable, if we can show that the remaining one is also natural and explicable, we ought to be prepared to believe that Justin probably accepted it as a tradition on the same level—possibly, indeed, a tradition already incorporated in the Fourth Gospel, but not on that account recognised by Justin as anything more authoritative than a tradition.

To show this, let us consider a similar quotation, also about John the Baptist. Mark introduces his Gospel by a quotation in his own person—"The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ the Son of God, as it is written in the prophets, Behold I send my messenger, &c." Matthew and Luke, on the other hand, place this quotation in the mouth of Jesus Himself (Matt. xi. 10; Luke vii. 27). Those who believe that Mark represents the earliest Synoptic tradition will find no difficulty in seeing the naturalness of a change which takes a prophecy thus out of the framework of the picture, as it were, and inserts it in the picture itself; and, indeed, the prophecy is so connected by Matthew with the words of John himself that it might very well seem, at first sight, to have been uttered by the Baptist, speaking of himself in the third person: "John came

preaching . . . and saying, Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand; for this is he that was spoken of by the prophet Esaias, saying, The voice," &c. (Matt. iii. 1—3). How natural for early Christian teachers, feeling the importance of subordinating the teaching of the Baptist to the teaching of Christ, to take these latter words as the Baptist's own confession that he was but a Voice to prepare the way for the Messiah! And as to the negative part of the tradition, in which Justin is supposed to have borrowed from the Gospel, we can see it already in growth in Acts xiii. 25 (W. and H.'s text), where John is made to say, "What do ye suppose (*ὑπονοεῖτε*) me to be? I am not he." How similar is this to the tradition of Justin: "When men began to suppose (*ὑπελαμβάνον*) that John the Baptist was Christ, he cried to them, I am not the Christ"! But obviously the tradition could not stop here. It was necessary that the Baptist should not only say what he was not, but also what he was; and thus, the negative and the positive traditions being blended together, we have Justin's version of the tradition: "I am not the Christ, but the voice of one crying," while in the Fourth Gospel the same tradition is differently expressed in two answers to two different questions.

From all this it seems to follow, 1st, that Justin may have been here borrowing, not from the Fourth Gospel, but from some tradition to which he and the Fourth Gospel are both indebted; 2nd, that if Justin is borrowing from the Fourth Gospel he probably regarded that Gospel as unauthoritative, and on a level with tradition rather than with "the Memoirs."

(d) (*Apol.* I. 63) Justin says that Isaiah (i. 3) accused his countrymen of not knowing God; and then, according to his plan of showing everywhere that "what the prophets proclaimed Jesus taught," he wishes to show that Jesus in the same way accused the Jews of not knowing the Father

and the Son. Now the Fourth Gospel contains just such passages as are applicable to Justin's purpose; for in that Gospel Jesus says to the Jews (viii. 19), "Ye neither know me nor my Father;" and of the Jews (xvi. 3), "They have not known the Father nor me." But, instead of quoting either of these passages, Justin quotes a passage from Matthew and Luke where Jesus does not address "the Jews" at all, nor does he speak about the Jews definitely, but is represented as in these general terms apostrophising the Father: "I give thee thanks, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth. . . . No one knoweth the Father but the Son, nor the Son but the Father, and they to whom the Son revealeth Him."

Commenting on this most important passage, Dr. Ezra Abbot says, in effect, that, though Justin quotes Matthew, he appears to have had John in his mind (*Authorship, &c.*, p. 45), "his language seems to be influenced by the passages in John, above cited, in which alone the Jews are directly addressed." This is very likely; but the inference from it is exactly the opposite of that which Dr. Abbot intends. It is by no means improbable that Justin had the Fourth Gospel, or, at all events, some tradition adopted by the Fourth Gospel, in his mind; it is very likely that a tradition had sprung up that Jesus had addressed these accusations directly to "the Jews" themselves, and that Justin knew of such a tradition and was "influenced" by it. But then, if he had this doctrine in his mind, and believed it to be contained in an Apostolic Gospel, why did he not quote that Gospel in support of it? Why should he have the Fourth Gospel, which would have been exactly to the point, "in his mind," but the Synoptists, who are not to the point, on his pen? So far, therefore, from proving that Justin recognised the Fourth Gospel as Apostolic, this passage proves just the reverse—viz., that although he probably had it "in his mind," he did not venture to quote it as authoritative.

(e) (*Dial.* 69) Justin says that Christ healed those who were blind from their birth (τοὺς ἐκ γενετῆς πηρούς). "There seems here," says Dr. Abbot (*ib.* 45), "to be a reference to John ix. 1, where we have the phrase τυφλὸν ἐκ γενετῆς, the phrase ἐκ γενετῆς, 'from birth,' being peculiar to John among the Evangelists, and πηρός being a common synonym of τυφλός;" and Dr. Abbot further shows that ὁ ἐκ γενετῆς πηρός occurs in the Apostolic Constitutions v. 7, 17, and in the Clementine Homilies, xix. 22, where there is a clear reference to John ix. 1.

This undoubtedly proves that some tradition about the healing of "men blind from their birth" was current at the time of Justin; and it is possible, but not probable, that he derived it from the Fourth Gospel. For in the Gospel only *one* such incident is mentioned, and special stress is laid on the *unique* nature of the cure (ix. 32). "From the beginning of the world it was never heard that any one (τις) opened the eyes of one that was born blind." Now, if Justin had been aware of this statement, and had regarded it as Apostolic, he would hardly have detracted from the unique nature of the miracle by here so loosely using the plural. Still more effectively does he elsewhere destroy its unique character. For he introduces it, still using the plural number, among a number of other miracles not unique, as having been *imitated* by the agency of the devil (*I. Apol.* 22): "And whereas we say that he made whole the lame, and paralytic, and blind from birth (*v. r.* πονηρούς), and that he raised the dead, herein we shall seem to be describing *acts similar and identical* (ταὐτά) *with the deeds said to have been wrought by Asklepius.*" If therefore Justin did indeed borrow this tradition from the Fourth Gospel, he would appear to have felt very little respect for it in thus point-blank contradicting the tenor of the Gospel's context.

But it is more probable that Justin borrowed this refer-

ence from some other tradition than the Gospel. The story of the miracles wrought on a blind man and a lame man by Vespasian in Alexandria is recorded by Tacitus; and it must needs have been sometimes brought up against the Christians—when they urged that their Master made the lame to walk and the blind to see—"But the divine Vespasian did the same things." Tacitus, however, distinctly adds (*Hist.* iv. 81) that the two men healed were *not* congenitally diseased. It became, therefore, a matter of importance for the Christians to reply that Jesus had healed those who laboured under some congenital defect (τοὺς ἐκ γενετῆς πηρούς) where πηρὸς might represent lameness as well as blindness. When the tradition assumed more definite shape, particularising an individual cure, the singular would be substituted for the plural (τὸν ἐκ' γενετῆς πηρόν); and when the narrative came to particularise the disease, blindness, it would be natural for the Fourth Gospel to change the more general term πηρός into the more definite τυφλός. But still, even after the Fourth Gospel had discarded the old title τὸν ἐκ γενετῆς πηρόν, it would remain for some time as an oral tradition, and by this title it would occasionally be referred to; and thus may be explained the occurrence of this title in the Clementine Homilies and Recognitions, although it is certain that the author of the latter accepted the details of the narrative of the Fourth Gospel.

(f) Justin (*Apol.* i. 52, and *Dial.* 14, 32, 64, 118) agrees with the Fourth Gospel (xix. 37) in citing Zechariah xii. 10 in the form, "They shall look on him whom they pierced," ὄψονται εἰς ὃν ἐξεκέντησαν, instead of the difficult version of the LXX. ἐπιβλέψονται πρὸς με ἄνθ' ὃν κατωρχήσαντο. But this is at once explained; for (1) the Hebrew demands some such word as ἐκκεντεῖν; (2) the form of the quotation in Rev. i. 7, "Every eye shall see him, and they who pierced (ἐξεκέντησαν) him," makes it pro-

bable that this reading existed before the second century; (3) the word *ἐκκεντεῖν* is actually introduced in the passage of Zechariah by the versions of Aquila, Theodotion, and Symmachus, of which the first was written in the first half of the second century.

But although this passage is useless as a proof that Justin copied the Fourth Gospel, it is of some use as being one among many proofs that Justin used the same traditions as the Fourth Gospel.

(g) (I. *Apol.* 13) Justin speaks of Christ as "having become our teacher and having been *born for this purpose*." It is alleged that this is influenced by John xviii. 37, "*for this purpose have I been born, and for this purpose have I come into the world, that I might bear witness to the truth;*" and it is quite possible Justin had in his mind this saying of the Fourth Gospel; but of course it cannot hence be inferred that he regarded the tradition as authoritative or as part of the Memoirs.

(h) (*Dial.* 56) "I affirm that he (Jesus) has never done nor discoursed save as the Maker of the world, above whom there is no other God, willed that he should do and discourse (*ὁμιλεῖν*)." This is thought to resemble certain passages in the Fourth Gospel which state that Jesus always acted and spoke according to the will of the Father.

But Justin's affirmation is perfectly explicable without any reference to other sources. It seems (*Dial.* 128) that some of the Jews held that, as the light of the sun is inseparable from the sun, so the Logos was inseparable from the Father. Arguing against this belief, Justin has been here (*ib.* 56) teaching that the Word is distinct numerically from the Father; but he now adds this necessary caution, "distinct in number, *but not in will*; for I affirm," &c. Such a reservation was necessary as a protest against a polytheistic inference, and there is no reasonable ground for supposing that Justin borrowed it from the Gospel. On

the other side, it is probable that, if Justin had really had the Fourth Gospel as an Apostolic document to refer to, he would not have introduced the word *ὁμιλεῖν* (which is not found in that Gospel), and instead of making the assertion in his own person he would have supported himself by a quotation from the Memoirs. For, be it observed, the affirmation is not of the nature of an argument, but a statement of the Christian belief, "We Christians, though we attribute to the Logos a personality distinct from the Father, nevertheless assert that the Logos was not distinct from the Father in will." And how easy to add, "for Jesus also in his words said, I speak the things that I have seen with my Father" (John viii. 38), or, "I and my Father are one" (*ib.* x. 30), or, "I do the works of my Father" (*ib.* x. 37)! If it be urged that Trypho would not have accepted the statement of Jesus about Himself, surely the reply is obvious, that, for an exposition of Christian doctrine, Trypho would have more readily accepted a quotation from an Apostolic Gospel (which he himself must be supposed to have read) than the casual and personal utterance of a comparatively unknown teacher like Justin.

(i) In *Dial.* 100, quoting Psalm xxii. 3, "But thou, the Praise of Israel, inhabitest the Holy Place," Justin says that these words declared that Christ was to do "something worthy of praise and wonder, being about to rise from the dead on the third day after the crucifixion; which (thing, fact, &c.) he (Jesus) has, having received it from the Father, *δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς λαβὼν ἔχει.*" It is alleged that a reference is here intended to John x. 18, where Jesus says, "I have authority to lay it (my life, *ψυχὴν*) down, and I have authority to take it again; this commandment I received from my Father (*ταύτην τὴν ἐντολὴν ἔλαβον παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μου*)."

But here, as elsewhere, the supposition that Justin had

the Fourth Gospel in his mind is incompatible with the supposition that he regarded that Gospel as Apostolic. For immediately after the statement that Jesus had "received this from the Father," Justin proceeds to give his grounds for the statement, and to quote the words of Christ in support of it. After justifying the application of the title, "Praise of Israel" to Christ, he proceeds to give a quotation from Christ's words, introducing it with the preface, "and furthermore in the Gospel he (Jesus) is recorded to have said——." Now, surely, if Justin really had a certain passage in the Fourth Gospel *in his mind*, nothing would have been easier and more to the point than to quote that passage, thus, for example: "This power of rising from the dead Jesus has, having received it from the Father; for also in the Gospel he is recorded to have said, 'I have authority to lay down my life and to take it again, this have I received from my Father.'" But instead of quoting this passage, which would have been exactly to the point, Justin quotes another passage from the Synoptists: "All things have been delivered to me by the Father; and none knoweth the Father save the Son, nor the Son save the Father and they to whom the Son will reveal Him." Why should Justin thus have substituted a comparatively inappropriate quotation for the passage which he *had in his mind*, and which was perfectly to the point, except because he felt that it did not possess the same authority as the Memoirs which contained the written words of the Lord? No explanation of carelessness or forgetfulness will avail here; for how can a writer have forgotten that which—by our antagonists' assertion and our own admission—he *has in his mind* at the very time of writing?

(j) (*Apol.* I. 66) "We were taught (*ἐδιδάχθημεν*) that the [bread and wine of the Eucharist] are the flesh and blood of that Jesus who was made flesh." It is maintained that this use of the term "flesh"—instead of the Synoptic

expression, "body"—is a reminiscence of John vi. 51—56 (e.g., "My *flesh* is food indeed and my blood is drink").

No doubt, if this passage stood by itself, we might suppose that it meant, "We were taught by the words of Jesus, in the Gospel of His Apostle John, that we are to feed on His flesh and blood, and this feeding we believe to take place in the Eucharist." But here, as so often above, Justin destroys this supposition by giving the words of Jesus, from which this "teaching" is deduced; and once more we find that these words are taken from the Synoptists. Moreover, it is probable that the "teaching" (*ἐδιδάχθημεν*) refers to the instruction received by the catechumens from their teachers, and based on the Synoptic Gospels.

The context will make this clear. After describing the rite of baptism, Justin is proceeding to describe the Eucharist, and he begins by saying that it is only partaken of by those who believe the *teaching of the Church* (lit., *τὰ δεδιδασγμένα ὑφ' ἡμῶν*, "what they have been taught by us;" not, "by Christ"), and who, after receiving baptism, are living *as Christ commanded*. The antithesis between the teaching of the Church and the commands of Christ appears to demonstrate that, although the teaching is based upon the commands of Christ, it is not identical with them; otherwise it could have been more simply and shortly put thus: "who believe in the teaching of Christ, and live in accordance with it." Justin proceeds to justify the strictness of the Christians in thus limiting access to the Eucharist, by explaining its mysterious nature: "For not as common bread, nor as common drink, do we receive this; but even as Jesus Christ our Saviour, by the Word of God was made flesh, and had (*ἔσχε*) flesh and blood for our salvation; so also *were we taught* (*ἐδιδάχθημεν*) that the food blessed by the prayerful word that proceeded from him (or, by the prayer of the Word that proceeded from him, *τὴν δι' εὐχῆς λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῦ εὐχαριστηθεῖσαν τροφήν*)—from

which our blood and flesh are by transmutation nourished—is the flesh and blood of that same Jesus who was made flesh.” This “teaching” then does not apparently refer to any teaching about the Lord’s Supper as first instituted, nor to any doctrine proceeding from our Lord Himself, but to the Eucharistic commemorations of the Lord’s Supper, and to the manner in which all Christians, before being admitted to it, “were taught” to regard these. Some differences of interpretation there may be as to detail—*e.g.*, whether the “prayerful Word that proceeded from him” means the Lord’s Prayer (as Otto thinks, *I. Apol.* 66, *note*), or to some other prayer of blessing—but the general tenor seems clear: “We do not regard the Eucharistic elements as common food; we were taught, before we were admitted to that sacred rite, that the food blessed by Prayer is the flesh and blood of Jesus.”

Justin proceeds in the next sentence to justify the solemn way in which the catechumens were taught to regard the Eucharist, by quoting the words of Jesus, on which this teaching is based. Now, since mention has been made of the “flesh and blood” of Jesus, which are nowhere mentioned but in the Fourth Gospel, it would be natural that he should quote from that Gospel; again, since the “teaching” which he desires to justify, treats of the Eucharistic commemorations and not of the First Supper, some general statements of our Lord, setting forth the necessity that all who believe in him must feed on His flesh and drink His blood, and that the partaking of His flesh and blood conveyed to the recipient eternal life, would be exactly in point, and more in point than any description of the First Supper itself. Yet, to the Synoptic description of the First Supper Justin confines himself: “For the Apostles, in the Memoirs composed by them, which are called Gospels, delivered that Jesus had thus commanded

them—viz., that having taken bread, he blessed and said, Do this in remembrance of me. This is my body. And that in the same way, having taken the cup, and blessed it, he said, This is my blood: and that he distributed it to them alone.”

Now, to some extent, it is true, Justin adapts his quotation for his purpose by selecting the account of Luke, who, alone of three Synoptists, records the *command* of Jesus, “Do this in remembrance of me;” and by this means he certainly succeeds in giving a commemorative tendency to the words of Jesus, by implying that those elements which were the body and blood of Jesus at the First Supper, would be no less mysteriously sanctified in future commemorations. But at what a sacrifice he obtains this convenience! He says that “the *Apostles* delivered that Jesus had thus *commanded* them,” whereas not a single Apostle, in any Gospel, delivered this “command.”*

But it may be said that Justin regarded St. Luke's Gospel as virtually written by the Apostle St. Paul. This is very doubtful. At all events on one occasion when Justin refers to an incident recorded by Luke alone (xxii. 44), although he still retains the word “Apostles,” he makes an addition evidently intended to specify Luke, “In

* It is, however, probable that these words are an interpolation in the text of St. Luke, as it is regarded by Westcott and Hort, borrowed from St. Paul (1 Cor. xi. 23—25). In that case, it will be found that Justin has borrowed (1), the words of Institution, from Matthew and Mark (“This is my body,” “This is my blood”), and (2), the words ordaining a Memorial, from St. Paul (“Do this in remembrance of me”). “Further, it will be seen that Justin has borrowed *καὶ ἔμωλες* from the *ἑσθίωτες καὶ* of St. Paul, “In the same way also” (1 Cor. xi. 25). He has also emphasized the words ordaining the Memorial by placing them first. It is possible that Justin, though *beginning* with the intention of quoting the Memoirs, so far altered his intention as, at least, to append the apostolic version of St. Paul; and possibly this may be implied in his use of the word “delivered,” not “wrote.” St. Paul himself (1 Cor. xi. 23) says of his account of the Lord's Supper: “I *delivered* it to you (*παρέδωκα*),” and Justin, using the expression, “the Apostles *delivered* (*παρέδωκαν*),” may be referring to the teaching of the Apostle, which had, perhaps, already become associated with the Gospel of St. Luke.

the Memoirs which I assert to have been compiled by his Apostles and by those who followed them ;” and, as Justin in the whole of his writings makes no use of St. Paul’s Epistles, we have no means of knowing what authority he would have attached to a Pauline account of the institution of the Lord’s Supper. But even if we admit that St. Luke, representing St. Paul, might be described as “an Apostle,” where are “the Apostles”? They are non-existent. But if Justin had accepted the Fourth Gospel as Apostolic all this inconsistency would have been removed, and the argument would have run thus: “We believe the Eucharistic elements to be the flesh and blood of Jesus; for the Memoirs tell us that the Lord’s Supper was to be repeated as a Memorial for the faithful, and the Apostle whom Jesus loved has recorded that all who have faith in Jesus must eat his flesh and drink his blood.” If Justin did not write thus, the reasonable inference is that he could not do so because he did not regard the doctrine of the Fourth Gospel as Apostolic. He used much of it, and believed it, but he accepted it rather as the teaching of the Church (*τὰ δεδριαγμένα ὑφ’ ἡμῶν*) than as the precepts of Christ. Inferentially this doctrine was true, but it was but inferential, and required to be based on the “Memoirs,” which alone contained the words of Jesus.

(1) *Dial.* 91 speaks of fleeing to Him “who sent (*πέμψαντι*) His crucified Son into the world.” Compare *Dial.* 40, “according to the will of the Father who sent him (*τοῦ πέμψαντος αὐτὸν πατρός*),” and *Dial.* 17, “the only blameless and righteous Light sent from God to men, *πεμφθέντος*.” It is urged that, whereas the Fourth Gospel uses *πέμπεω* of Jesus 25 (? 27) times, the rest of the New Testament uses it only twice (? once), and it is inferred that Justin is therefore probably borrowing a phrase from that Gospel.

Provided that we substitute for “the Fourth Gospel”

some such words as "the doctrine of the Fourth Gospel," this inference may be admitted to be highly probable; and all the more so, because of the participial form in which Justin uses the phrase (comp. ὁ πέμψας με πατήρ; John v. 37, vi. 44, vii. 33, viii. 16, 18, xii. 49, xiv. 24, and in the other twenty cases, where πατήρ is not expressed, the participle is used). The reason for the introduction of this phrase is interesting. In the Synoptists Jesus speaks of the Father as τὸν ἀποστείλαντά με (Luke x. 16), and Justin, quoting this passage (*I. Apol.* 62), does not hesitate to add, "He is called Apostle (ἀπόστολος), for he is sent (ἀποστέλλεται);" by which name "Apostle" Jesus is also called in the Epistle to the Hebrews iii. 1. But in course of time, as the word Apostle became technical, and reserved for the Twelve, it became natural to speak of Jesus, not as ὁ ἀποσταλὴς nor as ὁ ἀπόστολος, but uniquely as ὁ πεμφθεὶς; and by a corresponding change, the Father is described as ὁ πέμψας. Yet curiously enough, while in the participial form, πέμπω thus supplants the Synoptic ἀποστέλλειν, on the other hand in the finite parts of the verb, ἀποστέλλειν maintains its ground, so that we have the following remarkable result: the Fourth Gospel uses the participial πέμψας 27 times and the participle of ἀποστέλλω (as applied to Jesus) never; (2) it uses the finite form of ἀποστέλλω 17 times, and the finite form of πέμπω (as applied to Jesus) never.

This subtle distinction is a mark of late date; and Justin's agreement with the Fourth Gospel in adopting it is one among many proofs that he was in sympathy with the later traditions embodied in that Gospel, although he did not regard them as apostolical.

(*m*) (*Dial.* 63) "Since his (Christ's) blood has not been produced (γεγεννημένον) from human seed but from the will of God." It is suggested that Justin (like Tertullian, Irenæus, and others) read ὅς . . . ἐγεννήθη in John i. 13,

and that he has in mind that passage, "Who ($\delta\varsigma$) was born ($\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\nu\nu\acute{\eta}\theta\eta$) not from blood nor from the will of flesh, nor from the will of man, but from God."

For two reasons this is doubtful. In the first place, the same antithesis between human and divine generation is common in Philo. Not Abraham, according to Philo, but the divine Word ($\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omega\varsigma$ $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$) begot Isaac (I. 130), who is to be considered not the result of generation, but the work of the Unbegotten. Samuel also is spoken of as "perhaps a man" and "born of a human mother," but as "divinely born" (I. 379). Moses, having received Zipporah, finds her "pregnant by no mortal" (I. 147). More generally Philo says (*ib.*), "It is not lawful for virtues . . . to have a mortal husband. Yet they will never become pregnant from themselves alone, if they receive not seed from some Other. Who then is it that sows goodness in others except the Father of all, God Unbegotten and All-begetting? . . . Thus virtue receives the divine seed ($\tau\grave{\alpha}$ $\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$ $\sigma\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$) from the Cause of all."

But it may be still urged that, although Philo originated this thought, the expression of it may have been borrowed by Justin from the Fourth Gospel. A difference between the language of the two passages, apparently slight, but really important, makes this supposition improbable. For why should Justin, if he borrowed the phrase from the Gospel, substitute "from the will of God" for "from God"? The answer is that he did not believe that Jesus was incarnate from the Virgin by God the Father, nor by the Spirit, but by the Word, or Logos; and for this reason Justin prefers to say that Jesus was incarnate either by the Word, or by the Will, or Power of God, but *not by God Himself*. This is seen from more than one passage: (I. *Apol.* 66) "Jesus Christ, made flesh *by the Word of God* ($\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}$ $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\upsilon$ $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$);" (I. *Dial.* 54), "not from

human seed, but from the *Power* of God." Now that by the insertion of "Power" he means expressly to indicate the Logos, and ~~not the Father~~ is clear from *I. Apol.* 32: "The above-mentioned blood of the grape is significative that he who was to appear would have blood indeed, yet not from human seed, but from divine *Power*. Now (next to that God who is Father and Master of all) *the first Power and Son is the Logos.*" It is a repellent and scarcely orthodox doctrine to teach that Jesus was incarnate by the Logos, which almost amounts to saying that the Logos on earth was begotten by the Logos from heaven; but that this doctrine was Justin's is evident by his comment upon the words in Luke i. 31, 35, and Matt. i. 21: "Thou shalt be with child by the Holy *Spirit.*"* He explains it thus (*I. Apol.* 33): "Now the *Spirit* and *Power* that proceeded from God we ought to suppose to be *no other than the Logos*, who also is the First-born of God." If it be asked why Justin did not accept the more orthodox belief which affirms that Jesus Christ was incarnate by the Holy Spirit of the Virgin Mary, the answer is, that Justin does not seem fully to recognise the personality of the Holy Spirit except as inspiring the Prophets, and as being joined with the Father and the Son in accepting the worship of the Church. On the whole, then, bearing in mind, first, that Philo, and not the Gospel, originated the antithesis, here discussed, between human and divine birth; and, secondly, that Justin's theory of the Incarnation and of the operation of the Spirit does not appear to be the same as that of the Gospel, and exhibits a significant difference of statement, we are led to the conclusion that if he knew the exact words of the Fourth Gospel on this point he deliberately diverged from them, and consequently did not regard them as Apostolic.

* Justin adopts the text of Luke, but adds words from the parallel passage in Matthew.

(n) (*Dial.* 88) "The Apostles have written that at the baptism of Jesus, as he came up from the water, the Holy Spirit as a dove lighted upon him." The descent of the Holy Spirit being mentioned by the two Apostles Matthew and John (*Matthew* iii. 16, *John* i. 32, 33), and this being "the only place in which Justin uses the expression 'the Apostles have written,'" it is argued that Justin means by "Apostles" Matthew and John, and, therefore, that he recognised the Fourth Gospel as Apostolic.

But surely there is no perceptible difference between "the Apostles have written," and "the Apostles have delivered in the Memoirs composed by them which are called Gospels." Now we have seen above (p. 727) that Justin (*I. Apol.* 66) uses the latter expression to introduce the Institution of the Lord's Supper, of which the Fourth Gospel makes no mention. As therefore no one can maintain that Justin included John in "the Apostles" there, so there is no ground for maintaining that he refers to John here. Besides, since Justin regards Mark's Gospel as written by Peter (*Dial.* 106), he might naturally describe an incident recorded by the three Synoptists as "written by the Apostles."

(o) *Dial.* 103, mentioning an incident described by Luke alone (xxiii. 7), says that Pilate sent Jesus to Herod *bound*. No "binding" is mentioned by Luke; but John (xviii. 12 and 24) says that the soldiers *bound* Jesus and led him to Annas, and that Annas sent him *bound* to Caiaphas. It is suggested (*Authorship*, p. 49), as "the most natural explanation" of Justin's "mistake," that he here confuses Luke and John together, and consequently had read this part of the Gospel of St. John.

Even if this "confusion" were admitted, it would by no means follow that Justin accepted the Fourth Gospel as Apostolic. But it cannot be admitted. For Matthew (xxvii. 2) concurs with Mark in saying that the chief priests

bound Jesus before leading him to Pilate. Now, if there is "confusion" at all, why should we not suppose that Justin confused Luke and the other two Synoptists? He quotes Matthew more than fifty times, and repeatedly blends quotations from Matthew with quotations from Luke; the Fourth Gospel (according to universal consent) he avowedly quotes once at most, perhaps not at all; what then is there in the above *data* which should induce us to believe that he "confused" Luke with an author whom he never quotes, rather than with an author whom he quotes repeatedly, and that, too, in conjunction with Luke? The probability is that Justin remembering, from Matthew, that Pilate had received Jesus *bound* from the Jews, assumed that Pilate sent Jesus on to Herod in the same condition.

(*p*) In *Dial.* 69 the Jews are said to have called Jesus a "magician" and "people-deceiver" (*μάγον καὶ λαοπλάνον*), and it is suggested that this may be a reminiscence of John vii. 12, where it is said by the Jews that he "deceiveth the multitude (*πλανᾷ τὸν ὄχλον*)."

But Matt. ix. 3 and xii. 24 contain charges of working signs like a magician by Beelzebub, and in Matt. xxvii. 63 Jesus is called by the Jews a "deceiver (*πλάνον*);" so that it is on the whole more probable that the reference, if any, is to Matthew than to John.

(*q*) *I. Apol.* 35—after quoting Isaiah lviii. 2, *αἰτοῦσί με νῦν κρίσω*, "they now ask of me judgment"—asserts that this prophecy about the Messiah was fulfilled by the Jews, who, "having dragged him along, set him on a judgment-seat, and said, 'Judge for us.'" Nothing, like this, is recorded in our Gospels; but it has been suggested by Professor Drummond* that Justin may have extracted his meaning from John xix. 13 by reading *ἐκάθισαν* for *ἐκάθισεν* in that passage, and interpreting it transitively.

* In the *Theological Review*, July, 1871, p. 328.

John xix. 13 is, "Pilate therefore having heard these words led Jesus out, and *sat* (ἐκάθισεν) on a judgment-seat." Transferring this act to the mob, Justin is supposed to have understood the tradition thus: "The mob dragged Jesus away, and *set* him on a judgment-seat." Then he would naturally add the request of the people, "Judge for us," out of his own head, as a detail which *must* have been true, because it was prophesied (just as, in *Dial.* 32, he tells us that the ass on which Christ rode into Jerusalem was "bound to a vine," because, in Genesis xlix. 11, the future lawgiver was to "bind his ass's colt to the choice vine").

But immediately after this passage, after adding also the piercing of the hands and the feet and the casting lots for the raiment, Justin refers, not to the Gospel, but to the "Acts of Pilate," "and that these things happened ye may learn from the *Acts of Pontius Pilate*." And although the reason for this may be that he was writing to heathens, for whom the Acts of Pilate would possess more authority than the Gospels, yet the fact leaves us uncertain as to the source of this tradition of "the judgment-seat." It is quite possible, however, that, just as the Synoptists (Mark xiv. 63) have preserved a tradition that the Jews—forced by the irony of Providence—hailed Jesus as a Prophet; and the Fourth Gospel (xix. 14) has a similar tradition that Pilate, under the same constraining influence, publicly entitled Jesus as a King,—so Justin here preserves a third tradition that the Jews hailed Jesus as a Judge. But if this tradition is a misunderstanding or various rendering of the statement quoted above from the Fourth Gospel, it would seem that the traditions embodied in the latter had not yet assumed, in the estimation of Justin, such an authoritative position as to prevent very considerable divergences in quoting from it. In other words, it would seem that the Ephesian oral doctrine, out of which the

written Gospel sprang, still existed side by side with the document, and sometimes preponderated over it.

(r) *Dial.* 123 shows a striking similarity to the First Epistle of St. John: "As from the one man Jacob, surnamed Israel, all your nation had been addressed as Jacob and Israel, so also we, from the Christ who begot us to God . . . are both called and are the true children of God, we who keep the commandments of Christ (*καὶ θεοῦ τέκνα ἀληθινὰ καλούμεθα καὶ ἐσμέν, οἱ τὰς ἐντολάς τοῦ χριστοῦ φυλάσσοντες*)." Now in the First Epistle of St. John (iii. 1) Westcott and Hort read, "Behold what love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called children of God, and we are (so)" (*ἵνα τέκνα θεοῦ κληθῶμεν καὶ ἐσμέν*); and it is urged that this resemblance of language and thought is too striking to be accidental.

It is certainly not accidental. But an inquiry into the origin of the phrase may prove that Justin and the Epistle borrowed from some common source. We find a similar phrase elsewhere applied to God (*Dial.* 56), "He is and is called (*λέγεται*) God," apparently intended to emphasize the reality of that God who revealed Himself as "I am." But this use of the phrase seems to have come to Justin through Philo (I. 580), who comments on the revelation of "I am," and says that it is as though God said to Moses, "My nature is to *be*, not to be called" (*λέγεσθαι*). And again (I. 221), Moses says that the tabernacle is called (*κεκλησθαι*) the tabernacle of testimony—"a very cautious expression, that (*σφόδρα παρατηρημένως ἵνα*) the tabernacle of Him who *is*, may *be* (*ὑπάρχει*), and not merely be called (*καλῆται*)." As therefore the classical authors use a proverbial antithesis between "being" and "seeming," so Philo, and Justin through Philo, appear to have used a similar antithesis between "being" and "being called, or named."

Now in the Christian Church the regular word for the

Saints being "the called, *κλητοί*," it would become natural—while exhorting them to sincerity or strengthening their hopes—to use a kind of play on the word "called," and to urge them not only to be *called*, but also to *be* God's children, or else to comfort them by reminding them that they were not only *called*, but also *were* God's children. Naturally enough therefore, Justin, contrasting the merely nominal title of Israel after the flesh with the spiritual claims of the Saints, declares that, while the former were "addressed" as Israel, the latter "are both *called* and *are* the true children of God."

A coincidence of thought so natural and so easily traceable to a common original in Philo, cannot be assumed to prove that Justin borrowed his language from the First Epistle, even indirectly, still less that he had *read* that Epistle and accepted it as Apostolic. Nevertheless—when combined with the use of the Joannine *ἀληθινός* ("true") and the phrase "keep the commandments of Christ"—it may be accepted as one among many indications that the author of this Ephesian dialogue was not ignorant of the Ephesian traditions, many of which are now incorporated in our Fourth Gospel, and also in the First Epistle which is a kind of Postscript to the Gospel.

IV. THE UNIQUE QUOTATION.

Hitherto we have been discussing a number of alleged similarities between the Fourth Gospel and Justin, some of which proved absolutely nothing at all, and needed little more than the bare quotation to prove their futility; others only showed that he was probably acquainted with some of the traditions of the Gospel, but did not show that he recognised them as apostolic; others proved almost demonstratively that he indeed knew both the doctrine of the Logos and also many of the words of Christ recorded in

the Fourth Gospel, but that he did not altogether accept the former, and that, instead of quoting the latter—even when he “had them in his mind”—he preferred to quote the “Words of Christ” from the Synoptic Gospels; others showed that the teaching of the Fourth Gospel was apparently associated in his estimation with teaching from apocryphal or traditional sources; but not a single quotation hitherto has been ever alleged to be an avowed quotation, that is to say, introduced with any kind of preface indicating an apostolic or authoritative origin. When Justin quotes Matthew—which he does fifty-five times—he generally introduces the quotation with a mention of the “Memoirs of the Apostles,” or “The Words of Christ,” or some other sign of quotation. But no one even contends that any of the twelve or thirteen passages quoted above are thus introduced. We now come to the passage which is alleged to be Justin's unique quotation from the Fourth Gospel.

I. Apology 61. “For Christ said, ‘Unless ye be born again (*ἀναγεννηθήτε*) ye shall certainly not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.’ Now that it is impossible for those who have once been born to re-enter the wombs of them that bare them is evident to all. (*ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἀδύνατον εἰς τὰς μήτρας τῶν τεκουσῶν τοὺς ἅπαξ γεννωμένους ἐμβῆναι, φανερόν πᾶσιν ἐστί.*)” Compare John iii. 5: “Jesus answered and said unto him, ‘Verily, verily, I say unto thee, unless a man be born (*γεννηθῆ*) anew (or ‘from above,’ *ἄνωθεν*)* he cannot see the Kingdom of God.’ Nicodemus saith unto him, ‘How can a man be born when he is old? Can he enter the second time into his mother's womb and be born (*μὴ δύναται εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν τῆς μητρὸς αὐτοῦ δεύτερον εἰσελθεῖν καὶ γεννηθῆναι*)?’” “Jesus answered and said, ‘Verily, verily, I say unto thee, unless a man be born of

* The usage of Philo. i. 28, *ἄνωθεν ἀρξάμενος*, and i. 263 *οἱ ἄνωθεν φιλοσοφῆσαυτες* is strongly in favour of the interpretation “from heaven.”

water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God.' ”

The similarity is obvious, and the hypothesis of accidental coincidence is absurd. But the question for us is, whether this similarity, in a passage introduced with the words, “Christ said,” is sufficient to show that Justin borrowed the passage from a document identical with the Fourth Gospel, and recognised by him as being of Apostolic origin, or whether here, as elsewhere, he may have borrowed it from a tradition, embodied differently in the Fourth Gospel.

In order to answer this question we must consider (1st) how Justin elsewhere used this preface, “Christ said,” whether to introduce passages from the Memoirs, or from traditional or apocryphal sources; (2nd), whether the differences between Justin’s quotation and the Fourth Gospel are best reconcilable with the hypothesis that he borrowed from a document or tradition; (3rd), whether there is any evidence to show that this passage, from the earliest times, was a part of traditional doctrine. *A priori* we approach these questions with a fair and reasonable pre-judgment against the hypothesis of quotation from a document; for since we have found Justin, above, repeatedly connecting the words of the Fourth Gospel with traditional doctrine, and nowhere quoting it as the “Gospel” or as the “Memoirs,” although he freely quotes the other Gospels thus, it is a reasonable inference that he is quoting from Tradition here. But this consideration might, of course, be overcome by a great preponderance of evidence on the other side, elicited in the investigation of the three points above mentioned.

First, then, the preface, “Christ said,” appears to be rare in Justin. His usual preface to quotations from the Gospel contains some references to the “Memoirs;” or else, after making mention of Christ, he introduces some mention of His words with the preface “he said,” or “he taught;”

or sometimes he mentions the "Gospel," or says "it has been written by the Apostles." An analysis of Justin's quotations from the Gospels given by Kirchhofer shows that, if we include the preface "Jesus Christ said," as well as the simple "Christ said," there are only nine passages thus prefaced. Four of these are prefaced by "Jesus Christ," and, of these, one is apocryphal—"Wherefore also our Lord Jesus Christ said, 'In whatsoever (state) I find you, in this I judge you.'"* One is a free quotation from our Gospels (Matt. xxii. 37—9); and two are exact (Matt. xi. 27; Luke x. 22; Luke xviii. 27). But of the five beginning with the shorter preface "Christ said," two—though resembling sayings in the Gospels or Epistles—differ so widely from the Gospels that we cannot feel sure they are not traditional (they resemble Luke xii. 48, and Luke vi. 36, with Ephesians iv. 32), two are apocryphal—"For Christ said, 'there shall be schisms and sects,'" "Christ saying that He would again come to His disciples in Jerusalem and then eat and drink again with them"—and the fifth is the present passage.† So far as this induction goes, therefore, it would appear that we are not justified, from the fact that Justin introduces certain words of Christ with the preface "Christ said," in inferring that Justin is quoting a Gospel. On the contrary, the evidence of the preface—though it does not go very far in either direction, yet, so far as it goes—inclines us to believe that Justin is not quoting from a Gospel, but from a Tradition.

Passing next to the differences between the form of the passage in Justin and the Fourth Gospel, we see that Justin, besides stating in his own person what the Gospel

* It is possible that this is another form of the tradition (John v. 30) "As I hear I judge."

† A sixth is introduced by the words *καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἡμέτερος χριστὸς εἶρηκε*, "for also our Christ had said," (*Dial.* 49) having been previously referred to, in the same chapter, with the preface *ὁ ἡμέτερος κύριος ἐν τοῖς διδάγμασιν αὐτοῦ παρέθηκε*. This extract is almost verbatim from Matt. xvii. 11—13.

assigns to Nicodemus in the form of a question, and besides otherwise varying the language, omits all mention of "water" and the "Spirit." If these words are useless for the special purpose for which Justin is making his quotation, their omission requires no explanation and is perfectly compatible with the hypothesis that Justin is quoting from the Fourth Gospel; but if the words are so useful as to seem almost essential, then their omission will be difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis of quotation, and will be a strong argument against it.

Dr. Ezra Abbot (*Authorship*, p. 42, note), maintaining that the omission of "water" is intelligible, says: "Justin is not addressing an argument to the Roman Emperor and Senate for the necessity of baptism by water, but simply giving an account of Christian rites and Christian worship. And it is not the mere rite of baptism by water as such, but the necessity of new birth through repentance, and a voluntary change of life on the part of him who dedicates himself to God by this rite, on which Justin lays the main stress." He adds that the sentence about the impossibility of returning to the womb and being born again, is an "unmeaning platitude" in Justin, if we suppose it to originate from him; "we can only explain its introduction by supposing that the language of Christ, which he quotes, was strongly associated in his memory with the question of Nicodemus as recorded by John."

A very brief summary of the context will enable the reader to determine for himself whether this explanation of the omission of "water" is satisfactory. Justin is showing the reasonableness and originality of the two sacraments instituted by Christ, both of which, he says, have been parodied by demons. It is therefore necessary for him to set forth (1) the Christian practice of the Sacrament, with its meaning and purpose; (2) Christ's precept about the Sacrament, and the correspondence between the Christian

practice and the precept of Christ ; he may then proceed (3) to show that the Sacrament is both reasonable and original.

This method he pursues exactly in dealing both with Baptism and the Eucharist ; let us begin by examining his treatment of the latter. First (*I. Apol.* 65), he describes the introduction of the newly-baptized Christian to the Eucharist, the bringing in of the cup and the bread, the offering up of praise by the president, and the participation in the Eucharist by the people. Then he explains the meaning and purpose of this rite ; they do not receive this, he says, as common bread and drink, but as the flesh and blood of Jesus. He next shows that this view is based on Christ's precept : " For the Apostles, in the memoirs composed by them, which are called Gospels, have delivered unto us that thus Jesus enjoined on them, viz., that having taken bread, He gave thanks and said, ' Do this in remembrance of me, this is my body ; ' and having taken the cup in the same way, and having given thanks, he said, ' This is my blood, ' and that he communicated it to them alone." Lastly, he adds that the demons, parodying this rite, have imitated it in the bread and cup, which are introduced in the mysteries of Mithras.

Here, then, we have a clear indication of Justin's method of justifying the Sacraments ; first, he sets forth the rite and its meaning ; secondly, the correspondence of it with the precept of Christ ; thirdly, the conclusion that the rite is reasonable and original. It remains to be seen how he applies this method to the justification of baptism. He begins (*I. Apol.* 61) by describing the selection of those who are thought worthy of being thus dedicated to God, and the prayers and fastings practised by them and for them ; then, he says, they are brought by us where there is water, and are born again (*ἀναγεννώμενοι*) in the same way in which we were born again ; for " in the name of God, the Father and Lord of the Universe, and of the Saviour Christ, and of the

Holy Spirit, they go through the purification then in the water (*τὸ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι τότε λουτρὸν ποιοῦνται*)." In accordance with his method he ought now to show that Christ, by His express words, enjoined this *purification by water*, or spoke of it as necessary; and the passage in John iii. 5, if quoted *without any omission*, as it now stands in our version, would have been exactly to the point; for Christ said, "Except a man be born of *water* and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." Instead of this, however, Justin quotes, "Except ye be born again ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." But this might obviously mean nothing more than, "Except ye become as little children" — a mere inculcation of the innocence and trustfulness of childhood—not in any way implying *purification with water*. How is it possible to suppose that Justin, wishing to justify the Christian rite of purification by water, and to show that Christ expressly commanded it, could have omitted the very words that contain the command? *

* Here it may fairly be asked, Why did not Justin quote Matt. xxviii. 19, "Go ye and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them *in the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit?*" Justin, having just quoted this very baptismal formula, could have found no more appropriate support than the very words of Jesus in "The Memoirs" inculcating it.

It must be sufficient here to state briefly (1) that the Gospel of St. Mark is recognised by all scholars to contain an interpolated appendix; (2) that the Gospel of St. Luke contains four or five most important insertions in the post-crucifixion narrative; see the text of Westcott and Hort, xxiv. 6, 12, 40, 51; (3) that the Gospel of St. John contains an apparent appendix, probably by the same hand as the Gospel itself, but still of the nature of an appendix; (4) the post-resurrection portions of the Gospels are very rarely quoted by the earliest writers, and indeed a cursory glance at Kirchofer would lead to the conclusion that they are never quoted by them; (5) the Apocryphal Gospels are quoted with comparative frequency for the post-resurrection narrative; (6) many passages in Matt. xxviii., e.g., the description of the "many bodies of the saints which arose from the dead," and how they "came into the city and appeared to many," and also the mention of the tale "spread among the Jews to this day," appear to be late additions.

The conclusion from all which is that the last chapter is by no means of equal authority with the rest of St. Matthew's Gospel, and that it is probable that Justin did not quote xxviii. 19, because he did not know of it, except, perhaps, as an additional appendix to the first Gospel.

Justin's following remarks confirm the impression that he is here quoting, not our Fourth Gospel, but a tradition which did not contain the words "water and the Spirit." For in the first place, as if conscious that his method has failed because he has brought forward no "words of Jesus" that inculcate purification with water, he supplements the deficiency by a precept from Isaiah, inculcating "washing": "And how those who have sinned and repent shall escape their sins, is declared by Esaias the Prophet. 'Wash you, make you clean, put away the evil of your doings from your souls' (Isaiah i. 16-20). And then, appealing seemingly to oral tradition, he adds: "We received from the apostles this account, viz., that, since our physical generation made us the children of impurity, ignorance, and constraint, * now, in order that we may become the children of knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) and choice, † and may obtain remission of sins committed before baptism, there is named over him who has chosen to be born again, and has repented of his sins, the name of that Lord who is Father of all, and Master." Next, in accordance with his method, he goes on to show (*ib.* 62) how the demons, having heard of this "washing" predicted by Isaiah, imitated it in their purifications; and (*ib.* 64), referring to the connection between "spirit" and "water" implied in the saying of Moses, "The Spirit of God moved on the face of the waters"—he says that the heathen have set up an idol of the Korè (Persephone) at the sources of streams, and have declared that she is the daughter of Zeus, *i.e.*, that the goddess who presides over water proceeded from Zeus as the Spirit proceeds from God.

Now does not all this show that there was evidently in

* This doctrine is of the same tenor as John iii. 6, "That which is born of the flesh is flesh."

† Compare John viii. 32, "The truth shall make you free." Philo (1, 426) says that the title of "sons of God" is reserved for those who have "knowledge" (*ἐπιστήμη*).

Justin's mind, and probably in the traditions of the Church, a close connection between "water" and "the spirit" implied in baptism; and, if so, does it not become still more difficult to understand why—if he had before him the teaching of Christ that men must be born "of water and the spirit"—he should have omitted these very words which form the basis of his charge against the heathen of parodying the rite which was to be instituted by Christ? * And, further, the fact that Justin connects Christ's words with the apparently traditional teaching of "the Apostles" is in conformity with the hypothesis that the words here quoted as Christ's were also traditional; and the introduction of Isaiah's precept "wash ye," combined with the omission of any words about washing in the precept of Christ, tend to prove that the latter precept contained no such words.

We pass now to consider the similarity and dissimilarity in the words imputed by the Fourth Gospel to Nicodemus but by Justin uttered in his own person. (1) Nicodemus asks, "Can a man enter the second time into his mother's womb and be born (*μή δύναται εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν τῆς μητρὸς αὐτοῦ δεύτερον εἰσελθεῖν καὶ γεννηθῆναι;*)?" (2) Justin says "Now that it is quite impossible for those once born to enter the wombs of those that bare them, it is clear to all (*ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἀδύνατον εἰς τὰς μήτρας τῶν τεκουσῶν τοὺς ἀπαξ γεννωμένους ἐμβῆναι φανερὸν πᾶσιν ἐστι.*)" Here Dr. Ezra Abbot asserts that Justin is guilty of an "unmeaning platitude"; the question of Nicodemus—as a

* It is interesting, by way of contrast, to show how Irenæus (*Fragm.* 34) cites this same passage: It was not for nothing, he says, that Naaman, the leper, was purified on his being baptized. For even so we, lepers in sin, are made clean by the sacred waters and the invocation of the Lord, being spiritually born again as new-born babes, even as the Lord has declared: "Except a man be born again *through water and the spirit*, he shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." Omit the italicised words, and every reader must feel that the argument falls to the ground, or, at all events, requires further argument to support it. For it is needful to show (if these words are omitted) that a man cannot be thus born again without "water and the spirit."

question uttered by a learned Rabbi determined to misunderstand the words of Jesus by taking them literally—is, he says, intelligible enough; but the Roman Emperor and senate could not thus misunderstand them; yet (argues Dr. Abbot) so imbued is Justin with the words of the Fourth Gospel that this question of Nicodemus is inseparably associated in his mind with the foregoing utterance of Jesus; and consequently, though Justin has no reason at all for inserting these words, he persists in inserting them. Still more strangely, though he might have, at least, preserved himself from this charge of uttering “platitudes” by quoting the words as a question uttered by a learned Rabbi, or by an objector, he either forgets the fact or declines to avail himself of it, and thus is guilty of a second folly. Combine these two errors, one of insertion and one of omission, with the extraordinary (supposed) blunder of omitting the very words (“water and spirit”) which are most necessary to his argument, and we must surely find Justin guilty of a complex absurdity, not easily attained in the process of extracting a single quotation—and, let us add, an absurdity not easily believed, unless there can be alleged some much better testimony for it than is yet forthcoming.

But the fact is, that this “unmeaning platitude,” as it seems to us, could be by no means unmeaning for those to whom it was addressed. Constantly do the Christians complain that their rites were misconstrued by being misunderstood in a literal sense. Elsewhere Justin says that the Christian Eucharist was made the basis of a false charge of feasting on the flesh and blood of a slaughtered child; and the Jews themselves are charged by him, in a passage referring particularly to baptism (*Dial.* 14) with “misunderstanding all things in a fleshly manner,” and with supposing that they are pious if they purify their bodies while keeping their souls in impiety. How much

more likely was such a "fleshly misunderstanding" on the part of Gentiles, unacquainted with the phraseology of Eastern religions! Therefore, in the first century, when a Christian teacher brought forward before a Gentile audience the necessity of baptism, and endeavoured to support it by one of Christ's precepts on the necessity of being "born again,"* the very next step must necessarily be to secure himself against misunderstanding and to lead his hearers to what he considered the right inference, by urging that "it is obviously impossible to be born again in the literal sense;" and this missionary traditional supplement to Christ's precept, might either be expressed, as Justin expresses it, in the writer's or speaker's own person, or, as is the case in the Fourth Gospel, might be placed in the mouth of an objector, in the course of a dialogue between him and Christ. We are, therefore, spared the necessity of convicting Justin of the stupidity and irreverence of mangling an apostolic Gospel, by appropriating to himself an utterance assigned by that Gospel to another speaker, and of doing this with no other result than to cause himself to utter an "unmeaning platitude." The truth is that Justin did not misquote an apostolic gospel, because he did not know of its existence; he merely appended to Christ's precept the ordinary

* It would be an interesting question to determine what kind of baptism was supposed by the author of the Fourth Gospel to be administered by the disciples of Jesus before the Resurrection (iv. 1); (a) whether they baptized in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and this at a time when they had not recognised the Son in His divine nature, and when (vii. 39) "the Holy Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified;" (b) whether if their baptismal formulary omitted the names of the Son and the Holy Spirit, it was thought necessary, after the descent of the Spirit, to re-baptize those who had received the imperfect baptism; (c) whether the statement that Jesus "*οὐκ ἐβάπτισεν*" means that He never baptized any one, and, if so, (d) whether the first disciples were merely baptized with John's baptism, or (e), if Jesus baptized His first disciples, what was the formulary He employed; and lastly, why St. Paul (Acts xix. 3) finding certain disciples that had not been baptized, except with John's baptism, did not quote Matthew xxviii. 19, or, at all events, make some reference to the express precept of Christ therein recorded.

traditional commentary common among teachers of the first century. It is quite possible that he did not even know of the dramatic manner in which that tradition had been utilised by the author of a recent Gospel; but if he did know it, and did not recognise it as apostolic, he would naturally prefer the more ordinary way of expressing the tradition.*

Having now stated the grounds, derivable from Justin's context, for believing that he is quoting this text not from a Gospel, but from a tradition, we have to ask whether the nature and history of the text itself confirm or weaken this conclusion; and the answer is that the various readings of this text found in the MSS. of the Gospel itself, and the remarkable variations with which it is quoted from the earliest times, are in favour of the supposition that, from the very first, this text was merely one of several traditional expressions, by which not only scribes copying the MSS., but also teachers quoting the Gospel, long continued to be influenced. In the text of Westcott and Hort this verse contains no less than three various readings of the class "thought worthy of notice in the Appendix on account of some special interest attaching to them," and Dr. Ezra Abbot testifies to the extraordinary variety with which it is

* There is still some difficulty in explaining why the language of Justin's statement should deviate so strangely from the language of Nicodemus, which seems the more simple and natural of the two and more likely to be in conformity with the common tradition. Granting that Justin altered *κοιλίας* into *μήτρας* as being more technically correct, and then—in order to avoid the sound *μήτρας τῆς μητρὸς αὐτοῦ*—altered *μητρὸς* into *τεκνοῦν*, still we cannot easily account for his use of the word *ἐμβῆναι*. So far as can be judged from Liddell and Scott, and the best Indices to Aristotle and Lucian (as well as the Concordance to Homer) the word is used for *mount, embark (on), advance*, but never for *εἰσελθεῖν*. Is it possible that Justin had in his mind the famous saying of Heraclitus, which might be thought in point here, that "no one *embarks (ἐμβαίνει)* twice on the same stream (of existence)?" In any case such remarkable variations are more consonant with the hypothesis that he is freely repeating a traditional saying in his own way, than that he is deviating from the written word of an apostolic Gospel.

quoted by the earliest writers. Both in the Clementine Homilies (xi. 26), and in Clement of Alexandria (*Cohort. ad Gentes*, 9), as well as in this passage of Justin, "ye" is used instead of "a man"; instead of "born anew, or, from above" (*γεννᾶν ἄνωθεν*), Justin's word *ἀναγεννᾶν* is used by the Clementine Homilies (xi. 26), Irenæus (*Frag.* 35), Clement of Alexandria (*Cohort. ad Gentes*, 9), and many others; instead of "he cannot see," or, "he cannot enter," the form "he will certainly not see, or enter," is so common, that Dr. Abbot has noted sixty-nine examples of it in various authors quoting his text; and instead of "kingdom of God," the phrase "kingdom of heaven" is found in Hippolytus (*Ref. Haer.* viii. 10), the Clementine Homilies (xi. 26), Irenæus (*Frag.* 35), and many others, extending to so late a period, and influencing so many MSS., as to be inserted by Tischendorf in his text.*

Such being a brief sketch of the history of the text of John iii. 5, we conclude by showing how all these variations may naturally be accounted for, and how all of them easily fall in with the theory that the text did not originate a precept of Christ before unknown, but was merely one among many traditional expressions of it. It appears from the Synoptists that in the earliest times there had been known some precept of Christ in which He solemnly insisted on (*ἀμῆν, οὐ μῆ*) the imitation of "little children" as a condition of "entrance into the kingdom of God;" but whereas Matthew (xviii. 3) used "ye," and "kingdom of heaven," Mark (x. 15) and Luke (xviii. 17) concur in using the singular "whoever," and "kingdom of God." Matthew's version is, "Verily I say unto you, unless ye be turned (*στραφῆτε*) and become like the children, ye shall certainly not enter into the *kingdom of heaven.*" The words

* Commenting on this variation, Westcott and Hort (*Notes on Select Readings*, p. 75) point out that it is naturally suggested by the recurrence of the phrase in Matthew, but add that it is "perhaps derived from a traditional form of the words."

of Mark are identical with those of Luke: "Verily I say unto you, whosoever shall not receive the *kingdom of God* like a little child, *he* shall certainly not enter into it." The Synoptic variations—"be turned and become like," and "doth not receive the kingdom of God like"—indicate that there was no agreement as to the precise word in which Jesus expressed the imitation of children. It is possible that both the Synoptic phrases are attempts to render some Aramaic word meaning "to be born again," which appeared in the earliest times too difficult to render literally in Greek. Jesus may have said originally, "If ye be not born again," and the First Gospel may have interpreted this into Greek by saying, "If ye turn not back and become as children;" while the second and third Gospels interpreted it, "Whoever shall not receive the kingdom in the spirit of a little child."

Although part of this supposition is conjectural, thus much is certain, that St. Peter assumes (1 Ep. i. 3) that all Christians are "born again" (*ἀναγεννᾶν*), and, consequently, that in very early times, long before the composition of the Fourth Gospel, the phrase was in use among the faithful to denote the change necessary for entering into the kingdom of God. Whether therefore as a development of the Synoptic words of Jesus, or as a recurrence to the original and exact words of which the Synoptic version was a periphrastic interpretation, a tradition would be naturally current in two shapes, first (following Matthew), "Verily, I say unto you, *unless ye be born again*, ye shall certainly not enter into *the kingdom of heaven*;" and (following Mark and Luke), "Verily, I say unto you, whosoever shall not be born again, *he shall certainly not enter into the kingdom of God*." Omitting "verily I say unto you," we find that Justin's tradition exactly agrees with the former of these: "Unless ye be born again, ye shall certainly not enter into the kingdom of

heaven." Another curious version is given by Clement of Alexandria, who combines the use of the word "born again" with Matthew's "become as little children," and Luke's "receive":—"Unless ye again become as little children and be born again, as the Scripture saith, ye will in no wise receive Him who is truly your father, and will in no wise ever enter the kingdom of God" (*Cohort. ad Gentes*, 9). The Fourth Gospel, instead of "enter into the kingdom," prefers the more Hebraic expression, "see the kingdom of God" (compare "see death," "see corruption," Luke ii. 26, Acts ii. 27—31); and instead of "will certainly not" (*οὐ μή*), prefers the stronger phrase implying inherent impossibility, "is [not able." Lastly, instead of the single word "born-again" (*ἀναγεννᾶν*), it prefers two words (*γεννᾶν ἄνωθεν*), which may possibly mean "born over again," but which, more probably, may be interpreted "born from above," *i.e.*, "born with a heavenly birth;" and though it adopts (with Mark and Luke) the singular form instead of Matthew's plural, it substitutes "unless a man" (*ἐὰν μή τις*) for "whoever." No comment is required to show how very much further the Fourth Gospel goes than Justin in deviating from the Synoptic Tradition.

So far, our conjectures are based on obvious facts, on the variations in the Synoptists, in the quotations by the Fathers, and in the text of the Fourth Gospel itself; but when we pass to the following verses (John iii. 4, 5) containing the objection of Nicodemus and the reiteration by Jesus of his former statement—with the substitution of the words "of water and the Spirit" for "anew, or from above"—we have fewer facts to guide us, and any suggestion must be regarded as merely a working hypothesis. Nevertheless, when a great number of convergent evidences, external and internal, make it so probable as to be practically certain, that, in Justin's estimation, passages now

found in the Fourth Gospel *were* Traditions, neither apostolic nor authoritative, it is not a superfluous task to show how Tradition *may* have originated the present extract from that Gospel.

As to the reply of Nicodemus, we have shown how natural it was for the earliest teachers of the Christians to supplement the "hard saying" of Christ with some words indicating that it must not be understood literally—a supplement which Justin appends in his own person, while the Gospel dramatically assigns it to Nicodemus. Nor is it much more difficult to explain the origination of the new version of Christ's precept with the words "water and the Spirit." For as soon as the Synoptic "born anew" came to be connected, in the minds of the faithful, with baptism, it was natural that some modifying comment should be added to the mysterious word. From St. Peter's Epistle (iii. 21) we may infer that some were in danger of ignoring the inward birth, while laying stress on the outward purification; from the Acts of the Apostles (xix. 3) we find, on the other hand, that in the very early days of the Ephesian Church there were some Christians who were ignorant of the necessity of Christian baptism, and consequently, it may be presumed, of any precept of Christ on the subject, and it is quite possible that a rejection or depreciation of the rite may still have lingered in that city. For the latter class it was necessary to point out that the purification must be "from water;" for the former, that it must be "from the Spirit." Yet the Fourth Gospel does not substitute this new version for the old so as to exclude the latter, but appends it as an explanation: "Ye must be born anew," says the Saviour; "but," replies Nicodemus, "that is impossible." "Ye must be born *of water and the Spirit,*" is the answer and explanation.

Some little illustrative confirmation of this hypothesis may be derived from the fact that, even after the recogni-

tion of the Four Gospels had arrested the development of Christian Traditions, the tendency to despiritualise the original saying of Christ is still found (though ineffectually) at work in the quotations of the text by early authors. For example, the *Clementine Homilies* (xi. 26) omit all mention of "Spirit," but retain "water"—suggesting, however, some spiritual signification perhaps by the epithet "living." "Unless ye be born again by living water into the name of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, ye shall not enter into the Kingdom of heaven." And the *Clementine Recognitions* (vi. 9) omit even this faint hint of the spiritual element: "Unless a man be born again of water, he shall not enter into the Kingdom of heaven;" and, to the same effect, Tertullian: "The Lord saith, Unless a man be born of water, he hath not life." If, even after the stereotyping of Christian doctrine by the recognition of the Four Gospels, these variations of quotation from documents were possible, and if their tendency is evidently to lay less stress on the inward reality and more on the outward sign of regeneration, how much more easy was it that changes should take place in the development of a still undefined and sometimes obscure tradition, and how probable that all the changes should be in one direction—namely, towards the interpretation of Christ's "hard sayings," in such a way as to make them more generally intelligible and applicable, even at the cost of making them less spiritual.

Now, summing up the evidence on this unique quotation, we are led to the conclusion that the writer is not quoting from a document that he believes to be an apostolic Gospel, but from a Tradition, our reasons being these:—(1) There is no mention of its being quoted from a Gospel; (2) it is introduced with the words with which Justin *more often than otherwise* introduces a traditional or apocryphal saying of Christ; (3) it is associated, in the immediate context, with other doctrine apparently traditional; (4) its language

differs so remarkably from that of the Fourth Gospel as to be hardly compatible with the view that Justin knew the Gospel and regarded it as apostolic ; (5) those very words in the Gospel, which would have been most useful for Justin's purpose, are omitted by him ; (6) the quotations of this passage by other early authors, and the condition of the text in the Fourth Gospel itself, confirm the supposition that it was a tradition derived from the Synoptists, and taught in the Early Church with great variations ; (7) it is possible, without any difficulty, to explain how the passage in the Gospel may have been traditionally developed from the Synoptists.

In addition to these arguments there is the indirect evidence from the other similarities between Justin and the Fourth Gospel, previously considered ; which show that (1) he knew of the existence of the Gospel, or parts of the Gospel, in some form ; (2) he never avowedly quotes it as a Gospel, or as authoritative ; (3) although it is one of his main purposes to prove Christ's divinity and pre-existence previous to the Incarnation, he yet never borrows thoughts or arguments from that Gospel which alone enunciates these doctrines ; (4) although he agrees with the Fourth Gospel in identifying the Logos with Christ, he differs from the Gospel, and approximates to the Jewish Philosopher Philo, in his expression of his views of the Logos ; (5) where he treats of topics peculiar to the Fourth Gospel (as distinct from the Synoptists)—viz., the mystery of the brazen serpent, and the appearance of God to Abraham, he differs from the Gospel and agrees with Philo ; (6) in all these points, and especially in the doctrine of the Logos, his doctrine is more Alexandrine and less Christian, or, in other words, less developed, than that of the Gospel ; (7) he repeatedly associates references to the Fourth Gospel with teaching from apocryphal or traditional sources ; (8) even when he is said by modern critics to be

“remembering” or “referring to” passages in St. John’s Gospel, it is admitted by those same critics that he never quotes those passages, but quotes the Synoptists by preference; (9) even when he declares that he will show how Jesus “revealed” His pre-existence and divinity, he quotes the words of Jesus, not from the Fourth Gospel, but from those Gospels which, as Canon Westcott truly says, “do not declare Christ’s pre-existence.”

What must we now say to the argument that the Fourth Gospel was “very abundantly” used by the Valentinian Gnostic heretics against whom Justin wrote? Surely this: that (if the fact can be proved) it is a potent argument to show that Justin did not regard the Gospel as authoritative. For if his heretic antagonists used it, while he abstained from using it, this strongly confirms our supposition that his reason for abstaining from the use of it was not ignorance of it, but a belief that it was not apostolical. The testimony of the Diatessaron of Tatian is to the same effect. This pupil of Justin admitted the Fourth Gospel to an equality with the other three; but this is said to have been after he had become a Gnostic Encratite; and his compilation rejected the genealogies and “such other passages as show the Lord to have been born of the seed of David after the flesh.” As we know, on Justin’s positive statements, that he would have disapproved his pupil’s excision of the Gospels, so we might reasonably infer (even if there were no further evidence) that he might very probably have dissented from his pupil’s estimation of the Fourth Gospel; but the overwhelming evidence enumerated above, converts this probability into a certainty. The Gnostic Valentinians and the Gnostic Encratite Tatian took one view of the Fourth Gospel; Justin Martyr (who was not a Gnostic) took another.

How, then, did the Fourth Gospel, patronised by Gnostics and regarded with suspicion by the comparatively orthodox

Justin, win its way so rapidly in the Church that, by the end of the second century, it was not only universally recognised, but even all traces of hesitation have been obliterated, except such as may be detected in the works of this single author? Those who regard this question as unanswerable, except on the hypothesis of apostolic authorship, not only make too little allowance for the non-critical and receptive spirit of the Church in the earliest ages, but also do a great injustice to the intrinsic power of this most spiritual treatise. It succeeded because it deserved to succeed; because it was, spiritually speaking, in accordance with the truth; because it truthfully protested against the thaumaturgic tendencies of the Church by exhibiting Jesus principally as a worker of spiritual and not material marvels; because it truthfully represented Him as a Leader who was not, and who could not be, understood till His physical presence had been succeeded by His spiritual presence; because it finally and definitely rescued Christianity from the danger of becoming a narrow sect of Ebionites; and lastly, because, in answer to the cavils of heathen cynics who scoffed at the notion that the Father of men could have awaked from ages of neglect to send His Son at last as a Saviour into a corner of Syria, it raised and established for Christ's religion the claim that it was not an afterthought or extemporised epilogue, but a pre-ordained and continuous drama, co-extensive with the history of the Universe, wherein the Protagonist was none other than the Eternal Word or Wisdom who from the beginning was with God, and was God.

EDWIN A. ABBOTT.

DR. MARTINEAU'S AND MR. POLLOCK'S
SPINOZA.—I.*

THE present Essay falls into three divisions; the first treating of the relation of Spinoza's philosophy to present thought; the second, of the Life of Spinoza as presented by his recent English biographers; the third, of Spinoza's philosophy, in reference especially to Dr. Martineau's important exposition and examination of it. Of these only the first and second appear in the present number.

I. SPINOZA'S RELATION TO MODERN THOUGHT.

There are several good reasons why an adequate account of Spinoza's Life and Philosophy should be made accessible to the English public. Of these we may place first the singular purity, self-forgetfulness and rectitude of the man's personal character, and his passionate devotion to truth; for, as Mr. Froude truly says, "it is not often that any man in this world lives a life so well worth writing as Spinoza lived, not for striking incidents or large events connected with it, but because he was one of the very best men whom these modern times have seen." He has a

* *A Study of Spinoza*. By JAMES MARTINEAU, LL.D., D.D., Principal of Manchester New College, London. With portrait of Spinoza. London: Macmillan and Co. 1882.

Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy. By FREDERICK POLLOCK, Barrister-at-Law, late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and Honorary Doctor of Laws of the University of Edinburgh. With portrait of Spinoza. London: Kegan Paul and Co. 1880.

further claim on our attention on account of his great significance in the history of theological and philosophical culture. The most important of the few works of his which were published in his lifetime, the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, not only inaugurated sound Biblical criticism and exegesis, and anticipated some of the results of recent liberal scholarship, but has also the merit of holding a leading place among the few books which, in that age of theological dogmatism, nobly pleaded for liberty of thought and expression as being indispensable to a nation's true well-being. Nor has his influence been less striking in the sphere of philosophy, for from the year 1780, when Lessing made to Jacobi his celebrated confession of sympathy with "Spinozism," the *Ethica* of Spinoza so captivated for half a century some of Germany's foremost thinkers, that in the view of Schleiermacher, Goethe, Schelling and Hegel it is Spinoza, rather than Descartes, who should be regarded as the true father of modern thought.

But the most cogent practical reason why thoughtful persons should now be enabled to attain an accurate knowledge of Spinozism is because this philosophy is still a living power in the world, and may be expected to play for some time to come an increasingly important part in the struggle which has now commenced between scientific theories and religious beliefs. It is an obvious and interesting fact that Spinoza's writings have powerfully attracted two quite distinct types of mind. Fervent intuitionists, such as Novalis and Schleiermacher, and thoroughgoing experientialists, such as the late Professor Clifford and his friend Mr. Pollock, opposite as they appear to be in their intellectual sympathies and tendencies, yet agree in regarding Spinoza's chief work as a masterpiece of philosophical genius. Is it a startling paradox—or is it rather an evidence of the depth and catholicity of Spinoza's philosophy—that on the one hand, his views to a great extent anticipated and

-inspired Schelling and Hegel in the construction of their celebrated *a priori* philosophical systems, and that on the other hand, in some of their features, they bear, as Mr. Pollock justly remarks, a striking likeness to the results arrived at in the present day by such purely experiential psychologists and physicists as Taine and Haeckel? When, in the concluding portion of this essay, we endeavour, with the help of Dr. Martineau's exposition of Spinoza's views, to give our readers some account of their true character and of their logical or illogical nexus, the reason of this curious two-fold attraction which they exert will be evident, and we shall then see more clearly whether or not it affords any ground for believing that on the basis of Spinozism the seemingly opposite tendencies of philosophical thought will gradually be brought into harmony, and that hereafter experientialist and intuitionist, savant and theologian, will cordially shake hands over the pages of the *Ethica*, and admit that Spinoza has shown how the true philosophy includes and reconciles their respective one-sided methods and ideas.

In order, however, to form a correct estimate of Spinoza's relation to present thought we must, to some extent, anticipate the answer to the above question and briefly point out why it is that the mystic and the man of science both find satisfaction in the study of his philosophy. It must be remembered, then, before all else, that it is by *the clear and positive intuition of the reason*, and not by any process of logical generalization and abstraction, that Spinoza professes to arrive at his fundamental position that there is one self-existent Substance, and that this Substance (which is with him synonymous with God) is constituted of an infinity of attributes, each of which is itself infinite. These attributes, of which two only, thought and extension, are accessible to human knowledge, manifest themselves in an infinity of finite modes, and these modes of thought and extension con-

stitute the universe of mind and matter. It might be supposed at first sight that this is only the modern Evolution theory inverted; that the two theories cover, in fact, precisely the same ground, only that the terminus of the evolutionist is the starting point of Spinoza, so that the former, instead of first mounting upwards with Spinoza by the intuition of the reason to the Absolute, and then descending deductively to finite things and finite minds, takes the reverse course, and, beginning with finite forms of matter and sensation, endeavours to ascend inductively to a knowledge of the original substance and cause of physical and mental phenomena. But it will be found on reflection that this comparison between Spinoza's thought and the thought at present dominant in scientific circles is utterly illusory and very deceptive. By this inverse process it is not possible to make the slightest approach towards Spinoza's self-existent or uncaused Substance. The study of the finite may conduct us to the notion of the indefinite, but never to the positive intuition of the infinite; the study of the temporal yields no insight into the nature of the eternal. By this we by no means intend to deny that the apprehension of the infinite and the eternal may or must accompany all knowledge of the finite and the temporal, but simply to assert that such apprehension is ever an intuition of the reason and never to be detected among the data of sensation. It is true that according to Spinoza, bodies and minds are modes of Substance; but at the same time he most emphatically teaches that Substance in itself is indivisible and unchangeable, and that in relation to it the notions of part and whole, as well as of time, duration, and succession, have no intelligible meaning. Finite things appear to us to be capable of division and to pass through successive changes, but this confused and inadequate idea is due to the delusive play of the imagination and must be laid aside when the intellect is contemplating things in their

reality, *i.e.*, in relation to the Substance, which is their ground and cause. It must never be forgotten, then, that in Spinoza's view the eternal and infinite Substance is no generalisation or abstraction which the understanding fashions out of a previous knowledge of the temporal and the finite. It is present, indeed, in all finite objects and in all finite ideas, but it is apprehended, not through sensation, but through rational intuition, and it is known with a clearness and certainty to which our knowledge of finite phenomena can make no pretension.

And now we reach the crucial question, the answer to which determines the essential character of Spinozism, as, indeed, of every philosophical system: What is the relation between the infinite and eternal Substance or God, intuited by the reason, and the universe of finite bodies and minds? A thinker's reply to the question determines his position either as an Atheist, an Agnostic, a Pantheist, or a Theist. If he replies, "I know of and believe in nothing but these finite material and mental modes, and recognise no such faculty as Spinoza's intuition," then he is properly described as an Atheist. If again he replies, "I believe in the existence of Substance, or God, on the testimony of intuitive reason, and I regard it as the infinite and eternal reality of which finite material and mental modes are the necessary phenomenal expression, but I can attach to it no other predicate than this," then he is an Agnostic. If, however, he replies, as Spinoza does, "I can say this, but I can say more. I can assert that I know by intuition that this Substance is a thinking thing, and also an extended thing, though its thought is not as my thought (seeing that it does not involve intellect or will), nor its body as my body (seeing that it is one and indivisible); but I agree with the Agnostic that this Substance *must* express itself as it does in the actual universe of nature and mind," then we have that form of doctrine called Pantheism. If, finally, he

replies, "I believe on the testimony of rational intuition and also of my moral and spiritual consciousness that there is an infinite and eternal Being in whom all the phenomena of nature find their ground and their adequate cause, but I see no reason to believe that He *must*, from inner necessity, call into existence and sustain this particular universe; all I know is that He actually does so. The attributes and modes of finite being in the universe I learn by self-consciousness and observation, and not by way of deduction from some previous knowledge of God's nature. What I further know by intuition is that He is the light of my intelligence, and also the inspirer and the object of my holiest affections, and, therefore, I have ground for presuming that all the phenomena which proceed from His causation will be characterised by wisdom and beneficence. I know also by intuition that though 'in Him I live, and move, and have my being,' nevertheless, I am not merely a passive mode of His eternal substance and causality, but am in some measure a free or original cause to whom the choice is continually offered, whether I will accept God's invitation and become at one with Him, or will turn away from the infinite and the eternal and seek the gratifications of the earthly and the temporal," we should consider this to be a Theistic confession of faith.

It will naturally be objected to this last clause that many Theists and Christians hold the necessarian dogma, and so refer all their mental determinations to God's sole causality; but, so far as we can see, this doctrine, in logical minds, must pass into some form of Pantheism. And further, as to Pantheism itself, it should be noticed that it is not essential to it that God should be regarded as having infinite extension, or even that there should be a belief in extended matter at all.

Professor Flint, in the excellent chapter on Pantheism in his *Anti-Theistic Theories*, says that this theory "is always

in unstable equilibrium between Theism and Atheism, and is logically necessitated to elevate itself to the one or to descend to the other," and Jacobi concludes that the logical outcome of Spinoza's system is Atheism. Had the term "Agnosticism" been in use in Jacobi's day, he would, we think, have preferred to say that a logical Spinozist must become an Agnostic,* and we are certainly somewhat surprised that Professor Flint, who clearly recognises the difference between Atheism and Agnosticism, should not have substituted the latter term for the former in the above description of Pantheism. It seems to us that the inner genius of Spinozism is distinctly and intensely antagonistic to Atheism. Is it in the nature of Atheism, or of any system which logically tends to Atheism, to kindle the warmth and enthusiasm which Spinoza's views have kindled, and still kindle, in many pure and lofty souls? We are very far from accepting Spinoza's theological position as true and satisfying, and we heartily endorse what we believe to be Professor Flint's real meaning, that Spinozism is in unstable equilibrium between Agnosticism and Theism, so that its earnest adherents will not find rest for their minds till they settle down in one or other of these two forms of theological thought; but at the same time we must insist upon it, that between the Atheism of D'Holbach and the Agnosticism of the logical Spinozist there yawns a gulf impassable. The thinker who sets the infinite over against the finite, the eternal over against the temporal,

* It should be noted, however, that Dr. Martineau, in the profound chapter on Spinoza's doctrine concerning Religion (which we shall afterwards have to notice), argues that if we adhere to Kant's interpretation of the word "God," Jacobi was certainly justified in classing Spinoza with Atheists, on the ground that Spinoza's God is without intellect and will, and these attributes are, according to Kant, essential to the idea of a "Living" God (See *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 347). But as in another passage in the same chapter (p. 334), Dr. Martineau says that if the view of Causality which leads Spinoza to deny to God an Intellect and Will like ours, be true, "it ought to reduce us to the silence of Agnosticism," we may, perhaps, fairly infer that Dr. Martineau himself classes Spinoza among Agnostics.

the real over against the phenomenal, and emphatically declares that no logical manipulation of the latter member of these pairs can by any possibility conduct us to the former, and that the former is held on the strongest of all mental tenures, the immediate and unquestionable intuition of the reason, that thinker may be far removed from the possession of adequate religious ideas, but he is assuredly still farther removed from the barren and cheerless negations of Atheism. Spinoza most seriously errs, we think, in regarding all finite minds and bodies as logically involved in the essence of God, and thus subjecting both God and man to what is virtually mechanical necessity; he errs also in not recognising the validity of the testimony of the moral and spiritual consciousness as to man's personal relation to the "Father within him;" but amid all these errors he ever clings with unrelaxing tenacity to the idea that human thought and human conduct cannot lead to truth and peace so long as man gives his mind and heart to the study and love of the finite and does not, in intellect and action, aspire constantly to union with the infinite and the eternal. Although Jacobi classed Spinoza with Atheists, there are passages in the *Ethica* which we cannot read without feeling that Spinoza, in happy inconsistency with the logical exigences of his system, has given expression to a mood of thought and emotion which has some real affinity with the mood which prompted Jacobi's own saying, "we believe in God, not by reason of the nature which conceals him, but by reason of the supernatural in man, which alone reveals and proves him to exist."

What has been said will, perhaps, help to make clear the nature of the attraction which Spinozism has exercised, and is still likely to exercise, over minds of a mystical or theosophic turn, as well as over many devout and imaginative natures, who need a religious faith, and yet are held back by prepossessions engendered by prevalent scientific theories

and speculations from the acceptance of definite Theistic doctrines. Such persons find, or think they find, in the propositions of the *Ethica* a revelation of the true meaning of that mysterious antithesis, yet indissoluble union, of the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal, which ever presents itself in their own inner life, as well as in the perception of the universe around. Following Spinoza's guidance, they see, or think they see, that all that is painful, discordant, or destructive in nature, all the error, sin, and sorrow in society, and in their own lives, appears to us in a repulsive guise, simply because we contemplate it from the wrong point of view. Seen *sub specie æternitatis*, i.e., from the Divine point of view (and Spinoza teaches how we may at length succeed in placing ourselves at this true intellectual stand-point), all that before appeared as imperfections are now seen to be harmonious and necessary features in the perfect whole. Man is in one sense but a finite mode of God's infinitude, and as such, is constantly liable to error and to passions that mar his peace; but in another sense, as an intellectual being, he has a vision of, and a part in, this Divine infinitude. The end of his existence is to escape from the attractions of the finite and the temporal, and to be actuated more and more by the Infinite and the Eternal. Freed at length from the dominion of earthly passions by the greater might of that one divine passion, the intellectual love of God, man, though living in time, more and more roots his being in the infinite: he becomes one with God, and shares in God's eternity, so that over the better part of him the disintegrating hand of time and death is powerless.* How far these doctrines are in harmony

* Whether Spinoza's views have real affinity with those of many Christian mystics depends, of course, mainly on the answer to the question, "Does he, in ascribing the attribute of thought to God, regard God as *self-conscious*?" This important question is most thoroughly discussed in the fifth chapter of *A Study of Spinoza*, and Dr. Martineau, after stating and examining the arguments adduced by such competent critics as Trendelenburg and Busolt in favour of an affirmative answer, arrives at the conclusion that "there is

with Spinoza's fundamental definitions and axioms, and are legitimately reached *more geometrico*, we shall be better able to determine when, under Dr. Martineau's guidance, we have explored more in detail Spinoza's philosophy. At present we are merely describing the mode in which Spinozism actually attracts a certain class of minds. There is, assuredly, to many persons, a potent charm in this blended determinism and optimism, but it can hardly be doubted that, in part at least, its action upon the spirit is analogous to that of a pleasant soothing narcotic, which deadens the painful sense of human sin and human responsibility, at the cost of weakening those moral energies and those spiritual affections and emotions which constitute what is noblest and divinest in the nature of man.*

Let us now turn to that opposite aspect of Spinoza's philosophy which is making it now so attractive to living savans and sociologists, that Mr. Pollock thinks "it may be safely affirmed that Spinoza tends more and more to become the philosopher of men of science." It is hardly likely that men of science will be strongly drawn to Spinoza's account of Substance as resting on the immediate intuition of the mind. A few of them, so far as they are theologically inclined, may find his religious philosophy more to their taste than Mr. Spencer's Agnosticism; but it is obvious that what Mr. Pollock refers to as the ground of his prognostication as to the future influence of

nothing in the phrases so ingeniously borrowed from the vocabulary of Theism, to contradict or qualify the much plainer propositions which exclude all Divine self-consciousness and personality, and constitute a system of pure naturalism." Dr. Martineau likewise arrives at a negative conclusion in reference to the kindred question, whether Spinoza, in saying that "the better part of us is eternal," meant to assert the doctrine of personal immortality (v. p. 289). This matter will demand attention when we treat of Spinoza's philosophy.

* As Dr. Martineau remarks in his Address on "The Relation between Ethics and Religion" (p. 18), "Spinoza himself notices (*Ethics* III., pr. 49) that towards a being supposed to be free, affections far more intense will be felt than towards one under necessity."

Spinozism, is the striking similarity of Spinoza's views concerning matter and mind, and their relation to each other, and the views now in favour with some of the more influential savans, psychologists and sociologists. Spinoza professes to arrive at these views by deduction from the idea of Substance, and other intuitive notions; but it can be shown that no such deduction is possible, and that he must have reached them by way of experience and speculation. In fact, he started with the physics, mechanical physiology, and psychology of Descartes, carried these out to their logical consequences, and then thought that the cosmological theory thus reached could be shown to follow of necessity from his fundamental intuition of a self-existent Substance. It becomes evident, however, when the *Ethica* is carefully examined, that the theory of the phenomenal world therein contained rests on quite another foundation than that on which Spinoza rests his belief in infinite Substance or God; as, indeed, must be the case in every philosophical system which professes to give a reason for the existence of phenomena. The actual features of finite and temporal things must be learned from experience, but it is only in the light of man's rational intuition of the Infinite and the Eternal that the mind's quest for the cause and meaning of phenomena can attain any satisfaction. Hence it is essential to the very life of Spinozism that the physics and psychology should be taken in connection with the primary ontological perception of God; and, therefore, those savans whose admiration and acceptance of Spinoza's teaching is confined to the views which are common to him and Haeckel, have not imbibed in the slightest degree the vital essence of his thought, and he cannot with any propriety be called their philosopher.

Still when we consider in how marked a manner the physics, physiology, and psychology of Spinoza accord with the views now current among prominent evolutionists, and

how convenient is his authority for setting aside those deliverances of consciousness which stand in the way of the universal application of evolutionist ideas, we shall be prepared to understand why our men of science and our "scientific" sociologists should do homage to a thinker who more than two hundred years ago anticipated many of their principles and even claimed to have deduced them from the necessary idea of substance. The typical evolutionist in the present day is inspired with the conviction that his principle and his method of explanation will, if persistently applied, gradually solve all that is humanly solvable in the mystery of nature and of man. There are, however, certain common beliefs which, if true, indicate facts which the theory of Evolution is quite helpless to explain. Either these beliefs must be declared errors and illusions, or else the pretensions of the Evolution theory must be seriously curtailed. The former of these alternatives is naturally the one usually adopted, and in every such case the evolutionist can appeal for confirmation to the *Ethica* of Spinoza. The most formidable of these beliefs is that connected with the existence of the human will, the consciousness of personal identity, and especially the conviction that man possesses freedom of choice between the springs of action which he feels to be of different moral rank. If this consciousness be really reliable, and it be regarded as a fact that persons who have yielded to temptation could have chosen to do otherwise, then man is to a certain degree an original or uncaused cause, and there is an element in his nature which lies entirely outside the scope of evolutionist calculations. What says Spinoza on this head? That the soul is merely the aggregate of successive ideas; that will is only desire; and that every finite mode of thinking in man is necessarily determined by its relation to preceding finite modes of the same attribute. Human conduct is therefore, in every case, strictly

necessitated, and the emotion of repentance for our own sins and that of blame for the sins of others, are based upon confused and mistaken ideas. Spinoza, accordingly, can hardly fail to receive recognition and gratitude from the scientific moralist and sociologist. Another prevalent idea is that the adaptations in nature indicate intention and design in the cause of nature. The Darwinian theory is supposed by many to have superseded all such appeals to intelligent causality, and Spinoza in denying to God all purposive activity appears to be in entire harmony with the evolutionist position. Again, some of our leading scientists (such as Prof. Huxley) believe that the doctrine of the conservation of force requires us to deny that thought or will exercises any causal influence over the movements of the body, and others (such as the late Prof. Clifford) with more consistency believe that we must also deny that the external world is the cause of our sensations and perceptions. This latter view is precisely in accordance with Spinoza's doctrine that there is perfect parallelism between modes of extension and modes of thought, but that no causal action is exerted by the one on the other. And if it be said that this exact parallelism of two quite independent series of phenomena is *prima facie* most improbable and demands some explanation, then the theory of Spinoza that thought and extension are two out of the innumerable attributes of the one self-existent substance, and therefore find the explanation of their unity and harmony in it, presents itself as a plausible way of escape from a serious dilemma. And, lastly, the difficulty of accounting on evolutionist principles for the appearance of consciousness on a stage where previously there seemed to be nothing but unconscious matter, is explained away by the doctrine of Spinoza that modes of extension are always accompanied by modes of thinking, so that even in the inorganic kingdom there are elements of sentiency which pass into distinct consciousness

when the elements of extension form a nervous system and a brain.

We have ventured thus to set forth in some detail the two aspects of Spinoza's philosophy, which attract respectively the mystic and the savant, partly because we think that some idea of his relation to both religious and scientific thought will be a useful introduction to a review of Dr. Martineau's admirable exposition and examination of Spinoza's doctrines, and partly because we wish to make our readers share our own persuasion that a thorough research into the strength and weakness of the imposing structure of thought which Spinoza's genius has reared is about the very best discipline for arriving at a correct understanding of the real foundations of religious belief, and of the true character and worth of those scientific theories and speculations which now threaten the destruction of all theological interest in the higher regions of British culture.

II. THE LIFE OF SPINOZA.

There is every reason to be grateful to Dr. Martineau and Mr. Pollock for their masterly delineations of Spinoza, as a man and as a thinker. These two scholarly and graceful treatises are both needed, for, as Dr. Martineau observes in his Preface, "a sufficient *raison d'être* may be found for both in the different points of view which they carry with them, through criticisms seldom much at variance."

Mr. Pollock's "Life of Spinoza" is good, and at the time of its appearance was decidedly superior to earlier English accounts of this philosopher. Now, however, it is almost superseded by Dr. Martineau's far more elaborate presentation of Spinoza's outer and inner history. This latest of the biographies of Spinoza is as admirable for the vast amount of conscientious research which it evinces, and

for its ingenious and happy suggestions in regard to perplexing features in the earlier narratives, as it is for the neatness and elegance of its literary form. While Mr. Pollock has treated the greater part of Spinoza's correspondence in a separate chapter, Dr. Martineau has interwoven a full account of the whole of it in the biographical narrative. It is evident, too, that the latter writer has made a special and minute study of the letters, and the result is that he has not only been enabled to add something to our too meagre knowledge of Spinoza's relations with contemporary thinkers, but by inserting the descriptions of the correspondence in their proper places in the sequence of events, has made the letters more intelligible, and also much enhanced the interest of the story. When to this is added, as another special feature of this biography, that it dwells in detail on the order of the composition of Spinoza's works, and also throws much light on the successive phases of his intellectual development, enough has been said to show that it is to Dr. Martineau's "Life of Spinoza" that future students of this philosopher will naturally have recourse.

So attractive is the true story of the life of this lonely thinker, who cared for truth so much and for wealth and honour so little, that we expect that Dr. Martineau's new volume will be sought for by many readers, not because of their taste for metaphysical inquiries, but because, having been interested by Auerbach's charming fancy-picture, they will be eager to make acquaintance with the less romantic but not less beautiful and honourable life of the actual Spinoza. And probably some of these readers may take such a liking to the man that they will be disposed to try to learn somewhat of those ideas of his which in his lifetime led thoughtful people of all ranks to court correspondence with him, and to visit him in his humble lodging; and now, two hundred

years after his death, have caused a statue to be erected to his honour, by contributions from all parts of the world, on the very spot, close to his grave, where, a hundred and fifty years ago (as we learn from Dr. Van Vloten), a clergyman of the then predominant Reformed Church exclaimed, "Spit on that grave—there lies Spinoza." Even orthodoxy, however, which is so prone to pass unkind and unjust judgments on the personal character of heretics, was often disarmed and charmed into admiration when brought into close acquaintance with the blameless purity and noble disinterestedness of Spinoza's nature. By far the most important of the sources of our knowledge of Spinoza's character and history* is a life of him written by John Coler, the Lutheran minister at the Hague from 1693 to 1707, who lived in the same lodgings which Spinoza had occupied rather more than twenty years before. This honest and kind-hearted man was evidently so fascinated by what he heard concerning the deceased philosopher, that he took great pains to collect all the reliable information that could be had about him, and particularly inquired of the worthy and pious people with whom Spinoza had lived during the last five years of his life. The good pastor is evidently quite in love with the sweet and simple beauty of the character he so faithfully portrays, though, as he takes good care to let us know, he shrinks with the greatest dread from Spinoza's theological and philosophical views. It was a happy thought of Mr. Pollock's to append to his treatise a reprint of the old translation into English of Coler's quaint and very interesting account.

"On the Burgwal at Amsterdam," writes Dr. Martineau, "is still shown the house of Michael d'Espinoza, the tradesman, in which his son Baruch was born on the 24th of November, 1632." Michael d'Espinoza, whose native place

* For a complete account of these sources, see Mr. Pollock's *Spinoza*. Introduction p. xxiii.

was in the province of Leon, in Spain, not far from the frontiers of Portugal (probably at one of the five towns in that district which bear the name of Espinoza), was among the emigrants who sailed from Portugal about the beginning of the seventeenth century to escape from the cruel persecutions of the Romish Church, and to seek a peaceful asylum among the people whose indomitable spirit had at length secured for them practical independence of Spanish rule. Dr. Martineau graphically describes the condition of things in the Peninsula, which had led the Jews (who so long as they remained in Spain were obliged to outwardly conform to Catholicism, and accordingly passed under the name of "New Christians,") to seek a fresh home in the Netherlands. He tells us also that "it was no home of religious peace on which the refugees had alighted. They had taken advantage of large professions of toleration which were never meant for them, or indeed for more than a victorious majority of the persons who made them. They found themselves in an uncongenial community, which gave them no rights of worship or citizenship, but which, pre-occupied with its own dissensions, left them in the security of indifference and contempt."* By the time, however, when Baruch was born, the Jews, by their industry and enterprise, and their expressions of cordial sympathy with the Dutch Christians in their hatred of Spain, had become a recognised and respected portion of the community, and there was nothing to prevent the young Jew from receiving a thorough training in the faith and culture of his people. After passing through the elementary classes of the Jewish High School, Spinoza appears to have come under the influence of two eminent teachers, Manasse ben Israel and Saul Levi Morteira, whose mental characteristics are picturesquely sketched for us by Dr. Martineau. The former of these teachers has

* *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 7.

a place in the history of England, owing to the zealous efforts he made to induce Cromwell to re-admit the Jews into this country; the latter was the senior Rabbi, and a learned Talmudist, and under his instruction the precocious Baruch made such progress in the knowledge of the Talmud that at the age of fifteen "he became the pride of his teacher and the hope of the synagogue." In the advanced classes of the Amsterdam school he had the opportunity, says Mr. Pollock, "of mastering the philosophical writings of the golden age of modern Jewish learning, the commentaries of Maimonides and Ibn Ezra." In these studies he would indirectly become acquainted with Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic modes of thought and expression, and therefore Dr. Land holds "that to understand Spinoza aright we must begin by placing ourselves in the circle of thought from which all his teachers set out, that of Aristotle."*

At this period of Spinoza's life it is by no means improbable that he was, as Auerbach represents, unfavourably impressed towards Judaism and its teachers by the fate of Uriel da Costa.† The speculative restlessness and passionate weakness of this unhappy man allowed him no permanent peace in any religious communion. Born and bred a Roman Catholic, though in blood a Jew, he became converted to Judaism and fled from Oporto, his native place, to Amsterdam; there he abused the Jewish teachers and

* P. 6, of *Spinoza's Essays*, by LAND, VAN VLOTEN, KUNO FISCHER, and ERNEST RENAN, edited by Professor Knight. By the courtesy of the publishers, Messrs. Williams and Norgate, we have been allowed to see the proof-sheets of the greater part of this forthcoming work. The two lectures delivered on occasion of the Bicentenary of Spinoza, by Prof. Land, to the class of Philosophy at Leiden, give a brief but admirable account of the sources and of the essential features of Spinoza's philosophy. The question how far Spinoza was influenced by mediæval Jewish writings, is also ably discussed in an article in *Mind*, July, 1880, by Mr. W. R. Sorley, on "Jewish Mediæval Philosophy and Spinoza."

† V. Mr. Pollock's *Spinoza* (p. 8), from which narrative the above sketch of Da Costa's career is abridged.

rulers for not keeping close to the Scriptures; and they, in turn, excommunicated him. Then he published a controversial tract to disprove the immortality of the soul, and it is an instructive indication of the spirit of that age that on the motion of the chiefs of the synagogue, the Christian civil authorities publicly burned his book and punished him with fine and imprisonment. This seems strange behaviour on the part of those who (both Jews and Christians) had themselves only recently escaped from ecclesiastical tyranny; but it illustrates Dr. Martineau's above-quoted remark, and is just of a piece with the previous action of this same Reformed Church of the Netherlands towards the Arminians, and with that of the New England Puritans towards the Quakers. Mr. Pollock's remark upon it is:—"It is a general fact in human history, and one of the saddest, that no sooner has a persecuted community secured its freedom, than it takes to persecuting in its turn."

There is hardly ground, we think, for this sweeping generalisation; the fact rather is that at the period in question the connection in men's minds between dogma and salvation was so close and essential as to render them quite unable to take a just view of toleration and of the right of honest thought to free expression. Both Jews and Christians needed that enlightenment on this subject which first dawned on modern theological thought with the publication of Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise. But to return to Da Costa. After enduring this social ostracism for fifteen years, he, in outward form at least, became reconciled to the Jewish Church, but his deistic and anti-Rabbinical utterances at length brought upon him a more stringent excommunication. This second exclusion he bore for more than seven years, and then again submitted, but was re-admitted only after undergoing a very humiliating ceremony, so humiliating, indeed, that his wounded pride rendered life unendurable. After the ceremony he hastened home, wrote

an autobiography, in which he bitterly denounced his persecutors, and then shot himself.

Whether this event caused Spinoza to consider if he himself was altogether sound in the Jewish faith we do not know, but certainly not very long after this he lost his interest in Rabbinical instruction, and no longer aspired to become a shining light of the Jewish synagogue. We are left to conjecture as to the mental process which brought about this change. It was probably hastened by the mode of instruction of his teacher, Morteira, whose mental habits were not likely to win the confidence of an enterprising thinker and close reasoner such as Spinoza was. "Fond of the forms (to quote Dr. Martineau's words), but incapable of the spirit of philosophical thought, Morteira could not fail to start more problems than he could solve; while his dogmatic temper would but fix the difficulties which he attempted to beat down. It is no wonder that, under such a master, the clear-witted boy of fifteen found matter for many puzzling questions in his Hebrew Bible and his Talmud; and met with answers more disturbing still. He had caught from his straightforward father an abhorrence of pious pretences, and could not be imposed upon by critical excuses and evasions; and when he got nothing better to help his perplexities, what could a modest and retiring youth do, but keep his difficulties to himself, in reserve for future ~~and~~ private scrutiny?" *

Probably soon after this he served his apprenticeship to the art by which he was to earn his living—that of making and polishing optical glasses. At the same time he acquired a knowledge of Italian, French, and German, and, at a rather later period, began the study of Latin. This last-mentioned study indicates a growing thirst for Gentile culture, for the learning of this language (which was at that time the ordinary medium of learned intercourse throughout

* *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 11.

Europe), was discouraged by the Jews as not tending to religious edification. Greek, it appears, he never thoroughly mastered. Amid his other studies for several years "he repeatedly read the Hebrew Scriptures and their most approved interpreters."

As to what events occurred in the life of Spinoza from the age of fifteen up to the age of twenty-three (when the open rupture with his people happened), we have but little information. There is no doubt, however, that "working silently and living blamelessly, he was passing through the most momentous crisis of his inner history."* During the first half of this period he probably lived at home with his parents and two sisters, quietly studying when not engaged in the manual labour of his trade. During the latter half of the time we know that he formed two connections of a very dissimilar nature, the one appealing to what was religious and mystical in his mind, the other to his mathematical and scientific tastes and aspirations. The first of these was the friendship he formed with several devout and liberal-minded Christians, some of whom, as we learn from Coler, were Mennonites. For an account of this sect we must refer the reader to Dr. Martineau's interesting narrative. "From their disapproval of infant baptism (he tells us), they are often confounded with the later Anabaptists; but their characteristics are quite different, bringing them rather into resemblance, partly with the *Hernhüter* and partly with the Society of Friends."† Closely akin in spirit to the Mennonites were the Collegiants with whom also Spinoza formed friendships, and when, about the time of his excommunication, it was deemed prudent that he should leave the city, he removed some two or three miles out of Amsterdam, on the Ouderkerk road, to the house of one of the members of this fraternity. Mr. Pollock speaks of these Collegiants simply as Remonstrants, but as Dr. Martineau points out,

* p. 18.

† p. 15.

they were a peculiar offshoot of the Remonstrants founded by three brothers, Kobbe by name—all of them farmers—"to whom it occurred that if pastors and churches were not to be allowed, they could do without them. They might be driven away from this 'mountain,' and shut out of 'Jerusalem,' but God was a Spirit, as near as before. The preachers might be silenced and banished, but the truth which they preached could not go into exile with them; belonging to the nature of things, it might still be found by those who stay among the dykes as by those who take ship upon the sea."*

At this date, too, the Remonstrants had a regular ministry in Amsterdam, while the Collegiant communities formed not churches, but collegia, and met together "for mutual help in the Christian life with nothing to disturb the equality of all except the diversity of gifts."

What was it that attracted Spinoza to these simple-minded Christians at this crisis of his mental history? It might be supposed that, as both the Mennonites and the Collegiants appear to have had some mystical tendencies, or, at least, to have held views somewhat akin to the Quaker doctrine of the Spirit, it was a kindred mystical element in Spinoza's mind which drew him and them together. Nor do we think this at all improbable; for, notwithstanding his partiality later on for the *mos geometricus*, we cannot help thinking that Spinoza was all along much of a mystic at heart. It is true that at a later period of his life, after he had thoroughly mastered Descartes' writings, fascinated by the certainty and clearness with which the results of mathematics and of mathematical physics flow from the definitions and axioms, he became altogether possessed with the idea that all phenomena, mental as well as physical, are related to the clearly intuited Substance, as the properties of the triangle are

* p. 16.

related to the essential definition of the triangle. Hence the later mathematical form of his philosophy which masks and fetters the ontological and theosophic passion of the man (*amor Dei intellectualis*). And, if we mistake not (though here we speak with much diffidence, for we are not sure that Dr. Martineau's profound study of Spinoza sanctions our impression),* there are passages both in the *Ethica* and in his other writings, which, in spite of the mechanical rigidity of the form, seem at times to glow with intense heat, as if, indeed, the iron framework of the system were about to melt and allow the mighty spirit within to burst forth into some grand Platonic strain. The blood of the prophets and of the son of Mary still flowed in Spinoza's veins; and it is this strange synthesis in his mind of the mystic intuitionism of the fourth Gospel with the mechanical physiology and psychology begotten of the study of Descartes, which explains at once the secret of his power and charm, and of his glaring inconsistencies. In reading some parts of the *Ethica*, one would almost think that Spinoza believed that it is only such men as La Place and Herbert Spencer who (through getting to see the universe *sub specie aeternitatis*) are able to enter into the kingdom of heaven. But it clearly crops up in Coler's *Life of Spinoza*, and still more in the Theologico-Political Treatise, that Spinoza was quite aware that there is another path to heaven, which, though apparently very different from the former one, is just as certain to lead

* V. p. 289 on "The Mind's 'Eternal Part,'" and Chapter V. on "Religion" *passim*. It affords very strong presumption, we must admit, against the correctness of our view that Dr. Martineau and Mr. Pollock, different as are their theological position and sympathies, appear to agree in the main in their interpretation of this important part of Spinoza's writings (V. Mr. Pollock's *Spinoza*, chapters IX. and XI.). Mr. Pollock allows, however, that "there is unquestionably something of an exalted and mystical temper in Spinoza's expressions; and it seems possible enough that but for his scientific training in the school of Descartes, he might have been a mystic indeed." We shall recur to this question in the concluding division of this essay.

those who tread it faithfully to their home in God—the path of simple obedience to conscience, of love to God and man. Spinoza knew somewhat of the deep meaning of the words, “Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them unto babes;” and it was, we think, because he knew and felt this truth (however inconsistent it might have been with his intellectual philosophy of God, man, and nature*), that he loved the society of these simple-minded and devout Mennonites and Collegiants. As Dr. Martineau truly says, the attraction which Spinoza felt towards them was not that of conversion to their theological creed, but it was “the inwardness of their religion which set it free from the letter of history and law, and made it a simple relation between the finite and the infinite mind.”†

Our excuse for this rather lengthy digression is that it is not possible to understand either Spinoza's life or his philosophy, unless we see clearly how it came to pass that he continually stood in friendly relations with two very different sorts of people. We have had a sample of one sort in his friends, the Collegiants, and we now come to a sample of the other sort, with whom he made acquaintance about the same time—namely, Francis Van den Ende, who afterwards was put to death in Paris for taking part in a conspiracy against the French Government. He was at this time half doctor and half schoolmaster in Amsterdam, and he undertook to help Spinoza in his study of Latin, Spinoza, in return, becoming a resident usher in Van den Ende's school. Van den Ende was a vigorous but restless thinker, “a scientific materialist without theology,” and so bitterly averse to the theological opinions he had formerly held that prudence did not always restrain his tongue, and so, getting a reputation for Atheism, he finally lost his

* *V. A Study of Spinoza*, p. 369, for a clear statement of the nature and cause of this inconsistency.

† p. 18.

pupils, and had to leave the city. A full account of Van den Ende, and of his probable influence on Spinoza's culture, is given by Dr. Martineau.* Mr. Pollock thinks that he not only encouraged and helped Spinoza in his study of Descartes' writings, but also introduced him to the writings of Giordano Bruno.† That Spinoza had learned something of Bruno's speculations seems very probable, especially from two dialogues apparently written by Spinoza about this time, and now incorporated in the recently discovered small treatise on "God and Man"; ‡ and as both Jews and Protestants abhorred Bruno, it is difficult to see how else, than through Van den Ende, Bruno's ideas can at this time have found their way into Spinoza's mind.

During his stay in the house of this vigorous free-thinker, we are told he gave his heart to Van den Ende's daughter—"the Olympia of Auerbach's tale; the Clara Maria of fact." This young lady (as we read in the English translation of Coler's "Life") "was none of the most Beautiful, but she had a great deal of Wit, a great Capacity and a jovial Humour, which wrought upon the Heart of Spinoza, as well as upon another scholar of Van den Ende,

* p. 19.

† p. 12.

‡ *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 13. Dr. Martineau says that, if we agree with Avenarius that these dialogues were written about this date (1651-52), they do not throw much light on the state of mind to which Spinoza was brought by the first collapse of his early theology:—"Nothing can be inferred from their crude and confused sentences, except that his philosophy was yet unformed. The incompleteness, however, was all on the affirmative side of his convictions; the rapid gathering of rabbinical clouds and bursting of thunders on his head clearly show the range and decisiveness of his negative conclusions. Naturalism had taken the place with him of the Supernatural; Reason, of Revelation; prediction by determinate causes, of imaginative visions by Prophets; Necessity, of Design; and the reckoning of human consequences, of threats from Divine anger. The Israelites, though having their function in the world, ceased to be a 'covenanted people': their annals were no more sacred than other history; their 'Scriptures' fell back into the mass of ancient literature. He knew he must be treated as an apostate. But having in him a good deal of the esoteric temper, and believing that for the mass of men the religious 'imagination' did something of the work of truth, he was not eager to precipitate his exile, and still held his peace so long as he ingenuously could."

whose name was Kerckkrinck, a native of Hamburg." Kerckkrinck was the successful wooer; as Dr. Martineau neatly puts it, "he made up for want of genius by abundant wealth, and being a handsome fellow into the bargain, easily cut out the olive-faced philosopher by the bribe of a pearl necklace and a good address." Such was the tradition; but Dr. Van Vloten, by hunting up the register of her marriage, found, by a comparison of dates that Clara, who was twenty-seven years of age when she married, could not have been more than eleven or twelve years old when Spinoza was studying and teaching in Van den Ende's house, and so it seemed that this, the only bit of romance in Spinoza's life, would have to be mercilessly eliminated. Happily, however, his recent biographers have hit upon a suggestion which enables us to retain it in substance, though slightly modified in form. It is very probable that Spinoza, after he removed to the house on the Ouderkerk Road, where he lived for five or six years, still kept up his intimacy with Van den Ende's family, and nothing could be more natural, says Dr. Martineau, "than that the friendship begun in a common love of Virgil and Cicero should turn, at the ages of seventeen and twenty-nine, into love of each other. But the lens-grinder was penniless, and sure to remain so: he soon removed to a distance, and became absorbed in a more ideal love-suit—to immortal truth; and if the mortal maiden left him to the pursuit, and, after ten patient years, gave her hand to one who was both able to offer her a home and did not forget that matrimony is the crown of love, we can hardly accuse her of worldly fickleness."* Kuno Fischer remarks on this episode in Spinoza's life: "With the pangs of love such a head could not have much to do. It was too clear to be darkened by passion." We fail to see the conclusiveness of this inference. Was Dante's mind darkened by his passion? But it is true, the

* p. 25.

“witty” and “jovial” Clara Maria was probably not exactly a Beatrice. Mr. Pollock, after observing that it is just possible that some such half-ideal, half-childish affection may have sprung up between Spinoza and Van den Ende’s daughter, adds: “Spinoza was not a poet, some one will say. No, but he was a mystic at the time in question, which for this purpose will do at least as well.”*

Whether or not Spinoza during his residence in Van den Ende’s house was captivated by the personal and mental charms of the clever and sprightly Clara, there is no doubt that he was much interested in studies, such as the writings of Descartes, and perhaps of Giordano Bruno, which, in conjunction with the personal influence of Van den Ende, completed his estrangement from Jewish orthodoxy, and from the ceremonial usages connected with it. It appears, also, that at the same time a little circle of inquirers belonging to various religious bodies began to gather round him, and though the Cartesian system seems to have been the chief subject of their discussions, “he must now and then in the course of them have given utterance to heterodox opinions. The heads of the synagogue took offence at the doctrine and the practice of the young member of their body, from whom they had formerly expected so much, and tried every means in order to retain him in their fold.”† So anxious were the Jewish leaders to keep the gifted Baruch in peaceful connection with their body, that they offered him, we are told, an annual pension of one thousand florins, if he would attend the synagogue occasionally, and abstain from ventilating his troublesome doubts. Spinoza could not, of course, entertain such a proposal for a moment, because, as Coler says, “he was not a hypocrite, and minded nothing but truth.” In a not very reliable biography of Spinoza, written early in the eighteenth century, by one Lucas, a physician of the

* p. 14.

† *Spinoza Essays*. Dr. Land’s Lecture, p. 7.

Hague, we read that two fellow-students questioned him closely on the theology, and extracted from him certain heretical opinions, such as that, according to the Scriptures, God has a body, angels are only phantoms, and the soul means only the principle of life, and is therefore mortal. This inquisitiveness of theirs was probably, as Dr. Martineau suggests, prompted by the chiefs of the synagogue; at all events, Spinoza's admissions were reported to them, and soon after this in the early part of 1656, Morteira and his colleagues felt it necessary to take decided action. Spinoza was summoned before the Court and, after many unavailing attempts to induce him to recant, they inflicted on him the first degree of ecclesiastical censure, the lower excommunication, which excluded him for thirty days from Jewish society, and was intended to give him time to reflect and repent. The proceedings against him inflamed the zeal of some fanatic, who set upon Spinoza with a dagger one evening as he was leaving some public building, either a theatre or the synagogue.* He evaded the blow, however, and it only pierced his coat, which he afterwards kept in that condition as a memorial. At this time it was that he left Amsterdam and took up his abode with his Collegiant friend on the Ouderkerk road. "It was here," says Mr. Pollock, "under the roof of heretics, anathematised by the Synod of Dort, that he learned the final decision of the Jewish congregation on the charge of heresy against himself." The sentence was pronounced on July 27, 1656, in the Portuguese language. It is given in full in English in Mr. G. H. Lewes' *History of Philosophy*, vol. ii., p. 167. The curse "invokes on him God's unrelenting and pursuing wrath, forbids any one to hold commerce with him by speech or pen, to enter the same house with him or come within six feet of him, to do him any kindness, or read anything of his." †

* *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 23.

† *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 28.

The blow must have been a severe one to any Jew, for the ties of kindred among Israelites are unusually warm and strong, but it is probable that it fell more lightly on Spinoza than it would have done on most men. The modes of thought and extension which constituted our philosopher must have been singularly unlike those which, in the case of poor Uriel da Costa, issued in self-destruction. Spinoza wrote a reply in Spanish to the "amiable document," as Dr. Martineau calls it, and then most likely quietly resumed the study of Descartes; for we are told that on receiving the news of his excommunication he remarked, "This compels me to nothing which I should not otherwise have done." The state of mind of the pupil of Descartes was probably closely akin to that of the pupil of Kant, described in the following passage from Heinrich Heine's racy treatise on *Religion and Philosophy in Germany* :—

Dear reader, if ever thou shouldst visit Amsterdam, bid some cicerone show thee the Spanish synagogue. It is a beautiful building, having its roof resting on four colossal pillars. In the midst stands the pulpit, from which was pronounced the curse on the despiser of the Mosaic law, the Hidalgo don Benedict de Spinoza. On such an occasion a buck's horn, called a *Shofar*, was blown. There must be something quite terrible about this horn; for as I once read in the life of Solomon Maimon, as the Rabbi of Altona was endeavouring to lead him, the pupil of Kant, back to the old faith, and as he stubbornly persisted in his philosophical heresies, the Rabbi resorted to threats and, holding up the *Shofar*, inquired in tones of awe, "Knowest thou what this is?" But when the pupil of Kant replied with calm indifference, "It is the horn of a buck," the horror-stricken Rabbi fell backwards on the ground.

For the next five years Spinoza (who now dropped the Hebrew name "Baruch," and assumed instead its Latin equivalent "Benedict") lived at his friend's house, earning an adequate livelihood by his handicraft. His lenses were excellent, and we hear that those found in his room at his death fetched a very good price. He also gained some repu-

tation as an optician, and it was in this character that he first made the acquaintance of Huyghens and Leibnitz. He seems now to have broken off all communication with his family, and only once more in his lifetime do we hear anything of them—namely, on the death of his father, when his sisters disputed his claim to a share in the inheritance. On conscientious grounds he legally asserted and established his right; but having done so, gave everything to his sisters except one bed. He was during these years the leading spirit of the little band of Cartesians before alluded to, which consisted chiefly (says Dr. Martineau) “of medical students or practitioners, including his subsequent correspondents, Simon de Vries, Dr. John Bresser, and Lodewijk Meyer, known as the editor of his posthumous works.” It is probable, too, that he began now to give lessons to private pupils in the new scientific method, “and so would become conscious, in expounding it, of whatever difficulty it left unsolved.”

In 1661 he removed from the neighbourhood of Amsterdam with his host and friend, and lived for two years at Rhijnsburg, which town was the head-quarters of the Collegiant sect. Before, however, leaving Amsterdam he wrote a “Short Treatise on God and Man and his well-being,”* probably as a parting legacy to his group of friends. “In order,” says Dr. Martineau, “to give this recovered Treatise its true significance, we should regard it, not as the first draft of a projected work, but as the first landing place of his mind in its independent advance. To a large extent it is a reproduction of Descartes, in its ontology, its conception of method, and its psychology and classification of the passions. But there are marked deviations which, though few, are of supreme importance. He adopts the Determinist theory. He makes the actual and the possible co-extensive,

* For the story of the discovery of this treatise, which had only existed in manuscript, v. *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 83.

and so identifies Nature and God. And the human phenomena he interprets on the principle of automatic naturalism. All these are in fact but different aspects of one thoroughgoing change ; and are separately mentioned only because they alter the soil and the fruits of different fields. The wonder is that so vital a modification should make so little show and leave the Treatise with still so Cartesian a look." *

The two years at Rhijnsburg, "though wholly uneventful, were probably among the most fruitful in his mental history." † It was during this time that he made a careful study of Method, and had also already placed on the stocks the great work on which his philosophical fame chiefly rests, for as early as 1661, at the commencement of his stay at Rhijnsburg, he sent to his friend in London, Heinrich Oldenburg, a fragment of the *Ethics*, and two years later we find Simon Vries, one of his younger friends in Amsterdam, reading the *Ethics* in manuscript. This Henry Oldenburg, who plays a prominent part in Spinoza's correspondence, was a native of Bremen, and came over to England as Consul for that city in the time of the Protectorate. He formed many intimacies with eminent literary and scientific Englishmen, and was appointed one of the secretaries of the Royal Society. A very full and interesting account of him and of the letters that passed between him and Spinoza is given in Dr. Martineau's biography. He visited Leiden in 1661, and took a trip to Rhijnsburg on purpose to see Spinoza. The relation between him and Spinoza is a very curious one. Spinoza seems to have opened his mind to Oldenburg with unusual freedom, but it is clear that the latter never thoroughly understood Spinoza's philosophy. He constantly urges Spinoza to publish, but his zeal for publication grew much colder after he saw the effect of the publication of the Theologico-Political Treatise ; and though he offered to take

* p. 85.

† p. 39.

some copies of the *Ethica*, if it should be published, he was evidently half-afraid of having anything to do with it, and expressed no great sorrow when Spinoza gave up his intention of publishing it.

During his stay at Rhijnsburg, Spinoza published with his name, in 1663, abstracts of Descartes' *Principia Philosophiæ*, with an appendix on "Metaphysical Thoughts." "This appendix," says Dr. Martineau, "perplexes us by presenting still an elaborate defence of Freewill, which he is said to have long renounced. His editor, Meyer, excuses him by saying that in teaching the pupil, for whom these abstracts were prepared, he felt bound to sink his personality, and remain the mere representative of Descartes. But if so, it is strange that these 'Thoughts' should stand as the recognised indication of philosophical advance from Descartes to Spinoza."*

During these two years at Rhijnsburg he had been studying Descartes' *Discours de la Methode* on the one hand, and Bacon's *Novum Organum* on the other, and, not being satisfied with either, he had commenced and brought nearly into its present form his fragmentary treatise on the "Amendment of the Understanding." As mentioned above, he also sent to his young friend Simon de Vries, for the consideration of his confidants at Amsterdam, the first seventeen Propositions of the Ethics. The affection and respect of this Simon de Vries for his beloved teacher is very beautiful and touching. "I have long desired," he writes to Spinoza, "an occasion to be with you, but weather and the hard winter have not allowed me. Sometimes I complain of

* P. 41. Note. Here Dr. Martineau indicates what appears to have been the one slight weakness in Spinoza's high character. In these "Thoughts," Spinoza not only repeats Descartes' arguments for Freewill, but constructs others of his own, and yet Meyer tells us he did not believe the doctrine. Dr. Martineau holds, and we think justly, that his concealment goes beyond the limits of mere reserve, and that it abates the interest of his character to come across the frequent sentiment, "*Hoc hominum commune vitium est, consilia sua, etsi tacito opus est, aliis credere.*"

my fate in being removed from you by a distance that keeps us so much apart. Happy, most happy, is that companion who dwells with you under the same roof, and who can at all times, dining, supping, or walking, hold discourse with you of the most excellent matters. But though we are separated in the body, yet you have constantly been present to my mind, especially when I apply myself to your writings." * This Simon Vries once offered Spinoza a present of 2,000 florins, that he might be able to live more at ease, but Spinoza refused it, because he had no use for it, and the possession would, he said, be burdensome to him. And when Vries was dying, he wished, as he had no wife or children, to make Spinoza his sole heir; but Spinoza declined the offer, and begged Vries to bequeath it to his own brother; and even out of the annuity of 500 florins which the brother wished him to have, Spinoza would only accept 300. This unselfishness was a striking characteristic of Spinoza's character. We have seen another instance of it in his behaviour to his sisters in regard to the paternal inheritance, and it presents itself again conspicuously later on, when, after the brutal murder of John de Witt, his heirs disputed Spinoza's right to the small pension which the Grand Pensionary had conferred on him for life, and which, at that time, was his chief support. "This wrong," writes Dr. Martineau, "his indignant friends would have resented on his behalf; but rather than retain a benefaction by a quarrel, he surrendered his just claim. So struck were the intending litigants with his forbearance that what they had denied to equity they yielded to admiration, and regularly paid him the allowance." †

In 1663 Spinoza removed to the village of Voorburg, about two miles from the Hague. His chief motive for the change of residence appears to have been "to place himself within reach of powerful protectors who would secure him from harm in the contemplated publication of his philo-

* Mr. Pollock's *Spinoza*, p. 23.

† p. 92.

sophy; and such protectors he would have in the brothers De Witt at the Hague. This is what he means when he tells Oldenburg that he has friends influential in the State, who may guard him against danger; and that if they cannot he will hold his peace."* There, as elsewhere, Dr. Martineau's narrative acquires additional interest and worth from the vivid picture it gives of the contemporary history and politics, and of the influence which the political ideas of Spinoza and his friends exerted upon the higher thought of the country. The seven years which he spent at Voorburg were devoted to the composition of two principal works, the first half of the period being given to the *Ethics*, the latter to the *Theologico-Political Treatise*; and in the former half he also gave some attention to the unfinished essay on *Method*. As an explanation of the non-completion of this last-mentioned work, Dr. Martineau approves of the acute remark of Avenarius "that Spinoza had to break off the 'Emendation' treatise because, when he came to define the intellect, he could not do it without resort to his metaphysical system for which he was only preparing the way, and this difficulty forced him to see that a doctrine of the intellect could not be a prelude to his metaphysics, inasmuch as it can arise only as their result."† The *Ethics* he continued to compose in Dutch, and, as the portions were completed, sent them to Amsterdam for his disciples there to study and translate into Latin. Dr. Martineau shows from Spinoza's correspondence that it is most probable that his great work which was begun in 1661 was already complete before the autumn of 1665, and "this well accords with the fact that in September of this year Oldenburg twits him with having turned from philosophy to theology, to treat of 'angels and miracles and prophecy,' in evident allusion to his having taken in hand his *Theologico-Political Treatise*. For the next four years his industry was concentrated upon this work—a disproportioned time if measured by the

* *Ib.* p. 51.

† p. 49.

product of the previous equal term, but not if we allow for the difference between an achievement of genius and a result of study. His *Ethics* depended only on his powers of thought, spontaneously moving on the lines or off the lines traced already by Descartes. His *Treatise* deals with a vast ancient literature and history, and involves a continued criticism of the opinions of others on a cyclopædia of unsettled questions."*

As an explanation of the circumstance that Spinoza allowed the manuscript of the *Ethica* to lie by while he was composing the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Dr. Martineau suggests that he found at Amsterdam that the papers containing the *Ethics* had passed too freely from hand to hand for the authorship to remain a secret. "This awakened his fears, and sent him back with a resolve to open his assault upon public errors from another side, and by a work which, never leaving his own desk during its progress, should be brought home to him by neither indiscretion nor treachery."† The *Tractatus* appeared, accordingly, in 1670, anonymously. It made a great sensation, exciting both vehement admiration and vehement condemnation. The doctrine of the subjection of the Church to the State, which it advocated, brought upon it the bitter condemnation of the clerical party, "for if there is anything that ecclesiastical dogmatists of all parties are united in hating with a perfect hatred, it is the Erastian view of the relation of the State to religious differences."‡ It was accordingly proscribed along with the *Leviathan*, of Hobbes, and other works, as a Socinian production—a fate which Spinoza had dreaded, and to avoid which, if possible, he had discountenanced the translation of the book from Latin into Dutch. While engaged on these two great literary labours he had also, during his residence at Voorburg, carried on an extensive scientific correspondence, particularly with Oldenburg, and, through Oldenburg, with Boyle, and other

* p. 55.

† p. 59.

‡ Mr. Pollock's *Spinoza*, p. 33.

English savans. Dr. Martineau has carefully examined these letters, and gives good reasons for his conclusion—a conclusion which appears somewhat at variance with Mr. Pollock's impression *—"that, in truth, Spinoza's physical knowledge does not seem to have been so accurate or so large as his opportunities would lead us to expect. The reflective tendency of his genius did not permit him to pause with long patience upon the analysis of concrete facts, but hurried him away into the region of large conceptions (generals that had never been generalised), whence, as he believed, he could see them brought to the birth." †

Soon after the publication of the *Tractatus*, Spinoza removed from the neighbourhood of the Hague to the city itself. One of his motives for settling at Voorburg had been the facility it gave for intercourse with cultured friends living at the Hague, and, now that he had finished his two great works, he could afford time to receive the accession of visitors which his residence at the Hague itself would involve. Even at Voorburg several distinguished foreigners sought him out, and after the publication of the Theologico-Political Treatise, the number of persons anxious to converse with him was much increased. At first he lodged and boarded with the widow Van de Velde, who had already had some acquaintance with the ways of studious men, for fifty years before she had been in service at the house of the celebrated Grotius. We cannot resist the temptation of quoting Dr. Martineau's vivid picture of Spinoza's habits during this last period of his life :—

After the lapse of a generation, the widow's house was occupied by Coler, the worthy Lutheran minister who became Spinoza's biographer. He used as his study the single back-room which held the philosopher's bed, and books, and tools of work. No house, once made memorable, passes down without its traditions; and to these we owe the scanty notices remaining of the widow's lodger. Though it was the pleading of friends

* *Ib.*, p. 11.

† p. 64.

that had brought him into town, the chief thing that struck observers seems to have been his loneliness of habit. Even for his meals he would often not quit his room, and for two or three days together would see no one. In part this may have been due to a discouraging experience of the cost of living at the Hague; for the necessity of retrenchment drove him next year to remove into a house on the Pavilio-en-gragt, at the back of the widow's, occupied by a painter, Van der Spijck, whose wife would allow him to provide his own meals, and save something by their frugality. Here he spent the last five and a-half years of his life, endeared to his host and hostess by his sweet temper and quiet friendly ways, but declining all social visits beyond the house, though graciously receiving the calls of visitors entitled to seek him."*

Though at the Hague Spinoza devoted so much time to study as sometimes not to leave the house for months, yet the literary results do not seem proportionate to the labour, for we know only of the unfinished *Tractatus Politicus* and of notes for a new edition of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. Dr. Martineau suggests that "his feeble health was now beginning to tell upon his power of intellectual achievement—upon its quantity, though not upon its quality; and that the languid moods which insisted upon relief from strain became more frequent."†

The relations between Spinoza and Leibnitz, which occurred during these last years of Spinoza's life, are fully described by Dr. Martineau, who arrives at the conclusion that "the charge against Leibnitz, of insincere and time-serving depreciation of Spinoza, has no real foundation."‡ These relations with Leibnitz are connected with the far more interesting and intimate connection between Spinoza and Freiherr von Tschirnhaus, a Bohemian nobleman of a noble and generous temper. He was about twenty years younger than Spinoza, and after Spinoza's death earned considerable renown by his achievements in science. He was not only a savant, however, but an acute student of the mental processes involved in scientific discovery.

* p. 73.

† p. 74.

‡ p. 79.

Hence his lively interest in the writings of both Spinoza and Leibnitz, and it was his report to Leibnitz of Spinoza's doctrines which induced the former to visit the philosopher of the Hague. Dr. Martineau regards Tschirnhaus as the keenest of Spinoza's contemporary critics, and the sketch which he gives of this nobleman's character and career, and of his relations with Spinoza, is most attractive.

About this time an incident occurred which showed that Spinoza's name and reputation had already reached the great centres of learning in Europe—an offer, namely, to him from the Elector Palatine, Karl Ludwig, of the Chair of Philosophy in the University of Heidelberg, with no other restriction on his action than the understanding that he would not misuse his liberty to disturb the established religion. Spinoza replies in an admirable letter, politely declining the offer, partly because he feared teaching would interfere with philosophical research, and partly because he is not sure what is involved in this understanding that he should not disturb the public religion.

In the year preceding this invitation the tragic fate of the De Witts occurred. The historical incidents associated with that brutal murder are depicted with Dr. Martineau's rare descriptive power, and on this occasion we see Spinoza's soul, usually so placid, vehemently stirred by strong emotions of grief and indignation:—"For once his equanimity gave way, and on hearing the news he burst into a passion of tears. Nay, he resolved to denounce the crime on the spot where it was committed; and prepared a handbill which he was about to post up by night in the low precincts of the prison; but was saved from the rash act by Van der Spijck's precaution in locking the house door and refusing exit."*

Not long after this Spinoza again incurred public odium by an act of which his biographers, previous to Dr. Martineau, have failed to discover any satisfactory explana-

* *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 88.

tion. In the winter of 1672-73, when the head-quarters of the French army libof invasion were at Utrecht, a certain Colonel there named Stoupe, at once a soldier and a theologian, who had printed a somewhat unfavourable criticism of Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise, invited Spinoza in his own name, and also in that of the Prince of Condé, to visit Utrecht, saying that Condé would recommend him for a pension if he would dedicate some book to the French King. Such an invitation does not seem at all likely to have been congenial to Spinoza's mind, and yet he accepted it, and went to Utrecht. It so happened that Condé had been suddenly called away, and the visit led to no known result, except that Spinoza said he had no wish for the proposed pension. As might be expected this visit caused him to be regarded with angry suspicion as one carrying on treasonable negotiations with the French, and on his return the populace were so excited that Van der Spijck feared that rioters would attack his house; but Spinoza reassured him by bravely declaring that if any mob came to the door he would at once go out to them and let them treat him, if they chose, as they had treated the De Witts. This shows that Spinoza, with all his timid shrinking from collision, could be courageous enough when duty demanded it. But why did he accept this invitation, and thus voluntarily take a course that threatened not only his peaceful relations with his neighbours, but even his life? Dr. Martineau suggests an explanation which may clear up the mystery. He shows that the contending parties were at that time so circumstanced that both had good reason to wish to learn whether they could prudently open negotiations for peace. "If," says Dr. Martineau, "on each side there was a secret wish to measure the temper of the other, no intermediary could look more innocent and be more informing than a philosophical recluse of republican sympathies whose private life was in contact with the most pacific party in the State. That some such public object should

lie hid behind the personal motive assigned for the visit would be perfectly consistent with the truest patriotism." *

In 1675 Spinoza went to Amsterdam to see about the printing of the *Ethica*; but he found that a rumour had been set afloat, and was believed, that he was about to print a book to disprove the existence of God. He found also that owing to this rumour, not only the clergy, but also some Cartesians, were up in arms against him; and so, with his characteristic caution and love of quietude and peace, he dropped the intention of immediate publication. He appears now to have addressed himself to the preparation of the notes for a new edition of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, and at the same time to have carried on some correspondence which had grown out of the doctrines of that work. The rapid advance of consumption was, however, undermining his strength. For some time his letters had spoken of failing health, and he had begged the indulgence of his correspondents. On Saturday, the 20th of February, 1677, he felt somewhat worse than usual, and sent for his friend Dr. Meyer, of Amsterdam, who arrived on Sunday morning. No one seems to have supposed that his end was so near, for both the Van der Spijcks went to church in the afternoon, and learned, to their great surprise, on their return, that he had died at three o'clock. No one was present at his death save Dr. Meyer, the friend who afterwards superintended the publication of the manuscript works.

In concluding this meagre outline of the story of Spinoza and his writings (which can give, of course, but a very imperfect idea of the complete and artistic picture presented in Dr. Martineau's admirable biography), we would wish to call attention to one great distinctive trait of Spinoza's philosophizing, namely, its practical character.

"Spinoza himself tells us," says Dr. Land,† "by what road he came to philosophical enquiry. He had found that all those things which men generally seek after, riches, honour, pleasure,

* p. 91.

† *Spinoza Essays*, p. 17.

do not permanently satisfy. He asked if it were possible to discover and acquire that by means of which he would partake of perfect and enduring happiness. Nothing he saw but love to the eternal and infinite could bestow on him that joy. The highest good consisted for him in this, that he himself, and as many others as possible by his means, should come to the knowledge of 'that unity which connects the mind of man with the whole of nature.'

His life and letters convince us that he had found the tranquil happiness he sought for ; but the interesting question still remains whether that peace of soul had been mainly won, as he himself seems to have thought it had, by persistent intellectual striving to attain to the true knowledge of himself and nature in their relation to the eternal Substance, or whether it had really been gained by the simpler process (which, in the case of unintellectual people, he admits to be legitimate and effectual) of obeying those monitions of the heart and conscience which are felt to carry with them a divine authority. We are inclined to think the latter is the true hypothesis, and the more we study his life and writings in the light of Dr. Martineau's exposition, the greater grows our reverence and love for the man, but at the same time the clearer grows our perception that his system, so far from being a coherent and consistent chain of reasoning, resting on self-evident primary truths, is, as we think will be clearly seen when we treat of Dr. Martineau's presentation of his philosophy, neither satisfactory in its first principles nor faultless in its logic. We cannot agree with Jacobi when he says, after refuting Spinozism, that it is, after all, the only self-consistent solution of the problem of the universe that philosophy can give ; but we heartily echo his genial exclamation :— "Take my blessing after all, great, aye, holy Benedict. Philosophize as thou mayst, and go astray in word respecting the nature of the Supreme. His truth was in thy soul and His love was thy life."

CHARLES B. UPTON.

MUSICA ECCLESIASTICA. *

“**I**N omnibus requiem quaesivi, et nusquam inveni, nisi in hoexkens ende boexkens.” This famous saying exhibits the history of Thomas Kempensis in an expressive miniature. We should miss the whole force of the self-delineation, were we to treat it (with a modern writer) as in any respect an echo of the magnificent despair of Ecclesiastes. The “omnia,” which constituted the limited experiences of the quiet Frater of St. Agnes’ Mount, were insignificant indeed, if we measure them by the eager excursions into all fields of human interest and expectancy, made by the insatiable spirit of him who cloaks his mysterious personality under the ambiguous phrase, “a son of David, a king of Jerusalem.” “Requies,” which was the first quest and the assured gain of Thomas, never fell upon the cankered soul of that great writer who dared

* 1. *Prolegomena zu einer neuen Ausgabe der Imitatio Christi nach dem Autograph des Thomas von Kempen.* Von KARL HIRSCH. Band I. (Berlin: Carl Habel.) 1873.

2. *The Authorship of the De Imitatione Christi.* By SAMUEL KETTLEWELL, M.A. (Rivingtons.) 1877.

3. *Quæritur e quibus Nederlandicis fontibus hauserit scriptor libri cui titulus est De Imitatione Christi.* Auctore G. BONET-MAURY. (Paris: Sandoz et Fischbacher.) 1878.

4. *Gérard de Groote, un précurseur de la Réforme, au quatorzième siècle, d’après des documents inédits.* Par G. BONET-MAURY. (Paris: Sandoz et Fischbacher.) 1878.

5. *Giovanni Gersen, sein Leben und sein Werk De Imitatione Christi.* Von DR. CÖLESTIN WOLFSGRUBER; Benedictiner zu den Schotten in Wien. (Augsburg: Max Huttler.) 1880.

6. *Thomas à Kempis and the Brothers of Common Life.* By the Rev. S. KETTLEWELL. (Kegan Paul, Trench and Co.) 1882.

to inscribe "Vanitas" as the epitaph alike of piety, of folly, and of toil. And when Thomas, in the course of those fifteen years which he spent with laborious care in making his fair copy of the Vulgate for the Brethren of his House, came to the scornful sentence which said, "Faciendi plures libros nullus est finis: frequensque meditatio, carnis afflictio est," he must have joyed to think how sweet was the peace which his gentler soul had found, in the "nooklets" where he delighted to meditate, and among the "booklets" which he transcribed with unwearied pen.

Characteristic both of his feeling and of his style is that sudden dropping into his native Lowland speech, which gives quaint piquancy to the saying we have quoted. He might have phrased it in continuous Latin, with no loss of the antithetic rhyme which he loved (in angellis atque libellis). But the kindly flavour of the Teuton terms enriches the whole meaning of the home-keeping utterance. Like the Shunammite of old, Thomas could say, "I dwell among mine own people." Not only was the horizon of his natural world bounded by the low-lying flats of Gelderland and Overysseel; but beyond this landscape his imagination took no soaring flights. He felt no desire to penetrate into any greater field of human existence than that which, for him, was amply filled by the diligent Brothers of his Order, the simple and pious women of his own neighbourhood, the poor who resorted to the monastery gates, the children who thronged the little schoolhouse where the Brothers taught. In the souls that peopled this quiet scene, his heart, it is plain, was deeply interested. Yet even these he was prepared inwardly to renounce, "with companions of every kind, yea, also all cities, towers, manor-houses, hills and valleys, streams and fountains, plains, meadows, and groves" (*Orationes Piae*). The catalogue of his renunciations, minute and extended as it is, leaves still untouched the shelter and the occupation wherein he felt most at home.

Safe in the corner of his cell, with ink-horn by his side, and the open page before him at which he worked, there was nothing to interrupt the inward enjoyment of that "rest in the Lord," which was the aim and the ideal of his long life.

Thomas was the younger son of John and Gertrude Hemerken; the name has been Germanised into Haemerlein, and Latinised into Malleolus. He was born in 1380 at Kempen, near Crefeld, in the diocese of Cologne. From the place of his birth he called himself Kempensis, and sometimes Kempis (if, indeed, this be not a mere contraction for Kempensis), and has been called by others de Kempis and à Kempis. It is not improbable that those who brought into use these latter forms mistook the place of the birth of Thomas. The Latin equivalent for Kempen is Kempena, and in 1389 we have an Alexander de Kempena. But there is another town, Kampen, not far from the scenes of Thomas's later life; here some have erroneously imagined him to have been born; one of his biographers accordingly proposes, as the true spelling of his name, de Campis, or Campensis. The connection of Thomas with Kempen ceased in his three-and-twentieth year, when he and his elder brother, John Hemerken, sold the family house adjoining the churchyard.

Of the two brothers, John Hemerken was in some important respects the more distinguished man. He was the senior by full fourteen years, and kept the lead in personal force and ecclesiastical standing, as well as in age. His powers early attracted the notice of Gerrit de Groote, and when the Brotherhood of the Common Life developed into an institution of Canons Regular of St. Augustine at Windesheim, John Hemerken was one of the first six Canons selected as the basis of the scheme. A genius for organisation declared itself in him, and pointed to the special line of service in which he was to achieve distinction. Of six new religious houses in succession, he was the organ-

ising head and the virtual founder. Thus for nine years he presided at Mount St. Agnes as its first Prior, his brother being one of the fraternity. Here, besides spiritual labours connected with the internal welfare of the community he built, levelled, planted fruit-trees, wheat-fields, garden plots, moulded pottery, planed timber, himself labouring with hand as well as brain in all these useful works. Yet could he also excel in arts more delicate; the miniatures in his illuminated service-books vied with the best of his time. We have no reason to suppose that he left behind him any original writing; nevertheless to him has been ascribed (partly, as it would seem, through an inadvertence) the authorship of a work more commonly assigned to Thomas. One of the MSS. of this famous work, at the Bodleian, carries the name "Joannes de Kempis;" and a very early printed edition (Strasburg, 1481) bears the title, *Johannis Malleoli de Imitatione Christi*.

If thus John Hemerken was, on the firm lines of practical work and personal direction, a powerful coadjutor in the movement for the revival of spiritual religion which the preaching of Gerrit de Groote had initiated, Thomas Hemerken for his part proved himself an apt scholar under Gerrit's chosen successor, the rich-souled Florent Rade-wyns. It may well be doubted whether, without the efforts of religious organisation which were due to the timely suggestions of the good Florent, the fervid oratory and the noble example of Gerrit would have produced permanent effects. To Florent was due the idea of a common Brotherhood, and it came about in a very simple way.

One of Gerrit's most useful plans of practical reform consisted in the multiplication of good books. Copies of the Scriptures, of the Church offices, of the spiritual writings of the Fathers, were scarce and often imperfect. Gerrit offered clerky occupation to many poor students, setting them to work at the transcription of the volumes

which he thought most useful, and these were sold at a small cost. The scheme succeeded, even beyond the expectations of its originator; and there came a time when Gerrit was perplexed as to the way of dealing with the body of copyists who had come at his call, and for whose employment and even maintenance he found himself responsible. Then Florent struck out his bold suggestion. Why not gather these poor scholars into a community, make a common purse with the gains of their vocation, and frame rules for their living together? Gerrit thought the jealousy of the existing Orders would prove fatal to the success of any such new movement. "At least we can try," urged Florent. "In God's name, then," exclaimed Gerrit at length, "let us begin." So started into life the Brotherhood of the Common Life, with Florent as the head of their first society. They were not an Order, and were known sometimes as "*Scriptores bonae voluntatis*," or "*Clerici extra religionem viventes*." It was the home of the Brotherhood at Deventer, presided over by Florent himself, that Thomas Hemerken entered in 1393, when but thirteen years of age. He became an excellent copyist, one of the most skilful of his day. Nor was he merely a servile transcriber; with regard to the Holy Scriptures in particular, we read with no little admiration the account of the sedulous care with which he sought out the best manuscripts that were to be borrowed in his neighbourhood, with a view to securing a text as free as possible from errors. To discover a good book, and to make it generally accessible by painstaking and legible transcription, was one of the main delights of his existence. In this useful labour he persevered, with quiet, conscientious devotion to his favourite pursuit, throughout the prolonged term of a life which extended to ninety-two years.

Of John Hemerken's genius for administration we do not find a trace in Thomas. He left Deventer to join the

Canons Regular at Mount St. Agnes, near Zwolle, in 1406; was ordained priest in 1414; became sub-Prior in 1425; was chosen Procurator of the monastery about 1443, an office which made him purse-keeper to the community, and was considered fitting to his disposition on account of his tenderness to those in need of alms; but its other duties proved uncongenial to him, and he was relieved of it. With advancing years he resigned also the post of sub-Prior, about 1455, and henceforth devoted himself chiefly to his booklets and his cell. He was the chronicler of the monastery, and one of its preachers. His sermons are pervaded by a touching strain of emotional piety, an almost infantile simplicity of devotion to the sublime objects of the Catholic faith. A clear vein of purity of spirit and of self-consecration to the duties of religion, runs like a silver thread through his discourses. Otherwise they have little power of exposition or force of thought; nor do they seem to have procured for Thomas anything of a preacher's popularity. His humble and useful career came to a close on 26th July, 1471. In his later years he had been troubled with dropsy in the lower limbs, and this was probably the cause of death. Many a less excellent and lovely soul has been duly canonised; but the verdict of sainthood has never been formally passed upon Thomas Hemerken by the watchful authorities of his Church; it has been reserved for a recent National Conference of Unitarians to be the first to invest him, in their Report, with the spiritual dignity of "S. Thomas à Kempis."

In his recent account of the Brothers of the Common Life, Mr. Kettlewell is too much inclined to regard them as Reformers, in the modern sense. He attempts to prove that the work done by the members of this community, and the religious awakening which they produced, had a direct influence in causing the Reformation under Luther. But Mr. Kettlewell's method of proof consists too often in the

reiteration of his own impressions at tedious length. We do not see that he has added anything of real force to the argument of Prof. Bonet-Maury, from whose admirable brochure he has borrowed (we might almost say plagiarised) with very insufficient acknowledgment.* Bonet-Maury concedes that Gerrit de Groote remained throughout "a submissive son of Holy Mother Church, and that he meditated no change either in the dogmata or in the ritual of Catholicism. His was a more modest aim, but one not less important for his epoch. His paramount object was to recall the clergy to an apostolic purity of morals and poverty of living, and to stir the faithful from their lethargy by the stimulus of study, and by the promotion of the interior life" (p. 49).

The case in favour of Gerrit's unquestioning acceptance of Catholic usages is indeed stronger than Bonet-Maury puts it, for he cites Gerrit as recalling "with a certain regret, that in the Primitive Church all the faithful communicated of the body and the blood of Christ, while at this day the participation in the cup has been replaced by the *Pax vobiscum*" (p. 27). Gerrit, however, in the passage referred to, is not expressing any desire for the revival of communion in both kinds, or even giving any hint that he was aware of this ancient practice. What he actually says is that "in the primitive Church all the faithful used to communicate, instead of which the *pax* is now given, as a sort of communication of the body of Christ." The change, he thinks, is due to the decaying fervour of the Church, as compared with ancient times. (*Vit. Ger. Mag.*, xviii. 15.)

By two channels, however, of indirect influence, it may be fairly claimed for the Brotherhood that they set men's minds moving, and assisted in preparing them for the Reformation.

The education which they afforded in their excellent

* Compare, e.g., Kettlewell I., 150, 167, 169, with B.-Maury 39, 60, 61.

schools, by recalling the instinct of a more genuine culture, paved the way for the rise of the Humanists. It was at a school of the Brotherhood in Deventer that Erasmus himself laid the foundations of his faithful love of generous letters. The spirit of Humanism was not the spirit of the Reformation, and was in some respects its antithesis and its enemy. But Humanism created or fostered a widespread indifference to the scholastic theology, and thus rendered the open attack, subsequently made upon the old positions in the name of the new dogma, more easy; while it deprived the defence of much of its heartiness.

Again, the appeal which the Brotherhood made for the revival of an efficient, if an austere *morale*, and of a deeply personal piety, led men to question the immaculateness of a Church which responded, as a whole, but faintly and unwillingly, to the voices in her midst, which cried earnestly for a practical and spiritual regeneration. An intellectual dissatisfaction with the prevalent ecclesiastical theories of man's justification before God followed in the train of the moral disappointment. It was from the perusal of the wonderful book which, whoever may have been its author, represents the type of self-consecration cherished in the Brotherhood, that John Wessel, as he owned to his biographer, "first gained a taste of true theology"; and the influence of Wessel upon Luther is well known.

It is interesting to note that the Brotherhood, which had fostered a spirit of so much importance to the Christianity of Europe, was not extinguished at so early a date as Mr. Kettlewell would lead us to believe, but lingered on even to our own day. Bonet-Maury records that the last member of the community, Gerard Mulder, died at Zevenaar on the 15th March, 1854.

We have now to deal with the *vexata quaestio* of the authorship of the golden book above referred to. Let us call it by what seems to be (we agree here with Mr. Kettlewell)

its distinctively English name, *Musica Ecclesiastica*. Its ordinary title, *De Imitatione Christi*, is a part of the heading of the first chapter only of its first book. The term which had suggested this heading has been naturalised in the Revised Version of the New Testament, where we have the phrases "imitators of God" (Eph. v. 7), "imitators of me, even as I also am of Christ" (1 Cor. xi. 1), and similar phrases. But the expression is still somewhat foreign to English usage; the *μίμησις Χριστοῦ*, which is suggested by the language of St. Paul, scarcely bears direct transference into our matter-of-fact speech; and certainly the object of the chapter "*De imitatione Christi et contemptu omnium vanitatum mundi*" is not exactly reproduced by a term which, to our ears, falls in better with the prescription of a mechanical obedience to the external form of the Lord's holiness, than with the loving reception and absorption of the spirit of his divine character. Hence the older English translations have glossed or avoided the seeming rigidity of the Latin phrase. "Of following Christ" is the usual rendering in old versions. Dean Stanhope evades the difficulty by prefixing "The Christian's Pattern" as a new title for the book; Robert Nelson gives us "The Christian's Exercise"; Hain Friswell's "Like unto Christ" is perhaps a more successful substitute than either.

The title *Musica Ecclesiastica* has this to recommend it, in addition to its presence in the majority of the English manuscripts of the work, that it brings into prominence a peculiar characteristic of the style, which had been almost forgotten by the critics, till the enthusiastic diligence of Hirsche invested it with quite new interest and importance. And the pervading style bears a close relation to the sustained spirit of the book. The rhythmical arrangement is no mere trick of art. In its interior substance this wonderful manual of the life religious is a song of the soul, plaintive and musical; its chapters are canticles of the spirit hid with

Christ in God. As we linger on its pages, we feel that we have no treatise before us; these are not passages of an argument, but lyrics of the Holy Ghost. Each book is complete in itself, and contains its own explanation within it; yet there is a certain order in their designed arrangement, which it is well to notice, the rather as this order is disturbed in nearly every printed edition. The book which stands fourth in the ordinary collocation, the *Devota Exhortatio ad Sacram Communionem*, though the last to be comprised in the collection, was placed by Thomas Hemerken, when he added it to the rest, not at the close of the work, but as a new third book. And this is significant. As, when the work consisted of but three divisions, so when it was augmented to four, the climax was reached, not in devotion to an external rite, but in that *Interna Consolatio*, which is communicated by the "interna Christi locutio ad animam fidelem." The dialogue of the soul with the Lord, which constitutes the matter of this largest section of the work, forms its true ending, to which all else leads up. Whether Thomas was the original author, or only the collector and editor of the finished work, he has some right to say how he meant the sequence of its parts to be viewed. To change the order, is to make that appear the end which Thomas introduced as a means, and to obscure the clear view of the true end, "Audiam quid loquatur in me Dominus Deus."

Was Thomas the author? Mr. Kettlewell is quite sure that he was; but Mr. Kettlewell's notions of evidence are somewhat elementary. As a specimen of his general style of reasoning, or rather rambling, we give his proofs of the authenticity of an engraving of Thomas, which forms the frontispiece of one of his volumes:—

It is deemed to be a genuine likeness from these two considerations: first, because it bears a resemblance to the best authenticated portrait of Thomas à Kempis; at least, it seems

to be the face of the same man when younger, though even then beyond the prime of life; secondly, from the words *ad vivum* attached to the inscription on the picture, which must mean a lively or life-like portraiture, or "after the living man" or "after the life." What authority there is for this is not known, but when placed on the print it was evidently designed to lead those who looked upon it to regard it as a true likeness of a Kempis; and that there was some ground for this assertion, though we are ignorant of it, we may reasonably presume. The name of the artist is in the corner of the picture, though hardly discernible; and he would scarcely like to risk his credit by such an assumption unless it had been true, when at the time it was done the veracity of the statement might have been otherwise questioned.

The painter's name is "Abrahamus Bloemaert;" and inasmuch as he was not born till 1567, nearly three generations after the death of Thomas, and fully four generations since Thomas attained the age represented in the picture, the probability of his having taken a portrait from the life must be admitted to be extremely slight; but it is quite as great as the probability of any purchaser of the print having been in a position to question the life-likeness of the portraiture from personal knowledge.

The external evidence for Hemerken's authorship is remarkably deficient in point. In his own autograph copy no claim of authorship is made; the evidence of other manuscripts, and of printed copies, is not strong; and it is confronted with similar evidence for a Gerson authorship, which is impossible, and of a Gersen authorship, which is improbable. Of contemporary attestation the best is the statement of Johann von Busch, in the *Windesheim Chronicle*, completed in 1464. In the printed copies we read: "unus frater Thomas de Kempis, uir probatæ uitæ, qui plures deuotos libellos composuit [uidelicet Qui sequitur me de imitatione Christi cum aliis] nocte insecuta somnium uidit præsagium futurorum." But, in what appears to be the earliest MS. of the *Chronicle*, the passage we have

bracketed is wanting, and it is doubtful whether it comes to us on the authority of Busch himself.

The internal evidence may be read in two different ways. Great similarity of style is observable between the undoubted writings of Thomas and the *Musica Ecclesiastica*. Did he form his style on the model of the book he loved ; or is this book the quintessence of his own writing ? All must admit that in substance the *devotos libellos* of Thomas fall short of the peculiar beauty and dignity of the *Qui sequitur me*. Mr. Kettlewell's long-winded extracts from the *Soliloquium Animæ*, and other acknowledged works of Hemerken, will hardly contribute to convince the sceptic. On the whole, the interval is vast, in spite of occasional glimpses of the same poetic charm and spiritual grace. Nor is it only that we miss in the undoubted Thomas the master-touches which fascinate us in the *Musica Ecclesiastica*. We are struck with the absence from the *Musica Ecclesiastica* of characteristics which we look for, as a matter of course, in any devotional work of Thomas. Where is that eager and passionate devotion to the Blessed Virgin which was so marked a feature of his writing and his life ? Could he have been content entirely to pass this by throughout four books of his own composing ? Further, we discover in the *Musica Ecclesiastica* traces of an older ritual than that which existed in Hemerken's day. Wolfsgruber has drawn special attention to the expression : " Apponam tamen os meum ad foramen caelestis fistulae " (iv. 4), as unintelligible, except as an allusion to the golden tube, " fistula, cujus opera sanguis domini a communicantibus fidelibus hauriebatur " (Du Cange), an allusion which carries us back, at least, to the thirteenth century.

Bonet-Maury's able *Quaeritur* directs us to sources anterior to Thomas, and going back to the year 1384, from which the author of the work may have drawn. Among these sources, all of which belong to the Netherlands, he

enumerates, besides the writings of Gerrit and Florent, a spiritual treatise by the Carthusian Henricus Kalkariensis (1328-1408), and an *Epistola de vita et passione Jesu Christi* by Johann Voss de Huesden (1342-1424). The strain is the same, but the verbal coincidences are not striking, except in the case of the extracts from Florent. And here again the question of priority arises. Did Florent borrow from the *Musica Ecclesiastica*? Or was it the other way?

The argument from style appears to us to possess a very important value, but it is a value chiefly negative in regard to the question of authorship. It definitely and unmistakably excludes, for example, the English claimant, Gualterus Reclusus, or Walter de Hilton, as well as the Paris University Chancellor, Jean Charlier de Gerson. Each of these writers has a characteristic style, and in neither case does the manner of writing, the construction of sentences, the flow of periods, the rhythm and movement and spirit of the diction, bear any affinity to the literary genius of the *Musica Ecclesiastica*. Hilton's *Scala Perfectionis* and Gerson's *De Meditatione Cordis* are very accessible books. Let their solemn prose be read along with the captivating melody of the *Qui sequitur me*. No more will be needed to convince the intelligent ear that the writer of this incomparable piece was filled to overflowing with a natural sense of harmonious cadence, in which the wise Chancellor and the pious recluse were entirely deficient; their writings exhibit literally nothing akin to it. A practical demonstration of this sort is irresistible in its impression. It carries a conviction which is not to be upset by the allegation of any amount of external evidence derived from the headings of manuscripts, or the colophons of printed books, or the emphatic testimony of warm friends.

Nor, let us add, is it difficult to see how such testimony as exists in favour of Hilton or of Gerson may have arisen. In the case of an anonymous work, which obtains vogue

and excites curiosity, the temptation is strong to assign it to the most admired author in the department to which it belongs. He will naturally be supposed more competent than others to have composed it. This tendency to ascribe it to him gains force, when, as will almost inevitably be the case, the anonymous writing attaches itself to some work of the known author on a similar topic. Treasured by the same readers, bound up together, transcribed together, printed together, this fellowship of juxtaposition, added to the fellowship of purpose, breeds or enhances the notion of a closer relationship. Hilton was the typical English spiritual writer; the *Musica Ecclesiastica* naturally got mixed in with his works. Gerson was, in like manner, the typical spiritual writer of France; and when the printers brought out, in one joint volume, his *De Meditatione Cordis* and the *De Imitatione Christi*, they obeyed a sort of blind instinct of probability in that they assigned both to the same pen, as indeed sundry scribes had done before them.

Out of the presence of Gerson's name in the attributions of transcribers of manuscripts, arose, perhaps, as a mere scribal blunder, the form Gersen. But though there is some evidence of this (*e.g.*, the Harl. MS. 3,223, dated in the year 1478, where "cōpositus a D. Johāne gersem. Cācellario parisiēsi" occurs *a prima manu*, corrected in a later hand to "gerson"), yet, on the whole, the proof is insufficient, and it may be that in some cases Gersen is the name really intended, Gerson the blunder by way of emendation.

Assuming the existence of a Giovanni Gersen, Abbot of St. Stephen's, at Vercelli, in the thirteenth century, it is, perhaps, fortunate for him, and certainly it is unfortunate for the critic, that we have not so much as a single alleged scrap of a Gersen writing which we can lay side by side with the *Musica Ecclesiastica* for the purposes of a comparison of style, treatment, sentiment, or spiritual power. The mind of

Gersen is a wholly unknown quantity to us, except in so far as we may be inclined to attribute to him the work whose authorship is in dispute. In the absence of any opportunity of such comparison, it has been sought to invalidate *a priori* the claim of an Italian ecclesiastic, by pointing to a distinctively Teutonic colouring in the Latinity of the *Musica Ecclesiastica*. But here the choice which has been made of a Lombard prelate, to fight the battle against Thomas, interposes a barrier to the success of an argument which is triumphantly urged against the Frenchman, Gerson. The Lombards are of Teutonic stock, and retain many Teuton names and terms of speech. One of the proofs (indeed, so far as we can see, the sole proof) of the historical existence, in the thirteenth century, of the surname Gersen, is drawn from the circumstance that at Cavaglia, in the diocese of Vercelli, an ancient family, having a name which is variously spelled as Gersen, Ghersen, and Garson, holds its seat. This name, according to Weigl, has a Teutonic etymology. The very "shibboleth of the Thomists," as it is called by Wolfsgruber, the use, namely, of *scire exterius* in the sense of "know by heart," has its strict analogy in Lombardic speech. Camillo Mella tells us that to this day the school-boys of Verona use the expression *saper da fuora*, instead of *saper a mente*. The Lombardic *da fuora* comes quite as close to *exterius* as the Dutch *van buiten* can pretend to do,* and Wolfsgruber pursues the parallel, with undaunted skill,

* The German *auswendig* is still closer in form. But, at the risk of being considered impervious to sound doctrine, we must be allowed to express a doubt whether "known by heart" is the writer's meaning in the couplet which is in question—

Si scires totam Bibliam exterius et omnium philosophorum dicta,
Quid totum prodesset sine caritate Dic et gratia ?

The meaning of this we take to be, 'If thou knewest *from the outside*, the entire Bible and all the maxims of philosophy, what would it profit thee *without the inner substance*?' Compare what had just been said respecting disputes *about* the Trinity, as contrasted with humbling oneself before the Trinity. But all the critics are against us. Even the old English version has "yf thou couldst all the bible *without the boke*."

through the whole list of Teutonisms which critical scrutiny has discovered in his author. Nay more, he carries the raid into the enemy's ground, by accumulating an opposition list of pure Italianisms, as he alleges, which are to be met with in the *Musica Ecclesiastica*. We must confess that Wolfsgruber's positions are firmly taken, and sustained with spirit and thoroughness. We are not unwilling to concede to him that he has removed internal objections to a Gersen authorship, and has established some grounds for looking beyond Hemerken's century for the original author.

But if we admit that Gersen *may* have written the book, this is only on condition that Gersen's actual existence is fully proved. We do not see that Wolfsgruber makes good this essential point. He finds a Gersen family now, and for perhaps a couple of centuries, at Cavaglia. He gives fairly good reason for believing that Cavaglia, the ancient Caballicum, was also known in old times as Canabacum. He brings forward a Joannes de Canabaco, of unknown date; and a Joannes of pious fame, at Vercell, in the thirteenth century. He assumes that these two were the same individual. He further assumes that this individual bore the surname Gersen. He yet further assumes that the resulting John Gersen, of Cavaglia, was the Abbot of St. Stephen, at Vercelli, during a period (1220-1245) which the earlier chroniclers have left blank. We commend him for the skill with which these assumptions are fitted to the few grains of material fact in his possession. As an exercise of historical conjecture, *Giovanni Gersen, sein Leben*, is a most interesting study, but as a piece of serious history it is valueless.

What conclusion do we draw from the difficulties which at present beset the question of the authorship of *Musica Ecclesiastica*? Wolfsgruber will assuredly rank us among the "pessimists" who refuse, in the existing state of the evidence, to make up their minds upon the point. Well, if

we are "pessimists," we are "pessimists" in good company; for in the list of these offenders Wolfsgruber reckons Ellies Du Pin, Cornelle, Silvester Sacy, and other honourable names. At present we are afraid that we must humbly take our place behind them.

It vitiates the argumentation for and against this or the other of the alleged authors of the book, that the dispute is taken up as a party question. National pride and ecclesiastical associations have had a good deal to say in the discussion. Frenchmen are violent for Gerson;* Germans are positive about Thomas; Benedictines of all nations will go through fire and water for Gersen. All this lends excitement to the disputation, and accounts for the fierceness with which sides are taken, as well as for the absolute certainty which the disputants parade; it accounts, at the same time, for the unsifted condition in which a large part of the materials for judgment still remains.

We apprehend that the conditions of a satisfactory settlement of the question have not yet been reached; but we do not despair of the problem. What is needed, first of all and most of all, is that the large body of manuscripts should be carefully collated, with a view to determine accurately their age, the authenticity of their inscriptions, and the variations of their texts. It is surprising how little has really been done, in this wide field, with scientific precision. The whole strength of the Gersenists' case rests on the presumed antiquity of certain MSS. If, for example, the Benedictine Cod. San. Paulanus (which professes to have been transcribed in 1414 from a dated copy of the years 1384-5) be authentic, the case for Thomas is at once destroyed. If Cod. Aronensis really belongs to the fourteenth century, the case for Gersen is brought within historical grasp.

Wolfsgruber has done more than his predecessors to

* Bonet-Maury, whose education has given him cosmopolitan sympathies, is a Thomist.

exhibit a conspectus of the MS. materials existing in continental libraries, but he has not exercised any strong critical faculty in the direction of estimating their value. The English manuscripts he has not dealt with: some of these Mr. Kettlewell has described, in an Appendix abounding with errors. The theory of recensions, of which Wolfsgruber gives some hints, requires a further investigation of the actual contents of the several codices. Which are the oldest readings? And do the varieties of reading so arrange themselves as to point to a Dutch, an English, an Italian recension of a common original? This, we believe, is the view of a Roman Catholic ecclesiastic who is now engaged in working at the problem. He admits, we understand, a recension by Hemerken, but goes no further with the Thomists.

On any view of Hemerken's relation to the authorship of the book, the world must gladly own an ineffaceable debt to him in respect of its promulgation throughout Europe. He it was who sent it forth on its career of spiritual helpfulness, a helpfulness which has been acknowledged in every land, almost in every religion. From Thomas Hemerken's quiet nook came forth, without a name, on its errand of blessing, this holy book, winning its way by its own merits, and loved everywhere for its own sake.

It may add somewhat to the interest of this paper if we call our readers' attention to the existence of an early English version of the first three books of the *Musica Ecclesiastica*, hitherto almost unknown, and never, we believe, printed. Two copies of it exist in manuscript, of which one is in the Cambridge University Library, the other in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin. The Dublin copy formerly belonged to Henry Dodwell, the Nonjuror, a fellow of T.C.D., from 1662 to 1666. It has been described by Dr. Ingram, the Librarian of Trinity College, in a communication read to the Royal Irish Academy on 22nd May of this year.

Previously to this, we had an opportunity of examining the MS. with some care.

We hope that Dr. Ingram may be induced to edit and publish the whole text of the version, collated with the Cambridge copy. Considerable philological interest attaches to it as an early English document. As a translation it is marked by great simplicity and strength. Merely as a specimen of some of its merits and peculiarities, we give the brief fifth chapter of Book I., not keeping to the old spelling (with its *thorn* for *th* and its many contractions), nor to the original punctuation, but following, as far as practicable, the metrical arrangement as exhibited in Hirsche's edition of the original. It will be observed that the translation of the opening sentence is unusual. There is a curious variation further on, where "to the love of God" represents "ad legendum," the uniform reading of the manuscripts, so far as we have been able to ascertain. Our conjecture is that the manuscript from which the translation was made had the contraction "ad legēdū," which was erroneously read, "ad legem dei," and that then, from "the lawe of God" the transition was easy to "the loue of God." The "without exception of persons" is also noteworthy. The clause "And not curiously inquired" is an addition to the text. And there are some other signs of independent readings.

OF READING OF SCRIPTURES.

CHAP. V.

Truth is to be sought in holy writings :
 And not in eloquence.
 Every holy writing oweth to be read with the same spirit
 wherewith it was made.
 We owe in scriptures rather to seek profitableness :
 Than highness of language.
 We owe as gladly to read simple and devout books :
 As high books and profound sentences.
 Let not the authority of him that writeth,

Whether he be of great letter or little,
Change thy conceit.
But let the love of pure truth draw thee to the love of God.

Ask not who said thus :
But take heed what is said.
Man passeth :
But the truth of our Lord abideth everlastingly.
God speaketh to us in divers wises,
Without exception of persons.

Our curiosity oft times in reading of scriptures de-
ceiveth us :
In that we search curious sentence where it is to be
passed over simply,
And not curiously inquired.
If thou wilt draw profit in reading ;
Read meekly,
Simply and truly :
Not desiring to have a name of cunning.
Ask gladly ;
And hear holding thy peace :
And let not the parables of elder men displease thee,
For they are not brought forth withouten cause.

ALX. GORDON.

*HAMLET AND THE TEMPEST: A SHAKSPERIAN
CONTRAST.**

HAMLET, perhaps more than any other work of the poet, reveals the very heart of Shakspeare. Of all the creations of his genius we should point to the Danish Prince as most resembling Shakspeare himself. It is wonderful how the Warwickshire peasant, the London playwright, saw into the mystery of the world, and apprehended the tragedy of this strange, perplexing life of ours. Perhaps more than to any other play the soul responds to this dark, terrible, fateful story of Hamlet. We read the Comedies: we listen, laugh, feel instructed and amused, and lay them down again. In the Histories we admire the wonderful procession of events, in which heroes live again for us, battles are renewed, and great empires of the past seem to be revived. In other Tragedies our souls are harrowed by bloody deeds of jealousy, ambition, and revenge. But, after all, we turn again and again to the pages of our familiar *Hamlet*, and learn every time new lessons of the mysterious soul, the world of circumstance, the conflict of life, and the terrors of fate.

How did the problem of life present itself to the mind of Shakspeare? Here in this play we have the answer to that inquiry. We all know that the most popular plays and romances are those which are steeped in tragedy. Most eagerly do we read the story of the human soul struggling with opposing forces, triumphing in moral greatness

* A Lecture.

over its foes, or showing its majesty even when overwhelmed in the terrible conflict with the powers of the world. Thus, the deepest heart of man testifies that life is a conflict, that existence is a tragedy, that we do not come into a play-ground or pleasure-garden, but into a battlefield, and that those who would fulfil their vocation must gird on armour, and do their appointed work in the never-ceasing strife. Even in the smallest life the tragic element may be found. The powers of the soul, and the circumstances amidst which it is born, and which cramp it in; the sense of inward freedom meeting ever with the iron barriers of outward necessity; the greatness of thought and the material limitations of activity; the obligation of duty and the feebleness of the will; the constant changes of the world bewildering the mind, dashing our love by death, spoiling our plans by unexpected events, overwhelming the structures we have been so long in raising by some terrible catastrophe;—with more or less intensity these tragic elements enter even into the smallest life, while from a world-historical view the whole course of mankind appears as a constant struggle with natural forces and opposing wills—the martyrdom of man. Now let us come to this play, read its living words, take in these sentences which throb with life, and here there shall be for us no strange story, no unfamiliar picture; but here we shall find our own deepest life-experience *writ large*; here we shall find the soul interpreted to itself; each one of us shall find that Hamlet is no other than himself; over and over again shall we repeat his passions, his meditations and terrors, as the very best expressions of all that we have felt and thought and feared. Before we begin to read, we look down the list of *dramatis personæ*: the King, the Queen, Ophelia, the fawning courtiers, the merry gravediggers, who so strangely mingle the tragedy of death with jests and laughter—yes! and we include that mysterious Ghost who keeps alive the dreadful Past and

compels the sinful deed to bring forth its dire harvest of woe and death. The Ghost is the dramatic representation of the present consequences of the undying Past ; the Past lives with us, is in us, is part of us.

But besides all these, there is another Presence not included in the list—a Presence more awful than even the returning Ghost,—a Presence whose influence is felt in every line of every scene, whose power is resistless, who, though unseen, is omnipotent—who, from the very first, makes prophecy of doom, and drives the torrent of events to one direful end.

That Presence is the power whom men call Fate, who to the rebellious soul appears a cruel tyrant, to the wicked a relentless judge, but who to the faithful and obedient becomes transfigured into the Beneficent Necessity, the Eternal Righteousness, the Everlasting God.

This wondrous story is saturated with Divinity. You say Hamlet did this and thought that ; the King committed such a crime, and devised such tricks and schemes. But who appointed this fearful issue ? Who directed the torrent of events to this awful end ? Who ordained that the seeds of crime and weakness should bring forth such a harvest of calamity ? Not even Shakspeare, who wrote the story, *consciously* designed its close. Do you think his gentle mind took pleasure in distracting our souls with horror and filling our vision with scenes of blood ? No ! the course of this tragic history is as necessary, as fateful, as the course of Nature's order. Given the circumstances of the time, given the characters hemmed in by those circumstances, and no other issue was possible.

Here, then, presiding over the whole, shaping every event, controlling every movement of the troublous tide of change, is the power which men call Fate, which philosophy calls Necessity, which conscience regards as relentless Justice, which faith rejoices to worship as eternal God and

ever-blessed Father. Overshadowing all the actors in the play is the presence of this tremendous Fate. Hamlet shrinks from its behests; the King thinks to cheat and bribe its eternal laws; Polonius knows nothing of it in his worldly wisdom and political blindness; Ophelia is carried on its tide like a frail lily cast upon some impetuous cataract; the foolish gravediggers make merry with its ordination of mortality. But there it abides, over-ruling the whole, omnipotent in its force, triumphant in its vindication. This is the tragedy of Fate.

Now the saddest tragedy which Fate can ordain is that of a man who finds himself unequal to his duty, hemmed in by conditions and events with which he is too weak to deal. And that is the tragedy of Hamlet, the tragedy of a man who confesses *I ought*, and then cries *I cannot*.

Consider, for a moment, where this young prince finds himself at his first entrance into the active world of duty. His education is complete; he has come home from college a finished gentleman—a prince indeed, worthy in some future year, when his noble father waxes old and dies, to take the crown and rule the kingdom. A fond mother, a most dear father, a loyal country, the hope of kingship—what earthly lot could be happier?

In the meantime he devotes himself to the studies he so much loves, and in quiet meditation and earnest thought he finds his most congenial occupation. All at once he is rudely wakened from this dream of security. Suddenly the scene is changed. The gracious world in which he has been living vanishes—his love blasted, his hopes destroyed, his deepest sensibilities grossly offended.

His father dies—stung by an adder, it is said, while sleeping in his arbour. His ambitious uncle, taking advantage of Hamlet's inactivity and excess of grief, draws round him the creatures of the Court, and seizes upon the crown. This is terrible; but worse is yet to come! Surely he can

find consolation in the love of his widowed mother ; they can mingle their tears, share their grief, and renew their memories of the dead ! But even this natural comfort is denied him. Within a month of his father's funeral his mother becomes the wife of his ambitious uncle !

Can there be worse than this? Yes! Fate seems resolved to pile the agony upon this delicate soul, least capable of so great a load. There comes to him a whispered rumour that his father's spirit haunts the city. The guards have seen the Ghost pacing the platform of the castle at the midnight hour. Then descends upon the delicately-cultured youth the avalanche of woe, and he hears the summons to a duty too terrible for him to obey. The visitant from the other world explains, in tones of anguish, the unnatural murder which has been committed. The man who now wears the crown is the murderer of Hamlet's father, and (horrible to tell!) the husband of Hamlet's mother. Revenge!—that is the one command the angry Ghost lays upon the terror-stricken son; and Hamlet records a solemn vow to neglect all other things, and devote himself to the work of vengeance. And, surely, every noble impulse of his soul must prompt him to avenge the dead. A terrible crime has been committed against the majesty of the State, and against the sanctity of the family. The highest sanctions of morality demand the exposure and punishment of the hideous deed. Hamlet is a *Prince*, and he is bound to defend the State against treachery; he is a *Son*, and he must vindicate the sacredness of the family against unnatural crime. And yet, strange to say, he fails in this most solemn duty. Had he met his uncle as he parted from the Ghost he could have killed him in his passion; but his inner world of thought has time to assert its sway over the storm of emotion; ideal meditation, mental analysis, speculative thought, begin to overpower him; his will becomes paralysed, his

executive power sinks into feebleness. A delicate, sensitive, cultured youth is called to deal with horrible events which require unflinching purpose and swift activity. A poet is called no longer to meditation, but to deeds of terror. A soaring Genius is placed in the midst of circumstances which make it shrink from the world of hideous realities into its own native region of pure ideas.

Instead of gratitude that the crime is revealed, and that he is elected the minister of justice, he mourns his fate, cries—

The time is out of joint : O cursed spite
That ever I was born to set it right !

Instead of leaping to vindicate justice, he laments the spiteful Fate which has given him too hard a task. At one time he thinks to free himself from his difficulties by suicide ; but even the thought of self-destruction has only the effect of starting his mind on speculations about the mysteries of death and immortality ; and in wandering meditation he loses sight of the world of facts.

Every time he begins to plan some scheme of action, the chariot of thought with its horses of fire snatches him away into the clouds, where the real world for the time is lost.

It is instructive to notice the difference between the tragedies of *Macbeth* and *Othello* and this deeper tragedy of *Hamlet*. In *Macbeth* and *Othello*, the action hurries on with terrible speed to the close ; but here the plot is retarded, and slowly works its way until, all of a sudden, comes the final crash. To murder Duncan is most horrible to the mind of *Macbeth*. But the witches' prophecy (stirring up his fierce ambition) drives him, against all nobler thoughts, to the deed of blood. The incantations of a witch are enough to make *Macbeth* rush into treason and murder. The appearance of his injured father, the call of every duty as a Man and as a Prince, are not enough to rouse the will of *Hamlet* to avenge treason and murder.

One deep suspicion of Desdemona's unfaithfulness, and the fierce Othello slays the woman he has vowed to love. Hamlet has certain proof of his uncle's guilt, and yet he cannot brace up his resolution to hurl the criminal from the throne he has defiled. Macbeth and Othello, blinded by passion, precipitate the will into a torrent of activity. Hamlet requires to see every circumstance, weigh every condition, and anticipate every issue before he can decide on action.

Or take the contrasts which Shakspeare has provided in this play itself. Young Fortinbras (who has been too much neglected in criticism and on the stage), the Prince of Norway, to snatch from Poland a worthless strip of land, raises an army and marches forth to sacrifice blood and treasure to vindicate his foolish claim. Young Laertes hears of the murder of his tedious old father, Polonius; and, in an ecstasy of rage and grief, gathers a crowd of rebellious Danes, and rushes, sword in hand, into the King's presence to avenge his death.

While the great tide of action goes surging on around him, Hamlet still lingers, hesitates, shrinks, and bemoans his grievous lot. Though he stands still, the world is moving on, and Fate is rushing forward to a catastrophe, all the more sad and horrible because of that fatal weakness of Hamlet's will.

Only one man in all Denmark has opportunity to direct affairs aright. Only one man is able to bring back justice, truth, and loyalty to the distracted realm. Let Hamlet act with firm purpose and steadfast will, and good shall rise out of evil, crime shall be blasted with shame and ruin, and the State shall be delivered from the curse under which it groans. That awful Fate; let Hamlet bring into its service a strong will and steadfast resolution, and it shall appear as a blessed redeemer. But let Hamlet stand aloof in ignoble lethargy and miserable weakness, and it

shall appear as a dreadful judge, only to reach its purpose by a wide-spreading catastrophe of wrath.

There are many particulars in the play on which we must not venture to enter. The nature of Hamlet's mental derangement, his treatment of Ophelia, his relation to Horatio, the terrible fate by which he murders Polonius, at the very moment when he has summoned resolution to slay the King; thus instead of avenging his father's murder, becoming himself the murderer of the father of his lover and his friend. All these matters deserve most careful study; but we must pass them by while we try to gain some glimpse of the great *motive* of the play.

Before the final catastrophe, Hamlet has a presentiment that Fate has proved too strong for him. He says to Horatio—"Thou wouldst not think how ill all's here about my heart." But though the clouds of the fateful storm are gathering fierce and dark, he proclaims his faith in Providence, and his readiness to abide the end. If his will is weak, his mind is true, and his conscience faithful; if his arm is too feeble to wield the sword of justice, yet he has never once bowed to falsehood or curried favour with successful wrong. Horatio would not have him fence with Laertes, if his mind misgives him :

If your mind dislike anything, obey it. I will forstal their repair hither, and say you are not fit.

And the answer proves how pure, noble, and brave is this soul, which, alas, is united to such a feeble will :

We defy augury : there is a special providence in the fall of a sparrow. If it be now, 'tis not to come ; if it be not to come, it will be now ; if it be not now, yet it will come : *the readiness is all !*

At last Fate forces the hapless Prince to do the deed which he has meditated so long. In the path through which Fate has carried him we can trace the victims of his

weakness. Old Polonius rashly murdered; the fair Ophelia, once to have been Hamlet's bride, driven to madness and the grave; Hamlet, the son of a murdered father, standing himself charged with the murder of the father of his dead lover and now alienated friend. After these auguries of deeper gloom, we have the frightful close—the Queen poisoned, Laertes slain, Hamlet with the poison of the venomed sword working in his blood. Then at last, with all this train of grief behind, surrounded by a scene of death, just before the poison takes his strength, like a flaming candle before it sinks in darkness, his will rises into one supreme action, and he slays the wretched King from whose most hateful crime this crop of sin and suffering has grown.

The end was *necessary*. Shakspeare did not choose it. No other end was possible. A manufactured story would have made it like the conclusion of many a three-volume novel; the sheep would have been divided from the goats; the bad punished, the good rewarded; the King slain, but Hamlet saved alive; the Queen condemned to shame, but Ophelia spared to take her place with her husband Hamlet upon the throne of Denmark.

But Shakspeare never manufactured; he created. A play of Shakspeare is not wilful and accidental, but natural and inevitable as solar system and tidal wave. The Fate which rules the lives of men was the inspiration of his genius, and so his plays become mirrors of the Divine Order of the world. Shakspeare knew that the Power which works through all things is not a mere *Arbitrium*, which distributes, with exact discrimination, personal and material rewards to the good and punishments to the bad. He regarded the Divine Power as an irresistible Tendency, which works through suffering, crime, weakness, and death, continually evolving nobler things out of the waste and failure of a miserable past. Shakspeare knew that the

Divinity which rules the world is not a feeble Judge, who can only *separate sheep from goats*, and place a gulf between Heaven and Hell ; but an Almighty and Eternal Goodness, which, through dispensations of change and death, is working out an Everlasting Righteousness, to be through all and upon all.

The old era must end. Crime has worked out its own destruction. The feeble will, that could not strive with wrong, must also pass away. The old generation is outworn ; a new and nobler age must rise to redress the wrongs of mankind and restore peace and order to a distracted world. And so, with consummate wisdom, Shakspeare makes the expiring Hamlet nominate the vigorous Fortinbras as his successor to the vacant throne. The *Hamlet* of the stage ends with the death of the Prince. But Shakspeare's *Hamlet* does not close in such unmitigated gloom ; already there is a flash of creative light ; as the old Heaven and Earth pass away, lo ! the dawn of a new Heaven and a new Earth. While we are lamenting the past, with its heap of slain, already young Fortinbras comes in, flushed with victory, possessed of courage, will, and wisdom to become an instrument of that Divine Purpose, which, out of crime, decay, ruin, and death, is able to bring forth new worlds of life and beauty, strength and wisdom.

II.

The resurrection of a new world from moral chaos is wonderfully exhibited in *The Tempest*. *The Tempest* is supposed to be the last play Shakspeare wrote ; and if so, then he closed his writings with a beautiful gospel, and crowned his work by a wonderful prophecy. In *Hamlet* dark clouds hang over the sad story from first to last. In *Hamlet* Shakspeare is exercised by the strange conditions and circumstances of life. The tide of Fate rolls on its way through scenes of crime and passion and supernatural terror,

carrying a whole generation to one direful mood. In *Hamlet* Shakspeare fails to solve the problem. He states the riddle of the world which he cannot answer. *And to be able to state the problem is a great gain.* People do not get full answers, because they are afraid to speak their doubts and frame their questions. We can trust this poet, who is not afraid to face the facts, who does not shrink from describing all the terrible events possible in a most distracted world. If Shakspeare ever gets an answer to the great questions, we are sure his answer will be worth listening to.

In *Hamlet*, though he fails to solve the problem, yet in all his darkness and difficulty he never once complains or despairs, he never loses faith and hope. He never loses faith. He tells us of that "divinity that shapes our ends rough-hew them how we will," even though he cannot clearly see the end for which Divinity is working, or vindicate the strange methods along which it moves. He never loses hope. He is appalled, as much as any of us, to see Ophelia and Hamlet swept away along the fateful torrent which bears innocent and guilty to a common grave; yet with unconquered hope he brings into the hall of death Fortinbras, the strong deliverer, whom must retrieve the nation's fortunes, and repair the desolation wrought by crime and weakness. In *Hamlet* Shakspeare stands in the midst of life; its noises assail his ears; its awful sights appal his mind; its clouds and dust darken his soul. He believes it possible to gain a higher, broader view; but as yet he cannot rise into the Mount of Vision, as yet he cannot clearly behold the Divine Pattern by which earthly things are being surely fashioned. But in *The Tempest* he ascends that Mount of Vision, and in the light of the Divine Purpose he can see the meaning of the world. The Tempest of sin and suffering is raging far down below, but now he can see how all its rage is over-ruled by an unerring Wisdom at one with a perfect Love. Guilt and

crime and passion, which seem sometimes to rule the world, are being secretly governed by an invisible Goodness, an infinite and resistless Love, which is working out a sure atonement to be revealed at the appointed hour.

No wonder the poet laid down his pen as he completed this matchless play. He has told his vision, uttered his prophecy, revealed the things which are within the veil, made a sublime discovery beyond which the grandest faith and hope can never rise. What more can he say? His message is complete; his work is done. He has explored Humanity, and mirrored the world in his wondrous art; now at last he opens Heaven, closes his revelations by an Apocalypse of coming glory, affirms the omnipotence of Love, and prophesies the redemption of the universe through the resistless energy of that Mercy which is "mightiest in the mighty." What more can he say? What higher word can he add? From that serene height the great soul speaks his final prophecy, and completes his book of life. His task is finished, and for him "the rest is silence." Like Prospero he breaks his magic wand, renounces his potent art, and leaves his completed task to work out its large results. For as we said that we might regard the meditative Hamlet as in some sort representing the poet himself, so here we cannot but see in the noble Prospero the image of that great magician who, by his wondrous arts, has compelled Nature and Man into his service, and employed them for wisest and most beneficent ends.

In this play we find Prospero, the great genius who has pierced into the subtlest secrets of Nature, dwelling on that strange island within whose compass we are made to see every mood of Nature and every passion of Humanity. By the envy of his brother and the treachery of his king, Prospero, the Duke of Milan, is banished, with his infant, from his dukedom. Placed with the crying child of three

years into a wretched rotten boat, he yet, by a most kind Providence, arrives in safety on the magic island. There for twelve years he remains, and presides over the lonely place as a superintending providence. That island, as the play proceeds, appears as the symbol of the world. This world of ours, rolling solitary through space, teeming with mysterious forms of life, the scene of contending passions—what is this but the magic island? With this key the whole course of the play opens up a treasury of wisdom. In former times this magic island was enslaved by a frightful witch named Sycorax, who worshipped an evil deity named Setebos. Until Prospero's arrival, the lovely place lay under a curse. The delicate powers of Nature (spirits of life and joy and beauty) were spellbound and imprisoned, or else compelled to become the slaves of Sycorax. At length the hideous creature died, but her hateful influence remained. Caliban, her monstrous offspring, still ruled the island, and Ariel, the spirit of joy and beauty, was still held fast by a fatal spell within a cloven pine-tree.

Thus things stood, when Prospero arrived with his young daughter. The powers of evil are now brought face to face with the powers of goodness. We take it as most significant that Shakspeare first brings to the island a wicked mother and her hateful son, and afterwards, to work redemption, a noble father and his pure and lovely daughter. In *Hamlet* Fortinbras, the deliverer, comes in as a sort of *deus ex machinâ*, to do the work in which Hamlet failed. There is no organic bond; there is a break between the old generation and the new. But here is a profounder doctrine of hereditary influence and organic continuity. Each power, whether of good or evil, *continuates* (to use a Coleridgean expression) itself. The individual is always more than an individual. The individual stands in an unbroken chain of living influence which comes down from all the past and goes forth through all

the future. The murdered King lived in the distracted realm he left behind and in the grief and horror of his afflicted son ; as we said before, the Ghost which haunts the city is the dramatic representation of the presence of the dead Past in the living Present. In *The Tempest* this doctrine of continuation is taught more vitally. Though Sycorax be dead, yet still she lives—lives in her monstrous offspring, lives in the curse which still rests upon the unhappy isle. And to work redemption there comes, not only an individual, but one whose being is already propagated into the future in the person of a most hopeful child ; there comes not only a *Man* to do his work and die, but a FATHER, who shall live in holiest influences through future time by the sacred womanhood of a most chaste and lovely daughter. Miranda is as much more wonderful than Ophelia as Prospero is nobler than Hamlet. She is the most radiant vision of womanhood ever conceived by a poet's mind. Shakspeare has created a long line of splendid women, but of them all there is not one with more matchless grace and beauty, more charm of maidenhood, than Prospero's daughter. Well might Ferdinand exclaim when he was told her name :—

Admired Miranda !

Indeed the top of admiration ! worth
 What's dearest to the world
 You, O you,
 So perfect and so peerless, are created
 Of every creature's best !

Miranda is the only woman in the play. She appears in unique and radiant womanhood against the background of various and darker manhood. She stands, amidst this crowd of various men, the very type of perfect womanhood—daughter, lover, wife, and we are sure mother yet to be. Apart from her, salvation is impossible. Her infant smiles cheered her father in his exile. The babe was "infused with a fortitude from heaven." Her helpless weakness became his

mightiest strength. For her he lived. To her training and education he devoted his lonely life. Through her alone he can see a hope of better things. In his despondency he cheers himself with the vision of Miranda restored to her home, married to some noble husband, and blessing the world with offspring as perfect as herself. For twelve years has Miranda lived upon the magic island, that island all her world, a narrow cave her home, her stately father her only companion. Reverence, trust, love—these are the only emotions which absorb her soul (except, indeed, repugnance for the monster Caliban, who has requited all her kindness with most brutal violence). In her helpless ignorance Prospero is her providence. He encompasses her with wisdom and tenderness, seeking to be to her both father and mother. He knows all about that mysterious origin of hers, which lingers in her own memory only like the shadow of a dream. He knows her by birth to be a princess. He is able to fathom those deep emotions of maidenhood which still lie latent beneath her filial consciousness. In his far-seeing vision he beholds the obedient daughter a faithful wife, the simple maiden a joyful mother of children. He encompasses her before and behind with a providence too wonderful for her to understand; he lays his hand upon her with a love too deep for her to measure; he foresees a destiny awaiting her which her wildest fancy has never conceived. From the lust of Caliban on the one hand, and from the wild beauty of Ariel on the other, he maintains her pure and perfect human nature, worthy to partake, at the appointed hour, in every holy sacrament of womanhood.

Can we help discerning in all this the symbol of that vast Divinity, whose being embraces the little island of our world, whose wisdom knows our mysterious origin, and pierces the deepest secrets of our souls, whose Providence foresees the destiny which awaits us in worlds unknown? In Miranda's happy ignorance faith in her father is enough. As a perfect

daughter, she is best prepared to become a perfect wife. Reverence and filial trust are but ripening her nature, until the day when all the deep fountains of unsuspected love rise from fathomless depths, and she yields herself without reserve in one supreme gift to him who claims her as a wife, and whom she rejoices to look up to as her lord.

By strange methods and dark ways the providence of Prospero works towards its end. A dreadful storm one day descends upon the island. The waves rise mountains high, till they seem to touch the stars. The heavens seem to open, while continuous fire bursts down on sea and land. All the forces of destruction seem combined to do their worst. A brave ship is seen struggling with the tempest, and then in a moment appears to be dashed to pieces. Miranda beholds, and her tender soul is in an agony of pity. She knows her father, by his magic, is able to control the elements, and now she entreats him, with tears, to allay the dreadful storm. She cannot understand such a catastrophe. She cannot see any wise meaning in the tempest, nor how it can be serving any beneficent end. Were *she* a god of power she would have sunk the sea beneath the earth before it should have wrought such terrible destruction. And then there is revealed to her (as under similar doubts there *cannot yet* be revealed to us) the secret of her father's providence. No wrath, revenge, or ruin is intended by this strife of elements, through that confusion one loving purpose moves, above that seeming chaos one great wisdom reigns supreme. Not one soul in that tempest-tossed ship is utterly to perish, all at last shall be brought safe to land.

The hour for which, all through those long years, Prospero has watched and waited, is now drawing near. In that ship, tossed upon the waves, are his treacherous brother and his old enemy, the King of Naples. By a strange fate these men are cast upon the very island where dwells the injured man they purposed to destroy. And with the King

of Naples comes his princely son, Ferdinand. Injured and injurer both have offspring in whose young minds no evil memories remain. Through the new generation atonement must be made, ancient quarrels reconciled, and the world restored to peace and goodwill. These two princely children, Ferdinand and Miranda, through a spontaneous love, are to become the unwitting saviours. Wandering through the island on which the waves have cast him, lamenting his father as perished in the storm, suddenly there bursts upon the young prince the radiant vision of a perfect maiden. "At the first sight they have changed eyes." At once the children of the two ancient foes are bound together, soul to soul, in one perfect atonement of unutterable love. But Prospero must be assured that this is no common gushing sentiment, no transient passion. He must know that this is a love equal to the great issues for which it is born. He separates the children, assumes a stern demeanour, lays heavy tasks upon the Prince, and treats him as a slave. But labour only feeds the young man's love, and sorrowful sympathy deepens the tenderness of gentle Miranda's breast. In one of the chastest passages which his pen ever wrote, Shakespeare describes Miranda soothing Ferdinand in his toil, and pouring out to him, while he labours like a slave, those hidden secrets which she would have locked securely in her heart had she found him seated on a throne. *Labour and suffering*, these only give true love the grander opportunity for triumph. The stern Prospero and the lamented King are both forgotten by these children in the new passion of that all-absorbing love. Forgetful of her father's command, Miranda reveals her name; unmindful of his recent grief, Ferdinand pours forth his admiring affection.

Revealed to each other, they also, for the first time, begin to know themselves. Each is the other's hidden soul, now, for the first time, discovered. Within an hour Miranda has

entered into a new world, and discovered within her soul emotions which seem more urgent and compelling than any commands which even a father's authority can give. At first she struggles to hide her passion in maidenly reserve. But at last her simple, natural, unsophisticated heart yields; she will obey the deep instincts of her own pure soul; no hollow conventionalities shall restrain the divine impulse which fills her breast:—

. . . Hence, bashful cunning!
 And prompt me, plain and holy innocence!
 I am your wife, if you will marry me.

It has been well said, "What a commentary is this scene on the words, *For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and cleave unto his wife, and they twain shall be one flesh.*" Unconsciously to those two young souls, their spontaneous instincts were serving a vaster purpose, and their passionate love was the moving of that Infinite Charity which is ever seeking to make an end of sin and bring in an everlasting righteousness. In this way the poet consecrates the pure love of youth and maid by showing its inevitable service in the progress of the race, making the union of the sexes an awful sacrament of Divine Providence. We have not space to show how, in this play, Shakspeare still further exalts the marriage bond, transfiguring its sensuous relations by the consecration of duty, and sanctifying passion by inviolate chastity and moral obligation. Neither can we say all that might be said of those two wonderful creations, Caliban, the earth-born monster, and Ariel, the ærial spirit of joy and beauty. Caliban is the undeveloped man, with nascent intellect and imagination, capable of great things through ages of toilful evolution. But at present he is devoid of conscience, and has no sense of moral relationship. His lust is savage; his hatred terrible; his appetite gross; his

noblest deity a wretched drunkard ; his highest freedom to plunge without restraint into mad intoxication. On Ariel a whole volume might be written. He is the secret soul of natural joy and loveliness, the love of beauty for its own sake. Or may we not say this?—Ariel is the spirit of Ideal Art, long paralysed by an age of gross materialism ; still kept in partial servitude while the strife continues between the powers of good and evil, and only to rise into perfect liberty when man has triumphed over every power of darkness and gained peace with himself and atonement with the universe.* Thus in Ariel's imprisonment, service, and final freedom we can see a deeper meaning in those words of the apostle : "*The creature was made subject to immaturity not of its own will, but by reason of him who put it into subjection, in hope that even Nature itself will be liberated from the bondage of decay, and brought into the freedom of the glory of the children of God.*"

We hasten to the happy close. The treacherous King and faithless brother are brought face to face with the man they have injured at the very moment when Ferdinand and Miranda are discovered conversing within the cave. The lost are found ; the old enmities are forgotten in the vision of perfect love. In *Hamlet* the old generation was swept away, to take no part in the atonement. But here the old generation, which has filled the world with hate and misery, stands face to face with a succeeding generation, which shall inaugurate a new and nobler era. "*Instead of the fathers shall come up the children.*" Through the purity of childhood and the mystery of love the Divine Purpose is moving on, leaving hate and sin and suffering behind, and bringing in a kingdom of peace and goodwill. The wrath of man is made to praise God. Eternal Providence is vindicated, the secret

* This will appear more than a fanciful suggestion to those who are familiar with Kant's doctrine of Art as the mediating realm between the sensible and spiritual worlds.

of the world revealed. That old crime was overruled; the unnatural deed which exiled Prospero and his child has at last provided safety and shelter to the criminals themselves. That fearful storm, that sudden wreck, that separation which seemed long as death itself—these have brought the lost together, reconciled hearts that were alienated, and made provision for a better future. All suffering is disciplinary; in it there is no element of wrath, but an irresistible purpose to make man perfect, even at the cost of ages of anguish. In the most terrible punishment there is no revenge; even in the deepest hell there is only a purgatorial fire of love to purge the dross, and to refine the gold. The divinest power in the universe is neither material energy nor brute force; these are impotent against the might of all-conquering love. Justice itself bows before mercy; the tempest of wrath breaks at the feet of penitence; vengeance sheathes her sword at the bidding of a full and free forgiveness. To sum up the Gospel of Shakspeare's last play in the words of a modern thinker—“*Man has an instinct in the depths of his consciousness, which teaches him that the throne of Mercy is above that of Justice, that wrath is by nature transient, and that a sentence of condemnation may be revoked, but that the voice of Love is eternal, and that when it has once gone forth, the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.*”

FRANK WALTERS.

THE IMAGE OF TRUTH.

A DREAM.

I DREAMT that I stood on a wide plain. It seemed to be an autumn afternoon, for a great part of the plain was covered with fields of stubble. Some harvest, good or bad, must lately have been reaped, and the plough had not yet passed over, removing the traces.

In the midst of the plain, some way from where I stood, was a very great Image. It reached from earth into the invisibility of the deepest heavens. I saw only from its knees to its breast, for the feet rested far below the level of the ground on the granite beds at earth's heart, and the head and shoulders (while I somehow could not but believe they existed) were out of sight above me. Whether their invisibility was due to their great distance, whether they were lost in some purple autumn haze, or whether they were themselves partly transparent, and so of a like purple with the sky, I could not quite determine. But it did not occur to me to suppose that the Image possessed *no* head or shoulders. I longed for a telescope that might help me to find the lips. Grand lips in form and in utterance, I thought, must they be that should tally with the stately form I beheld before me.

From the distance at which I stood, the outline of the Image was all I could clearly observe. Full of admiration, I inwardly questioned what it was, and whose it was. An informant stood at once beside me, who answered

my two questions in two words—"My Truth," and vanished.

So she was living—a Figure, and not an Image, after all.

I approached her. But, alas! my admiration of the stupendous beauty of her form grew feebler as I came nearer, and saw the colouring and detail of her garb. Gaudy raiment of all crude and garish hues draped her. She was bedizened, too, with false jewels on a gigantic scale. Baubles, beads, swords, gilt books, compasses, sextants, crucibles, pendulums, thumb-screws, hand-cuffs, gags, money-bags, flagons and quill-pens were only a few of the objects I could discern, hung about her as if by way of ornament. Her robe was also covered with pictures and writing—pictures of goblins and angels, and writings in every character, few of which I had skill to read.

And so, on a near view, the noble form—or, rather, so much of her as I could from such a position see—stood before me, a hideous jumble of everything unbeautiful, inharmonious, and commonplace. I began to doubt whether I had heard correctly the words of my late informant. His veracity it did not yet occur to me to doubt; but my own hearing, I fancied, might have misled me.

So I went back to my former position, whence the garish details of the apparel were softened by distance. I considered the Figure anew, and the glorious outline at once reconvinced me I could be gazing upon nothing less divine than Truth herself.

But men approached. More—more—a crowd.

I joined them.

Each, as he came near the knees of the Figure, made obeisance. I watched the various countenances meanwhile, and observed the very differing expressions they bore, and still more the extreme variety of the directions in which the worshipping glance was cast.

Many—most—looked at the lowest fringe of the gaudy

skirt. This skirt, reaching to the knee, just touched the earth. Its fringe was composed of coins and jewels, mostly counterfeit.

These worshippers were in most cases men—strong men, and well appalled.

And there were many, very many, and these chiefly women, who riveted their eyes on the charms hanging low at the side of the Figure. These charms were a silver heart set with rubies, and a brazen cross wound round about with a glittering serpent. These worshippers did not appear quite so wretched as the former group, not an individual among which looked as if smiling were possible to him. Yet even the charm worshippers appeared uneasy, and started as if frightened and unsafe whenever the crowd jostled them. And I perceived that they had, every one of them, stopping of some kind in both ears.

Then there were sad-looking men with beautiful eyes, who raised their glance a little higher, to where the robe of the Figure was covered with words, and musical notes, and paintings, in endless confusion; verses, and lyres, and dragons, and wings; painted trumpets blown by painted lips, and painted blood shed by painted combatants.

And higher yet on the Figure was her girdle of brass, upon which were graven the twelve signs of the ecliptic, and from which hung innumerable short chains of platinum. These chains supported a variety of strange objects. A specimen of every instrument science has invented to prosecute her inquiries or to simplify her labour, and a copy of every book which has done service from earliest ages by advancing the study and knowledge of facts; and the author's name was emblazoned on every book. A group of persons made their obeisance with glance exclusively fixed upon this girdle, and the weight of things dependent from it. These girdle-worshippers had a calm look of unshaking

interest on their faces; but there was no triumph and no joy in their searching eyes.

And a few there were on the outer rim of the crowd who looked higher still as they paid their homage; looked up of where the great hand of the Figure pressed on the greater heart. And these were very troubled men. They had on their faces the wistfullest look of wonder and question, and they sighed as they made their obeisance.

There was a little hillock just beyond the verge of the crowd, upon which I mounted in order to see the mass of worshippers as a whole, from a more commanding point. I then perceived a very intent group apparently digging busily about the place where the knees of the Figure disappeared beneath the ground; but I could not make out exactly what they were about. They scarcely seemed to be worshipping at all, since their glance was downward. Of these anon.

I turned away from the crowd in disgust, for I said to myself—"These men have dressed up Truth in their own way, till she is hidden under the tawdry trifles with which they have decked her; and now each party is content to worship, instead of her, just so much of her apparel as it has itself contributed to provide. Were she at this moment unclothed except by her own glorious grandeur, which of them, I wonder, would worship her any more?"

So turning, and so exclaiming, I came upon a group of haughty, erect persons who stood apart, and made no obeisance. There were but a few of them—a score or so among the millions.

"Why do you not join the rest in the worship of Truth?"—I inquired, addressing myself to these men. A smile half of hope, half of bitterness answered me; and one man spoke.

"We would worship Truth," said he, "could we but see her to worship. But in tedious course of many years the crowd have heaped this tinsel so thickly upon her that there is nothing of her to be seen. And she must be seen to be

worthily worshipped. We mean to tear off the disguise to-morrow, that these fools may cease from their idolatry; but even then *we* cannot hope to worship; for we shall not see her eyes; they are so far away. Nought but her very eyes can content us. These multitudes are deluded; we are merely puzzled. If we have a hope it is to see her face through the vision of our children, ages hence. And for their sake, and for our own sake in them, we will presently find us means to tear off the trammels and gauds that oppress yon lofty one, and make her clutch at her grand heart in patient pain."

"Nay," said a second of these proud persons; "it is not her eyes that we seek, but her very voice. A word from the lips of Truth would command our adoration; yet we know this of her and of ourselves, that her speech is not human speech, and that our ears are not so constructed that we could hear it—no, not though she shouted till the universe rang again! Yet our children *may* hear better than we, and we will disrobe Truth of her trumpery raiment that they may live nearer her lips, and catch, maybe, her whispers."

So were these men not at one among themselves—some desiring the eyes of Truth, and others her voice. Yet in this they were agreed, that each held himself destined to take part in the unveiling of the lofty Figure, and each placed his hope and his faith in this intended act.

I asked, how should the disrobing of Truth help their children to climb within sight of her eyes, or within hearing of her voice?

"Because when all the many implements men make in honour of truth shall be laid on the earth before her, instead of being left dangling about her in the vain attempt to draw her down into visibility by their mere weight, there will be made, as it were, steps, by which men may mount and worship from a loftier standpoint. It is thus that our children

shall grow by the wisdom of their fathers. Likewise, when the good and bad raiment which has been hung upon Truth shall be by us taken off and strewed upon the ground where we stand, it shall make a very great heap, from the summit of which men may see so much the higher. It is thus our children shall grow wise, even by the *folly* of their fathers. See you not that already we have reached her knees? The ground upward from her feet is formed of *débris*, amassed from time to time, as again and again Truth has been freed of the garb that had become too opaque and oppressive for her longer to endure, and we stand by so much higher than our fathers. She presses on her heart to-day; to-morrow *we* will deliver her from her trammels, and show these herds their folly."

He turned loftily for assent to his companions. "Ay, to-morrow!" responded they, and the select few looked complacent.

But suddenly a loud gust of wind filled the air with dust and tumult. Truth moved her hand from her breast, and with it tore off, bit by bit, every morsel of coloured and glittering array, and, casting all from her among the excited crowd, stood still again in a new effulgent whiteness.

The crowd, every man and woman of them, after rubbing from their eyes the dust which the stupendous action had raised, continued to worship. But to my amazement, they, one and all, ignored entirely the lofty, shining Figure, and confined their homage to that particular detail or bauble of her late garb which had engrossed their attention before.

But it had been a different matter to worship these when they hung, if not in order, at least at a common centre, so that each devotee could see and could kneel without inconveniencing his neighbour. Now, the rags into which Truth had torn her raiment lay about in disordered confusion. The fringe of coins was hopelessly entangled among the beads, crosses, and charms. The sharp point of many a

lancet and the broken glass of many a lens from the brazen girdle had torn cruel holes in the painted skirt, where angels now showed wingless and dragons headless, and where the verses and chaunts in many notations had lost their titles and key-notes.

Oh! the jostling, and fighting, and cursing that now went on! One party rushed frantically away at last, bearing in triumph the gilt books—all soiled as they were—the broken crosses, and the battered flagons.

“We have the Truth!” they madly cried. “All who follow not with us are liars and devils.”

Another party escaped from the turmoil with less ado and cackle, each silently hugging a bag of the coins which he had succeeded in extricating with bleeding hands from the heaps of *débris*. These chuckled softly.

“We have the one Truth worthy of adoration. See this most precious metal! See these most excellent jewels! Let those fight over their charms and relics who please; we alone are the wise worshippers of Truth.”

I observed that this group had grown much more numerous in the scuffle, and that it now comprised, not only the vast number of men who from the first had paid homage to the fringe of gold and silver, but many also who had formerly belonged to the several other groups. This seemed the stranger when I remembered that the coins were counterfeit, as also the jewels; and that this nearer view might have been expected to work the contrary effect.

Then the anxious-visaged persons who had gazed so sadly and so lovingly upon the paintings,—who had deciphered the verses, and listened for strains from the pictured lyres, bent their beautiful eyes closer over the torn and dusty raiment on the ground. It was decaying very fast as it lay in limp heaps, and from its folds and from the ground close about it, there issued swift, slimy things, and lizards, and veno-

mous adders. Yet these worshippers bent low, and murmured between weeping and smiling—"If Truth be left to us at all, she is here among the forms and sounds of beauty. Ay! most beautiful is she! most beautiful! even in her decay; and still we worship. What but beauty shall reveal Truth to us?"

And fondly they handled the torn raiment; and some of them even caressed, as if abstractedly, the strange, sly reptiles that were clustering among it.

The girdle-worshippers I next observed. These, with calmness and no hurry, collected their scattered instruments, and at once applied them, each after his fashion, to ascertain if possible what had happened.

One took a telescope of enormous power to investigate the precise nature of this strange, pervading dust with which the clear autumn air had so suddenly become darkened. Another turned the lens of a microscope in the direction of the majestic Figure; and a third, having picked up one of the jewelled crosses that were charms, proceeded inquisitively to ascertain its precise value by melting it in a crucible. "Surely" said all, "Truth lurks here somewhere. Vain indeed to seek her, save among the crucibles, the scalpels, and the lenses!"

Lastly, the questioners who had dumbly watched the hand at the heart, seeing it there no longer, looked for it nowhere else. Their knees shook; and they fell to the ground, and wept.

And lo! Truth herself grew transparent as the dust settled, and I could well believe that none saw, or could hope to see her at all, whose eyes had become filled with the image of her dress.

Then the select knot of explainers came forward; but to my astonishment they stood, to a man, with their backs turned to the living Figure. They went from group to group, and pointed out the madness of the gold-worshippers,

the weakness of the charm-worshippers, the error, fault, and folly of all; and the end of their discourse was that the whole multitude took to quarrelling, wrestling, sneering, despairing, and dying; while Truth stood hard by, deserted, and owning not one worshipper among them all.

Sick with horror and blank disgust, I was striving to awake from the distress of such a dream, when my informant stood once more at my elbow, and gravely spoke.

"You have not seen all," he said. "Look at those men yonder, busy with spade and shovel among the heap of *débris*. Nay, come nearer."

I obeyed. There was an opening—a deep, dark shaft, as if to a mine.

"What are they doing here?" I inquired.

"Burrowing back to the feet of Truth. These are the men who hold that Truth is, and can be, nothing but feet. Her feet are of gas, they say; though her knees and body are solid as Life, and her unseen head, for all they can deny, is of the strong impalpability of Thought itself. But their faith is in feet. As the Foot is, so is the Heart and also the Head. That is their proverb. All Truth thus is gas, and all gas is Truth. Only one thing is worthy of deference, and that is the theory which proclaims the omnipotence of gas. Burrow not with these men, thou dreaming child, but climb rather, as I will later show thee. For the Heart of Truth is nobler than her Feet; and her Head, which no man hath yet seen, is noblest of all."

"Alas!" said I, "then *all* are wrong. Truth is here, and worshippers are here, yet the worshippers have no Truth, and Truth has no worshippers! In very deed, the thing is to me so bewildering that I half misdoubt me whether there be not error in thy information. What if this Image that serves men as a peg for their ideals be, after all, not a Life, but a Name? not a Figure, but an Idol? What, if we may not see her feet, is duty? What, if we may not see her

head, is worship? What is this crowd so concerned about in her name? What is Truth?"

My informant lightly touched my eyelids. The vault of the zenith opened up above me to an immeasurable and awful height. The earth at my feet clave open into an immeasurable and appalling abyss. The Figure of Truth hung between the fathomless gulf and the fathomless heaven; and I saw from her feet to her incomprehensible eyes.

But then, as I gazed, a horrible thing happened. A dimness seemed to clothe her slowly round about. A dimness, extending from her knees to her shoulders;—no further, upward or downward. A dimness that grew to a cloud; a cloud that grew to a black darkness that formed a horrid cleft in the central being of Truth.

I shivered with deadly cold. A biting, raw, gusty wind sprang up from every quarter at once, and whirled round and round me; while the air was filled with low, hideous laughter, and wails, and chilly screams.

Then the dark gap, occupying just that portion of space which the visible part of Truth's figure had formerly filled, slowly lightened. But the form did not re-appear. I still saw the distant outline of her head, too far above me, and in too unearthly a light to interest me at all now that my first surprise was past, especially in that wild clamour of the elements. I still saw the great, firm, immovable feet lit by their own whiteness, infinitely far below me; but where her hand had been, and the heart her hand had pressed, there was—*nothing*. I saw the distant horizon, black with thunder, where the plain met the sky;—saw it right through the blank where the Figure so lately had stood. And the blank was framed, above by the shoulders and head I cared not that I could not reach, and below by the feet I cared not that I could not stoop to. And the elements roared, fiercely

and confusedly, right through the emptiness which the great Heart erewhile had seemed to fill.

I suddenly fell weeping very bitterly ; for I would rather never have been born than thus to have looked upon Truth that had no heart.

My pitying informant again touched my eyelids. "Of this—enough!" said he.

All appeared once more as it had done at first. The natural sky arched overhead a little mistily, and in the mist the Figure was again lost above the breast, the earth was closed about her knees, and the stubble of the unploughed field stood up sharply where that awful chasm had lately seemed to open. Only the babbling, fighting crowd had vanished, and all its treasures with it.

But more was to be revealed.

"Here, then, is Truth," said my informant. "Are you now content to have her heart, while forgetting her feet and waiting for a change to appreciate her head? Can you worship the heart of that which is, *for you*, headless?"

I felt that I was committing myself blindly to I knew not what; but, in my terror lest any further hesitation on my part should bring back that awful vision of a blank, and that blowing of merciless winds, I said, faintly, "Yes."

"Then here are your companions."

Immediately the air around the Figure was seen to be filled with an active, silent throng, invisible before. My informant floated up among them and through their midst, and as he disappeared in the purple haze above them, he cried sweetly down to me his final words:—

"These are they who do the Best, and speak not. When the crowd below catches a glimpse of them, it asks them concerning the Truth they love. They have no answer to give. For what men say of Truth is but the emptiness of opinion. Yet when the cry reaches them, 'What shall be done?' they answer promptly with a deed. But you, O

dreaming child! if you will have a Word whereby to answer those who may question of your dream, can take your choice of three, only remembering that a name is but a name, and that to worship it is idolatry and corruption. The Truth, for those who circle round the centre and are silent, and for you who have chosen your lot with them, has to-day three lawful names:—I. *Unself at Work*. II. *The Handing-On*. III. *The Will of God*."

His last words were very faint with distance, and when they were spoken I awoke.

L. S. BEVINGTON.

R. W. EMERSON.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "MODERN REVIEW."

MY DEAR SIR,—Once more to fail in bearing my promised testimony in your Review to the revered Emerson, is a grief; but "willing as the spirit may be, the flesh is weak." And after having written—amidst recurring attacks of illness—a voluminous heap of MSS., the result proves to be that my notice was planned on the scale of a book, rather than of an article, and is unworthy of our honoured friend; while neither strength nor time permit me to re-write or to condense it fitly.

This disappointment causes regret, because my hope was to bring into brighter light the rare blending of the Spiritual with the Intellectual in Emerson's life and aims. For, though by common consent scholars of the Anglo-American race acknowledge him as the grandest "Representative Man" of *Genius* of the Western Republic, by his embodiment in thought of her purest Ideal—apparently, they fail to see that, by his pre-eminent Virtue in character and life, he stood as a Real Type of that *Personal Greatness*, towards which he welcomed his compeers everywhere to aspire.

How unique, in quickening influence and inspiring energy, his *Genius* and *Personal Greatness* were, appears in this. As one reads with impartial judgment the tributes of grateful love, which already have been offered up in his honour—from his "Life by G. W. Cooke," that heralded, like a bright procession of sunset clouds, his departure; on, through the touching effusions at his funeral, from the elect friends summoned to conduct the closing rites, W. H. Furness, Rockwood Hoar, J. Freeman Clark, Howard Brown, A. Bronson Alcott, and F. Henry Hedge, whose accidentally-delayed words soon followed in resonant response; and on again, through the series of fervent Memorial Discourses, too many to particularise, in America and Great Britain, and the discriminating notices which have appeared in weekly,

monthly, quarterly periodicals, from highly skilled and variously gifted critics, to his faithful disciple, Alexander Ireland's most timely and interesting "In Memoriam"—he is cheered to find that, among these mirrored forms of Emerson, there is scarcely one which has not caught characteristic splendour from his glowing beauty, translucent truthfulness, humane magnanimity, and symmetric manhood. So generous and equitable, indeed, have been these manifestations of regard, that the writer of this note consented to complete what he had tried to say of Emerson—as The Young Preacher; The Orator, Lecturer, and Scholar; The Reformer, Citizen and Patriot; and The Friend*—only because he hoped to crown those photographs from memory by two finished pictures of The Poet-Seer, and Mystic-Saint. But in these aspects, even, he now has been anticipated by Edwin P. Whipple's eloquent article on "Emerson the Poet," in the July number of the *North American Review*, and by R. Heber Newton's magnificent discourse on "Emerson's Gospel of the Religion of Nature."

Difficult would it be to add words of worth to these manifold testimonials of our friend's transcending excellence, as exemplar, guide, inciter, and illuminator. Indeed, it seems presumptuous to describe Emerson at all! For has he not, throughout his works, imaged himself unconsciously, in each alternate tendency, mood, attainment, aspiration, with such luminous fidelity, that it seems irreverent to copy, with a blunt pencil, portraits exquisitely perfected in characters of light? One feels prompted, rather, to say to new students of the Sage of Concord's writings: Would you know aright this Prophet of the Soul, as he lived, read his Orations, Addresses, Essays, Poems, and especially the earlier ones, such as "Nature," "The American Scholar," "Literary Ethics," "The Method of Nature," &c., reading what is inscribed with sympathetic ink between the lines, and yielding to the impressions made on heart and conscience, yet more than on critical intellect, by these *Confessions*—and you shall behold this beautiful Person as he was in character, as in conduct he irradiated the scenes he moved among, and as he was known inmosty to God and guardian angels. There he stands revealed! For if man ever did, he wrote in hearts' blood, according to Sidney's maxim, "Look in your heart and write." The very passage of Autobiography, wherein this maxim is

* See the *Inquirer* for May 6, 1882.

quoted—the Essay on “Spiritual Laws”—is a transcript from his Diary: “The way to speak and write what shall not go out of fashion is to speak and write sincerely. The argument which has not power to reach my own practice, I may well doubt, will fail to reach yours. He that writes to himself writes to an eternal public.”

A second difficulty, in attempting to sketch Emerson, is that no two observers saw the same man. Unchangingly faithful to his own spirit, as he was, he yet presented ever new phases to the persons he met, according to their quality. And each on-looker saw that side only which his own vision was fitted to discern. So must it be with his works. One is inclined, therefore, to whisper in the ear of his critics: Beware how you judge this whole-souled brother, for you go to judgment yourself in the estimate you are enlightened and just, humble and loving enough to form of one who so earnestly listened to the “Over Soul.” This man was, in the best sense, a high-bred Christian Gentleman; but no Stoic was ever more nobly proud, no Puritan more sternly upright. He scorned pretension, had shrewd insight into character, and, as he says of Nature, “knew how, without swell, brag, strain, or shock, to keep firm common sense, ‘*Semper sibi similis.*’”

Then a final hindrance to declaring what one's heart prompts him to say of this singularly impersonal person is, that the friends who revered him most highly, most scrupulously withheld the least allusion which might be vitiated by praise, for the reason that they knew how devoutly he referred all goodness and wisdom to the ever-present Inspirer, with whom he sought to dwell in calm communion, unruffled by a breath of self-love. Well does his confidential comrade, Alcott, write of the “one subtraction from the pleasure of his books, his pains to be impersonal or discrete, as if he feared any the least intrusion of himself were an offence offered to self-respect, the courtesy due to intercourse and authorship.” And who can forget the passage in his essay on “Friendship,” where he writes: “Let me be alone to the end of the world rather than that my friend should overstep, by a word or a look, his real sympathy. I am equally baulked by antagonism and by compliance. Let him not cease to be himself an instant. I hate, where I looked for a manly furtherance, or a manly resistance, to find a mush of concession. . . . Friendship demands religious treatment. Reverence is a great part of it. . . . Should

not the society of my friend be to me poetic, pure, universal, as Nature itself?" Though our forerunner has ascended into the transparent world of light, therefore, a dweller amidst shadows still relucts to testify, however modestly, to Emerson's rare merits.

Delicate as might be the duty, however, gratitude and honour alike commanded me to bear witness to this illustrious compatriot, as he had revealed himself in confidential intercourse through many years. For my conviction is firm, that hereafter Emerson will be recognised universally as a far *grandeur style of Person* than has been apprehended, as yet, except by the few drawn within the sphere of his close fellowship. To them he was peerless. Merely by living he opened new possibilities of personal being, of human society, of heavenly communion, of immortality begun on earth. For his daily existence was so pure, ample, free, blissful, Eden-like, that the long-transmitted "Curse" seemed transformed into the "Beatific Vision." This Man of the Future incarnate, this Golden Age revived, it was the aim of my unfinished article to enshrine for others' love, by proving how, to use his emphatic words, he actually had "annulled the adulterous divorce between Intellect and Holiness," and in his own person "*reconciled*" the Poet-Seer and Mystic-Saint in living oneness, with the wedding-ring of Beauty. But why present a blurred copy of his Ideal-Real when we have the original pictured with sunbeams, in this sublime outburst: "I stand here to say:— Let us worship the mighty and transcendent Soul. The lovers of Goodness have been one class, the students of Wisdom another, as if either could exist in purity without the other. Truth is always holy, holiness always wise. I will that we keep terms with sin and a sinful literature and society no longer, but live a life of discovery and performance. Accept the intellect and it will accept us. Be the lowly ministers of that pure omniscience and deny it not before men. It will burn up all profane literature, all base, current opinions, all false powers of the world, as in a moment of time. I draw from Nature the lesson of Intimate Divinity. The sanity of man needs the poise of this immanent force. His nobility needs the assurance of this inexhaustible reserved power. . . . The doctrine of this Supreme Presence is a cry of exultation and joy. . . . I praise with wonder this great Reality, which drowns all things in its deluge of Light. . . . The natural history of the

Soul we cannot describe, but we know that it is Divine. . . . From this faith I draw courage and hope. Let those fear and fawn who will. The Soul is in her native realm, and it is wider than space, older than time, wide as hope, rich as love. Pusillanimity and fear she refuses with beautiful scorn; they are not for her, who putteth on her coronation robes, and goes out through universal love to universal power."

There lives the Real-Ideal Emerson, as it would have been my joyful privilege to image him, if health had permitted. But presently "The Correspondence of Carlyle and Emerson," edited by the accomplished æsthetic Professor of Harvard University, Charles E. Norton, will appear; and then, so soon as a careful revision of his Journals, Note Books, Poems, and Correspondence can be completed, "Emerson's Life," by his friend and literary trustee, J. Elliot Cabot, of Boston, will follow. These will give the needed opportunity for some worthy critic to portray, in your pages, the radiant Optimist of the West.

WILLIAM HENRY CHANNING.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

THE ORIGIN OF THE NAME "JEHOVAH."

IN the last number of the *Modern Review* I notice that Mr. T. Tyler has proposed a new derivation for the name of the national God of Israel, which it has lately become the fashion to call Yahveh. He supposes it to be borrowed from the Vedic Dyaus, and endeavours to support his hypothesis by assuming the existence of an early maritime trade between Babylonia, the original home of Abraham, and the mouths of the Indus. None of his arguments, however, seem to me convincing. Philologically it is difficult to grant that the initial dental of the name could have been lost when it was borrowed by the ancestors of the Israelites. The loss of the initial in Latin is nothing to the point, as Latin is a sister language of Sanskrit, not a foreign idiom, and it is a regular law of Latin phonology for a primitive *dy* to become simply *j*. So far as I know, there is no such law either in Hebrew or in any other Semitic language.

Dyaus, moreover, does not correspond with Yahveh in character. Dyaus was the sky-god, whereas Yahveh, like other Baalim, was originally a solar deity. Semitic theology was intensely solar, and in so far as Yahveh was a god of the polytheistic multitude, and not of the prophets, he was a Baal, in whom was reflected the great luminary of day.

The connection which Mr. Tyler seeks to establish between Babylonia and India in early times is also, to say the least, very questionable. The Bactrian elephant represented on the Black Obelisk was brought from Muzri or Lesser Armenia; and even if it could be shown that there were commercial relations between India and Assyria in the ninth century B.C., we should have no proof that similar relations existed between India and Babylonia more than a thousand years earlier. The Chaldean origin of the Indian form of the deluge tradition has been called in question, and the age of the teak found at Mugheir and Abu Habba is as late as the epoch of Nebuchadnezzar. The only

evidence of early intercourse between Chaldea and India that I have come across is a mention of *Sindhu*, or Indian muslin, in an old Babylonian list of clothes. It would appear that even at the time when the fleets of Solomon and Hiram traded to Ophir (if, indeed, this is to be identified with the Indian Abhira), the mouths of the Indus were still occupied, not by an Aryan, but by a Dravidian population, since the Hebrew *tukiyyim*, "peacocks," is the Tamil *toget*.

Mr. Tyler has forgotten, however, that if the name of an Indian deity were borrowed by the inhabitants of Babylonia, they would be the trading classes of the country rather than a small tribe of aliens who had settled among them. Mugheir, which, by the way, is shown by the inscriptions to be Ur, Warka being Erech, was the seat of a powerful monarchy, and it is inconceivable that an obscure body of emigrants to the West should have carried with them the name of a deity adopted from abroad which has left no traces of itself in the native literature of Chaldæa. Our knowledge of Babylonian mythology is fairly complete, thanks to the long lists of gods and demi-gods which have been preserved to us, but there is no such deity as Yahveh to be found in it. The mythological tablets sometimes give us the names of the gods worshipped by the neighbours of the Babylonians, but here, too, we look vainly for the name of the national God of Israel. If it was borrowed by the ancestors of the Israelites, it must have been after they had left Babylonia.

Prof. Friedrich Delitzsch's attempt to find an Accadian etymology for the name is unsuccessful, as has been shown by Dr. Tiele and others. At the same time the arguments by which he tries to prove that its original form was Yahu, Yahveh being due to a later *Volksetymologie*, remain as strong as ever, and I do not well see how they can be upset. *Yahu*, however, hardly admits of a Semitic derivation, so that, after all, we seem driven to conclude that though Mr. Tyler's special thesis is unacceptable, his general view of the foreign origin of the word is correct. This is confirmed by the fact that the Canaanites or Phœnicians, the near kindred of the Hebrews both geographically and linguistically, had no more knowledge of a god *Yahu* than the other Semitic populations of Western Asia. At present this is all that can be said upon the subject with any strong show of probability; *Yahu* does not seem to have primitively been of native Israelitish origin, and yet all attempts to discover a foreign source of the name have failed.

Under these circumstances, perhaps the wisest course would

be to wait for further light, and not to suggest a new solution of the problem. But Mr. Tyler may, with some justice, claim that if I reject his solution of it, I ought to propose one of my own. If I do so, however, it must be understood to be only a tentative one. I am, myself, inclined to look to the Hittites for the origin both of the God himself and of his name. The Book of Genesis brings them into special connection with Abraham in the South of Palestine, and David, who reigned at Hebron before he reigned at Jerusalem, while making war on the Semitic Arameans of Damascus and Zobah, was in alliance with the Hittite king of Hamath. The alliance lasted long, and when in later days a panic fell upon the Syrians, they at once concluded that "the king of Israel hath hired against us the kings of the Hittites" (2 Kings vii. 6). Tou, or Toi—itself a non-Semitic name—was the king of Hamath, who sent his son Joram to form a league with David, and that Yahu is the first element in the name of Joram seems evident from the form Hadoram, which takes its place in 1 Chron. xviii. 10. I have tried to show elsewhere that Hadad was the Semitised form of Dadis or Attis, the Hittite god of the air, and that when Macrobius makes Adad the supreme god of the Syrians, and says that the word means "one," he is referring not to the Semitic Syrians, but to the people of Hierapolis and its neighbourhood, the White Syrians of Strabo. However this may be, a later king of Hamath, in the time of Sargon, when the city appears to have passed into the hands of the Semites, is called by the Assyrians Yahu-bihdi in one place, and Ilu-bihdi in another, and since Ilu is the Hebrew El, "God," it would seem that Yahu must have been as much the supreme deity of Hamath as he was of Judah. It is, therefore, significant that the Hittite captain in David's army was named Uriah. Outside Hamath and Israel the inscriptions, neither of Assyria nor of Egypt, reveal any names of which Yahu forms part.

If this suggestion of mine is rejected, I see no alternative except to adopt Dr. Robertson Smith's reference of the word to *קרה*, "to fall back upon" (as in Job xxxvii. 6), the original meaning of the name being "he who causes (rain or lightning) to fall upon (the earth)." But this etymology assumes both the Semitic origin of the word and the form Yahveh, notwithstanding the contrary evidence of compound proper names as well as of the Assyrian inscriptions.

A. H. SAYCE.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

THE PEAK IN DARIEN.*

MISS COBBE'S new book is a timely and effective contribution to the controversies of the day on some of the chief subjects to which she has devoted herself, and it is full of that freshness of feeling and earnestness of conviction which give zest and life to any discussion into which she enters. It is intended, as she says in the Preface, for those of her contemporaries who are daily brought face to face with some of the darker problems of our time, or are led by their advancing years to ponder ever more earnestly on the mystery of the great Transition. In the various papers—some new, some already published in various periodicals—she has “striven to meet fairly the questions: Whether the denial of God and Immortality be indeed (as Agnostics or Comtists are wont to boast) a ‘magnanimous’ creed? Whether life be truly (as Leopardi and Schopenhauer, and hundreds of their English disciples din daily into our ears) a burden and a curse? and Whether (as much recent legislation and newspaper literature would seem to teach) bodily health be, after all, the *summum bonum* for which personal freedom, courage, humanity, and purity ought all to be sacrificed?”

The first of these questions is discussed in the paper on ‘Magnanimous Atheism,’ which appeared, five years ago, in the *Theological Review*. Dismissing, as essentially false and irreligious, the idea of the relation between religion and morals which would make virtue a bargain with the Most High, or an act of supreme prudence, consisting in obedience to the will of God for the sake of everlasting happiness, or for fear of loss and punishment, it is shown that the real question is, whether a man is necessarily self-interested “in doing the will of a Being whom he loves, and whom he hopes by serving to approach and resemble.” The love of goodness, which is the inspiration of such obedience to a supremely righteous and holy will, is “not a less disinterested, though naturally a more fervent, sentiment than love of goodness in the abstract.” After vindicating Theism from the charge of degrading the character of human virtue, it is not difficult to go further, and to establish its claim to exalt the quality of the righteous life, and to

* *The Peak in Darien, with some other Inquiries touching Concerns of the Soul and the Body.* By FRANCES POWER COBBE. London: Williams and Norgate. 1882.

inspire and strengthen the conscience and the will under the conditions of the moral struggle. It is admitted, of course, that this, by itself *proves* nothing as to the truth or falsehood of either theory of life. Miss Cobbe's contention is, that the religious beliefs, which rest on other foundations, are not open to the charge of moral unworthiness; and she shows what a much poorer and weaker thing life would be if the faith in a supreme will, and an all-embracing love, and an imperishable spiritual life, were to disappear, or to be finally discredited as a superstition or a delusion.

In the essay on 'Pessimism and One of its Professors,' a distinction is rightly made between what we may call respectively the higher and the lower Pessimism. The former may in some measure be due to "the growth of a finer sense of pity for human woes, and the inclusion of the lower animals in the scope of our sympathies;" and it may give rise to pure philanthropies and noble self-sacrifices in the attempt to alleviate the miseries to which it is so sensitive. But there is a Pessimism, only too common, which is essentially arrogant, selfish, and heartless, unable to believe in good because afflicted with a profound incapacity to discern it. As an instance of the kind of character which naturally allies itself with a thorough-going pessimism of this uglier sort, we are invited to look at a portrait of one of its noted professors—Arthur Schopenhauer—drawn from the life with a remorseless pen. The picture is unlovely in almost every feature; and we are made to feel the truth of the remark, that "there are minds—and Schopenhauer's was one of them—whose brilliancy is that of a lighthouse. Its best use is to disclose the cold and troubled sea, and the dreary rocks whereon the unwary might make shipwreck."

The argument of the short paper, entitled 'Hygeiolatry,' is directed against the doctrine which may be embodied in the formula: "That any practice which, in the opinion of experts, conduces to bodily health, or tends to the cure of disease, becomes *ipso facto* morally lawful and right." As against this portentous fruit of some modern theories of life the thesis is defended: "That bodily health may not be lawfully sacrificed to our desire of pleasure or fear of pain. It may and ought to be sacrificed to the health of our souls, to the service of our fellow-men, or to fidelity to God." Miss Cobbe believes that under the baleful influence of the former doctrine the old courage of Englishmen is dwindling away—a view which seems to us to have something of "pessimistic" exaggeration in it. She speaks with righteous indignation of practices which are justified in the name of "physiological research," on the plea that they may conduce to the cure of disease. And she refers, with the necessary reserve, but with the intense and impressive earnestness with which she always approaches the question of purity of life, to the moral poisoning of youth, which she believes to be going on "to a frightful extent," caused by the evil counsels given by some medical men, in connection with the conditions of physical health. It is impossible to question the fact of this moral poisoning, while it is equally impossible

to know its extent. No doubt it is "frightful," whether it be small or great. But we cannot help hoping and believing that, both in her estimate of the extent to which the general principle is accepted, that *everything* may be sacrificed to bodily health, and of this last and most revolting application of it, Miss Cobbe is, in some respects, predisposed to believe the worst; and that she may be underestimating the effect of those restraining influences which so often prevent an immoral theory from producing its logical consequences. But it is impossible to speak too seriously or too emphatically on such a subject; and once more we have to thank Miss Cobbe, as we have had to thank others of her sex, for speaking with such noble, womanly courage and "godly sincerity" the word of warning and counsel.

Under the heading 'Zoophily,' the duties of man towards the lower animals are discussed, the object of the paper being to define the feeling with which they ought to be regarded, and which most naturally determine our treatment of them. We need hardly say that the argument is yet another plea to save our humbler fellow-creatures from the hands of the tormentors.

In the amusing paper on 'Sacrificial Medicine,' we are presented with a selection (accompanied with characteristic reflections) from the senseless and disgusting prescriptions of the doctors of former days, "distinguished by one or other of the grand characteristics, roughly definable as Costliness or Nastiness." The point, or, shall we say, the sting of the article is to be found, not in the recognition of the great advances made in the direction of science and common sense in the practice of medicine, but in the suggestion that "to our grandsons, half our modern nostrums . . . may possibly appear scarcely a degree less ridiculous than the Arcanum of Toads or the Mummiall Quintessence."

Passing to the next essay, we should be glad to believe that the question of the 'Fitness of Women for the Ministry of Religion' is one which "is likely soon to acquire importance." We fear that it is affected by deeply-rooted prejudices, which, while they are peculiarly unreasonable, may, perhaps, on that very account, be all the more difficult to get rid of. The good sense and sobriety of judgment with which the whole subject is discussed by Miss Cobbe ought to make its impression, and do something towards removing the hindrances which have prevented women from entering on a work for which, in many respects, they are especially qualified.

'The House on the Shore of Eternity' is a brief allegory, the interpretation of which is, perhaps, a little too immediately obvious. At the same time the analogy seems an imperfect one between the soul of man in this earthly life and a ship *in the stocks*, which the spectator takes to be a house most skilfully and ingeniously constructed, and yet perversely unsuited for a residence on *terra firma*. Its true nature and destination are, of course, discovered when the tide flows in and floats it away. The life of man, however, in its earthly stage, hardly corresponds to the ship which has as yet *no* function to fulfil. The idea of the *voyage* of life is as

beautiful and touching as it is old ; but it is the voyage begun in this life which carries us into the haven, or into unknown seas—an idea which has more of the truth of poetry and spiritual fact in it than has the newer allegory.

The paper from which the volume is named comes last, the title referring, of course, to the well-known lines which conclude one of Keats' finest sonnets. We do not feel inclined to discuss or analyse these closing pages, suggestive as they are of many reflections. They are full of tender and comforting thoughts about the great Transition, connected chiefly with the touching incidents which have been recorded as accompanying the last moments of earthly life, when the dying person has seemed to *see something* with " a sudden lighting up of the countenance, and a word or gesture of recognition," " a rapture of surprise or delight." Repudiating the idea of founding any *argument* for a future life on such occurrences—our faith in that life resting on independent grounds—Miss Cobbe regards them as suggesting, at least, the possibility that consciousness is not always lost, but is continuous through the passage from one life to another. Perhaps she draws the line a little arbitrarily, when she separates from all other classes of spiritual manifestations the cases in which those *just dying* have seen visions of the departed ; and there are many equally well authenticated accounts of the appearance, in visible form, of far absent friends, with no suggestion of any permanent separation of the soul from the body of either seer or seen. Whether such visions may be the creation of the brain under certain exceptional conditions, or whether they are due to a real spiritual presence which is not hindered by the material conditions of space, is a question the solution of which is at present in a very rudimentary state. Certainly there are no stories of these visions which we are more *willing* to believe than in those, the special and pathetic interest of which is here so touchingly and sympathetically shown, and which are on the side of the deepest longings and the brightest hopes which we approach the moment of crossing the borders of the Silent Land.

PROFESSOR KNIGHT'S EDITION OF WORDSWORTH'S POEMS.*

WE are at last to have, in fitting beauty of form, the complete and standard edition of Wordsworth's poems. In undertaking the duty of preparing it, Professor Knight has earned the gratitude of all true Wordsworthians. His task, though it could not but be a congenial one, was one which involved no little labour of a kind which might easily degenerate into drudgery, for one of its chief features is the collation of all the various editions published during the poet's life-time, from

* *The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth*. Edited by WILLIAM KNIGHT LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy, St. Andrews. Vols. I. and II. Edinburgh: William Paterson. 1882.

the *Evening Walk*, of 1793, to the sixth collective edition of 1845, involving the labour of going through the earlier poems a dozen times, and the *Excursion* half a dozen times, with a single eye to the changes in the text, from the important and significant alterations, which have a real literary interest, down to the constantly recurring slight verbal amendments. The results of this collation are given at the foot of the page, on a simple and perspicuous plan, which enables the reader to see at a glance how the text originally stood, what was the date at which it was finally settled, and what intermediate changes, if any, may have been made in it. Thus to the opening line of the Sonnet Composed on the Beach near Calais—"It is a beautiful evening, calm and free,"—the note gives the date of 1807, with the following readings:—

Air sleeps,—from strife or stir the clouds are free,	1836.
A fairer face of evening cannot be,	1842.
It is a beautiful evening, calm and free,	1846.

(Returning to 1807.)

Those of us who are lucky enough to possess the original editions, say, of the *Lyrical Ballads* of 1793 and 1800, or the two volumes published in 1807, will not give up the pleasure of reading the poems in the form, both inward and outward, in which they originally appeared, and noting mentally, as they read, the passages which the author afterwards altered or rejected. But these precious little volumes are now among the prizes to be picked up on rare occasions, and at extravagant prices; and even those who have them will not the less, but rather the more, appreciate the value of the complete collation, the varied interest of which they have ascertained for themselves at first-hand, within a narrower range.

It is probable that the majority of readers will be surprised to find how frequently Wordsworth revised his poems, and how many alterations he made in them. Some of the pages of the new edition are pretty equally divided between the text and the various readings; and though this naturally happens oftenest in the *Evening Walk* and the *Descriptive Sketches*—those early and more conventional productions which the author might just as well have left as they were written, instead of laboriously endeavouring to assimilate them to his later style—it will also be found in the case of some of the *Lyrical Ballads*, and other early poems; and, at a later date, amongst other instances, *Peter Bell* was subjected to a careful, and, on the whole, an advantageous revision. We feel tempted to give some specimens in evidence of the interest and value of this part of Professor Knight's work, but we have not room for them here; and we shall probably return to the subject, when the future volumes have enabled us to take a more comprehensive view. One thing will certainly be made clear, that, contrary perhaps to the general impression, in the large majority of cases Wordsworth improved when he altered. There are instances, it is true, sometimes quoted as if

they were representative ones, in which the poet in his critical mood has done harm in retouching his first fresh work. But no reader of any critical discernment, who would go through the twelve or thirteen hundred variations which are recorded in these two volumes alone, could hesitate to approve, on the whole, of the results of the poet's self-criticism, as embodied in his final readings.

There is no doubt that Professor Knight has done wisely in taking his text from the latest editions, and giving the previous readings in the footnotes, rather than adopting the earliest form of the text, which would have been the only other admissible alternative. We should have thought that the third course, which he speaks of, as having required consideration, viz.: the production of an eclectic text, in which each poem should be given in the form which approved itself as the best to the editor's judgment, was out of court altogether. The special purpose of the collation, is to give the reader the means of judging for himself whether the poet's original work, or his afterthought, is the happier; and it would have greatly complicated matters to have had the editor's opinion always intervening. With regard to the choice between the text of the earliest and the latest editions, it seems to us only just to an author to give his works, in a standard edition, in the form which he himself finally settled, even if it were not, as in this case, so evidently the one to be on the whole preferred on its own merits.

The arrangement of the poems in chronological order (as they were written, of course, not as published) adds a new feature of interest, and was required in an edition designed especially for the study of the poet's art and the development of his genius. A complete list of the poems, with the dates of composition and of publication, is given; and it is interesting to learn from it, among other things, how much of Wordsworth's best known and finest work belongs to nearly the earliest period, written between his 23th and 27th years, and published in the *Lyrical Ballads*, which include the 'Lines written in 1793, a few miles above Tintern Abbey,' and in the *Poems* of 1807, amongst which are the 'Ode to Duty' (1805), and the 'Intimations of Immortality' (begun in 1803, and completed in 1806).

The edition will contain, of course, all the author's own printed notes and prefaces, and also the indispensable personal memoranda which he dictated, late in life, to his old friend Miss Isabella Fenwick. A selection only of these was given in the edition published by the poet's executors; and although they were printed *in extenso* in Dr. Grosart's edition of the *Prose Works*, they now appear for the first time in their proper place, in connection with the poems to which they severally refer. A new and very interesting source of information as to the circumstances under which many of the poems were written, extending often to minute detail, has happily been available in the form of the journals kept by Miss Wordsworth, at Grasmere, from 1800 to 1808. Professor Knight, in speaking of these journals at the Wordsworth Society's last meeting, said that they were "a singularly interesting record of 'plain living and

high thinking,'—of very plain living, and of very lofty thought, imagination, and feeling. They were the best possible commentary on the poems belonging to that period; because they showed the manner of life of the brother and the sister, the character of their daily work, the influences of Nature to which they were subjected, the homeliness of their ways, and the materials on which the poems were based, as well as the sources of their inspiration. . . . Miss Wordsworth's delineations of Nature in these daily jottings were quite as subtle and minute, quite as delicate and ethereal, as anything in her brother's poems. Above all, there was in these records a most interesting disclosure of Dorothy Wordsworth's friendship with Coleridge; and a very remarkable friendship it was." The editor has been allowed to use such portions only of these journals as serve the same general purposes of illustration as do the Fenwick notes; from a line or two indicating a date or locality, to a page of exquisite description of some scene, the essence of which was fixed on the spot or afterwards by the poet's art. It is to be hoped that these extracts, like those which were given in the Memoirs from Miss Wordsworth's *Recollections of the Tour in Scotland*, are only the precursors of the appearance of the complete record. We are glad to have many descriptive passages from these Scotch journals, also reprinted here, in connection with the poems which they illustrate; and Professor Knight, who is himself a chief authority on topographical matters connected with Wordsworth, has embodied in additional notes much of the information contained in his delightful book, '*The Lake District as Interpreted in the Poems of Wordsworth*.'

Certainly nothing more could well be asked for in the way of illustration than has been provided in these volumes. They give us the opportunity of studying the poet's mind and work in a way which he himself approved and encouraged; and if it should seem to us at first that poetry which deals, as Wordsworth's does, so simply and directly with the heart of nature and the inner life of human thought and affections, needs no such elaborate apparatus for its interpretation and enjoyment, we shall still find that there is scarcely a poem which has not been enriched by having some fresh and interesting association connected with it, and some more personal significance imparted to it.

We are promised, in the preface, "several poems or fragments of poems, hitherto unpublished." It is not mentioned what these are to be, and we can only hope that now at last we are to have that book of *The Recluse*, from which a quotation was made thirty-one years ago in the Memoirs, but which has been hitherto so unaccountably withheld from publication. It is not to be supposed that anything else of importance is still in manuscript; and among the pieces which had been dropped out of the later editions, or had been printed elsewhere and never included in them, perhaps the only ones of any real interest are the quaintly characteristic picture of 'Andrew Jones,' the pest of the village, which we may smile at, but be rather glad to recover; and the stanzas on the Glowworm, which, though less perfect than the others of the group of

poems referring to 'Lucy,' to which they belong, are not unworthy to be restored to the place from which they were unceremoniously dismissed, after appearing in one issue only.

The editor promises us a new Life of Wordsworth, and he is also preparing a bibliography of criticism, or critical estimates of the poet, which will, we hope, not be a mere index or reference list, but will briefly indicate, if possible, the character of such criticisms as are of any special interest. We hope also that all discoverable traces of the study of Wordsworth on the Continent will be registered; and specimens of any translations of his poems into other languages would be very welcome.

The two volumes already published (to be followed by six others) will require a careful list of additions to the various readings in the foot-notes, with a few other corrections, the possible sources of error in the collation not having been sufficiently guarded against. Fortunately the editor is now forewarned as regards the greater part of his task, and we may confidently reckon on the accuracy of what has yet to be done. In every point requiring judgment, discrimination, and an intimate knowledge of his subject, Professor Knight seems to us to have done his work as well as it could be done; and when it is completed it will be a worthy monument of the pure and lofty genius in whose honour it has been undertaken.

THE FACSIMILE REPRINT OF 'THE TEMPLE.' *

AN Introductory Essay by the author of 'John Inglesant' was enough to ensure the popularity of Mr. Unwin's facsimile of the original edition of George Herbert's Poems, even if the quaint and pretty little volume had not deserved success on its own account. It is reproduced as nearly as possible in the exact form in which it was given to the world, two centuries and a half ago, by the author's friend and brother, Mr. Nicholas Ferrar, of whom readers of 'John Inglesant' are not ignorant; a form which nearly resembles what is perhaps, as far as externals are concerned, the most desirable of the modern editions, the one printed at the Chiswick Press, and published by Mr. Pickering in 1850. The only fault to be found with it is that the binding, in imitation of the original "sprinkled sheep," is an ingenious counterfeit made of paper, which soon gives premature signs of wear at the edges and in the hinges. It is, however, an uncommonly good imitation of the old-fashioned style of cover; and the little book is altogether a very dainty quaint image of the original.

The few preparatory pages of Mr. Shorthouse's most delicate and

* *The Temple: Sacred Poems and Private Ejaculations.* By Mr. GEORGE HERBERT. A New Edition, with Introductory Essay by J. HENRY SHORTHOUSE, Author of 'John Inglesant.' London: T. Fisher Unwin. 1882.

harmonious prose are very pleasant to read, and are suggestive of many thoughts which might carry us some distance from George Herbert. He has less to say in the way of literary criticism of the poet's work than he has of certain matters concerning religion and culture which suggest themselves to him in this connection. He writes of George Herbert, "the ascetic priest, who was also a fine gentleman, with his fine cloth, his cambric fall, and his delicate hands," as the type of that "exquisite refinement" which he considers to be "the peculiar gift and office of the Church" [of England]. "Just as *George Herbert*, when on his way to the music meeting in the Close of *Sarum*, hesitated not to soil his hands and clothes, 'usually so neat and clean,' in helping the man with the cart that had broken down, so this exquisite Church, delicate with the scent of violet and Lent-lily, and with the country places which God made and not man—eschewing alike the gaudiness of one ritual and the excitement and noise of other appeals to the uncultivated—still holds forth in town precincts and back alleys and courts this Gospel of refinement and sacred culture, apparently so alien to the people among whom its lot is cast."

This is very charmingly put, and there is much truth as well as beauty in it. But we should say that the Church does really preach first to the uncultivated a robustness if a less "exquisite" Gospel than this, where it wins its way to any good purpose,—a Gospel of purity and decency of living, of common honesty, of "righteousness, temperance and judgement to come." The refinement and culture which characterise the English Church are certainly not her exclusive possession. Those who are open to the influences of refinement and culture in all their workings in literature, art, and life, will be attracted to the Church which has assimilated so much that is gracious and beautiful and of fine literary and artistic quality. But it is claiming rather too much to say of the Church of England that she "has produced a culture unequalled in the world beside."

In the essayist's critical remarks on *The Temple*, there is much that is true and discriminating, as when he finely observes that Herbert's poetry is "the spiritual instinct of a human life consecrated to God amid the pleasures, the temptations, the pains, of the world's courts and cities." He seems to us, however, to be inclined to underrate its literary quality, only allowing that "here and there you meet with three or four lines of great felicity and melody of rhythm," and even this "seems the result of chance." Those "three or four" happy lines certainly occur a good deal oftener than is implied in the phrase "here and there." At the same time we may share Mr. Shorthouse's doubt whether *The Temple* will ever be popular again; while recognising in it "a strength of expression and a reality of feeling which will always ensure for it an audience fit, if few." His genial and thoughtful Introduction will be sure to send his readers to the Poems in the right mood to enjoy them and to find in them a new interest and charm.

GREIN AND WÜLCKER'S CORPUS OF ANGLO-SAXON POETRY.*

COMPARATIVELY few Englishmen have at all an adequate conception of the strength and grandeur of early English civilisation; and probably nothing but a more widespread study of the Anglo-Saxon literature will finally dispel that strange illusion under the influence of which many otherwise intelligent persons still practically remain—that English history begins with the Norman Conquest! What presented itself to us when children as a kind of chaotic preface which we wanted to skip (Alfred hanging in an unattached way in the middle of it, without antecedents or consequents) was in truth “the making of England,” and the more we become acquainted with the noble literature, so long and so unaccountably neglected by us, the more shall we become convinced that all the best and all the most permanent characteristics of the English character are already reflected there. We have no small satisfaction, then, in welcoming the first instalment of the long-expected new edition of Grein's *Bibliothek* of Anglo-Saxon poetry, and sincerely hope that it will be largely circulated and diligently studied in England as well as in Germany. It is in reality a new work, and, although the original *Bibliothek* bore in every part that unmistakable stamp of genius which never wears out, yet the progress made in Anglo-Saxon studies during the last quarter of a century is so great, and the opportunities of consulting the original MSS. which Wülcker has enjoyed are so extended, that the new work ought to mark a great advance upon the old one. At present, however, we can hardly judge of its execution, and it will doubtless be many years before the completion of the “glossary” will enable competent judges to form a definitive estimate of its merits. The present half-volume contains a few short poems, to which it may be inferred the editor assigns a high antiquity, and an accurate transcription of the MS. of *Béowulf*. The edited text of *Béowulf*, together with a number of minor but important poems and (presumably short) literary notices, will make up the second half-volume. Only those who have reached an advanced stage of proficiency—indeed, hardly any but experts—can read *Béowulf* in the text here provided, which makes it all the more to be regretted that the progress of the work is so extremely slow. When the restored text is published, we may, perhaps, be allowed to call attention to some of the claims of the great Anglo-Saxon epic upon the attention of modern English readers; meanwhile we cannot resist the temptation of citing the passage in which the poet relieves by his gentle simile the horror of the scene when the giant sword, with which *Béowulf* has slain the monster, Grendel's mother, is eaten away by the hot and poisonous blood, and melts down to the hilt, “most like an icicle, when

* *Bibliothek der Angelsächsischen Poesie...* VON CHRISTIAN W. M. GREIN. Neu bearbeitet von RICHARD PAUL WÜLCKER. 1 Band. 1 Hälfte. Kassel. 1881.

that the Father loosens the frost-band, unwinds the wave-ropes—He who has power o'er times and o'er seasons, the true Creator.”

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P. H. W.

EWALD'S 'BOOK OF JOB.'

EWALD'S Commentary on Job, with translation,* well deserved to be included in the series of translations of the most important books on the Bible, which are given us by the Theological Translation Fund. The ingenuity of interpretation, so conspicuous and never-failing, and the clear head and systematising faculty required to trace the general scope of the argument of this difficult book, all possessed in so high a degree by Ewald, make this one of the most successful of his labours. That it is so may be seen by a glance at most of the writings on Job that have appeared since his, such as Hirzel, Renan (who says, "Il serait injuste d'oublier qu'après Schultens, c'est M. Ewald qui a le plus contribué aux progrès de l'exégèse du livre de Job"), Kuenen, and Samuel Cox. As an early work it is marvellous in boldness and novelty, and, perhaps, most of its new ideas have stood the test of time.

Mr. J. Frederick Smith has been engaged so long on the translation of Ewald's translations that he could safely be entrusted with this; and his work is generally well, sometimes surprisingly well done. At the same time, I cannot but say that some of his accepted rules of translation are, in my judgment, to be regretted, and differ considerably from Ewald's own. At the outset, the title is unfortunate. The book is not, in the intention of its author, a "a commentary with translation," but a "translation with a commentary" (*das Buch Ijob übersetzt und erklärt*). The fastidious care bestowed on the language, rhythm, and strophes of the translation, shows this to be the essential text of the work; it is intended to be self-sufficient, and the *explanation* (rather than "commentary") consists mainly of *pièces justificatives*. Mr. Smith says in his preface, "The translator has considered it his duty . . . to faithfully observe the fundamental principles on which the great interpreter of the Hebrew Scriptures performed his task of reproducing as closely as possible the minutest peculiarities of his Hebrew authors, *even at the cost of German grammar and idiom*. Real students of Ewald would not thank an English translator for the attempt to improve upon him." I cannot understand this, or if I do I think it the reverse of the truth. Nothing is more conspicuous in Ewald's Hebrew grammar and Biblical translations than his constant endeavour to rise above mere literal renderings, and to show what in idiomatic German is the sense of each Hebrew phrase. Thus here, in I. 1, "Ein Mann war in Lande Uss,

* *Commentary on the Book of Job, with Translation*. By the late Dr. G. H. A. VON EWALD. Translated from the German by J. Frederick Smith. (Theological Translation Fund Library. Vol. xxviii.) Williams and Norgate. 1882.

Ijob genannt," where the Hebrew is literally, "his name (being) Ijob;" and I. 5, "Also that Ijob *all die Zeit*," where the Hebrew has "all the days;" but a plurality of days being a *time* or *period*, the more familiar German idiom is preferred. And again, at the beginning of v. 5, we have *vajjehi* "and it was," "and it came to pass," a word essential in narrative when an adverb or dependent clause of time or place is prefixed to the principal verb (here the clause "when the days of the feast were gone by"), but to which nothing in any modern language corresponds; Ewald, therefore, omits it, and writes simply, "Doch wann die Tage, &c." When will our translators generally understand this, and cancel "And it came to pass" throughout the whole Bible? for the N. T. *καὶ ἐγένετο* is only the same Hebraism, reproduced in Greek through a slavishly literal system of translation. Now, as I cannot think that Ewald has sacrificed German grammar and idiom, so I do not believe that an English translator ought to renounce the attempt to produce really idiomatic English for Ewald's German. To quote Renan again: "Il me semble que les traducteurs entendent, en général, leurs devoirs d'une manière fort incomplète. On croit conserver la couleur de l'original en conservant des tours opposés au génie de la langue dans laquelle on traduit; on ne songe pas qu'une langue ne doit jamais être parlée ni écrite à demi." It is only in a slight degree that I think Mr. Smith's practice is open to these objections, which his principles, announced in the preface, have suggested; but he says (I. 8), "the man was greater than *all sons of the East*," where Ewald has "alle Söhne des Ostens," because the definite article is not usual in German after *alle*, which, however, gives the definite sense, so that the proper English would be "all the sons." That the translator has preserved, not only the rhythmic division of the verses into two or three lines, but the longer strophes of several verses, each as arranged by Ewald, is a matter of course; the reader unaccustomed to see the poetical books of the Old Testament printed thus will be struck by the new beauties thereby disclosed. But if Mr. Smith intentionally abandoned Ewald's rhythmical (iambic or trochaic) treatment of the lines, he should have given his reason for departing from his original in so important a point. It is the fact that Ewald's language is felt to be poetry that makes the frequently fanciful phraseology pass current without being called affected; the want of poetic rhythm may earn for the English some such reproach. Whether Job *should* be translated into verse is a different question—I should be inclined to say not—but this is a translation of Ewald, not of the original.

Of the merits of Ewald's exegesis of the book of Job, in regard to its general character, the development of its plot, the questions raised and discussed, and their final solution, some account ought to be given; but space fails me to indicate any of these except in the briefest manner. A certain excitement of spirit or enthusiasm pervades his treatment of the book, which has, perhaps, led him to overlook difficulties in the way of his preconceived conception, and has prevented others from always fol-

lowing him. Thus the idea that the discussion on the Divine government—in which Job's three friends maintain the traditional thesis that pain and misery are given in retribution for sin, so that, conversely, sin may be inferred where affliction is found, and Job denies the doctrine and asserts his own integrity—culminates in ch. xix., in Job's obtaining a vision of an immortality of the soul, which will solve the difficulty concerning the morality of the Divine government, is not accepted by Renan, Davidson, Kuenen, &c., and certainly seems seriously to derange the argument. This would be the solution, and no further discussion would be necessary; the poem would close here, and would be unique in the Old Testament in establishing at a far earlier date than can be *de facto* claimed for it, a belief among the Jews in the future life of the soul. Kuenen, with greater sobriety of judgment, says, "Ewald ascribes to Job and his friends a refinement in argument and a profundity of thought, of which, with the best will, one can discover very little in their speeches; moreover, the poet stands surely high as an artist, and need not be so very strongly idealised by Ewald." But the interpolation of all the speeches of Elihu (ch. xxxii.—xxxvii.) has been so ably proved by Ewald that scarcely any one now believes them to be genuine; their excision restores argument and beauty to the poem.

It may be that Ewald, with his love and profound knowledge of Arabic poetry, is tempted, like his predecessor Schultens, to ascribe too much of Arabic character to this poem, which is Arabic in the locality assigned to its persons, but otherwise essentially Hebrew in character. Still, even on this side he has done good service, *e.g.*, in discovering in the word חרבנות III. 14 the original designation of the *pyramids*, and the native word, from which the Greek *pyramis* was borrowed: "Kings . . . who built pyramids for themselves," in place of the meaningless "desolate places" or "ruins,"—a sense obtained from a Hebrew word.

R. M.

PROFESSOR PÜNJER'S 'THEOLOGISCHER JAHRESBERICHT.'

IN his Preface to this first volume of an annual report on the Theological Literature of the Year,* Professor Pünjer, of Jena, the Editor, states that the object of the undertaking is to facilitate the formation of a general idea of the position of theological inquiry in every department. Students of theology, in whatever department, know how desirable it is to get such an idea, and will be grateful for any assistance which facilitates its acquirement. The names of the Editor of the above *Jahresbericht* and his collaborators sufficiently guarantee that abundant

* *Theologischer Jahresbericht*. Unter Mitwirkung von BASERMANN, BENRATH, BÖHRINGER, DREYER, GASS, HOLTZMANN, LIPSIUS, LUDEMANN, SEYERLEN, SIEGFRIED, WERNER, herausgegeben von B. PÜNJER. Erster Band, enthaltend die Literatur des Jahres 1881. J. A. Barth, Leipzig, 1882.

learning, simple devotion to the truth, and an honest, outspoken judgment will be brought to bear upon its production. Our duty in this brief notice is simply to call attention to some of the features of the undertaking, which we believe will procure for it hearty support amongst the independent theological students of England. First, the various branches of theological literature have been assigned to the collaborators above enumerated, according to each man's special study. Professors Siegfried, Pünjer, Lipsius, and Seyler (all of Jena), review, for instance, the Literature of the Old Testament, Philosophy of Religion, Dogmatic Theology, and Ecclesiastical Politics, according as they respectively make one of these special branches of theology the study of their lives. In the next place, it is the aim of the review to be as complete as possible. It is true that in this first volume the theological literature of Germany only has been surveyed with anything approaching completeness; but the literature of other countries has been less fully dealt with, simply because in the case of quite a fresh undertaking of this kind, and with the limited funds at the disposal of German professors and German libraries, foreign books are not always to be obtained. As publishers generally hear of the work, defects of this kind will most likely be supplied in subsequent volumes. Again, it is evidently the aim of the Editor and his collaborators to preserve their review from the vice of representing one school of theology only as possessing any claim to a share in the important work of furthering the study of theology. Though these scholars all belong to the ranks of free and independent inquirers, they strive to be perfectly fair to scholars who occupy another theological position. Thus, for instance, Professor Lipsius warmly acknowledges the merits of Dörner's *Christliche Glaubenslehre*; and Dr. Werner knows how to appreciate the value of Kurtz's Church History in its newest edition. Other excellent features of the first volume of this review we must pass unnoticed. We sincerely trust the theological public of the world will support an undertaking which promises to supply a real want. The first volume is an excellent commencement of a very desirable work, and if it meets with the encouragement it deserves, the subsequent volumes are sure to be still more excellent.

J. F. S.

MR. SHARPE'S HISTORY OF THE HEBREW NATION.*

MR. SHARPE'S History needs no introduction to the readers of the *Modern Review*. The revered and lamented author was busy almost to the very end of his life with the studies of which the successive editions of this work have presented the results, and it is pleasant to think

* *The History of the Hebrew Nation and its Literature*. By SAMUEL SHARPE. Fourth Edition. London: Williams and Norgate. 1862.

of even his latest labours finding their permanent record here. The book is so intensely characteristic of the writer that as we look through its pages we seem to be once more in his presence, and the History seems to talk to us rather than offer itself to be read. The unwelcome task of the critic may surely be put aside. The book, like its author, seems to challenge assent to every proposition, but is in reality most tolerant of diverging opinions—one thing only is not to be endured and that is indifference. And it is here that we find the great merit of Mr. Sharpe's work. Its earnestness and sincerity demand attention, and it has been the means of rousing many a mind to independent thought and investigation. Mr. Sharpe's stubborn independence was pushed to an extreme which prevented his deriving from the works of other scholars as much help as he might otherwise have gained from them, and, as an inevitable consequence, prevented his having as much influence on them as he might otherwise have had; but the influence of his steady devotion, his genial warmth, and his fearless originality, will long be felt amongst those who knew him, and will itself be no mean monument to his fame.

P. H. W.

DR. STEBBINS' 'STUDY OF THE PENTATEUCH.'*

AS "the result of [his] own personal investigations, extending over a period approaching half a century," and at the request "of scholars, professors in theological schools, and ministers of different denominations," Dr. Stebbins has published a *Study of the Pentateuch*. This "study" is introduced by an attack on the Dutch school of Biblical critics (more especially as represented by Dr. Kuenen) in the shape of a running account and "refutation" of *The Religion of Israel*. Dr. Stebbins declares "the infallibility of the late Pio Nono was modesty compared with the dogmatic certainty with which [the Dutch critics] make affirmations upon subjects about which such scholars as Gesenius, Ewald, De Wette, to say nothing of others hardly their inferiors, hesitated to give an opinion, much less (*sic*) to dogmatise. The emphatic manner in which they announce as finalities some of the flimsiest of their speculations and hypotheses provokes a smile. There will be ample and frequent opportunity to illustrate this signal characteristic of the work under review [Kuenen's *Religion of Israel*] in the course of this essay" (pp. 7, 8). Such a beginning prepares us beforehand for a "plentiful lack" of sound argument and judicial impartiality; but it leaves us at a loss to understand how an ex-lecturer on Hebrew literature can have studied so lucid a writer as Kuenen, and can yet remain in ignorance of

* *A Study of the Pentateuch, for Popular Reading, &c., &c.* By RUFUS P. STEBBINS, D.D., formerly President, Lecturer on Hebrew Literature, and Professor of Theology in the Meadville Theological School. Boston: G. H. Ellis. 1881.

the very A B C of modern Biblical criticism, as expounded by that scholar and others. Dr. Stebbins, indeed, falls into errors which, when we consider the position he has held, suggest curious questions as to the demands made by the "Meadville Theological School" on her staff of professors.

Even so simple a matter as the technical use of the term historical "tradition," to signify the material that has come down to a writer from previous generations, takes Dr. Stebbins out of his depth, and he thinks he has caught Dr. Kuenen *flagrante delicto*, because he shows that a writer whom the latter describes as working up "materials supplied by tradition," had *written sources* on which to rely! (p. 11). Immediately after this (pp. 12, 18) Dr. Stebbins is equally pleased with himself because he finds it said in the Book of Chronicles that "the Levites were more upright in heart to sanctify themselves than the priests," a statement which he regards as fatal to a supposition he has seen good to attribute to Dr. Kuenen—viz., that the Chronicler's "purpose was to elevate the priesthood above the Levites." Here there is the grossest confusion. I am not aware that either Kuenen or any one else has ever attributed any such purpose to the Chronicler. Ezekiel, and the author of the Book of Origins did, indeed, labour hard and successfully to establish this distinction between priests and Levites, which had not previously been recognised; and the Chronicler, doubtless, wrote his history in conformity with the ideas and practices that had become prevalent in consequence of their efforts, and in the interests of the priestly and Levitical views of history; but he himself, living about two centuries after the introduction of the Law, and at a time when the elevation of the priests over the other Levites was no more challenged than the exclusive rights of the tribe of Levi itself, could have had no such purpose as Dr. Stebbins imagines Dr. Kuenen to attribute to him. In point of fact, the Chronicler's leaning towards the non-priestly Levites has been perfectly well noted and set forth by Kuenen and his school. Dr. Stebbins is simply beating the air.

But we are far from having sounded the depths of our author's misconceptions. By systematically ignoring the composite character of the Pentateuch, he produces the impression (it is not clear whether he means expressly to assert it [p. 21]), that Kuenen assigns *all* the narratives in the Pentateuch to a date at least as late as that of the Captivity. This is entirely untrue, and we have only to remember that Kuenen assigns the "Prophetic narratives" to the eighth century B. C. in order to see how completely Dr. Stebbins' argument collapses when he tries to show that the evidence of the earlier prophets reduces Kuenen's hypothesis to an absurdity. This assumption of the practical integrity of the Pentateuch, however, runs through the whole of our author's work, and he attempts to justify it on two grounds. What are they?

We are almost ashamed to remind our readers that recent criticism recognises, as one of the most important documents of the Pentateuch, a work generally called "The Book of Origins," which is partly narrative

and partly legislative, and is distinguished, amongst other characteristic marks, by a scrupulous avoidance of the use of the Divine name of *Yahweh* previous to the moment of its revelation to Moses (recorded in Ex. vi. 2, 8). After this point the name *Yahweh* is freely used, and the critic is dependent upon other characteristics of the document in separating it out from the composite whole through which it runs. Owing to the exclusive use of the word *Elohim* (God), and the avoidance of the name *Yahweh*, in the early portion of this work, it has frequently been called the "Elohistic Document." Now Dr. Stebbins takes hold of this name, says that Dr. Kuenen regards the use of *Elohim* as a "chief characteristic" of the author's style, and then triumphantly points to a series of passages—all of them *subsequent* to Ex. vi.—in which the use of the name *Yahweh* prevails, and which Kuenen nevertheless assigns to the "Elohistic" author! "This," he adds, "is sufficient to show the fallacy of the whole criticism; for, if the 'chief characteristic' of one of the theoretical documents is found to be almost universally used in the others in practice, either the theory or the practice is sadly at fault" (p. 71). This is almost incredible. The merest tyro who had heard a single popular lecture on the criticism of the Pentateuch could not have made such a blunder. Yet Dr. Stebbins gives it as the result of "a careful and most minute study"!

Our author's second reason for rejecting as entirely baseless the results of the critical dissection of the Pentateuch is almost equally astonishing. It rests on the want of agreement amongst critics as to the division of the books. Now the fact is that in this matter the almost absolute agreement of recent critics of very different schools, is one of the most encouraging phenomena on the field of Biblical investigation. This agreement is so remarkable that Dr. Robertson Smith, who regards the "Book of Origins" as the latest great stratum of the Pentateuch, is able to accept, as the basis of his argument, the list of passages assigned to that book by Nöldeke, who regards it as the earliest! But Dr. Stebbins does not know, or does not choose to know, anything of this, and thinks he has established his point by comparing Nöldeke's list with that of — Stähelin, as given in Parker's *De Wette*! On the strength of such arguments as these, the Pentateuch is treated as a single whole, and when Dr. Stebbins passes from criticising Kuenen to attempting an independent investigation into the age of the Pentateuch, every reference to a passage in Deuteronomy, the Book of the Covenant (Ex. xxi.—xxiii. 19), or, the Prophetic narratives is fearlessly accepted as evidence that the whole Law, as known and enforced by Ezra and Nehemiah, existed at the time when the reference was made. By this style of argument, backed by a good deal of equally valuable "internal evidence," Dr. Stebbins reaches the conclusion that nearly the whole of the Pentateuch was written in the age of Moses.

The publication of such a book is in itself a matter of very small interest or significance. In the long run matters of historical criticism are decided by a select committee of students, and "the public" simply

accepts their conclusions. A book, on a question *adhuc sub judice*, intended "for popular reading" may delay or accelerate the process of public enlightenment, but it will not affect the final result unless it can affect the judgment of students; and we find it difficult to suppose that Dr. Stebbins' work will give students of the Bible cause to reconsider any position assailed, or to feel more secure in any position defended by him. In itself, then, the book in no way merits the long notice we have given it. It is a bad specimen of a bad style of book. Those who agree with its conclusions will, if they are wise, regret its publication more than those who dissent from them. The fact, however, that it has been published by an "ex-Lecturer on Hebrew Literature and Professor of Theology," and at the request of "scholars" and "professors in theological schools," is one which invites more serious consideration than the book deserves on its own account. This must be the excuse for so long a notice.

P. H. W.

THE SYNOD OF ELVIRA.*

"THE City of Elvira for long has been a mere name; its very site is uncertain, matter only of inference and conjecture; and to the world of our own day the Synod to which the city gave its name is hardly more familiar." If this statement is incontestable it will not be amiss to say that Elvira, or Iliberris, was a city of the South of Spain, standing, there is good reason to believe, on the site of the modern Granada, though some place it on the hills four miles away; and that the council of Spanish bishops and clergy called after it met early in the fourth century, "primarily to restore order in the Church of Spain after its disturbance in the recent persecution." Strange that the canons of this council have come down to us without any hint, beyond their own internal evidence, as to the time when it was held; stranger still that historians have differed about the date by no less than five hundred years! Reasonable doubts, however, would seem to contract themselves within the more modest limits of a quarter of a century, and even these limits are still farther reduced by the fact that most writers bring the Synod into more or less intimate connection with the Diocletian persecution. Discarding the authority of almost all the great historians of the Spanish councils, Mr. Dale contends, with convincing force, that the Synod of Elvira must have been held, not during, but after the persecution, and places it accordingly in the early part of 306 A.D. In truth, the canons all through imply times of peace rather than of trouble. Some of them are directed against offences to which there could be no temptation when persecution was

* *The Synod of Elvira and Christian Life in the Fourth Century.* An Historical Essay. By ALFRED WILLIAM WINTERBLOW DALE, M.A. London: Macmillan and Co. 1882.

raging, and if one canon decrees a penalty for non-attendance at church, and another, to the scandal of the devout Catholic, prohibits paintings on the walls of churches, it follows that the Christians must have been, at the time, in quiet possession of their places of worship. Moreover, a principal figure at this council was Hosius, Bishop of Cordova, the statesman of the Church. Now, at no other time than that here assigned, could Hosius have been present. Not earlier, for we have his own testimony that he was a confessor when the persecution took place under Maximian. And not very easily later, for from the accession of Constantine, in July, 806—so we correct Mr. Dale, who (p. 41) inadvertently says 807—he would seem to have been closely absorbed in State affairs as private adviser to the Emperor. Thus the name of Hosius alone might seem to fix the date of the council with tolerable certainty, while in another respect his presence was of marked significance. Mr. Dale at least would have it believed that the convening of the Synod was the result of a policy which even then the far-sighted Churchman was pursuing—that of drawing together the antagonistic powers of Church and State and uniting them in permanent reconciliation. There can be no doubt, at any rate, that it aimed at the unity of the Church, and a uniform system of discipline.

But the chief interest of the decrees of this council lies in their bearings on the life of the time, and it is in this aspect that they are here for the most part discussed. "The fourscore canons of the Synod stereotype in outline a faithful picture of the Spanish Church as it existed in the early years of the fourth century; and although it is the dark and ignoble elements of thought and action that must inevitably preponderate in a representation of this nature, through the shadow and the shame of penal legislation we catch glimpses of a noble ideal, present then in aspiration and hope." It is this outline which Mr. Dale undertakes to fill in, and the picture which he presents to us may be profitably compared with that so powerfully drawn by Mr. Lecky in his *History of European Morals*. If any fault is to be found with Mr. Dale, it is that he is, perhaps, a little reluctant to acknowledge any influences, other than Christian, tending to mitigate the horrors of a time when even professing Christians could think themselves obliged, as State officials, to assist at human sacrifices, when ladies (Christians, too!) sometimes beat their slaves to death, and when there was a continual demand for bloodshed and slaughter. That such things were utterly at variance with the spirit of Christianity will be denied by no one, and the only point of difference can be as to the extent and nature of the influence exercised by the Church in attempting to suppress them. Mr. Dale complains that "Lecky, in his *History of Rationalism*, does scant credit to the exertions of the Church to put an end to these scandalous cruelties;" yet, in his later work, Mr. Lecky distinctly and exclusively ascribes to Christianity "the destruction of the Gladiatorial games" (*European Morals* i. 282). Indeed, on this point, Mr. Dale himself does not utter an altogether certain sound. As a Christian, he would no doubt wish to give all the credit to Christianity. As a Pro-

testant, is he not a little afraid of seeming to ascribe too much to methods which afterwards became identified with Rome? At any rate, he tells us, in regard to the evils of that age and the attempts made by the Synod of Elvira and other Synods to suppress them, that "it was all in vain; the penal law could not reach a disease which lay at the very heart of life, and would yield only to spiritual remedies." Is this, it may be asked, altogether true? The moral evils inherent in the Roman civilisation were not, of course, to be healed in a day, and they gave way at last only before the slow and gradual diffusion of those humaner principles which it will not be denied that Christianity was a chief agent in promoting; but the Church probably did the best that could be done at the time with the means at her disposal, and, after all, the penalties which she enforced—her only weapon was excommunication—were of the kind which are usually called "spiritual." However, we have no inclination to quarrel with Mr. Dale's views, which have evidently been thought out with great care, and are very moderately expressed; and on whatever points we might be inclined to differ from him, we have no hesitation in saying that he has produced an essay of more than ordinary value, and one which well deserves the attention of the historical student.

R. B. D.

DR. VANCE SMITH'S 'TEXTS AND MARGINS OF THE REVISED NEW TESTAMENT.'

THE publication of a second edition, in pamphlet form, of Dr. Vance Smith's useful notes on certain Texts and Margins of the Revised New Testament,* gives us an opportunity of mentioning them here for the benefit of those of our readers who are interested in the doctrinal questions which have been raised in connection with the revisers' work. It would be absurd to suppose that a theological system which has been formed in the course of so many centuries, and considered from every imaginable point of view by scholars and divines, could be upset or materially weakened by the correction of a few passages in the English translation of the original documents. At the same time, so long as those documents are appealed to in support of the popular doctrines of Christianity, it is interesting to see how far and in what way the "proof texts" have been affected by the changes which have been made by a body of picked scholars, and (for the most part) divines of the orthodox school, in either the Greek text or the English translation. The texts in question have been by this time pretty thoroughly discussed, the acceptance or rejection of the new version of them being almost

* *Texts and Margins of the Revised New Testament affecting Theological Doctrine briefly reviewed.* By G. VANCE SMITH, B.A., Theol. and Philos. Doct. Second edition. London: British and Foreign Unitarian Association, 37, Norfolk Street, Strand. 1882.

inevitably affected, to some appreciable extent, by the doctrinal prepossessions of the critic or reader. Dr. Vance Smith does not claim to be absolutely free from bias himself; but the fact that he does not expect to find only the language of his own theology in the words of Evangelist and Apostle, or even of Jesus himself, leaves him comparatively free from the temptation to decide, as a partisan rather than as an impartial judge, on questions of scholarship and criticism. At any rate, we think he has succeeded in making such a fair statement of the points which he discusses as to enable his readers (so far as a popular exposition will do so) to judge the case for themselves. While admitting his own liability to some bias, in spite of his desire to be impartial, he suggests, reasonably enough, that his fellow-members of the company of revisers may not have been absolutely secure from being influenced in certain cases by their theological opinions—a consideration which gives additional significance to such emendations as may be supposed to have gone against the grain and to have been made only under the compulsion of fidelity to their duty as scholars and interpreters. Oddly enough, Canon Cook, in his recently published work, *The Revised Version of the Three Gospels, considered in its Bearings on the Records of our Lord's Words, and the Incidents of His Life*, refers more than once to Dr. Vance Smith's remark as a reflection on the orthodoxy of the revisers, as though he had said that they may have been biased in favour of the readings which have pleased their unorthodox critics, and are condemned by Canon Cook! He speaks of it as "an imputation to be met by indignant repudiation, and refuted by substantial arguments." We are not concerned now to discuss Canon Cook's position, or to see further what he has to say about such of the disputed texts as come within the scope of his special treatise. In our next number we hope that Dr. Vance Smith will himself review Canon Cook's book, which appears to be written in the main to the same effect as the famous articles in the *Quarterly Review*, and Sir Edmund Becket's book which we noticed when it appeared.

Dr. Vance Smith's discussion of the selected texts is intended, not for scholars and experts so much as for ordinary readers, who can appreciate a simple and candid statement of the case. As good instances of his method, we may refer to his remarks, amongst other critical matters, on the marginal reading, "God only begotten," in connection with the doctrine of the Logos, on Phil. ii. 5—7 and the idea of the Divine humiliation, on the two texts translated by the revisers, "our God and Saviour Jesus Christ," on the different suggested renderings of Rom. ix. 5, and on "deliver us from the evil one." Dr. Vance Smith's method and results will not altogether satisfy the partisans of any system, orthodox or heterodox, of what is called, in a thorough-going and exclusive sense, "Scriptural Doctrine." His failure to do so may be reckoned among his credentials, and accepted as a testimony to the candour and common sense which he has brought to a discussion in which those faculties are too often conspicuous by their absence.

MR. BOULGEE'S HISTORY OF CHINA. *

MR. BOULGEE continues the long story he has to tell with the same plodding patience which characterised his first volume. The present instalment carries us down to the end of the eighteenth century, and covers the sixty years' reign of Kanghi, and the equally protracted sovereignty of his yet greater grandson, Keen Lung.

The figure of Keen Lung is unquestionably one of the most remarkable in the history of the world. Ascending the throne at twenty-five, in 1735, he assumed the government of 60,000,000 people: there seems no reason to doubt that the octogenarian Emperor held sway over a population of no less than 800,000,000. The six decades of his rule saw the establishment of a "scientific frontier" along the whole vast line of his western marches. His generals and his soldiers made his name a name of fear, not only to the milder populations further north, but even to the fierce and reckless Ghoorkas of Nepal. It is worth noting, that one of the roots of the hatred of the Chinese mandarin for England lies in the belief that these savage marauders had British support in their wanton assault on the outlying populations of China. Keen Lung in his old age saw the successful achievement of the great scheme for the restraint of the mighty Hoangho within its banks. Like others of the nation's greatest rulers, he found time also for literary pursuits; and it was he who extorted from Voltaire the tribute—

Occupé sans relâche à tous les soins divers,
D'un gouvernement qu'on admire,
Le plus grand potentat. qui soit dans l'univers
Est le meilleur lettré qui soit dans son empire.

We look forward with exceeding interest to Mr. Boulger's third and last volume. No more competent narrator could tell the tale of the relations of the Western nations with China during the present century. We hope and believe that the narrative will be impartially related. In that case assuredly it will carry its moral on its front!

R. A. A.

PROFESSOR BIRKS AND MR. HERBERT SPENCER.

PROFESSOR BIRKS in his lectures on Modern Physical Fatalism,† undertook to refute the doctrines of Evolution as contained in Mr. Herbert Spencer's *First Principles*. It appears that Mr. Spencer, in an

* *History of China*. By DEMETRIUS CHARLES BOULGEE. Vol. II. London: W. H. Allen and Co. 1882.

† *Modern Physical Fatalism and the Doctrine of Evolution*. By THOMAS RANSEN BIRKS, M.A., Prof. of Mor. Phil. Cambridge. Second edition. With a Preface in reply to the *Strictures of Mr. H. Spencer*. By C. PRITCHARD, D.D., F.R.S., Prof. of Astronomy in the University of Cambridge. London: Macmillan. 1882.

Appendix to his book, has dealt rather severely with these Lectures of Professor Birks', charging him with unfairness and misrepresentation, as well as with want of intellectual acumen. The Professor having been prevented by illness from replying, or indeed from knowing anything about Mr. Spencer's strictures, his friend Dr. C. Pritchard has undertaken his defence in some twenty pages prefixed to the new edition. It is generously done, and will serve to bring some of the controverted matters more distinctly before the reader. We confess, however, that Dr. Pritchard seems to us to have been more successful in clearing his friend from the charge of any conscious unfairness, than in vindicating his scientific accuracy of statement or his full appreciation of the matters in dispute.

WE have been obliged, from press of other matter, to postpone several notices of books which should have had place in this number. *Natural Religion*, by the author of *Ecce Homo*, we hope to treat at greater length than would in any case have been possible here, and we shall also have some account to give of Mr. Leslie Stephen's *Science of Ethics*. We have received from America some books, published by Messrs. Houghton, Mifflin and Co., Mr. G. H. Ellis, and Messrs. Roberts Brothers, of Boston. These, with several other volumes which are on our table, must be reserved for future notice.

END OF VOL III.

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