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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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
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
LOUIS N. WILSON, Litt.D.....Clark University

Articles intended for publication, and all correspondence relating to the editorial department of the JOURNAL, should be addressed to Dr. George H. Blakeslee, Clark University, Worcester, Mass.

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Vol. 10

JULY, 1919

No. 1

RECENT POLICY TOWARDS THE NON-CHRISTIAN PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

*By Maximo M. Kalaw, Assistant Professor of Political
Science, University of the Philippines*

One of the strongest objections to the independence of the Philippines has been the so-called non-Christian problem. According to the census estimate of 1918, out of the population of 10,500,000 Filipinos, there are 500,000 inhabitants who belong to the so-called non-Christian tribes. The most numerous of these non-Christian people are the Moros, who inhabit the Sulu Archipelago and certain parts of Mindanao. The Mountain Province and Nueva Vizcaya, in Luzon, contain also non-Christian people. It was predicted that with the establishment of Philippine autonomy these Moros would revive their piratical life and war on their Christian brothers.

Unlike the backward peoples in other parts of the globe, the non-Christian peoples of the Philippines have always received humanitarian treatment from the American government as well as from their Christian brothers. From 1913 to 1916 the non-Christian peoples were under the exclusive control and jurisdiction of the Philippine Commission composed of a majority of Filipinos. Since the passage of the Jones law in 1916, the Philippine legislature, composed entirely of Filipinos, assumed legislative control of the non-Christian tribes. Since 1913, therefore, the representatives of the Christian Filipinos have dictated the policy pursued toward their non-Christian brothers,

and a review of what has been done since that time would give us an insight as to our treatment of the problem.

The Philippine Commission and the Philippine legislature have expressed unequivocally by appropriate legislation their policy towards the non-Christian peoples. Such a policy has for its fundamental objective the establishment and promotion of friendly relations with the non-Christian people of the Philippine Islands and the promotion of their agricultural, industrial and economic development and their advancement in civilization. (See, among others, Acts Nos. 2208, 2404 and 2444.)

Upon the establishment of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes by section 22 of the Jones law, the Philippine legislature on February 20, 1917, enacted Act No. 2674 providing for the operation of the Bureau. That law defines in clear and unequivocal terms the policy of the government towards the non-Christian people as follows:

. . . . to foster by all adequate means and in a systematic, rapid and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social and political development of the regions inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos, always having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between and complete fusion of all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago.

The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision and control over all the non-Christian people, has, consistently with law, adopted the following program of administration with regard to those people:

The advancement of the non-Christian elements of our population to equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants. This is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:

(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of semi-nomadic race are induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in organized communities.

(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.

(c) The extension of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their development and the extension of government control.

(d) Construction of road and trails between one place and another among non-Christians to promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and with the Christian people.

(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.

(f) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in, the fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu.

The foregoing program is for all non-Christians in every part of the Philippines. In 1914 the United States military forces ceased to control the parts of Mindanao and Sulu inhabited by the non-Christians, and these were then created into the Department of Mindanao and Sulu under a civil governor. Philippine constabulary soldiers composed mostly of Filipinos were sent down to keep order. But soldiers are not the main factors of the policy of the civil government. With them went Filipino teachers, doctors, and nurses to preach, in words as well as in deeds, the gospel of brotherhood and civilization. The non-Christian peoples are now being taught and guided to improve their living conditions in order that they may fully appreciate the benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the government to organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities, aid them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse, educate their children, and show them the advantages of leading a civilized life on a par with their more civilized brothers.

To assure the success of the work, the organization and extension of public schools throughout the non-Christian territory has been given special emphasis. Among the Moros of Mindanao and Sulu, as in other parts of the Islands, the first instruction in the English language was given by American soldiers detailed as teachers. The army foresaw the advantages of public schools from a military viewpoint. As early as 1903 primary schools were organized in a few of the principal villages where

Arabic and English were taught. However, in view of the newness of the idea and the distrust of the Moros and other non-Christians, very little progress was made in establishing and maintaining public schools. At the end of the school year 1903-1904, they had an attendance of only 1582 pupils, and by 1913, at the end of the military rule in Mindanao and Sulu, there was an attendance of only 4535. The last five years, in which the Filipinos controlled the legislative policy towards the Moros, the educational progress has been tremendous. The following figures show the average daily attendance and the expenditures for public education for the Moro provinces from 1912 to the present time:

FISCAL YEAR	AVERAGE DAILY ATTENDANCE	EXPENDITURES
1912	3,807	P 93,987.00
1913	4,535	137,069.00
1918	16,114	650,000.00 (estimate)

Act 2531 passed by the Philippine legislature under date of October 26, 1915, gave great impetus to educational work in the non-Christian provinces. This act appropriated the sum of 1,000,000 pesos for expenses of the Bureau of Education necessary for the construction, establishment, organization, and operation of additional free insular primary schools in the territory inhabited by Mohammedans or other non-Christian Filipinos, and to make the necessary provisions for normal training of teachers for said primary schools. This fund was allotted in proportion to the school population, and was used for the purchase of sites, construction of buildings, purchase of equipment, and for current expenses such as salaries and supplies. This million pesos was a direct contribution of the Christian population to their non-Christian brothers; for our non-Christian population is far from being self-supporting, and millions of pesos have to be taken every year from the pockets of the Christian people for the uplift of their backward brothers. This fact must not

be lost sight of in the discussion of the non-Christian problem.

Special effort has been made to so frame the courses of study that they may meet the peculiar needs of each of the non-Christian people. Settlement farm schools have been established to meet the particular needs of more or less nomadic tribes. Boarding schools are established wherever economic conditions demand it. It has been found that the only practical way to reach the non-Christian girls is through dormitory schools. Loom-weaving is being taught to girls in a few schools. The industrial work prescribed for these people, however, has been limited very largely to agriculture for boys and plain sewing for girls.

The number of teachers in the Mountain Province in 1912 was 93. The number of teachers assigned to this work at the present time is 251. The number of teachers in Nueva Vizcaya in 1912 was 64. At the present time there are 87 teachers on duty there. The number of teachers in the Department of Mindanao and Sulu in 1912 was 99. At present there are 783 teachers assigned to this department. A great many of these teachers have come from the Central Luzon Agricultural School, but almost every province in the Philippine Islands is represented. The willingness of these teachers to leave their homes and take up work in the non-Christian provinces is a significant development in education and in the problem of final unification and nationalization of the people of the Philippines. During the past year the attendance in the non-Christian provinces has almost doubled. The schools in the northern part of Luzon and also in Mindanao are fitting boys for farm work by giving them a fundamental knowledge of agriculture and by teaching them how to work. Girls are taught plain sewing so that they may provide their own clothes, and weaving and other minor industries so that they may earn a livelihood.

Side by side with the extension of the public schools is the extension of the public health service. In 1914

the health and school authorities of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu undertook the establishment of combination ~~schools and~~ dispensaries. These institutions, seventeen of which have already been established, are in charge of the School of Nursing of the University of the Philippines. The salaries of the teachers in these combined institutions are paid in equal parts from health and school funds. These institutions are for the most part located in remote communities and make a strong appeal to the non-Christian people. Approximately 30,000 children are treated each year in these dispensaries. In addition to the school dispensaries mentioned above, there are nine special dispensaries maintained wholly by the school department. The teachers in charge of these dispensaries receive a course of instruction in dispensary work at the normal institutes. In order to train teachers for this work, a graduate nurse has been assigned to the Zamboanga Normal School where she is conducting a course for students who are preparing themselves to become teachers. In this connection it must be said that kind treatment and modern medicine have proven greater civilizing factors than bayonets and kragis. The most prominent citizen of the Moro people, Senator Hadji Butu, tells how a physician, Dr. Sixto Orosa, has won the affection of his people. He says:

All the Moros like him; many come from the mountains to ask medicine from him. Before he came they were afraid to drink hospital medicine and to stay in the hospital. But now they have proved that Dr. Orosa's medicines cure quickly and his operations are not painful and the wounds heal in a short time, so they have full confidence in him. All the Datos and Chiefs of Sulu want Dr. Orosa to stay in Jolo all the time, as they regard him with positive affection.

Of no less importance than the public health work is the extension of public works throughout the Mohammedan, Pagan and other non-Christian regions to facilitate their development and the extension of government control. This was a new policy, for during the time that the military authorities controlled Mindanao and Sulu

no permanent road construction of any kind was done, with the exception of the road from Camp Overton to Camp Keithley, ~~into Lanao and~~ connecting the town of Zamboanga with the San Ramon penal colony. As soon as the Christian Filipinos gained control of the legislature a vigorous policy of extending the public works throughout the non-Christian parts of the Islands was begun. Special attention was given to the construction and maintenance of roads and trails, the improvement of ports and landing facilities, the extension and maintenance of telephone lines and a portable water supply, the removal of obstacles to navigation of rivers, and the construction and maintenance of public buildings, especially schools and hospitals. The sub-provinces of Agusan, Bukidnon, Cotabato, Davao, Lanao, Sulu and Zamboanga of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, are all receiving the benefits of this public-works program. It will be only a question of time when they will have just as good roads as the parts inhabited by the Christian Filipinos.

Then we have activities in connection with the natural resources of the non-Christian parts. Graduates of the College of Agriculture are yearly being sent in numbers to teach the Moro people the modern methods of farming. A policy of immigration has been undertaken whereby Christian citizens from the densely populated parts of the Islands may, with government help, immigrate to the fields of Mindanao and Sulu and establish themselves side by side with the non-Christian brothers. For the year 1917 the Philippine legislature appropriated 100,000 pesos

for aid to such inhabitants of the provinces of Luzon and the Visayas as may desire to settle in Mindanao and Sulu, either in order to take advantage of the public-land act by purchasing public land or acquiring the same under the homestead provisions of said act, or for the purpose of taking employment as laborers on private plantations or public works, including propaganda and transportation expenses.

The object of these agricultural colonies was not only the development of the vast fields that have not yet been

touched by the hand of man, but also the amalgamation of Christian and Mohammedan Filipinos. In laying out the plans of these colonies the government saw to it that a Christian Filipino had a Moro for a neighbor. This arrangement was predicted by some as dangerous and ill-advised, but the undertaking is now considered a success even by those who were at first most pessimistic and adverse opponents of the plan. Once more it was proven that Moros and Christian Filipinos can live harmoniously together, for they are in truth citizens of one country and members of one race.

But possibly the most difficult task of the government has been the separation of Church and State in the Moro country and the relinquishment of civil authority by the native chiefs in favor of the agents of the central government. In no other Mohammedan country has this ever been attempted. From time immemorial governmental authority has been exercised by the prelates and clergy of the Mohammedan church in Sulu, Cotabato, Lanao, a large part of Zamboanga, and in those portions of the provinces of Bukidnon and Davao which are inhabited by Mohammedans. Naturally, every feature of the extension of government control with its consequent tendency to reduce the authority and perquisites of the Mohammedan clergy and their patrons, the *datus*, is always made the subject of petition and oral protests, oftentimes couched in the most vigorous and insistent terms, by the people to the authorities. The separation of Church and State, always a complex and delicate undertaking, is a specially difficult matter requiring the exercise of the utmost patience and tact by local officials in our Mohammedan territory. The activities of government control, such as the public land surveys and the implantation of the system of taxation, which are new to our Mohammedan territories, arouse suspicion as to their ulterior objectives.

Yet, despite these serious obstacles which militated against the complete extension and recognition of government authority, the policy of the central government

has been crowned with tremendous success. The Sultan of Sulu has formally renounced his claim to sovereignty over his Mohammedan subjects in favor of the civil government. Peace and public order have been kept in excellent condition as elsewhere in the Archipelago. Colonel Ole Waloe, commanding the constabulary in the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, in a brief memorandum to the Department Secretary dated November 23, 1918, says:

1. As late as 1885, the Spanish Government pardoned Datu Pedro Cuevas and his gang of escaped convicts on condition that they protect the town of Isabela, Basilan, from further attacks from the Joloano and Yakan Moros, notwithstanding the place was at that time protected by an excellent fort.

2. In 1904 the same Datu Cuevas wrote the Governor that he had captured three pirates and, after investigating them, had had them shot.

3. During 1908, no less than six different outlaw bands operated at various times during the year on Basilan in such force and with such daring that it was necessary to send four companies of U. S. Infantry and two companies of constabulary to that island.

4. For the years 1908-1909, thirty-seven outlaws were reported killed, captured and wounded. For 1910-1911, twenty-eight. For 1912-1913, forty. For 1914, twenty-three. For 1915, one, and for 1916-1917, none. This great change from a spirit of outlawry and piracy, coming down from the Spanish regime, to peace and industry, was brought about almost entirely by the sympathetic attitude and friendly interest of the Department Government toward the Moros and Pagan tribes of the province. Force without limit had been used for three hundred years, but apparently with little, if any, permanent results.

5. For the last four years, the number of grave crimes occurring in the province of Zamboanga have been less than those in the Department's most advanced Christian province for the same period.

6. The Moro is no more the blood-thirsty religious fanatic of a few years ago, but is aiding us to a remarkable degree in maintaining law and order. In fact, our success in dealing with Moro outlaws has been due almost entirely to the loyal support and aid we have received from the great majority of the inhabitants of the districts affected. The Moro is industrious and a good farmer to the extent of his agricultural knowledge. He is beginning to see the advantages of education, to have respect for his Christian brother and be more tolerant in his religious views. He is, however, proud of his history and loyal to his religion, but commerce and education are rapidly widening his horizon.

The juramentado is a thing of the past while there has been only one amuck in the province of Zamboanga during the last eighteen years. This misguided being was probably suffering from an attack of temporary insanity, as he imagined that his mother-in-law had administered poison in his food; after brooding over the matter a few days he decided to commit suicide in the old Moro fashion, namely by running amuck.

Contrary to the prediction of the calamity howlers, the Christian Filipino officers of the constabulary have succeeded completely in winning the respect and confidence of the Moro.

7. The Pagan tribes of the province, subanos and Yakans have never been headhunters nor made human sacrifices. On the other hand, they have given very little trouble, except when led on by outside malcontents that took refuge among them when pursued by the law. They are peaceable, industrious farmers and hunters by nature, and, under the present system of governmental supervision, are rapidly taking up homesteads and settling in the low lands. This, of course, is not only of great benefit to themselves, but simplifies the problem of law and order and creates a supply of labor for the future development of the country.

8. The practice of appointing constabulary officers deputy governors in Moro and Pagan districts has not only greatly facilitated the maintenance of law and order in those sections, but has aided us much in our efforts to get the Pagan tribes out of the hills and settled in villages in the low lands. Furthermore, concentration of authority is in line with their notions of government, and it is believed more completely meets their present needs.

The foregoing testimony of an American official is one of the most eloquent proofs of the success of our policy towards the non-Christian tribes.

The Jones law also brought a new era among the non-Christian people. For the first time they were given representation in the national legislature. Seven out of the ninety members of the lower house and two out of the twenty-four members of the senate were to be appointed to represent the non-Christian peoples of the Islands. As a result of this arrangement, three prominent Moros and two Pagans received the appointment. The most conspicuous citizen of the Moro people, Hadji Butu Baki, was appointed senator, and Datu Piang and Datu Benito were appointed representatives. Their appointment was received with great satisfaction by the Moro people,

and for the first time in the history of the Philippine Islands, the Mohammedan Filipinos sat side by side with the Christian Filipinos in the legislative halls to work out the destinies of their common country. Senator Butu and Representatives Benito and Piang were granted the special privilege of taking the oath of office on the Koran. This act of the senate and house of representatives was looked upon by the representative Mohammedans present at the inauguration as assurance of an attitude of religious tolerance and respect on the part of the Christian Filipinos. It was not considered a mere courtesy, but rather a guarantee of non-interference in their religious affairs.

Coincident with the inauguration of the Philippine Congress there were presented significant memorials indicative of the feeling of confidence and love which the Moro people have for their Christian brothers. These memorials were addressed to both houses of the legislature, through the governor-general, signed by the Sultan of Sulu and the most important and influential datus in the Sulu Archipelago, Cotabato, Lanao and Zamboanga Provinces, representing all classes of Mohammedans in Mindanao-Sulu, expressing their gratitude for material benefits and political privileges afforded Mohammedans during the past three years, and also for the liberal appropriations for public schools, health, and public works, and for the representation in both houses of the Philippine legislature granted under the new organic act for the Philippine government. The memorials also expressed the hope that the administration would continue to strengthen the existing close relations between all the people of the Philippine Islands.¹

Such, in brief, has been our policy towards the non-Christian peoples. It is acknowledged by all unbiased observers as a decided success. It is an unprecedented treatment of non-Christian peoples by their more civilized

¹From a recent report by Governor Frank W. Carpenter, of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu.

fellowmen, who by sheer number, strength and superior civilization could, under recognized practices, claim to be the sole owners of the country. You can now travel from one end of the Moro region to the other in safety. The schools have brought the standard of the Moro people nearer that of their Christian brothers. Teachers, doctors and nurses from all over the Islands have carried a message of friendship and love and have established more firmly the national solidarity of Christians and non-Christians than the severest policy of blood and iron would have done. The respect that the Christian Filipinos have shown towards the religion of the Moros has inspired them with renewed confidence. The participation that the Moro people were given in national law-making has bound them closer still to the Christian Filipinos. "We are one in spirit and one in blood," says Senator Hadji Butu.

Upon the establishment of the Philippine Republic the world will certainly find the non-Christian Filipinos as enthusiastic supporters of its independence as their Christian brothers.

CONDITIONS WITHIN ROUMANIA AND TURKEY

By Melvin M. Knight, Ph.D., Member of Roumanian Red Cross Commission

All the nations in the Balkans, excepting Greece, are in bad condition financially—and rather uncertain as to just what their condition is. Turkey is probably the worst off. Silver money is worth exactly its value by weight; and it takes 70 piasters in paper to be worth 20 in silver. Enver Pasha and a small group of satellites, "Young Turks" (usually meaning not Turk at all) most of them, have disappeared with the national treasure. Thus there is practically no bullion basis at all for the currency. Turkey was held out of bankruptcy, before the war, only by the conflicting claims of different nations. The largest creditors, as you know, were England, Germany and France. Even if the Greeks, or some group of powers, should be given a nominal political protectorate over European Turkey and the Straits, there is little doubt as to who would be the real beneficiary of the inevitable foreclosure.

Turkish army discipline is likely to be a little shocking to the sensibilities of the Occidental, until he has become more or less familiar with the customs of southeast Europe in general in this particular. Some soldiers, the overflow from barracks, were quartered in one of the long outside corridors of the Mosque of St. Sophia during my recent visit. One morning I was present while the bastinado was being administered to some culprits. One of the waiting list on a little platform at the side would be ordered down. He would lie on his back, with his shoes removed. Another soldier would grasp his legs just below the knees and hold his feet, bottoms upward, about 3 feet from the floor. The officer would then take a stout stick, about twice the thickness of a man's thumb

and 2 or 2½ feet long, and strike the sole of the foot at intervals of several seconds. This officer strained his muscles; there was a vicious crack about the impact which made one wince, and wonder if the bones would not be broken. One man had eleven strokes, but his stoicism broke down after the seventh, and he cried out at every blow. At the close of the performance, the officer gave a sharp order, and the man had to jump erect on his recently pulped feet and stand at salute. One man did not whimper at all. While he was standing at attention, the officer struck him a hard blow in the face with the flat of his hand. Whether this was because he had not cried out, or whether his was an uncommon breach of discipline, I do not know. Aside from any emotional distaste for such procedure, it raises the question as to the governing capacity of a race which after many hundreds of years must or can handle its subjects in just that way. In spite of all this, it is quite fashionable for those who have spent some time in the Ottoman Empire to vehemently hate the Greeks, Jews and Armenians, and to guard the Turks as the best racial type in the Balkans. The commercial shrewdness and general rascality of these three alien races is certainly beyond debate. There is a saying that it takes two Jews to beat a Greek, and two Greeks to beat an Armenian.

Personally, the difference between the Turkish discipline and the Roumanian is not apparent to me at a glance. Both in their present form are copied from the Prussian, and both "out-Prussia" it. A Roumanian Captain P. was wildly gesticulating in the face of an army chauffeur while he harangued him (or abused him, if you like), in approximately the key of "Q-flat." The soldier was not the ordinary dirty, cringing peasant type. For example, he spoke French with some fluency—an unusual accomplishment for a common soldier. After some minutes of high-keyed questions, the answers to which were not accepted or even allowed to be finished, the soldier would unconsciously break his rigid "attention" position, and use his hands more or less as he talked (Roumanian is a Latinic

language). The Captain would then thrust down the hands and slap him viciously a number of times in the face, accompanied by imprecations. At length, the officer made some threats in evidently highly idiomatic Roumanian, of which I could not even understand the gist, but which immediately reduced the soldier to a cowed and concerned silence. Then the Captain struck him a number of times for not responding with sufficient alacrity, as he had just struck him for beginning answers he was not allowed to finish. Later, I casually asked the officer what sort of punishments they were allowed to administer to soldiers. He seemed surprised at the idea suggested by the French word "permis." He said he might have this fellow thoroughly whipped or, significantly, "perhaps worse." Upset the caste system of such an army for a moment, and its pent-up-hates give you what has been termed "Bolshevism," a term we Westerners have a way of talking much about on a rather slender basis of understanding, perhaps.

If a permanent partition of the territories in this part of the world is now to be made, the one certainty is that the Bulgarians will not get all the territories chiefly inhabited by people of that nationality. The English secret service agents have been very actively trying to eliminate the intellectual disease now popularly called "Pro-Bulgarianism," but called by a very different name ten years ago by English writers. Many English and Americans who visit central Macedonia contract this disease, and must be segregated, as it is quite contagious.

Before the Great War, the Roumanians claimed to be a nation of some fourteen millions of people, if all their people could be given them. Of course, a number of people in any possible division would belong to other races, but it was considered legitimate to claim anything which had 55 per cent Roumanians, or even less, if the other races were numerous, so that there were more Roumanians than any other one nationality. Now, after the war and the typhus epidemics, it was surprising to find that the Roumanians have become a race of *nineteen* millions. Such regions as the Banat, which doubtless contains some Roumanians, are not sub-

ject to debate (by either side). This territory, for example, is *absolutely* necessary, we are assured, because it alone would establish a logical frontier, and because it contains valuable iron works.

I wish first to make a rough sketch of economic conditions here, and then to make a few remarks on the political situation. Some goods are now coming in and the prices of the lightest articles of a nature to be easily transported have been considerably modified. A good pair of shoes is still worth 400 or 500 lei (the lei is equivalent to a franc in normal times), and only a short time ago they were worth 1000. During the winter just closed, good second-hand overcoats sold as high as 2000 francs, and even higher. New ones were unobtainable. The prices of other clothes were pretty much in proportion. One must be rich to have proper clothing, in a climate similar to that of New York.

Food prices were quite as bad, and have not changed very much yet. Flour until American imports began to come in, was almost out of the market, entirely so for the poor. Tea, the great national mild drink, was 280 lei the kilo; sugar 50 lei, and corn meal from 6 or 7 to 15 depending upon the locality. People made huge fortunes out of these things, speculating on the necessities of the starving. Of course, the government passed regulations. But if you pass a law that sugar can sell for no more than 11 or 12 francs the kilo, the big dealer, a friend of some minister or other, will sell at the fixed price to a number of his friends, collecting large "tips" for the privilege of buying so cheaply. When the article finally gets to the poor consumer, it is 35 or 40 lei after all.

The government controls all the transportation, means for which are very scarce. Of 1400 locomotives before the war, only a little over 100 are now in condition to run, and many of these are very poor. The Germans are roundly cursed for this situation, in order to keep the poor quiet, while the friends of the Government wax fabulously rich on the monopoly thereby created. The members of the Government grant permits to transport

only to their "friends" who either use the permits to haul things from where they are cheap to where they are high priced, or sell the precious permissions outright to speculators. The result is fortunes for the government's friends, plenty to eat and wear for those able to pay, and the most wretched want for the nation at large.

A few ordinary grafters have been skimming the cream off the market. Thread sold until a week or two ago at \$2 and \$3 per spool. Every Roumanian ship which docked carried one or two people, officers, couriers, etc., who managed to slip enough of such articles to make a few thousands of francs profit. The French rushed "relief" to the Roumanians—doubtless in response to the call of their Commercial Bureau here. This relief took the form of perfumes and silk stockings (!) which were sold to the rich at prices the writer fears to report, as he certainly would not be believed. The papers now tell us that the French are going to open a similar "Commercial Bureau" in Bulgaria, to let French traders know where the largest profits are to be made. So far, the Americans seem to be the only people with any idea at all of relief proper—regardless of the money to be made. And even at this, the French are openly hostile to us—for spoiling the market for the French profiteers on wartime starvation conditions. If we had never done anything for France along the same lines, the breath of their ingratitude would not be so keen.

There is a real dearth of materials in Roumania, and the Food Commission, distinctly an American institution in all its functions, is doing a wonderful piece of work. Only this morning, I met a Lieutenant Commander who had just docked three American flour ships at Constanza, bearing 24,000 tons of that precious material. But there is no doubt, in spite of all the energy and efficiency of the American officers, that a great deal of speculation in American flour is going on. Moreover, there are some supplies in the country, at reasonable prices, but only the friends of officials can get permission to transport them to the cities—at several hundred per cent profit.

The trouble is, in a nutshell, that the whole fabric of control is rotten from top to bottom, and from center to circumference. "Blacksheesh" the Turkish expression for anything from a tip to a sure enough bribe, is everywhere current; and there is no dearth of what in English we call plain thieving. The Mayor of B., a Roumanian port town, asked the commanding officer of a British war vessel for 100 tons of coal to enable him to open the schools. It was granted at once. The schools did not open, however, and an investigation showed that the coal had been sold on the market to a speculator. The mayor of another port town made a similar request. Warned by the experience of his colleague, this Britisher immediately assented, but stated that he would deliver the coal at the school buildings in small installments, as needed. That was the last he heard of it—there was no lump graft to be made in that way!

The former American Red Cross Commission to Roumania distributed only a part of its supplies before leaving. The remainder were left for the Roumanian Red Cross, but under the special charge of a Russian Colonel V—as thorough a scoundrel as ever walked upright. He was copiously decorated for the magnificent way in which he gave away these supplies—to his friends and to such Roumanian dignitaries as had to be hushed up. Some American army officers tried to get hold of about a dozen, out of the tens of thousands of cakes of "Ivory" soap left behind for distribution. They could not be bought or borrowed under any circumstances. Yet when the officers dined at Russian or Roumanian barracks, or the houses of the rich, they washed with Ivory soap. When the British Red Cross left, they turned over a large quantity of good toilet soaps, many of them medicated, to officials of the Roumanian Red Cross, who immediately sold them for 5 or 6 francs the cake, ostensibly because too good to give to the poor—though no kind of soap could be had for less.

Tailor shops in Jassi were overwhelmed with Russian officers wishing overcoats made out of American blankets.

Red Cross pajamas and all sorts of supplies were for sale in the open market—the richer women bought them and had them made over into clothing of various kinds. Several wagon-loads of these supplies showed up only a few days ago in Bucarest! There will be no such promiscuous stealing as this from the present Commission, but there is no way under heaven to prevent thefts amounting to thousands of francs. The only safe way to ship automobiles is with a guard; which is not very practicable, because it often takes a freight car a week to travel a hundred miles, when it is supposed to be rushed. The next best thing is to remove everything removable, and fasten all the tires on with padlocks and chains. Spark-plugs, floor-boards, even magnetos are likely to be removed; we had a big square of leather cut from the upholstery of one automobile. Of 239 cases, containing 120 pairs each of American shoes, three cases came completely empty. The total number of good American shoes stolen, if they are put on the market in Roumania, will probably bring 25,000 francs or more. Two Roumanian army chauffeurs who work for the Red Cross insisted on helping me change a spark-plug—and within five minutes one or the other had stolen a pair of side-cutting pliers out of the tool case.

The general trouble is that Roumania is a feudal aristocracy, decades behind Western Europe, and not in the same path of development at all as America. All the nasty things we used to say about French civilization before the war are true here, raised to the *nth* power. In feudal aristocracies generally, I believe, the common man has no rights, and the ruling classes no integrity. Yet there are still possibilities from the working and peasant classes. If Roumania could get a decent government and a quasi-modern industrial system, she might yet develop a democracy. The figure of illiteracy usually given, 60 per cent, is much too high. The older age-classes, almost entirely illiterate, have been decimated during the war and epidemics. Ten years from now, there should be comparatively few illiterates in the country. Those in the saddle rave about "Bolshevism," as though

only the dregs of the population were against them. As a matter of fact, it is the producing classes of the country who are most restive. They want a chance to work for living wages, a necessary part of which scheme is, of course, the power to buy the necessities of life at prices they can stand, without the addition of several hundred per cent of graft, with the connivance of the small class which has gotten control of the country, who are living like princes and waxing rich while the workers starve. Stealing is no essential part of these poor people's idea of justice, but only a substitute for it when justice is unobtainable.

The banking system of the country is a tool of the government, and almost a close-corporation for looting the nation at large. The Banca Nationala is theoretically a state bank. In practice, it is a private institution, doing the state business for the private profit of the members of the government and their friends. Its stockholders are the members of the so-called "Liberal" party. All government loans are emitted through this institution.

Next down in the hierarchy is the Banca Romanesca, a private institution. Until recently, it was supposed to be directed by a man named Stefanescu. It is now known that it is really run by Vintili Bratiano, brother of the Prime Minister. The chain of banks runs on down, the larger holding stock in the smaller institutions, much like some of our American syndicates. If a deal is too shady for the big one, it is passed on down to one of suitable size, so that the same men get the profits without any open scandal rubbing off on their skirts. These institutions are given all sorts of privileges, amounting to commercial monopolies in a country where an inadequate amount of transport facilities is all in the control of the government. American and British firms could be easily induced to bring in the medical and other supplies so direly needed at this time, at reasonable profits. But in that case, the "Ring" could not get the amazing profits they now enjoy, so the permissions cannot be secured.

I will end this digest of the situation with a few words about the new land act and the currency. At the time of

the Battle of Marasesti in 1917, the army officials made some more or less definite promises about free land to soldiers after the war. Subsequently, the government issued from Jassi, the temporary capital, a sort of manifesto, promising a fairer distribution of the land. The previous history of the old distribution would be too long even to summarize here. It is a long series of peasant uprisings, of pure nostrums applied to a cancer. A few men hold most of the land in the country, and there are tremendous tracts of State, Crown and institutional lands. The actual tillers of the soil have practically nothing, and have been crushed down by their feudal lords for so many centuries that they do not even know what human rights mean.

In the fall of 1918, when the dynasty itself was tottering, a law was finally published, whereby something over 6,000,000 of acres of arable Crown, State and private lands were to pass to peasant proprietors by March, 1919. No single proprietor could hold more than about 500 acres in the future. The land was to be classified—put into three categories according to its value and for what it was suited. There were no decent survey maps, and the peasants could not be trifled with any longer, so it was decided to evaluate according to rent paid—the valuation being roughly fixed at twenty times the rent. The previous proprietors are to be compensated through an issue of government bonds, and the peasants are to reimburse the government during a period of ten years—perhaps more, in cases where obviously necessary. The bonds net the old proprietors 5 per cent interest until they fall due.

This is not a bad thing for some of the peasants. If they merely pay double rent for ten years, they are getting the land at half its assessed value (since they would have to pay the rent anyway) and besides have the privilege of paying it out on time. But the Act has already been the bone of some of the bitterest contentions. It will yet be fought to a finish by the old proprietors before it is finally consummated. Some of their arguments

are palpably specious and others have more than a germ of truth in them.

One of their sound contentions is that the rents are based on the pre-war rate of exchange for Roumanian money (1 lei = 1 franc, French). But since the Germans issued millions on the basis of gold deposited in Berlin, which already served as the basis for the old currency, and since the Russians confiscated the treasure in Moscow, nobody knows what the actual gold value of the large present supply of money is. It depends on the indemnity collected from the Germans, and upon the general economic resurrection of the country. Only a few weeks ago, the French franc exchanged for only 1.90 to 2 lei. Then it suddenly jumped to 2.10 and 2.20. Now that trains are running to Paris, merchants are very anxious to bring in goods on which there is a very rich profit. Thus they bid up French currency, and other currency which exchanges at fixed prices in Paris, to take with them to buy goods. Other factors may also have been at work to push the exchange down to 2.40 and 2.50 lei per franc. When we arrived a month ago, an American dollar would exchange for a little better than 11 lei—today I exchanged at the rate of 14. The chief industries, like petroleum, which might export abroad and create credits, are tied up for lack of machinery, export facilities such as cars, engines and ships, and clothing and food for the workers. Only about a fourth of a winter wheat crop was sown because of the lack of draft animals, of seed, and because of the uncertainty created by the new land act. The one-fourth will feed the country, but the three-fourths represents the grain normally exported.

Hence, any present valuation of the land in Roumanian money amounts to a little over a third of its value in normal times. So the proprietors of the land are to be reimbursed in "land bonds" by the government at once, at about two-fifths the gold value of the land before the war. With the increasing value of the money, the peasants may be able to threaten the government into reducing the payments, but this will not help the original holders any;

and there will be so many of these bonds in the country as to render negotiating them at anything like face value out of the question.

Many proprietors claim that there are not peasant buyers for all their land, and that the tracts taken away from them will not be used for some time. Moreover, they claim that the supply of available labor will be entirely dissipated by giving the peasants lands of their own, so that the large holders will not be able to plant even the small fraction remaining. There is the usual argument that the peasants are shiftless and lazy, and the much sounder one that the absolutely necessary animals and machinery can only be brought in with financial credits which would be well-nigh impossible to handle in small dribblets.

Meanwhile, the peasants have their own grievances and complaints. It is obvious to them that there is an insufficiency of seed, of food and clothing, of animals and machinery. The government sent many horses out into the country districts during the winter to be cared for, since they would have starved in the cities (to see dead horses, mere heaps of bones through lack of nourishment, on the streets of the city of Bucarest is an everyday occurrence). The peasants supposed they were to be allowed the use of these army horses for the spring planting. Whether because of the threatening military situation, I do not know, but the government has recently ordered the return of all these horses by the peasants to the army. There is much muttering of the industrial populations of the town. Officials must grant exorbitant wage demands and wink at all sorts of thefts. The price of unloading cargoes from ships before the war was four or five lei per ton. At Galatz the workers recently went on strike for *eighty*.

The present government is the victim of the hopeless economic conditions as well as of its own corruption and inefficiency. With prices and conditions as they are, the present incumbents would have no hope of reelection. Marghiloman, the Anti-Russian who forboded all the

disasters of the war, was minister during the German occupation. A temporary government under General Coanda succeeded him, giving way in turn to the present "Liberal" party government. A new election was to have taken place in January, under the new universal suffrage act for old Roumania and Bessarabia. This was put off by the government until March, now until May, and will doubtless then be postponed at least until July, when the new harvest will make the situation more tolerable and the present government will have some chance of re-election. The question is, will the lid stay down that long? With wars and rumors of war, with an uncertain international situation, and the perennial possibility that the settlement will not be all that might be desired, will not some one of a dozen likely events set off the fireworks?

One well-known American traveler already rather facetiously remarked that our present American Red Cross expedition was to bolster up a rotten government and prevent a much-needed revolution. There is always the likelihood that a disturbance will be started on such a large scale that the government will disappear like a soap bubble—something like Charles the Tenth's Government of 1830, which died, to quote the old pun "of no complaint at all—everybody satisfied." Certain it is that many government people who are supporting us are doing so only because it strengthens their own hands—and will do so only in proportion as it does strengthen their hands. They wish us to place our relief stations in the politically rather than economically critical spots.

As a strenuous democrat (no party affiliation is intended), I personally object to in any way impeding the final disappearance of the feudal baron in whatever form. Yet I recognize that some people are to be helped, in spite of the general economic situation, and the condition of the working classes which makes destitution faster than any human agency can relieve it. This is Roumania today. Every cargo of supplies which comes into the country does relieve the situation somewhat—even what is stolen takes buyers out of the market and thus reduces prices

by reducing demand. With a grand total of about 3000 tons of supplies, we must first feed probably a hundred mouths (counting our total personnel, American and otherwise) for several months, and we shall buy much scarce merchandise in the local markets. Yet with the remainder we shall do some good. Not much, perhaps, compared with a Food Commission which can bring in 24,000 tons in a single day, but some.

The most hopeful thing I have yet seen as concerns our work is the campaign for second-hand clothing, now in progress in America, to be gathered by the Red Cross and transported by the Food Commission. This will be a truly great thing, if a few thousands of tons can be brought in. If you could only see the barefooted people in the city and in the country this raw March day, with nothing but tatters to protect them from the wet wind, you would understand what I mean.

Has this disjointed tale a moral? We Americans and Rudyard Kipling differ from Voltaire and Anatole France in supposing that there must always be a moral. If such indeed there be, it must be this: European civilization looks more like ours on the surface than it does under the shell.

AMERICANIZATION FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF YOUNG ASIA

*By Professor Benoy Kumar Sarkar, Member of National
Council of Education, Bengal, India*

I. THE RACE-PROBLEM OF THE NEW WORLD

To the student of economic history and sociology the immigration problem of North and South America is of profound scientific interest. For, the peopling of the New Hemisphere by the children of the Old World since the days of Columbus and the Pilgrim Fathers is but the latest stage of the same world-movement of which the previous phases are embodied in the settlement of Celtic and Roman Europe by the Franks, Goths, Vandals, Huns, Angles, and Saxons, or the still earlier colonizing of ancient Eur-Asia by the members of the Indo-Germanic (Aryan) family, viz., Greeks, Romans, Persians, Hindus, etc., or the valley of the Hwang-ho by the Scythians (Tartars) of Central Asia, the Mesopotamian Doab by the Dravidians of Southern India, and the "gift of the Nile" by the pharaonic invaders from the hills of Nubia and Eastern Africa.

The problem of race-fusion in present-day America is essentially identical with the race-problems in other ages and climes. There are, however, two significant differences. In the first place, what has been accomplished in Asia and Europe through centuries and even millenniums is being effected in America in generations, if not in decades. And in the second place, the solution of the problem is being attempted in the New World much more consciously than in the Old, thanks to the cumulative experience of humanity, and thanks to the marvelous power with which modern science has endowed mankind to conduct experiments, to forecast the future, to select the desirables, to reject the undesirables.

It is this conscious and deliberate creation of new men

and women out of the old human material within the shortest possible time that imparts to the American phase of the age-long process of race-mobilizations a distinctive character; and this is the function of Americanization.

The problem may be easily stated. The New World must derive its raw flesh and blood from the Old. The object, however, is neither to relieve Europe and Asia of their over-population and poverty, nor as the idealists would assert, to afford the scum of humanity a chance to rise in the scale of civilization. These, no doubt, are the "by-products" of immigration. But first and last, the aim must be national, i.e., to serve "America first." The considerations that should count most are: first, to have an adequate supply of hands for the farms, factories, forests and mines of America; secondly, to build up communities of men and women who could enrich in diverse ways the social and intellectual make-up of American life, and last but not least, to create a body of citizens with whom loyalty to America in times of distress and war would be but a second nature. These are the foundations of the minimum program of Americanization that lies before the educators, social workers and political leaders of the United States.

II. AMERICA'S ULTIMATUM TO ASIA

So far as the Americanization of immigrants from Asia is concerned the problem has ceased to exist. The New Worlders do not want to Americanize the Asian laborers. The men, women and children of the Orient have been postulated to be "unassimilable" before anything was attempted in the way of "adopting," naturalizing, assimilating or amalgamating them.

The question has now practically been closed by treaties and legislation. To a certain extent the attitude of the employers of labor was different from that of the laborers. But, on the whole, the verdict of the United States as of Canada was the exclusion of Asian labor-force from the right of setting foot on the soil of the New Hemisphere. And so America has finally declared herself to be a forbidden land to the Oriental peoples.

The closing of Canada¹ to the laborers of Asia has been effected: (1) by the Chinese Exclusion Law of 1903-1908, which demands of every immigrant of the Chinese race a landing tax of \$500; (2) by the informal Japanese-Canadian agreement (1907), which limits Japanese immigrants in Canada to 400 persons a year, and (3) by the landing-tax of \$200 on every Hindu immigrant, as well as by the regulation (1910) of "continuous journey" from India (a prohibitive ruling because there is no *direct* steamship route between India and Canada).

The United States has been closed² to Asian labor by the following measures: (1) The Chinese Exclusion Law of 1904, which re-enacted without limitation, modification or condition all the previous suspension or restriction laws relating to the immigration of laborers, skilled or unskilled, from China; (2) the "gentlemen's agreement" of 1907, which Japan has bound herself to grant passports to no laborers except such as are "former residents, parents, wives or children of residents," and "settled agriculturists;" and (3) the sweepingly restrictive Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, which has unconditionally forbidden the immigration of laborers from Asia (*minus* China and Japan, provided against separately) by latitude and longitude.

In the policy of exclusion the United States has thus been less indirect and more thorough than her northern neighbour. And this has allayed the unrest of labor-unions and their journalists and politicians. It is obvious, however, that the employers of labor have been considerably hurt by these measures, for they have been deprived of manpower especially at a time when labor shortage is being felt on all sides because of the demand of the Great War for "human bullets."

But this apparently satisfactory "settlement" of the Oriental question is so drastic, inhuman, discriminative (and hence unjust) that it bids fair to be the most acute

¹ The Immigration Situation in Other Countries, pp. 61-75, in the *Report of the Immigration Commission Series* (Washington, D. C.).

² Hall: *Immigration*, pp. 327-335; Millis: *The Japanese Problem in the United States*, p. 277.

disturber of the world's peace in the coming decades. It is America's *ultimatum* to the Orient. The problem has thus passed beyond the limits of a merely local labor-legislation or "domestic" industrial dispute into the arena of international politics. For, the present situation is virtually a standing challenge to Young Asia to venture on opening the doors of America in the same manner in which China and Japan were opened by the Eur-Americans during the middle of the nineteenth century. This affront is constantly provoking the humiliated and embittered Asians to demonstrate to the world that the edge of the Damascus blades has not been dulled for good.

III. THE ORIENTAL FACTOR IN THE IMMIGRANT POPULATION

During the period from July 1900 to March 1909 Canada admitted altogether 1,244,597 immigrants of all nationalities. The Oriental element in the immigration between 1901 and 1909 is represented by the following figures: Chinese, 3,890; Hindu, 5,185; Japanese, 12,420. The number of Asians during this period was thus only 21,495, i.e. about one fifty-eighth or less than 2 per cent of the total arrivals.³

The present immigrant population of the United States, is, roughly speaking 34,000,000 (adults 15,000,000, children 19,000,000). This is about one-third of the total population (whites and negroes). Of this the number of foreign-born whites over twenty-one who cannot speak English is approximately 3,000,000.

The Asian factor in the immigration that has produced this vast foreign population is infinitesimally small. It was less than 3 per cent in 1910. Even at its height (between 1871 and 1880) it was less than 6 per cent. The total arrival from entire Asia between 1821 and 1903 amounted to 421,190, i.e. 2.06 per cent of the whole immigration.⁴ The percentages of Asian immigration (including 100,000 Levantines of Turkey in Asia, Syrians, Armenians, Arabs and Turks) on the basis of the total

³ *Immigration Situation in Other Countries*, p. 52.

⁴ Hall: 342.

admitted from all races are given in the following schedule from the *Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration* (1906):

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	TOTAL ALL RACES	CHINA	ALL ASIA
		per cent	per cent
1861-1870	2,377,279	2.7	2.8
1871-1880	2,812,191	4.4	5.4
1881-1890	5,246,613	1.2	1.3
1891-1900	3,687,564	0.4	1.9
1901-1905	3,833,076	0.33	3.0

From 1901 to 1910 the total arrival was 8,795,386. Of this only 243,567, i.e., about 2.7 per cent represented the immigration from all Asia. According to the *Thirteenth Census of the United States* (vol. i, p. 781) the Asia-born population in 1910 was counted at 191,484 and the Europe-born at 11,791,841. Asia furnished 1.4 per cent of the foreign-born population and Europe 87.2 per cent. For 1900 the figure for Asia had been 120,248 and for Europe 8,871,780, and the percentages 1.2 per cent and 85.8 per cent respectively.

Let us study the figures in detail and by race. The number of Hindu laborers in the United States was never large. In 1909 the figure was 337, in 1909-10, 1782. In 1913 the entire bulk of Hindus ('immigrants' proper as well as merchants, students and travellers) amounted to about 5000 persons. From 1911 to 1916 the total arrivals gave the figure 1372. The following statistics speak for previous years: 1906, 271; 1907, 1,072; 1908, 1,710.

The Hindu element in the Asian immigration did not rise to conspicuous proportions, and since the mobilization of labor from India to the United States began as late as 1906 it could not influence American conditions to any appreciable extent. The legislation of 1917 has disposed of the Hindu laborers before they became a real "problem."⁸

In 1910 Japanese in the United States numbered 72,157, and in 1913 about 95,000. The immigration down to

⁸ *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (1916), pp. 106-107; Jenks: *The Immigration Problem*, p. 253.

1898 never comprised batches of more than 2000 a year. From 1891 to 1900 the total arrival was 26,855 and from 1901 to 1910 129,797. The movement began practically in 1885 when emigration was first legalized by Japan. It is well known that from 1638 to 1868 the Japanese government did not allow any of its citizens to cross the "dark waters" under penalty of death.⁶

Chinese immigration was longer in duration and larger in volume than Japanese or Hindu. But it never rose as high as 5 per cent of the total immigration. The number of Chinese in the United States never reached 150,000 at any one time, and only once rose above 110,000. During the thirty-two years of "free" immigration (1848-1880) the number of immigrants from China never rose above 20,000 a year, nor averaged for any decade more than 14,000 per year. From the first Exclusion Act of 1882 the arrival down to 1910 was 105,482. From 1820 to 1910 China's contribution totaled 334,426. Deducting the departures, the number of Chinese in the United States in 1910 was 73,531, and in 1916 about 60,000.⁷

But from 1881 to 1910 a portion of the "new immigration" (i.e., that from Southern and Eastern Europe) amounted to over eight millions and a half: Austro-Hungarians, 3,096,032; Italians, 3,008,920; Russians, 2,456,097. The volume was thus more than 81 times that from China for the same period. For 1899-1908 the total Slavic immigration alone was 1,687,199, i.e., about sixteen times the Chinese immigration of three decades. During one decade 1891-1900 Russia alone supplied to the United States 593,703, i.e., about double the number that China contributed in ninety years (1820-1910). From 1901 to 1910 the "new immigration" was measured at 65.9 per cent of the total arrivals in the United States. The percentage has been steadily on the increase. It was about 75 per cent at the beginning of the Great War (1914).⁸

⁶ Steiner: *The Japanese Invasion*, pp. 17-19; Mills, p. 2.

⁷ Mary Coolidge: *Chinese Immigration*, pp. 424-427, 500; Gulick: *American Democracy and Asiatic Citizenship*, p. 138-139.

⁸ Roberts: *The New Immigration*, p. 362; Balch: *Our Slavic Fellow Citizens*, p. 461.

IV. THE BASIS OF DISCRIMINATION

It is evident that the waves of Asian invasion did not assume any formidable magnitude. And yet prohibitive special legislation has been enacted by America to put an absolute stop to the tide of immigration from China, Japan and India. It is evident also that the United States has no objection to supplying its labor market with men, women and children from the villages of Portugal, Spain, Sicily, South Italy, Greece, the Balkans, Galicia, Bohemia, Lithuania and Russia, not to speak of the northern countries of Teutonic Europe.

Is there anything in the causes of migration that tempts America to be more favorable to Europe than to Asia? The point would be clear if we analyze the forces behind the mobilization of labor.

The historic migrations of ancient and medieval times took the form chiefly of military usurpations, political annexations, tribal settlements, or racial "colonizings." The Aryan immigrations into Greece and India, the Tartar invasions of China, and the "barbarian" inroads into the Roman Empire are instances of such mobilizations of warrior hordes seeking "a local habitation and a name." The processes by which the Red-Indians, the Aztecs and the Incas were exterminated by the Christians of the colonial period in order to make room for the races of the Old World are likewise of the same category. But surely the immigration into Canada, the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, etc., during the last 150 years is not at all of that warlike character.

There is a vague idea abroad that America has been peopled by the political refugees, liberators and revolutionaries, who found autocratic and conservative Europe too hot for their propaganda. It is also thoughtlessly believed sometimes that the New World has enlarged its numbers mainly by granting asylum to the men and women who escape from the religious persecution and horrors of intolerance rampant on the other side of the Atlantic. The political disturbances, in Europe, of 1830 and 1848, and

the earlier Puritan and Huguenot revolutions have no doubt influenced the American population both in quality and quantity. But, as a rule, both these notions are statistically untenable. In recent years especially, except in the case of a certain number of Jews and Poles (and this again for very limited periods) political and religious oppression may be practically ignored as a source of emigration from Europe. Besides, the Lafayettes, the Kosciuskos, the Frederick Lists, the Kossuths, those apostles of freedom and emancipators of subject peoples, belong to the intellectual middle class; and even though temporarily ill-financed and impoverished they are not counted among that immigrant mass which has to be handled at Ellis Island and Angell Island.

There is but one grand cause of the movements *en masse* from one land to another; and that is economic, the pressure of population on the means of subsistence. This Malthusian motive underlies even the earlier migrations of a military character by which Asia, Europe and Colonial America were settled during different periods of history. It is *the* force, the greatest single cause, that has impelled Europe in the nineteenth century and after to unburden herself of her teeming millions and send them forth as seekers of gold dust to the mines, oilfields, ranches and workshops of the Eldorado of the world. It is the same economic urge that is pushing Asia to expand beyond her geographical confines and found a Greater Asia on the under-peopled banks of the Amazon and the Mississippi.

The New Worlders have chosen to be hospitable to the hungry folks from Europe, but when Asia is at the door crying for bread they have grimly determined to offer only stones. Of course they are perfectly within their rights when they manipulate their turnpikes according to their own discrimination, admitting some, refusing others. With their machine-guns, air-planes, "tanks," and submarines, and now militarized and navalized as they are to the *n*th term of their man-power, they are not certainly in the plight of the original inhabitants of America, the Peruvians or Mexicans; and presumably they do not fear the appearance of

Pizarro or Cortez from the Asia of the twentieth century. But as the project of world's peace on permanent foundations is emphatically proclaimed from house-tops in these days, Young Asia deems it within its province to argue out the basis of discrimination on which America has embarked upon the exclusion of Orientals.

In what respects, then, are the laborers of the Orient less desirable as prospective American workmen and citizens than the immigrants from Europe? Are the conditions of American agriculture, manufacture and transportation more peculiarly suited to the habits of life, "genius" and temperament of the European masses than to those of the Asian laboring classes? Can the native and long-naturalized laborers of America point to a single economic or social feature in which, say, the Slavs or Latins of Eastern and Southern Europe are, *under natural conditions* more conveniently situated with regard to the domicile in the United States than the Caucasian (Aryan) Hindus,* Mongolo-Tartar, Chinese, and Malaya-Mongoloid Japanese? These are the interpellations by Young Asia that await answer from the economists, ethnologists, labor-protagonists and legislators of America. And the same queries may be legitimately raised by the American capitalists and employer classes in their stand against the labor-view of the Oriental immigration.

V. ASIANS VS. LATINS AND SLAVS

We would, therefore, make out a qualitative inventory of the stuff that the United States is anxious to Americanize.

Among the "new immigrants" in American industries, on the average, 74.8 per cent could not read and write. According to the *Abstract of Immigration Commission's Report* (1907-1910) on "Immigrants in Manufacture and Mining" (p. 211) 91 per cent were illiterates among Magyars, 87.5 per cent among Slovenians, 84.4 per cent among

* "Pure-blood Hindus belong ethnically to the Caucasian or white race and in several instances have been officially declared to be white by the United States Courts in naturalization proceedings." *United States Census* (1910), vol. i, p. 128.

Slovaks, 82.6 per cent among Roumanians, 80.5 per cent among Greeks, 79.9 per cent among Polish, 78.1 per cent among Bulgarians, 77.3 per cent among Lithuanians, 74.5 per cent among Russians, 71.3 per cent among Serbians, 70.9 per cent among Croatians, 67.5 per cent among South Italians, 65.8 per cent among Syrians, and 47.5 per cent among Portuguese.¹⁰

What, now, is the tradition of economic life to which these immigrants had been used for centuries in southern and eastern Europe? As a rule, the Jews constituted the middle class in their European homes. They had been more urban than rural, as Joseph points out in the *Jewish Immigration to the United States*, and had possessed almost a monopolistic control over the industry commerce, and banking of the communities. The rest of the "new immigration," however, has invariably consisted in the main of the peasant classes, agricultural hands and unskilled laborers.

The cultivators of Russia, Roumania or Galicia had never heard of steamgang-plows that break up a hundred acres in a day or two. Theirs were the implements that the Babylonians had worked with millenniums ago, and that have been partially displaced only yesterday by the "industrial revolution" in the more advanced countries of the world. Czechs, Slovaks and Serbs used wooden utensils in the stall and the house. Their technology furnished them only with the primitive fork, rake and plough. In their estimation human labor was cheaper than any labor-saving instrument. It could be had, in fact, almost for nothing. Clark mentions in the *Old Homes of New Americans* the story of a Bohemian peasant who condemned the extravagance of a farmer because of his erecting a fence around his pasture instead of having a man to watch his sheep and a girl to watch his geese. The economic life under the most favorable circumstances was not unlike that of the "peasant proprietors" described by Arthur Young in the eighteenth century. There was "variety of work," as Professor Emily

¹⁰ Roberts: 3.70. According to the *United States Census* (1910), vol. i. (p. 1186) the illiteracy of Chinese in the United States was 15.8 per cent, and that of Japanese 9.2 per cent.

Balch observes in *Our Slavic Fellow-citizens*, employment indoors alternating with field work. Men, women and children "coöperated" in the tending of chickens, geese and ducks in the perspective of "gardens with their rows of tall sunflowers and poppies."

The primitivism in husbandry might at its best suggest indeed of Theocritean idylls. But one must not miss the dark cloud in the silver lining. These arcadias were nests of appalling poverty. Lord noticed in Italy the proverbial destitution of the famished Irishman, thousands of weary straw-plaiters earning "four cents a day," and thousand others who dip in the water of a spring or rivulet a handful of leaves or a few fresh beanpods to be eaten as salad with their dry hard bread.¹¹ And the Greek peasant, as Professor Ross puts it so graphically in *The Old World in the New*,¹² lived on greens fried in olive oil, ate "meat three times a year," and kept "without noticing it the 150 fasting days in the Greek calendar." The cooking of Austro-Hungarian Slavs was done in earthenware vessels over primitive ovens, and their houses were furnished with products of the spinning wheel, needle and dyepot. The standard of life governing such communities is obvious. It was mud floors, vegetarianism (not the cult of faddists, of course, but the virtue of a necessity), no underwear.

The village was the center of their social existence; their outlook embraced only the petty concerns of the neighbourhood. Civic sense was the furthest removed from their consciousness. "When the Italian pays his 2 or 3 per cent to the government, he says: it has gone to the king."¹³ Servility was ingrained in their physiology. The Slav peasant automatically took off his cap to those dressed like gentle-folk, known or unknown.¹⁴ Individuality was not dreamed of in domestic life. Among the Croatians the young men and women were not accustomed to choosing their mates for themselves, the marriage being arranged

¹¹ *The Italian in America*, p. 235.

¹² Page 183.

¹³ *Brandenburgh Imported Americans*, p. 53.

¹⁴ Balch: p. 42.

by parents or guardians. It was the fear from the demons in the elements that nourished their religion. The Franciscan friars, writes Brandenburg,¹⁵ beg money at Naples from Italian emigrants by saying that "they would ward off the fearful dangers of the voyage and in the new wild land America by purchasing prayer-cards." And undoubtedly they were as innocent of the problems of child labor, newspapers, trade unions, bank accounts and birth control as the man in the moon.

This is the cultural outfit of immigrants from the European hive of humanity. Altogether, then, the migration from southern and eastern Europe to America has reproduced, on continental scale, the exact process by which the "deserted villages" of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century became instrumental in the urbanization and industrialization of England, France and Germany. It is a step in the transformation of the entire world from the feudal to the "industrial" regime, from the lower to the higher standard of "necessaries, comforts and decencies of life." It is carrying forward the dynamics of economic history that was first operated by the application of the steam-engine to cotton-manufacture in 1785.

To America, therefore, these guests from Europe can but contribute their primitive midwifery, agricultural superstition, high birthrate, and rural ignorance. In American cities they make their presence felt by room and clothing that reek with odors of cooking and filth. Like Bohemians in the country towns of Texas they displace old American settlers from their favorite habitations. Jews are shunned by "Americans" because they eat garlic; Greeks because they are mere barbers and dirty shoe-shiners; Italian fruiterers because they come from Naples, the city of rogues and rascals, or because their women are notorious for cat-like fecundity; and Slavs because, as Kuokol writes in *Wage Earning in Pittsburgh*, of their rows and fights when they get drunk on pay-day or when celebrating a wedding or christening. These are the people that are easily duped

¹⁵ Page 141.

by the "managers" of political parties, and materially help lowering the level of public life. They can be handled without trouble by employers and captains of industry, and are pounced upon by capitalists to be exploited as tools in the breaking of strikes. They thus militate against the effectiveness of workingmen's associations. They spoil the labor market and demoralize the proletariat class. In all respects they embody an enormous drag and dead weight upon America's advance in civilization, democracy, and efficiency.¹⁶

Such is the raw material that the United States is eager to wash, scrape, chisel and polish, to assimilate, to manufacture 100 per cent Americans of. If these specimens of humanity be worth a nation's spending millions on, how can the unprejudiced mind be indifferent to the potentialities of those other human beings of *the same socio-economic standing* that come from across the Pacific? Does hunger affect the muscular organism and the nervous system of men and women differently in the East and the West? Is primitive agriculture the parent of worse poverty and lower standard of material existence in Asia than in Europe? Are the illiteracy and superstition of the white cultivators better adapted to the democratic institutions and labor organization of republican America than those of their yellow and brown peers? Or are the social and moral values of American life likely to deteriorate less through the influx of Occidental medievalism, nescience, boorishness and serfdom than through that of the Oriental? Young Asia wonders as to how it is possible for the brain of America to make a choice between Europe and Asia "under the same conditions of temperature and pressure."

VI. PERSECUTION OF ASIANS IN AMERICA

No new objection can be urged against Asian immigrants from the viewpoint of labor, sanitation, morals, or culture in addition to what is valid against the "new immigration." Intellectually, economically, and politically, the American-

¹⁶ Roberts: p. 295.

izability of the unskilled laborers from Asia is on a par with, not a whit less than, that of those from Europe. The "pre-industrial" life with its medieval hygiene and civics does not qualify the Slav or the Latin for the duties of the American citizen in peace and war to a far greater extent than it does the Chinese, Japanese, and Hindu immigrants. As a matter of fact it need be admitted in all fairness that the prejudice of "Americans" against the "new immigration" is really as strong as against the Oriental. Emotionally appealing, it could not be otherwise.

But it is very remarkable that under the same "stimulus," viz., an equally keen anti-foreign race-feeling, the people as well as the government of the United States have "reacted" differently to the two groups of foreigners. The differential treatment of the Asian and the European immigrants in America is a striking fact of considerable importance to students of behavioristic social psychology.

On the one hand, the patriotic Americanizers have been trying their best to abolish the "race lines," the "little Italy's," the "little Hungary's," etc., from their cities. They are thoroughly convinced, as they should be, that these "immigrant colonies," these clan-communities, these towns within towns, present the greatest hindrances to Americanization by perpetuating Old World traditions, customs and ways of thinking. Rightly, therefore, are they determined to do away with the segregations as far as practicable in order to assimilate the "new men, strange faces, other minds" from Europe. On the other hand, American behavior towards Asian immigrants has been the very antithesis of this attitude. The only method directly calculated to prevent fusion, amalgamation or even assimilation has been pursued in the treatment of Orientals. It is a story of systematic ostracism, localization, persecution and torture from beginning to end. Young Asia has at last been forced to realize, like the Jew in medieval Europe, that in this land of the free "sufferance is the badge of all our tribe."

The people of India have few specific grievances against America. On the whole, the treatment of Hindus in the

United States has not been unsympathetic. And the anti-Hindu animosity of American laborers could not rise to a tragic intensity, because the Hindu labor movement was too short-lived and small in bulk to grow into a "nuisance." As Hindus have no government and flag of their own to protect their interests and sense of the dignity of man, the United States had no trouble in managing the situation. The American public turned a deaf ear to the half a dozen feeble protests from Hindu leaders in the States. The insolent conduct of the immigration officers at the ports, who make it a point to suspect and harass Hindu merchants, students, and travellers as laborers or "public charges" *in posse*, continues however to be a source of Young Asia's chagrin against America.

The first anti-Japanese propaganda was formally started in 1900, i.e., within about fifteen years of immigration from Japan. In 1905 Japanese had less than 100 children of school-going age scattered in different wards of San Francisco. But the School Board ordered them to be segregated in a separate Japanese school. The same year the State Legislature of California declared the marriage of whites with Mongolians (i.e., Japanese and Chinese) illegal and void. The "school problem" and the problem of miscegenation gradually led to the formation of the Asiatic Exclusion League. It was directed solely against Japan, for Chinese exclusion had already been legislated in 1904, and the Hindu labor-movement had hardly begun. The "gentlemen's agreement" of 1907 finally excluded Japanese laborers from America. Since then California and Arizona have passed alien land laws (1913). These are discriminative exclusively against Japan. According to these laws leases of agricultural land by other aliens (i.e., those not eligible to citizenship, e.g., Japanese) are limited to three years, and ownership to the extent provided by existing treaties. The injustice of these laws would be apparent from the fact that subjects of the United States are accorded the same rights as other aliens by the land laws of Japan.¹⁷

¹⁷ Mills: pp. 197-226, Gulick: *The American Japanese Problem*, 336-339.

During all this period Japanese have submitted to humiliating treatment¹⁸ in restaurants, lodging houses, hotels, moving picture shows, and theatres. Even the Y. M. C. A. has not hesitated to deny them the use of gymnasiums, swimming tanks, athletic fields, etc. Japanese have been excluded from fraternal orders and trade unions. They have not been allowed to employ white women as help. Members of the Japanese consulate have been compelled to leave the residences of their own liking because Americans of the neighbourhood prevented the grocery stores from supplying the "Jap" with provisions on threats of boycott. Added to these the unnoticed and unpunished assaults on Japanese in the streets of American cities, and the indignities suffered by high class Japanese on board American ships and at the ports of landing. After all this comprehensive de-Americanizing of "Mr. Jap" the intellectuals of America dare declare: "Orientals are unassimilable!"

VII. ANTI-CHINESE "POGROMS" OF THE UNITED STATES (1855-1905)

As Chinese immigration was the oldest and most voluminous of the labor-movement from Asia, the anti-Chinese antipathy of America was the most intense and monstrous. In fact, Japanese inherited the anti-Chinese prejudice, and Hindus the anti-Japanese in the chronological order of their arrival; as, in the psychology of America labor, the last immigrant is the worst. Japanese came to America about three years after the first Chinese exclusion law (1882) had been passed, and Hindus reached the Pacific Coast about the time when the anti-Japanese movement was finally drawing to a head (1905-1907).

In 1851, i.e., three years after the discovery of gold in Sacramento Valley there were about 25,000 Chinese in California. They were hailed by the Governor as "one of the most worthy of our newly adopted citizens." But in 1855 the Foreign Miner's License Tax was passed to push Chinese out of the mining fields. Since then for a whole

¹⁸ Steiner: pp. 46, 81-83.

half century the popular and governmental (state as well as federal) attitude of America towards Chinese was one of unvarnished iniquity and hypocrisy, as Prof. A. C. Coolidge admits in *The United States as a World Power*.¹⁹

Chinese had to pay special capitation tax, special police tax, special fishing license. In addition to this discriminative legislation the Chinese government had to accept in 1868 some of the objectionable terms of the Burlingame treaty (which, however, was, on the whole, the only decent piece of transaction between America and China down to 1905). By this document China agreed to the denial of American citizenship to persons of the Chinese race. Nor is this all. The ballot was forbidden to Chinese living in America. Schools were closed against them. They were not allowed to give evidence on the witness stand even in cases affecting their own property. They suffered open torture in public places and residential quarters. In normal times it was "mob-law" that governed their person and property. The dictates of American demagogues created veritable reign of terror for them. By 1876 the persecution of Chinese had become so chronic that the Six Companies at San Francisco had to lodge formal complaints to the proper authorities against the assaults and atrocities of Americans.²⁰

In 1880 an American commission was forced on the imperial government at Peking. By hook or by crook it compelled China to invest the United States with right and authority to modify the Burlingame treaty against Chinese interests, so that Americans might have the legal freedom to "regulate, limit or suspend Chinese immigration" at their own convenience. The first Chinese exclusion bill followed hard upon this in 1882. The American public was not to be satisfied yet. Violent outrages continued to be perpetrated on innocent Chinese men, women and children in the Western States. In 1885 and 1886 Chinese

¹⁹ Pages 335-337, 356; Foster: *American Diplomacy in the Orient*, pp. 300, 301, 306.

²⁰ M. Coolidge: pp 69-82, 129, 255-277.

were stoned, mobbed, looted and murdered in Wyoming, Washington and California.²¹

By the treaties of 1868 and 1880 the "most favored nation" privileges had been mutually assured between China and the United States. The Chinese legation, therefore, requested the federal government to respect the stipulations of those treaties and protect the life and possessions of Chinese living on American soil. Chang Yen Hoon, the Chinese minister demanded of the United States an indemnity of \$276,619.75 for outrages on Chinese. The indemnity was not granted. Nor did the federal government care to redress the wrongs in any way.²² On the contrary, law after law was sanctioned in direct violation of treaties.

To this conduct of the United States stands in bold relief the behavior of China in regard to the carrying out of treaty stipulations. In 1858 the government of Peking had paid America an indemnity of \$735,258.97. In subsequent years the Chinese Empire invariably paid indemnities to all foreign powers even to cover the losses outside "treaty ports" for which it was not legally responsible.²³ The cynic would probably remark that treaties are meant to be kept only by unarmed nations.

In 1888 by the Scott Act America cancelled the legitimate "return" certificates of 20,000 Chinese who had temporarily gone out of the United States on short trips. They were thus mercilessly deprived of their house and home without compensation. In 1892 Chinese were declared unbailable by the Geary Law. It enforced also the compulsory registration of every Chinese immigrant for purposes of identification. Under this ruling *bona fide* students from China have been marked and photographed in nude state. The immigration authorities have been pleased to violate the "most favored nation" clauses of treaties by thus indiscriminately applying the conditions for laborers to the "exempt" classes. And instances of

²¹ M. Coolidge; pp. 188, 271.

²² *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1886, pp. 101, 154-158.

²³ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1886, pp. 105, 140-143.

wealthy Chinese merchants refused admittance into America or detained and maltreated in the immigrant-sheds at the ports on the suspicion that they might be laborers are only too frequent. The treatment of the officially invited Chinese exhibitors to the St. Louis exhibition (1904) was perhaps the most scandalous in this uniformly disgraceful history of America's relations with Chinese. This together with the Exclusion Law of 1904 was "the last straw that broke the camel's back." Half a century's high-handedness and atrocity at length prevailed with Young China to declare a boycott of American goods, ships, institutions, and missionaries in 1905; but political pressure from the aggressive Power compelled it to withdraw even this weapon of self-defence.²⁴

A tragedy also has its humorous side. Whenever the Chinese legation applied to Washington, D. C., to take note of the violation of treaties indulged in by the states or by their citizens and indemnify the Chinese for the losses sustained, the federal authorities used to take refuge under the peculiar constitution of the United States by which the "nation" is prevented from intervention in "state" affairs.²⁵ On several occasions, however, they have not had the courtesy to even acknowledge the thrice-repeated appeals and requests from the Chinese ministers. Rather, they have taken the liberty of administering pungent rebukes to the official representatives of China for not servilely accepting the wishes of America and trying to advance the Chinese view of the case in dignified and emphatic protests.

Is it surprising, therefore, that Young Asia should regard America's "inquisition" of China and her people as unparalleled in inhumanity in the modern annals of inter-racial relations except perhaps by the infamous partitions of Poland and the blood-curdling anti-Jewish "pogroms" in Russia? No wonder that in the United States Chinese are compelled to live in Chinatowns, the "ghettos" of the

²⁴ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1890, pp. 228-230; 1892, pp. 138, 140, 142-143, 147-156; M. Coolidge: pp. 197, 221, 466, 471.

²⁵ M. Coolidge: pp. 271.

New World. And yet America's "scientific" students of the immigration problem have the face to glibly remark about the exclusiveness and unassimilability of Asians! Do they want Young Asia to understand that America's charity to the Chinese (1907), embodied in the partial return of Boxer indemnity, is at once an expiation for all her previous sins as well as a justification for her gagging the Chinese mouth until Doomsday?

VIII. THE CRIME OF COLOR

As we have seen, the high standard American laborer has socio-economic and cultural reasons for bearing prejudice against the Jew, the Italian, the Greek and the Slovak. The prejudice against the Asian laborer is presumably not at all different from this in kind or even in degree. During the early years of the discovery of gold on the Pacific Coast (1848-1852) American prejudice against Spaniards and Frenchmen also had been no less deep and bitter. Historically speaking, Chinese, the "new immigrants" of those days, only inherited the previous anti-Spanish and anti-French animosity of America.

A comparative study of all these immigrations brings out the important fact that the *rationale* of American prejudice is essentially the same in each case. It consists in the natural desire of the native workman to close the labor-market to foreign competitors. To the employers of labor, of course, the race of the laborer or his nationality is of no special significance. They care mainly for the "hands," no matter whose.

But why is it that the identical anti-foreign sentiment of the labor unions has not led to identical anti-foreign propaganda and anti-foreign legislation? Why is it that one group of foreigners is isolated, tortured, and legislated out of the country, while at the same time there are deliberate efforts to educate, adopt and assimilate another group of equally (if not more) obnoxious "Dagoes?" How are we to explain that there has been proposed no definitively Slavic exclusion or Latin exclusion or Jewish exclu-

sion law in the United States? How is it possible for the collective mind of a nation to discriminate between two communities of the same mentality, same economic status, and same socio-civic outlook?

The reason is not to be sought in the religious difference between Asia and Europe. For the states as well as the federal government tolerate every "ism" on earth from mariolatry, transubstantiation and immaculate conception to Mormonism, Christian Science and free thinking. Besides, in modern times, the laboring classes are not, as a rule, fanatical enough to examine people's articles of faith before entering on social intercourse. Confucianism, Buddhism, and Sikhism, as such, are not balanced against Christianity or Judaism in the mind of the masses in the twentieth century.

Do the physical features, the physiognomic expressions, then, account for the differential treatment of the Asian and European immigrants by the laborers and their leaders in America? One might be tempted to say "Yes." But, humanly speaking, native Americans themselves are too often familiar with the accidents of embryology to demand an ideal grace of line and proportion of limbs as the *sine qua non* of friendships, unions or communal gatherings. And surely their aesthetic repugnance is not daily aroused by every instance of deviation from the anthropometrically perfect cephalic index or by every aberration from the Venus of Melos type.

What, in the last analysis, is the fundamental *differentium* between the Asian laborer and the European laborer? The Asian is yellow and brown, the European is albino, i.e., colorless or white. It is the complexion of the skin that is ultimately responsible for the exclusion of Asia from the labor market of America. It seems almost ridiculous that so much should depend on so slight distinctions.

Race-prejudice, especially as it has developed in the United States, is at bottom practically tantamount to skin-prejudice. According to humanitarians this may indeed be a regrettable phenomenon, but as long as it exists it is impolitic to be blind to the fact or minimize its social significance and explain it away by ethnological investiga-

tions. It is an open question, moreover, if color-prejudice or race-prejudice in any of its forms is ever likely to disappear from the human world. Until, however, the prejudice is removed or modified and mitigated by conscious educational and social service agencies, it is reasonable to recognize that the anti-Asian animus of America would remain a most powerful *casus belli* between the East and the West. It behooves the American captains of industry and entrepreneurs, therefore, in the interest of the world's peace to reopen the question of Oriental immigration and have the "assimilability" of Asian laborers studied by economists and sociologists on less prejudiced and more equitable grounds.

Like Europe the United States has not yet had the time and "preparedness" enough to display excessive land-hunger or market-quest, or zeal for the exploitation of weaker peoples in extra-American territories. But the persecution to which innocent Orientals have been exposed in America without redress from the legally constituted authorities, and the humiliation meted out by the authorities themselves in the shape of laws and agreements are convincing evidences that America and Europe are birds of a feather so far as aggression is concerned. In Young Asia's political psychology, therefore, the *ultimatum* of American labor to the Orient for the "crime of color" affords the same stimulus to vindictive will and intelligence as the steady annihilation of enslaved and semi-subject races by the dominant European Powers and the notorious postulate of the "white man's burden" that pervades the intellectuals, journalists, university circles and "upper ten thousands" of Eur-America.

In primitive times the world's peace was disturbed by incidents like the rape of Helen or of Seeta. In the Middle Ages religious fanaticism added fuel to the fire of the normal tiger-instincts in man. Today the great armageddon is being fought over the violation of Belgium and the sinking of the *Lusitania*. And all through the ages territorial expansion, dynastic prestige, commercial monopoly, military renown of *digvijaya* (conquest of the quarters), and so forth, have dictated the call to arms. Now that there

remains no more of land, water, and air to be seized except possibly on Mars, the peace of the world is being recklessly staked by the aggressive races on the color of the skin. It is in this way that the organic struggle for self-assertion maintains its continuity by changing its camouflage and ostensible motive from generation to generation, and that might establishes its historic right to rule mankind. Young Asia is fully conscious of the situation, and has been preparing itself to contribute to the grand cosmic evolution from its own angle of vision.

For the present Asia's retaliation may easily take the form of an economic boycott of the United States. It is unfortunate that Americans should have lost the moral hold on the Orient when they can least afford to do without it. In and through the Great War is being sung the swan-song of the Monroe Doctrine and America's policy of isolation. Her provincialism is soon going to be a matter of history. Already the financial center of gravity of the world has been shifted to New York. The American merchant marine has been expanding at an enormous rate under our very eyes. And with its power and serviceability immensely multiplied by the Panama Canal, Uncle Sam promises to be the inter-continental transportation agency of nations. Besides, during the last two decades American capital has more than doubled itself. What through manufactures, what through shipping, and what through bullion the United States today is in the greatest need of expansion, an enlarged horizon, an empire of foreign commerce and culture, a world-penetration all along the line. Is it expedient for America to have a discontented Asia to reckon with *now*, in view of the fact that the possibilities of the Orient as a paying field for American enterprise cannot be overlooked even by these to whom Latin America is looming large? The crisis is a challenge to the intellect and prudence of the United States. A monumental world-problem is hanging on the capacity of the American brain to rise to the height of the occasion and bring about a fair adjustment between the claims of Young Asia and the right of the United States legislature, from the platform of inter-racial justice and good will.

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE

By David S. Spencer, D.D., Nagoya, Japan

THE CABINET

It is rather a striking fact that the Cabinet has no official standing in the new constitution of the Japanese Empire. That the cabinet should not be officially recognized seems unaccountable, for in a modern constitutional state there must exist an instrument, call it what you may, by which the government may properly present itself to the country. Let us then turn to the fundamental law of the land for light on this matter.

Article LV of the constitution reads:

The respective ministers of the state shall give their advice to the emperor, and shall be responsible for it.

All laws, imperial ordinances, and imperial rescripts of whatever kind, that relate to the affairs of the state, require the counter signature of a minister of state.¹

Article X of the constitution reads in part:

The emperor determines the organization of the different branches of the administration, and salaries of all civil and military officers, and appoints and dismisses them.²

Here then the chief officers of state are called ministers of state, and their appointment is securely maintained within the emperor's prerogative. In his *Commentaries* on the above Article LV, Ito traces the origin of the cabinet back to the early history of the empire, finds therein the use of these ministers of state as the "media through which the imperial commands are conveyed," and in fact, uses the word "cabinet" to designate this company of

¹ Ito, *Commentaries on the Constitution of Japan*, 2d ed., p. 23.

² *Ibid.*

his majesty's servants. The custom of appointing ministers of state he finds justified by the rescript of Emperor Kotoku (645-654 A.D.), and the Emperor Tenshi, (662-671 A.D.), established the council of state (*daijō-kwan*), which comprehended eight departments. Various changes took place in the intervening years, but in December, 1885, was established the modern organization of the cabinet, Mr. Hirobumi Ito being the prime minister, with ten ministers of state; namely, the minister president of state, (or prime minister), and the ministers of foreign affairs, home affairs, finance, war, navy, justice, education, agriculture and commerce, and communications. Ito here goes through a rather extended line of argument to show that these servants of the state derive all their authority from the emperor, and are his advisors, and in no way amenable to the diet. He then continues:

If ministers of state were not responsible, the executive power could easily overstep the limits of law, which would thus become a mere collection of nominal enactments. The responsibility of ministers is, as it were, a pillar supporting the constitution and the law. It, however, has to do with the matters of State under their charge, and is not one involving criminal responsibility. When a minister of state errs in the discharge of his functions, the power of deciding upon his responsibility belongs to the sovereign of the state: He alone can dismiss a minister who has appointed him. Who then is it, except the sovereign, that can appoint, dismiss and punish a minister of state? The appointment and dismissal of them having been included by the constitution in the sovereign power of the emperor, it is only a legitimate consequence, that the power of deciding as to the responsibility of ministers, is withheld from the diet.

Then, as if fearing that this might lock up things too much in the hands of the emperor, and so tend to drive the people into opposition, he continues, saying:

Although the emperor reserves to himself in the constitution the right of appointing his ministers, at his pleasure, in making an appointment the susceptibilities of the public mind must also be taken into consideration. This may be regarded as an indirect method of controlling the responsibility of ministers. Thus, in our constitution the following conclusions have been arrived at: *First*, that the ministers of State are charged with the duties of giving advice to the emperor, which is their proper

function, and that they are not held responsible on his behalf; *secondly*, that ministers are directly responsible to the emperor and indirectly so to the people; *thirdly*, that it is the sovereign and not the people that can decide as to the responsibility of ministers, because the sovereign possesses rights of sovereignty of the state; *fourthly*, that the responsibility of ministers is a political one, and has no relation to criminal or civil responsibility, nor can it conflict therewith, neither can the one affect the other. . . . The minister president and the other ministers of state being alike personally appointed by the emperor, the proceedings of each one of them are, in every respect, controlled by the emperor, and the minister president himself has no power of control over the posts occupied by other ministers.³

As might be supposed, much discussion has from time to time arisen as to the meaning of the above Article LV, and the amenability of cabinet ministers to the representatives of the people. It is easy to see that some ulterior motive must have prevailed in the wording of this important section. This is not the place for discussion of terms, but note should be taken of this language in its relation to the cabinet. Its great importance is our justification for this long quotation.

Although as stated above the cabinet has no direct constitutional status, and might legally be abandoned at any moment by the will of the emperor, it is indirectly recognized as a constitutional organ, as Clement properly points out. This position is clearly enough established by citing imperial notification No. 135 (issued in 1899), which deals with the functions of the cabinet.⁴

ARTICLE I. The cabinet is composed of the various ministers of state.

ARTICLE II. The minister president of state stands at the head of the ministers of state, reports affairs of state to the sovereign, and in compliance with imperial instructions, has control over the various branches of the administration.

ARTICLE III. The minister president of state, should an occasion seem sufficiently important to demand such a course,

³ Ito, as above, pp. 102-103. McLaren, *Transactions Asiatic Society Japan*, vol. 42. pt. I., p. 94. Okuma, *History of Japan*, Vol. I, p. 158.

⁴ Clement, Prof. E. W. Constitutional Imperialism in Japan, in *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, New York, April, 1916, p. 13. Dyer, Henry, "Dai Nippon," p. 283, for concise statement of powers. McLaren, *Transactions Asiatic Society of Japan*, Vol. 42, pt. I, p. 232.

has competence to give instructions to any branch of the administration or to suspend its notifications, pending an expression of the sovereign will on the subject.

ARTICLE IV. All laws and all imperial ordinances affecting the administration as a whole, shall bear the counter signature of the minister president as well as that of the minister from whose department they directly emanate. All imperial ordinances affecting a special department only, shall be countersigned by the minister of that department alone.

ARTICLE V. The following matters shall be submitted for deliberation by the cabinet:

- (1) Drafts of law, financial estimates and settled accounts.
- (2) Treaties with foreign countries, and all national questions of importance.
- (3) Ordinances relating to administration, or to the carrying out of regulations and laws.
- (4) Disputes connected with the relative competence of ministers of departments.
- (5) Petitions from the people, handed down from the throne or submitted by the imperial diet.
- (6) Expenditures apart from the ordinary estimates.
- (7) Appointments of *chokunin* officials and of local prefects and governors, as well as their promotions and removals.

In addition to the above, any important matters connected with the duties of ministers of departments, and having relation to the higher branches of the administration, shall also be submitted for deliberation by the cabinet.

ARTICLE VI. Every minister of a department is competent to submit any matter whatsoever bearing on his functions for the consideration of the cabinet through the minister president.

ARTICLE VII. With the exception of military or naval affairs of grave importance which, having been reported directly to the sovereign by the chief of staff, may have been submitted by his majesty for the consideration of the cabinet, the ministers of state for war and navy shall report to the minister president.

ARTICLE VIII. Should the minister president be prevented from discharging his functions, they may be delegated temporarily to another minister of state in conjunction with the latter's own duties.

ARTICLE IX. Should any minister of state be prevented from discharging his functions, they may be delegated temporarily to another minister of state in conjunction with the latter's own duties, or another minister may be appointed to discharge them.

ARTICLE X. In addition to the various ministers of state, a minister may be specially authorized to sit in the cabinet.

The constitution was promulgated February 11, 1889. The above imperial notification shows an interesting ten years' growth in the ideas held by the leaders concerning a cabinet as a political organ of the national life.

In theory the emperor appoints each minister to his portfolio. In modern practice, when a change in cabinet must occur, the genrō look about for a man who is able to organize a cabinet in accordance with their ideas, and this man undertakes, under mandate from the emperor, to form a cabinet. The initiative seems never to rest with the emperor. The nature of the cabinet, its political coloring, is dictated by various conditions. Of these more later.

The retiring prime minister may suggest to the emperor his successor, as Marquis Okuma recommended Viscount Kato in October 1916; but the genrō still seem to have the power to set aside this choice and put their own man in. This point has still to be carefully noted. Possibly Ueyehara would not agree with me in the above statement as to the power of the genrō,⁵ thinking that their influence has become a thing of the past; but events of late have clearly proven the contrary.⁶ Nevertheless progress in the direction of a larger democracy is steadily being made, and sooner than we think Japan may see a party government in power.

It must be borne in mind that many of the powers which according to the constitution belong to the prerogatives of the emperor, are, due to custom in Japan, exercised by the cabinet, in the name of the emperor. Thus the issuing of emergency ordinances, the making of treaties with foreign powers, the declaring of war and the negotiations for peace, the commanding of the army and the navy, the determining of their organization, the appointing and dismissing of public officials, the fixing of their salaries and pensions, etc., all fall within the functions of the cabinet. The emperor does nothing except in name. The cabinet has the power even over the judiciary, and they practically control the financial affairs of the nation, in spite of the provisions of the constitution which seem to place the

⁵ Ueyehara, G. E., *Political Development of Japan, 1867-1909*, p. 139.

⁶ Pooley, A.M., *Japan at the Cross Roads*, pp. 113, 114, 121, 127, 129, 133, 134, 163, 172.

finances in the hands of the lower house of the diet⁷ (54) (55). As Uyehara further shows, the cabinet wields a great power over the development of national affairs because of their connection with the privy council, their right to speak in either house of the diet, to visit and to speak in all committee rooms of the diet, where much of the legislation is really determined, and in their use of the public money, a dangerous element in the moral field of politics today.

In our efforts to understand Japanese politics, another danger must now be considered. This may best be approached by a study of the following table of cabinets, compiled through the courtesy of S. Terada, chief secretary of the imperial diet:

Table of Imperial Japanese Cabinets

PREMIER	AGE	TERM OF OFFICE	DURATION
Ito, 1st.....	45	December 22, 1885–April 30, 1888	2 yrs., 5 mos.
Kuroda.....	58	April 30, 1888–December 24, 1899	1 yr., 7 mos.
Yamagata, 1st...	52	December 24, 1889–May 6, 1891	1 yr., 5 mos.
Matsukata, 1st..	57	May 6, 1891–August 8, 1892	1 yr., 3 mos.
Ito, 2d.....	52	August 8, 1892–September 18, 1896	4 yrs., 1 mo.
Matsukata, 2d...	62	September 18, 1896–January 12, 1898	1 yr., 3 mos.
Ito, 3d.....	58	January 12, 1898–June 30, 1898	0 yr., 6 mos.
Okuma, 1st.....	61	June 30, 1898–November 8, 1898	0 yr., 4 mos.
Yamagata, 2d...	61	November 8, 1898–October 19, 1900	1 yr., 11 mos.
Ito, 4th.....	60	October 19, 1900–June 2, 1901	0 yr., 7 mos.
Katsura, 1st.....	55	June 2, 1901–January 7, 1906	4 yrs., 7 mos.
Saionji, 1st.....	58	January 7, 1906–July 14, 1908	2 yrs., 6 mos.
Katsura, 2d.....	62	July 14, 1908–August 30, 1911	3 yrs., 1 mo.
Saionji, 2d.....	63	August 30, 1911–December 21, 1912	1 yr., 3 mos.
Katsura, 3d.....	66	December 21, 1912–February 20, 1913	0 yr., 2 mos.
Yamamoto.....	62	February 20, 1913–April 16, 1914	1 yr., 1 mo.
Okuma, 2d.....	77	April 16, 1914–October 9, 1916	2 yrs., 6 mos.
Terauchi.....	65	October 9, 1916–September 29, 1918	1 yr., 11 mos.
Hara.....	65	September 29, 1918–	

It will be noted that the average term of the first eighteen ministries is a little less than twenty-two months each. Ito's first ministry was a beginning, a school for both cabinet

⁷ Uyehara as above, pp. 140–146. Ito, *Commentaries*, as above, pp. 124–152.

members and members of the diet, but the other two somewhat lengthy ministries, the second Ito and the first Katsura, each occurred during a period of foreign war, when all domestic squabbles were loyally laid aside to give all force to the protection of the nation.

It must be further noted that in the seventeen ministries mentioned, but nine names appear among those of prime minister, and these nine include Okuma and Itagaki, who were together, and whose ministry lasted but four months. In other words, for twenty-nine years, the cabinet has been under the direction of eight men, of whom four have practically dictated its policy from the first. If we seek to place these men, in their political relations, or rather in their clan relations, they belong to two sections of the country almost exclusively. To the Choshu clan belong Yamagata, Ito, Inouye, Katsura, Terauchi, Uyebara, Hara, Okubo, and Oura; while to the Satsuma clan belong Matsukata, Saigo, Saito, Kabayama, Yamamoto, Oyama; and it would be easy to add to these lists of the two clans which have managed the rudder of the ship of state all the years since the cabinet was born. Okuma is from Saga; Itagaki from Tosa clan; Saionji was a *Kuge* from the former Kyoto court; Viscount Kato is a Nagoya man; Baron Goto hails from Iwate-ken; but with the exception of Okuma and Itagaki, who have been little at the front in cabinet affairs, the policy of this body has been dictated by about four men. Katsura began as Yamagata's henchman, Saionji was Ito's lieutenant, and Matsukata has been long connected with the privy council, and Terauchi is Yamagata's choice. While in law the emperor may choose any man in the empire as his prime minister, he never yet has chosen a man against the wishes of these clansmen.

It will naturally be asked, how is it that these clansmen manage to control the choice of men as they have done? The answer is offered that they never could have maintained the hold they have had on the administration except for the marriage alliances which they have been able to form. "Marriage alliances often give the key to the domination

of clans and factions in Japan, as in England." Take the case of Viscount Kaoru Inouye.

A clansman of Choshu, Inouye strengthened his position by marriage with a daughter of Nitta Tadayama, a leading *daimyo* of Choshu. His brother-in-law, the present Viscount Nitta, married Inoko, sister of Viscount Mori, a scion of the Princes Mori, the Lords of Choshu. The deceased statesman's heir is his nephew, Katsunosuke Inouye, lately Japanese ambassador in London, son of the Marquis's elder brother Ikutaro, and married to the late Marquis's daughter. Katsunosuke Inouye is blood brother of Prince Hirokuni Ito, Vice-grand Chamberlain, who married the late Prince Ito's daughter and was adopted as his son and heir. Baron Keiroku Tsuzuki, the privy councillor, formerly in the foreign office, and well known as the late Prince Ito's diplomatic assistant on his journeys abroad, is married to Mitsuko, a sister of the Marchioness Inouye. The late Prince Katsura married as his second wife Kana, adopted daughter of Marquis Inouye, whilst his son and heir by his first marriage, Yoichi, married the Marquis's niece, Tei, daughter of the Viscount Nitta. The connection between the Katsura and Inouye family goes even further, for Katsunosuke Inouye's heir and son by adoption, Saburo, is blood son of the late Prince Katsura by his first marriage. Baron Bunkichi Ito, legitimized son of the late Prince Ito, married a daughter of the late Prince Katsura. A connection between Inouye and party politics is seen not only in the Ito relationship, but in the marriage of Hara Kei, leader of the Seiyukai (a prominent political party) and ex-minister of home affairs, to the daughter of the Marchioness by her first marriage with the late Mr. Nakai, as well as in the adoption by Marquis Saionji of a Mori as his heir, and the engagement of this heir by the late Prince Katsura as his personal secretary.⁸

The case of Marquis Inouye might be thought to be a special one; but this is not remarkably so. The marriage alliances formed by Marquis Matsukata were quite as intricate. A story is told in Tokyo of this Marquis having been asked by the former emperor how many children he had, and he is said to have replied in his characteristic way "Your Majesty, I will have strict investigation made." I have seen a photograph of this statesman taken about 1915 showing the veteran surrounded by

⁸ Pooley, as above, p. 116. *Japan Weekly Mail*, Vol. X, p. 63, On Duration of Cabinets in Japan, p. 364; On Official Rank of Cabinet Ministers, showing clan influences.

a family, first and second generations, of eighty-four in number. Mr. Hara, leader of the Seiyukai is similarly entrenched. Marquis Inouye though never personally active in politics, was able to guide affairs of state from behind the *shoji* for years, through Katsura and Saionji.

Following out some of the matrimonial connections in this way is the path by which to discover how the Satsuma section or clan has been able for years to control the navy, and Choshu the army. The term *Sat-Cho*, a combination of Satsuma and Choshu, is a word constantly used in Japan regarding political affairs. Well informed Japanese say without hesitation that the government is still run largely by clan influences.

It must ever be borne in mind that it is no part of our study to teach the Japanese how to build their political institutions. They are a capable people, and Japan possesses all the rights of any sovereign state to frame her own national life to suit her conditions. Our duty is to try to interpret that life to Western readers so that they shall better understand the Japanese people. Doubtless the average Japanese understands Western life and spirit better than the average Westerner understands Japan, for the Westerner is usually decidedly provincial. We need to see that in her development politically Japan has had, and still has, a serious handicap in her past feudal and family relations. In her foreign relations and her commercial life, in her finance and in her educational and judicial systems she has really done great credit to herself and benefit to the world; but in regard to her domestic political and moral conditions the same commendation can scarcely be given. Freedom of her government from clan influences, the improvement of her electorate in sound political ideas, and a just recognition of the rights of the people through their representatives in the diet are changes essential to success. Captain Brinkley thinks that the provisions of her constitution differ in no respect from the most advanced Western standard.* Upon this point

* *History of the Japanese People*, p. 692.

very good men may differ with him; but no matter how perfect the framework of political documents, there must be behind the law right public sentiments before the best results can be attained. English and American public sentiment bases itself in the individual. The people are the state,—constitutional democracy; the Japanese public from primary school to life's last hours is taught to find its temporal and eternal welfare in an imperial house, and the whole energy of Japanese officialdom is expended in conserving the clan influences which support that house.

Japan is ruled by old men.¹⁰ Prince Yamagata was born in 1838; Baron Shibusawa, in 1840; Marquis Okuma in 1838; Marquis Matsukata in 1840; Marquis Saionji in 1849; Ex-Premier, Terauchi, has seen sixty-six years; and with one exception, Mr. Shoda, the members of the last cabinet are all men of the pre-Meiji era. Turning to the privy council, of its twenty-six members, six are above eighty, seven above seventy, ten between seventy and sixty, and only two are in their fifties.

Turning in this connection to the kizoku-in, house of peers, to be treated in its proper place later, we find the members famous for their advanced age and conservatism or clan spirit.

These last two named institutions, of which the genrō are all members, practically decide the leadership and the party or clan coloring of the cabinet. The people are not considered at all. So long as these clansmen are in power, how is a cabinet in harmony with the progressive spirit of the nation to be secured? As the people have no means of effecting legally a change in the constitution, how are they going to secure their desires to participate effectively in the political life of the nation?

While this article is being written, there has occurred in Japan an event of far-reaching importance, and bringing with it no little surprise. For months previously the press of the country had voiced the dissatisfaction of the people, as it was claimed, with the Terauchi cabinet, and

¹⁰ *The Japan Advertiser*, February 7, 1918, p. 4.

rumors of its resignation had occasionally been heard. This outcry was no cause for wonderment, for the press of Japan is, as a rule, scandalously lacking in mature judgment on any political question, domestic or foreign. But on September 21, Count Terauchi handed the emperor the resignations of himself and his associates in the cabinet. The genrō at once set to work to find a successor, and Marquis Saionji was summoned by the emperor and asked to form a cabinet. The Marquis took five long days to consider the matter, and then declined on the usual ground of ill health. True, he is in his seventy-ninth year, and might well claim consideration on account of age. But there were other valid reasons for his refusal. Why has the Terauchi cabinet fallen? It began with the strongest possible backing of the genrō, and with prophecies of long life. Why should it fall just now? Its failure to secure approval of its intervention scheme in favor of the Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia could not be offered as ground for admitting defeat. Nor does anybody of responsible opinion seem able to name any definite mistake made by the Terauchi cabinet. The shouting of the "Outs" against the "Ins" is an old political trick, and surely, it is said, does not justify the ministers in deserting their portfolios. The truth is, the Terauchi cabinet has fallen because it could not satisfy *the people*, could not secure the support of a majority in the diet. This World War has mightily stirred the thought life of Japan. Profound changes in sentiment are rapidly taking place. Japan's unkindly treatment of China is not approved by the people, who are themselves reading more and more widely. The Terauchi cabinet was a bureaucratic cabinet. The demand of the times is increasingly in favor of giving political power largely into the hands of the people. Marquis Saionji is a democratic spirit. He knew full well that no "whole nation" government, such as the bureaucrats were calling for could hope long to stand. Hence the Marquis declined, and the genrō were beaten. Their defeat brought almost unanimous rejoicing. The press grew wild over the affair. The Seiyukai (constitutional

party), the strongest political party in the diet, which had stood aloof from the Terauchi ministry, remained quietly looking on, knowing rather well that the time was ripe for a long-looked-for change in political affairs in the nation. With the declination of Marquis Saionji, no bureaucrat of sufficient influence and acceptability remained; so the genrō were compelled to turn to the younger politicians for help. Mr. Takashi Hara, the successor of Prince Ito and Marquis Saionji, founders of the Seiyukai, and long leaders of that party of growing power, was immediately summoned by the emperor, even Prince Yamagata, the great conservative and backbone of the genrō giving his consent; and in a few hours was able to name a strong cabinet of experienced men, all connected with his own Seiyukai,—except the ministers of the army and navy who are excluded from politics, thus bringing in the first genuinely party cabinet in Japan. Not the first so-called party cabinet, for the Okuma-Itagaki cabinet of 1898 was started as a party cabinet, though speedily overthrown by strife within the cabinet itself, the members lacking experience in working together, and there being no real constituency behind them. The Ito cabinet of 1900 was a second attempt at party cabinet building, though not quite all party men, and defeated in this case not from within but because of the bureaucratic opposition in the house of peers, which naturally dislikes party government, as will be shown later. Mr. Hara's cabinet is a Seiyukai cabinet and a people's cabinet. Mr. Hara is a commoner of the commoners, who, though of excellent birth, began life at the bottom of the ladder, as an errand boy, rose steadily because of his own merits, and has occupied in order positions of trust all the way up to the diet where he still remains as one of the foremost leaders. "He is the first prime minister to be appointed outside of the clan or court circles which have ruled Japan for the past fifty years."¹¹ Only two members of the cabinet bear titles, all are younger men, but all are trained men in the political and business world. They have at

¹¹ *Herald of Asia*, Vol. VI, pp. 29, 31 and 32. *Japan Advertiser*, September 21, and October 20, 1918.

once made a favorable impression by abolishing liveried guards when appearing in public, and by showing a friendliness to and confidence in the representatives of the press which none of their predecessors have thought becoming.

The significance of this event for us at present is the light it throws upon the question of political development. Whatever other importance it may bear, it clearly marks advance on the part of the people, and a weakening of clan influences. The members of this ministry hold their portfolios not because of their possible connections with the Sat-Chō groups, but because of their membership in the Seiyukai, and their political fitness for their positions through practical training and experience.

But we dare not prophesy for them an easy reign. The defeated genrō and the bureaucrats in the *kizoku-in* will watch their every move, and will, if they dare, place obstacles in their way.

Our next step in this investigation is to try to understand the structure of the diet and its behavior toward the cabinet and the clan system.¹²

¹² *The Japan Weekly Mail*, 63 Volumes, see index. This publication, under the masterly editorial hand of Capt. F. Brinkley, R. A., recently deceased, constitutes the greatest treasury in the English language of the constantly occurring events in the political, social, commercial, judicial, educational, and religious life of the Japanese people during the Meiji era. Captain Brinkley was in closest touch during all the Meiji era with the life of Japan, in all its phases. He was long retained as an advisor to the Japanese government, and to prominent Japanese corporations, married a Japanese lady, lived among the people, was an authority on the Japanese language, and possessed an unusually well-balanced mind for the work of recording for posterity the daily happenings of the people. The constant reading for thirty-five years of this authority has been most helpful to the present writer.

By Charles K. Edmunds, President of Canton Christian College

American friends often ask: "How do you find the Chinese students? How do they compare with American students?" My answer after fifteen years in China is that the distinction between the Oriental and the Occidental lies in technique and in knowledge, not in intellectual calibre. While there are differences in point of view and in method of approach, there is no fundamental difference in intellectual character. The Chinese conception of life's values is so different from that of Western peoples, that they have failed to develop modern technique and scientific knowledge. Now that they have come to see the value of these, rapid and fundamental changes are taking place. When modern scientific knowledge is added to the skill which the Chinese already have, results will be achieved on the basis of their physical stamina and moral qualities, which will remove the ignorance, indifference and prejudice of the Western world.

Religion, government and reverence for antiquity have been the dominant influences in shaping the course of Chinese education, sometimes hastening and sometimes checking its progress. Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and for the last century Christianity, have directly influenced considerably the development of the educational system. Undue respect for the ancient sages has prevented radical reforms until they were imposed by the necessities of modern intercourse with the rest of the world. While the Chinese have been highly conservative, and their educational system has reflected this, their conservatism has its limits. Slow in making a departure, once its practicability is demonstrated, they do not hesitate at radical changes nor are they discouraged by difficulties.

The policy of providing modern education upon a national basis was adopted only a few years ago. Allow-

ing for this, China compares favorably with the educational history of the Western world.

Education has always been regarded as of supreme importance. Formerly cherishing solely the literary and ethical excellencies of ancient Chinese classics, she now extends her admiration to the practical realities of western science, because in them she recognizes the instruments for the realization of new national and economic ideals.

Fortunately the people of China have long been democratic in spirit and so has been their educational system. To develop the individual into a man of virtue and culture, and to secure social control through raising up leaders with ability and character to influence the lives of others, have been the main motives of Chinese education throughout many centuries; and may well continue even with altered content of the curricula. For China today is more in need of true men than she is of merely modern methods.

THE CHANGE FROM THE OLD TO THE NEW

The ancient system of education and its content have been fully described elsewhere.¹ The gradual decadence of the schools themselves and the growth of the system of literary examinations as the means of providing candidates for government positions, followed in more recent times by modifications in the subject matter of the examinations and finally by the abolition of the examination system in toto—these fill the period from the really old to the really new education in China.

The last stages of this long period have been three, the changes becoming more and more rapid as we approach the present, the changes in education being concurrent with fundamental alterations in the political life of the nation. The transition from traditional to modern education began with the forced opening of the first five ports to foreign trade in 1842 and ended with the abolition of the ancient system of literary examinations in 1905. 1905

¹ *Pop. Sci. Monthly*, January, 1906; February, 1906.

to 1911 marks the construction period in which a modern educational system was actually applied with more or less success and frequent alterations. 1911 marks the end of the Manchu Dynasty and the beginning of the attempt to establish a republican form of government involving necessarily also a reorganization of education as far as government auspices are concerned.

THE SIMULTANEOUS DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND OF GENERAL EDUCATION

Either of these tasks taken separately would constitute a gigantic problem, whereas the fact is that they are so closely related and one so dependent on the other, that the attempt to establish a democracy before adequate public education is had, or the attempt to establish an adequate system of schools before the government is itself sufficiently stable to handle the financial burden thus involved, may well be regarded, especially when the size of China and her peculiar history are noted, as the greatest educational problem of all time, and one which will necessarily require several decades yet for its solution.

The time limits of the three periods just described apply to mission schools and colleges as well as to government institutions, but with different characteristics. Missionaries were the pioneers of the first period and their schools were practically unmatched by government effort. Their work, however, did not have the scope and character which it assumed during the second period. There was no well-established educational policy; schools were opened as necessity arose and funds permitted and many were they who were "called" to educational work who would have "chosen" some other form of missionary effort with better adjustment and greater efficiency, had the demand not been so imperative. Only toward the end of the first period did the mission boards realize the tremendous importance of offering sound education under Christian auspices to the youth of awakening China. In the second period several fairly strong mission colleges

and numerous high and lower schools were developed which have not only served as models and stimulators of government effort but have provided some of the large number of teachers demanded for the government's own program. The third period has been one of coördination and affiliation between mission institutions both locally and in large associations, while their opportunity for service is even greater today than it was in 1911 because the political uncertainty which has prevailed since then to date has greatly handicapped government institutions with but few exceptions, chiefly through reduced revenue.

THE GOVERNMENT'S FIRST STEPS (1862-1897)

We shall note briefly the main points of progress during these three stages of transition, construction and reorganization. Naturally the first step of the government after the opening of the treaty ports was to inaugurate schools for the training of the interpreters which this sudden increase in foreign intercourse demanded. Naturally also the first of these was established in the national capital, 1862, which in 1866 was raised to a so-called college grade by the addition of a scientific department. In 1868 Dr. W. A. P. Martin, an American missionary who had specialized somewhat in international law, was appointed to the staff and in 1869 became the first president of what is now known as the Government University of Peking (the American Methodist Mission having already taken for its school the name of "Peking University"). Reorganized in 1898 this institution in 1917 included besides a preparatory department of some 600 boarding students with a teaching and administrative staff of 6 foreigners and 47 Chinese, a normal school and four collegiate departments: Letters, law, science and engineering, with a total staff of 56 Chinese and 11 foreigners, and some 1100 students. The preparatory school has just been abolished and a two years' preparatory course incorporated in each of the collegiate departments. Most of the Chinese instructors in the collegiate departments

have been trained abroad, many of them having previously studied in mission schools.

Language schools were started also in Shanghai and Canton immediately after this Peking school. The government next inaugurated technical and professional schools of various sorts and of varying excellence and fortune.

1869	Mechanical school.....	Shanghai
1869	Naval schools.....	Foochow
1879	Telegraph college.....	Tientsin
1887	Peiyang University.....	Tientsin
1890	Naval College.....	Nanking
1890	Mining and Engineering College.....	Wuchang
1893	Army Medical College.....	Tientsin
1897	Nanyang College.....	Shanghai

Of these the two survivors most worthy of more detailed notice are Peiyang University and Nanyang College, now called the Government Institute of Technology. Both of these are national schools and are supported in part with funds from the Telegraph Administration, the China Merchants Steamship Navigation Company, and the Superintendent of Customs.

Although Peiyang University was inaugurated in 1887 when Dr. Charles D. Tenney was made president, organization was not effected until after the war with Japan (1894-95). Located in a suburb of Tientsin this is now the best established government school in China, comprising departments of general arts and sciences, law and engineering, with about 300 boarding students and a staff of some 16 Chinese and 13 Europeans under the presidency of T. L. Chao.

The Government Institute of Technology located in a suburb of Shanghai (the New York of China) was reorganized in 1897 by Dr. John C. Ferguson. It now has 600 students and a faculty of 14 Chinese and 6 Europeans.

All three of these government institutions of first rank were inaugurated under American presidents who had previously been Christian missionaries, while today the president of each is a Chinese.

Concomitant with the development of these schools attempts were made to introduce reforms in the time-honored examination system itself. In 1869 mathematics was introduced, in 1875 the Viceroy Li Hung Chang advocated the physical sciences but failed to receive royal sanction. War with France in 1887 aroused the government somewhat and natural sciences were introduced in the examination system to a limited extent while mathematics received increased attention. The literary chancellors themselves were of course unfamiliar with the new subjects and very little was actually accomplished. Again the shock of a foreign conflict (Chinese-Japanese War, 1894-95) aroused not only the scholars of the realm but the Manchu emperor himself, who forthwith became an ardent student of Western arts and sciences. The demand for the new learning became so great that within eighteen months of the close of the war with Japan all modern schools throughout the land whether under government or mission auspices or private control were overcrowded, and such in fact has been the condition ever since. There is no possibility of overstating the eagerness of the Chinese for modern education.

The greatest advocate and active promoter of these educational reforms was the illustrious Viceroy Chang Chih Tung, who not only inaugurated an ambitious university scheme at Wuchang, engaging many experts from America and several European countries,² but by his remarkable book *Learn*³ of which millions of copies were distributed, prepared the minds of the people throughout the land for the sweeping reforms that were so soon to be launched. He outlined a complete system of schools and indicated the curricula from primary grades to university courses, embracing a mixture of Chinese classics and the modern learning of the West. He courageously advocated the abolishing of the "eight-legged essay" and

² These initial efforts were however not properly followed up and today yield only a memory.

³ The precise Chinese title is Ch'uan Hsüeh P'ien or *An Exhortation to Learning*; the English translation is known as *China's Only Hope*.

its stilted confrères and suggested that Buddhist and Taoist temples be converted into schools and the temple lands and incomes used for educational purposes; which has been very largely done, though not until the unfortunate reactionary movement had culminated in the Boxer outbreak of 1900.

EDUCATIONAL HISTORY AND FOREIGN CONFLICTS

The decade 1895 to 1905 was crowded with rapid developments and reactions, the widest extremes being reached on either side. It is indeed curious that the educational history of so peace-loving a people as the Chinese should not only be punctuated but even definitely articulated with foreign conflicts. Perhaps one may take some comfort from this and hope that in connection with the settlements to be effected by the present peace conference involving both Eastern and Western powers a still newer day may dawn in China and her national integrity become so guaranteed that she may steadily progress in that internal development so sorely needed on her own account as well as in behalf of the continued peace of the world.

Be that as it may, the decade referred to is certainly of intense interest alike to the student of China's educational development and of her international relations.

Ushered in by her war with Japan it closed with the Russo-Japanese War which involved the territory of her chief dependency and effected tremendously her whole future as a nation.

Aroused by the first of these conflicts the emperor rapidly passed from a student to an ardent advocate of modern education, issuing in 1898 a series of most remarkable decrees, calling for the immediate inauguration of all the reforms suggested by Chang Chih Tung and even others. This action literally shook the empire and would doubtless have been successful but for the treachery of Yuan Shih Kai, then Viceroy of Chihli and the most powerful military leader of the day. Warned by Yuan the empress

dowager turned the tables, imprisoned the emperor and decapitated most of his progressive advisors. His edicts were annulled, newspapers were suppressed, the proposed schools were held in abeyance, the right to use temples was revoked, the eight-legged essay and the old order of examinations were restored.

This retrograde policy lasted till 1900, when the Boxer outbreak caused the temporary abandonment of all modern schools and colleges in northern China. Some of them, including the Peiyang University, were even completely destroyed. The ultimate effect was helpful; for after China had been humbled, the program of educational reform was again adopted and the empress dowager herself advocated the very measures she had so vigorously resisted only a short time before. Her decrees were even more far-reaching than those of 1898. Modern education progressed by leaps and bounds and in the midst of reform came the Russo-Japanese War which induced even greater efforts. The cry of the time was: What Japan has done, China can and will do. Students poured into the island empire, as many as 15,000. Returning from Japan these became active in the cause of progress and reform, editing magazines and translating books, till a veritable flood of literature, much of it immature and violent swept the reading-public out of their lethargy.

PHASES OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE PERIOD

While the earlier decrees provided for the official recognition of the graduates of modern schools, and for the modernization of the traditional schools, those of 1905 abolished the old system of examinations and the old style school as well, and provided that larger numbers of students be sent to Europe and America.

In 1903 a commission was appointed to devise a detailed plan for a national school system, and from 1905 till the end of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 there was an abundant issue of memorials, edicts, regulations, etc.; enough to fill twelve volumes. While many of these became im-

mediately and truly effective, many others were never fully realized and one must read reports based on these documents with a questioning eye focused on accomplishments in contrast with proposals. Even so the actual results appear remarkable considering the difficulties and the size of the problem.

These regulations and plans have undergone such frequent and even radical changes that it suffices for present purposes to indicate only the main features that have survived, and then to present in more detail the educational system now in force.

A Ministry of Education was created as one of the eleven great executive departments of the state. This assumed the educational functions previously assigned to the Ministry of Rites, and organized divisions to deal with general supervision, technical or special education, publication, industrial education, finance.⁴ Educational administration in the provinces and in smaller local areas was developed in great theoretical completeness but has fallen short in practice.

In connection with the old examination system an elaborate scheme of inspection and control had been established and naturally this same element has received considerable attention in all the new proposals.

The system prior to 1906 provided for a Literary Chancellor in each province, who acting for the Ministry of Rites, controlled the competitive examinations in his province. He was assisted by a director of studies in each prefecture and a supervisor in each district.

The scheme of 1906 provided for each province a Commissioner of Education appointed by the throne on the

⁴ Certain subsidiary central authorities are to be noted: A Metropolitan Board of Education handles education in the national capital; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in partial control of Tsing Hua College; the Ministry of War of military schools throughout the country, and naval academies at Foochow, Tientsin, Chefoo, Nanking; the Ministry of Communications, of schools of telegraphy; the Ministry of Agriculture of special and agricultural schools; the Ministry of Finance of a school of finance in Peking; and the Controller of Customs of a special customs college in Peking.

recommendation of the Ministry of Education, a local board of education appointed by the commissioner, and six inspectors, appointed by the governor on the nomination of the commissioner. This plan was altered in 1909 and again in 1912, and finally in 1913 a *new scheme of national inspection* divided the country into eight inspectorial divisions: 1, Chihli, Fengtien, Kirin, Heilungkiang; 2, Shantung, Shansi, Honan; 3, Kiangsu, Anhui, Chekiang; 4, Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi; 5, Shensi, Kwangsi, Szechwan; 6, Kansu, Sinkiang; 7, Fukien, Kwangtung, 8, Yunnan, Kweichow; each territorial division to have two inspectors. Mongolia and Tibet temporarily subject to special regulations.

The office of inspector was made merely advisory in character in recognition that under the new government central authority has become less arbitrary, while local authorities have assumed more power of self-government. This system of provincial and local administration of education was meant to be provisional in character and the practice in the various provinces has been far from uniform. In most of the provinces a department of education is an integral part of the provincial administration, the chief of the department being appointed by the president of the republic while there are also provincial inspectors appointed by the governor of the province.

In the summer of 1911 over one hundred delegates from the provinces attended in Peking the first conference of the Central Educational Council, created as an advisory body. Recommendations were officially adopted, but the revolution prevented their immediate application.

Along with the development of modern education there was a movement toward the adoption of a representative government which an imperial decree of 1908 had promised. The Ministry of Education prepared a special educational program hastening the development of popular education as the foundation for such a form of government. 1916 was the time appointed for its establishment. But the imposing program was never realized, for first the throne brought down date of adopting the constitutional government from 1917 to 1913 and at the beginning of 1911 an-

other program for the following two years was submitted and sanctioned only in turn to be cast aside in the political upheaval which resulted in the downfall of the Manchu dynasty at the end of that very year. The schools and colleges of China contributed a great share to the revolutionary movement.

Beginning with October 10, 1911 attention became focused on the struggle for liberty. Funds intended for educational institutions were used for armies. School buildings became soldiers' quarters; in not a few cases the entire school plant was destroyed by mobs. Students volunteered for service in the field, and large numbers of students organized for securing war funds. The students of Canton Christian College raised \$55,000 Chinese currency. The disorganization incident to this revolution gave the cause of national education a setback from which it has not yet fully recovered; though mission schools were relatively little affected.

PHASES OF THE REORGANIZATION

The Ministry of Education of the provisional government, organized in Nanking (January 9, 1912) issued a policy and curriculum for temporary guidance. The most important and significant measures urged were, first, to permit boys and girls to attend the same lower primary school; and, second, to eliminate the classics entirely from the curriculum of primary schools. The rapid and general diffusion of knowledge through public lectures, newspapers, libraries and moving pictures was strongly urged, with a fair measure of success.

When Yuan Shih Kai was elected President of China (April 1, 1912) a new Ministry of Education was organized. It endeavored to secure the return of all properties temporarily loaned to the military. It decreed that all text books should be submitted to the Ministry and it called an Emergency Central Educational Conference which met in Peking July 10 to August 10, 1912.

THE PRESENT STATUS OF GOVERNMENT EDUCATION

The school system established on the inauguration of the Republic is indicated by the following outline:

	AGE	SCHOOLS	LENGTH OF COURSE
I	7-10	Lower primary	4 years meant to be compulsory
II	11-13	Higher primary or Industrial of class B	3 years 3 years
III	14-17	Middle or Normal or Industrial of class A	4 years 4 years (1 year preparatory) 3 years
IV	18-24	University Higher normal Professional school	3 years preparatory—3 or 4 years collegiate 1 year preparatory—3 or 4 years collegiate 1 year preparatory—3 or 4 years collegiate

Supplementary courses offering continuation of work for two years are provided for those graduates of both the lower and the higher primary schools who for one reason or another cannot go to the school of a higher grade.

Industrial schools of class A offer general industrial education while those of class B provide elementary industrial education or training in special trades.

Whereas before the revolution the responsibility of establishing primary schools was not placed upon any specific authority, the new administration definitely assigns this duty to cities, towns, and villages. The establishment of middle schools is left to the provincial authorities; and for the first time in Chinese history, middle schools for girls are specifically provided for, on the same basis as those for the boys.

The normal schools aim to train elementary school teachers; the higher normal schools, teachers for middle and normal schools. Normal schools are established by the provinces; while provincial higher normal schools

are supported from the national treasury. An elementary school is attached to each normal school, and each higher normal school has one elementary school and one middle school attached to it. Normal schools for girls have kindergartens attached.

Curricula changes have included the elimination of Chinese classics as a subject in itself and the introduction of new subjects of study having a social and industrial significance.

The dominance of the classics in the modern schools of China has lasted for a very short time compared with the struggle against classics in the educational history of other nations.

The preparatory department of the *University* has three groups of studies covering a three years' course; the first is for those wishing to enter the faculties of art, law or commerce; the second prepares for science, applied science, agriculture or pharmacy; and the third prepares for the study of medicine.

There are five educational institutions of higher grade under the Government that are worthy of note. The work at the Government University of Peking, at Peiyang University near Tientsin, and at the Government Institute of Technology near Shanghai has already been mentioned. Of Tsing Hua College near Peking and of the Teachers College at Nanking we shall presently give some detail. Government universities are said to be contemplated at Nanking, Wuchang, and Canton, but have not been organized as yet.

PROBLEMS BEING SOLVED

Among present problems that are being solved we note: the more adequate use of the school in the development of moral character, the strengthening of school discipline, the more effective adjustment of education to the life of the pupil and the needs of the community, and most important of all, the provision of a more adequate corps of qualified teachers through whom alone can these other problems be satisfactorily handled.

ADJUSTMENT OF EDUCATION TO LIFE-NEEDS

The effective relating of education to the life of those who receive it has yet to be accomplished in China. The conflict between book learning and the newer and more practical forms of education is now on in China just as it was not long ago in western countries, in which it is not even yet fully settled. The deeper questions of content and of method, such as have been raised by the necessities of war training in America, apply in a peculiar way also to China. Until very recently there was on the part of mission schools and colleges and also on the part of government institutions too much of a tendency to import a foreign cap for the Chinese pate, and while the error of this way is now fully realized the questions of curricula are still largely unsolved. Many experiments are being tried and much progress is being made, especially in the institutions where educational traditions are not over-emphasized, and where there is a genuine desire to make education the real threshold to an efficient and happy life on the part of each pupil.

In the first place the former conception of education as preparation for official life, though greatly diminished has not yet been completely replaced in the Chinese public mind by the broader idea of education as a training of each man for all phases of the life he is to live.

Secondly in importing content and even method bodily from America (for the importation of educational ideas has been chiefly from America) there has been too little regard for the modifications that should be determined in view of the peculiar history of the pupils, racially and as individuals, and of the present day status of their community in all phases of its life and of the need for an approximate but vital adjustment and solution of the many problems China faces which only her own citizens properly trained and inspired can solve.

SUPPLY OF TEACHERS

The greatest impediment to the progress of modern education in China has been and still is the small supply of competent teachers. It has been impossible to recruit teachers from the old schools to any extent because of the peculiar nature of both the content and the method of the old learning and also because of the conservatism of the old style teacher.

The most available source of able teachers has been found among the graduates of the mission schools, but this supply is far below the demand which naturally is constantly rising both in numbers and as to quality.

The next most immediate source was in the first decade found among those literati who attempted to prepare themselves as modern teachers by special short-cut study. Their chief recommendation was their earnestness, but even so they could hardly be depended on except as a temporary makeshift.

The use of foreign teachers has been confined to the higher institutions beginning with the middle and normal schools. The number of such, however, has never been very large. In 1911 the total number of foreign teachers (this includes Japanese, of course, as well as Europeans and Americans) was but 545; in 1917, probably not more than 600.

At one time the number of Japanese instructors engaged in provincial middle and normal schools was quite large, but for a combination of reasons their employment has for the last decade almost entirely ceased.

The number of teachers recruited from students returned from abroad has been relatively small. Even those who have found positions in the schools rarely expect to devote their lives to teaching. There is great need that a larger number of Chinese students trained in America and Europe should respond definitely to the call of their country for well-trained native teachers and educational administrators. In more recent years some of the ablest of the returned students have gone into school work, but there is still an

urgent need for a more adequate response in the right spirit. Too many of even the relatively small number who have entered educational work have failed to realize their obligations and opportunities and the necessity of a gradual development of their own capacities for the higher positions.

The Ministry of Education reports for 1918 a total of 150,000 teachers as against 89,766 for 1910 and 63,566 for 1908. While the largest number of teachers in the lower schools is found among the graduates of Chinese normal schools and training institutes, until quite recently the material attracted to the normal schools has been of relatively poor quality. The increase in numbers has, however, been very rapid.

The total number of students in normal schools and training institutes has grown as follows: 1903, 80; 1904, 2400; 1905, 5321; 1910, 28,572; 1918, 29,500.

One of the hopeful signs of the times with reference to the teacher problem in China is the very effective and rapidly growing Teachers College which has been inaugurated at Nanking under Dr. P. W. Kuo, a graduate of Columbia University. This institution founded in 1914, had in 1917 a faculty of 14 returned students from America, 8 Chinese instructors without modern degrees, and 2 Americans. The college is for men only, the average age of its 283 students being 22. A vocational middle school was opened in 1917 with 95 pupils. There is a primary practice school in connection with the college. This institution is serving as a model and its influence is being strongly felt. There is great need for more and better normal schools of this higher type to train teachers for the secondary schools.

UNSOLVED PROBLEMS

Some of the most important general problems remain unsolved; namely, the financing of the public school system, the provision of universal education, and the relation of missionary institutions to the public educational system.

FINANCE

Funds for the maintenance of education are supposed to be regular items of the national and provincial budgets. Some of the ways by which money has been raised are extremely interesting and at times pathetic. Money formerly devoted to religious processions, theatrical exhibitions, and clan ancestral halls is sometimes put into the school fund. Temples and monasteries have been converted into schools, and temple lands and incomes appropriated. In some cases the return from licensing gambling has been devoted in part to education! Official recognition is offered to encourage private munificence. Some of the provinces have increased the rate of certain local taxes, but such increases are said to have been generally small. Since the establishment of the republic the practice of increasing the rate of local taxes for educational purposes has become more general, but as yet no system of general taxation has been evolved.

There is moreover a failure to discriminate properly between the government tax and the local tax, and there is a constant conflict between the central and provincial governments as to remittances.

The solution of the problem of financing the new educational system is dependent upon the larger problem of the national revenue. Thus far the fiscal aspect of China's national life has been far from satisfactory. The successive and excessive revolutions have played havoc with China's finances, and years must elapse before their effect ceases to be felt. It is estimated that the first revolution alone cost China in additional public expenditures and private losses a sum of about \$172,000,000 United States Currency, aside from the complete cessation of internal revenue for several months. The burden of maintaining the military in China is proportionately greater than in any other country not actually at war, amounting to as much as forty per cent of her total national budget.

The simplest method of increasing China's revenue would be to increase the custom's import duty which has stood for years at only 5 per cent, but this requires an international agreement on the part of the leading foreign powers in treaty with China who recently offered in return for China's joining the Allies to permit an increase to 7 per cent (really only an effective 5 per cent owing to scale of values adopted), which is still remarkably low when you consider that many Chinese products entering the United States pay from 25 to 60 per cent duty. Unable of herself to determine her own policy of customs revenue China's only hope for a future independence lies in the true observance of the open door policy and the development of her natural resources with the financial and technical assistance of America and Great Britain and Japan; but in association, not separately. China's natural resources and her cheap and abundant labor still await proper development and application as the basis of all other prosperity including educational development, and in turn popular education is a necessary accompaniment and adjunct of this material development.

One step toward a solution of the financial problem of general education would be the elimination of the great surplus of non-teaching offices; for while in 1910 the government teaching force numbered less than 90,000, the number of purely administrative officers was nearly 96,000, and in 1918 there are 157,000 officers out of a total staff of 326,000. Private and mission schools should also be encouraged and thus reduce the government's burden at least for a time.

UNIVERSAL EDUCATION

Reliable data are not available but it appears that the proportion of children who attend school varies considerably among the provinces—in some as low as one-fortieth, in others nearly a half.

Some idea of the growth of the government effort in education may be had from the following data as to the number of schools of all grades under various native auspices:

	GOVERNMENT	PUBLIC	PRIVATE	TOTAL
1905	3,605	393	224	4,222
1910	14,301	32,254	5,793	52,238
1915	(Detail not available)			122,286
1918	(Detail not available)			134,000

Of this total number of schools probably 120,000 are lower-primary.

The total enrollment in schools under various native auspices in 1905 was 102,767 and in 1910 it was 1,625,534 whereas in 1903 there were but 1274 students in all modern schools under native auspices. For 1918 the enrollment has been reported as 4,500,000, with an expenditure of about \$40,000,000 (silver).

There should be a million schools instead of 130,000, or an addition of some 870,000 schools having a staff of 2,000,000 teachers, with all that is involved in the preparation of these teachers and the financing of the program.

Then there is the language difficulty. Since the Chinese language is not alphabetical, but ideographic, learning to read is a much harder task than in most countries; and this is intensified by the fact that the written language is not the same as the spoken tongue, and that the spoken language is not the same over the country, but is subject to numerous dialects. The language difficulty is being overcome by: (1) Substitution of a rational process of teaching the meaning instead of mere memorizing the sound of the character, as was the old style in elementary instruction; (2) Use of graded and illustrated readers; (3) Publication of books and papers in colloquial, specially adapted to the daily speech of the people; (4) In the hands of modern trained Chinese the written language proper is growing clearer through simplification of style and introduction of punctuation; (5) A more widespread and insistent emphasis on the study of Mandarin in all schools, in order to hasten the unification of the spoken language throughout China; (6) And a more widespread use of a properly developed romanized or phonetic form of the written language.

But development of the language so as to be able adequately to express the content of modern knowledge presents a most tremendous problem, which only native scholars highly trained in modern thought and equally familiar with their native tongue and its previous development can solve. It will take time, but this difficulty will ultimately be overcome. It is, however, an even greater problem than would have been presented had all the content of modern knowledge knocked at the door of eleventh-century English and demanded immediate expression. So long as this language difficulty remains so largely unsolved, it will be necessary to conduct the higher grades of instruction in the sciences with English as the medium—at least for those who are themselves to be leaders in the renaissance. To have a share in the in the preparation of men who will solve this problem is about as far as the foreigner can hope to go.

The question as to what should be the government attitude toward missionary education is well discussed by P. W. Kuo,⁵ who draws suggestions from the situation in Japan and in India. No definite action has yet been taken by the new government regarding the relation of missionary education to the government system. The system of recognition which China might adopt should require the fulfilment of certain educational standards, but take no account of the religious teaching.

There will need to be considerable progress in the government's own educational program and especially in the settling of its policy and in the choice of qualified administrators, before the missionary institutions could justifiably be subjected to any degree of real governmental control. And yet in due time the government should exercise legitimate supervision of the educational work of the missionaries as well as of other private educational institutions and utilize the missionary schools and colleges to supplement the national educational work.

⁵ Teacher's College, Columbia University, Contributions to Education No. 64, pp. 136-140, New York, 1915.

SCHOOL FEES

Tuition in government schools is determined by the head of the school concerned in accordance with the standard set by the Ministry of Education. In private schools it is determined by the organizers, but must be reported. Fees are charged at a monthly rate ranging from thirty cents in the lower primary to three dollars silver in university grades. In normal schools tuition is free and cash allowances are made to students.

Tuition fees in mission schools vary from zero to a substantial figure in the best established institutions. As a rule the fees are small in the elementary schools, as these are often maintained chiefly for children of church members; in secondary schools the rates rise and in some of the mission colleges there is no difficulty filling all available space at a tuition relatively much higher than is common in America. At Canton Christian College for instance the annual tuition is 15 to 25 times the cost of table board for one month, whereas in an American college with a tuition of say \$150 for the year, table board would ordinarily not necessarily exceed \$50 or even \$30 per month, a ratio of only 3 or 5.

Of course in institutions where these higher fees prevail, numerous scholarships are required to provide for the poor but worthy student.

DEGREES

When in 1905 the ancient system of literary examinations was abolished, the old style Chinese degrees naturally ceased also. Although for a while official degrees were granted to graduates of government colleges and to students returning from abroad upon their passing special examinations, this was abandoned in 1911 when a new civil service was inaugurated entirely separate from the educational system. Graduation from a college itself now confers a degree, which, however, is purely academic and carries no privilege of official preferment.

American mission colleges grant the B.A. degree under supervision of the educational authorities of the state in which the home board of trustees may be organized. For instance, Canton Christian College is under the Regents of the University of the State of New York and diplomas are granted under the Regents' supervision and seal.

STUDENTS ABROAD

An important phase of modern educational development in China is the exodus to study abroad of a large number of young men and also women. The earliest of these went to America and England in the seventies, but the most marked exodus was that to Japan after 1905.

Many of these students returning from Japan became strenuous agitators for reforms, often with no appreciation of the difficulties that could only gradually be overcome, so that the Chinese government at one time imposed restrictions on this exodus to Japan. In more recent years the numbers have been smaller from an entirely different cause. Owing to various actions and demands of Japan the patriotic spirit of the Chinese students has been now and again aroused and forthwith expressed by a protest in the form of a boycott of Japanese institutions. The most recent of these was in the spring of 1918 when practically every Chinese student in Japan either returned home or at least ceased to attend school. The second predominant factor has been the establishment of the so-called Indemnity Scholarships for study in America and the development of Tsing Hua College near Peking for the preliminary training of those who are to enter on such scholarships. According to the original plan 50 students are to be sent each year to the United States on Indemnity Scholarships beginning with 1909. At first these were sent directly from various schools, chiefly the mission colleges, throughout China, after passing competitive examinations in Peking; then in 1911 the Middle School at Tsing Hua was established and now only candidates who first pass through this school are sent to the

United States on Indemnity Scholarships. Others have been granted scholarships from the provincial governments, especially since the inauguration of the republic. Tsing Hua is now aiming to develop a collegiate department of its own so that hereafter most of the indemnity scholars coming to America will come for graduate work only. While we believe that many of those who have come thus far have come at too early a stage, there will not be a true fulfillment of the purposes of the foundation in promoting the mutual relations of China and America if this development of higher work at Tsing Hua prevents an adequate number of qualified students from actually reaching America; for only by their bringing to Americans through personal contact in the United States an appreciation of Chinese characteristics and taking back to China the best that our civilization in all its phases has to offer them can the two peoples be brought effectively together, which, we take it, is the real purpose underlying the return of the indemnity fund. It would seem from recent developments at Tsing Hua that this aim needs to be somewhat safeguarded.

Tsing Hua College in 1917 had an enrollment of 624, all boarders of an average age of 16, while the staff included 25 Chinese trained in the United States, and 17 Americans, as well as 19 Chinese without a foreign training.

It is reported that the Japanese government has proposed to use a part of the 1900 indemnity fund still due to it in the establishing in Peking of a school similar to Tsing Hua, in which students will be prepared under a faculty of Japanese and Chinese returned from Japan, for further study in Japan, and thus form a basis for the development of a better mutual understanding.

Prior to 1907 students abroad were under the care of China's diplomatic representatives. In 1907 a Chinese Educational Mission was organized to supervise all such students, especially those sent under Indemnity Scholarships, and in 1913 all students supported by the provincial governments also came under this Educational Mission's general supervision. In 1909 in Tokyo 1992 Chinese

government students were in collegiate schools and 395 in military schools, totaling 2387; besides 2500 private students. In 1910, 5000 private Chinese students were in Japan, 150 of them women. For the same year in the United Kingdom there were some 140 Chinese government scholarship students and an equal number supported by private funds; in Belgium, 70 government students; in France, 80; in Germany, 60; in Austria, 10; in Russia, 15. No information as to the number of private students in these countries is available. In the United States in 1910 there were at least 600. At present besides 373 Indemnity Students in this country, 38 of whom are women, there are 30 students supported by the Central Government and 183 supported by various provincial governments, of whom 8 are women. There are also some 764 studying in America on their own resources (the number of women in this group has not been available); making a total of 1350, of whom 250 are in preparatory school and 1100 in college.

EDUCATION OF WOMEN

Although women had no proper place in the old educational system of China, when the new era dawned for men it almost immediately dawned for women also. Of course mission schools for girls have existed for many years (since 1844) but even so they have not had adequate emphasis and even today there are not more than three institutions in all China where women can get collegiate training of proper grade; these are all under American mission auspices. It was fifty years after the opening of the first mission school for girls that the first modern school for girls under Chinese auspices was opened (Shanghai, 1897).

Prior to 1907 government officials emphasized the importance of educating women, and some of the provinces established girls' schools, but the central government attempted neither to provide nor to regulate schools for girls. In 1907, however, official provision was made

not only for primary schools for girls but also for normal schools and women have been given government scholarships for study abroad. At the present time there are 46 such in the United States and about 80 others* on private support.

There are today fifty-four girls' normal schools of more or less excellence and Chinese opinion is rapidly developing a new status for the women of Cathay. Certainly there is no more significant factor in the renaissance of China than this; but very much yet remains to be done, and many first class high schools and a few first class colleges for women are greatly needed.

Among the higher educational institutions in Canton, for instance, which attempt to serve a region of say 30,000,000 population, there is no provision for college work for women, except at the Canton Christian College in connection with the regular courses for men also, and no adequate provision for first class high school education for girls, though at least one of the mission schools is aiming to develop such. It is a time for the concentration of all forces whose combined strength will be needed to meet the opportunity adequately.

(To be continued)

* Data as reported through the Chinese Students Alliance and through the Educational Commissioner in Washington differ.

CHINA'S RIGHTS AT THE PEACE TABLE

By Gilbert Reid, D.D., Shanghai, China

If China manages to have righted all the wrongs wrought on her only within the limited period of the World War she may be satisfied. It is impossible to get a true perspective of conditions in the Far East, if the eye looks merely on conditions in Europe or America. Observation true to the facts must be all-around and, as far as possible, free from the bewilderment of passion. It is only natural to have misconception of the doings and inter-relations of the Chinese on the one side and of all other peoples, Western or Japanese, on the other, if there is already a preconception, either for or against some particular people, as shaped by bias incident to warfare in Europe. Prejudice directed against Japan may lead one to overlook all the misdeeds of the United States and her Allies as perpetrated, somewhat under cover, in Far Cathay. To understand the situation, to appreciate the wrongs done to China, and by whom, as well as to realize who are responsible for seeing that these wrongs be righted at the Peace Table, it is all important that these and all other predilections—the pro and anti-spirit—be shaken off, leaving the mind in the innocence of unruffled judiciousness.

Another preliminary to a correct study of this serious problem is to appreciate that just as all aliens residing in the United States should in times of emergency place America's interests first, or return to the land from whence they came, so all foreigners in China should place first, not the interests of their own country, but the interests of China, or, under the behests of a constraining patriotism, return to their native land, at least till the interests of all shall work injury to none. Missionaries and educationists in China ought especially to be subject to such a rule;

otherwise their mission will be looked upon as political, to denationalize those whom they profess to aim to bless.

If the reader, then, feels like casting blame on what we are about to write, let him blame the facts, not the writer.

First, we deal with concrete facts, then with some of the abstract principles, made conspicuous by President Wilson, and finally with the results as determined at the Peace Conference.

The first series of facts relates to the bringing of the war into China, and next the bringing of China into the war. In both cases, Japan has been soundly berated for making great gains at China's expense; but in the one case Great Britain should be censured for initiating the trouble for China, and in the other case the United States. This line of reasoning directly conflicts with the usual habits of placing all the blame for China's misfortunes on Japan.

WAR BROUGHT INTO CHINA

As soon as war arose in Europe, the Chinese government set to work in real earnestness to ward off dangers from the war, to maintain strict neutrality, and to defend China's neutral rights. Request was made of the Japanese government to cooperate in the same neutral policy and so preserve the peace of the Far East. The German government also gave a despatch to Japan that if Japan remained neutral, German ships would not attack British shipping in China seas. Moreover, to remove all excuse that the port of Tsingtao was a German naval base, the German squadron left for the southern Pacific and was finally destroyed at the south end of South America. The Germans made no attack on any colony of Russia, France or Great Britain or on any territory leased to them by China, in all the Far East. Contrary to the previous wish expressed by Sir Edward Grey, that the war be circumscribed to the narrowest limits, the war was quickly extended into all the continents of the world. China, too, was to become entangled. The initial wrong, culminating in many other wrongs and vast catastrophes

to China, was not done by Japan. To ignore this fact is to be unjust to Japan, and to be false to the truth.

The British government, contrary to the wish of China, made request of Japan, or, as the *London Times* said, "appealed" to Japan, to attack the German-leased territory of Kiaochow, with its port of Tsingtao, on the southern side of the province of Shantung. Japan turned away from China's request and complied as a faithful Ally with the request of Great Britain. The Japanese government first issued an ultimatum to Germany to surrender and to hand over Tsingtao to Japan to be in turn handed over to China. The ultimatum was ignored, and the Japanese, aided by a few British troops, proceeded to attack Tsingtao, destroy its forts, and take prisoners its defenders. As the ultimatum was not accepted, some Japanese claim that there is no duty on Japan's part to return Kiaochow to China.

Japan, however, worked injury to China in trying to subjugate these few Germans. As if the great Japanese army and navy were powerless to effect the victory, by attacking from the sea, they made it a matter of "military necessity" to violate China's neutral rights and so the rules of international law, in two particulars. Japanese transports entered a Chinese port on the north side of Shantung promontory, 180 kilometers away, a port that was not a treaty port at all, still less leased to Germany, and in the face of China's protests landed the troops and guns on Chinese soil. In the face of further protests, and in clear violation of the Hague Convention, Japanese troops and guns were taken across the neutral territory of China to attack Tsingtao from the rear or landward side, marching as great a distance through neutral territory as German troops marched across Belgium to reach Paris.

What is wrong in Europe is wrong in Asia; Right is Right the world around. Japan made a "scrap of paper" of the Hague Convention.

In accordance with this same Hague Convention, China could have resisted by force of arms, as Belgium resisted German troops, but this would have placed China on the

side of Germany, against the combined forces of Japan, Great Britain, France and Russia. China would have suffered worse than in her weak, negative and neutral position.

Having captured Tsingtao, Japanese troops, under some other kind of "military necessity," proceeded to march westward to the provincial capital of Tsinan, a distance equal to the length of Belgium from east to west, and to take over as Japanese personal property all the railway and mining concessions granted to Germans by the Chinese government on Chinese territory—concessions financed by German money. Where before in international law is it prescribed that where one nation is at war with another nation, it can go into a third and neutral nation and seize all the property of that other and belligerent nation? For Japan to act thus was to make herself, and not China, sovereign in China; the wrong done to China was greater than that done to Germany.

Britons were glad to see German trade and influence in China removed as a menace; but they were less satisfied to see the advantages which had been won by Germany, transferred to Japan, a new and rising rival. As to what might happen to China neither Britons nor Japanese had any care.

These wrongs done to China were intensified very soon by Twenty-one Demands presented by Japan, with injunction to complete secrecy. When the Chinese government delayed in the acceptance, an ultimatum was presented, not this time to Germany but to China. China, seeing the futility of relying on right or reason, yielded to stronger military force. Agreements were made and signed—signed on the Chinese part by the chief delegate to the Peace Conference. These agreements related to special rights and prior position for Japan in Shantung, in inner Mongolia, in southern Manchuria, in the Yangtze Valley (known as British sphere of interest), and in Fukien. Certain matters affecting China's sovereignty were postponed for future negotiation.

To put the issue clearly before the mind, will Great Britain, having instigated Japan to bring the war into China, now see to it that the wrongs done to China by this act shall in some way be righted? Will Great Britain for the sake of the cause of Righteousness, befriend China and possibly offend Japan? Or shall China be placed in bondage as a result of a war, begun in Europe, and thrust into the midst of the four hundred millions of China?

CHINA BROUGHT INTO THE WAR

If China's entry into the war was to have any effect on the distinctive military operations of the war in Europe, other than commercial rivalries, then it was right to have put forth effort to persuade China to abandon neutrality and become one of the belligerents. If, moreover, China could only get her wrongs righted by being present at the peace table, and if she could be present at the peace table only by joining the war on the Allied side, then it was wise for her to yield to outside persuasion. Should the presence of Chinese delegates in Paris be without effect, it would have been better for her to have remained neutral and to be at peace in her own borders and with all peoples. By going into the war, the wrongs done her were augmented, and with the wrongs dire catastrophe.

The war issue was thrust into Chinese politics primarily by an innocent suggestion of the American President in February, 1917, that China as well as all other neutral nations imitate the example of the United States in severing diplomatic relations with the German Imperial Government. If this suggestion or request had been simply communicated to China in the regular way without any pressure, no harm would have been done. China would have remained neutral and at peace. Moreover, no further advantage would have accrued to Japan at China's expense. However, for some reason or other best known to the parties concerned, a crusade, a propaganda, under American finesse was begun to embroil China against Germany, in the eventuality of war between

Germany and the United States. The American agitation in Peking was termed by Samuel G. Blythe in the *Saturday Evening Post* a "flying wedge." By strenuous effort and plenty of secret diplomacy, the wedge, thus thrust into China, separated the president of China and his adherents of neutrality from the premier and his adherents of war. Most of parliament sided with the premier. What was clear, another cause of friction had arisen. And this was the first harm done.

The great argument presented to the Chinese was that by closer alliance of the two republics it would be possible to checkmate the aggressions of Japan. Hitherto Japan for her own interests had advised China against going into the war, but now, on scenting the American argument, she turned round, rushed in ahead of America and became the most urgent and active of all in favor of declaring war as well as of severing diplomatic relations. At the same time, the Entente Allies made secret agreements with Japan to allow China to go into the war. Japan has remained at the head, the paramount factor in China's international relations. This is the second harm done to China.

While at first it was Young China who saw the force of American argument, later it was the party of militarists and conservatism—military autocracy—that insisted on participation in the World War. As this party favored war, it had the support and recognition of the nations arrayed against Germany. Hence the nations which were fighting for democracy in Europe and the overthrow of military autocracy, were turning against democracy in China and favoring that which they condemned in Europe. This was the third harm done to China.

The president, Li Luan-hung, who wanted the war question kept away from China, was devoted to the ideas of democracy. He had the whole country back of him in building up a real republic. He had eight months only to put the republic to the test. If the war issue and its complications had not arisen, President Li would doubtless have succeeded in making the republic a success.

Hindrance to this achievement was the fourth harm done to China.

A clash came between the reactionary, autocratic militarists and the party of democracy, progress and constitutionalism. The result was civil war or the fourth revolution. This was the fifth harm done to China.

Japan by gaining the predominance succeeded in making in 1917 and 1918 a large number of Agreements or contracts with the military party in China, whereby valuable concessions were given to Japan, while China became burdened with financial obligations to Japan. Most of this work was done in secret. This was the sixth harm done to China.

When it was found that China did but little to help the Allies in the war, and still more failed to wage a commercial war on Germany, as Great Britain desired, then about the time of the armistice the Allied ministers along with the Americans presented China with a complaint of remissness on twelve particulars. Later, under more pressure, the new President of China some time after the armistice, issued a Mandate calling for the repatriation to Germany and Austria-Hungary of enemy aliens in China and the seizure of German property five or six months after this same armistice. This was new international law being taught to the Oriental. This was the seventh harm done to China.

China by entering the war has been compelled to take orders from a combination of seven fighting nations, sometimes one, sometimes another and sometimes all. China has lost her power of independent action. This is the eighth and the greatest harm done to China.

As another harm, which may be traced back to the war issue through precedence granted to Japan, may be cited the Lansing-Ishii exchange of Notes (needing no ratification by the Senate), whereby Japan is recognized as having special interests in China—an arrangement made unbeknown to China. As between the United States and Japan in China, Japan may be prior; but as between China and Japan, China has special and prior interests in China as Japan has in Japan.

Of the four presidents of China, President Sun Yat-sen strongly opposed the war, President Yuan Shih-kai resisted the frequent requests of his friend, Sir John Jordan, to join the Entente (all before America had come into the war), President Li Yuan-hung preferred neutrality with equal friendship to all, while President Feng Kno-chang, the one who actually declared war (with no joint action of people or parliament), insisted that China was not joining the Allies but was waging war independently!

The question, then, to be put clearly before the mind is this: Will the United States, for initiating the war issue in China and for giving Japan added opportunities, now see to it that the wrongs done to China shall in some way be righted? Will the United States, for the sake of the cause of Righteousness, befriend China and possibly offend Japan?

Before the war there was a fairly safe balance of power in China. In general, Russia, France and Belgium worked together, and Great Britain and Germany worked together. So far as the United States and Japan took part, it was more apt to be with Great Britain and Germany than with Russia, France and Belgium. The big Powers (excepting the United States) had each a sphere of influence, the greatest being that of the British. Each power was able to secure from China concessions for railways and mines within its own sphere, but with an "open door" policy as to trade in all parts of China. No one of these great Powers was willing to see China dismembered, and thus be limited to its own special sphere of influence. Now this balance has been unbalanced, and the "open door" policy has been cast aside so far as the two Central Powers are concerned. A plan is in full operation for destroying Germany as a commercial competitor in China, but, in doing so, it places all the German interests and privileges in the hands of the Japanese, who already are a strong commercial rival.

Having dealt with concrete facts and their interpretation, we may now apply a few of the abstract principles announced to all peoples by President Wilson.

In his "fourteen points" speech he said:

What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression.

All that is needed is to insist that the spirit of these words be applied unreservedly to the sovereign status of China. If Japan and her Allies have in the past been guilty of "force and selfish aggression" in their treatment of China, all that is needed is for the United States to insist that these nations be truly penitent, as befits a League of Nations, and spontaneously recompense China for wrong done her in days gone by.

Another wise remark, showing that President Wilson is a sound student of history, is the following:

Special alliance and economic rivalries and hostilities have been the prolific source in the modern world of the plans and passions that produce war. It would be an insincere as well as insecure peace that did not exclude them in definite and binding terms.

Nothing more apparent. Shall the principle be applied to the inter-relations of foreign nations in China?

We now come to the most important of all in the discussion, namely, the outcome as determined at the Peace Conference.

The Chinese, having gone into the war in order that China might represent herself, and not be represented by Japan, at the Peace Conference, will be sadly disappointed if as a result their wishes are cast aside for the sake of expediency, and Japan's position in China is stronger than ever by being confirmed by the Peace Conference. Moreover by being encouraged to appeal to the United States and Great Britain as against Japan it would be humiliating if the only result should be that the Chinese incur the resentment of the Japanese.

For some reason, the Chinese have laid no stress on Japan's violation of international law when the Japanese

seized by conquest all the German rights in Shantung as well as in the mode of attack on Tsingtao. If this Peace Conference is to be based on Righteousness, then the Chinese should have strongly protested against all violations of law by whomsoever perpetrated.

The Chinese have presented as their chief desire, that Kiaochow, including Tsingtao, be taken away from Germany and restored to China. The Japanese have expressed a willingness to do so, on "conditions." These conditions had been agreed to by China in the Agreement made in 1915 subsequent to the twenty-one demands and the ultimatum. They consisted in allowing Japan a concession in the best part of Tsingtao to be under Japanese jurisdiction, and in granting to all others an International Settlement. This would make Tsingtao a second Shanghai. Not much would be left to China for her to administer and control.

The Japanese are now satisfied when the Peace Conference confirms Japan in its position and claims with respect to Kiaochow. The treaty states that Germany's rights are terminated and that Kiaochow and all German rights are to pass over to Japan. It is not even stated that Japan will restore Kiaochow to China. A man from Mars, reading the treaty, would not suppose there is any China, or, at least, that Kiaochow has been a part of Chinese territory.

The argument advanced by the Chinese seems to have been that the Agreement signed in 1915 was "under duress." Whether so or not, it was for the Peace Conference to have insisted that this treaty of peace was to recognize only Right, and not the "right of conquest." Kiaochow has never ceased to be Chinese territory. It was never a German colony; it was only leased to Germany, and it must be acknowledged that the Germans made a beautiful port of the Bay of Kiaochow. If self-determination is to mean anything, it means that Chinese territory is not to be seized by Japan without China's free consent, and, particularly, that the Chinese people living in Kiaochow shall determine for themselves whether they prefer to remain Chinese or come under Japanese rule.

The trouble with the new peace treaty at this point is not so much that the poorest portion of Tsingtao may not be restored to China by Japan, with due formalities, but that Japan is confirmed in her claim that her wishes and not those of China are to be respected and that the right of conquest still rules.

Even more important is the disposal of all German railway and mining concessionary rights in Shantung. As China has been the other contracting party, it would seem as if the German rights should pass into Chinese hands, should it be necessary for Germany to relinquish them.

But Japan says "No," and the peace conferees again confirm Japan in her claim. Valuable property for the Japanese to get a hold of, "without charges!" Though the Japanese in 1914 forcibly took possession of these rights on Chinese territory, contrary to all law or justice, yet now the Peace conferees confirm Japan in this act or right of conquest. Japan originally seized this property, not on German or Japanese territory, but on Chinese territory, and, that, too, when China was a neutral nation.

The Japanese excuse their action by saying that in 1915 a treaty was made by Japan and China in which the final disposal was to be left to Japan and Germany to determine, and in which China was to have no part. The Chinese now claim that the treaty of 1915 was signed "under duress." The Paris peace treaty confirms Japan in possession of these concessionary rights granted to Germany by China. The treaty practically confirms the law that one nation at war with another can not only seize property of enemy subjects, but can do it in a third and neutral nation, as China was at the time of occupation in 1914-1915.

Greater than Japanese possession of these valuable concessions, is the recognition accorded to Japan by the Big Three and the treaty of peace at Paris. China, on the other hand, is slighted, ignored, deserted.

In a word, the peace treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations tacitly confirm Japan in her position

of paramountcy in China. This is in addition to such confirmation in the Lansing-Ishii agreement.

Such being the case, it appears that the better policy of the Chinese delegates would have been to curry favor with Japan and form an alliance for mutual defense than to curry favor with Anglo-Americans, who, as Mr. C. T. Wang has said, "left China in the lurch."

Other parts of the treaty of peace stipulate for a few blessings to China, outside of the prevalent policy of right of conquest.

The astronomical instruments seized by Germany in 1900 are to be restored to China. It may be borne in mind that a few years ago the German government made an offer to the same effect. It is well to have it done now, as showing that the peace conference has done something for China.

The new treaty of peace also stipulates that the Chinese need not pay any more Boxer indemnity to Germany. What the Chinese have asked for, one of the desiderata, is that the Boxer indemnities due to all countries be relinquished. All that can be expected is that the allied and associated governments now agree that Germany must comply with China's wishes.

It is also stated by Baron Makino that Japan restores to China, in return for economic rights to go to Japan, "complete sovereignty in Shantung." It was never known before that Chinese sovereignty in Shantung had ceased or that it had been claimed by Japan. Japan merely pretends to give to Chinese that which was already China's and not Japan's.

On the mere matter of justice, as comprehended by ordinary minds, and so by 400,000,000 of Chinese, it looks as if it had no place in the decisions reached at the Peace Conference concerning China, one of the Allies arrayed against Germany.

All in all, the Great War has worked havoc to China, and the agents have been those of our own household, and not those who are barbaric and conquered.

THE PROBLEM OF THE NEW AND SMALL
NATIONAL-STATES IN CENTRAL AND
SOUTHERN EUROPE: A SUMMARY
SURVEY

By Harry E. Barnes, of the Department of History and International Relations, Clark University

I. INTRODUCTION

Never before in history has a peace congress been faced with such extensive problems in the matter of reconstructing the political map of Europe. Even the treaties of Westphalia, Utrecht and Vienna seem petty in their territorial redistributions as compared with the changes which the present conference must bring about, regardless of the nature or the justice of the details of the settlement. In view of the immense importance of the problems involved in the settlement of the conflicting national claims, for both the present and the future, it has occurred to the writer that a brief but comprehensive historical and ethnographic survey of the contested districts might be of value in serving as the background against which to estimate in a critical manner the results of the work of the peace conference. While it is obvious that an article covering so many problems in so short a space will lack utterly in originality, it may at least possess the merit of being relatively comprehensive and complete as regards the major aspects of the question. As far as it has been humanly possible, the writer has kept his own opinions wholly in restraint and has endeavored to base all assertions upon evidence of the highest reliability and impartiality. Upon matters of detail, which may be contested, no opinions have been expressed, for our information is often in such cases relatively incomplete and the exact facts can be discovered

only through a local investigation by a field commission of experts.¹

II. THE OPPRESSED NATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE WAR

In the following brief survey of the European nations not completely united and emancipated, one is justified in omitting any discussion of the case of the Irish, the French in Alsace-Lorraine, the Danes in Schleswig, or the Italians of the Irredenta district, as either too well known to demand any special consideration or as questions concerning the solution of which there can be no debate as to the larger issues involved. Attention may be centered upon that confused field of thwarted national aspirations and conflicting national claims which extends from the head of the Gulf of Bothnia on the north to Crete on the south, and from the Erz Gebirge on the west to the delta of the Danube on the east.

The northernmost of these oppressed nations are the Finns of Finland Esthonia and northern Livonia.² Orig-

¹ For a survey of the historical development of the problems of nationality and nationalism, which would serve as the logical introduction to this article, the reader may be referred to the article on "Nationalism: Its Historical Development," in the forthcoming edition of the *Encyclopedia Americana*.

² The citing of authorities for every statement in this brief sketch of the submerged nations would not only be pedantic and wearisome, but quite impossible within the space limitations imposed. A general note of indebtedness must suffice. For all matters concerning racial distribution I have relied upon W. Z. Ripley's *Race of Europe*, the most brilliant American contribution to European ethnography, always keeping in mind his convincing demonstration in Chapter II of the lack of any definite correlation between race, language and nationality. On the question of language distribution the chief authority has been Leon Dominian's, *The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe*. The guides chosen in the field of the general problems of nationality in this district have been A. J. Toynbee's *Nationality and the War*, Stoddard and Frank, *The Stake of the War* and the several detailed works of R. W. Seton-Watson, as well as his brilliant summary of these problems in the chapters he contributed to the cooperative volume on *The War and Democracy*. The admirable chapter by James Bryce on "Nationality" in his *Essays and Addresses in Wartime* has also been very helpful, as have the many valuable and scholarly articles in *The New Europe*, *The Journal of Race Development*, *The Current History Magazine*, *The Atlantic Monthly*, *The National Geographic Magazine* and other leading contemporary journals. The brief historical sketches are

inally constituting the stock which inhabited most of the great plain of Russia, they have been forced north against the Lapps by the successive invasions of Slavs from the south. They were converted to Christianity by Bishop Henry, an English missionary, in the middle of the twelfth century. In the fourteenth century Finland was annexed to Sweden and about 1350 Denmark, which had controlled Esthonia, surrendered it to the Teutonic Knights. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the vigorous Swedish monarch, Gustavus Adolphus, obtained for Sweden both Esthonia and Livonia. While the Swedes were able to control the Finns politically for a considerable period, they were never able to impose their culture upon their Finnish subjects beyond inducing them to accept Swedish Protestantism. In 1721, by the Treaty of Nystad, Peter the Great obtained for Russia Esthonia, Livonia and part of Finland, and by 1809 Russia had secured complete political control of all the Finnish peoples. For some ninety years thereafter the Finns enjoyed practical cultural autonomy, but in 1899 the advocates of the Russification policy of Pan-Slavism induced Nicholas II to extend these measures to Finland. The Finns, however, took advantage of the weakness of the czar in the revolution of 1905 and compelled him to restore the Finnish constitution and to consent to the many liberal political reforms proposed by the Finns. A revival of Russification policy by the Russian bureaucracy in 1913-14 was terminated by the outbreak of the World War, but was probably instrumental in inducing the Finns to declare their independence from Russia in December, 1915. From the racial standpoint Ripley, the leading authority on the racial distribution of Europe, holds that the Finns are a branch of that primordial Nordic stock which inhabited the region now known as

drawn mainly from the recent and scholarly manual on medieval history by Lynn Thorndike and from the excellent surveys of modern history in the works of Hayes, Hazen, Robinson and Beard, Andrews, Seignobos, Fyffe and Schapiro, as well as special articles in historical and critical journals. Details regarding population and religion have been obtained from the above mentioned works and from the *Statesman's Year Book* and articles in recent and authoritative encyclopedias.

Russia and from which have been differentiated the Teutonic, Letto-Lithuanian and Finnish types. The Nordics were pressed north by the invasions of the Alpine Slavs from the southwest. The Finns, having been massed against the extremely broadheaded Lapps in the north and intermarried with them, have acquired a tendency towards broadheadedness which was quite unknown in the original stock and is practically absent among the Finns of the Baltic provinces of Esthonia and Livonia who have not been brought into proximity with the Lapps. In recent times there have been three languages used in Finland, the Swedish in commercial and international relations and to a considerable degree in culture and religion, the Russian as the official speech, and the Finnish as the national language. The Finns number some three and a half millions of people, of whom about two and a half millions live in Finland. In 1910 an authoritative estimate put the proportion of Finnish-speaking peoples at 88 per cent and at least that proportion are of a definite Finnish stock. In religion the Finns are overwhelmingly Lutheran. The strength of the national bond between the Finns of Finland and their kinsmen in the Baltic provinces can only be determined when the confusion and conflicting claims growing out of the present war have subsided.

Living next to the Finns of Esthonia are the Letts and the Lithuanians who inhabit the Baltic provinces of southern Livonia and Courland and their hinterland. The Letts dwell in the Baltic coast region and the Lithuanians in the adjacent inland districts. While the Letts and Lithuanians are physically identical and linguistically and culturally closed allied, their history has been at least slightly different. That this variation began only after they had been pushed up towards the Baltic by the oncoming Slavs cannot be doubted. The conquest and colonization of the Letts by the Teutonic Knights was begun in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The Letts followed the Order into an acceptance of Lutheranism, but after the Order was dissolved in 1526 the Letts were later partitioned between Poland and Sweden. It was not long, however,

until the Letts were united with the Lithuanians in a common subjection to Russia. By the Treaty of Nystad in 1721 Livonia was ceded by Sweden to Russia and Courland was obtained by the third partition of Poland. Lithuania has had a much more distinguished history. At the opening of the fourteenth century it was a great non-Christian duchy stretching from the Baltic provinces on the north to the Black Sea on the south. In 1386 its Grand Duke, Jagello, married Jadwiga, daughter of the king of Poland, accepted Roman Catholicism for himself and his subjects and became King of Poland as Wladyslaw II. This purely personal union was changed into a constitutional one by the Union of Lubin in 1569. The merger with Poland was never popular, however, with the Lithuanians, and in accordance with the principle of national self-determination this historical union could in no way be used as a basis for a claim to Lithuania on the part of the restored Polish state. Lithuania constituted the majority of that part of Poland which went to Russia in the partitions from 1772 to 1795. Until 1876 it was allowed a large amount of cultural autonomy, but after that date the Russification policy was pursued with the usual result of only increasing the national sentiment of the Lithuanians. Racially the Letts and Lithuanians are identical, both being branches of the same primordial Nordic race from which the Teutons and Finns were also differentiated. The Lithuanian language is one of the most interesting in Europe, being the best preserved representative of the so-called "Aryan" type. It is said that the intelligent Lithuanian peasant has little difficulty in reading Sanscrit. The Lettish language differs but slightly from the Lithuanian. Religion is the chief point of division between the Letts and Lithuanians. While some Letts belong to the Greek Church and some Lithuanians are Protestants, the vast majority of the Letts are ardent Lutherans and the Lithuanians are overwhelmingly Roman Catholic. Their Roman Catholicism is the only thing which the Lithuanians have in common with the Poles. It is generally estimated that there are about two and a half millions of Lithuanians and a

million and a quarter of Letts, though in the official Russian censuses they are lumped together as all Lithuanians.

Of all the nations freed by the war Poland can, perhaps, claim the most notable and romantic past. Little is known of the origins of the Poles—a Slavic people—before the foundation of the vast Polish kingdom embracing most of central Europe by Boleslaw the Brave (992–1025). This abortive domain was divided in 1139 and not reunited until 1320. In the middle of the thirteenth century the Teutonic Knights began their missionary work and colonization among the Poles and succeeded in converting them to Roman Catholicism. The military success of the Knights was not as marked as their theological progress; twenty-four years after the personal union with Lithuania under Jagello, the Poles and Lithuanians utterly defeated the Knights in the battle of Tannenberg. In 1683 John Sobieski, king of Poland, relieved Vienna and saved central Europe from the Mohammedan. The complete union with Lithuania at Lublin, in 1569, gave Poland assurance of an ample territory, but the state was so beset with fatal weaknesses that decline was inevitable and ultimate extinction invited. The kingdom was extensive but lacked distinct or defensible boundaries; there were serious religious and racial diversities; gross political, social and economic inequalities existed; the constitutional arrangements invited anarchy; and the control by foreign kings resulted in the exploitation of Polish interest. The first partition between Prussia, Austria and Russia in 1772, while unjustified on the part of the partitioning powers can stir little sympathy, but not so with the second and third partitions in 1793 and 1795. In the twenty-one years that had intervened the Poles had eliminated many of the fatal economic and political weaknesses that had previously endangered their national existence and had given promising evidence of being on the eve of a far-reaching political renaissance, but the avaricious czarina, Catherine II, would tolerate no strong Slavic state obstructing Russian contact with the west and she arranged the outrageous partitions of 1793 and 1795 which terminated the political independence of Poland. The national hope

of the Poles were temporarily revived by Napoleon's creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, in 1807. Still more promising was the establishment, in November of 1815, of a Kingdom of Poland by the then liberal czar, Alexander I. This embraced much of the old kingdom of Poland and was favored with the most liberal political constitution then in existence in Europe, but the Poles desired complete political independence and could not resist the contagion of the revolutionary movement that swept over Europe in 1830. Their revolt was speedily suppressed and the short-lived kingdom was united with Russia. Encouraged by the growth of nationalism in Germany and Italy and by the benevolent but treacherous attitude of Napoleon III, the Poles made one last desperate attempt in 1863 to obtain their freedom. This rebellion was crushed with even greater ease than the revolt of thirty-three years earlier, and a most brutal and thorough-going punishment was meted out to the gallant rebels. That policy of Russification then began, by means of which the Russians have since tried without avail to crush the national aspirations of their Polish subjects. The one extenuating compensation which the Poles have enjoyed since 1863 has been the fact that the coming of the industrial revolution to Russia made Poland the center of Russia economic life. That part of the Polish nation which was included within the Kingdom of Prussia—a part of upper Silesia, Posen, West Prussia and the Masurian district of East Prussia—has met with oppression only less severe than that which their kinsmen received from Russia. But the rigorous religious, educational and agrarian policy of Bismarck and Bülow only served to stir the resentment of the Poles and to reanimate their national spirit. Only in Austrian Galicia were the Poles accorded that degree of autonomy and liberal treatment which has made them partially satisfied to dwell in political subjection to another state. The Poles are a branch of the Slavic division of the Alpine race, but are much less broadheaded than their Czech and Slovak neighbors on the south, or even the Russians to the east. Their contact with so many different peoples has caused a

considerable prevalence of racial intermixture. Their language is a distinct western Slavic dialect. In religion over three-fourths of the Poles are Roman Catholic. The only notable exception is to be found in the three hundred thousand Protestants in the Masurian Lakes district of East Prussia. The most liberal estimates of the number of Poles in Europe at the outbreak of the war put it at about twenty-three millions, of whom some three million five hundred thousand live in Germany, about four and a quarter millions in Austria and the remainder in Russia.

Stretching from southeastern Poland to the Sea of Azov is the district of the Ukraine, the home of the Little Russians or Ruthenians. Roughly this is the region included between the Dniester and Dnieper Rivers and coincides with the fertile "black-earth" district of Russia, the most productive cereal growing region in Europe. The Little Russians or Ruthenians of the Ukraine have had a most varied history. Settling in southern Russia in one of the most recent waves of Slav immigration, they were first welded into something like a southern Russian state with Kiev as their capital by Yaroslaff in the first half of the eleventh century. An attempt was made to introduce at least a veneer of Byzantine civilization. The kingdom lasted little more than a generation and the eastern part of the region was overrun by the Tartar invasion of the thirteenth century. In the fourteenth century the majority of the Ukraine was conquered by the expanding Lithuanian principality and was later included in the joint kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. In the middle of the seventeenth century an unsuccessful rebellion of the Ukraine led to the placing of the eastern portion under the suzerainty of Russia, but most of it remained with the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom until the partitions. Austria obtained the Ruthenians of eastern Galicia by the first partition in 1772, and Russia secured the remaining portion by the partitions of 1793 and 1795. Within the last forty years there has developed a determined Ukrainian movement for independence from Russia which has been greatly stimulated by the same Russification policy that has been applied to the Finns, Letts,

Lithuanians and Poles. Racially the Ruthenians are the purest of the Russian Slavs and the best Russian exemplification of the Alpine race. They speak the purest of the Slavic dialects. Most of the inhabitants of the western Ukraine adhere to the curious Uniate Church. This was created in 1595 by the Union of Brest-Litovsk, according to the terms of which the Ukrainians of the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom were made to accept the supremacy of the Roman pontiff, while at the same time they were allowed to retain their Greek orthodox liturgy, ritual, ceremonial and organization. Further east the Ruthenians are divided between the Uniate and the Orthodox Churches. Liberal estimates place the total number of Ruthenians at about thirty millions, of whom some three and a half millions reside in Galicia, seven hundred thousand in the Carpathian district of Hungary and about fifty thousand in Bukowina. The others are, of course, found in southern Russia.

South and west of the home of the Poles and Ruthenians is found the land of the Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia and of the Slovaks of northern Hungary. Like the Poles, these peoples have had a distinguished past. Their Slavic ancestors came into this district during the sixth century and were organized into the first Bohemian state during the second quarter of the seventh century. Absorbed by the transitory Great Moravian Empire in the ninth century, Bohemia regained its independence in the tenth after the Magyars had overthrown the Moravians and absorbed the Slovaks. In 1068 it became an independent kingdom and during most of the fourteenth century its dynasty headed the Holy Roman Empire. The height of its prosperity was probably attained under Charles IV (1347-1378). The Hussite wars of the fifteenth century were not only of a religious nature, but were also a great national movement. In 1526, to gain the strength of unity against the Turks, the Bohemians accepted the personal leadership of the House of Hapsburg. Almost exactly a century later, as a result of the first episode of the Thirty Years' War, Bohemia lost its independence and there began a period

of ruthless Germanization and forcible conversion to Catholicism which for nearly two centuries seemed to have crushed out the national life of the Czechs. In the first half of the nineteenth century, however, this was rekindled by the reaction of the nationalistic aspects of the Napoleonic period upon Bohemia and by the arousing of Czechish interest in their national culture and history by a number of brilliant scholars, among them the linguist and philologist, Dobrovsky, the philosopher, Kollar, the archeologist, Safarik, and, above all the historian, Palacky. The national movement in the spring and early summer of 1848 was brought to a speedy and tragic end, but since 1868 the Czechs have maintained a steady campaign for the recognition of their national rights and aspirations by Vienna, the old Czech party demanding that Emperor Franz Joseph be formally crowned king of Bohemia at Prague, and the Young Czech party looking forward to the more aggressive and ambitious program of uniting with the Slovaks, Ruthenians and Jugo-Slavs in the attempt to make the Dual-Monarchy a Slavic state. Racially the Czechs are, of course, Slavs, being much taller and more broadheaded than the Poles and, to a lesser degree, than the Ruthenians. In Bohemia and Moravia, however, there are large minorities of Germans which constitute about 36 per cent of the total population in Bohemia and 29 per cent in Moravia. Czechs and Slovaks use the Slavonic dialect of the Czechs as their national literary language. In religion the great majority of the Czechs are Roman Catholic, while the Slovaks are fairly evenly divided between Catholics and Protestants, but religion plays little part in the present national complex of the Czecho-Slovaks. In 1910 it was estimated that there were about six and a half millions of Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia and slightly more than two millions of Slovaks in the Tatra districts of north-western Hungary.

Though the Magyars of Hungary are normally and quite correctly regarded as a dominating or governing nation, it is at the same time true that since 1526 they have been in varying degrees subject to the House of Hapsburg. The Hungarians, presumably, an off-shoot of the Finns, came

into the great plain of Hungary in the ninth century. They tried to push further westward into Germany but were decisively defeated by Otto the Great in 955. Receding into Hungary, the Magyars remained as a wedge separating the northern and southern Slavs of central Europe and were organized into a stable state by their first king, St. Stephen (997-1038). In the twelfth century they began their expansion southward through Croatia to the Adriatic. By 1200 they had been converted to Roman Catholicism and had very generally adopted European customs and institutions. In 1222 King Andreas II issued the famous Golden Bull which served as the constitution of Hungary until the revolution of 1848. In the thirteenth century Hungary was overrun by the great Mongol invasion from Asia; the Hungarian army was crushed in 1241 and the country devastated. Recovering from this disaster the Hungarians met a similar fate at the hands of Suleiman the Magnificent, the leader of the Turks, some three centuries later at the battle of the Mohacs, 1526. The Turks occupied the most of Hungary and turned the remainder over to the Hapsburgs. After the tragedy of Mohacs the Hungarians never regained their complete independence until the end of the present World War. In 1699, by the terms of the treaty of Karlowitz, that part of Hungary taken by the Turks was returned to Austria and until 1848 the Hungarians enjoyed a large degree of autonomy under the Hapsburg emperors who reigned as kings of Hungary. The promising revolution of 1848 failed primarily because the Magyars were unwilling to grant to the other nations of Hungary the same concessions from Budapest that the Magyars had succeeded in extorting from Vienna. After the creation of a temporarily independent Hungarian republic in the spring of 1849 the Magyars were overwhelmingly defeated by the Austrians and their Russian allies and were severely punished for their uprising. When the Hapsburgs were humbled by the double defeat of 1866, they found it necessary to placate the Hungarians by the arrangements of the Ausgleich of 1867, which created the Dual-Monarchy and raised Hungary nearly to a plane of

equality with Austria. This important concession did not, however, give Hungary independence and it was most unjust to the non-Magyar majority in Hungary. The Ausgleich was framed to make possible the German-Magyar repression of the Slavs, and the rule of the Magyars over their subject Slavs and Roumanians in the attempt to Magyarize all of Hungary has been more brutal and severe than that of any other state except Russia. The exact nature of the racial derivation of the present Magyar population of Hungary is unknown. Ripley holds that they are the products of the intermixture of an original Slavic population with a Finnish minority which entered the plain of Hungary in the ninth century, conquered the Slavs and imposed their Finnish language and culture. He believes that in the mixture of the two races the Slavs were much the more numerous and that the modern Magyar is about one-eighth Finnish and seven-eighths Slav, a fact which accounts for the present broadheadedness of the Magyars. The Hungarian language is a Finnish dialect with considerable evidence of borrowing from the Turks. In religion the Magyars have since their conversion to Roman Catholicism been overwhelmingly adherents to this cult though there are a few Protestants. In 1910 there were about ten millions of Magyars in Hungary, which was about forty per cent of the total population. The most important repressed nations were some three million Roumanians, two million Germans, about five million Slovaks, Croats and Serbs, and a half-million Ruthenians. The just and desirable readjustment of central Europe at the present peace conference will inevitably leave Hungary as one of the "small nations" of the future.

To the east of the Magyars and occupying the northern half of the great plain of the lower Danube are the Roumanians. The product of a considerable mixture of races, these people were gathered under a political organization in the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia after the retirement of the Mongols who invaded this district in the thirteenth century. Under the leadership of Stephen the Great of Moldavia (1457-1504) they had

become a powerful military state and for a time fought off the Turks with success, but were later overcome by these Asiatic invaders. According to the terms of the treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (1774) between Russia and the Turks, the latter were ordered to improve their rule in this region and further progress was made by the treaty of Adrianople in 1829 which secured for these two principalities practical autonomy from Turkey. In 1859 the inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia defied the Great Powers and united themselves in the joint Roumanian principality, which attained complete independence in 1878 by the treaty of Berlin and declared itself a kingdom in 1881. In recent years Roumanian nationalism has been greatly stimulated by the study of Roman colonization of Dacia and the attempt of Xenopol and the Roumanian historians to trace the relationship between the ancient Romans and the modern Roumanians. The racial composition of the Roumanians is a complicated question. Ripley believes that the original substratum of the Roumanian people was an ancient Eurafrican population like that which originally settled Russia and constituted the progenitors of the Nordic race. Among these there settled a considerable number of Roman colonists in the second century A. D. In the west the Slavs came in very large numbers following the sixth century. In the thirteenth century the Mongols swept over this district, and in the sixteenth the Turks conquered it. As a consequence, Roumania is not homogeneous racially, but shows the predominant influence of the Slavs in the west and of the primordial long headed Eurafrican stock in the east. The Roumanians vary from very broadheaded in the Transylvanian district of Hungary to relatively longheaded in the region of the delta of the Danube, and are uniformly short and stocky in stature. The language of modern Roumania is a Roman dialect resembling classical Latin almost as much as some of the variations of medieval Latin. This is in well-nigh universal use today among Roumanians. Perpetuated in parts of this region from classical times, this language has become a vital element of recent Roumanian nationalism and has been sys-

tematically extended and adopted since 1860, to the general exclusion of the previous Slavic and Turkish dialects. In religion the Roumanians are chiefly Greek Orthodox. There are about ten and a half millions of the Roumanians, some six and a quarter millions living in Roumania proper, two and three quarters' millions in Transylvania, a little over a million in Bessarabia, two hundred and seventy-five thousand in the eastern Bukowina and about forty thousand in northeastern Serbia. Added to these there are about a million and a quarter non-Roumanians living in the pre-war Roumanian state.

Across the Danube to the south of Roumania are to be found the Bulgarians. Populated originally by the same longheaded Eurafican race that had settled the Roumanian portion of the lower Danubian plain, this district was invaded in the latter part of the seventh century by the Bulgars, an off-shoot of the Finns. They founded in 679 the first Bulgarian kingdom, which endured until the conquest of Bulgaria by the Byzantine Empire in 1018. Under Czar Simeon (893-927) the Bulgarian kingdom developed to considerable proportions and became the strongest of the Balkan states. Recovering from the Byzantine conquest the Bulgars established a second kingdom in 1186 which reached the height of its power under Ivan Asen II (1218-1241). In the middle of the thirteenth century Bulgaria was ravaged by the Mongols and was finally conquered by the incoming Turks between 1340 and 1396. The beginning of the Bulgarian national revival dates from about 1830. The brutality of the Turks in Bulgaria in 1876 precipitated the momentous Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. By the treaty of Berlin of 1878 Bulgaria was granted autonomy from the Turk, but was unnaturally separated into two principalities, Bulgaria and East Roumelia. In 1885, the Bulgars broke down this artificial division and formed the united principality of Bulgaria. Twenty-three years later the Bulgars took advantage of the embarrassment of the Turks during the civil war of 1908 and declared their independence of Turkey and proclaimed Bulgaria as a kingdom. By the unfortunate second

Balkan War of 1913 Bulgaria was estranged from the other Balkan states. Racially the Bulgarians are highly composite. In the west the contact with the Slavs has made the Alpine racial characteristics most prominent, while in the east the traits of the primordial Eurafican or proto-Nordic race prevail. The Finnish or Bulgar invaders of the seventh century have had almost no significance for Bulgaria other than political. Racially they have long been assimilated in the original population and in the neighboring and invading Slavs. Turkish occupation has left traces of the Asiatic racial traits. Swarthy in complexion and short in stature, the Bulgars vary from extreme broadheadedness in the west to longheaded in the east. The Bulgarian language is now a definite Slavonic dialect, the original Finnish language has definitely disappeared centuries ago. In religion the Bulgarians are solidly Greek Orthodox, but the Bulgarian church is independent of the organization of the Greek Church. The best estimates put the truly Bulgar population of Bulgaria at about four millions at the outbreak of the World War, which number constituted about 75 per cent of the total population. In addition to these there were about a million and a quarter Bulgarians in southern Macedonia under Serbian rule and a very considerable number in the hinterland of the northern Aegean in the Dobrudja district and in the portion of Turkey adjoining Bulgaria.

Extending eastward from the western boundary of Bulgaria to the head of the Adriatic Sea is found the home of the Jugo-Slavs (i.e., the Southern Slavs), the Slovenes of Carniola and adjacent districts, the Croats of Croatia, the Serbo-Croats of Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Serbs of Serbia and Montenegro. The Jugo-Slavs are the southern contingent of that general Slav incursion into central Europe in the sixth and seventh centuries. They were separated from their northern kinsmen in the ninth century by the Magyar invasion which drove a wedge between the two branches of the western vanguard of the Slavs. The Slovenes have never created an independent state, but have alternated between German and Italian

control and are to-day primarily Germanic in most phases of their culture other than their language. Croatia was the first of the Jugo-Slav districts to develop a strong and coherent political organization. From 800 to about 1100 Croatia enjoyed a distinguished existence as an independent duchy and then as a kingdom, but from the beginning of the twelfth century to the present most of it has been controlled by Hungary. Serbia became a powerful kingdom in the thirteenth century and under Stephen Dushan (1331-1355) developed into the most extensive Balkan power that has existed since the decline of the Macedonian Empire. The independent Serbian kingdom was terminated by the Turks at the Battle of Kossove in 1389, and by 1459 the southern Slavs were completely conquered by the invading Turk. Serbia remained in a condition of subjection until the beginning of the national revolt in 1804. The right of self-government was obtained in 1830 and complete independence recognized in 1878. In 1903 the corrupt and Austrophile Obrenovitch dynasty was eliminated by the brutal assassination of the royal family. The rival Karageorgevitch dynasty which succeeded to the throne, in spite of its disgraceful mode of regaining power, brought to Serbia a more liberal and efficient political system and encouraged a revival of Serbian national sentiment, which has been intensified by Austrian aggression in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 and the creation of Albania in 1913. The little mountain kingdom of Montenegro can boast of having been the only Slavic state of the Balkan peninsula to defy Turkish conquest. After three centuries of ineffectual attempts to conquer these warlike Serbs the Turks recognized their autonomy in 1799 and their complete independence in 1878. From the standpoint of race the Jugo-Slavs are the purest and finest type of Alpine Slavs. This is probably due to their more isolated habitat which has prevented as much intermixture of races as in central and eastern Europe. They are very tall and broadheaded brunets, of so fine a physical type that Deniker has designated them as a separate race—the Dinaric, but, as there is no doubt that they are true

Alpines, this attempt to classify them as a distinct sub-type seems but a needless further complication of an already high confusing subject. The Slovene language differs from the Serbo-Croat, but is an allied dialect. The Serbian language is the purest Slav dialect of the Balkan peninsula and the Croatian language is merely Serb written in Latin characters. In religion the Slovenes and the Croats are Roman Catholic, while the Serbs are Greek Orthodox. The total population of the territory inhabited by the Jugo-Slavs is estimated at about fourteen millions, of whom at least ten millions are Jugo-Slavs. Of the Jugo-Slavs a little over eight millions are Serbo-Croats and the remainder mainly Slovenes.

To the southwest of Serbia lies the little mountain state of Albania. Inhabited by a group of hardy, primitive and warlike mountaineers, Albania, by a fiat of the Austrian government, was advanced in 1913 from a tribal condition to independent statehood in the effort of Vienna to shut off Serbia from an outlet to the Adriatic. Albania has had no distinct history but has existed as a group of warring tribes since classical days. Racially the Albanians are regarded by Ripley as identical with the Serbo-Croats. In culture the Albanians are a strange mixture of Greek, Slav, Turk and Italian. In religion the Albanians are divided between the Mohammedans, Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholics the Moslems being the most numerous. Certainly southern Albania or northern Epirus belongs to the Greeks on the basis of both culture and national feeling. It is estimated that there are a little more than one million Albanians out of a total of a million and a half inhabitants living in the Albanian state.

The southernmost extension of the Balkan peninsula is the habitat of the Greeks, who, whatever the actuality, regard themselves as the descendants of the Greeks of the age of Pericles and Aristotle. The Greeks were conquered by the Romans in 146 B.C., but retained most phases of their culture and imposed it upon the Byzantine Empire founded by Constantine in 330 A.D. The Greeks remained under the control of the Eastern Empire until the occupa-

tion of Hellas by the Turks between 1423 and 1460, except for a short period following the fourth crusade (1204-1261), when a Latin empire was established, and the later temporary conquest of a part of Greece by Stephen Dushan in the middle of the fourteenth century. By their own gallant efforts and through the aid of Russia, France and England the Greeks were awarded their independence in the treaty of Adrianople (1829) and established as a kingdom in 1832. Receiving some territory by the treaty of Berlin (1878) the Greeks have since made great strides in advance, especially after 1909 under the leadership of their exceedingly able and statesmanlike premier, Eleutherios Venezelos, who reorganized the Greek state and prepared it for the victorious war against the Turks in 1912-1913, by which Greece was greatly increased in population, territory and prestige. The modern Greek prides himself not only upon this cultural heritage from classical Greece, but also maintains his direct physical descent from the Attic Greeks. In spite of many invasions of the Greek peninsula between classical times and today by non-Greek peoples, such as Avars and Slavs, it is true that in some districts, especially in Thessaly, Attica and the Peloponnesus, the modern Greek has retained the characteristics of the original Mediterranean race to a remarkable degree. The "Greeks" of Asia can scarcely be regarded as Greek in anything else than national feeling and some superficial aspects of culture. The Greeks speak a language which is a debased form of the ancient Attic Greek, but since the Hellenic revival of the last century it has been systematically improved and brought back closer to the classical form. In religion the Greeks belong almost without exception to the Greek Orthodox Church. There are about four million seven hundred thousand Greeks in the Greek state, about two millions in the Aegean Islands and along the coast of Asia Minor, some one hundred and fifty thousand in Epirus, nearly two hundred thousand in Macedonia, about three hundred and fifty thousand in the city of Constantinople and about four hundred thousand in western Thrace, where they constitute a majority of the population.

If space were available one might carry this discussion into a consideration of the disputed territory in western Asia, such as Georgia, Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia, Arabia and the new proposed Jewish state in Palestine, but this territory involves problems of so widely different a character and such relative ease of solution that they may be passed over with this mere allusion.

III. NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE

The principle of national self-determination as applied to the reconstruction of Europe means in its most fundamental and general sense the redrawing of the map of Europe so that state lines will coincide as far as possible with the ethnographic boundaries of the distinct national units which have been heretofore either thwarted in obtaining complete political unity or denied any political independence and existence whatever. This guiding tenet of nationality must, however, be accepted with reservations and should be governed by general good judgment and common sense, or its enforcement will merely result in a return to something near complete political anarchy. As Mr. Zimmern has pointed out,

If the sentiment of nationality were admitted as a sole and sufficient claim for a change of government French Canada would pass to France, Wisconsin to Germany, and part of Minnesota to Norway, while the New York police would become servants of the new Home Rule government in Ireland. The theory which makes national feeling the criterion of Statehood can easily be reduced to an absurdity.*

Were there available space it would be most instructive to summarize what is known about the claims presented by the small nations at the peace conference. It is perfectly obvious that in many if not most cases the claims have embraced all the territory to which the most shadowy pretensions could be advanced, apparently in the hope that after extensive reductions in the original claims the territory assigned would be somewhat more than what each nation

* A. E. Zimmern, *Nationality and Government*, p. 49.

could hope to receive on the basis of the facts in the case. Such representative conflicting claims as those of Italy and Jugo-Slavia to Dalmatia, Istria, Fiume and Trieste; of Albania and Greece to Epirus; of Greece and Bulgaria to Macedonia and Thrace; of Greece and Italy to the Dodecanese Islands; of Serbia and Bulgaria to western Macedonia; of Roumania and Bulgaria to the Dobrudja; of Roumania and Serbia to the Banat; of Roumania and the Ruthenians of Galicia to Bukowina; of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and the Ukraine to eastern Galicia; of Poland and the Ukraine over their boundary line; of Poland to Lithuania; of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland to upper Silesia; and of the Poles and Germans to West Prussia afford overwhelming proof that the principle of strict fairness and a conciliatory and compromising policy have not guided these states or potential states in their approach to Paris. They have apparently decided to stake the future of their nation upon the success which attends their "higgling in the boundary market at Paris." While these extreme claims put forth by the small nations create political and diplomatic problems of the first magnitude, they are so obviously out of accord with a true application of the national principle in the contested regions that they may be passed over with no further mention. Attention may be given to a brief survey of what the most competent and relatively disinterested authorities regard as the settlement of conflicting claims in the contested parts of Europe which would be compatible with the principle of nationality.

In the settlement of the problems of nationality in Western Europe, there seems little disagreement as to the desirability of allowing Ireland to experiment with home rule, of consenting to the French re-annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, of permitting Luxemburg to join itself to Belgium and of giving assent to the annexation of the definitely Danish portion of Schleswig to Denmark.⁴ To pass to that disputed mid-European district once more, Finland should

⁴ These solutions proposed are in no way necessarily the personal opinions of the writer, but are those selected on account of the reputation of their authors for knowledge and fairness and evident desire to promote the future peace of Europe.

certainly be given independence from Russia, but the Aland Islands should be handed over to Sweden with the guarantee that they remain unfortified and shall never be used as a naval base. Further, there can be little doubt that the Finns of Esthonia should be induced to unite in one government with their kinsmen in Finland and the natural process of political evolution would be forwarded by at least a loose federation of the Finns of both Finland and Esthonia with the Letts in the Baltic provinces. That the Letts of the Baltic provinces should have their independence from Russia will not be denied, though it is quite evident that the Letts cannot preserve a prosperous national existence without some sort of a union with the Finns or Lithuanians and without freedom from the economic oppression of the German and Polish landlords. Lithuanian aspirations for independence must also be admitted as just, and it seems most desirable that the Lithuanians be united with the Letts for their mutual economic benefit, though there is no doubt that in any such arrangement religious toleration should be assured and Russia should be guaranteed commercial access to Riga. Further, a commercial union between Poland and a Letto-Lithuanian state would be most desirable for all parties concerned.

An independent Poland has been a hope of liberals from the beginning of the Great War. The nucleus of the restored Poland must, of course, be the strictly Polish Russian Poland. To this should be added from territory within the German Empire the Polish portions of Posen and Silesia and the Protestant Poles of the Masurian districts of East Prussia, if the latter so desire. While the Vistula and the port of Danzig should both be internationalized and Poland should have the territory along the Vistula up to and including Thorn, there is little doubt that she should relinquish for the future good of herself and Europe the ambition to regain all West Prussia and Danzig, though there is no doubt that she should receive sound guarantees of Polish cultural and economic autonomy in West Prussia. From Austria, Poland should undoubtedly obtain western Galicia, but the attempt to claim Galicia as far as Lemberg is clearly

absurd, whatever the composition of the population of Lemberg. Equally unjustifiable is the Polish claim to Lithuania as far as Vilna. Without the avowed desire of the Lithuanians to unite with Poland the latter can advance no valid claim, ethnic or historical, to the possession of any distinctly Lithuanian districts.⁵ The national aspirations of the Ukraine to political independence certainly demand respect, at least until it is able to obtain the grant of autonomy within a liberalized Russia. An independent Ukraine could not exist without control of Odessa, but some arrangement would have to be made with Russia in this case which would assure Russian access to this great Black Sea port. There is little doubt but that the Ruthenians of eastern Galicia should be joined with the remainder of the Ukraine, whether the Little Russians maintain complete independence or effect some sort of a liberal union with Russia. Geographical conditions would probably exclude from this union the Ruthenians in Hungary south of the Carpathians, but the Ruthenians of Bukowina would unquestionably be included in any united Ukraine state or province. The sub-Carpathian Ruthenians should be allowed the right of migration. The new Czecho-Slovak state must doubtless be assigned Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia. The disputed portions of Austrian Silesia must be neutralized or divided with Poland. Geographical conditions make it practically impossible for the three million three hundred thousand Germans dwelling around the north-western rim of Bohemia to join their kinsmen across the Erz Gebirge, and they will have to be granted cultural autonomy and political equality in the new state. Absolutely lacking an outlet to the sea, the Czecho-Slovak state will be compelled to develop favorable commercial relations with the Germans, Poles, Ruthenians and Roumanians in order to secure access to some port.⁶ Though possessing

⁵ A map indicating a very fair solution of the Polish boundaries according to the principle of nationality is to be found in A. J. Toynbee, *Nationality and the War*, opposite p. 51. See pp. 73 ff for his arguments against detaching all of West Prussia from the German Empire.

⁶ Such access is provided for in the treaty submitted to Germany.

the richest cultural background of any Slavic group, the new Czecho-Slovak state will have to develop industrially and commercially if it is to have a distinguished future. The Magyars can scarcely expect less than the total loss of all non-Magyar portions of Hungary, but they will, without doubt, be compensated in part by complete independence from Austria. Like the Czecho-Slovaks they will require an outlet to the sea, which may be obtained through Roumania in return for the surrender of the territory held by the eight hundred thousand Magyars of Transylvania.

We may now turn to the Balkan districts. On the basis of nationality Roumania would be assigned Transylvania and, perhaps, a portion of the adjoining Hungarian plain of Alföld in which the Roumanians predominate. Roumania could also justly claim the eastern portion of Bukowina, the definitely Roumanian portions of the Banat of Temesvar, and at least that half of Bessarabia lying next to Moldavia. Indeed, it would probably be advisable to extend the eastern boundary of Roumania to the Dniester River, but any claim to Odessa would be most unjustifiable. Further, it would seem very desirable that Roumania should surrender to Bulgaria the Dobrudja south of Constanza. The rigorous upholders of the doctrine of punitive justice would doubtless regard Bulgaria as a fit subject for partition among the Balkan states which allied themselves with the western Powers, but such a view could not be regarded as far-sighted or motivated by a sincere desire to promote the peace of Europe. If the defeated Powers are to be expected to submit to the application of the principle of national self-determination when it operates to their detriment they cannot be denied any benefits which may occasionally accrue to them on this basis. Then, it has never been demonstrated that the Bulgarian people have been sympathetic with Pan-Germanism. Bulgaria was urged to enter the second Balkan War by treacherous advice from Vienna and her treatment by the other Balkan states at the close of this war did not reflect credit upon the latter. The entry of Bulgaria into the War of the Nations on the side of Germany was not the act of the Bulgarian people, nor,

probably, even the wish of Czar Ferdinand; rather it seems to have been the result of inexcusable diplomatic bungling on the part of the western Allies who were unwilling to grant Bulgaria's just claims to Macedonia as the price of her active aid or to guarantee her protection from Germany in case of further neutrality.⁷ If the national principle is applied to the adjustment of the Bulgarian boundary it would certainly require the cession to Bulgaria of Macedonia south of the Shar Mountains, of Dobrudja south of Constanza, and of eastern Thrace and Adrianople. Further, Greece should be required to guarantee the commercial access of Bulgaria to Kavala, and, while Greece should doubtless be given possession of the entire northern coast of the Aegean, there can be no question that Bulgaria should be assigned much of the inland region now held or claimed by Greece. The new Jugo-Slav state, by the principle of nationality, will receive most extensive additions. These would certainly include Carinthia, Styria, Carniola and Küstenland, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the disputed Adriatic region it would seem that if Italy obtains Trieste and Istria, the Jugo-Slavs would certainly be entitled to Fiume. It would further appear that the probable future peace of both Italy and Jugo-Slavia, and incidentally of Europe, would be greatly promoted by the neutralization of the Adriatic Sea. Serbia also has a definite national claim to a part of the Banat, though this may be surrendered to Roumania in consideration of Roumania's relinquishing any claim to the Roumanians now dwelling in Serbia. While Montenegro should not be forced against her will into the Jugo-Slav state, it is obvious that it would be to the distinct advantage of all parties concerned if such an agreement could be reached in a harmonious manner. The inclusion of Albania with a large amount of autonomy for the latter would also be most desirable. If Albania is to remain a separate state, national considerations demand that she surrender northern Epirus to Greece and receive

⁷ For a convincing summary of the relation of Allied stupidity to Bulgaria's alliance with Germany see J. D. Bouchier, in *The Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1919. pp. 415-16.

in return considerable Albanian territory in the north and east in Montenegro and Serbia and towards the south-east in Greece. An independent Albania would for a time certainly be a proper field for supervision by a mandatory power. A just respect for the national claims of Greece would require that she secure northern Epirus, the northern coast of the Aegean, but with a guarantee of Bulgarian access and the surrender of the inland districts to Bulgaria, western Thrace, the coast of Asia Minor, the islands of the Aegean, including the Dodecanese Islands now held by Italy, and the island of Cyprus. In view of this allotment, Greece should by all means be required to guarantee the inland districts of Asia Minor commercial access to the Aegean ports, especially to that of Smyrna.

The principle of nationality will doubtless, and in justice must be, applied to the reconstruction of western Asia, which has at last been freed from the rule of the intolerable Turk. While the Turk can claim, under the cover of the national principle, a more or less independent state in Asia Minor, national independence should certainly be extended to Georgia, Armenia, Syria, Palestine, Arabia and Persia. The internal peace and order of these new states and their security against foreign aggression should, and doubtless will be, guaranteed through their supervision by a more advanced and powerful state according to the mandatory system. The candid analyst of political reconstruction on the basis of nationality will also be likely to be skeptical of any reasons brought forward to deny the application of the principle to Egypt and Korea, though it might readily be conceded that the mandatory power in these cases should be exercised by Great Britain and Japan respectively. As the Monroe Doctrine is embodied in the covenant of the League of Nations, it will devolve upon the United States to compel the respect of the principle of nationality in the Western hemisphere and to require the "small nations" of this half of the world to respect the dictates of international law and morality.⁵

⁵ For a brief consideration of the important problem of the relation of the League of Nations to these "small nations" see S. P. Duggan (Editor), *The League of Nations: The Principle and the Practice*, chapter ix.

NOTES AND REVIEWS

Recollections of a Russian Diplomat. The Suicide of Monarchies (William II and Nicholas II). By EUGENE DE SCHELKING. New York, the Macmillan Company, 1918. 327 pp.

The author aims to give an entertaining yet historically true picture of the domestic and foreign policies of Germany and Russia, beginning with the accession of Alexander III. In this book "men make their entrance and their exit from the European stage, not as the historical characters they have hitherto represented in the eyes of their audience, but as human beings, with all their weaknesses and foibles of ordinary every-day people." It was "the feebleness of Nicholas II which brought disaster to Russia and eliminated the Romanoffs from that throne, just as the insensate, egoistical and dynastic policy of William will inevitably eliminate the Hohenzollerns from among the monarchies of Europe, when the people of Germany realize the rôle he has played in deliberately planning the tragedy."

Mr. E. de Schelking is well qualified to write upon his subject for he was an important figure in diplomatic life from 1883 to 1903, having held the following diplomatic posts: First Secretary in Greece, France, Spain and Germany—both in Berlin and Munich—and for a time Legation Councillor at the Hague. In 1903 he left the diplomatic life and has since devoted his time to political journalism.

Half of the book is devoted to a discussion of the Russian policy, especially that which led up to the Revolution of 1917. In the chapter, "Czar Ferdinand of Bulgaria, The Fox of the Balkans" the author exposes the schemes and intrigues of the Bulgarian monarch, who, the author says, was neither more nor less than a traitor. He has "played such a sinister part in the European tragedy that he deserves a special pillory."

Since the author was personally acquainted with many of the important personages with whom his account deals there is added a touch of reality and interest which could be obtained in no other way.

CLARA E. SCHIEBER

Prussian Political Philosophy. By WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY.
New York and London, D. Appleton and Company 1918.
203 pp.

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This book presents a study of the Prussian theory of state. The opening chapter, "American Political Ideals," gives the theories underlying our own government with which are contrasted the doctrines of Prussia. To the Prussian the state is the fundamental entity to which the individual must sacrifice his all. The kaiser, on account of the divine origin of kingship, demands unquestioned obedience. Underlying the whole Prussian theory of state is the Hegelian philosophy. In the chapter, "Tendencies towards Responsible Government in Germany" contributed by Prof. Walter J. Shepard, it is shown that during the last few years there has been a modification of the old Prussian theory, which is to be seen in the influence exerted by the Reichstag upon the acts of the chancellors. This whole theory of state has been taught the Germans through the clergy, the press and the schools.

Responsibility for the World War is laid upon the German general staff. The kaiser, who had formerly wanted peace, gradually became militaristic and sought war in the hope of advancing Germany politically. Mr. Willoughby warns the Allied Powers against attempting to make peace until Prussian autocracy is completely overthrown.

The book presents the Prussian theory of state as it was doubtless understood before and during the war by the extreme German militarists and their intellectual followers. But with the kaiser now in exile, another German people uncertain whether to base their republic upon the principles of moderate socialism or Bolshevik communism, many of the author's conclusions, so far as they attempt to portray the permanent attitude of the German people as a whole, are already antiquated. C. E. S.

The Development of the United States from Colonies to a World Power. By MAX FARRAND. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company. 356 pp.

The book emphasizes the social and economic rather than the political development of our country. The author shows that here have been brought together the varied characteristics of Continental civilizations and made into the distinctive traits and institutions which have become known as American. He traces the various attempts at colonization in North America; the de-

velopment of colonial government so closely patterned after that of Great Britain; the contention with the Mother Country over trade and commerce; the American Revolution; the formation of the Constitution; the territorial expansion of the United States; the wars to which the United States was a party, with special emphasis upon their social and economic results; reconstruction after the Civil War; the position of America as a World Power, especially since the Spanish-American War; and finally the participation in the World War.

The volume makes an interesting addition to the ordinary political history.

C. E. S.

Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Chosen (Korea) (1916-1917). Compiled by Government-General of Chosen. Keijo (Seoul), July 1918.

Korea was annexed to Japan, 1910, during the governor-generalship of Count Terauchi. After his resignation, 1916, Count Hasegawa was appointed in his place, under whose régime and direction this report was compiled.

The report shows the manifold ways in which Japan has attempted to reform Korea. It has completely reorganized the financial system; and introduced modern methods in agriculture, largely through the operation of model and industrial farms and instruction through extension schools. Afforestation has supplied many barren districts with thousands of young trees. Sericulture has greatly increased the production of silk. Internal communication has been improved by railroads and public highways, while foreign traffic has been advanced through the construction of wharves, lighthouses, and other aids to navigation. Modern methods of sanitation, hospitals, a system of quarantine, the inspection of goods, have all been introduced; while the local government of Korea has been reorganized with special provisions for law courts, police regulations and care of prisoners.

Perhaps the greatest influence of Japan has been exerted over the educational system. There are separate schools for Japanese and Koreans; those for the Japanese being patterned after the educational system of Japan. The education of the Koreans "aims at giving the coming generations such moral training and general knowledge as will enable them to meet the needs of the times, and make of them loyal and good subjects of Imperial Japan, and, at the same time, worthy citizens of the world." The Japanese language is required as the medium of instruction, and the use of text books "compiled by the government-general

or those receiving official recognition" is made compulsory by all government and public schools.

This report is valuable for the clear and definite presentation which it gives of the many and undoubted benefits which Japan has brought to Korea along material lines. Japan has administered Korea as an estate, but whether it has been successful in dealing with the Korean people, must be determined from other sources than this report.

C. E. S.

Thirty Years. Anglo-French Reminiscences, 1876-1906. By SIR THOMAS BARCLAY. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914. 389 pp.

The title prepares us for the style in which this book is written, rambling and disconnected, with the human and personal elements always present. Sir Thomas is well qualified to write such a book since he lived in France from 1876, when he was sent to Paris in the service of the *London Times*, until 1909, during all of which time he was working shoulder to shoulder with the leading men of that period.

After 1900 he took an active part in the agitation for more cordial relations between France and England and his book is mostly an account of the diplomatic steps leading to the formation of the Entente Alliance. The anti-English sentiment existing in France is described especially after 1870; this was intensified by conflicts between the two countries in Egypt, the Congo, and Siam, and by the views expressed by the English on the Boulanger, Fashoda and Dreyfus incidents. In the work of improving this sentiment through several agencies, such as the formation of the Franco-Scottish Society, the British Chamber of Commerce, of which Sir Thomas was the president, through newspaper articles and public addresses in Great Britain and France, he came in contact with the leading statesmen of Europe. He has filled his discussion with word pictures of these men, and enlivened it with interesting impressions, amusing anecdotes, and incidents of association with men who played the leading rôles in England and France a few years ago. Throughout the book are seen flashes of his extraordinary power of observation.

The treaty of arbitration between France and England, which was the result of his work, is "one of the three greatest events in the history of arbitration;" the other two mentioned being the Alabama case and the creation of the Hague Court.

The Germans were in favor of this treaty. Germany was assured of the open door in Morocco for at least thirty years and many of

her statesmen hoped this alliance with England would weaken the France-Russian agreement. Although Alsace-Lorraine presented a "stumbling block," Sir Thomas thought there was no need of a "Revanche"—for France revenged 1870 in Morocco.

M. T. MURRAY.

The Immediate Cause of the Great War. By OLIVER PERRY CHITWOOD. New York, Thomas Crowell Company, 1918. 270 pp.

This book is divided into three parts. The first, entitled "Some direct Causes of the War," traces historically the formation of the two rival groups in Europe after the Congress of Vienna; the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. Before 1914 this grouping is noticed in nearly every conflicting question, such as the Morocco dispute, and the Balkan problem. The second part traces the immediate causes of the European War, and is based upon the documents and newspapers accessible at the time the book was published. A clearly drawn picture is given of the diplomatic inter-relationships of the various states in Europe and Asia. The third and last division of the book deals with the reasons for America's entrance into the war. Here the submarine controversy is fully traced.

By no means is this an exhaustive treatment of the causes of the war; it is rather a résumé of the most important facts. The material is well chosen and well organized, and the book will serve as the best of outlines for the study of the detailed accounts which are flooding the markets.

M. T. M.

The Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan, 1853-1865. By PAYSON JACKSON TREAT. The Johns Hopkins Press, 1917. 459 pp.

A collection of Albert Shaw Lectures delivered by Professor Treat at Johns Hopkins University and published under the direction of Prof. John H. Latané. The account begins with Commodore Perry's opening of the ports of Japan, which for more than two centuries had been closed to all foreign intercourse except for a limited commerce with Holland and China at Nagasaki. Professor Treat declares that "if religious propaganda could have been divorced from commercial intercourse, the doors of Japan might never have been closed."

A detailed account is given of the establishment of friendly relationships between Japan and the United States under the excellent direction of Mathew Calbraith Perry, Townsend Harris,

and Robert H. Pruyn, which culminated in the ratification of the commercial treaty of 1858 by the mikado.

Throughout we have a view of Japanese politics with interesting incidents of diplomacy, showing that the Japanese government was always handicapped by the domestic troubles resulting from conflicting factions within the empire.

The work of these "three worthy representatives of their nation" and the return of the Shimonoseki indemnity to Japan by the United States in 1883, laid the foundation of the "traditional" friendship between America and Japan. M. T. M.

The United States in the World War. By JOHN BACH McMASTER.
New York, London, D. Appleton and Company, 1918.
485 pp.

In this book we see the master hand once again in the use of newspaper material and state documents. As in his history Professor McMaster here follows a chronological order in presenting his facts. The development of events is traced from the beginning of the struggle in Europe to the end of our first year of war (1914-1918). Each event is stated in its chronological order; the diplomatic negotiations relative to it are given, and the sentiment of the people of the countries concerned is shown from newspapers and other contemporary writings. Without attempting to prove any thesis, McMaster has yet made it easy to trace the gradual change of sentiment in the United States away from Germany and in favor of France and England. Pro-German propaganda and German intrigue in the United States are dealt with at great length as well as the American government's plans for counteracting these treacherous acts when found among German agents and German officials. The author presents the question of neutral trade and of submarine warfare in an interesting way by giving first the actual events, then a summary of the diplomatic correspondence and the newspaper comments. This volume is undoubtedly one of the few really valuable works among the many hundreds which have appeared upon the war.

M. T. M.

Bolshevism. The Enemy of Political and Industrial Democracy.
By JOHN SPARGO. Harper and Bros., Publishers. New York and London, 1919. 389 pp.

This book gives a plain and understandable outline of the origin, history and meaning of Bolshevism. It is an attempt

"to provide the average American reader with a fair and reliable statement of the philosophy, program, and policies of the Russian Bolsheviks."

In his analysis, Mr. Spargo relies upon official documents issued by the Bolshevik government; writings and addresses of accredited Bolshevik leaders; Russian Socialist organizations of long and honorable standing; and responsible Russian socialist journals.

The long delay in the uprising of the Russian people was due to German intrigue, for Germany knew that once Russia was aroused she would become a menace to her western neighbor. The Romanof rule was Prussian not Russian. The provisional government under Milyoukov was bound to fail for it was capitalistic. Kerensky's regime was well suited to the temper of the Russian mind but it fell on account of the pressure of the Bolshevik assisted by German money. However, practically all classes in Russia desired the defeat of the Hohenzollerns, for a kaiser no more than a czar was thought to be inclined to grant desired reforms.

To Lenine all capitalistic government is equally undesirable, whether in England, France or America. A democratic republic is a bourgeois republic; and Lenine is opposed to both. Mr. Spargo discounts many of the "horrors" of the Bolshevik stating that they have merely inverted the old czarist regime. According to the author the Bolshevik represent a very small minority of the Russians. They number only about two hundred thousand, and if it were possible to hold a truly secret, just election Mr. Spargo thinks they would be defeated throughout the country.

Most of our citizens who favor Bolshevism are pacifists and stand for complete disarmament, while the Bolshevik themselves believe in war and do not favor disarmament until the whole world has become Socialistic. The Bolshevik movement is the "infusion into the class strife and class struggles of the world the same brutality and the same faith that might is right which made Prussian militarism the menace it was to civilization." Just as the world set about to defeat Prussianism so must Bolshevism be put away not through blood but by removing social pressure upon the masses, by relieving the poverty and servitude which have driven man to Bolshevism. "The remedy of Bolshevism is a sane and far-reaching program of constructive social democracy."

CLARA E. SCHIEBER.

Democracy and the Eastern Question. By THOMAS F. MILLARD.
New York, The Century Company, 1919. 446 pp.

A discussion of the Chino-Japanese situation in the light of the Great War and of the responsibility of America to assist in settling the Eastern problem. Mr. Millard states that his book is not non-partisan for such an attitude would be impossible for one who had lived in the East and known the actual conditions.

In the opening chapter the issue between China and Japan is defined. Japan is an autocratic, militaristic, imperialistic state; China is a weak and apprehensive democracy. Just as the European question could not settle itself, so America, for its own security if no other, must help to settle rightly the Eastern Question.

At the beginning of the war, Japan was not friendly to America, and in fact did not become so until we had voted to greatly increase our army and navy. Japan is not in favor of the League of Nations, if the League means a limitation of armament. The whole policy and military organization of Japan is based upon that of Germany, in fact Japan had no quarrel with Germany but hoped that by joining the Allies and persuading China to stay out of the war it might secure Germany's interests in the Orient. China realizing and fearing Japan's ulterior motives long hesitated to enter the war when her leaders saw how the Entente condoned Japan's conduct.

The Ishii-Lansing Treaty is condemned most strongly. Japan and the United States were a party to the treaty, while China was a subject to the treaty. The whole transaction was kept secret from China; this made an especially embarrassing situation for the Chinese minister to the United States, Dr. Wellington Koo.

The methods by which Japan has practically monopolized trade in China are described at length; while Japan's attempts to keep China from representation at the Peace Conference and its treatment of the Chinese delegates are discussed with much detail.

Two chapters deal with the Russian Problem. Japan wished to intervene in Siberia for its own benefit, but when the Allies agreed upon joint intervention Japan was opposed to such a course.

In a final chapter which Mr. Millard calls "The Solution," he pleads for the settlement of internal political problems and unrest in China; the eventual return of all "foreign concessions" and "spheres of influence;" and the reorganization of trade under

Chinese control. Through all this period of transition America must lend a helping hand. What China asks is "to be delivered from the old system of predatory penetration and exploitation by imperialistic powers, and to be allowed, and helped, to work out a peaceful national destiny on democratic lines."

The book is well supplied with quotations from standard works on China and Japan and from the most important newspapers of both countries. There is also an appendix which contains many valuable documents, such as "The Hay Doctrine" relating to the "Open Door," and Japan's Diplomatic Demands on China in 1905, with the Original Secret Twenty-One Articles.

C. E. S.

THE JOURNAL
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OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
 (Continuing the Journal of Race Development)

OCTOBER, 1919

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EDITORS

GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE, Ph.D.....President G. STANLEY HALL, LL.D.

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CONTRIBUTING EDITORS

Professor HARRY E. BARNES.....New York
Dean DAVID P. BARROWS, LL.D.....University of California
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Ass't-Professor FREDERICK W. WILLIAMS.....Yale University

PUBLISHER

LOUIS N. WILSON, Litt.D.....Clark University

Articles intended for publication, and all correspondence relating to the editorial department of the JOURNAL, should be addressed to Dr. George H. Blakeslee, Clark University, Worcester, Mass.

Books for review, exchanges, subscriptions, and all correspondence relating thereto should be addressed to Dr. Louis N. Wilson, Clark University Library, Worcester, Mass.

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THE OCTOBER ISSUE OF THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Señor Don Ignacio Calderón has been for fifteen years Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from Bolivia to the United States. In the length of his service he is dean of the Latin American ministers in Washington. Thoroughly acquainted with the United States, by long residence, travel and study, his statements upon Pan American relations have long been regarded as particularly authoritative. Before coming to Washington he had filled many important positions in Bolivia: Supervision of Public Instruction for the Republic of Bolivia; President of the Banco Hipothecario, a large financial institution of LePaz; and Secretary of the Treasury of Bolivia. In the diplomatic service, he was previously secretary of the Bolivian legation at Rome, and later at Lima, Peru; and was for some time Consul General from Bolivia at New York City.

Mr. Enoch F. Bell, Associate Secretary of the American Board of Foreign Missions, has had occasion to study at first hand the conditions of a number of foreign countries. While the Secretary of the Board, Dr. James L. Barton, has recently been devoting himself particularly to the Near Eastern problem—Turkey and particularly Armenia—and has just returned from important relief work in Asia Minor, Mr. Bell has been traveling for the Board in the Far East, and Mexico in order to investigate local social, political and religious conditions. He was one of a commission of three sent by the American Board a year ago to Japan and Korea; and has summarized the results of his study in recent articles. A few months ago he visited Mexico, where he had opportunity to meet the leading Mexicans, as well as resident Americans, and to make a fair minded judgment of the situation. He is giving the JOURNAL the first hand impressions of a careful student of the Mexican situation.

Señor Conrado Benitez is able to give an accurate presentation of the point of view of the educated, thoughtful Filipinos. He is Dean of the College of Liberal Arts in the University of the Phil-

ippines, Manila, and was one of the technical advisors to the Philippine mission to the United States which recently visited this country.

David S. Spencer, D.D., has been for many years a resident of Nagoya, Japan, where he has been stationed as a missionary of the Methodist Episcopal church. He has, at the same time, been a careful student of Japanese life and political conditions. As one of the contributing editors of the JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, he has been writing a series of articles entitled "Some Thoughts on the Political Development of the Japanese People." The preceding articles appeared in the issues of January, 1917; April, 1918; and July, 1919. Dr. Spencer is temporarily residing in the United States and is at present one of the executive officials of the Interchurch World Movement of North America.

Charles K. Edmunds, Ph.D., President of the Canton Christian College, Canton, China, is a trained scholar and a scientific observer. He secured his doctorate in the department of physics, Johns Hopkins University; was for a time Magnetic Observer, United States Coast and Geodetic Survey; and is now observer in charge of the Magnetic Survey of China under the auspices of the Carnegie Institution of Washington. He went to Canton Christian College as a Professor of Physics and Electrical Engineering, but was soon elected Vice President and then President of the institution. He gave one of the leading papers at the Clark University Conference upon Recent Developments in China, 1912; this appeared in the volume of Conference papers published by the University the following year. The present article is the continuation of a presentation of modern education in China, the first part of which appeared in the previous issue of this JOURNAL.

Gilbert Reid, D.D., has long been recognized as one of the foremost authorities upon Chinese conditions. For many years he was Director in Chief of the International Institute of China situated at Shanghai, and was in close touch with many of the leading Chinese. This institution was started under the sanction of the Chinese government, the object being to promote harmony, friendliness and peace between China and other countries and between adherents of different religions. He has written a number of books on China and Chinese conditions, both in English and in Chinese. He is one of the editors of the JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS to which he has been a frequent contributor. For over a year now he has been residing in the United States and is at present engaged in writing a history of China and the war.

Percy A. Martin, Associate Professor of History in Leland Stanford Jr. University, has for a number of years made a special study of Latin America. While the field in which he has carried on his intensive study, is Brazilian history, having spent a number of months in research in Rio and other Brazilian cities, his interests extend to the whole Latin American situation. Three years ago he was associated with Dr. Oliveira Lima, the Brazilian historian and publicist, in giving a course of lectures at Harvard University upon Latin America.

Emma Serepta Yule is on the Faculty of the College of Agriculture, the University of the Philippines, Los Banos, the Philippines. In the study of international relations it is well to know the character of the people of the various countries concerned. Miss Yule has given an unusual and valuable paper describing at first hand the customs, traits and characteristics of the Filipino farmer.

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THE PAN-AMERICAN UNION AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE

By Señor Don Ignacio Calderon, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, from Bolivia

When after the fall of Napoleon some of the autocratic powers of Europe, Germany and Austria amongst them, formed what they misnamed the Holy Alliance, to crush popular rights and revive the disappearing so-called divine power of kings, the New World had succeeded in shaking off the very kind of government they intended to support. The United States, although still in the early stage of her healthy and powerful development, saw immediately that the New World could not exist half democratic and half autocratic. President Monroe made the brave declaration that no new colonies would be tolerated in America and that the late Spanish dependencies that had obtained their freedom should not be deprived of their independence.

This declaration, that in due course of time has been the object of many comments and interpretations, considered in itself was a bold notice to the arbitrary and monarchical powers of Europe that the United States did not intend to tolerate any other form of government than the one established by themselves and adopted by the former colonies of Spain; that is the government of the people for the people. To make such a declaration, President Monroe did not deem

it necessary to ask the consent or the approval of any other nation: it was absolutely a free and voluntary warning to the scheming despots of Europe that freedom was and must continue to be the heritage of America.

The Spanish republics, which at the time the Monroe declaration was made were yet fighting the war for independence, considered it as a token of friendship and moral help to their endeavours; but none of them saw in it a bond to put them as it were under the tutelage of the United States.

I must frankly state that if anything has awakened a feeling of distrust and attributed to this country imperialistic tendencies, it is the way in which on more than one occasion the Monroe doctrine has been interpreted.

It was contended that inasmuch as the United States has by its own accord taken the republics of America under her protection, it was her duty to see that they be made to fulfill the obligations contracted with foreign subjects or nations, interfering in that way in their domestic affairs and acting as a sheriff on behalf of the foreign claimants. This specious interpretation of the Monroe doctrine created a natural uneasiness and general protest against it, and more particularly when it was found out that in most cases the claims lacked justice and when submitted to arbitration, few of them have ever been found fully justified.

And it must not be forgotten that such claims originate generally out of concessions deliberately obtained from revolutionary and arbitrary governments, which means that those concessions were in fact the result of improper and condemnable collusions between foreign speculators and unscrupulous revolutionists.

No self respecting and well known business men or corporations have ever been involved in that kind of question, nor has any country on this continent deliberately refused to comply with obligations justly and honestly contracted. Many instances could be remembered of great naval demonstrations backing claims which when submitted to an impartial examination turned out to have originated in shameful exploitation.

I must say that if the international pirates did not rely on the backing of their own governments, much bad blood and unfortunate complications would be avoided and the peace of the nations secured.

The remedy against the evil of unhealthy concessions with their consequent troubles is not to uphold them, but to discourage them.

The distortion of the Monroe doctrine from a great and generous determination to keep the western hemisphere as the unpolluted temple of freedom and democracy has given to the ill disposed occasion to accuse the United States of aiming to become the guardian of the other republics and assume the right to interfere in their domestic affairs.

The contempt with which it was so common to speak in former years of South America and its revolutions, and the mistrust that such an attitude produced in those countries, kept our peoples in a mood that was not the most conducive to a closer and more friendly understanding.

The great statesman J. G. Blaine conceived one day the idea of calling the nations of America to a Pan-American Congress in Washington; and this first attempt to bring them together, to study their needs and the measures necessary to foster trade, create a common interest in their progress and welfare has been the origin of the present Pan-American ideal.

The basis of the Pan-American Union is the perfect equality recognized amongst the nations that belong to it. In the several Pan-American conferences that have taken place in Washington, in Mexico, in Rio and Buenos Aires, the delegates discussed and adopted very important resolutions concerning the building of roads that eventually would link together North and South America by a Pan-American railroad, questions of trade facilities, and educational development. In fact all matters that concern the increase of friendly relations and develop mutual understanding tending to harmonize the general interests of our peoples, have been discussed and agreed upon.

This coming in contact with each other has created a better knowledge of the ideals and needs of the different

republics; their development and growth have been more clearly followed and understood, and the advantage of pulling together has become more apparent, bending our efforts to the single and high aim of making each and all of our nations the worthy home of free men, conscious of their duties and devoted to the advancement of all mankind in the path of right, of freedom and mutual help.

If the Monroe doctrine is the proud determination of the United States to keep the whole American Continent free from any contamination of foreign autocrats, the Pan-American Union is the agreement of all the republics to live together, linked by the great ideals of democracy; not looking down upon the weaker or the less advanced ones, but determined to help them and to forge ahead in a united and free effort to reach the goal of popular welfare, free and peaceful development, and the elimination of pauperism and anarchy.

Most of the Spanish speaking republics have a great duty to perform, which is ever more and more pressing, in order to make democracy a reality and atone for the wrongs of centuries of oppression which during and after the Spanish domination have been endured by the unhappy descendants of the two great Indian empires of the New World, the original owners of the land. Heartless and crushing as was the treatment of the Indians by their conquerors, their condition remains without redress under the republic. Had the Indians of Mexico, Central and South America been educated and their land and personal rights respected, the social and political conditions of those countries would have been very much advanced. The Indians are as capable of becoming good and progressive citizens as any white man, and many of them have distinguished themselves as soldiers, writers and statesmen.

Missionary and philanthropic associations in the United States expend millions of money in the Far East, while nearby there is a most necessary work of education and civilization. The Indians form an important part of the population of many republics and could become very useful citizens when redeemed from their intellectual and political degradation.

The negroes in the United States are a very serious problem, because their psychology differs radically from the white man's, while the Indian in time will, by education and assimilation with the dominant races, become a valuable addition to the population.

The war has no doubt brought the American republics nearer to each other. We feel the unity of our political principles and the absence of any cause of antagonism, while the spirit of peace and brotherhood grows stronger. In the Old World, centuries of oppression and rivalry have left amongst the newly formed nations the seeds of hatred and many causes of friction which, even after the horrors of the last war, threaten to involve them in new struggles. We in the New World, inspired by broader sentiments and the desire of a closer union, breathe an atmosphere of friendliness toward each other and all mankind.

INTERVENTION AND THE MEXICAN PROBLEM

*By Enoch F. Bell, Associate Secretary of the American Board
for Foreign Missions*

Various forces seem to be combining to bring about American armed intervention in Mexico. Some of them, though unintentionally so, are Mexican; some are American. Among the former might be placed a new Mexican nationalism expressed in certain constitutional "reforms" which tend to cause serious clash with old-time international laws and customs; second, such an inadequate governmental control of all Mexico as to allow the abuses of banditry; and thirdly a certain obstinate insistence upon governmental position that irritates other governments. These tend to work against the fullest understanding on our part of Mexico's mind and motives. It is only when we go in person below the border that we realize how little there is of anti-American zeal and how much more friendliness appears than we dreamed possible.

The forces operating in America for intervention include pride, pity and "propaganda"—and the greatest of these is propaganda. For some time this has been the most potent means of "educating America to its duty." Present day developments like the Big Bend ransom affair pique our pride and cause us to see red—particularly if we have been suffering such pin pricks for some time. Our pity too is often aroused when we think of what that country might be and is not. Yet most of the American people would settle things in a friendly though firm way if these propaganda bees would stop buzzing.

It is this anti-Mexican publicity work that keeps the friends of international peace on the anxious seat. President Carranza and his government have long been troubled by it. They have tried to offset it with publications of their own here and in Mexico. They are always alluding to

it. The *Democrata* of Mexico City for example publishes today a statement by the sub-secretary of the department of industry, commerce and labor:

The outcry of a certain American press is designed expressly to influence our (Mexican) legislation and public men, so as to bring about a change in the forms incorporated in our present legislation which fails to satisfy the conditions of monopoly and privilege to which certain American companies are aspiring.

As for the United States, we have been indoctrinated for some time. Last April *The Nation* in an editorial said:

There is reason to believe that efforts of serious proportion are being made to bring about war between the United States and Mexico. Bit by bit the propaganda is being spread. Leading American and Canadian oil men go to Paris—the former after an unseemly controversy with the state department. In Paris these gentlemen meet with the other oil groups. Suddenly it is announced from the library of J. P. Morgan that a committee of ten Americans, five British and five French bankers has been formed to protect the interests of foreign investors in Mexico, etc., etc. . . . A drive is on. President Carranza is to be labelled pro-German and his régime is apparently to fall into the category of Bolshevism. Law and order, property rights, the church and the old constitution are all to be invoked. Foreign recognition is to be secured and the public opinion in America is to be whipped into favor of intervention. . . . The oil magnates and their banking committee understand precisely the nature of the instrument which they are playing on.

Some days ago the writer received from an American authority on things Mexican the following letter:

Intervention is coming just as fast as certain interests can possibly force it. I have just returned from a meeting called by the League of Free Nations Association to discuss what should be done to stop what seems to be inevitable—armed intervention. The revelations made concerning the amount of money being spent by the oil interests to manufacture propaganda in favor of intervention are simply appalling. While I have had evidence of this propaganda for some time, I had no conception of its enormity until the facts were laid before me. I am told that the oil men are playing not simply for the oil wells of Tampico and Vera Cruz, but for a much larger stake, that they have found out that Mexico is full of oil; that while they admit that Carranza so far has not confiscated their properties and has promised not to do so, what they want is the United States to get hold of Mexico so that they can easily obtain those billions of dollars worth of oil

properties which are certain to be developed in the future. When the country here has been worked up a little more then it will be easy to pull off a few bandit raids and inflame the people of the United States to such an extent that we shall be swept into war before we know it.

"Uncle Dudley" of the *Boston Globe* in one of his best editorials (August 22) on the question of a war with Mexico refers to certain people "not in contact with the grindstone of life" who are as anxious for armed intervention as we are to avoid it. He writes:

Their motives and their propaganda are evident. And since congress is so fond of investigating it might profitably inquire whether there is any connection between this group on our side of the border and the disorders on the other side of it.

So much for quotations and for the forces operating to bring us into war with our neighbor on the south. Suffice it to say that the situation is most serious. We must all of us awake to the significance of the hour. The time has passed for thoughtless acquiescence. America needs to take firm hold upon the question. We must know what we are being led into—and refuse to be led there.

There seem to be two alleged reasons for armed intervention: America's rights and Mexico's needs. To preserve the property and other material privileges secured under the Diaz regime, and above all to safeguard the lives of Americans allowed to enter Mexico and live there for business purposes it is to be expected that Mexico will live up to the rules and practices of all civilized nations. Yet Mexico has such a habit of revolution that no government has been able to prevent loss of American property and life. There was, however, but little talk or thought of war until the Carranza government set out to create a constitutional law nationalizing the oil as well as other natural resources of Mexico—a socialistic if not bolshevistic move against the long accepted rules and regulations of international understanding. This produced a question of far reaching moment which the governments of the various foreign investors concerned apparently have not intended to recognize, and which the American owners would naturally like

changed. One can sympathize with the foreign interests in this matter and with the governments involved without believing for a moment that America would have any right to intervene by force of arms—that is, to the extent of setting up a new government for the people of Mexico which would amend the constitution to suit the purposes of outside nations. No such interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine would stand inspection by a Pan-American Commission or justify us in objecting to Japan's doing what she wished with China. Nor would any League of Nations long exist if such a fundamental principle of self-determination were violated by the very nation which has taken the lead in this Big Brother defense of the rights of the smaller nations. Armed intervention for property purposes is—with us at least—an outworn creed. It doesn't pay. There are other and better ways of getting our property protected in Mexico. These we must continue to work for with the patience born of a complete understanding of the necessary slowness of progress in Mexico toward full law and order.

As for protecting life, that is a much more serious matter. Scores of Americans through no fault of their own have been caught in the cataclysm of revolution. It will not satisfy the American people to say that Mexico is sorry and that every amend possible will be made. It does not do either to criticize the system which compels our government to demand satisfaction for the death of its citizens in Mexico even if said citizens took all the initiative in entering Mexico and went into the most dangerous situations of their own accord. Just now nothing will satisfy the people but a proof that Mexico can protect our citizens within her borders. This is quite another thing, however, from saying that to avenge the loss of 200 Americans we were justified in exposing to death 200,000 of our own boys; or in killing off many hundreds if not thousands of Mexicans who had nothing to do with the murder of our own.

The problem, it is true, as someone has said, is how to protect American lives and incidentally American property in Mexico without destroying by war a hundred times as much life and property as we set out to protect—"hitherto

the traditional lunacy of governments." But let us beware of the fallacy that by resorting to war with our weaker neighbor we shall in the end best preserve our rights. If we are to be "fools" let us err on the side of patience.

The other fundamental reason alleged for intervention is Mexico's needs. The most subtle advocates of our policing Mexico base their most telling plea upon the condition of the poor peon after centuries of abuse and the necessity of our giving him a chance to get back to his own. They ask that America, the great friend of the oppressed the world over, should "clean up Mexico" and "put it to rights." There is no doubt that the Anglo-Saxon thinks he could make Mexico worth while. I suppose too that he would welcome a chance to try. Possibly too the advocates of armed intervention might convince some that by the use of force upon a proud and unwilling people in a volcanic land we could lay lasting foundations for peace and prosperity for the poor peon, but most of us would refer to Germany and her Alsatian difficulties. Many too would be convinced of the divine wisdom of the One who centuries ago recognized the folly of a conquest by the sword in order to gain a hearty universal reception of His culture. No, Anglo-Saxons may be willing to die in defense of democracy among all peoples, but they are not fools enough to try to shoot those democratic ideals and practices into a race subdued for the purpose.

Mexico's needs cannot be met by force intervention. Nor can her fundamental problems be solved by foreign swords. Not even if we went in with the purest altruistic purpose possible. Even if we should so subjugate Mexico that she would be compelled in the most inaccessible mountain fastnesses and unto the utmost limits of the land to accept our system of government, industry, commerce and finance; even if we imposed our education upon the poorest peon for a generation or two—and nothing short of fifty years of forced occupancy could approach the requirements of such benevolent intervention—we would still be suffering the condemnation of all Kulturites and still have the problem on our hands. Cortez and his crew began it four hundred

years ago. They made their conquest as thorough as we could make ours. They even had the mighty assistance of the Church, which introduced great educational and economic improvements, helped develop the vast mineral and agricultural resources of the land, and purified the religious ideals of the Indian masses. Nevertheless matters went from bad to worse while the foreigners appropriated the land, sucked out the silver and gold, and reduced the masses to slavery. The result was rebellion against foreign exploitation, and the expulsion—though temporary—of the foreigners.

In the Forties America took a hand. She intervened by armed force when Texas and Tyler schemed. We won glory—and gold. We got California. We lost, however, what power of reform within Mexico we possessed in virtue of our own struggles against outside interference with our liberties. Mexico began to doubt us then and she has had reason to continue to do so since. We are not any too proud of our record. To be sure we compelled the Mexican to respect the Texan ranger, and we saved enough good land from the hand of the "lazy peon" to sustain some of the finest Anglo-Saxon civilization America can ever boast of. We can never forget, however, that we took all this away from Mexico by force of arms and that even a small payment of money could never serve to salve our conscience. If any country owed Mexico a debt of good will it was our own. Our armed intervention of 1848 aggravated rather than alleviated Mexico's real troubles. Indeed it has made it much harder for us to help Mexico at this juncture.

Some ten years later England, France and Spain, because of certain losses in men and money, decided upon armed intervention in Mexico. The fleets appeared off the coast; the ultimatum was delivered. The French army entered and took control. To cement the authority over a people too weak to run themselves a king was given them—a foreigner—and every effort possible was made to reconcile the Mexicans to a system calculated to prove their ultimate salvation. But somehow the old fear of foreign exploitation flared up once more. The different factions united against the foreigner, and out the foreigner went. They even shot

the "emperor." Nationalism, through this armed intervention of foreigners, was revived; and somehow the real problem was no nearer solution than before.

After that there came an intervention of another sort—an economic invasion largely from America. This too was "armed" in the sense that it compelled Mexico by "concessions" to surrender outright great sources of natural wealth. Diaz felt obliged to devote an exaggerated proportion of attention to making Mexico attractive to outside capital, but in doing this he failed to give sustained attention to the real and abiding needs of the people. To be sure Diaz's government was as avowedly paternal as ours would be. Yet becoming more and more personal and less paternal, it played into the hands of capital, foreign as well as domestic. The result was the usual one for Mexico: rebellion, revolution and another state of chaos crying out for some saner treatment than had thus far been tried.

We can never hope to solve the Mexican problem by force of arms against her will. What the Mexicans need is to be disarmed—disarmed of the suspicion of us and our motives that have possessed them for so long. This must be done by some proof of our genuine friendship and our true desire to coöperate with Mexico in her development. If by going into Mexico with the slogan "Mexico for the Mexicans" we could loan our forces with the consent of the Mexicans we would be infinitely better off than if we went to war to preserve our dignity or to settle Mexico until she could settle with us. Under such coöperative plan we would be invited to do a thorough job of it. The longer we remained with an altruistic motive the better would we be known and perhaps liked. We could remain until democracy and self-government got into the very blood of the masses, and until the nation was full of such Mexicans of intelligence and integrity as many of us have met. Under such circumstances we would not be asked to leave as we practically were in the Philippines. Nor would our term of occupancy or our methods of administration in Mexico be subject to the whims and follies of our party platforms at home. There would be no leaving when politics entered.

We could make this task a civil service undertaking behind which each administration would throw the prestige and power of its position, outvying even its predecessor in largeness of plan and lavishness of expenditure.

But what a dream! What Mexican would suggest an American mandatory! And what American would dare guarantee such perfectly sustained altruism! No, rather must we assume that if we enter Mexico by force "to clean her up" we shall intensify her suspicion of us and close her heart—and that of Latin-America generally—to our approaches. There is no better way of losing what leadership we have from the border to the Straits than by armed intervention in Mexico.

Some months ago three Mexican Catholic archbishops made a statement to the American press of great significance. Someone has called it one of the great documents of the day. The archbishops after a great deal of persecution on the part of the revolutionists had been exiled from their homeland. They had other causes for grievance against the Carranza government. Almost every reason was theirs, humanly speaking, for favoring the overthrow of the present constitutional party. Moreover, by remaining silent they could have given their support to the attitude generally taken by Catholics here against Carranza. Nevertheless, they refused to lend their moral support to any movement fostering American and foreign intervention in Mexico. On the contrary they came out boldly for peace. They knew their own people and what the effect of intervention would be upon them. Though exiled, they still remained identified with Mexico and championed what they considered to be Mexico's best interests and ours. Note their words:

We desire that wise counsel should displace all thoughts of violence in the consideration of such differences as exist, or as may be created, between our dear land of Mexico and the land of our refuge. Between lands linked in a common destiny by nature and by sentiment, free lands intended by God to help each other in harmony, mutual confidence, and disinterested friendship, in the fulfilment of the high purposes for which He has created them, the peace of God should prevail. . . . We would give testimony of our abiding faith in the essential justice of the Mexican people,

and our unalterable trust in the ultimate triumph of all just causes placed before the tribunal of our people. Shall we appear in vain to the fair-minded moulders of American opinion that they refrain from thoughts of violence and instruct their public in the ways of charity, and of peaceful settlement of all difficulties? We appeal especially to those in the United States who in good faith have made our cause their own, reminding them that the temples of God are the hearts of His people, and that the mission of His Church is to create peace and good will among men.

THE PROBLEM

This fundamental problem of Mexico is the development of self-governing sense and stability within the masses. When the people get to thinking and become conscious of their power no more problem will there be for us or for Mexico. Until such is accomplished there will be trouble, and no matter how many interventions there may be or how many revolutions, until the people have become educated to the function of self-government the problem will be one for them and for us to consider.

This problem which the most thoughtful and patriotic Mexicans face is such that only generations of patient and persistent effort can solve. You will recall the words of President Lincoln when he was urged to intervene by force of arms in Mexico:

The system (republican) everywhere has to make its way painfully through difficulties and embarrassments which result from the action of antagonistic elements, a legacy of former times and of very different institutions. Such states are entitled to greater forbearance and more generous sympathies from the United States.

That problem will be solved by the Mexicans themselves, give them time and support enough.

To bring this about, namely, the development of a self-governing people, many sound steps have already been taken by the Mexican people and many more will be taken if they are let alone. No government has ever faced greater difficulties than the present one. Perhaps some will say that they made the one great mistake of changing the constitution in such a way as to attempt to deprive foreign inter-

ests of their property. This certainly has been at the root of many of Carranza's difficulties. At the same time, progress has been made. ~~oo~~ Indeed, it looks now as if the Mexican constitution itself would soon be amended to remove the cause of so much international trouble, and to make possible the attraction of large foreign capital.

On the whole the political and social movement since the days of Diaz has been fundamentally a sound one. This statement can be maintained notwithstanding the many imperfections in government and the unbearable abuse of power by some civil and military authorities and in spite of a pathetic lack of a trained, reliable body politic. The movement since Diaz's day tends to free the common people from age-long tyranny and exploitation exerted through church and state; and to awaken the common people to a consciousness of their rights and power. The people of Mexico deserve and need the moral support of all lovers of liberty, enlightenment and social uplift. Such support, however, should persist in prolonged patience no matter what the political vicissitudes may be from time to time.

But to solve the Mexican problem the great need is that of all countries struggling into self-government, namely: a nation of men and women of staunch character and unselfish patriotism. This need is greater even than economic development under just and strict governmental protection. Mexico needs *men*—men with

Strong minds, great hearts, true faith and willing hands;
Men whom the lust of office does not kill;
Men whom the spoils of office cannot buy;
Men who possess opinions and a will;
Men who have honor; men who will not lie.
Tall men, uncrowned, who live above the fog
In public duty and private thinking.

This can be said without casting reflections upon the fine men in Mexico (and in exile) who in the years past have done so much to bring honor upon the Mexican name and in whose hands rests the leadership required for these great days.

AMERICA'S PART

Now there is much that America can do instead of going to war with Mexico. If done in the spirit of coöperative construction, we can do our share toward providing the stability and security required. Many of us, for example, can visit the field and see for ourselves. Our impressions will be as good as those received by the San Antonio business men a little while ago. We shall produce points of contact that will tend toward a better understanding between the nations. We shall come in touch with the people themselves, know them better, and give them better impressions of America than they have perhaps received in times past.

Secondly, we can study their language and their literature, thus getting into their mind and history. There is nothing outside of personal contact that would give us a better understanding of the Mexicans. Ethnologically we are quite different. They have their peculiar racial temper and temperament. It is not untrue to say that they are "Oriental" while we are "Anglo-Saxon." Through their language too we would understand how historically they have suffered from European arrogance and exploitation. We would get into the great realm of religion too and understand how it is that the Church has ceased to function as a great ethical force for the freeing of the common people. A knowledge of the Mexican language and literature along with travel would open many a mind to the situation.

Third, we should take the attitude of believing in the Mexicans as a people. We may distrust their governments, but not the people. Perhaps we have allowed the acts of government to color our view of the people. This must cease. We must go deeper. We must trust this present day movement and see to it that our moral support is given in such a way that there shall not be any of the old-time compromise with those powers of autocracy and tyranny which always tend to deprive the people of their rights. We must believe in the moral capacity of the Mexican whether he be a Mestizo or a pure-blooded Indian. The

writer well remembers watching a basket ball game at Guadalajara a few months ago. He was accompanied by a former basket ball player from Yale and a man from Harvard. Both these men spoke in highest terms of the skill of the Mexican players, and all agreed that the young men kept their tempers and showed as much self-control in defeat as well as in victory as could be found in similar circles in America. This showed capacity for self-government.

Fourthly, we might fall in line with the plan of the Mexican government to have more Americans encouraged to enter Mexico to settle there as citizens of the country. While at first thought this might seem an impracticable plan, yet it is one that ought to be seriously considered. One reason why Germans, Spanish and other European peoples have such a hold upon the people of Mexico is because they are willing to identify themselves with the communities in which they live. Surely men from America, as from Canada and Europe, would bring a tremendous amount of stability to the people of Mexico through this form of sacrifice. Incidentally such immigrants would have opportunities of money making that they could not have in other lands owing to the natural wealth of the country.

Fifth, we could assist in the educational work of Mexico. This of course would be the most far-reaching way of assisting our neighbor on the South to develop the life and character demanded for the new day. Under the present government American men and women of great wealth could do much along lines of providing teachers for private and public schools, could erect hospitals and run them freely, could support large social service enterprises, and could flood the country with up-to-date, high-toned and thoroughly Christian literature.

Sixth, last but by no means least, let us attract young Mexican men and women to America for educational purposes, treat them as they well deserve, and send them back not only good friends of America but of every cause that is good and enduring.

As a Mexican exile says, "this talk of intervention should give way to plans for mutual helpfulness." Why there-

fore may we not keep the fundamentals in mind and prove our good will to the Mexican people through the only kind of cooperation that makes for peace? This is not inconsistent with a firm insistence that Mexico will fulfill her international obligations.

THE POLITICAL DESIRES OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE

*By Conrado Benitez, Dean, College of Liberal Arts, University
of the Philippines, Manila*

A few months ago the people of America were surprised to get the news that a mission made up of forty representative Filipinos had left Manila and were coming to Washington charged by the Philippine legislature with the duty of conveying to the United States "the frankest assurance of the good will, friendship, and gratitude of the Filipino people, and submit with as much respect as confidence the question of Philippine independence, with a view to its final settlement." For the first time in the history of Filipino-American relationship, a large delegation composed not only of the political leaders of the people, but also of the various elements of the population, was being officially sent to America to remind her of her promise of two decades ago. Heretofore, the demand for Philippine independence has been voiced directly to the American Congress by means of formal resolutions of the Philippine legislature, and through the resident commissioners in Washington. Heretofore, the charge has been made that the question of Philippine independence was of concern only to the Filipino politicians. But the sending of the mission to the United States has served to invite America's attention to the fact that the desire for independence is universal among the people. And in this connection, it is well to add that the recent cable dispatches from the Philippines announcing the unanimous victory at the June third elections of the Nationalist Party—the party that sent the mission to America—only confirm in an unmistakable manner the contention that the Filipinos as a whole are for independence.

The propriety and opportuneness of sending this mission at this time when America is overburdened with foreign

and domestic problems has been questioned. To the credit of the Filipinos, as expressed by Governor-General Harrison before Congress, it should be remembered that during the critical time when the United States was busy engaged in the greatest war of all ages, the people of the Philippines purposely refrained from discussing their own national problem, but instead, devoted their energies to military preparation, and showed a spirit of loyalty to America unique in the record of colonial relationships. The authorities and people of America are now acquainted with the war record of the ten and a half million Filipinos over at the other side of the Pacific. And it is this same spirit of loyalty which prompted the Filipinos, once the armistice had been signed, to send a friendly mission to America, and without any grievance, frankly to remind her that it was time she practiced in her domestic relations those principles she had enunciated before, during, and after she went into the war—principles which led her to recognize the independence of the small countries of Europe. In the words of Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Senate and chairman of the mission, "how could you, indeed, give your recognition, nay, your assistance and coöperation to the independence of the Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Jugo-Slavia, and others, and withhold them from the Philippines? Our experiment in self-government has been pronounced by your own representatives a success. You were not bound by any promise to those countries, but you were and are so bound to the Philippines." Such has been the spirit which animated the Filipinos in sending this mission. America, in her effort to rule the destinies of the European world, is in danger of forgetting the destiny of her ten and a half million friends in the Philippines.

Now, therefore, the Filipino people, through their legally constituted representatives, have come before the American people submitting the following propositions: First, that as defined and established in the act of Congress of August 29, 1916, the purpose of the government of the United States is to withdraw its sovereignty over the Philippine Island as soon as a stable government can be established therein;

second, that in accordance with the terms and provisions of that law the people of the Philippines have organized a government which has offered complete evidence that conditions are ripe for the establishment of an independent government that will fully be capable of maintaining law and order, administer justice, promote the welfare of all the inhabitants of the islands, and discharge as well its international obligations.

Concerning the first proposition, the Filipinos have not the least fear that America will ever consider her promise as "a scrap of paper." To quote from the joint resolution of the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives:

America has been sufficiently explicit in her purposes from the beginning of her occupation of the Philippines. . . . The American flag that waved over Cuba for lofty reasons of humanity and justice, scrupulously observed and respected after the victory, is the same flag which, when the war spread to this part of the globe, extended its protecting folds over another people anxious for justice and liberty. And that American flag could not stand for emancipation in Cuba and at the same time for forcible subjugation in the Philippines. The difference, if such ever existed, consisted only in matters of detail not in the affirmation and observance of the cardinal principles. In one case, owing to the proximity of Cuba to the American shores, the terms of the problem were known at the outset and provisions had been made for its solution. In the other, the lack of adequate information in the United States as to the true conditions of the Philippine problem, aggravated by long distance, momentarily obscured the question and naturally gave rise to a less determined and speedy procedure. Thus while Cuba became free and independent after scarcely four years of American occupation, the Philippines, which professed the same ideals as her sister of the Antilles, continue in a state of dependency after more than twenty years of such occupation.

Both American official statements, and American public opinion are unequivocally for the redemption of America's pledge.

Concerning the second proposition, the testimony of the duly appointed representatives of the American government in the Philippines should be given preponderant weight. Governor-General Harrison has made the following statement both in his public addresses and before the joint

committee of the Senate and House during the hearings on the Philippine question in June:

There are about 1000 municipalities in the Philippines, all of which are governed by elective Filipino officials. There are about 42 provinces in the islands likewise governed by Filipinos. There are two elective houses of the legislature composed entirely of Filipinos. Out of seven members in the cabinet six are Filipinos, and most of the heads of the executive departments of the government are Filipinos today. It is true that there are still some 700 Americans in the Philippines, but for the most part they are teachers, professors, and scientists, and to my mind a class of men who would be desired by the Filipinos even if they had complete independence. That presents a picture of practical autonomy. It has been going on for the last two and a half years, or ever since the recent charter has been given us by Congress, and in my opinion, during those two and a half years the Filipinos, having been given an opportunity, have satisfactorily demonstrated the fact that they have already established and are maintaining the stable form of government which is prescribed in the preamble to the Jones bill as a prerequisite to their independence.

Vice-Governor Charles E. Yeater in an official cablegram to the Secretary of War attests to the "capacity for initiative and the constructive spirit evidenced by the legislature, the first organized under the Jones law."

The stability of government used as a prerequisite to the granting of Cuban independence has been more than complied with by the Filipinos. In the language of the memorial to Congress,

our present government is a government based on the peaceful suffrage of the people, representing the whole of the country deriving their powers from the people and subject to the limitations and safeguards which the experience of constitutional government has shown to be essential to the maintenance and protection of individual rights.

Judged alone from the legal condition imposed by the act of Congress of August 29, 1916, there is no doubt in the minds of those who know that the Philippines are today ready for complete independence. But it must be admitted that the American government is one based on public opinion, and it is to it that final appeal must be made. This is what makes the independence campaign of the Philippines difficult, and yet full of promise; difficult, be-

cause we are dealing not only with the officials directly concerned in the administration of our affairs, but also with the millions of private citizens, who are absorbed in their own business, and do not have time to study other peoples' problems, and yet whose opinion contributes to make up the bigger public opinion, which in the long run shapes the policies of the government. And full of promise, because in the words of Secretary of War Baker, "the American people love their own liberty too well to deny it to others." It takes longer time to get the mass of the people to act, and to assume a definite stand in regards to matters which do not directly concern their individual welfare, but the heart of the people is sound and open to any reasonable appeal. And when once the history of the long and bloody struggle of the Filipinos for emancipation is known, when the people of America learn to appreciate more fully the historical fact that the cause which led the United States to war against Spain was the self-same cause which forced the Filipinos to fight against Spain, demanding those fundamental rights of man which have been long ago incorporated in the political life of Americans—then will the moral issue involved in the Philippine question become clear, and the duty of the American citizen definite.

Till that time comes the Filipinos are prepared to wage a nation-wide campaign of education in America. The word education is used advisedly, for more knowledge of Filipino history and civilization and actual condition is all that is necessary to make the citizens of America see their duty towards the Filipinos. There was a time indeed when even members of the American Congress had to be shown the location of the Philippines on the map.

Then, followed the era of misrepresentation, when the retentionists, in order to justify the retention of the Islands, had to show the backward condition of the country and people,—naturally enough, savages could not be trusted to run their own government. This was the period of sensational publicity in America—the exhibition of the finely-shaped but half-naked Igorrotes; the publication of profusely illustrated magazine articles portraying the life of the wild

tribes. The effect of those exhibitions and those articles may still be traced in the ignorance displayed by many editorials written even in this year of our Lord 1919, and in connection with the recent visit to this country of the Philippine mission.

Suppose you belonged to a people that for several centuries had been leading a civilized Christian life; for years the leaders of your people have been asking for constitutional reforms in vain; finally, you rise in revolt, and your father and brothers and other relatives and friends are either shot or banished—they have given their all for what they thought was their right. Your people meet with success in their struggle against the sovereign to the extent of driving her out of all your territory except the capital. But a third party appears on the scene and takes the place of the former sovereign. The third party, not knowing your history and past sacrifices, disregards all that you have actually accomplished and gives you no credit for it. A period of misunderstanding ensues. War follows, and you are vanquished. But your people have not lost faith. They coöperate in the work of reconstruction, and make a success of it. The new sovereign is democratic and believes in the right to petition. If every time you exercise that right you are met with the statement by the moulders of public opinion—the editors of newspapers—that your people were head-hunting savages, and cannibals only twenty years ago, and that therefore, it is preposterous to grant them independence after only that many years of tutelage, would you not resent such an insult?

The ten million Christian Filipinos living today deeply resent the many libels committed against them by so many citizens of their new American sovereign. From bitter experience, they have learned to appreciate the significance of the teaching that the basis of an efficient democracy is education. A little learning is indeed a dangerous thing, especially in a democratic community upon whose public opinion depends the righteous determination of the fate of ten and one-half million people. Our newspaper clippings show that the only opposition to granting the Filipinos

what they desire arises from men who actually believe that America found in the Philippines naked savages and wild men. Those who would like to see the Philippines permanently retained for exploitation, know the temper and the heart of the American citizenry too well to openly espouse their cause. There are those who are solicitous over the safety of the Filipinos once they are left alone, and these would like to be assured that no harm shall ever befall them.

But was independence ever attained by any nation without the people taking a chance? If individuals did not leave the parental roof and took a chance, would they attain success in life? If absolute safety from foreign aggression was an essential condition to independence, how many nations would be independent today? Could Belgium have withstood the attacks of Germany? Could France alone? And yet, who would say that these two countries should not be independent?

The Filipinos submit their national case to the American people in the confident hope that it will merit a just consideration. But a just consideration is possible only after all the parties concerned have been duly acquainted with the facts of the case. We have no right to ask the American people to come to a decision within a given period of time, but we demand a fuller study of our problem, so that, whatever decision is arrived at, will be the result of honest judgment, and not of prejudice and ignorance. To quote from the instructions of the Philippine legislature to the mission, our "national record of over twenty years, from the first day of American occupation until the present, is an open book, and is now unhesitatingly submitted to the examination and criticism of the world."

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE

PART IV

By David S. Spencer, D.D., Nagoya, Japan

THE DIET

As is well known the Japanese imperial diet, or parliament, is bicameral, being composed of an upper house, or house of peers, called *kizoki-in*, and a lower house, or house of representatives, called the *shugi-in*. This diet is abundantly provided for in the constitution, and in reading this document one has the feeling that Prince Ito, in directing the drafting of it, had chiefly in mind neither the United States congress nor the English parliament, but the Prussian system. The people must not be able to control the government, is a spirit written into every page of this important document.

Let us first study the structure of the house of peers. Ito calls this body the "assembly of the higher class," in distinction from the representatives who are the "commoners."

The house of peers shall, in accordance with the ordinance concerning the house of peers, be composed of the members of the imperial family, of the orders of nobility, and of those persons, who have been nominated thereto by the emperor (Constitution, Art. XXXIV).

Ito continues to say under this article,

The members of the house of peers, whether they be hereditary, elected or appointed ones, are to represent the higher grades of society. If the house of peers fulfills its functions, it will serve in a remarkable degree to preserve an equilibrium between political parties, to check the evil tendencies of irresponsible discussions,

to secure the stability of the constitution, to be an instrument for maintaining harmony between the governing and the governed¹

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The purpose of the establishment of the house of peers will then dictate largely its composition. Hence we find it composed of (a) princes of the blood, (b) peers (princes and marquises sit in virtue of their right when they reach the age of twenty-five); (c) counts, viscounts and barons, elected by their respective orders; (d) imperial nominees, chosen by the emperor because of distinguished services to the country; and (e) representatives of the fifteen highest tax-payers, chosen by themselves, one from each prefecture. The age limit for classes (d) and (e) is thirty, for all others, it is twenty-five. The term is seven years for members of classes (c) and (e); all others are life-members. Members of the imperial family, however, are entitled to membership on attaining their majority. The electors in class (e) must be males, and of full thirty years of age; and the person elected must in addition be nominated by the emperor.² The composition of this house, June 20, 1917, the occasion of the thirty-ninth session, was as follows:³

Princes of the blood.....	12
Princes.....	13
Marquises.....	36
Counts.....	17
Viscounts.....	70
Barons.....	67
Imperial nominees.....	119
Highest taxpayers.....	44
Total.....	378

Thus, out of 378 members, 44 came from the people, but were of that class of landed proprietors and capitalists who are naturally conservative. All the others owe their existence as members in some way to the imperial house. This fact needs to be kept in mind.

¹ Ito, *Commentaries on the constitution of Japan*, p. 72.

² *Japan Year Book*, 1917, p. 637; Ito, *Commentaries*, as above, p. 186-189.

³ *Japan Year Book*, 1917, p. 637.

The following is a list⁴ of the presiding officers of the *kizoku-in* to date:

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Presidents	Vice-Presidents
1890-1891....Count Ito	1890-1891.....Count Higashikuze
1891-1896....Marquis Hashisuka	1891-1893.....Baron Hosokawa
1896-1903....Prince Konoye	1893-1894.....Marquis Saionji
1903-.....Prince Togukawa	1894-

Of the composition of the house of representatives Ito says,

The house of representatives shall be composed of members elected by the people, according to the provisions of the law of elections (Art. XXXV).⁵

The law of election of the house of representatives determines the election districts, age and qualifications of voters and candidates, and determines the methods to be followed in contested cases. A city having at least 30,000 population forms one electoral district, entitled to one representative; larger cities, one for each 130,000; and in rural sections about 130,000 people form a district, having one representative. Male Japanese citizens, of full twenty-five years, and who pay direct taxes on property or business to the extent of at least 10 yen, are entitled to the ballot, which is secret. A general election is held every four years, which is the period of membership in the lower house.⁶

At first the house had 300 members; it now has 381, owing to improvement in law of elections. The occupations of the members of the house may be of some interest, as they are distributed among agriculture, mercantile, commercial, legal, journalistic, medical, governmental, industrial and miscellaneous pursuits. Mr. Y. Okuda, former chief secretary of the house, is the compiler of this table.

⁴ See *Japan Year Book*, 1917, p. 638.

⁵ Ito, *Commentaries*, as above, 73; Law of Elections, 214-254.

⁶ The last session of the diet revised the law of elections in the direction of more liberal provisions. The age requirement remains at twenty-five years; but the minimum amount of direct national taxes is fixed at 3 yen, instead of 10 yen, and the voter must reside in the given election district at least six months continuously instead of one year, as formerly.

SESSION	AGRICULTURAL	MERCANTILE	COMMERCIAL	LAW	JOURNAL	DOCTORS	GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL	INDUSTRIAL	MISCELLANEOUS
First.....	144	12	14	24	12	3	27	10	5
Third.....	175	15	15	21	10	3	8	8	5
Sixth.....	183	15	16	30	14	5	1	6	5
Seventh.....	185	15	16	24	16	1	3	7	6
Eleventh.....	156	30	13	18	11	1	5	1	3

It is made clear in the above that the majority of the members of the sessions above named were of the agricultural class. It is also apparent that the mercantile class are on the increase, while lawyers seem not to be a popular class in the legislative halls.⁷

This table closes with 1889. Let us take a later view, from a table just recently compiled and note the changes in the nature of the membership of the diet.

	1902		1912		1917	
	Num- ber	Per cent	Num- ber	Per cent	Num- ber	Per cent
Farmers, landowners.....	120	31.8	80	21.0	64	16.8
Banking, trade, manufacturing, mining.....	72	19.2	86	23.4	114	29.9
Barristers, journalists, authors....	58	15.4	85	22.3	120	31.5
Others.....	126	33.6	127	33.3	83	21.8
Totals.....	276	100.0	381	100.0	381	100.0

From this showing it becomes clear that the class connected with the land is gradually decreasing, while that of the business class is increasing, as is that of the lawyer and scholarly class, while the miscellaneous class is losing itself in the two classes last named. The reason for the increase of the second and third classes lies largely in their ability to purchase their way to the diet, it is claimed. But more of this later.

Possibly a lesson may be drawn from the ages of the members of the lower house. It is noted that the average age is gradually increasing. From the first election the average was 42.3; from the third, 44.3; from the fifth, 44.8; from the

⁷ *The Far East*, vol. II, 1897, pp. 149-152.

*Sessions of the diet**

NUM- BER OF SESSION	OPENED	SUSPENDED	REOPENED	DISSOLVED	CLOSED
1	November 29, 1890				March 8, 1891
2	November 26, 1891			December 25, 1891 (b)	June 15, 1892
3	May 6, 1892	May 16, 1892	May 23, 1892		March 1, 1893
4	November 29, 1892	January 23, 1893	February 7, 1893		
5	November 28, 1893	December 19, 1893	December 29, 1893 (a)	December 30, 1893 (c)	
6	May 15, 1894			June 2, 1894 (d)	October 22, 1894
7	October 18, 1894				March 27, 1895
8	December 24, 1894				March 29, 1896
9	December 28, 1895		February 25, 1896		March 25, 1897
10	December 25, 1896	February 15, 1896			
11	December 24, 1897			December 25, 1897 (e)	
12	May 19, 1898	June 7, 1898	June 10, 1898	June 10, (1898 (f)	
13	December 3, 1898				March 10, 1899
14	November 22, 1899				February 24, 1900
15	December 26, 1900				March 25, 1901
16	December 10, 1901	February 27, 1901	March 10, 1901		March 10, (1902 (g)
17	December 9, 1902	December 19, 1902	December 28, 1902	December 28, 1908 (h)	
18	May 12, 1903	May 21, 1903	May 23, 1903		June 5, 1903
19	December 10, 1903			December 11, 1903 (i)	
20	March 20, 1904				March 30, 1904
21	November 30, 1904				February 28, 1905
22	December 28, 1905				March 28, 1906
23	December 28, 1906				March 28, 1907
24	December 28, 1907				March 27, 1908 (j)
25	December 25, 1908				March 25, 1909
26	December 24, 1909				March 24, 1910
27	December 23, 1910				March 23, 1911
28	December 27, 1911				March 26, 1912 (k)
29	August 23, 1912				August 26, 1912 (l)

30	December 27, 1912	January 21, 1913	February 4, 1913		March 27, 1913
31	December 26, 1913				March 26, 1914
32	May 5, 1914				May 8, 1914 (m)
33	June 22, 1914				June 29, 1914 (n)
34	September 4, 1914				September 10, 1914 (o)
35	December 7, 1914				
36	May 20, 1915				June 10, 1915 (q)
37	December 1, 1915				February 29, 1916
38	December 27, 1916				
39	June 22, 1917				July 15, 1917
40	December 25, 1917				March 28, 1918
41	December 25, 1918				March 31, 1919

* Corrected from the diet calendar through kindness of Hon. Saburo Shimada, M.P.

(a) Suspended four days but dissolved on 30th.

(b) Extra election, February 15, 1892.

(c) Extra election March 1, 1894.

(d) Extra election September 1, 1894.

(e) Extra election March 15, 1898.

(f) Extra election August 10, 1898.

(g) Ordinary election August 10, 1902.

(h) Extra election March 1, 1913.

(i) Extra election March 1, 1904.

(j) Election May 15, 1908.

(k) Ordinary election May 15, 1912.

(l) Special session.

(m) Special session.

(n) Special session.

(o) Special session, war.

(p) Extra election March 15, 1915.

(q) Special session.

(r) Want of confidence vote.

seventh, 46.1; from the ninth, 47.1; from the tenth, 48.1 years, and from the thirteenth 51 years. This is in part due to the fact that more of the older members are now being returned to successive sessions of the diet. The following six men have been continuously members of the lower house from the first session of the diet:

Inukai, *Ki*, Kokuminto leader from Okayama-ken.
 Kono, *Hironaka*, Kensekai leader, from Fukushima-ken.
 Minoura, *Katsudo*, Kensekai leader from Oita-ken.
 Motoda, *Hajime*, Sei-yu-kai leader from Oita-ken.
 Osaki, *Yukio*, Kensekai from Miye-ken.
 Shimada, *Saburo*, from Yokohama.⁸

There are instructive lessons to be drawn from the table shown on page 162. It will be seen from this table that during the early years of parliamentary life, the suspensions and dissolutions were frequent. These were the days when the people, eager to have a part in their own real government, were trying their strength against the remaining influences of feudalism. In the first session the representatives were lamb-like—were getting ready to contend for larger recognition by the government. As soon as agitation began, in the second session, the government dissolved the diet. This only stirred more deeply the determination of the representatives of the people to fight it out with the bureaucrats, and the next ten years reveal, as is clearly seen from the table, a steady contest with little apparent progress. I say "apparent," for while the people uniformly met with defeat, for reasons which will appear later, the fact is that during all this time the politicians were strengthening by exercise their war sinews, and, on the other hand, the leaders of the government were becoming convinced that they must have party backing in the diet in order to do business at all. A reference to the table of imperial cabinets will help here. It was the conservative peers and their hatred of party government which defeated the fourth Ito cabinet, because Ito had found himself compelled to resort to a trial of party government, himself as party leader, in order to the carrying on of government business. This was an admission by the strong man him-

⁸ *Japan Year Book*, 1917, p. 640, furnishes the figures above given.

self of the necessity of considering the people. Ito had changed. The Russo-Japanese war united the nation, caused the burial of political disputes, and permitted the first Katsura ministry to continue the longest of any on record. But, the war over, it was the people who overthrew the third Katsura ministry, after only two months in the saddle, thus making definite advance during these years.

The bureaucrats had banked upon the constitution of the diet to protect bureaucracy. They had thought that they here possessed the means for holding these frisky young politicians well within bounds.⁹ The quiet years in the table of sessions of the diet mean preparation along different lines of attack, as we shall later see. That is a story for another section. Meanwhile note the gradual rising of the people against intrenched feudalism.

The presidents and vice-presidents of the *shugi-in* have uniformly been able leaders, and are to date as follows:

Presidents and vice-presidents of the Shugi-in

SESSION	PRESIDENT	VICE-PRESIDENT
1, 2	Nakashima, Noboyuki	Tsuda Mainichi
3, 4	Hoshi, Toru	Sone Arasuke and Baron Kusumoto
5	Kusumoto, Baron	Abe, Iwane
6	Kusumoto, Baron	Kataoka, Kenkichi
7-9	Kusumoto, Baron	Shimada, Saburo
10-11	Hatoyama, Kazuo	Shimada, Saburo*
12-17	Kataoka, Kenkichi	Motoda, Hajime
18	Kataoka, Kenkichi	Sugita, T.
19	Kono, H.	Sugita, T.
20, 21	Matsuda	Minoura K.
22-24	Sugita, T.	Minoura K.
25-28	Haseba, S.	Koezuka R.
29-30	O-oka, Ikuzo	Seki, N.
31	Ooka; Haseba; Oku, H.	Seki, N.
32-35	Oku, H.	Seki, N.
36	Shimada, Saburo	Hanai, Dr. T.
37	Shimada, Saburo	Hanai, and Hayami, S.
38	Shimada, Saburo	Hayami, Seiji.
39	O-oka, Ikuzo	Hamada, Kunimatsu
40	O-oka, Ikuzo	Hamada, K.

* Mr. Shimada served to the end of the twelfth session, Mr. Motoda through the thirteenth to seventeenth sessions.

⁹ Uyehara, p. 164, Note, etc., *Japan Weekly Mail*, Vol. XV, pp. 246, 311, 479; Vol. XVI, pp. 777; Vol. XIV, pp. 57, 430, 560, 621, 646. All valuable editorials covering this stormy period.

We must go still further in this analysis in order to understand, from other points of view, the influence of reactionary forces upon the nation's political development. In the nearly thirty years of parliamentary life already passed in Japan, there have been thirteen general elections, as follows:

*General elections, regular and special**

ELECTION	DATE	KIND	NUMBER OF ELECTORS	VOTERS PER 1000 POPULATION	FRANCHISE HOLDERS PER 1 DIET MEMBER
1	July 1, 1890	Regular	442,272	11.10	1,474
2	January 15, 1892	Special	434,594	10.7	1,449
3	March 1, 1894	Special	436,113	10.5	1,454
4	September 1, 1894	Special	459,373	11.1	1,531
5	March 15, 1898	Special	453,637	10.5	1,212
6	August 10, 1898	Special	502,243	10.4	1,674
7	August 10, 1902†	Regular	982,868	21.6	2,614
8	March 1, 1903	Special	958,322	17.10	2,549
9	March 1, 1904†	Special	762,445	15.7	2,012
10	May 15, 1908†	Regular	1,597,594	32.5	4,215
11	May 15, 1912	Regular	1,506,143	29.5	3,927
12	March 25, 1915†	Special	1,576,201	29.3	4,137
13	April 20, 1917	Special	1,469,994	26.6	3,858

* This table is the work of Mr. S. Terada, Chief Secretary of the *shugi-in*. Many lists published in English, even in Japan, are wrong, because they contain serious errors.

† Increase 1902 due to lowering property qualification; that of 1908, to extension to Hokkaido. Decrease 1904, due to lowering the land-tax.

Now mark the effect of attempted bureaucratic control of the elections. By severely limiting the franchise at the beginning, it resulted that slightly more than 1 per cent of the population acquired the right to vote. Unlimited franchise would *then* have been revolutionary; the people were not ready for it. But while the literary and property qualifications insured a representation in the diet of the stable elements of the community, they also, by their very nature, excluded many of the most scholarly, progressive and morally worthy elements, because these latter elements generally were not possessors of landed estates or large inherited properties. Again, the representatives in the lower house were looked upon and spoken of as "commoners," in

distinction from those of the upper house, who were the "higher class."¹⁰ These terms meant a feudalistic attitude. The masses thought that the granting of a constitution and a parliament meant the removal of this attitude; the bureaucrats were loath to surrender their inherited centuries-old power; and when, in the second session of the diet the "commoners" sought to make use of the power believed by them to be theirs under the constitution, the bureaucratic government summarily dissolved the diet. A ten-year contest passed before the first concession on the franchise was secured, the effect of which appears in 1902. But the government in its anxiety to control the situation, took a step in the second election, February 15, 1892, in which it signally disgraced itself and weakened the moral tone of parliamentary life for a hundred years.

The government thereupon at once dissolved the diet, and, under the leadership of Shinagawa, tried to gain the majority by interfering with the elections through the prefectural authorities and all other available channels. Bribes were given to voters out of a secret fund, besides which they were intimidated by ruffians instigated by police authorities. This resulted in a reign of terror throughout the country, under which not only government officials, but all bankers and commercial men in any way connected with the government, as well as all other business folk under its indirect control, found it impossible to cast their votes of their own free will. Even worse conditions prevailed in Kochi and Saga, then provincial headquarters of the two opposition parties, and in certain northern prefectures, where armed mobs paraded the streets in broad daylight, with the result that many were killed and wounded. But, in spite of these endeavors, made at the cost of peace and order, the outcome of the elections was still a majority for the opposition.

After this interference with the elections by the government, the corrupt practice of purchasing votes by means of junketing and money was introduced. Comparing the first election in 1890 with those that followed after 1892, the first was unattended by violence, and the voters prided themselves upon the small amount of expenditure involved. Now it is entirely different. The custom that still prevails of relying upon pecuniary influence to secure election is the fruit of the abuse of government authority in 1892.¹¹

¹⁰ Ito, *Commentaries*, Art. 33, p. 69.

¹¹ Okuma, *Fifty years of New Japan*, Vol. I, p. 166-7; Lay, "History of Political Parties," *Transactions Asiatic Society of Japan*, Vol. 30, p. 405.

From the consequences of that act Japan is but slowly recovering. The politicians soon learned that they could use the money trick taught them by the government, and they have ever since been prone to rely upon "filthy lucre." Nor has the government records since that day been such as to cause unalloyed pride. Mr. Uyehara declares that ten years ago an election cost a successful candidate about 3000 yen.¹² The claim is now popularly made that the average cost of a seat to a candidate is close to 10,000 yen. It is also claimed by those best qualified to know that this corruption of elections is on the increase.¹³ The great business houses of Mitsui and Mitsu-Bishi are said to liberally support the party leaders financially in their contention with bureaucracy.¹⁴ A multitude of still other witnesses might here be called, following the above list of elections in order, as some writers have done; but the above will suffice to show the folly of attempting in this way to restrain the natural political desires of the people; and, in fact, a better moral tone already begins to appear. In 1917, the government caused to be posted in public places and to be heralded through the press to all the people a list of "election don'ts" which surely will be read with interest by Americans:

Election don'ts

1. Don't forget that the voters must go in person.
2. Don't accept money, cheques and other presents.
3. Don't accept invitations to any sort of entertainment.
4. Don't vote, nor go about canvassing, tempted by prospects of a public or private position.
5. Don't accept invitations to go in any conveyance to or from the voting place at other people's expense; nor let them pay your fares or tips or lodging expenses for you.
6. Don't let your judgment be warped by considerations of agrarian interests or pecuniary relations.

¹² Uyehara, as above, p. 273.

¹³ *Herald of Asia*, February 24, 1917, p. 676; April 21, 1917, p. 99, 109; June 16, 1917, p. 355; 16,149 cases reported in 1917.

¹⁴ *Herald of Asia*, April 7, 1917, p. 42.

7. Don't threaten, kidnap, or deceive voters, nor interfere with traffic.

8. Don't spread unfounded reports in the hope of frustrating the success of candidates.

9. Don't collect many people, beat gongs and drums, display large banners, and make other demonstrations.

10. Don't carry firearms, spears, swords, clubs, and other dangerous objects.¹⁵

Note the importance of the number ten, like the Decalogue. Prosecution, fine and imprisonment follow conviction. Here follows the list of offenders by elections.¹⁶

ELECTION	OFFENDERS	ELECTION	OFFENDERS
1	286	2	323
3 and 4	1,153	5 and 6	1,029
7	1,861	8	1,996
9	284	10	1,519
11	3,772	12	7,298
13	24,339		

These figures were supplied by Mr. Sakae Terada, Chief Secretary of the Imperial Diet.

The numbers given for elections 1 to 10 contain cases not yet fully determined.

Those given in elections 11 to 13 represent convictions determined.

In cases of elections 3 and 4, 5 and 6, the figures cover two elections per year.

In addition to the above figures many men were accused of violations of the election laws, but figures showing results are not obtainable at this time.

The reader may be inclined to ask, "Are the Japanese generally so untrustworthy that they cannot be trusted with political power?" I believe that every thoughtful American, every citizen of whatever civilized country, knowing the situation here and viewing it dispassionately, must answer with an emphatic negative. The people are naturally reliable, liberty-loving, loyal and aspiring. They possess a deep respect for the officer of the law, and endure official oppression—a Prussianized political system—as no

¹⁵ *Herald of Asia*, February 24, 1917, p. 675.

¹⁶ Personal notes by the writer.

Anglo-Saxon would ever do. *They are steadily resenting an out-of-date feudalism*, which must give way to better methods, and are improving in spite of serious handicaps.

Take but a few illustrations here of the political handicaps under which the representatives of the people are placed. In discussing projects of law in the diet, government bills take the precedence, and thus the government can, and sometimes does, control legislation. Efforts of the members to promote their own bills or those originating with the people are often frustrated. As the government can at its pleasure dissolve the diet, and so defeat any bill they may dislike, it becomes possible for them to control legislation in this way also.¹⁷

The judicial system of Japan also readily lends itself to manipulation by the government in power, so that in this another way bureaucracy may defeat the ends of justice and forefend itself against the risings of popular rights.¹⁸

Members of the diet have a constitutional right to question publicly the members of the cabinet concerning government business; but since they have no means of compelling an answer, and no ultimate control over the cabinet, the provision has less practical and positive value than might at first appear.¹⁹

The houses of the diet have the right to address the crown, and herein lies a privilege of real value, for four dissolutions out of seven have grown out of addresses impeaching the cabinet. But even these addresses the cabinet can defeat.²⁰

So closely does the constitution and the law of the houses tie up the liberties of the houses, that the diet cannot easily make or amend rules for its own government.²¹

As the two houses have coördinate powers and rights, the conservative, bureaucratic peers can defeat all projects intended to increase democratic tendencies.²²

¹⁷ Oyehara, as above, p. 152.

¹⁸ R. Masujima, LL.D., in *New East*, November, 1918, p. 503. *Important.*

¹⁹ Ito, *Commentaries*, as above, Art. LIV, p. 91, Chap. III, p. 68. Uyehara as above, p. 153.

²⁰ Uyehara as above, 156. Especially note on President Hironaka.

²¹ Uyehara as above, 159.

²² Uyehara as above, 159-162.

It must be borne in mind that the members of the upper house are drawn in no real sense from the people, but come in larger measure from the "higher classes," upon nomination and advice of the ministers. Already the feeling is spreading that the upper house is a piece of useless machinery, and one of the new manifestations of democracy in Japan is the fact that the people are saying this publicly.²³ This change in the character of the membership of the upper house grows directly out of the financial and industrial changes which the new age is bringing to Japan, thus lifting into positions of comparative wealth and social influence members of the so-called middle and lower classes. These men are now among the highest tax payers of their several communities, and so eligible to become members of the upper house. But having had little or no training in political affairs, these *narikin*, or suddenly rich, people cannot be expected at the start to prove valuable political agents. Time will be needed for them also to attain a condition of practical usefulness. There must come a change. The upper house must either be popularized and become able to work in harmony with the growing political ability of the lower house, or it must lose its legal standing of equal authority with that house. The age has little patience with effete bureaucracies.

It is the theory of the government that the members of the upper house shall not form political parties, and as a matter of fact they have not quite done this; but they have formed clubs, somewhat along the lines of social classes in the body, and these clubs serve as media for the expression of political influence. These clubs or groups are:²⁴

Political groups in upper house

Kenkyukai.....	108	Doyo-kai.....	29
Chawa-kai.....	61	Koyo-club.....	33
Independents (nominal)...	63	Koin-club	13
Independents (real).....	55	Princes of the blood.....	12

²³ Uyehara as above, pp. 163, 164. *Herald of Asia*, July 13, 1918, p. 472; October 19, 1918, p. 91. The last is by Baron Ogimachi, one of the nobility.

²⁴ *Japan Year Book*, 1917, p. 638; *Herald of Asia*, June 22, 1918, p. 395; *Japan Times*, June 6, 1910. "Peers and Partyism."

This long and interesting battle on the part of the diet with the reactionary government, the frequent and repeated defeats of the people by these conservative forces, has in some quarters led to discouragement with the attempt at parliamentary institutions in Japan. Those already possessing the elective franchise have lacked a sense of duty to the country in the exercise of their rights, and have either not voted at all, or have been ready to pledge their votes upon receipt of the slightest favors, or of contemptible bribes.²⁵

While the voting is secret and the poles carefully guarded by police, this does not make the voting either sure or intelligent. The candidates establish on polling day booths along the street adjacent, and I have seen a voter on departing from the polling place announcing to each of the booths in turn that he has voted for the candidate favored by each such booth. A voter of this city has told me that this custom is general. Neither the government nor the party leaders have made any adequate plans for the enlightenment of the electorate, and this for reasons which will be explained under political parties. Foreigners have more than once committed the mistake of failing to sympathize with the government and people in view of the problems they together have to work out, as did Sir Rutherford Alcock in 1864.²⁶

The sessions of the diet, at first characterized by much debate, and accompanied with occasional attempts at oratory in a foreign style, have latterly settled down to more quiet manners, the lower house meeting as a body on alternate days, as a rule, the other days being devoted to committee meetings, in which the main questions are largely threshed out. The public sessions have thus become comparatively tame.

²⁵ Uyehara as above, p. 272; *Japan Weekly Mail*, Vol. XIII, p. 319; Vol. XIV, pp. 51, 430.

²⁶ Treat, Dr. P. J., *Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan, 1853-1865*. Pp. 315-326. A most valuable work covering the period indicated.

But this is not the time for discouragement over parliamentary institutions in Japan.²⁷ Feudalism must be thoroughly uprooted, and the people come to take an active part in the building of their new national structure. They have knotty problems to solve in the status of the upper house, in the terms of the constitution, in making the cabinet dependent upon the diet, in the organization of their political parties, and in the education of the electorate; but these changes for the better are bound to come; and of this more later.

(The next article will deal with political parties and tendencies taking careful note of the rising democratic tendencies in the life of the people.)

²⁷ *Herald of Asia*, February 24, 1917, p. 676.

MODERN EDUCATION IN CHINA. II

By Charles K. Edmunds, Ph.D., President of Canton Christian College, Canton, China

EDUCATIONAL NEEDS AFFECTED BY INTERNAL CONDITION AND INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

A review of China's internal condition and international relations leads to certain conclusions regarding the types of education most urgently needed.

China is destined to become one of the foremost producing nations of the world, a vast market, a huge stabilizing, peaceful power if allowed to develop its great wealth in its own way. The shortest road to a partial success in this endeavor to preserve free nationality in Asia is the development of China's material resources, which will not only enrich China and the world, but will help to arouse the people from their age-long sleep, and to create a sense of nationhood.

The introduction of foreign capital and the internationalization of foreign interests in a coöperative spirit with China and the supervision by a League of Nations constitute the only hope as regards China's foreign relations and even as regards her internal development. The fundamental element in all this from the Chinese side is more general education of the people to give the background for progress and the training of native leaders upon whom must rest the responsibility for carrying out in detail such plans as may be formed for the alleviation of present conditions.

It is just here that one of the functions of our mission colleges in China comes in—to train these leaders in situ, without loss of connection with China; for they need to know China as well as Western science and institutions and methods. Certain types of education demand special

attention if China is to be prepared adequately to meet even her immediate needs. These are the departments of engineering, agriculture and medicine. Concerning each of these we venture to offer a brief and suggestive account.

Engineering

The ever increasing outside demand for China's products, makes it imperative that she be integrated industrially as well as politically for only by responding adequately to this call of the time for industrial development can she retain even that measure of national independence which she still possesses and lay the foundation for ultimate complete independence.

Of primary importance in this connection is the more adequate development of better means of communication, railways, trolley lines, automobile roads, telegraph and telephone systems.

This development of communications is not only fundamental to other industrial development but is of special urgency in China in order to alleviate the famine conditions frequently arising as a result of floods by permitting the more rapid and more adequate movement of food supplies to regions in want, and furthermore the development of the lines of easier transport of both goods and people will serve to unify the people and bind them together whereas now it is exceedingly difficult for a sense of nationhood to be developed among a people so widely separated by rivers, mountains and dialects with no trunk lines connecting the north with the south or the east with the west; the existing railways are practically confined to the north-eastern quarter of the country and the total in the whole country is a little over 6500 miles, whereas we are finding our 265,000 miles inadequate for a country of the same size.

It is essential that *within China's own borders* adequately equipped schools should be established in which the Chinese may be taught the arts and sciences necessary to the development and maintenance of such utilities.

Fundamental to railway and other industrial development is the exploitation of the mineral wealth of China,

especially that in coal, oil, and iron, as well as the ore deposits of other metals. No geological survey of Chinese dominions has yet been made and the Chinese themselves have never developed the art of mining to any great degree. There is urgent need of scientific investigation under China's own auspices of both the general geological structure and the specific commercial values. The actual reconnaissance would in great part furnish the means of the needed training in a working form. The intellectual processes involved in such work are precisely those which the youth of China especially need as a corrective of the traditional neglect of the inductive method; and the intellectual and even ethical results of a thorough investigation of the natural resources of their land, even though inspired primarily by economic considerations, would if carried out on broad and sound lines be greater even than the industrial and commercial results.

Some attempt to meet the need of education in the various lines of engineering is being made at Peiyang University, the Government University at Peking, the Mining and Engineering College maintained in connection with the Peking-Mukden Railway at Tangshan three hours east of Tientsin, at the Government Institute of Technology at Shanghai, and in a less substantial way at Taiyuan in Shansi and at Chengtu in Szechwan. Then there is the engineering department of Hongkong University which, however, is strictly speaking not in China and can never effect the same result as an institution on Chinese soil and under Chinese control. None of these institutions is really adequately equipped or staffed in comparison with the need for high-grade engineering education. Nor are any of the mission colleges prepared as yet to render any adequate service in this connection.

Agriculture

The fundamental industry in China is agriculture, some two-thirds of the entire population being thus employed; and because the more complicated industries based on the mineral resources are so largely undeveloped and will be

slower in their more adequate improvement, the resources of the soil are of special and more immediate importance. Perhaps the greatest opportunity for industrial improvement in China lies in this department. The methods and the very implements are said to be the same today as in 2700 B.C. The Chinese agriculturalist is an expert intensive gardener but knows little of extensive farming or of the improvement of plants and animals by selection and breeding. Moreover the area under cultivation could be greatly increased. The use of the grass lands for cattle raising, and the development of dairy products as well as a meat supply offers a tremendous opportunity.

With proper organization and administration along these lines of education and the development of communications, the land could readily support not only the present population with a greater margin of livelihood but would even produce raw materials and foodstuffs for export in much greater quantities than today.

Then too the afforestation of China's hillsides is imperative; for at least one-sixth of the area of China proper that is the only hope. Besides the need for fuel and for building timber, there is the urgent matter of flood prevention by control of rainfall and runoff over these hilly and mountainous regions. While a forestry advisor (an American) is employed by the central government it is a question whether his advice is adequately followed or whether he is given any opportunity to effect the sorely needed improvements.

And finally there is the great problem of conquering the desert lands. Perhaps a twentieth of China proper is so arid and sandy as to be put in the desert class, and then there are the extensive deserts in the dependencies of Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan. In view of the need to overcome the great deserts of America, Australia and Africa, as well as these in Asia, this problem of developing plants and methods that will aid in creeping out step by step upon the desert instead of allowing the desert to advance upon the present habitable areas is of great importance to mankind. And to its solution the Chinese if trained in scientific

lines and endued with the scientific spirit will be no mean contributors.

All these considerations emphasize the need for agricultural education in China not only for China's benefit but also for that of the world at large.

The central government has undertaken the development of a School of Agriculture and Forestry in Peking, and a few of the provinces have local experiment stations with some attempt at instruction. In two provinces, Shantung and Szechwan, a large number of so-called agricultural schools are reported in the Educational Directory of 1918: no less than 67 and 17 respectively; but it is to be feared that these as well as the other eight government agricultural schools reported for other provinces are of inadequate grade and attainment. The institutions under missionary auspices which lead in this work are Nanking University and Canton Christian College, where courses of collegiate grade both theoretical and practical are offered in the various phases of agricultural education and it is encouraging to note how popular these courses are. There is no limit to the opportunity for effective service in this department except that imposed by lack of funds.

Medicine

Disease is rife throughout China and the death rate is probably higher than in any other country. The mental power and economic efficiency of the nation as a whole is thereby greatly lessened.

Unhygienic conditions are offset somewhat by the practice of eating no uncooked food and drinking weak tea made with boiling water. A public health service is almost unknown and so smallpox, tuberculosis, and leprosy go practically unchecked. The spread of pneumonic plague in 1910-1911, however, aroused the Government and some measure of a preventive service has been established. The autopsies then permitted led to official authorization for autopsies and dissection throughout China beginning November, 1913; but full advantage of this privilege can only be had gradually.

China has long had her own practitioners of the healing art, and there is quite a volume of Chinese materia medica. Quinine, for instance is widely used, and inoculation for smallpox has long been practiced. There is a very thriving business today in patent medicines, among which unfortunately certain foreign concoctions predominate and through some, sent in largely through the Japanese Post Office, the morphia habit is all too readily assuming the rôle formerly held by opium. There is no legal control of the practice of medicine in China. The Chinese old-style practitioner has no knowledge of surgery.

Private practitioners of western methods are for the most part confined to the treaty ports; among them are a few Americans or Europeans but more Japanese, mostly of inferior training. There are perhaps 60 or 70 Chinese modern physicians educated in Europe or America, but most of these work in hospitals or medical schools, not as practitioners. There are a few graduates from missionary medical schools who are now practicing, but there have been to date probably less than 160 such graduates and many of them are working in mission hospitals or medical schools. On the whole then, outside the mission hospitals and outside the treaty ports there are very few practitioners in China who have had any training in western medicine and almost none who have been adequately trained.

The first hospital in China was established in Canton under American missionary auspices in 1835. The first government hospital was inaugurated at Tientsin as late as 1904 under army auspices. The only hospital for the insane in all China is also in Canton and maintained by American missionaries. Although medical instruction began decades ago in an informal and inadequate way in connection with the mission hospitals, medical schools even under missionary auspices are of only recent development, mostly since 1908.

A dozen medical schools under Protestant missions with a total foreign staff of 80 and a modern-trained Chinese staff of 30 look after some 600 students, of whom less than 100 are women. Two-thirds of all the medical as also of

the educational work in China under Protestant missionary auspices is conducted by Americans. Some 250 American physicians and 90 nurses aided by 20 Chinese physicians (modern trained) and 400 assistants and 600 nurses attend annually some 2,300,000 patients. The value of this medical work as a remover of prejudice and a door-opener cannot be overstated, let alone its real humanitarian value as such, which appeals to the Chinese sufficiently to draw contributions of some \$500,000 Chinese currency, annually for the support of medical work under American auspices. The chief centers for this hospital and educational work are Mukden, Peking, Tsinan, Chengtu, Hankow, Changsha, Nanking, Hangchow, Shanghai, Foochow, Canton. The foreign staff of a missionary medical school ranges from four to fourteen, the investment in plant from \$10,000 to \$210,000 each, the annual cost of maintenance from \$10,000 to \$50,000. The number of graduates is small, totalling to date about 160; tuition is low, \$100 Chinese currency, or less.

The central government maintains two medical schools, one in Peking and one in Tientsin in connection with the army. Provincial medical schools have been attempted at Tientsin, Wuchang, Nanchang, Soochow and Canton, perhaps elsewhere also, but except at Tientsin they have not amounted to much. This Peiyang Medical School, which must be distinguished from the Peiyang Military Medical College also at Tientsin, gives probably the best medical instruction of any government institution. It is the outgrowth of the work of Dr. John Kenneth McKenzie of the London Missionary Society whose skill attracted the attention of Li Hung-chang when he was Viceroy of Chihli. It is now officially recognized and supported as a government institution. All instruction is in English.

In November, 1912, the Ministry of Education issued outlines and regulations for "Special Medical Colleges." These are meant to correspond to the schools in Japan similarly designated; a four years' course, for which the curricula must be approved by the Board of Education, though the school may be developed under private auspices.

Such are being conducted at Nanchang, Wuchang and Canton where there are two, although one of them is largely inspired by and dependent on the efforts of two American physicians.

The total enrollment in these government and special medical schools is about seven hundred. All of them lack access to satisfactory hospitals for clinical instruction.

There would be no greater force for the regeneration of China than an adequate corps of well-trained Chinese women physicians inspired with Christian ideals of character and service. Yet there are but three institutions under missionary auspices, and but one under Chinese auspices where any attempt is made to provide women with medical education, and all of these are small, poorly equipped, understaffed and ill-prepared to train competent physicians. Of course, the girls of China lack as yet adequate preliminary education, but this condition is improving. There is of course great need for high grade nurses as well as physicians. Even from the existing schools, the oldest of which dates from 1900, there are but a hundred graduates all told, and most of them could not rank as independent practitioners.

Besides the missionary medical schools there are a few schools under foreign semi-government auspices, inspired probably by motives of political policy. At Mukden, the Japanese have inaugurated a promising school with a staff of twenty. At Tsingtau and at Shanghai, the Germans had begun the preliminary stages of modern medical schools when the war stopped their progress. At Canton the French conduct a hospital and medical school, with three physicians detached from the French army; but it is entirely inadequate as a teaching institution.

No medical school in China is adequately equipped and none is adequately manned, though some include on their staff most excellent men and aim at high standards and are following sound policies. The whole aspect of this problem has been modified within the last few years by the entrance into the field of the China Medical Board of the Rockefeller Foundation, which has stimulated real progress by giving aid under proper conditions to a number of hospitals through-

out the country, by affording opportunities for further training and research to a number of missionary physicians when on furlough, and to a number of Chinese graduates in modern medicine, by assisting in the development of more adequate premedical courses at Changsha, Shanghai and Foochow in connection with existing institutions, by strengthening greatly the medical school of Shantung Christian University where the medium of instruction is Mandarin, and by the reorganization of the Union Medical College at Peking where the medium of instruction is English. In connection with this last institution a premedical faculty has also been provided, and for the hospital and medical schools very extensive buildings are now in course of construction at a cost of several million dollars gold.

A large medical faculty is being provided and their work will undoubtedly affect medical standards throughout the land in due course. But in view of the great need for adequately staffed hospitals, all over the land, and for qualified private practitioners, only the hem of the problem has been touched.

The China Medical Board proposes in due time to establish a similar plant and staff at Shanghai. South China properly speaking is still neglected although the region of Canton is especially rich in clinical material of all sorts, particularly of certain tropical diseases. The medical school of Hongkong University is not on Chinese soil, charges very high fees and does not have a whole-time faculty, but is manned almost entirely by physicians whose chief concern is their private practice. These reasons, especially in view of the natural attitude of the Cantonese toward an institution wholly under British control and on British soil, make it extremely desirable to develop in Canton a medical school of the highest grade under joint missionary and Chinese auspices. No greater opportunity for effective philanthropic investment can be found in China than now offers in connection with medical work at Canton where ninety years ago such work entered China, yet where existing institutions today are not adequate to the situation.

CAUSES OF BACKWARDNESS

The fundamental element in the three types of education just discussed is of course natural science in its many branches and this involves the realm of ideas most in contrast with the content of Chinese education of the old type. But even more fundamental than the difference in content is the difference in method and attitude for it is here that the major causes of China's backwardness in science are discovered:

Absence of the inductive method

"Method" is the distinguishing characteristic of modern science, "inductive method" if you please; and this has been almost completely lacking among the Chinese, whose philosophers have preferred *a priori* deduction, and give great weight to analogy.

Western teachers of Chinese students are constantly impressed with their readiness to argue by illustration and to accept a single illustration as proof; not that they consider that a single exception to a rule invalidates its generality, but that from a single case a general law can be deduced.

The method of the Chinese philosophers was *a priori*, and it seems that they adopted this course, not through ignorance of the experimental and inductive method, but from choice.

We see the sages of China, vainly seeking a short cut to universal knowledge by following what they considered by the light of inner reasoning to be the order of nature, instead of laboriously studying one thing at a time in order to connect "all the particulars by general laws."

Spirit of inaccuracy

A spirit of inaccuracy or of indefiniteness, of being satisfied with very approximate statements, as well as with assumptions instead of proofs and of generalizing from a single case, is most prevalent and will only be dispelled by the spread of modern education. There is no more vexing factor in the life of a foreigner in China than the utter lack

of accuracy among the Chinese in most matters involving numerical relations. The ordinary troubles that one has with ~~careless and even dishonest~~ workmen and contractors are enhanced many fold by reason of the discrepancies between the various measures used for different purposes though called by the same name. The method by which the units were adopted and fixed is lost in antiquity, and the variations in the measures now used destroy any claim that there ever was a true standard such as those recognized and employed by western peoples to-day. For instance, the *chih* or unit of length differs according to the province and the prefecture, the city and the ward, the craft and the usage. There are over a hundred different values of the *chih* actually in use, the extreme values differing by more than 6 inches in a unit of approximately 14 inches, on the average. In some places the carpenter's rule so differs from the mason's that in a building 100 feet long, if the same specifications in Chinese measure were furnished to masons and carpenters, the frame of the house would overhang the stone foundations by 2 feet. In most cloth shops there is one measuring rod to use in buying and another to use in selling, and it does not take a Solon to tell which is the shorter. The maker of measuring sticks or of balance rods keeps a stock of ungraduated blanks and inserts the brass points to suit the wishes of his customer. Nearly every householder has his own set for checking against those of itinerant vendors of drygoods and foodstuffs.

The distance between two points A and B, according to Chinese representation, depends not merely on the geometrical factor, but on others which determine the relative facility of travel between these points. It is further from A to B than from B to A, if B is upstream from A on a river, or at a greater elevation on a hill road. It is further between A and B at night or when raining than it is by day or when clear. While of course the practical philosophy of this way of regarding distance is evident, it still is true that such failure to separate these factors from the geometrical factor in the form of statement operates to retard appreciation of accurate statement and accurate thinking.

Paper may be sold by the hundred sheets and yet by a desire to keep the stated cost per hundred uniform in spite of variations in quality the dealer will "call" a less number of sheets a hundred sheets, so that when I requested my servant to buy a hundred sheets of a certain paper, he returned with eighty and insisted that "in that kind of paper a hundred sheets are only eighty."

The whole Chinese system of thinking is based on such a different line of assumptions from those to which we are accustomed, that they can ill comprehend the mania which seems to possess the occidental to ascertain everything with unerring accuracy. Curiously enough, concomitant with the early development of their system of weights and measures—a decimal system for the most part—the Chinese have become fixed in the habit of reckoning by tens, and frequently refuse to make a statement of number nearer to the truth than a multiple of ten. An old man is "seventy or eighty years of age" when you know for a certainty that he was seventy only a year ago. A few people are "ten or twenty," a "few tens," or perhaps "ever so many tens." The same vagueness runs in all their statements, and for greater accuracy than this the Chinese do not care, except when you are paying them money.

The Chinese are as capable of learning minute accuracy in all things as any people ever was—nay, more so, for they are endowed with infinite patience, but what we are here remarking is that as at present constituted they are entirely free from the quality of accuracy and that they do not know what it means except as they come under modern education.

Other causes

Another cause of China's backwardness in modern science is to be found in the lack of or failure to apply mathematical knowledge. Even though their philosophers early made most remarkable independent advances, especially in algebra, the knowledge of mathematics is today very small among China's scholars except where they have recently been under foreign instruction.

The language difficulty has already been mentioned sufficiently. The old system of education quenched the spirit of inquiry and neglected to include knowledge of science as a criterion for political preferment, which was the end of all education. The influence of astrologers, fortune tellers and geomancers was reinforced by the official indifference regarding popular education so long as the government felt that its own security depended somewhat upon the upholding of ancient superstitions and reverences, an attitude which fortunately has now seen its day even in China.

Outlook

A more widespread contact with translations of western books is slowly but surely bringing the reading Chinese into a fuller appreciation of western or more scientific thinking. Their increasing familiarity with the inventions and methods of the west is undermining their superstition, as is, also, the spread of Christian theology.

The changes in the method of instruction and the system of education are for the most part tending to develop a spirit of inquiry and an appreciation of the inductive method, which is beginning to yield due fruit. When the influence of returned students who have been adequately trained in western countries and that of the graduates from first-class mission and government colleges becomes more potent, we can expect to see a much more rapid development of the educational system, but here again the magnitude of the undertaking and the difficulties as to efficient teaching force and adequate resources are such, that only natives can handle the ultimate solution. We teachers from abroad can hardly expect to do more than to give the impulse and to help prepare the vanguard of such an advance.

When special and general education has proceeded far enough to provide the trained men needed to make the various adjustments involved in the tremendously complex and many-sided renaissance of this nation and to have provided the background of an enlightened people, there will of a surety be found among Chinese students many

who will desire to follow the torch of learning and of truth for its own sake, some of whom, we believe, will attain a high degree of analytical power and experimental skill, for the Chinese after all are capable of exact and careful thought under right conditions, and moreover possess unusual patience and manual skill. The Chinese have a power of application and patience and a capacity for detail that is destined to bring success in scientific inquiry when once they get the background, adopt the method and make the start.

The progress destined to be made by western science among the Chinese will surely undermine their faith in the "Book of Changes," which is at the base of Chinese philosophy. What new moral and spiritual ideas are to replace the old in order that the new state of these people may not be worse than the first? Mere education in the science of the west, mere contact with western civilization, commerce, railways, telegraphs, mines, etc., can not be expected to regenerate China, for the Chinese seem never to have been profoundly moved by other than moral and spiritual forces. Education which deals only with coördinated physical or mental facts, conducted however thoroughly, does not prove adequate for the regulation of the conduct of mankind. It is so chiefly intellectual that it leaves man's highest nature unsatisfied and almost untouched; therefore, it is imperative in the present intellectual and material awakening that the more subtle forces which will profoundly affect the soul of the race should be fostered side by side with these others, and that full advantage be taken of the critical state presented by this transition, in order to gain for Christianity its rightful place among the educated men of the rising generation.

At the same time care must be taken to avoid repetition of the unwarranted conflict between science and religion. Our instruction must be such that these two departments are not regarded as antagonistic, but as supplementary, not only in affecting daily life and conduct, but supplementary, also, as revelations of the character and purposes of God. We must, also, avoid the tendency to impose a system which is the outgrowth of western civilization with-

out due regard for the oriental character and mode of thinking. Much of the prejudice against missionary work has doubtless been due to its connection in many instances with dogmatism which happily has been and is being largely eliminated by the broadening of education.

Contradictory characteristics

In reviewing the faults and virtues of this remarkable people, one realizes that they exhibit strangely contradictory characteristics, at least contradictory as we of the West view them, though I am mindful that often the oriental, especially the Chinese, sees no contradiction between ideas or ideals which we may consider mutually exclusive.

Ingenious in small things, they rarely carry their invention in any direction to its natural sequel. Responsible for some of the best of early achievements in applied arts, they have made no great inventions in recent centuries.

As a nation, they present the greatest example of persistence, while as individuals they are often singularly lacking in this quality. They show great economy in use of materials but are very wasteful of time and energy. They build but do not repair.

Kindhearted and in general considerate of animals, in deference to Buddhistic teachings allowing even snakes to live, they let men die of starvation by the roadside and seldom make heroic efforts to save endangered lives; in hard times the lower classes even sell their children to be slaves.

So drilled in usage of the past, they continue in old ways even when the reason for that way has long since ceased. So conscious of their obligation to the past they are comparatively indifferent to the claims of the community in which they themselves are living and have little idea of passing on to the future with interest what they have received from the past. They spend vast sums in reverence to ancestors but destroy the forests that would safeguard their own descendants. They practice early marriage and polygamy for the sake of progeny, and yet impoverish their

posterity. The nation which of all now extant has shown the greatest power of persistence, nevertheless has made the least provision for its own future.

This outstanding result of ancestor worship and the all pervading practice of "squeeze" are the two paramount evils of Chinese life. Serious as these faults are and slow in their removal, they can be overcome by a type of education that will develop the scientific spirit, higher moral ideas, especially a regard for the community and the future, and greater strength of character; in short the highest type of modern education which while training the student for effective service will, also, spiritualize his motives in life. This is, indeed, the high aim many of our American missionary colleges are fulfilling to the extent of their ability.

MISSION SCHOOLS

The opportunity to serve China

Although the first modern schools in China were begun under mission auspices and some of the best educational institutions today are under mission auspices, the education of the Chinese is not the problem of the mission boards; it is China's own problem. But in view of the immensity of the government's task, the missions have an unprecedented opportunity to render a real service to China. Because of the disturbed political conditions ever since the revolution of 1911, the governmental effort at providing general education has, with a few exceptions, been very ineffective and the mission schools have even a greater opportunity today to help mould the educational system of China than was even thought possible in 1911 when such a new spurt was taken under the first republic in educational matters, the most marked since the eventful day in 1905 when a stroke of the Imperial pen abolished the old system of literary examinations and called for the establishment of modern schools throughout the land.

As already indicated, the great handicaps in the government's educational work are the lack of funds, the lack of qualified teachers and the lack of honest and progressive

administrators. An adequate appreciation of the function of education and the precise adjustment of the type attempted to the needs of the community and of the nation are also still to be achieved. It is for these reasons that mission institutions have had and are still to have a very great share in shaping the course of China's educational development.

After several decades of diffused and experimental ministry, which, however, has been of great value and was even a necessary preliminary, the Protestant missions are aiming to furnish China with a thoroughly standardized and coördinated system of Christian education, emphasizing quality rather than quantity, so as to provide educated leadership in the various professions and vocations, and an intelligent and reasonably educated Church membership and dependable citizenship who will constructively influence their community life. This is serving as a challenge and a corrective to the native schools of similar grade.

Statistics of mission schools

Out of a total of 6000 Protestant missionaries, some 4800 are Americans, and of these some 1500 are engaged in educational work, which includes two-thirds of all the educational work at present under way in China under Protestant auspices. Unfortunately the statistics of Catholic work are not available, though there are many French, German and Belgian Catholic missions, and a few American priests who work under one or the other of these missions. Generally speaking, the Catholic missions are not so ambitious from a purely educational point of view, though they are fairly strong on industrial work connected with the production of church fixtures and furnishings, and some of the best scientific work ever done in China both in former and in recent years has been under French Catholic auspices.

Protestant missions in China besides their medical work conducted in 1917-1918, 115 kindergartens, 5276 lower elementary schools, 575 higher elementary, 233 middle or high schools, 28 colleges, 156 normal and training schools,

31 theological schools, 40 industrial schools and 49 orphanages—a total of 1227 institutions, with a teaching force of 1471 foreigners (831 of them women) and 9595 Chinese (2783 of them women), and a total enrollment of 170,659 students (54,461 of them girls) distributed as follows: 3196 kindergarten, 133,826 in lower elementary, 19,605 in higher elementary, 12,533 in middle school, 1499 in college, 1409 industrial, 985 theological and 1544 in orphanages.

The proportion of female students is highest in the elementary grades where they are about one to two and in the normal school where they outnumber the males nearly two to one. But in middle schools the ratio is one girl to five boys while in actual college grades the ratio is one to twenty-two. There is as yet no institution under government auspices where a girl can get instruction of collegiate grade and only three, probably two, of really collegiate grade under mission auspices.

While complete data are not available, it seems likely that these ratios between female and male students would probably hold good, roughly speaking, for government schools as well as missionary.

The system of Christian education

The system of Christian education ranges from kindergarten to university, is widely spread throughout the country and heads up in the strategic centers mentioned presently. There are nine local Christian Educational Associations covering from one to three provinces each, and in turn affiliated with the Christian Educational Association of China with headquarters in Shanghai.

A relatively small portion of the population of China is found in the cities. Nine-tenths of the population live in the country or in relatively small aggregates, some in isolated homes, but generally clustered in hamlets and villages. These afford a smaller working unit than is usual in many other countries, and are the natural base upon which to start in the education of the common people of

China, whereas the training of the leaders for that more general educational conquest can best be done near the largest cities.

Although the great bulk of missionary education is still in the elementary and secondary grades, in more recent time a number of schools of college grade have been developed, nine even assuming the title of university.

The strategic points at which mission colleges and government institutions also are concentrated are as follows: From south to north through the eastern provinces, Canton, Foochow, Shanghai and the neighboring cities of Hangchow, Soochow and Nanking (all of which are connected with Shanghai by rail), Tsinan, Tientsin and Peking. Then up the Yangtze 650 miles is the educational center of Wuchang and Hankow. South from Hankow two hundred miles we come to Changsha, the capital of Hunan Province, the last to be open to foreign influence, and here Yale maintains an educational and medical mission. Then in the far west at Chengtu, the capital of the great province of Szechwan, there is the beginning of a college which has one of the brightest prospects in all China.

Of 26 colleges, in some of which the bulk of the work is still of high-school grade, 10 are maintained as "union" institutions by several denominational boards coöperating, while two are strictly non-sectarian though Christian. These are Yali or the College of Yale at Changsha, and Canton Christian College which may in a way be regarded as an intercollegiate mission since eight American institutions¹ maintain each a representative on the faculty of this school in distant China as a part of the foreign work of their Student Christian Association or other special organization. Curiously enough both of these institutions have had a remarkable degree of financial support from the Chinese; in the case of Yali this has taken the form of a definite coöperative basis, while at Canton money both for

¹ These are: University of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State College, Teachers College of Columbia University, Vassar College, Williams College, University of Pittsburgh, Washington and Lee University and Kansas State Agricultural College.

building and for running expenses has been turned over unconditionally to the Trustees of the College incorporated in New York.

Canton Christian College

The history of the Canton Christian College falls naturally into three periods: Inception, 1884-1903; organization, 1904-1918; and realization, 1919 and beyond. Started by Dr. Happer of the American Presbyterian Mission who raised the initial fund, the college has since become non-sectarian, and standing to serve the whole cause of education under Christian auspices in South China offers an opportunity to the several denominational boards each to support a man on the staff and nominate a trustee. Thus far three boards, two of them English, have accepted. While religious instruction is an integral part of the curriculum, great care is taken to make the atmosphere of the campus wholesome and tolerant and the doors are open to all students qualified by character and scholastic attainment to enter, irrespective of religious belief. The most striking feature of the institution since 1904 when the development of the present site was begun, has been the *rapidity of growth*. The campus has increased from 20 acres to over 130; the two long wooden bungalows which provided temporary shelter for the whole institution in the first years are now supplemented not only by a score of other temporary buildings, many of which are of brick, but by twenty-five permanent fire-resisting and ant-proof buildings, with five more in course of construction. The student body has grown from 60 to 600 and the staff from 6 Americans and 6 Chinese to 31 Americans, 2 British, and 51 Chinese (not counting the wives who do not teach). The budget of current expenses has risen from \$20,000 Hongkong currency to over \$200,000 annually. Only one element has failed to grow, the all important item of endowment; we had none in 1904 and we have almost none in 1919.

Half of the budget for current expenses is met by student fees and rentals; the remainder must be secured each year from generous individuals or supporting groups, Chinese

or American. The investment at the College to date is about as follows: Grounds \$80,000, buildings \$350,000, equipment \$35,000 on a total of \$465,000 United States currency. The rapid growth and this substantial investment make even more urgent the securing of an adequate endowment.

Inaugurated on the petition of over 400 prominent gentry and officials of Kwangtung, the College has in recent years received as much money for all purposes, current expenses as well as buildings, from Chinese sources as from America.

The institution is *coeducational* in all grades, with a total of about 40 girls. In the secondary grades we are in affiliation with the girls' middle school of the American Presbyterian Mission, on the condition that they offer adequate preparation for entrance to our College of Arts and Sciences. The establishment of a separate college for women awaits the development of a more adequate foundation of secondary schools.

English is the medium of instruction for all modern subjects beyond the second year of the secondary school. At the same time a *high standard in Chinese subjects* is maintained and all students are required to study Mandarin, which is also employed as the medium of instruction for some of the courses such as the geography and the history of China.

Three elements of modern education are so entirely novel in comparison with the old style and are now of such recognized importance that a brief mention will suffice to indicate the special emphasis they receive in the Canton Christian College and other progressive schools in China: *The natural sciences, manual training, and athletics.*

In endeavoring to introduce and develop interest in manual training, it has been necessary to proceed wisely, in view of the traditional antipathy toward any sort of manual work on the part of the scholar class. But that the movement has been crowned with abundant success is evident from the spirit exhibited by our students in digging a large outdoor swimming pool two years ago, a tremendous undertaking involving daily participation in dirty work which covered more than a year.

Outdoor games were, of course, introduced at the very inauguration of the institution and naturally the long finger nails and the long gowns were not long in coming off when once the wearer actively participated in a game of association football. That was the first step; other athletic forms were rapidly developed and the total effect of such in opening the mind as well as the pores has been of untold value.

In the line of manual training, more properly speaking, advantage was taken of the traditional reverence for the written and printed "character" and elementary practice in type-setting and printing was introduced as the thin edge of the wedge, which in due course was followed by required work in carpentry, basket and rattan work, and then later in gardening—all in the secondary school. While in the college grades proper nearly the whole time assigned to science courses is spent in laboratory and field work.

Somewhat related to the same principle underlying this athletic and manual work is that involved in military drill. Not only is the discipline of the secondary school conducted on a military basis but military as well as physical drill is required. In the College of Arts and Sciences there is no required military drill but a vigorous volunteer corps has been formed entirely on the students' initiative.

Three major problems of organization have been substantially solved: *The architectural general plan, the administrative function and the scholastic divisions.*

A comprehensive layout has been developed to permit a coördinated and harmonious expansion of the plant. The College maintains a resident architect and has organized its own construction department, thus greatly reducing the cost of buildings.

The type of permanent building adopted combines modern construction with a Chinese aspect, chiefly expressed in the roofs which are of green glazed tile and ornamented and curved according to the best native style. The floors are reinforced concrete, the walls of red brick of a pleasing soft tone. All the buildings are equipped with modern plumbing. It is distinctly the aim of the College so to build as to exemplify structurally and artistically the best combi-

nation of Western and Chinese architecture and thus as well as in other ways to be of help in this period of change in China.

The officers of general administration and the heads of the several schools constitute a Council which draws up the budget and looks after all affairs that concern more than one school, including the inauguration or elimination of departments or schools. With Trustees in New York and the College in China there is an element of administration unknown in an institution in America. This difficulty is reduced by frequent visits of the president from one side of the world to the other, and by delegating to the Council many functions generally performed in more or less detail by the Board of Trustees for a college in America.

There are three main schools of five years each: Elementary, secondary and collegiate, with enrollments (1917-1918) respectively of 120, 330, 103. Some 1100 students have entered the institution since 1899. All regular students are resident on the campus. There are also some 250 extension students, adults and children from the neighboring villages the work for whom, while of a much lower grade scholastically, is exceedingly important from a sociological point of view.

In the College of Arts and Sciences, a faculty of 30 offers courses in four groups: arts, natural sciences, social sciences, agriculture. A medical school, a teachers college and a school of engineering are also projected. After two decades of necessary emphasis on the secondary grades, the College department proper is now fully under way and in June, 1918 the first B.A. degrees were granted.

The opportunity for substantial and satisfying service along educational lines, combined as it is with opportunities for research in an almost untouched field, as regards economics, government, sociology, ethnology, geology and biology, and in the applications of all the sciences to the agricultural and industrial development of a country whose natural wealth is as yet not even surveyed, this great opportunity, we say, does not fail to attract men of high scholarship to membership on the faculty of the College, even on

the reduced financial basis which to too great a degree characterizes missionary enterprises.

Even under present limitations this "man-factory," as the Chinese call it, is a going concern; abundant high-grade "raw material" is available, a qualified staff is "on the job," the work is fully organized, the "plant" is being used to the utmost advantage, and it but remains to put more capital at the disposal of its directors, in order that it may indeed keep pace with its ever-increasing opportunity to supply precisely the product which China so greatly needs for the period of reconstruction which she faces.

AUTOCRACIES AND REVOLUTIONS IN CHINA

By Gilbert Reid, D.D., of Shanghai, China

During the thirty-seven years since I first went to China I have passed through three wars and three revolutions, have tasted the bitterness of the Boxer uprising in 1900 and the siege of Peking—a war of China against the world—and have just now witnessed the end of the fourth war—a world war—and with its close I hope there may also soon come the end of the fourth Chinese revolution.

Ten years ago there existed in China what was commonly called the Manchu autocracy. As a matter of fact there was no autocratic ruler at that time; there was only a boy emperor, eight years old, and a prince regent, his father, a mild-mannered man and a lover of his country. There was, indeed, the rule of an alien house, though most of the officials of China were Chinese, and not Manchu or Mongol. There was also a monarchy, but a constitutional monarchy, in which a constitution was being worked out through the processes of an eight year evolution, but not a revolution. Every town had self-government and its elected municipal council. By a liberal but safe franchise each province had a provincial assembly. In Peking there was also a national council, to become later on the upper house; most of its members chosen by provincial assemblies. Regulations were drawn up to have, through the same popular franchise, a lower house, a house of representatives, to be elected in 1912 by a vote of the people.

When I was in this country in 1910, I was accustomed to say that more progress had been made in China during the last seven years than in all the seventy years gone before. I favored a peaceful transfer from autocracy to democracy rather than an overthrow of autocracy by means of bloody revolution. If Great Britain could maintain a monarchy along with freedom and democratic ideas, it seemed to me

that China's best form of government in accordance with her traditions should be much the same. I preferred the way of reform to the way of revolution, especially as autocratic rule no longer existed in the Manchu house.

In fact ever since 1898, outside of officialdom, there had been two distinct parties of political agitators, working mostly from Japan and the United States, among sympathetic peoples, the party of reform under Kang Yiu-wei and Liang Chi-chiao, and the party of revolution under the leadership of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

In the autumn of 1911, the first revolution began and the revolutionary party came into its own. The chief military leader was a former officer of the imperial government, General Li Yuan-hung. The Manchu house called back to power Yuan Shih-kai, who became prime minister, or in fact autocratic ruler, more so than had been the boy emperor or the prince regent.

The revolution first aimed at the overthrow of the Manchu or alien house, though the people who joined the movement thought they were fighting for the overthrow of despotism. Very soon there came in the positive principle of establishing a republic in place of the threatened monarchy.

The leading diplomatic force on the revolutionary side was Dr. Wu Ting-fang, who had been twice minister at Washington. The leading supporter of Yuan Shih-kai, the last premier of the Manchu house and who preferred a constitutional monarchy, was Tong Shao-yi, who had once studied at Columbia University and had been special envoy to this country. The man chosen to be first provisional president of the new republic, chosen by a small coterie of Young China, was Dr. Sun Yat-sen. His government assembled at Nanking, while the old government held on in Peking. The latter government was still recognized by foreign powers, though neither government could raise any foreign loan.

The bad features of the revolution were, first, the overthrow and so the disappearance of orderly government all over China, and, second, the massacre of Manchu officials and people at different centers.

The good features were these: first, the revolution lasted only a short time; second, it was less bloody than most revolutions in other countries; third, law and order soon took the place of anarchy; and, fourth, through a spirit of compromise the Manchu monarchy retired in favor of a republic, in which Yuan Shih-kai should become president.

Far beyond the treatment accorded any abdicating ruler in any other nation, the revolutionists of China agreed on a generous support of the imperial family, and so today the dethroned boy-emperor still lives in the palace in the Forbidden City of Peking, not far from the presidential mansion.

Personally, I argued at the time in favor of the existing government and in favor of peace by negotiation. Revolutionists in Shanghai threatened to bomb me, but when I went to Peking early in 1912 to urge the Manchu and Mongol nobles to agree to abdication, for their own safety and for peace in the land, I was threatened by some unknown person among the Manchus. So much for having opinions in China. In reality, ill-feeling lasted for only a short time. The Chinese know how to overlook differences of opinion, if one is really interested in his country.

With Yuan Shih-kai as president, it soon became evident that his inclination was to be sole ruler, to be, not an autocratic monarch, but an autocratic president. A clash came with the faction that wanted more autonomy for the provinces, a kind of "state's rights" idea.

One of these men, Sung Chiao-jen, gave a lecture at the International Institute in Shanghai (the Institute with which I am connected) early in 1913, and a few days later when leaving for Peking as leader of the opposition he was assassinated. It was generally believed that the assassin was instigated by the premier of Yuan Shih-kai's cabinet, and probably with the connivance of Yuan Shih-kai himself.

This brought on the second revolution, a revolution to punish and overthrow Yuan Shih-kai, the president. The revolution was mostly in the Yangtsze valley. Yuan Shih-kai, backed up by foreign powers except by some of the Japanese, was soon able to win a military victory. The

leaders of the revolution fled to foreign parts, among them Dr. Sun Yat-sen. General Li Yuan-hung, leader of the first revolution, was now vice-president of the republic and sided more with the president than with the men of the second revolution. The political party in parliament with which these men were connected was expelled from Peking by orders of the president, and parliament, lacking a quorum, was dissolved.

President Yuan Shih-kai became more powerful than ever. He selected men for a single national assembly, men who for the most part would agree with him. He was the strong man of China, a man of wide political experience, though more along monarchical lines than along those of a republic. I had known him for twenty years, and like most foreigners was accustomed to respect him, though not always approving of his methods.

Very soon there appeared reasons for entering on a third revolution. The friends around Yuan Shih-kai had persuaded him to consent to become emperor in a new dynasty. This project came to the light late in 1915. His national assembly proclaimed him emperor, and elaborate preparations were made for his coronation.

Opposition was at once aroused against this monarchical ambition. One of the most active was Liang Chi-chiao, the man whom I have mentioned as leader of the reform party under Manchu rule, and who, after favoring the preservation of the old monarchy rather than the first revolution, had taken office under President Yuan Shih-kai. He with General Tsai Ao secretly left Peking and started in the southwestern provinces the third revolution, which like the second revolution was directed against Yuan Shih-kai as emperor. Vice-president Li Yuan-hung and Premier Tuan Chi-jui also opposed the new monarchical move and resigned from their positions.

Finding the scheme was destined to fail, Yuan Shih-kai announced that he would not be emperor but only president, but the revolutionists insisted that as he had given up the presidency he could not resume it of his own choice. The most fortunate way to settle the difficulty was for him

to die. There seems to be good evidence that he took gold leaf and thus passed away. It was a sad ending to the life of a man, in many respects the greatest Chinese statesman of the decade.

On the death of President-Emperor Yuan Shih-kai the third revolution came to an end in the spring of 1916.

Vice-president Li Yuan-hung was persuaded to become president, and General Tuan Chi-jui became premier. For the first time China had a republic. For the first time a republic in China was to be really tried. All parts of China and all parties worked in perfect accord. The old parliament, which Yuan Shih-kai had dissolved, reassembled in Peking. The prospects were bright. The head of the republic was an upright, unselfish, conscientious man, loyal to the idea of a republic.

When the members of both houses of parliament once again gathered together in Peking, it was my good fortune to be there also, and witness what may be called the reinauguration of the Republic of China. With my family I was a guest during the summer months of 1916 at the American Board Mission (of the Congregational Church). Aided by former students and by members of the Institute I arranged for a reception to be given to both houses of parliament, in the parish-house and church of this mission. The military governor of Peking was present to assist and sent his band to furnish suitable music. The president and premier sent special deputies to extend their greetings. The imperial family was represented. All the five races, Chinese, Manchu, Mongol, Phibetan and Moslem; all the religious, Moslem, Confucian, Taoist, Buddhist and Christian, and all the political parties, met in a friendly way, at what may be called a political "love feast" of the Chinese nation. I was not hampered in giving the parliamentarians my congratulations, my advice, exhortation or warning. At no time had I been more hopeful as to the future of China.

On through the rest of 1916, and up to February, 1917, the democratic idea was being gradually unfolded and advanced. The nation was at peace. Harmony existed except in some divergence of opinion between the president,

Li Yuan-hung, and the premier, General Tuan Chi-jui. The premier favored the concentration of power in the cabinet rather than in the president, as prevails in the French and British systems as distinct from the American. He called his cabinet a "responsible cabinet," though he was loath to be responsible to parliament. Moreover, the premier, while not a monarchist, was by training inclined to be autocratic and militaristic. The president was eminently democratic, sought for no power, was faithful to the constitution and to law, and, though a military man, desired peace within the broad bounds of China and with all the world.

Perhaps here I may offer a few reflections as to international politics, giving the Chinese view-point, if not altogether the American.

Never before as at this time should every man, should all the people, do so much thinking, such serious thinking, and hold opinions based on all the facts. It is, moreover, safer for democracy to allow men to express their opinions, whether of the majority or the minority. By a long tradition this is "the land of the free and the home of the brave." The type of thought, conduct and patriotism, is that of pure Americanism, not of militaristic Prussianism.

Either through my American spirit, or my Scotch blood, or Chinese experience, or from cultivation of "the international mind," I have never in China been backward in expressing my mind, and so through my thirty-six years in that land, bearing in mind the best interests of the Chinese I have at times criticised Russian policy, German, French, Japanese, British, American and even Chinese policy.

Now as to the facts connected with the fourth revolution, not yet come to an end. It will be seen that its appearance was due, in part at least, to the world war projected into China. It seemed to some that if there had been no world war, or discussion of participation in the war, there would have been no fourth revolution. This much is true, as M. C. T. Wang has published in an article which appears in a late number of a New York daily, that there has been a fight with "the powers of autocracy and militarism," pow-

ers which up to date have received the support of the democratic nations represented in China. All through the war China has been made to suffer. She is less free, less independent, and less a strong sovereignty, than if the war had been circumscribed to Europe, and no "entangling alliances" had been forced on China's political well-being. More than ever she takes her orders from others, and so far cannot be independent.

When Li Yuan-hung became president, there was no obstruction from Japan such as Yuan Shih-kai had experienced. He looked to President Wilson to take the lead in protecting the rights of neutral nations and he hoped that under such leadership a combination of neutral nations might mediate for peace. His wishes in this matter I was authorized to make known to President Wilson through the state department. China as a whole was more ready to follow America's leadership than that of any other nation.

How far China was to be amenable to American influence was put to the test when President Wilson in declaring a severance of relations with Germany in February, 1917, requested all neutral nations to imitate the example of the United States. If this request had been merely communicated to China, probably no complications would have arisen and China's neutrality would never have been abandoned. Through the energy and skill of three Americans, two Australians, and a few returned Chinese students from America, the American Minister moved upon Chinese officialdom in favor of war. As for the President he was resolved to remain neutral. The premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, whom I have described as autocratic and militaristic, gave a more listening ear. The arguments were chiefly two: first, a chance for China to be represented at the Peace Conference, and, second, closer coöperation between the two republics of the United States and China, as against the encroachments of Japan.

The Japanese soon got wind of this second argument, and, while before she had favored China's remaining neutral, she now came in ahead of the American Minister in insisting that China not only break off relations with Germany, but

later on join Japan in waging war with a common enemy. From that time down to the present Japan's predominant position has not once been relinquished. It has also been divulged that the entente governments were making secret arrangements with Japan to allow China to go into the war, promising to Japan all German rights, concessions and leased territory in Shantung.

The direct result of all this pressure was that the Chinese government sent a dispatch to the German Minister, protesting against German violation of international law, and adding a threat, which was written by one of these foreign advisers, that if the German imperial government did not repent, China must take further steps.

The next step was of course to sever diplomatic relations with Germany.

As soon as the United States declared in April, 1917, that a state of war existed with Germany, the pressure grew more intense for China to become also "one of the belligerents on the side of Right." The president was opposed to taking this third step, he was still trying to hold to neutrality along with a few other nations. It was understood that the sentiment of parliament was against a declaration of war, largely because they were against the growing autocracy of the premier. The premier, to accomplish his ends, called a conference of the military governors of all the provinces and of a few other military men, most of them military autocrats in their respective provinces. They supported the war measures of the premier, who was also minister of war. Parliament was ordered to discuss the question of going to war, and on the day the discussion was to take place, a mob was engaged by these military gentlemen to shout down all Chinese pacifists and to compel a vote for war, before any men could leave the hall. This howling mob surrounded parliament house from ten in the morning to ten at night, when the premier came in person and dispersed the mob. Needless to say, the parliamentarians refused to vote.

The premier chagrined at his failure, resigned his post and went to Tientsin. The chief military governors also removed to Tientsin and declared independence, a form of revolution by military autocrats.

The president, supported now by the parliament, appointed as acting premier Dr. Wu Ting-fang, who was minister of foreign affairs, and who had favored war, in order that China have a chance at the Peace Conference. He, however, disapproved methods of intimidation adopted by the former premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, to bring China into the war. Thus the military men stood arrayed against the democracy of President Li Yuan-hung, Dr. Wu Ting-fang, and most of the parliament.

Then, towards the end of June, to make confusion worse confounded, the strongest of the military governors, who had absented himself from the military conference, General Chang Hsun, was invited to come to Peking to mediate between the wrangling factions. In former days he had fought for the Manchu house. He was reputed as opposed to declaration of war. He accepted the invitation, and came to Peking with a body-guard of 20,000 soldiers. His mediation consisted in forcing the president to issue a mandate to dissolve parliament. Dr. Wu Ting-fang refused to countersign the mandate. "You can take off my head," he said, "before I do an illegal act like that." Another man was chosen premier, and the mandate was issued, though contrary to the president's real wishes.

General Chang Hsun forced a few more equally democratic ideas on the president, and then, having got rid of parliament, he thought he might as well get rid of a president. He gathered a following and proclaimed the restoration of the dethroned boy emperor. It was a ten days' restoration. The former premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, turned against his military colleague, raised an army, defeated General Chang Hsun and his troops, and restored the republic. Here, indeed, was a bewildering maze.

General Tuan Chi-jui, a military autocrat, but not a monarchist, was again on top. President Li Yuan-hung had fled to the Japanese legation and then to a French hospital. Having failed in all efforts at making a republic, he resigned in favor of the new vice-president, General Feng Kuo-chang, although the two men had been on opposite sides in the first revolution.

On the arrival in Peking of the new president, and with General Tuan Chi-jui again premier, the war question was upper-most. The former president and the parliament were both out of the way, and the fourth revolution had begun. The American minister, as if to make amends, sent a dispatch to the Chinese foreign office, saying that his government advised China to harmonize its own differences before thinking of going to war with Germany. The entente ministers, including the Japanese, advanced various arguments in support of China's going on with the war, the main one being the alluring idea of advantages to accrue to China. In August war was declared on both of the Central Powers, without sanction of Parliament.

Help was given to the war, but no help to democracy. Many of the parliamentarians, along with Dr. Wu Ting-fang, Mr. Tong Shao-yi and Dr. Sun Yat-sen, organized the legal parliamentary, republican government in Canton. For over two years this government has been in conflict with the autocratic, military government of Peking. We usually say it is the north against the south, but really it is democracy against autocracy.

China went into the war, but, according to allied report, she has done so little and proved herself so incapable, that on the eve of the Peace Conference she received a combined dispatch with twelve rebukes from the American and entente ministers. For one thing she has been loaded with a burden of 300,000,000 *yen*, all used to weaken China and take away her power for independent action. The autocratic Peking government, having declared for war, has received the recognition of the powers, while the democracy of China fares worse than the democratic aspirations of the peoples of Finland, Poland, Czech-Slovakia, and other weak nations.

When the armistice was announced, and the world war seemed on the eve of ending, the allied and associated ministers in Peking advised China to bring to an end her internal strife. Forgetting that the strife arose from the injection of the war issue and so from their own actions, they rebuked China for her folly and threatened her with a variety of disagreeable possibilities, unless China took measures to end

the strife. Both of the Chinese governments, aroused by a sense of danger from international interference and domination, appointed peace commissioners of their own to meet in Shanghai for discussing the cessation of internal hostilities and plans of reconciliation. They continued these discussions till the treaty of peace at Versailles was signed. Their discussions were so much talk. They separated without settling their troubles. The revolution continued.

In fact the disturbed condition of China grew worse on the knowledge that at the Peace Treaty of Versailles all German rights in Shantung were ceded to Japan, against the arguments and just claims of the Chinese delegates.

To make matters still worse, the allied and associated governments continue to dictate to China, while Japan alone has bound the action of China by numerous agreements, commercial, military, political, made in 1918.

The spirit of democracy, the right of self-government, the power of developing one's own institutions, freedom from entangling alliances, and confidence in the helpful designs of other nations, grow less and less as the League of Nations and world reconstruction appear on the horizon of the world's new day. A sad fruition to professed ideals that have failed of realization.

FOUR YEARS OF SOCIALISTIC GOVERNMENT IN YUCATAN

*By Percy Alvin Martin, Associate Professor of History,
Leland Stanford University*

One of the inevitable results of the entry of the United States into the Great War was the shifting of the attention of the American public opinion from the issues of the New World to those of the Old. As a consequence our interest in the affairs of our neighbors south of the Rio Grande suffered a temporary eclipse. But now that the tension caused by the war has perceptibly slackened the Mexican situation has again become the object of careful and anxious scrutiny on the part of the American people. Questions whose answers no longer admit of delay obtrude themselves. How far has our confidence in the present administration in Mexico been justified? To what extent have the reforms—political, social, economic—heralded by the protagonists of the last revolution produced results? Have we any basis for the belief that Mexico is at length emerging from a welter of disorder to enter upon an era of orderly and peaceful development? A satisfactory answer to these queries would entail a survey of the whole Mexican situation and would transcend the scope of this article. But a certain side light on the larger problems may be gained through an attempt to summarize the results of the revolution in one of the most important and interesting sections of the Republic, the State of Yucatan.

Yucatan was swept into the revolutionary current early in 1915. At that time Carranza sent General Salvador Alvarado with several thousand soldiers to Yucatan to oust Governor Argumeno who shortly before had installed himself in the executive office by a clever coup d'etat. Alvarado was successful in his mission and was promptly appointed governor by Carranza. The new executive

proceeded at once to turn Yucatan into a vast experimental laboratory in which were tried out a comprehensive series of social and economic reforms. The isolation of Yucatan from the rest of Mexico, its almost complete immunity from revolutionary disturbances, the peculiar circumstance that its chief agricultural product—henequen—afforded an unceasing source of revenue, made it possible for these reforms to have a fair trial under exceptionally favorable conditions. Finally the Maya Indians, for generations the docile tools of the great henequen planters, furnished an unusually plastic and malleable material for the purpose of social experimentation.

A complete catalogue, much less a detailed discussion of the manifold accomplishments of Alvarado is impossible owing to lack of space; moreover they have received such wide publicity as to be well known to all those who have been following recent developments in Mexico. For the purpose of this study it will be sufficient to pass in review certain of Alvarado's achievements as a preliminary to a tentative appraisal of the actual results of his efforts to transform the very fabric of the state within the short compass of four years. A special effort will be made to ascertain to what extent the revolutionary government of Yucatan has succeeded in its attempt to raise, overnight as it were, the social and economic status of the hitherto neglected Maya Indians, who make up the great bulk of the population.

Alvarado was indoctrinated with certain socialistic teachings and he had no hesitancy on several occasions frankly to set the stamp of his socialistic credo on official acts of the government. Thus in the preamble to the famous "Ley del Trabajo" or law regulating conditions of labor enacted early in 1916, the statement was made

that if a declaration is necessary this government declares itself frankly socialistic in order to protect the weak, the unfortunate against the privileges, the abuses and the insolence of the powerful.

It is not surprising therefore that his zeal caused him to run the whole gamut of social and economic reforms. His multifarious activities embraced such diverse objects as the abolition of the debts of the peons and the distribution of land—an attempt in other words to solve the perennial agrarian problem—the abolition of the liquor traffic, the suppression of bull fights, lotteries and organized prostitution; the improvement of the lot of the laboring classes by the direct encouragement of the formation of unions, the creation of a Department of Labor, and the enactment of comprehensive labor legislation which included everything from an eight hour day and a minimum wage of two pesos to the creation of an elaborate machinery for the settlement of industrial disputes.

Governor Alvarado also professed an enthusiastic though somewhat naïve devotion to the cause of public education. His own account of his achievements in this field is worth quoting in part. Shortly before his term of office expired he declared

All the laws and systems of education have been reformed we have established schools in the country; in every village and settlement, whether ranch or farm, and we have increased considerably the number of primary schools; we have established agricultural schools, a school of arts and trades, a school of domestic science, a school of higher arts, and we have improved and enlarged the scope of the normal school, the commercial school One of the great works of the Revolution has been the creation of the "Ciudad Escolar de los Mayas," a normal school for teachers where only children of the Indian race will receive an education. The school is very much like the Tuskegee Institution Three of the four years' course are devoted to trade classes and the pupils are instructed in stock raising and in cultivating the land. All instruction is practical and there will soon be established carpenter shops, machine repair shops, iron works, etc. We shall also teach the pupils how to raise domestic animals and fowls with profit. They will have besides, an orchestra, a band, a newspaper, moving pictures, a telegraph, telephone and wireless system, and lecture halls for various sciences. It will be a city in itself and the principal aim will be to instill into the minds of

the students the idea that they are the new missionaries who have consecrated themselves to the saving of their brothers of the same race from the evils of ignorance, superstition and vice.

Truly a generous and noble aspiration for the uplift of an entire people.

Other features of this comprehensive plan of social education included one hundred public libraries (with plans for five hundred more), the publication and distribution of the works of Samuel Smiles and Orison Swett Marden, the encouragement of the feminist movement through the holding of two women's congresses, school savings-banks, boy scouts, school farms, and a wide variety of athletic sports and games. The governor pointed with pride to the fact that at the end of his term of office there were in Yucatan more teachers than soldiers.

We have 2300 teachers and only 500 soldiers. We spend 2,400,000 pesos in education which is 64 per cent of the general budget of the state.

Governor Alvarado's socialistic theories naturally led him to believe in the nationalization of industries and the control by the state of public utilities. To a certain extent both of these ideas have been realized. Thus the *Compañía de Fomento del Sureste*, a majority of whose stock is owned by the state government, controls the Yucatan railway system and the *Comisión Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen* owns a line of steamers plying between New Orleans and Progreso. The *Comisión Reguladora del Comercio*, appointed by Governor Alvarado had for its object the importation from the United States of immense quantities of foodstuffs and their sale at a slight margin above cost. To promote local industries the government has invested nearly a million pesos in a plant for the making of twine and sacking from sisal hemp. And finally the crowning achievement of Governor Alvarado in the opinion of his admirers has been the creation of the famous *Comisión Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen*, a coöperative organization which not only controls and markets the total

henequen output of Yucatan but is also an unfailing source of revenue to the government. A discussion of the origin and functions of this remarkable organization lies outside the scope of this article. As a quasi-monopoly it has naturally been the object of violent attack both in Mexico and the United States. American harvester companies in particular could hardly be expected to view with equanimity the doubling of the price of henequen, indispensable in the making of binder twine. The great henequen growers themselves, forced by Alvarado to enter the monopoly, were also dissatisfied. Although they gained a higher price for their products this surplus was frequently wiped out by increase in wages and taxes decreed by the government. As will be presently made clear the real beneficiaries of the monopoly were the government, which thus found means to carry out its projects, and the peons on the haciendas who enjoyed the higher wages.

In February, 1918, Alvarado's term of office came to an end and he was succeeded by Sr. Castro Morales, formerly director of the United Railways of Yucatan. While the new executive is in full accord with the program of the previous administration and may be counted upon to follow the trail blazed by his predecessor, he has delegated to the local Socialist Party many of the powers wielded by Alvarado. Although it is yet too early to pass final judgment on the many projects launched by the Yucatan government the experience of the last four years warrants one in hazarding certain tentative conclusions, based on a careful investigation recently conducted in Merida and other portions of the state.

The results of this ambitious attempt to raise the social and moral level of the Yucatanians shrink visibly when subjected to the acid test of an impartial and painstaking scrutiny. Something to be sure has been accomplished. Bull fights and cock fights have been abolished, lottery tickets are sold only through clandestine channels, prostitution no longer flaunts itself in public places. The prevalence of gambling has been abated, but the greatest social evil of Yucatan, the use of alcoholic liquors continues to

flourish though in somewhat diminished measure. A foreign consul, long resident in the country, who had every reason to be impartial, declared in this connection:

Though nominally Yucatan is a dry state, in reality such is not the case. The Indian gets his liquor—it is often worse than formerly—and it costs him atrociously. Since the state went dry the use of drugs has increased. The liquor business is now chiefly in the hands of agents of the government. This is a matter of common knowledge though impossible to prove.

A recent visitor to Yucatan states,

When the president of the Socialist Party and I were in Tizimin he got a bottle of cane brandy brought in by a friend of his within five minutes after he had asked for it.

In other words prohibition is not enforced in anything like the thorough-going manner it is in Sonora under General Calles.

Educational advance though real has made nothing like the sensational progress claimed by the partisans of the government. Many of the institutions so glowingly described by Alvarado have advanced little beyond the experimental stage; such is true of the Ciudad Maya, the Ateneo, the School of Agriculture and various professional and technical schools. Certain of these schools moreover do not cater to any real needs of the state. In a country where the sole important crop is henequen an agricultural college organized along conventional lines is obviously an exotic plant in the field of education. Equally purposeless is an elaborate system of industrial training in a region where there are practically no industries save the raising of henequen. Nor have the famous plantation schools, so much stressed by the eulogists of Alvarado, proven an unqualified success. Sr. Torres Quintero, head of the Department of Education in Merida, is authority for the statement that the number of rural schools for Indians only, amounting originally to 1200 had shrunk by 1918 to little more than half that number. The chief cause of this set-back has been the double exodus of the Indians to the uncultivated

regions of the interior and to the towns. Again the quality of the teachers has only too often been low although this condition is being remedied as the Normal School at Merida begins to turn out its graduates.

More subtle but none the less serious perils to popular education are the dead weight of inertia and the influence of environment. Though the question of language is recognized as of paramount importance it has been found extremely difficult to confine instruction to Spanish. This is not surprising as few of the adult Indians speak anything but their native tongue. Many of the teachers themselves slip back into the use of Maya. Only too often the parents are indifferent or even hostile to the rural schools and it is found impossible to enforce compulsory attendance. One well qualified observer hazards the conclusion that the efforts to educate the children of the rising generation will be largely sterile unless they are kept away from the influence of the adult Indians.

The real test of the value of the social and labor legislation of Alvarado is to be found in the changes wrought in the condition of the agricultural laborers. The thousands of workers on the henequen plantations constituting nearly three-fourths of the total population presented a problem which the revolutionary government could not ignore if it would. Almost without exception they were Maya Indians, until a few years ago tied to the soil by a system of debt-slavery which few of even the most ardent champions of the Diaz régime essayed to defend. Illiterate, frequently broken in spirit, with the heritage of three centuries of semi-serfdom weighing upon them, they suddenly found themselves, with the advent of the revolution, not only the free citizens of the Republic of Mexico but the objects of earnest solicitude of a government whose avowed purpose was "to protect the weak against the insolence of the strong." About them was thrown an elaborate system of legal and economic safeguards—an eight hour day, indemnity for accidents, three months' wages in case of unmerited discharge. The educational needs of their children were met by schools and libraries brought to their very

doors. Meanwhile their scale of wages had risen to a point which a few years ago would have been regarded as fantastic. If they preferred to cultivate land on their own account the government would grant them patches of corn land or permit them to share in the benefits of the ejidos or restored community property. And lest they forgot their sudden rise in the world glib speakers from Merida would impress upon them their rights as Mexican citizens and would invite them to subscribe to the tenets of the Socialist Party.

What has been the effect on the rural population of Yucatan of this bewildering overturn of their whole social, economic and political status? The immediate reaction was a loosening of former ties and in many cases an abuse of their newly found liberties. Many of the Mayas reverted to type, as it were: certain atavistic instincts long dormant suddenly asserted themselves. To seek for a parallel one must go back to our own South in the days of the Emancipation Proclamation or to Brazil in the critical months following the complete abolition of slavery in 1888.

The character and psychology of the Maya Indians help explain much which otherwise would be obscure. The wants of the Yucatan Indians are few and the trappings of civilization sit upon them lightly. They require little in the way of food and clothing, and the creation of new desires with the stimulus of a greater ambition is a slow and discouraging process. Yet there seems to be general agreement among the best informed observers that the Mayas are good workers as long as they feel the impulse to secure the things to which they have been accustomed. They are not shiftless as are the poorer class of our southern negroes. Unlike most of the Indians in other parts of Mexico they are extremely cleanly in their person, bathe daily if possible, and keep their houses clean and neat. When obliged to labor they are first class workmen. From their forebears who built the marvelous Maya monuments they have inherited certain latent artistic and aesthetic gifts capable of development under a rational system of education. Physically many of them are splendid types

and can handle 325-pound bales of henequen with ease. But with the abolition of peonage many of them drifted from the plantations into the larger towns or cities where they frequently took up vices of the worst type. Others left the plantations for the remote interior. Here they settled on land given them by the government or simply squatted on unoccupied land where they pleased. They would clean and burn over their little milpas (corn patches), make rude huts out of branches and tree trunks covered with thatch, and sow their little crop of corn. The remainder of their time was devoted to hunting and idling; a certain restlessness would cause them from time to time to migrate to other localities and repeat the process.

The bulk of the Indians, however, remained on the plantations where they became a source of endless anxiety to the distressed and frequently harassed *hacendado*. In order to hold his laborers he was obliged to make enormous advances in wages. In the old days the peons received from seventy-five centavos to a peso and a half a day. At the present time they are paid two and one-half pesos and sometimes three and one-half pesos for each thousand *pencas* or henequen leaves which they cut. It is usual for a man to work with two boys—generally his sons. The boys cut off the thorns and the under leaves on the sides and ends and bind them in bundles of 50 or 100. Their working day is nominally from 4 a.m. to 2 p.m. with time taken off for lunch. A man with two boys can cut 6000 *pencas* per day thus earning from fifteen to twenty-one pesos. Even with these high wages the labor supply is both inadequate and unsatisfactory.

The results from the standpoint of the *hacendado* have been unfortunate. Not only has there been a decrease in output in henequen of at least 20 per cent but no new plantations have been set out. Still more discouraging is the inability of many *hacendados* to maintain their plantations to the point of efficiency necessary to prevent ultimate ruin. The typical henequen plantation represents a large investment, whose returns begin only after a number of years. The henequen field sometimes comes into bearing as early

as the end of the sixth year but generally only at the end of the eighth year. The length of time it will remain in bearing depends upon the frequency with which the ground is cleared of brush and upon proper cutting. With due care the henequen will bear for twenty, or even twenty-five years. But if the field is not kept clean and the leaves not properly cut the plant throws out a flowering stalk called the *barajon* and immediately dies. In the days of forced labor the rows of plants resembled a scrupulously kept garden; at the present time the hacendados are often forced to see their plants deteriorate before their eyes, through the indifference and carelessness of their laborers.

Thus a very genuine crisis in the great henequen industry due to the extraordinary labor conditions resulting from the revolution is in a fair way towards developing. The seriousness of the situation is being brought home to the members of the state government and they are making efforts to meet it. They have grappled with the problem from different angles. An endeavor is being made to raise the standard of living of the Mayas on the plantations, to create new wants and aspirations, to stimulate their ambition. Despite many statements to the contrary the high wages have tended in this direction. The Indians have better clothes, better food, and better houses than was the case hitherto; when they come into the towns they demand amusements and diversions formerly beyond their reach. Even the imperfectly enforced prohibition has been followed by good results. The rural schools—in spite of the shortcomings already noted—circulating libraries, coöperative stores, all exert an upward tendency. The present socialistic government in its propaganda in the rural districts continually stresses the dignity and necessity of labor. It is perhaps not unreasonable to hope that in course of time higher wages, a slowly rising standard of living and a general improvement in their social and economic conditions will at least partially solve the problem of keeping an adequate number of voluntary and efficient native laborers on the henequen plantations of Yucatan.

On the other hand it would be idle to gainsay that at the present time there has been a net loss in the efficiency of the plantation laborers. This decrease in their industrial efficiency threatens the welfare of the most important industry of the country and the development of its only exceptional resources. And what is still more serious from a social point of view is the possibility of a retrogression in the civilization of those Mayas who have abandoned the plantations for the back woods or unplanted brush. It is of the utmost importance that the government make effective efforts to counteract this not altogether praiseworthy "back to the land" movement. Fortunately this peril is recognized by the more far-sighted leaders of the Socialist Party now in power.

Another, in this case, direct method adopted by the government of Yucatan to meet the existing labor shortage has been the encouragement of immigration from other parts of Mexico. As is well known this experiment was tried in the form of the famous—or infamous—Yaqui deportations in the last year of the Diaz epoch. At present, needless to say, all immigration is voluntary. According to the statement made by Alvaredo at the expiration of his term as governor, the Department of Immigration of the Comisión Reguladora, had been instrumental in bringing over 8000 immigrants to Yucatan while another thousand were waiting to embark on the quays at Vera Cruz. From 150,000 to 160,000 pesos monthly have been spent for this purpose. The passage of the immigrants and their expenses en route have been paid by the Comisión, but after their arrival they are free to work when and where they will. What with the lure of the high wages, favorable working conditions and direct governmental encouragement it is not improbable that an ever increasing stream of Mexican immigrants will find its way to Yucatan.

Yet, all things considered, the future of the henequen industry in Yucatan is by no means roseate. As already intimated the seriousness of the labor crisis is only partially mitigated by the efforts of the government and certain far-seeing, progressive individuals. But even should an ade-

quate supply of labor be made available the plight of the henequeneros would still be critical. During the past few years ~~almost no new~~ planting has been done; when the new plantations now giving their maximum yield cease bearing some five or ten years hence there will take place a startling decrease in production. Again it is not improbable that the profound social and economic transformation through which Yucatan has been passing has permanently deprived her of the exceptional advantages she has up to this time enjoyed in the production of henequen. As a result of the increased cost of raising and marketing under the new labor conditions produced by the revolution there is good ground for the belief that Cuba, and certain districts of Mexico—notably the West Coast—can compete on at least an equal basis with Yucatan.

The effect of the recent social and labor legislation on other classes of the population of Yucatan calls for only a brief discussion. In a number of districts where transportation difficulties render the production of henequen impossible a certain amount of corn is raised by small farmers working little plots or milpas of their own, or at least in their personal possession. Some of these are in the hands of Mayas who were formerly peons on the henequen plantations. Up until recently these farmers have been bled by a class of middlemen who were wont to pay them one-third of the value of the corn offered for sale. This abuse is in a fair way towards being remedied by the efforts of the Socialist Party which is establishing a coöperative selling organization known as the Liga Resistencia.

In the urban centers of Yucatan labor enjoys the same relatively high remuneration as do the peons on the plantations. The same is true of the employees of the railroads. There are various industrial unions—coach-men, stevedores, restaurant waiters, railway men, etc. They have been quick to recognize the possibilities of the labor law and in most contests with their employers have emerged victorious. Strikes have been resorted to from time to time but it is generally more profitable and expeditious to lay their grievances before the Comisión de Arbitraje or Arbitration Com-

mission. This body is composed of five persons, two representatives of labor, two of capital and one appointed by the governor of the state. In reality, however—at least at the present time—all five members usually belong to the Socialist Party. Decisions are reached quickly and are almost invariably in favor of the laborers. “We settled the stevedore’s strike in an hour and a half” the president of the Socialist Party recently informed a visitor to Merida.

Why take longer? We are wise to the long investigations and reports that obscure the issue in the United States in similar cases. We want justice, not a lot of legal procedure.

A source of endless exasperation to the employer is the provision of the labor law awarding the laborer three months’ salary in case of unmerited discharge. Even in cases of the most flagrant incompetency or dishonesty on the part of the employee his claim is almost certain to be sustained by the Comisión de Arbitraje or the courts. Certain of the more provident employers insist that every person sign a paper before he is hired handing in his resignation from the position he has taken. In this way the employer is afforded a certain protection.

While it is yet too early to pass final judgment on the comprehensive scheme of social and economic reforms introduced into Yucatan by Alvarado it cannot be denied that those immediately benefited have been the members of the laboring classes. From the standpoint both of material comfort and wages they are obviously better off than under the Diaz régime—this despite the enormous advance in the cost of living. Yet in the final instance one cannot but detect something artificial and transitory in this utopia of the Yucatan wage-earners. They have been the beneficiaries of a social revolution for whose advent they were in no wise responsible and in whose guidance—until recently, at least—they have had no share. Even the most enthusiastic champions of Governor Alvarado admit that his measures have been highly dictatorial and arbitrary, glossed over with the thinnest veneer of constitutionalism. In seeking for parallels one instinctively

turns to the so-called enlightened despots of the eighteenth century. And with the passing of Alvarado's dictatorship, the control of affairs has come into the hands of the Socialist Party the great proportion of whose members are illiterate and with no training in self government. In fact there exists such a poverty of leadership that the president of the party admits it is necessary frequently to put their political opponents into positions of authority. On the other hand the guiding spirits of the Socialist Party are a band of enthusiastic, intelligent young men who have caught a vision of a socialized state in which poverty, want and crime are entirely banished, and are doing their best to convert their dreams into realities. Among the rank and file of the workers, however, there is little if any realization that their responsibilities and privileges are correlative. And what is still more serious, there is a real danger that the present socialistic régime will place in jeopardy the great industry on which the happiness and prosperity of the Yucatans ultimately depend. The well-wishers of Mexico will follow the progress of Yucatan during the next few years with profound and even anxious interest.

SOME SUPERSTITIONS AND CUSTOMS OF FILIPINO FARMERS

*By Emma Sarepta Yule, College of Agriculture, University
of the Philippines, Los Baños, Philippines*

No occupation of man has produced a richer store of traditions, customs, and superstitions than agriculture. The daily life and work of the farmer bring him in a peculiarly close relationship with the forces of nature. If he dwells in the darkness of ignorance in regions where the early morning light of civilization is just appearing, the poor farmer regards the productive agents of nature with awe. In the performance of his daily tasks a superstitious fear haunts him. The soil he tills, the seed he sows have hidden, mysterious forces; the air is filled with invisible beings, waiting, watching, ready with their supernatural gifts to bless with plenty or curse with want. The sun, the moon, the stars, the thunder, the lightning, the wind, the rain, are but manifestations of an all-controlling, relentless power. This fear, ever-present in the soul of the farmer leads him to practice many propitiatory rites and ceremonies. Ignorant of nature's laws, he knows no other way to gain the goodwill of the all-powerful forces on which he depends for his daily food.

The Filipino farmer, after nearly four hundred years of nominal contact with European civilization, is most superstitious, and in his planting and harvesting is a devout believer in the efficacy of all manner of conciliatory ceremonies. There is something altogether delightful in the childlikeness, the simplicity of many of these traditional rites.

As rice is and has been the chief means of subsistence in the Philippines so far back that the origin of its use is lost in the mazes of tradition, about this crop gather the greatest number and the most sacred of the Filipino superstitions. Though communities differ somewhat in the per-

formance of the rites, there is a resemblance that reveals their common origin or source. The few customs here given connected with culture of rice and other products are fairly representative of the beliefs and practices of the Christian Filipino farmers in different parts of the island of Luzon and the Visayan islands where the major portion of the five most important civilized tribes live.

The reason the farmer does not plow the soil deep is that the roots of the plants are afraid of total darkness.

While threshing the rice for seed by stamping it out with the feet, the worker may touch a rope, vine, or any body free to move, but he must not touch a fixed object as a post, tree or wall. Should he do this the stalks of rice grown from the seeds will be short and small. The straw from which the seed is threshed must not be burnt or the plants which grow from the seed will not be strong and vigorous.

During the seed-time farmers must not cut their hair or shave or eat salt fish. If they do any one of these things the stalks of rice will grow short.

When the farmer sows the rice in the seed-bed he must be alone so that if locusts or other insect pests come to destroy the crop they will not come in large numbers.

The strange blending of pagan and Christian practices and beliefs that can always be traced in the process of Christianizing a pagan people is apparent in many of the customs and superstitions of the Filipino farmers. The flowers used at Easter time or at other special church services are gathered up carefully by the farmers and carried home and broken up and mixed with rice seed before it is sown in the seed-bed. Grains for seed are often taken to the church on Corpus Christi Day to receive the blessing of the priest and be sprinkled with the holy water.

Whether the farmer is to plant rice seed in the seed-bed or to sow it broadcast for upland rice, he must eat a very hearty meal before beginning his work. This is done so that the grains of his crop will be good big full grains. Before he begins to sow, the farmer removes his salakot, or broad mushroom-shaped hat as a mark of solemn respect to the powers that control the harvest. In some localities uncover-

ing the head is interpreted to be in reverence to San Isidro, the patron saint of the farmer. As he sows, the farmer must be sure to close his eyes, for if he cannot see, neither will the birds and rats and mice be able to see where the seeds are. Ashes or bits of charcoal are scattered over the ground to blind in some way the eyes of insects and birds and also the evil spirits so they cannot see the grains. In all probability this was a scheme of the good *padres* to secure some fertilization of the fields by the farmers.

In broadcasting rice a bountiful harvest will be assured if the sowing be begun the day after a night when the sky is full of stars. Upland rice should be sown at high tide. If the farmer lives too far inland to note the ebb and flow of the tides, he tells by the eyes of a cat. When the tide is high the cat's eyes expand, when it is low tide they contract.

For four days after the sowing of rice no member of the family shall sweep the house or the yard about the house. Nor shall any one in the family sharpen a knife or any metal implement. If these things are done the harvest will be light and the grain of poor quality.

If a stick is used to make holes in which to plant rice seed (this method is used on newly-cleared land) the farmer splits the end of the stick used as a handle into many parts like a brush. This will cause the cereal to have large bushy heads.

When the lowland, or paddy rice is to be transplanted from the seed-bed to the field, almost as much time, certainly more mental energy, is consumed in the ceremonies required to secure the crop from the depredations of pests and spirits, as in the work of actual planting. The rites are a queer mix-up of paganism and Christianity. If the *cara-bao*, which pulls through the muck the one handled light wooden implement that answers for a plow, should lie down while plowing the land for planting it is looked upon as a most favorable sign from the powers. Exceedingly lucky is the farmer who can secure a specially marked *cara-bao* with which to plow a furrow around the whole field. For an animal so favored of the spirits extra hire is paid.

A few days before transplanting begins a platform is built in the field. On this platform as an offering to the spirits a sack filled with seed-rice is placed. Around the sack are laid cooked fish, buyo, wine, and toys. For three days and nights no one goes near this propitiatory sacrifice. At the end of this time the farmer inspects it. If he finds that any of the articles have been taken he is filled with hope and goes on with his planting with a good heart, for he knows that the spirits are satisfied with his offering and will not disturb his crop. If nothing has been taken he is wholly despondent and may go no further with his planting, feeling confident that his labor would be for naught, as the spirits of the air are still angry and he is helpless, his utmost has been done to appease them.

The spirits are frightened away in some localities by placing a cross made of bamboo in the field. At the foot of the cross onions, garlic, and ginger are put very early in the morning before the birds are awake. Just what the vegetables are for is rather obscure but the custom is rigidly followed by many when the cross is used. They evidently consider the cross powerless unless supported by these particular edibles.

The day transplanting begins, one man, preferably the farmer, plants one row of seedlings around the field, repeating prayers as he works. The same man will run rapidly across the field so that his helpers in the transplanting will work with speed.

Planting should begin very early in the morning so animals will not see the workers. Apparently it makes no difference about being seen after the work is begun. Animals and spirits of the air seem to be more or less mixed together as evils to be averted by secrecy.

Transplanting should be done in the full of the moon and if possible on cloudy days; this helps to secure abundance of rainfall during the growing of the crop.

While transplanting the rice the worker must be very careful not to sit or bend his knees, lest the stalks of the grain grow crooked. He must never, during transplanting time, sit on a log to rest or monkeys will come and destroy his crop,

for a man sitting on a log bears, in position of body, some resemblance to a monkey.

Even ~~the~~ ^{the} farmer's children must do their little part. After the planting is finished they must not run and play until four or five days have passed. Should they indulge in such recreation during these days the rats and mice in imitation of them would run and play over the field. Not only in sacrifice of pleasure do the little brown tots render aid in rice raising; they unconsciously act as augurs, oracles interpreting the will of the spirits. Should the children, before planting begins, play much with sand it is an omen of a good crop; just the reverse should they amuse themselves with hulls or husks of rice. Kite flying is an infallible sign of a harvest of small imperfectly filled grains, while by the children spinning tops the spirits promise a good harvest of full plump grains.

Hanging heavy heads of rice on sticks driven in different parts of the field is considered an efficient means of securing an abundant yield.

After the rice crop is planted, many things must be done to protect it from harm during the growing period. Bamboo branches stuck in the corners and in other parts of the upland rice field are believed effective in scaring away the spirits. The disheartening locust pest before which science and inventive ingenuity stand helpless, the Filipino farmer combats by burying some locusts in many parts of the field before transplanting the rice and also by catching some of the first locusts seen and eating them. That this last act will cause the swarm to move on is the faith that impels it. Through the latter superstition John the Baptist's special brand of food may have come into its present popular use as a sweetmeat in Filipino households.

If the destructive monkeys, another pest in the Philippines, menace the crop, a sure way to get rid of them is to catch one and skin it, then turn it loose. The companions of the flayed simian will disappear.

Rats are also an enemy that the farmer must fight. It is perfectly useless to kill them; this method only, in some unexplainable way adds to their number. On the whole,

the Filipino farmer deems it best to win the good will of this family of gnawing rodents, so he never scolds them or speaks to or of them except in terms of politeness. It is "Señor Rat" around the rice-field.

In some communities after the rice is planted the farmer goes over the field entreating the spirits in loud wailing tones to give him a good crop. As he implores he distributes in craftily chosen places a bribe in the form of a sweetmeat made of rice, sugar, and coconut. The use of San Nicolas bread is also widely practiced. This is a rice or flour bread cooked in a special way and blessed by the priest. It is usually given on September 10, San Nicolas Day, to the farmers who take it home, break it into small bits and scatter the pieces over the rice field. It is believed to be particularly effective in protecting the rice from blight and insect pest. Sometimes the bread is put inside a bamboo cross which is placed in the field.

It is most important that transplanting be begun on Mondays, Wednesdays, or Saturdays. This last day is an especially good day, as it is believed that at one time it was a sacred day, so a special blessing attends work begun on that day, whether it be planting or harvesting. The other four days of the week are dangerous days on which to begin work. To work on Sundays or holidays will inevitably bring failure of crop. Filipino farmers never work on the anniversaries of great calamities; to do so will surely cause the return of the misfortune.

In all countries the harvest season is attended with more ceremony, usually, than the planting season. Whether the people be pagan or Christian, the reaping-time observances are of the nature of a religious thanksgiving for the gifts of the soil, a rejoicing because of the returns for the farmer's labor. So it is in the Philippines. Only here at the beginning of the harvest, at the reaping of the first grains, the good will of the spirits that hover about controlling the golden fields must be gained. There seems to be a fear that these omnipotent beings may not permit the ripened grain to be garnered.

The farmer keeps in mind the next planting and before beginning to reap cuts the rice for seed. He does not fail to remember the value of good, well-filled seed-grains, so the fattest man in the family always gathers the rice for seed. This personage must have will-power as well as adipose tissue for he must keep silent while gathering the grain and for two hours after he has brought it to the house. This silence is necessary to insure germination.

A bundle of rice of the last crop is left in the granary to welcome the new rice. In some mysterious way this welcoming bundle makes the supply of new rice last, something after the manner of the good widow's handful of meal that fed the Prophet Elijah.

To prevent failure of the next crop and as an expression of gratitude to the Giver of harvests a bundle of rice is taken to the church the day before harvesting begins. Some farmers, the day before commencing to cut the grain, walk around each paddy, or field, and make the sign of the cross at the corners. Offerings of various kinds, as specially prepared candy, are placed in the field for the spirits and the night before reaping proper is begun chickens with white feathers are killed and cooked and placed in the fields that are awaiting the sickle.

The "kitdul," or ceremony of the cutting of the first grain has a dramatic flavor, a primitive dignity. Very strict rules govern this rite. The cutting must be done by the farmer very early on Saturday morning. On the way to the field he must not look to the right nor to the left but straight ahead. Selecting the "first rice heads" the farmer raises his knife to the proper reaping position and repeats the Lord's Prayer. When he comes to "Give us this day our daily bread" he slowly, religiously lowers the knife and cuts twenty stalks. Tying the stalks, which must not be more or less than twenty, the farmer walks home slowly, solemnly, and hangs the bundle above the stove where it remains until the harvest is over. If any member of the family should be ill during harvest-time some of these grains from the "bundle of twenty" are roasted and soaked in water and the liquor given as medicine. It is said that the requirement that the

farmer must not look around while going to the field is to prevent the reapers idly gazing from their work while harvesting is in progress.

Besides the "kitdul" the farmer or sometimes his daughter goes to the rice field the day before the reaping is begun and cuts a few stalks of grain which are carried home as though they were a heavy burden. In some occult way the harvest is made more abundant by the imitative act of carrying big sheaves.

There are many ceremonies connected with the using of the first reaped rice. One is to make "pilipig." This dish is prepared by parching the grains, then pounding them into flour which is mixed with sugar and coconut. The "pilipig," or ceremonial food, must not be tasted until an old woman or man who has a local reputation for performing the ceremony takes a dish of it to the rice-field and holding it on high with both hands, makes offering to the spirit saying: "You people of the north, south, east, and west, here is your share of the harvest. Protect the crop from destruction until it is harvested. Make the next crop grow well. Do not harm the farmers who till the soil. Send them no sickness. Keep them well and strong. Accept your share of the crop with our gratitude for your protection." After the offering to the spirits has been duly made then the "pilipig" is served to the gathered friends. It is thought that the yield will be greater if "pilipig" is offered to many people.

In the provinces of northwest Luzon the custom of making offerings to the spirits is curiously mixed with ancestor worship. In these provinces when the harvest offerings are made the farmers also make offerings to the spirits of their ancestors in gratitude for the land which they have inherited and for protection and aid in securing a crop. Blended with the gratitude is a fear that if the offering is not made to ancestral spirits they will become jealous and work harm to their descendants. In some communities after the rice is garnered a big harvest festival is held in honor of the spirits of ancestors. The offering is placed with many rites under a tree some distance from where the happy farmers are making merry.

Among the many and varied preliminaries the following ceremony inaugurates the harvest in some provinces. A woman with an established reputation for performing the opening of the harvest goes, early, dressed in black to the field the day before the reaping begins. Stopping at a corner of the field she makes sure no one is near, for onlookers would make the ceremony valueless; then she walks around the field on the "pilapil," or dikes that separate the rice paddies. As she walks she repeats a prayer which she finishes when she reaches the place from where she started. From this point she goes direct into the field, making an opening in the standing grain for her passing by bending the stalks from her on either side. A few feet from the border she breaks seven stalks and ties them with straw into a bundle. Then standing very erect she repeats a prayer, placing at the same time, inside the bundle, a cross of coconut leaves which she has brought. This bundle of seven stalks she takes to the owner. The next day at the same hour five, seven, nine reapers (any odd number) go to the field and begin to cut the grain. But before the real work commences, they must each, working in absolute silence, being careful not to expectorate, cut a fair-sized bundle and take it to the place where the seven stalks were cut the day before, and lay it at the roots of the stubble. These lie untouched until the rice is cut. After this solemn performance is over the harvesting with all its merry chaffing and singing may begin.

Harvesters should be happy and laughing, this keeps the grains in good condition. Every one, even the children must be careful not to bite the husk off the rice grains with their teeth. To do this would teach the rats and mice how to eat palay, or unhusked rice after it is put in the granary.

There are innumerable minor superstitions and customs such as: A farmer must not sell rice during harvest; if he does his crop will not last till the next harvest. On Fridays rice or money must be given to all beggars who ask for it. To refuse will bring failure of the next crop. At the first meal eaten of the rice of the new harvest there must be some left in the kettle where the grain is cooked. This makes the next harvest abundant. Rice for food is par-

ticularly well cooked during harvest season as the swelling of the grains affects in like manner the size of the grains of the new harvest. A snake living in a granary is believed to aid in bringing a good yield. The reason that there is more bearded rice raised than non-bearded is that the latter is younger and has not had time to spread over so much of the country.

Filipino farmers have one way of forecasting weather that is, at least, unique. For the first twelve days of the new year a record is kept that foretells, by months, the weather of the whole year. If it is a bright sunshiny day on the first day of January then the whole month, with the exception of the first twelve or indicating days, will be bright and sunshiny. Should the third day of January be rainy then March will be a rainy month and so on for the whole year, the weather of the month being determined by the weather on the day with the corresponding number in January.

There are special days when rain is a good sign or a bad sign. Rain on October 3, November 1, January 1, means a good crop. Rain on October 5 is so sure an indication of crop failure that should it occur many farmers will make no further effort to plant or do more with the crop already planted. On the other hand if it fails to rain on All Saints' Day many farmers will not go ahead with the cultivation of the rice-crop for rain on that day means a good crop.

Some other crop indicators are: good mango crop, poor rice crop; guava just the reverse. If the bamboo has flowers, they mean a shortage in the rice crop. If, on New Year's Eve the cow lows first after the midnight hour it means a good crop, but should the horse neigh or the dog bark before the cow gets in her "moo" failure of crop will result.

There are customs and superstitions connected with the planting of corn, the second staple food crop of the Filipino farmer, though not nearly so many as with rice cultivation. The crop is newer in the Islands, is not so important, nor is it held in such esteem as rice. Many of the superstitions and practices resemble the customs used in rice growing; for example, the planter must eat heartily before planting, and must work quietly so the rats and mice and the spirits will

not be attracted to the seed. Oftentimes planting is done at night so as to escape observation by animals and spirits. As further ~~protection against~~ ^{prohibition} these marauders a cross with garlic and other vegetables at the foot of it is placed in the cornfields.

Some superstitions, however, are peculiar to corn-planting as: corn should be planted on the odd days of the month. To secure ears of corn with little husk the farmer while planting the corn wears as little clothing as possible; some go almost naked. A woman must not drop seed-corn from an apron or skirt, as this would cause much husk. The planter turns around three times before beginning planting, as this makes three ears on a stalk a sure thing. Smoking should not be indulged in while planting, it will make small ears and small kernels. To eat sugar while planting corn is a good thing as it will make the kernels large and sweet. Chewing buyo makes red kernels. Laughing is prohibited as it makes few grains on the ear because the kernels will be far apart as the lips are in laughing. People with teeth missing are not permitted to plant corn, as there will be missing kernels on the ears.

The Filipino farmer has many beliefs, interesting because of their simplicity, connected with the planting of fruits and vegetables. The few here given are types and illustrate the customs: sour fruits, as the tamarind, may be made sweeter if diluted honey be used to water the plants. Camotes, or sweet potatoes, are much sweeter if the hole for planting be made with a stalk of sugar cane. The banana will bear a big bunch with large fruits if the farmer encircles his head with his arms and then bows low after planting it. Vines growing on the ground, as the squash, are much larger if the planter lies flat on the ground with his arms and legs extended after the completion of his work. If the vines are trained over a frame the farmer hangs bottles on it to secure large fruits. There is a freak coconut that appears occasionally. Its peculiarity is that instead of water inside there is a jelly-like substance. This coconut is called "makapuno" and is a delicacy, a luxury, costing four or five times as much as the ordinary nut. To produce this desir-

able fruit, the planter keeps his mouth full of rice, cooked until very soft, while planting the germinated coconut.

That all farmers in the Philippines are so influenced by superstitious beliefs is far from being true. Agriculture is too far advanced for that and there are educated, fairly well read farmers in touch, at least theoretically, with sensible if not scientific methods of farming. But it is true that a large majority of the tillers of the soil have more confidence in the efficacy of the practices related here than in any new-fangled plows and harrows, seed-selection, germinating tests, fertilizers, and such things advocated by *Americanos*. The farmers have a curiosity about the experiments, demonstrations, and talks by the men from the Bureau of Agriculture, and College of Agriculture and the Farm School teachers, but they feel that the familiar traditional methods are more reliable.

NOTES AND REVIEWS

The Old Freedom. By FRANCIS NEILSON. New York, B. W. Huebsch, 1919. 176 pp.

That we are in a period of social excitation leading to a flood of proposals and counterproposals for social regeneration is patent. Particular social "problems" still press for solution on every hand, but the striking feature of the day is the vast amount of discussion of plans for revolutionary changes. Socialism and syndicalism in their varied forms have occupied the center of the stage, but here is a book that revives the utopia of Henry George. The solution of current unrest is to be found in a return to "the old freedom." This, in a word, is the freedom enjoyed by Englishmen in the ancient days when every man had free access to the soil, was fully his own master, and governed himself through "the holdings of freemen clustered around a moot-hill or sacred tree." This was "a true democracy founded on economic principles."

The best parts of the book are the earlier chapters in which the author traces the rise of the feudal state in England, the gradual subjection of freemen and the annihilation of the yeomanry by restrictive legislation and the enclosure of the common lands. He suits his economic history to his purpose by almost complete silence regarding those fundamental changes which marked the Industrial Revolution. Or does he mean to imply that the system of enclosures resulting in "deserted villages" and a degraded peasantry was responsible for the invention of the steam engine and the power loom? If so, the thesis of the book would seem to be: we could have avoided all our present troubles if we had not developed modern industrialism but had remained in the era of simple agriculture.

After several chapters dealing with Syndicalism, the American Spencerians (Lodge, Root, Taft, etc.), Socialism, Fabianism, Municipalization and Nationalization, all of which contain many interesting and acute observations but seem to lead nowhere, the author has succeeded in creating in the reader a doubtful state of mind—he (the reader) hardly knows whether to look forward to a fiasco or to arouse himself with a great expectation. After reading the next and all but final chapter on "Definitions" which

have no stated bearing on what went before or what is to follow, the former state of mind rapidly gains the ascendancy. Indeed the entire connected statement of the author's positive proposition is contained on part of one page (171) and consists of a proposal for a "tax on the full monopoly value of land." Even here there is no proof but only assertion that this would restore competition, raise wages, "lower the cost of commodities, and remove the irregularities in the distribution of wealth."

This is not to say that there are not many piece-meal arguments throughout the book. Perhaps one might construct the author's meaning in some such form as this: with the expropriation of the soil and the introduction of Feudalism government became as Spencer called it "organized aggression" or, as Oppenheimer calls it, the organization of the political means for the purpose of exploiting economic resources and the working classes; natural rights tended to disappear for they can be maintained only in a society of democratic freeholders; the state abrogated rights and extended privileges; we are thus brought to a condition where the ideals of the natural and equal rights individualists are set at naught and confronted by a Socialist state to be introduced by a proletarian revolution; but this condition of state ownership and compulsion will be worse than the present semi-slavery in that it will constitute a further denial of natural rights; for, the policies of state and municipal ownership, already practiced on a large scale, have not altered capitalism noticeably nor raised the status of labor. How, then, is the laborer to win back this economic freedom? The answer (137) is obvious: "By forcing land into use through the taxation of the value of land."

Written by an English publicist this proposal would seem more applicable to English than to American conditions. No doubt we, too, suffer much from land monopoly, but one cannot overlook the fact that we have 4,000,000 farms operated by their owners. We no doubt need a more thorough policy of conservation; we need to break the monopolies of natural resources; and especially do we need to secure for social uses the socially created unearned increment of both land and capital. We have not only permitted certain favored individuals to levy an annual tax upon us through their monopolistic control of some of nature's richest gifts (e.g., coal) but we have given away billions in public utility franchises (creating new monopolies) the returns from which have too often been used to control legislatures and debauch city governments.

Our author would seem to see our perplexities in an all too simple

light. No doubt his picture of a return to the soil, of a vast multiplication of little homesteads with garden, cow, chickens and pigs, has its beauties in this day of exorbitant prices and popular frivolity. But is it not merely a utopian dream? So far as prices are concerned we need most of all an attack on the distributive system which trebles and quadruples prices between farmer and housekeeper. More important also than free land are capitalist monopolies, governmental incompetency, popular ignorance, and unsocialized conscience. We have an abundance of free land in New York, Pennsylvania, and New England; some of it for sale at prices that would not build the improvements on it. But the "back to the country movement" is slow in getting headway. The attractions of the city with its glitter, ephemeral luxuries and convenient vices prove irresistible. For centuries the country has been the seed-bed of the city, when will this current flow backwards? Not, indeed, as soon as the economic advantages of the country overcome the short hours, wages, and housing conveniences of the city. But when, in addition, there has been overcome the subtle satisfactions of the gregarious instinct and the varied nerve stimuli which makes one feel that he lives more—even if not longer—in the city. For, is it not idle to dream of an era when a people that through centuries has become biologically adapted to civilization will yearn for the simple life of the "old freedom?"

F. H. HANKINS.

World-Power and Evolution. By ELLSWORTH HUNTINGTON. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919. 287 pp.

Every study from the original mind of the Research Associate in Geography in Yale University is certain to be interesting and stimulating. There is a breadth of view and sweep of scientific imagination in the present work that at times makes one fairly catch his mental breath. From the very opening pages one is taken on a voyage of discovery and exploration that does not for a moment lose its enchanting and breathless interest up to the close of the sixth appendix. To some extent to be sure the author draws upon his previous books and articles so that all is not new, but as a theory of biological and social evolution this book easily outranks any previous one by Professor Huntington. After careful reading of the evidence here gathered one is quite ready to assent to the author's statement that "One of the most interesting phases of the historical studies of the next generation is bound to be the conflict of opinion as to the effect of climatic changes upon history" (p. 241).

As *Civilization and Climate* was a study of the effects of physical environment on the course of history in relation to space so the present volume discusses these effects in relation to time. The arrangement of the evidence is logically cogent, but, throughout, the reasoning is largely a brilliant gossamer of theory woven upon a rather scanty supply of facts. This is not to say, however, that the theory may not be true in its main features, nor that the facts are not in themselves formidable. Moreover, the author displays a most commendable forbearance and a high degree of scientific caution in frequent use of the words "may" and "probable" and in warning the reader that the subject of the far-reaching effects of climate is only being opened up rather than finally settled.

Among the many important ideas in the book four outstanding ones are the dependence of health on climatic conditions; the close relation between climate, health and economic cycles; the great part played by climate in the evolution of physical and mental life; and the close parallel between the pulsations of climate and the ups and downs of Roman history.

It would seem that the author has clearly and brilliantly demonstrated his fundamental contention that health and consequently physical vigor, mental alertness and moral stability are greatly affected by atmospheric conditions, especially humidity and variability.

The contention that the economic cycle is determined primarily by climatic changes will, if fully established, constitute in its complete significance a revolutionary contribution to the materialistic interpretation of history. The popular theory has been that industrial depressions bring on widespread unemployment, resulting in undernourishment, which induces increased sickness and deaths. But the author finds that "The statistics from 1870 to the Great War show that a high death rate regularly *precedes* hard times, while a low death rate precedes prosperity. Health is a *cause* far more than an effect" (p. 29). Thus climatic factors lower vitality; this produces mental depression, reduces verve, courage and willingness to make new ventures, obliterates creative imagination, and brings the financial and industrial worlds face to face with a crisis.

This sounds plausible enough and is backed up by various other pieces of evidence. The critical reader cannot, however, fail to be struck with the possibilities of error in the statistical graphs. The author does not give us the original data so that it is impossible to trace his methods. He relies exclusively upon graphs for

his proof of interdependence without once calculating the coefficient of correlation. Deaths alone are apparently taken as a sufficient index of general health, though variations may have been due largely to contagious epidemics whose incidence may depend as much on contact as on debility.

Much more serious, however, is our ignorance of how the graphs of chapter II were made. For example there is a remarkable resemblance of the curves of prices and of health. But the curve of prices instead of indicating the absolute figures "shows the fluctuations from the level that would exist if certain permanent tendencies, such as the improvements in manufacturing and transportation, or the decline in the value of gold worked steadily without interference from other factors, such as the weather." No one can blink the fact that here is an opportunity for statistical juggling. The author's conclusion that the general level of prices follows the curve of health with a lag of four years is nothing short of startling in view of the generally accepted theory that the price level is dependent on the supply of and demand for goods on the one hand and of money and credit on the other.

One would also like to know more about the manner in which school attendance, New York bank clearings, general prices, national bank deposits and immigration were combined and averaged to make curve H. Moreover one finds somewhat disconcerting the author's conclusion that "when crops and health move in opposite directions," "the prosperity curve follows the health curve with no apparent regard for the crops" (p. 42). For health and crops seem both to depend on similar climatic conditions and in later chapters on Rome and Turkey much stress is laid on their concurrent variations.

There would seem to be no possible criticism of the principle involved in the elimination of the secular trend, for it is the fluctuations that disclose causal relations. And yet one cannot be oblivious of the fact that the general direction of our economic life as shown by the secular trend is steadily upward regardless of climatic or health variations. The author clearly implies that the secular trend is due to improvements in methods, growth of numbers, changes in the value of gold, etc. And yet in the later chapters, especially that on Rome, it is precisely the secular trend of national life that is dependent on climatic factors. Moreover the elimination of England, where economic crises have regularly occurred, cannot be said to strengthen the general case.

In any case the author has advanced a most interesting theory.

The subject-matter considered in the second chapter is so important that it is worthy more extended treatment. As it stands the author's *a priori* argument seems stronger than his statistical inductions which are bound to be unsatisfactory to the serious student until the reader is given an opportunity to check the work at every step.

The third main contention in this pregnant volume is that climatic variations have been profoundly important in the evolution of animal forms and nervous structure. For, it was precisely in the periods of great climatic change (controlled possibly by intensified solar activity) that the chief crises in evolution occurred. Moreover the development of new types of animals today, of new types of men, and of the higher forms of mental activity is likewise in each case dependent largely on climatic stimulus, primarily the effects of climatic crises in producing mutations.

Finally, there is an application of the fundamental theses to Rome and Turkey. Here as throughout the reasoning is brilliant and entrancing and the conclusions sufficiently startling. But the author does not forget that he is setting forth hypotheses rather than scientific finalities.

Here is a typical example of his reasoning. On the basis of comparison of rainfall in California (San Francisco and San Diego) and at Rome he draws the conclusion "that the curve of tree growth in California can safely be used as an approximate measure of the storminess in the Southern half of Italy" (p. 189). This permits him to picture (p. 188) the variations of rainfall affecting Roman history by the use of the width of annual rings of the great sequoia trees. He then parallels the ups and downs of that history from 450 B. C. with the ups and downs of rainfall. Now it must be submitted that it takes considerable faith in the author's hypotheses to admit the cogency of this argument. For, be it noted in the first place that the fundamental relationship upon which the entire reasoning depends is by no means a close one. The significant portion of this table follows.

	AVERAGE RAINFALL		AVERAGE GROWTH OF TREES E THREE YEARS
	A San Francisco and San Diego	B Rome	
I	8.3	10.7	3.02
II	4.5	10.6	3.00
III	3.4	9.8	2.98
IV	1.9	9.6	2.92

Can it be said that rainfall at Rome varies in the same manner as in California when a decrease of 3.8 inches in the average in California corresponds to a decrease of 0.1 inch in Rome, and a decrease of 1.1 inches corresponds to one of 0.8 inch? We are not in a position to calculate the coefficient of correlation for the entire fifty-five years represented in the table for we are not given the detailed data. Moreover we can only presume that the seven years of heaviest rainfall in California (I) were also the same, year for year, as those of heaviest rainfall in Rome.

Then the difference in the extent of growth on the average is in three cases only 0.02 of an inch. Is this a significant difference or is it only the result of chance variations? This question is not intended to imply at all that there is any doubt as to the positive correlation between lessened rainfall and lessened growth, but rather to indicate that in dealing with such slight differences as the basis of far-reaching conclusions, one ought to take every scientific precaution to see that correlations are high and probable errors low rather than the reverse. Finally one wonders whether, even if it were clearly shown that rainfall in California and at Rome are much the same today, one would be warranted in assuming that they would therefore necessarily have been the same 2000 or more years ago.

But in spite of criticisms one is glad to say that the book is worthy the attention of every serious student of history, economics and sociology. It is too intangible in spots and too sweeping to be thoroughly convincing, but it sketches out areas for scientific exploration that are of utmost interest and importance.

F. H. HANKINS.

ORIENTAL COMMENT

CHINA WANTS NO COMPROMISE

Sin Wan Pao (Shanghai): Mediation usually leads to a compromise. No compromise is, however, permissible in the case of the dispute between China and Japan. What China is fighting for is her sovereignty. China fights because she wishes to protect herself. It is not a quarrel with another nation for the possession of anything which does not belong to her. A compromise will necessarily affect the sovereignty of China because sovereignty cannot be shared in halves or divided in any way. The reported proposal of Japan to return the shell to China after retaining the kernel is a deliberate game of falsehood. Mediation is welcomed

by China on one condition, namely, the maintenance of China's sovereignty in its entirety.

Hsin Shen Pao (Shanghai): With reference to the Shantung question, it is said that the United States is mediating, and that Great Britain has also stretched out a helping hand. We welcome impartial countries taking an active friendly interest in the matter. But mediation usually ends in compromise. The question is: Will the compromise be acceptable to China while it is satisfactory to Japan? China does not oppose signing the treaty with Germany. What we ask is justice. China will readily sign the peace treaty if the Japanese delegates would simply adhere to the principles of justice. The question whether China is going to sign the treaty or not depends entirely on the character of the settlement proposed by the mediators.

Sin Wan Pao (Shanghai): In view of the offer of the United States and Great Britain to mediate, Japan now declares she will restore Tsingtau to China if China signed the peace treaty. Such a promise we have heard again and again. The first one was made on the declaration of war by Japan against the Germans at Tsingtau but today Tsingtau is still in the hands of the Japanese. Is it not a ridiculous attempt in repeating the same old trick? China's sovereignty in Shantung is not to be limited to the possession of Tsingtau. It must be remembered that we cannot accept any settlement which restores Tsingtau to China while depriving her of the other concessions formerly granted to Germany.

Sin Wan Pao (Shanghai): The reason why China refused to sign the peace treaty is because the Shantung settlement has caused us serious disappointment. The reason why the peace conference is unjust in making the decision and why China's claims are all refused is because of Japanese influence. If Japan is capable of exercising such influence at the world peace conference at which the eyes of the world are fixed, it can easily be imagined what her power will be if China tried to negotiate for a settlement direct with Japan. We are confident that it is not the free wish of the government to open direct negotiations with Japan, for the Japanese are a crafty race. It is impossible to take too careful precautions against the plots of our traitors who are willing to lend themselves to the Japanese. It is to be hoped that our government will refuse to listen to the cunning arguments of the traitors. At the same time let us hope that the people will urgently press for the conclusion of internal peace with the view of curbing the militarists.

JAPANESE COMMENT ON SHANTUNG AND RACE MATTERS

Jiji (Tokyo): After recapitulating the recent statement made by the Foreign Minister regarding Shantung, the *Jiji* says that except for the reference to the proposed establishment of a common settlement in Tsingtao instead of an exclusive Japanese settlement, as stipulated in the Sino-Japanese agreement, the latest statement regarding the disposal of Shantung is practically a repetition of what was previously declared to the world time and again. In view of the misunderstandings entertained by some Chinese and foreigners, however, it was necessary to issue the statement.

Yorodzu (Tokyo): "It is said that the statement of the Foreign Minister regarding Shantung clearly means the abandonment of an exclusive Japanese settlement in Tsingtao. Both the peace delegates and the government of Japan are powerless in the face of Chinese propaganda, and it is now proposed to abandon the fruits of the efforts made in Kiaochow. It may also be said that the wanton debate in the U. S. Senate has had its effect against Japan. The Japanese diplomatic authorities are thus making themselves doubly responsible for their inefficiency. The people believe that their interests will be best served if the present authorities step down."

Yamato (Tokyo): "In our opinion, however, it is more proper to say that the latest declaration of Japan is due to the wishes of the United States than to say that it is designed to redeem the foolish blunders committed by China. Some foolish men in the U. S. Senate slandered Japan, charging her with intending to occupy Shantung permanently, and together with some foolish Chinese, strongly denounced Japan. As the U. S. State Department once recklessly pledged itself to assist the Chinese, for this reason it was powerless to exercise control over the preposterous fulminations in the Senate. It seems that the State Department has expressed the wish that the Japanese government will repeat its declaration regarding the restoration of Shantung to China.

"The foolish men in the U. S. Senate cannot be judged by common sense, as is pointed out by the American newspapers lately. Mr. Lodge did not utter a word in the Senate when Germany occupied Kiaochow, nor did he say anything regarding Shantung when Japan joined the war and the Sino-Japanese agreement was concluded regarding the disposal of Shantung. Yet he suddenly began to fulminate regarding the Shantung settlement. We can only ridicule the lack of common sense displayed by him.

"Those foolish Americans insist on what they call the Monroe Doctrine, yet they meddle in Oriental questions. Before the faces of those Americans racial riots have occurred, and they are unable to rise to the occasion. We shall not say anything regarding the attitude of the U. S. State Department, which has asked for a repetition of Japan's declaration out of deference to the wishes of such Americans.

"The present declaration, however, is different from the previous ones in that it proposes to establish a common settlement instead of an exclusive one for the Japanese. This proposal should not be passed unnoticed. Such a concession on the part of Japan should be made conditional on all exclusive settlements in other places in China being abolished. If an exclusive settlement is not to be established in Kiaochow alone, it means a diplomatic humiliation and a dishonor of Japan."

CHINESE PRESS ON THE TREATY

From the *Shih Shih Hsin Pao* (Shanghai)—Let us remember also that the American people are in sympathy with us. President Taft says that American interests in the Far East are of far greater importance than those in Mexico. Let us also bear in mind that every one of the American peace delegates is opposed to the decision of the Three Powers. We are opposed by three men, but we are supported by the whole world. If we decide to fight for our interests, no amount of pressure can prevent us from regaining Shantung.

From the *Min Kuo Fin Pao* (Shanghai)—The people of the whole country were aware of its precarious condition. They did not seem to know, however, that it was their duty to save it. The movement of the students has created the general impression that it is every one's duty to save his own country. Some know perhaps that it is their duty, but few know how this duty should be performed. The students have outlined the things that should be done. The lead taken by the students should convince all that there is a broad road leading to national salvation, and along this road every citizen must travel. Let us sweep away all the obstacles and with united efforts accomplish what we have started out to do.

From the *Chung Hua Hsin Pao* (Shanghai)—If we decide to sign away our own possessions and pass a sentence of death on Shantung it is safe to say that popular indignation will reach the highest possible degree. At the same time Japan is terrorizing the Peking government by asking if it is capable of suppressing the anti-Japanese movement.

THE JOURNAL
 OF
 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
 (Continuing the Journal of Race Development)

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EDITORS

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EDITOR FOR BOOK REVIEWS

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EDITOR FOR INTERNATIONAL NOTES

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
LOUIS N. WILSON, Litt.D.....Clark University

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Books for review, exchanges, subscriptions, and all correspondence relating thereto should be addressed to Dr. Louis N. Wilson, Clark University Library, Worcester, Mass.

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THE JANUARY ISSUE OF THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Masujiro Honda, L.H.D., of Tokyo, Japan, a leading Japanese publicist, was a semi-official representative at the Peace Conference at Paris. In connection with his trip he visited a number of the countries of Europe interviewing representative men. For a number of years he was editor of the *Oriental Review*, published in New York City. He is a writer upon international affairs both in the Japanese as well as American magazines.

Ernest A. Yarrow, Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Near Eastern Relief, Tiflis, Caucasus, speaks with authority regarding conditions in the Near East. For a number of years missionary of the American Board in Armenia, he played an important part in the defense of the Armenians during the massacres of the early part of the war. Later he spent some months in Siberia, in connection with Red Cross work.

Melvin M. Knight, Ph.D., Historian of the American Red Cross Commission to Roumania, and now on the faculty of Hunter College, New York City, has had exceptional opportunities of studying conditions throughout Roumania. He traveled through most parts of the country and met many of the political leaders.

Homer B. Hulbert was for many years a resident in Korea. He was a Head Master of the Imperial Normal School at Seoul; was the founder and editor of the *Korean Review*; and for a time the political agent of the Emperor of Korea. Among his many books on Korea should be mentioned particularly *The Passing of Korea*, which gives a vivid account of the downfall of the independent Korean Empire.

Frank A. Golder, Ph.D., Professor of History in the State College of Washington, is a recognized authority on Russian affairs. He has carried on investigations in the Russian archives for the Carnegie Institution, and researches for the United States

government in connection with the recent war. Among his publications are *Russian Expansion on the Pacific* and *Guide to the Materials for American History in Russian Archives*.

Payson J. Treat, Ph.D., Professor of History in Leland Stanford University, has carried on research in the Far East during 1906-7 and 1912. He is the author of *Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan* and *Japan, America and the Great War*.

David S. Spencer, D.D., has been for many years a resident of Nagoya, Japan, and a careful student of Japanese life and political conditions. Preceding articles in the series which he is contributing to the Journal appeared in the issues of January, 1917, April, 1918, and July, 1919. Dr. Spencer is temporarily residing in the United States and is at present one of the executive officials of the Interchurch World Movement of North America.

George M. Bolling, Professor of Greek Language and Literature at the State University of Ohio, Columbus, and Mr. N. J. Cassavetes, Vice-President of the League of Friends of Greece, have interested themselves in presenting the claims of Greece to the disputed districts in Thrace. They recently testified before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Mr. Cassavetes is also Director of the Pan Epirotic Union and the Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the Massachusetts Organization on Americanization.

Constantine Stephanove, Professor in the University of Sofia, Bulgaria, received his M.A. degree in residence at Yale University. He is Secretary of the general Macedonian Council in Switzerland, member of the American Geographical Society, and author of *We the Macedonians* and *The Bulgarians and Anglo Saxondom*. He writes with authority upon questions regarding Bulgarian claims.

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NATIONAL, RACIAL AND INTERNATIONAL SENTIMENTS¹

JAPANESE-CHINESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

By Masujiro Honda, L.H.D., Tokyo, Japan

Japan, in the Great War and in the Peace Conference at Paris, conducted herself most unworthily of her important position among the nations alligned against the Central Allies—this was the feeling with which I sailed from Yokohama in the latter part of April, 1919, on a tour of observation in Europe and America. At that time the Japanese resolution on racial equality had just been rejected by the Peace Conference, the Council of the Four Foreign Ministers had been instituted to expedite the work of the Big Five, and the Shantung question seemed likely to be settled in favour of China. But, travelling in the United States and Canada in September on my way back from a visit to France, Italy and England, I was pained to hear from American friends of humanity that their country, not mine, had most shamefully betrayed its high pretensions and cherished ideals in the Paris Conference and in the Senate at Washington. The object of this paper is to make clear the idea that, in the Chinese question at any rate, Japan and America have been working at cross purposes although both have had the best of intentions for all parties concerned.

When I expressed to a Frenchman my regret that Japan could not dispatch her troops to Mesopotamia as requested,

¹ Written at Omori, near Tokyo, November 11, 1919.

he immediately replied: "The very fact that Japan declared war against Germany as early as August 23, 1914, when no sanguine heart in France dared hope to escape defeat, gave such moral encouragement as could hardly be estimated. If the French soldiers had known at the outset that the struggle was to last four whole years, they would never have gone to war at all." As soon as the Armistice was signed on November 11, 1918, disarmed Germans said to Japanese civilians kept as prisoners of war near Hamburg: "For the last two years or more, we daily hoped that Japanese fighters would come in aid of our enemies, so that a complete rout could put an early end to our unbearable life of suffering." An Englishman said to me in London: "All the carnage and destruction wrought by the brutal foe fades into insignificance before the appalling result of the Great War which has made life simply unlivable for mankind in general. Our real war has just begun; we do not know how long it will last or where it will strand the whole world." From the tacit admission of some Britishers, however, that, unless the richer and more powerful nations replace their national selfishness by a sincere desire for international coöperation and mutual service, no effort of the League of Nations will save the civilized world from the curse of war, I gathered the notion that the millions of lives lost on land and in the sea were not lost in vain, but that through their death these brave fighters have taught mankind an invaluable lesson—the only way of making the world livable is for us to live an international life.

Taking a short view of things, as frail humanity cannot help taking, it is quite true that our life is made unlivable, for how long none of us can tell. The fear of starvation or revenge, the fear of the impossibility of economic reconstruction or recuperation through internal upheaval and external competition combined, the fear that the national rights and claims of weaker Powers will be crushed by the domineering influences even in the League of Nations, and lastly the fear that one Economic Empire will grow in spite of all efforts to the contrary and will try to dictate its will to the rest of the world as the sole dispenser of international

justice, which will eventually provoke yet another stupendous conflict before the true international government can be established with an international police force to enforce its laws and judgments—these fears have made every nationality, large or small, new or old, suspicious of this or that other Power or group of Powers, and bristle with aggressive or defensive militarism, the curse of which all have just experienced or witnessed. In this way, the progress of the new movement to divide the civilized communities horizontally into working, capitalist, and governing or arbitrating classes or groups, as a necessary step to establish a practicable system of socialistic internationalism, is being retarded by a cross current of dividing the world vertically into race, geographical or economic groups of nations. The new movement mentioned above pins its faith and effort to the League of Nations Covenant, imperfect as it is; the cross current insists upon retaining or upholding local doctrines, old alliances, or spheres of influence to strike a balance of power even inside the League of Nations. Those nations, therefore, who have suffered most from military operations and industrial revolutions will be the first to exert themselves for the perfection of the new international order of things. Such nations, on the other hand, as enriched themselves through or during the War will keep the longest to their national sentiments and old isms, before they bow finally to the authority of internationalism after a series of socialistic uprisings within their own houses.

From these general observations let us now examine the handling of the Chinese question by the Japanese and United States governments in and after the Peace Conference at Paris. Apart from the consideration of the legal propriety of Japan succeeding to the German economic rights in Shantung Province, the people of Japan have been taught by their own experience that military preparedness and legal and other reforms will alone make a nation truly independent, since they themselves had got rid of extra territoriality and secured tariff autonomy after two civil wars and two external wars in half a century's

time. We naturally thought and still think, therefore, that the three hundred millions of the Chinese people or an overwhelming majority of them are not trained, politically and in other ways, to form a stable government for themselves and by themselves, because, since the fall of the Manchu rule eight years ago, the well-considered policy of "self-strengthening" has been abandoned and the traditional politics restored of one party leaning on a foreign Power to borrow campaign funds in order to oust the other party. Suppose Britain should return the complete autonomy over Thibet to the Peking Government, Japan and Russia entirely withdraw from Manchuria and Mongolia, all the Powers interested in China gave up their vested rights and acquired concessions, what would happen then? China would be thrown into a state of anarchy as soon as a "hands-off" policy should be adopted by the interested powers—due to her traditional habit of local insubordination, the large bodies of freebooters, and the system of official exploitation of the masses. Even when China was isolated from outside influences, throughout her history of three thousand years, she was never once under a highly centralized civil authority.

The life and property of foreigners would be exposed to extreme danger, Bolshevich-like uprisings would destroy the foreign and home markets in the country, and no nation but Japan would take the odium of sending out troops to restore order.

Suppose, on the contrary, the American view or what seems like it should be adopted and put into practice, and all German rights and concessions should be handed over directly to China by the Peace Treaty, what would happen? The Peking Government or the Chinese delegates to the League of Nations Conference would, most probably, demand and acquire the complete autonomy of China by a single stroke of diplomacy with the unassailable moral support of the United States of America. Will this make China truly self-governing and enable her to take a position of respect in the Council of Nations? The real result of such an altruistic or academically just measure, we more

than fear, would be the same state of anarchy. Human rights cannot be given or taken away from outside—they must be deservedly acquired by effort and experience. Most likely, therefore, the leading nations would then exercise a mandatory power over China to give her time and opportunity to educate her people by means of foreign money. Will the borrowed money be devoted to the right object? Most likely, again, it would be squandered for civil strife as the political factions in Mexico are squandering their funds, or the Irish agitators who live on campaign funds forever or the Russian Bolsheviks who are destroying every existing institution before being aroused through sheer starvation to a need of private ownership. If the Japanese were as selfish and wicked as is sometimes represented abroad, they would urge the capitalist nations from within the Consortium group to lend without limit to China in such conditions, call the loans reconstruction funds, but in reality absorb a large part of the foreign money invested in China, because the Chinese must live anyhow and buy cheap goods made in Japan such as no other country could possibly supply.

Frankly speaking, we of Japan attach sole importance to the moral side of politics, consider obedience to authority as the centre of the civil order of the States; in short, we are philosophical power-worshippers. The Americans on the contrary, are pre-eminently theoretical freedom-worshippers, as the French are equality-lovers. Because political liberty was the only thing wanted immediately before the War of Independence, intoxicated by the national greatness since achieved, they fail to realize that an old and heterogeneous community, such as that of India or China, must first be trained in the habit of respecting a legally established authority before it will learn to govern itself. One outstanding defect of the League of Nations Covenant is, as was ably pointed out by a New York friend of mine, that it makes weaker nations dependent upon the stronger, it deprives a nation or a race of the desire and the power of initiative to become as great or as powerful as a few States now in a dominant position. Those great Powers are sup-

posed, it is true, to use their influence for the welfare and progress of mankind; but, in the present state of human frailty, the protected weak state has no incentive to better itself, to do good to the still less unhappy, while the protecting strong state often abuses its good intentions and tries to make others progressive even by coercion, which is a moral impossibility.

Both the United States and Japan, during the past year, have learned at Paris and through what has happened all over the world, including their own countries, that the doctrine of human rights pushed to its logical conclusion leads to nothing but anarchistic communism, while the theory of the moral order of the universe unaided by political freedom must end in Bureaucracy supported by Militarism. Our life, individual or national or international, is, in its final analysis, a compromise of sublime idealism and sordid practice. If Japan seems to benefit herself at the expense of her neighbours the Chinese, the League of Nations will exercise its power and wisdom by keeping her within bounds. If America insists upon spoiling the Asiatic Republic with what she calls fair play to the Chinese, there will prevail in the same Council of Nations the opinion that the practical truth lies half way between the two theoretical extremes.

THE CAUCASUS: THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL AND PRESENT CONDITIONS

*By E. A. Yarrow, Assistant to Chief of Staff, Near East
Relief, Tiflis, Caucasus*

One is actually bewildered in attempting to size up events as they have been developing during the past weeks. By September 10, the British had entirely evacuated the Caucasus with the exception of observation officers at several points, and the occupation of the port of Batoum. They had been in control for about seven months and my personal opinion is that upon the whole they did badly. Some things, however, must be put down to their credit. When they arrived early in the year they found the whole Caucasus in turmoil. With a great deal of firmness and tact they were able to stabilize the situation. They stopped the fighting between the Armenians and Georgians and established a neutral zone between the two Republics which has kept them at peace until the present. They cleared the Akhakkalaki district of Tartars and Kurds and made it possible for the refugee population to return to their homes. They put out the Turks from Kars and turned over the district to the Armenians. They defined the territories of the different republics; put these territories under the control of constituted authorities; and adopted the policy of maintaining the status quo. Up to this point the operations of the British forces were splendid and if they had maintained their spirit of impartiality to the end there would have been no cause of complaint. Of the three republics in the Caucasus; the Azerbeidjan, or Tartar had been in open conflict with the Allies, allying themselves with the Turks and openly fighting the British in Baku last year; the Georgians had never been in sympathy with the Allies and probably had a secret treaty with the Germans; the Armenians alone had been loyal to the Allies and did the

best they could to fight off the Turks on one side and the Tartars on the other. The Armenians claim and I believe they have legitimate arguments to substantiate their claims, that they received worse treatment at the hands of the British than either of the other two Caucasian Republics.

Among the Armenian contentions are the following:

1. In the Shusha and Karabagh districts, a detachment of the Armenian army under the leadership of General Antranig was making a successful advance on the Tartars, but were stopped by the British, and Antranig was "persuaded" to take a journey to Paris to take part in the peace negotiations! Nothing has been heard of his activities there. The district was placed under the Tartar rule by the British and, with their approval, a Tartar having the worst possible reputation was appointed Military Governor. Later under this Governor and within sight of a British detachment located in the city of Shusha, a massacre of Armenians took place in which a number of villages were destroyed and about a thousand Armenians lost their lives. This Governor was recalled and again replaced all within a few days while the British were still on the ground.

2. Practically all of the ammunition which the Turks left behind in Kars was taken out of Armenia and sent to Deniken by the British. This left the Armenians badly off for means of protection against their enemies. So far as I know, there was no ammunition taken from either Azerbeidjan or Georgia, although the Russians left large quantities in both of these districts. I believe the British explanation is that the British captured the Kars ammunition themselves, while that in Georgia and Azerbeidjan was already in the hands of these governments when the British arrived.

3. At the time the British withdrew, the whole district of Nakhetchivan which had been assigned to the Armenians, was being conquered by force by the Tartars and there was severe fighting going on not far from Erivan with the Armenians trying to resist this advance. I was told personally by those in charge that the British had had strict orders not to send troops into Armenia, although at that

time they had considerable forces in the other two republics. This was a patent pussy footing on their previously stated policy of maintaining the status quo.

Future investigation will prove whether the above contentions are with or without foundation, but it is my personal conviction that had the Armenians been non-Christians their treatment at the hands of the British would have been far different. In this connection the question of the Assyrian Christians in western Persia about the region of Lake Urmia comes to mind, and one asks oneself why something isn't being done to make this region safe, and why the something like 40,000 from this district who are now sweltering in refugee camps in southern Persia are not being repatriated. This is somewhat of a side question but taken in connection with the Caucasus situation it brings up the whole subject of British policy in this part of the world. Fortunately or unfortunately, it is impossible for the British to take up the question of the Caucasus apart by itself. Their world position is such that immediately they touch the question of the Caucasus, they touch also the question of India, Egypt, and Persia. This means touching Mohammedanism and I believe the explanation of recent political developments here must always begin with this consideration as a basis or starting point.

From various conversations with British officials in which there was much guarded phrasing and diplomatic cautiousness, I have gathered that they would be pleased to have America take the mandate for Armenia alone and leave the Azerbeidjan and Georgian questions to them. This solution would on the one hand free them from responsibility for the Armenians, and on the other hand give them control of the Batoum-Baku railroad leading from the Caspian to the Black Seas. Temporarily at least this arrangement would be deadly for the Government taking the mandate for Armenia, as it would cut off the oil fields of Baku, on which the whole railway and industrial systems depend, and it would also cut out Batoum, the Black Sea port for the Caucasus.

During the last few days persistent rumors are afloat that the British are returning to the Caucasus. If this is true I would venture to prophesy that it is for the purpose of putting into operation the above project. For some weeks I have been haunted by the fear that the British are about to begin a page of their political history which will not make good reading for their descendants. The subject of this page, if it is ever written, will be "A great Christian nation which was forced or thought it was forced, by considerations of world politics, to favor Mohammedan peoples at the expense of small Christian races."

Before the withdrawal of the British, those of us who were in charge of the various American enterprises in the Caucasus, began a frantic telegraphic propaganda in Paris and America urging that something be done to avoid what appeared to be a certain impending calamity. The attitude of the British was almost that of creating a stampede, and was either due to their real concern for the people or to some hidden motive. A number of times they had suggested directly or indirectly that the Americans might make representations urging that the British be held in the Caucasus.

The situation at that time was very dark especially for the Armenians. They were without ammunition and were being pressed hard by the Tartars at Bash Norashen and there was every reason to believe that Kars to the West would fall at any minute. The reports we sent out and the concern we expressed were not unfounded and if nothing had intervened most of the dire results which we predicted would have come to pass.

Personally I believe that the coming of Colonel Haskell as High Commissioner, and Director General of Relief saved the situation. He interpreted the authority given him by the Powers very liberally and in a short time was able to assume a commanding position with the three republics. He has been able to stop the fighting between the Tartars and the Armenians, temporarily at least, and has mapped out a neutral zone embracing disputed territory, over which he will place his own Governor. He stabilized the situation at Kars and has been able to arrange matters

with the Georgians so as to make much better agreements about railway transport, and with it all he has gained the friendship and goodwill of the three republics. His principal weapon has been the influence which his position as High Commissioner gives him with the Peace Conference. All three of the republics are anxious for recognition by the Powers and are willing to do much to stand well with them. The arrival of General Hargord and party helped to confirm Colonel Haskell's influence which is real even if it is on a rather shaky foundation.

The Caucasus today is quieter than when the British left, the early part of September, but one would be unwise to state that it is a stabilized condition. The republics are all on the tip toe of expectation of favors from the Peace Conference and are willing to be good, with the hope that their efforts in this direction will be rewarded. There is no likelihood that the Peace Conference will grant enough of the requests so as to make it worth while for the republics to continue in their present docile attitude, and sooner or later, the natural inference is that they will begin to be "bad" again. There *must* be an armed force here, not so much for use, as to be ready for use if necessary. One might state the situation in contradictory terms; the need for an army ceases with its arrival!

ROUMANIA VS. THE PEACE CONFERENCE

*By M. M. Knight, Ph.D. Historian, American Red Cross
Commission to Roumania*

Why has Roumania calmly ignored the Peace Conference lately, except for occasional explanations or excuses which seem like studious afterthoughts? This is intended less as a defense of her point of view than as an exposition of it, together with a little of its near historical background.

About Easter of 1919, some English gunboats made a demonstration on the Danube below Budapest—a bluff, the French and Roumanian officers further down the river called it, since the ships retreated as soon as shot at. Whereupon, so the officers at Zimnicea told me, Budapest was bombarded from the air, resulting in a considerable number of civilian casualties. French, Roumanian, even English officers spoke of this affair contemptuously, as unproductive of any possible good and certain to give Bela Kun's government the impression that spitework was being employed because forces were not available for real military intervention.

At this time the allied expedition in Odessa was on its last legs. It had cut the city off from its hinterland, so that to supply the population, swollen by a large number of soldiers, required the shipping which might otherwise have carried relief to the starving peoples of the Balkans. Even then, adequate provisioning was impossible. The speculators' paradise was here. Shipments of such things as thread and shoes for Roumania were diverted to Odessa—since cotton thread was worth only from \$1 to \$2 a spool in Roumania, and ordinary shoes only \$40 or \$50 per pair! Then came the Allied retreat from Odessa to the Dneister, the front the Roumanians had pleaded for from the start; but it was a demoralized army, almost without material and quite without morale, which arrived there. The Rou-

manian troops in North Bessarabia had fighting spirit—they had not been in Odessa—but they lacked everything else. There was next to no ammunition for the guns, and not even oxen to move them. Sixty kilometers of the crazy railroad had been laid on the ground by Russian women during the war. Travel on it was like riding a tramp steamer in a heavy gale, and the roadside was lined with the skeletons of cars which had given it up and rolled off, to be immediately stripped of everything combustible by the freezing soldiers and peasants. In the center of this front were the French, also practically without ammunition. They were mostly veterans from the Salonica front, vindictively hated somebody for sending them to this desolate country, and had no intention of getting hurt in what they considered a ridiculous post-war adventure. The miserable railroads had almost no cars and an insufficient supply of wood for fuel, so it was hard enough to get food to the troops, not to mention adequate ammunition to sustain a serious attack. The roads were entirely out of the question—a sea of mud where not quite washed out.

An idea of the French morale may be gained from the fact that at Reni, where we had to wait all day for a train, the troops amused themselves by firing their military rifles at the crows in the tall trees back of the station. Creeping through the low country to the east of here, the rickety locomotive stopping every few miles for repairs or to take on wood, every duck came in for a volley from the train. Some of the marksmanship was really not bad—but it did not endanger the Russian cause much.

Along the lower Dneister were the Greeks and Poles. The latter were disaffected because Roumania had allowed the fleeing Ukrainians to come in, disarmed them and shipped them to Galicia, where they were at war with the Poles, their allies in Bessarabia! The Greeks, who had shown some disposition to fight at Odessa, were behind the estuary of the river, where they were very unlikely to be attacked.

The Roumanians knew that the allied troops, which were requisitioning a large part of the transportation and other

resources of the country, had no military value. They knew that a real, concerted push from the Russians and Hungarians would come through, because there were not enough Roumanian soldiers to go round. In Transylvania, the Hungarians, encouraged by the English and French fiascos, committed some persecutions and a few real atrocities, and their talk about recovering their lost territory made their Czeco-Slovak, Serbian and Roumanian neighbors very nervous. Roumania remobilized her army under incredible difficulties—there was real starvation in the country, it was planting time and there was a cruel dearth of uniforms, shoes, hospital supplies, arms and transportation,—and drove the Hungarians back to the Theiss River. They offered to occupy Hungary and put an end to the Kun government, but Paris would not permit it.

Put in the Roumanians' place, we should have regarded the manoeuvres of the Allied Conference in Paris about as they did. Throughout the late spring and the first half of the summer of 1919, the Hungarian government continued to collect arms and munitions and to form armies. While the Allied economic blockade robbed the communists of any chance of eventual success, those responsible for it neither did nor allowed to be done anything positive either to set up the sort of government they would prefer or to protect the surrounding small countries from the formidable military force which was being organized. Paris was willing to use starvation as a weapon against Hungarian civilians, but was unwilling to use or allow to be used the bayonets which would be the sole efficacious means of dealing with the armed men. In the war certain to come, as it looked from the Near Eastern angle, the only part played by the Allied Conference was to legislate that everyone must wait until the Hungarians were fully ready, and then give them the advantage of striking when and where they chose.

To get the Roumanian point of view before us, it may not be amiss to briefly review a few facts about the war in the Near East which are generally understood there but not here. Western ideas about the reason for Roumania's entrance into the war in 1916 and the facts of her participa-

tion in it are founded on a myth which the Allied governments allowed their press to create because they did not dare publish the secret treaty of Bucarest and attached military convention, signed August 17 of that year. Not only were the Allies willing to pay a high price for Roumanian aid (as had been the case with Italy a year earlier), but they went a step further and practically forced her to accept it. It was a letter signed by General Joffre and delivered to the war ministry at Bucarest July 6, 1916, which brought Roumania into the conflict—not pressure from Russia, as has been repeatedly asserted. Russia, especially General Alexieff, had consistently opposed Roumanian intervention, and in the letter mentioned, General Joffre takes pains to explain that he has straightened out the matter with his Russian colleague, from whom a letter of confirmation will arrive *later*. The tone of this whole Joffre letter is categorical. In terms of the threatening German attitude of the time, it practically constituted an ultimatum.¹

A glance at this Bucarest treaty and military convention (published in *le Temps*, February 4, 1919), read in the light of our present knowledge, throws a flood of light on the reasons for the Roumanian defeat and much of the friction which has since arisen. The delivery of the 300 tons *per diem* of military material promised by the Entente, (Article 4, military convention) stopped at the end of the fourth day—remember that Roumania is a non-manufacturing country, and had been practically isolated for two years. The 1916 offensive undertaken by Roumania against Hungary was not due primarily to Roumanian territory-hunger, as most people in this country still appear to believe, but was prescribed by the Allies in Article 1 of the military convention. It will be remembered that the Galician attack of General Broussilof—which was to support the Roumanian right wing in these Transylvanian operations—suddenly stopped. The troops the Allies were to send to defend the Bulgarian frontier were insufficient in number, of poor quality, and arrived too late. The pre-

¹ For this letter, see Basilescu, *La Roumanie dans la Guerre et dans la Paix*, Paris, 1919, Vol. I, p. 179.

liminary agreement had been for 250,000; but the Russian staff insisted that 50,000 would be sufficient, since General Sarrail (Article 1 of military convention) was to begin an offensive eight days before that of the Roumanians, keeping all the Bulgarian and German forces busy elsewhere. Instead of 50,000 the number actually sent was 30,000 mostly prisoners and deserters from the Austro-Hungarian armies, and even these were still wandering about in the Dobroudjan steppes when the Bulgarians fell upon the Roumanian garrison at Turtukai and overwhelmed it. Instead of beginning the Salonica offensive, as agreed, a churchyard peace descended upon that front, allowing General Mackensen to withdraw most of the troops and form the Bulgarian-German-Turkish army along the Danube which took the Roumanians in the rear and sealed the fate of their capital. In fact, a calm settled down practically everywhere else, allowing the Germans to transfer their best shock and Alpine troops and unlimited material, until the Roumanians were outnumbered two to one and hopelessly outclassed in artillery, munitions, aircraft, transport facilities and every kind of engineering supplies.

Through Allied carelessness and inefficiency, Roumania was overrun, stripped much cleaner than was Belgium or Eastern France, and an incredible amount of damage done to immovable property. The German-Hungarian records, left behind in the hasty evacuation of Bucarest, show nearly 4,000,000 tons of material taken out of Roumania. Besides this, the amount stolen must be reckoned with, and the property unofficially confiscated. No mention is made of railway rolling stock, though hundreds of locomotives and thousands of cars are missing. A recent census of live stock shows that over 3,000,000,000 francs' worth have disappeared—pre-war valuation; it would take many times that to replace them now. The Hungarian share of the requisitions is, according their own figures, about 1,500,000 tons. This is, in terms of the European cars, (most of which have a capacity of ten metric tons), 150,000 carloads. We shall have occasion to refer to this figure later, in connection with the Roumanian requisitions in Hungary.

Territorially, the Allies agreed to give Roumania too much, in the Banat at least, at the expense of the Serbs. They do not seem to have felt much indebted to the Serbs in 1915-16. Naturally, they guaranteed to preserve the existing Roumanian frontiers, in all respects. The claim that this 1916 treaty was abrogated by Roumania in signing the peace of Bucarest in 1918 is very foolish. The peace treaty was signed under absolute necessity, due to the Russian withdrawal from the war. Roumania herself tore it up the 9th of November, 1918, and proceeded to drive out the occupation troops. The Allies later formally declared it null and void in the armistice of November 11. Then it is officially done for, as far as either party to the present controversy is concerned, is it not?

It is comprehensible, even to intelligent Roumanians, how the Banat question might be re-opened by later events, such as the formation of the Jugo-Slav state. But they cannot understand how there can be any discussion of the integrity of their frontiers as they existed before the war and were expressly guaranteed by the Allies in 1916. South Dobroudja is here referred to. It is not disputed, as far as I know, that there are many times more Bulgarians than Roumanians in this territory; but it also seems evident to me that the question was one of negotiation, since Roumania had a legitimate title to the ground, ante-dating the war. The 1918 peace treaty of Bucarest is certainly dead, formally abrogated by *all* parties, though a few diplomats do seem to linger most unaccountably about the grave, considering their attitude toward the document during its lifetime. For the Allies to set up a military occupation of the South Dobroudja under Italian troops, or do anything else which might seem to question that Roumania was one of themselves, was an egregious diplomatic blunder. It looked from Roumania in 1919 as though the Allies had already broken most of the terms of their covenant, and were busily engaged at Paris in breaking the remainder.

In the summer of this year, a thrill of national indignation at this Italian occupation swept through the country, due

to the execution of a Roumanian soldier for visiting his home in the territory—within the frontiers before 1914. The Italian nation was presumably not to blame—it is to be supposed that the troops took their orders from the Paris Conference. But this episode bore no small part in the irritation which manifested itself immediately when Roumanian troops entered Hungary in August and the Peace Conference tried to deal with them through Italian officers. I was with this army myself in Hungary, and heard the incident mentioned innumerable times as evidence of Allied imperialism and of Italian hostility and treachery.

Soviet Hungary, to return to her case, was in difficulties. She was an isolated small country, reduced from her habitual boundaries, with imports and exports paralyzed. This in itself tended to embarrass the exchange of products within the frontiers—Hungary within its new boundaries is not completely self-supporting. The currency system was unstable, since the arbiters of the world had not recognized the government—although there were other reasons, of course. The government tried to get on a solid financial basis by gradually withdrawing the old Austro-Hungarian currency and replacing it with the so-called “white money” of Budapest; but this did not get into general circulation, thanks to the strangulation which began at the frontiers and pressed inward, and the uneasiness of people about the stability of the unrecognized government. The conservative country population a few miles out of the capital looked on the new money with cold suspicion, and preferred the old. The story of M. Sauerwein of *le Matin* that the peasants would not sell to Budapest merchants because they disliked the government shows a distinct lack of appreciation of the economic forces at work. Neither did the merchants generally like the government. People do not boycott each other in business because they mutually dislike a third party. The fact is, it gradually came to pass that Budapest had a currency which would not buy food; the country, a money much of which was not good, or would cease to be good within a few days in the capital, within

reach of the government's arm. Coal became scarce, manufacturing dwindled and the grip of hunger slowly but surely tightened on the city.

The only possible solution the foundering Hungarian government could see was to strike out boldly with its military arm. It might have attacked the Jugo-Slavs. How thoroughly such an attack would have fitted into Italian plans has been brought to light by recent events. Whether this trap was actually laid or not has been a subject of much discussion in the Near East. At any rate, the Hungarians thought it wiser to attack Roumania. Their force which deluged the Roumanian outposts east of Szolnock with artillery fire and crossed the Theiss in numbers in July was lavishly supplied with Italian as well as German materials. My Italian friends insist that these grenades, etc., were all captured at Caporetto. On the other hand, Roumanian staff officers produced strong arguments that some of the material was of more recent manufacture. I have the word of an officer who was present at the Italian-Roumanian interview just before the occupation of Budapest that the presence of some of these things was apologized for on the ground that they were intended for use against the Serbs.

One fairy tale which seems to have been joyfully accepted in the Occident is that the Hungarian soviet troops were of poor quality and did not fight well. On the contrary, they were well-trained, well-armed, skilfully led on the whole, and quite as brave as other soldiers. They made the most of the element of surprise in their favor (which they owed to Paris), and in the beginning had a great numerical superiority over the Roumanian forces immediately opposed to them. Their chance of success lay in the hope of piercing and disorganizing the Roumanian front before reinforcements could be brought up. They underestimated the dogged resistance of the Roumanian peasant soldier and the skill of his officers. The front bent deeply, about thirty miles in one place, but did not break. How bitter the fighting was along this restricted front may be imagined from the fact that the Roumanians suffered nearly five

thousand casualties during the first two days—the Hungarians presumably about an equal number. After all, the military qualities are about the commonest in the world, and are pretty evenly distributed over the human race. Instead of reinforcing the elements actually engaged, the Roumanian staff brought up shock troops on the flank of the Hungarian army, already far from its base and in provisioning difficulties, cut the line of communications and was able to disarm almost the entire force. Though little quarter had been shown in the fighting, most of the Hungarians were immediately set at liberty and told to go home. Those who were kept for work had at least as good quarters and food as their captors; and it was really an amazing sight to one coming from the French front, to see nearly all the hardest, dirtiest work done by the Roumanian soldiers themselves.

Crossing the Theiss, the Roumanians marched on Budapest, in spite of the protests of an Italian officer, who claimed to have consulted with an English general and to speak with the authority of Paris. From the Roumanian point of view, Hungary had herself created a purely military situation by an unprovoked attack. The Peace Conference had done nothing to prevent it, and there was no apparent reason why that body should now step in before a final decision had been reached. The Allies had kept secret the fact of Bela Kun's resignation the first of August; so that all they really had to say to the invading army was to request it to confide in the Paris Conference and to stay out of Budapest. But Roumania had tried confiding in the Allies in 1916, to her sorrow. The Allies were still breaking the promises made at that time—witness especially the occupation of South Dobroudja. The time was peculiarly inappropriate for Paris to speak to Bucarest through an Italian representative, not only because of the execution episode, but because more recently Italian liaison officers and military supplies had been found with the Hungarians. Then, of course, if they wished to be really critical of Allied assurances, there was also the case of Serbia, next door. She had accepted the statement in 1915 that if she would

not mobilize against Bulgaria everything would be all right. The skepticism had to do with Allied trustworthiness in the one instance and intelligence in the other.

One would have to live in Southwest Europe to have any conception of the irritation at the Peace Conference which grew up during this past summer. Besides the broken or unfulfilled promises, Roumania had before her the English fiasco on the Danube, and the French fiasco at Odessa, convincing proof that Paris was both a moral and a military liability as far as the Near East was concerned. The big powers were dictating to the little ones in Paris. The "rights" of smaller nationalities seemed to consist in subscribing to accomplished facts, or taking the consequences. Said people in the Balkans: "Why should these people dictate to us? Their soldiers will no longer fight, as we see. They are only irritating Russia, and as to Hungary, they do nothing but bluff, and when their bluff is called it is we who have to fight. We can understand dictatorship, but it must have force behind it."—Budapest was occupied the 4th of August.

When the Hungarian forces had been disarmed by Roumania, a number of Allied officers came to Budapest, without any soldiers worth mentioning at their backs. They increased the difficulties of the occupying army and created a good deal of irritation, but that was about all. It would be hard to find a more illuminating example of the futility of unarmed people interfering in a military situation. Commands and proscriptions were given, only to be blandly ignored. Threats were occasionally resorted to, producing some reaction at first; but a threat is ultimately founded on force, and if it is overworked the nervousness it causes wears away. Whether the Peace Conference ever contemplated the adoption of strong, efficacious methods is problematical even with some of us Occidentals. The Near East has been skeptical for a long time, and is apparently more so now that the Dalmatian affair has come to a head.

As to the "looting" in Budapest under Roumanian occupation, it was mostly an hallucination of the newspaper correspondents, in the first weeks at least. I saw none

and heard no complaints of it, though free to go about at will in my own motor car, and was interviewed at all sorts of hours and places by Hungarians. Very likely there were isolated cases—we have not entirely eliminated the burglar and highwayman from civilian life. The correspondents spoiled such stories as may have been really true by circulating wild rumors about armies of refugees floating about in some region vaguely indicated as eastward of the capital, where those of us who had been over the country in detail knew they could not possibly be. Coming into a city where life was terribly hard—people living largely on gourds at eight kronen per kilo—they charged the shortage of food and fuel which had existed for weeks to an army which had been there only a few days.

Stories of wild disorder in Budapest during the occupation are to be suspected. The fact that they were circulated during the early days when I know them to be untrue leads me to disbelieve them now. Strict discipline was maintained. Multitudes of people thronged the streets by day—Budapest is a big city, like Philadelphia, only much finer and better built. At night nobody but officers and people with special military passes were allowed on the streets after nine o'clock—absolutely nobody but the guards after ten. These guards made their rounds in military formation, never less than a squad, fully equipped and officered.

Now as to requisitions: The Roumanians had collected several hundred railway cars at Szolnock when I passed through on my way to Bucarest. The bridge was being repaired so they could be taken into Roumania. Some of these cars were loaded with merchandise, some were empty. Requisitioning was going on at Budapest during my stay; but the country was not being gutted as Roumania had been under the Hungarian-German occupation. We may say this has no bearing on the situation, but it has for the Roumanians, and would have for us in their place. All the efforts of the Peace Conference and the Soviets have not yet ushered in the millennium of the brotherhood of man, so we had better think in terms of what happens in

the actual world. One of these sordid facts is that people do not immediately forget great, material wrongs done them. We would do well to remember, in connection with some hundreds of carloads of Roumanian requisitions in Hungary, that part of the mental background of the people who made them consists of the hopeless impossibility of ever getting back the 150,000 carloads or so on the other side of the balance, and that Bulgaria, Austria and Germany have apparently got off clean with the remaining two and a half millions of tons. To give merely illustrative items, a million head of cattle and over four million head of sheep were carried off from Roumania by the Central Powers. Roumania is getting comparatively few of these back. She may get a few thousand in Hungary, but the part she holds was worked over by the Bela Kun army before she arrived.

People should, it seems, show some sympathetic imagination concerning facts that are dramatic and convincing in themselves, whether or not they agree with the conclusions drawn from them. For example, the Allied people evinced great indignation one day because the Roumanians were taking hospital supplies in Budapest. The statement that a considerable proportion of these supplies were of Roumanian origin was investigated by me personally, and is true. In one large hospital storehouse in the southern part of the city, the shelves were lined with bottles and packages bearing the labels of the Roumanian Sanitary Service, Red Cross, and of private druggists from Bucarest to Braila and from Braila to Turnu Severin. In one room was a large number of big cases which still bore the routing marks to Jassy, Roumania, via Vladivostok—unopened.

If we would calmly and critically examine the Roumanian position, we should see no abnormal lack of frankness or clarity, compared with the actions of other nations. Roumania has said repeatedly that if the Peace Conference wishes to charge the materials taken out of Hungary against a future settlement, she is quite willing. Privately, Roumanians would tell you they think this is all they will ever get, and that if they had not acted as they did they would have got nothing at all. The Peace Conference has not

inspired much confidence in southeastern Europe. These people criticize its interpretation of "open covenants, openly arrived at" as illustrated by its own procedure, not to mention the freedom of the seas, alliances, the rights of small nationalities, economic discrimination and others of the fourteen shimmering promises upon which it began its career. Captain Sapelli remarks (in the November "Current History") that the English-Persian treaty is an abortion of the League of Nations, and goes so far as to suggest that neither France nor England has renounced "advantageous private engagements." If we lived in Roumania, this skepticism might call to mind the French shipments of perfumes, silk stockings and other luxury goods to that country last spring in order to pocket fabulous profits off the rich at a time when every pound of carrying capacity was needed to take food to the actually starving. Now we see D'Annunzio in Fiume, with his eye on the whole Dalmatian coast, and nobody daring to apply the force it would take to stop him.

With all these things before us, we still seem to regard Roumania as a detached case of moral obliquity; we lack the perspective to see her in her appropriate setting—how nicely she blends into the general background of European diplomacy. We hug the delusion that an international group can make its decisions respected without force; and some there seem still to be who have learned nothing from one refusal after another of Western European troops this year to serve effectively as international policemen. If anyone believes that our feet are at last planted on the higher ground of international disinterestedness, let him imagine a few sparks dropped into the Banat and Dalmatian situations today. Roumania wants the Banat; Italy wants Dalmatia; Jugo-Slavia, which holds both, is momentarily in a very disadvantageous position, without any outlets of her own to the sea. There is no fundamental reason why the Italians and Roumanians should disagree—the languages are astonishingly similar, and there is nothing in their recent misunderstanding which cannot be explained away by charging it to the Peace Conference. Remember-

ing that France, a sister Latin nation, is inclined to sympathize with both recalcitrants, imagine the Peace Conference or League of Nations attempting to get the Roumanians out of Hungary and the Italians out of Fiume, until they get ready to leave.

JAPAN IN KOREA

*By Homer B. Hulbert, author of "The Passing of Korea;"
former editor of the "Korean Review"*

It is said that there is nothing new under the sun, but the demonstration in favor of national independence made by the Korean people last March, and continuing until the present time, exhibits a number of features which are if not new at least extremely unusual in history and are worthy of more than passing attention. To understand the motive power back of this movement it will be necessary to review briefly some of the events of the recent past.

First, of course, is the age-long antipathy that has been mutually active between Japan and Korea. This antipathy takes the form of contempt on the part of Japan because of Korea's military weakness, and hatred on the part of Korea because of the selfish and aggressive nature of the Japanese. This hatred rests upon a basis easily understood. Passing over the various corsair raids and invasions by Japan which have been periodical since the year 600 B.C. and beginning with the opening of Korea about the year 1880 we find the first cause of Korea's enmity against her neighbor in the attempt which Japan made in 1884 to compel Korea to execute the same *volte face* which she herself had made. This was an impossibility because of the entire absence in Korea of any such incentive as that which drove the Japanese to it. In this unwarranted attack upon Korea the king was seized and all the ministers of his cabinet were killed before his eyes. But the attempt proved abortive and the revulsion of feeling on the part of the Koreans was complete. The savagery exhibited by the Japanese in that episode completed the alienation of any Korean sympathy which may have previously existed. So far from inaugurating a period of reform it caused an actual retrogression. This was Japan's first blunder.

The second was in 1895 after the Japan-China war when, in the attempt to secure enormous economic rights in Korea the Japanese were opposed by the queen. They removed this obstacle by assassinating the queen, burning her body and then compelling the king to degrade her officially to the status of a harlot. Besides being one of the most revolting crimes in history it was a blunder, for it forever rendered the Japanese an object of loathing to the Koreans and made it certain that Japan could work henceforth only with the instruments of fear and compulsion.

Third, in 1905 after the Japan-Russia war, Japan ignored her treaty with Korea and began a system of encroachment that eventuated in the annexation of the country to the Empire of Japan. Some people see in this a great triumph for Japan but in fact it was the greatest blunder of all, because it afforded an object-lesson which the Chinese were not slow to learn, which alienated the good-will of China permanently and sowed the seeds of future trouble—seeds that are only now germinating.

It now became Japan's purpose to "absorb" the Korean people, to eradicate every trace of nationalism and individuality from the Peninsula and to make the Koreans Japanese. In this she showed a surprising lack of historic perspicacity. To attempt to destroy a nation of 18,000,000 people short of physical annihilation is certain to prove futile. To seize and destroy all the historical works of a nation in the attempt to make the people forget that they have a past is about the most childish thing conceivable. A Chinese emperor tried it some 300 B.C. and became the laughing-stock of the world. And yet Japan is trying this very thing in Korea. The attempt to make the Korean people set aside their language in favor of that of Japan is equally foredoomed to failure. Russia's failure to do the same thing in Poland should have warned Japan of the absurdity of such an effort.

But there was another form of activity which did even more to exasperate the Koreans. By every trick which ingenuity could devise the Japanese authorities labored to get the best arable land out of the hands of the Koreans

and turn it over to their own nationals. They engineered a severe financial depression which compelled thousands of Korean farmers to sell out at ruinous prices. The Japanese took full advantage of this and alienated from the Koreans thousands of acres of the best land. Another device much favored by the Japanese was to lend some money to a Korean farmer, the bond stipulating that if the money were not paid by a certain day the farm should revert to the Japanese. On the day of payment the Korean would take the money to the house of his creditor in order to settle the bill. The Japanese would be absent and the Korean would be compelled to wait his return. When the Japanese came back he would charge the Korean with having failed to meet the contract and would drive him off the farm and take the land for his own. There was no tribunal where the Korean could get redress. The Americans in Korea are unanimous in their assertion that the Korean has no chance against a Japanese in the courts of Korea. Can the reader imagine a nation of 18,000,000 Koreans in which every case at law must be tried in the Japanese language? It is the same as if every case in America had to be tried in the Russian language. Over 1,500,000 Koreans have gone across the northern border into Siberia and Manchuria rather than longer endure such oppression.

There was just one thing that stood in the way of Japan's evil ambitions. Korea could never be completely cowed and enslaved so long as Christianity flourished as it was doing. Through the efforts of Americans it had been firmly established in that country and it was a type of Christianity which exhibited the most stubborn resistance to the degenerative process introduced by Japan. Korea would long ago have succumbed to the devastating influences of Japanese prostitutes and Japanese morphia had it not been for the deterrent influence of Christianity. Moreover the Christian church stands for education, for enlightenment, for individualism and for personal liberty. In every way Christianity was an obstacle to Japan. This was specially so because of the presence of hundreds of American citizens, scattered all over the country and fully cognizant of Japan's methods.

The matter of education was one of the most scandalous features of Japan's mismanagement of Korea. Over 350 Christian schools were peremptorily closed because they did not conform in every minute particular to Japanese regulations, which were made apparently for this very purpose. In the Government schools of all grades there were enrolled 87,000 students. This was less than one-half of 1 per cent of the population! It is significant to note in this connection that in the Philippine Islands, out of a total of 9,000,000 people, many of whom are savages and therefore almost inaccessible, the United States Government has 610,000 pupils in the schools. This is about 7 per cent of the population. In other words the United States is doing fourteen times as much work in those islands as Japan is doing in Korea.

In 1912 the Japanese administration adopted a policy toward Christianity which was medieval in quality and destructive in intent. Manifestly for the purpose of intimidating and discouraging the Christian church they arrested some 123 of the leading Christian people and under torture compelled them to say that they had been instigated by the American missionaries to the assassination of the Japanese governor general and had been supplied with arms from the same source for that criminal purpose. After a public trial, wherein 157 witnesses for the defense were not allowed to enter the witness box, 109 of these men were condemned to long periods of penal servitude. As soon as Americans got busy in Washington the whole thing was quashed and the men were liberated, but what I wish to show is the animus of the Japanese in Korea toward Americans and American influence. One can but wonder at the mentality of people who could suppose that such an absurd attempt could do otherwise than rebound upon the heads of its prime movers.

At last, when America had thrown her weight into the balances of war and had ended the struggle, when President Wilson had enunciated the noble principle of self-determination of nations, the people of Korea determined that the time had come when they must either declare for inde-

pendence or abandon forever the hope of a renewed national life. The apparent hopelessness of such an act has nothing to do with the question. It was a necessary step in the pleading of Korea's case before the tribunal of the world's opinion. They could do nothing less than show that they had heard the words of President Wilson and were determined to avail themselves of every slightest possible chance to rehabilitate their country's fortunes.

The first notable thing about this demonstration is the astuteness and organizing ability shown by the Koreans, in that the entire nation was organized for this thing without giving the Japanese a single clue. The country swarmed with Japanese spies, many of whom were Korean renegades in Japan's pay. Yet such was the skill and the ability of the Koreans that they successfully organized under the very noses of the Japanese. It is likewise a splendid vindication of Korean patriotism that among the millions who were privy to the plan not one of them disclosed the secret to the Japanese. It may well be doubted whether a movement of this size has ever before been consummated against such odds.

But there is something still more astonishing. When the secret movement began the vast majority of the Koreans, 17,000,000 out of a total of 18,000,000, were in favor of a general uprising and the indiscriminate slaughter of every Japanese civilian in Korea. When we recall that there were some 300,000 Japanese in the peninsula, scattered all over the country, we realize that in spite of Japan's overwhelming military power probably 100,000 of the Japanese would have perished. It would have been one of the most appalling massacres in all history. One has only to recall the hideous wrongs that the Korean people had suffered to realize that they were ready to die if, in dying, they could inflict such punishment upon their oppressors.

At this point we encounter the really astonishing factor in the transaction and the one that constitutes its uniqueness. The Christian leaders came to the front and said "No, we must not attack the Japanese and massacre them. Our national demonstration must derive its strength from

purely moral sources. By imitating the cruelties of the Japanese we will forfeit the goodwill of the world and we will be guilty of national suicide. Let us stand up in the power of sheer righteousness and declare our independence."

It sounds tame enough when put in cold type, but considering the flaming but suppressed passion of the people, such a suggestion was an exhibition of superb bravery. And it won. The Christian leaders dominated the passion of the entire nation, curbed their eagerness for reprisals and inspired them with a lofty determination rather to suffer for the cause of liberty than indulge in a merely temporary orgy of revenge. Christianity never secured a more signal victory in the field of practical politics. For this act of self-repression the Japanese owe the Christian leaders in Korea a heavy debt of gratitude, but they are wholly unconscious of the obligation. It is the kind of thing that the Japanese cannot appreciate or understand. On the contrary they charge Christianity with having instigated the demonstration.

On the first day of March, 1919, the entire nation stood up and declared its independence of Japan. They did it without show of arms and without the exhibition of a particle of hatred or rancor against their oppressors. In every place the Koreans gathered and unitedly chanted their national slogan, the word *Mansei* which is the same as the Japanese word *Banzai*, meaning "Ten Thousand Generations." They spoke no word of anger, they evinced no hatred, they simply said "We must and shall be free."

What followed was a result of panic on the part of the Japanese—a moral panic. They were well aware that the Koreans had abundant reason to hate them to the point of sanguinary revolt, and although the Korean movement was entirely peaceful the Japanese blindly leaped to arms and in a frenzy of terror struck at the Koreans. The police and gendarmes fired wildly at the crowd and charged them with swords and bayonets. Men, women and children were slaughtered in cold blood. The scenes on the streets were too revolting to describe. The prisons were glutted with captured Koreans. Tortures of the most terrible kinds

were inflicted, in the effort to make the Koreans betray each other, but without success. The whole shameful record can be found in the report of the Federal Council of Churches. Details have arrived since then showing that the atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese were even more terrible than were at first reported. Korean women and girls were treated in the most shameful manner, stripped naked, kicked about and addressed in language unbelievably obscene. Some of the girls were repeatedly violated, if the most recent reports can be believed.

The Japanese singled out the Christian people for special attention. In many places they would question people whom they had arrested and find out whether they were Christians or not. If they were not Christians they would be discharged but otherwise they would be severely handled. That Americans were specially marked was shown when a British subject was severely handled but was freed and given an indemnity of several thousand dollars as soon as his nationality was discovered. American missionaries have been seized and subjected to severe penalties, and that without a fair trial.

The question arises as to the attitude which the American people and government should assume in the premises. It is admittedly a delicate matter. On every side we are cautioned that the Japanese are a very sensitive people. This is a favorite method of checking criticisms of Japan but the time must come soon when the excuse wears thin and Japan will have to realize that there are things which the civilized world will not endure without protest. We Americans are not wholly pachydermatous and if our sense of justice is sufficiently abraded we are likely to rise up and say things that will hurt the *amour propre* of Japan. By the investment of millions of dollars and hundred of lives in Korea, before the Japanese took possession, the American people secured prior rights in the premises and the question is whether we ought to be compelled to give up those rights and see our work destroyed. That this work is in direct line with the enlightenment of the Far East is an added argument in the negative.

Japan did everything she could to prevent the publication of the facts in America and other foreign countries but, finding this impossible, she bent before the storm of public denunciation and promised to effect reforms in Korea. Her protestations came rather late in the day. She was in the position of a culprit caught in the act and with the goods in his possession. Promises of reform at this juncture seem to the Korean people to be inadequate. They are convinced that the reform will be merely formal and that the fundamental ambitions of Japan in the peninsula will suffer no change. Any one with the smallest appreciation of Japan's methods and ideals must agree with the Koreans in this. It corresponds with Japan's promises to return to China the sovereignty over Shantung while still retaining all the economic advantages. As if a man should appropriate your house and then promise to let you hold the deed of the house while he retains actual possession.

The Koreans are determined to keep at work until their independence is secured. Only thus, they believe, can the nation be saved from extinction. They are eminently right. The nation might as well die fighting as to disintegrate under Japanese domination. There is no American, conscious of the underlying principles of this Republic, who can do otherwise than applaud the Korean attitude.

But Korea will probably never be independent until Japan enjoys a thoroughgoing revolution. Such an event is not outside the bounds of possibility. She is the last remaining autocracy, a lonely residuum of the feudal idea of the divine right of brute force, an anachronism. The better sense of the Japanese people realizes this and it will not be long before the modern spirit permeates that nation sufficiently to bring about the desired change. Lafcadio Hearn, who knew Japan as few Westerners did, said that "The officials of Japan are restive under the necessity of keeping up the pretense that the Emperor is divine. When the common people begin to doubt it they will stop paying taxes."

WILL THE UNRESTRICTED SELF-DETERMINATION OF ALL NATIONAL GROUPS BRING
WORLD PEACE AND ORDER

*By Frank A. Golder, Ph.D., Professor of History in the State
College of Washington*

This war was to a great extent a struggle of nationalities, or national cultures, as the Germans would put it. According to Kaiser's William's view when two nations of different culture meet they must fight for supremacy, the less cultured must give way to the more cultured. On the other hand President Wilson believes that no one nation has a monopoly of the best culture, that all have something good, and therefore all should have the right to life, liberty, and happiness. William of Hohenzollern would do away with future wars by stamping out all but the German culture, Woodrow Wilson would bring about the same result by giving every national culture the opportunity to develop the best there is in it.

What is a nation? It is a group of people having traditions, a language, and institutions which distinguish it from its neighbors and a place it calls home. There is an Italian nation, a German nation, a French nation—altogether there are fifty or more nations on the continent of Europe.

A nation is not a state. A state may and usually does include in it more than one nation, for example, the British Empire; a nation may and sometimes does control more than one state, for example, the German nation which was in power both in Germany and in Austria. In a state made up of many nations (or nationalities) there is usually one which considers itself as superior and tries to impose its will upon the others and to dictate to them the way of life. They, in turn regard this as oppression and demand for themselves the freedom to live and think as seems best to

them. This oppression is generally more spiritual than economic, such as the prohibition of the native language, the development of the native culture. This clashing of wills creates bad feeling and usually leads to war.

The nationality conflicts of the present are what the religious wars were centuries ago, as bitter and as unreasonable. The Germans and Bohemians of today had the same satisfaction in killing one another that their Catholic and Protestant ancestors had at the time of the Hussite wars. Now as then the great mass of the Germans had little ill-will against the mass of the Bohemians and vice-versa; all that either asked is to live and let live. But the leaders of their respective nations will not have it so. In the fifteenth century the Holy Roman Emperor insisted that his Catholic dogma was superior to the Hussite theology and threatened to exterminate all who disagreed with him. Monks, priests, and patriots went all over Germany preaching crusades and inflaming honest, hard-working German peasants against equally honest, and hard-working Bohemians. In the twentieth century the German Kaiser boasted of his superior culture and because the rest of the world would not accept his view he spread death and desolation far and wide. From the throne, from the pulpit, from the professor's chair the doctrine was taught that there is no god but the German god, no culture but the German culture, and the unbelievers were given the choice between the German Kultur and the German sword. Nationality wars like religious wars are the children of oppression and intolerance; they live on propaganda and false patriotism.

National movements have many points of difference, some are natural, others artificial, some are honest, others false. They have also many points of similarity and their histories are very much alike. Usually the leading nationality in the state attempts to force its language, culture (sometimes its religion) on the other nationalities. They resent this action and it arouses in them a national self-consciousness. They declare that they, too, have a language and culture as good as that of the self-styled superior nationality. If the language and culture are crude they proceed

to polish them. The uncouth peasant speech is grammatized, the folktales and folksongs are published, the old and forgotten national costumes are brought out and dusted, and the antiquated customs are practiced. Each of these separately represents national literature, tradition, art and collectively national culture. As a general thing the nationals at first desire nothing more than the right to develop this culture, they have no burning desire for political independence. If their aspirations were granted they would probably cease to agitate and the movement would die. But the dominating nationality can not stand rebuff. It suddenly discovers that it has a duty to God, to the state, and to civilization to force its superior culture on the inferior subject. Incidentally the superior reasons that if the inferior be allowed to have his way in this he will demand other liberties as well, particularly political independence. In order to prevent this, new laws, more oppressive than the old, are passed with a view of stamping out all spiritual and national life. If tyrants were versed in history and psychology they would know that spiritual forces can not be killed by physical means, that the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church. But being blinded by their pride they can not see that their acts bring about the very situation they aimed to prevent. Unable to act openly the nationalities work covertly; they either conceal their printing presses at home or smuggle in prohibited literature from abroad. In this way they are freed from the government censorship and are in a position to denounce their rulers as tyrants and to appeal to all their nationals to rise and throw off the foreign yoke and to work towards political nationality. This is the second stage in the national movement.

By political nationality is meant complete political independence and the establishment of a national state made up of its nationals, governed by its nationals, and for the good of its nationals. From the point of view of the oppressor this is revolutionary doctrine, pure and simple, and as such it must be put down by blood and iron. The leaders of the movement are either imprisoned, or exiled,

or even executed, their writings burned, their property confiscated, and their followers scattered. In order to gain the good will of the masses, who are always more interested in social betterment than in cultural and political development, the government lightens their taxes and improves their economic condition. What is the result of the policy of repressing the intelligentsia and of helping the peasantry? The exiled intelligentsia creates a world prejudice against the oppressor and the peasant takes what is given him and demands more. Each year the national animosities become more keen, each year a little more fuel is added and this goes on until some fool sets a match to the inflammable material and a world conflagration like the present one is started.

Every national movement has then at least two distinct elements, a cultural and a political. Each has some good in it; but the Germans, for example, can not see much good in either so far as they apply to other nations than the German. They cling to the theory of superior and inferior nations and cultures.

Until we learn more about the subject of nationalities, and that must be done from the book of life and not from a philosophical treatise, we can not accept the German theory. All that we now actually know is that some nations are less advanced than others, have fewer opportunities than others. The Jugo-Slavs, the Letts, and others like them have never had much of a chance and it may be that some day they may produce a Beethoven, a Kant.

Some village-Hampden, that with dauntless breast
The little tyrant of his fields withstood;
Some mute inglorious Milton here may rest
Some Cromwell guiltless of his country's blood.

Each nation has something to contribute to civilization, one nation always can learn from the other. Diversity of opinion, diversity of taste, diversity of interest are the stimuli of intellectual growth, without them we would exist but not live. National cultural development, so long as it is not accompanied by national arrogance, as it was in Germany, should be encouraged.

National political development, that is to say the right of each nation or nationality to form itself into a nation-state is not so one sided and has less to commend it than national cultural development. If national political development were followed out to the logical end Europe would be parcelled out into very many nation-states, England into three, Ireland two, the United States into a dozen or more, New York City alone into several, Jewish, Italian, Irish, etc. Each of these states would be ruled by the nationality in the majority, in the interest of that nationality. The nationalities in the minority would have no voice, otherwise the state would cease to be a nation-state. Democracy would be a dead letter. The so-called oppressed nationalities are as oppressive as their oppressors. Let us not deceive ourselves in believing that the peoples who have been freed from Russian, German, and Austrian tyranny will necessarily be any more liberal or tolerant to those under them than the Germans or Russians were to their subjects. The Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia suffer much more from the Poles than the Poles did from the Russians. The so-called oppressed nationalities are sometimes more oppressive than their oppressors. If the nation-state were generally permitted the dominant nationality in the state would attempt to assimilate or crush the other nationalities and the world would have Ukrainization, Lithuanization, Polonization, Armenianization and the other evils that follow in its train. Already the Italian and Polish imperialists (as well as those of other oppressed nations) are making such greedy demands for lands over which they have no right and over people with whom they are not related that if the demands were granted another war would soon break out.

It is even a question whether real culture would be promoted by having nation-states. The number of literary, or so-called literary languages, would increase and that is not good. One of the principal reasons for a nation-state is the preservation of the national culture, and an influx of foreign ideas would prevent this.

Economically the nation-state and the world would not be better off. The number of customs barriers and military frontiers would increase, economic wars would spring up and national jealousies and antagonisms would flare up as never before.

Strict self-determination of nationalities, or the nation-state, is a step backward in the world's progress and all movements in that direction should not be encouraged and if permitted it should be with the view of making it serve a higher purpose than its imperialistic leaders have in mind. If the nation-state should succeed in firmly establishing itself neither humanity as a whole nor the nationals as a whole would benefit from it; the only people to profit by it would be a handful of politicians.

In studying the nationality questions of Europe one comes face to face with some curious situations. One learns that each nationality is divided into three prominent classes, the clergy, the bourgeoisie, and common people, the last named making up somewhere about ninety per cent or more of the total population. He learns that there are true and false national movements, that some come from the heart and others from the mind, that some have real grievances and others imaginary. In nearly every bona-fide movement the clergy and bourgeoisie are for national independence and national culture while the mass of the people are either indifferent, or favor it for entirely different reasons from those advanced by the upper classes. Most of the national leaders are honest men, but some are consciously or unconsciously influenced by selfish motives. The Polish leaders, who are almost altogether of the upper classes, tell us that they are working to save their nationals from Russian oppression, but as a matter of fact the Polish nobles are notorious for the mistreatment of their peasants, and it was against the will of this very nobility that Alexander II freed the Polish serfs from the yoke of their lords. What is it then the Poles really desire? Many of them desire nothing more nor less than to hold the reins of government and to be allowed to do as they please. The Ukrainian nationalists cry that the Russian government

did not allow them to develop their culture; if you look into the case you will discover that a majority of these leaders could not write a letter in Ukrainian to save their lives. The Lithuanian clergy demand Lithuanian political independence and the Poles oppose it because the Poles hold the episcopal seats and the Lithuanians would like to get into them. These motives are not necessarily unworthy or dishonest and it is quite possible that the national leaders would conduct the affairs of state as well if not better than the foreign officials.

This brings us to the question of the common people. How about them? What do they think and how do they feel on these matters? On the border districts many of the inhabitants do not know and do not care to what nationality they belong. For generations Polish, Lithuanian and Russian peasants have lived side by side, have intermarried, have laughed over the same joys and have wept over the same sorrows. They have even a "common speech" which is different from either one of the three national languages. For generations they have been exploited by Lithuanian, Polish and Russian landlords and they have not much love for any of them. The poor peasants are not interested either in cultural development or in national independence; many of them do not even understand the meaning of these words. What they want is steady work, good wages, and plenty to eat. They hate landlords of all nationalities, and they have no reason to think that a bishop of their own people would treat them with more consideration than one of another people. Ninety per cent of every nationality in Europe is more interested in social than national problems, in the question of food and wages than in culture and independence. This explains the success of bolshevism with its appeal to throw over the clergy and the bourgeoisie because they are the landholders, the privileged classes, the capitalists, the reputed oppressors of the working people. Not the suppressor of national culture but the economic oppressor is the enemy, cry the Bolsheviks. This is not the place to discuss the truth or the falsity of this theory, but merely to point out

that there are thousands of people to whom it appeals more strongly than the teachings of the leaders of the national movements. [l.com.cn](http://www.1.com.cn)

From what has been said it is evident that political self-determination of nationalities is not going to solve either the immediate or the future problems of the world. If this is so why do President Wilson and men of his type try to bring it about? The answer is that nationalism is not regarded by them as an end in itself, but as a means to something higher and better, a League of Nations or Internationalism, which they hope will help solve the problems.

By internationalism we mean better relations and more coöperation between states and peoples based on the principles of justice and humanity. The idea is not a new one and has been discussed in one form or another since the beginning of history. In modern times Alexander I of Russia proposed it for the guidance of European powers and out of that came eventually the Holy Alliance. The Hague Conference had in it many of the elements of internationalism.

At the present time President Wilson is the most ardent champion of a League of Nations. By nations he means not the leaders but the mass of the people, all classes of the people, speaking through their representatives organized into a legal government. The ideal of the league is to secure peace for the world by increasing the opportunities for mutual understanding. Each member of the league is asked to give up some of its sovereign powers, but aside from that each state is as independent as before.

Extreme radicals like Lenin are opposed to states, governments, and centralized power, consequently to a union of states. They agitate for a federation of peoples, particularly the working classes. They say that if the power were in the hands of the proletariat the ills from which we now suffer would disappear and the world would become one happy, united family without political frontiers, custom's barriers, and economic jealousies. Distinctly national culture with its pride and arrogance would give way to a cosmopolitan culture that knows neither state nor nation.

Is the internationalism of the Wilson ideal possible? Can the individual states be taught to think less of themselves and more of the world as a whole? That this is possible is fully proved by history. If we examine the course of social development we find that rival families united into clans, feudal clans into tribes, warlike tribes into nations, hostile nations into states. In Switzerland we have three nationalities in one state living in friendliness and peace, while across the border their kinsmen are at enmity. At one time the Scotch, the Welsh and the English waged cruel war among themselves, but now are one and inseparable. On the other hand right across the Irish Channel two nationalities hate each other bitterly. All these illustrations show that in states where one nationality respects the rights of the other national antagonisms do not flourish and where this is not the case hatred grows. If in democratic countries like Switzerland and England three nationalities can act together for the common good it ought to be possible for twice the number or many times that number to do the same thing. We have already more than a beginning in such international institutions as the postal union, the Red Cross, the banks, the stock market, the international food commission, the copyright and patent, the literary and scientific organizations, and the international labor legislation. At Washington there is in session today an international labor conference for the purpose of bringing about closer coöperation between the laboring men of the world. With capital and labor internationalized the most serious drawbacks that stand in the way of internationalism are removed. To many people the practicability of a league of states is no longer debatable; the real problem is to develop the machinery for its government.

Is the internationalism of Lenin, that is to say the rule of the proletariat, possible and desirable? If it means the rule of an intelligent majority for the good of all, if it means the uplift of humanity as a whole then it is both possible and desirable. Thoughtful people the world over are in sympathy with such a movement. It is the goal towards which humanity has been advancing and each century is

marked by progress. Class distinctions are disappearing, poverty is decreasing, man is more dignified, intelligent and spiritual; and the time is not far distant when the man with the hoe will be as rare as the man with the flint axe.

Wilson and Lenin differ, however, in their points of view towards life. Wilson loves mankind, Lenin experiments with it. Wilson uses his abilities to serve humanity, Lenin uses humanity to serve his theories. In the methods used to attain the object they differ also. Wilson believes in the evolutionary process, Lenin in the revolutionary way. Both Wilson and Lenin would abolish class distinctions. Wilson would do it by preaching better understanding, Lenin by inciting hatred; Wilson by appealing to reason and love, Lenin to passion and brute force; Wilson by melting the three classes into one, Lenin by killing off two classes for the sake of the third. Since Lenin has been in power he has preached class war, he has poisoned the hearts and minds of thousands of ignorant people against their neighbors, he has killed, imprisoned, exiled, burned, destroyed, and has been directly and indirectly the cause of the death of tens of thousands. He and his adherents are as fanatic as the most zealous inquisitors, sow the same seed and reap the same harvest—hatred, intolerance, a spiritual and intellectual decline of mankind. If by stirring up class hatred, by the suppression of free speech and freedom of thought, by arraying the ignorant against the educated, the poor against the rich, the unbeliever against the believer Lenin hopes to bring about his internationalism then he will surely fail. He may succeed in having his way for a time but no permanent good can come out of it. The world knows that no good comes from evil, no love from hatred, no noble mindedness from ignoble ideas, no spiritual uplift from brutish deeds. Lenin's methods can not bring about the ideal he has in mind. Mankind can advance just so fast and no faster; its speed, like that of a fleet, is determined by the speed of its slowest members. Lenin's policy of killing off the best minds in Russia (and the world over if he had his way) is like destroying the fastest ships in the fleet. It does not work for progress.

As an idealist President Wilson appreciates all that is fine in the theories of Lenin and his followers; but as a historian, humanitarian and practical statesman he sees the harm of attempting to realize them in Lenin's way. Instead of destroying the best ships he is planning to speed up the slowest in order to keep the fleet together. He is trying not only to unite all classes but all nations into one league so that all may advance together. He has no sympathy with nationalistic and imperialistic nationalism but for the time being he is making use of it in order to bring about later the higher internationalism. His immediate object is to help establish orderly government on a basis of justice and to allay national passions. If he can persuade two or more nationalities to unite in one state on the basis of mutual regard for the rights of one another he will do so, but he will insist that there shall be no forcing of one people to submit to the dictates of another. Causes for future friction must be removed and this in turn will reduce the causes for future wars and ill will. Wilson believes in the people and in the rule of the people and is preaching that they should take control but in an orderly and legal way. When the governments of the world shall be in the hands of all the people, regardless of classes, then the ideal internationalism will be attained.

THE SHANTUNG ISSUE

*By Payson J. Treat, Ph.D., Professor of History, Leland
Stanford Junior University*

Of all the clauses in the treaty between the Associated Powers and Germany the ones which have occasioned the most discussion in this country have been those dealing with the transfer of German rights in China to Japan. In spite of all that has been said and written about this subject it has not been easy for our people to get the facts upon which a sound opinion must rest. This has been due to several reasons. In the first place, very few of our senators and newswriters have had the wide knowledge of Far Eastern affairs necessary for dealing with so involved a question. In addition, the dispute soon became a partisan issue, which has not helped the discussion, and, finally, the Chinese, nursing a sense of wrong, have made use of a very effective propaganda, which has been largely carried on by their American friends.

Just as one cannot think intelligently about any of the Balkan problems without a considerable knowledge of European history covering many centuries, so the Shantung issue of 1919 must be traced back for many years. One lesson of ancient history must be remembered—that from the earliest times China was the great center of power and culture in the Far East. Japan was her pupil, and from China she acquired her cultural foundations, just as she gained most of her knowledge of material things from the West a thousand years later.

In more recent times it is necessary to remember that with three exceptions all the native states of Eastern Asia have passed under European control. India, Ceylon, Burma, and many smaller states fell to Great Britain; much of Indo-China to France; the East Indies to Holland; and the Philippines first to Spain and finally to us. Siam

has preserved some of her territory solely because of the jealousy of Great Britain and France. China has fallen away in power and prestige until she has been defeated, humiliated and exploited by many of the European powers and by Japan. Japan alone, of all the Asiatic states, has been able to profit from the lessons of the West, and, through a wise and thorough reorganization of all branches of the government and of the economic life of the people, has been able not only to retain her independence but also to stand out as the most powerful state in Asia. Fifty years ago no writer would have hazarded a guess that at any time in the future Japan would outrank China in military and economic development. The reaction of China and of Japan to the new standards imposed by the West makes a fascinating study, and it has a great deal to do with the events which have given Japan a foothold in one of the great provinces of China.

The origins of the present controversy go back almost twenty-five years. In 1894 the Chino-Japanese war broke out, with the causes of which we are not concerned. The best-informed foreign opinion in the Far East believed that Japan would be soundly thrashed for her temerity in entering the lists with one of the greatest nations in the world. Did not China boast a population of 300,000,000, while Japan had not one-seventh of that number? But the Japanese were well organized and they threw themselves into the fray with patriotic ardor. It was the first foreign war in which they had been engaged for almost three hundred years. China, on the other hand, was wretchedly governed and ill-prepared. Only some northern troops were sent into action, while probably the bulk of the Chinese people had little knowledge of what was going on. The result was that China was defeated in every engagement on land and sea, and Li Hung-chang, the venerable statesman of China, had to beg for mercy from Japan. This was, to every thoughtful Chinese, a most humiliating event. Up to this time they had looked upon Japan with contempt, because she had abandoned the ways of the East in order to follow the teachings of the West. Now contempt was

turned into bitterness and hate. During the war Japan had captured Port Arthur, in Manchuria, and Weihaiwei, in Shantung, two of the naval bases of China. The treaty of peace called for the payment of a large indemnity, the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula, which contained Port Arthur, and of Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. But this moment Russia, France and Germany, for purely selfish reasons, came to the relief of China, and served notice on Japan that her possession of Port Arthur would endanger the peace of the Far East, so, under their threats, she gave up the territory and accepted an additional indemnity from China. Europe had come to the aid of China in 1895, it was natural for her to expect similar assistance in 1919.

But China had to pay a heavy price for the help of Russia, France and Germany. Li Hung-chang, who hated Japan vigorously, believed that Russia should be relied upon, and thus began the Russian dominance at Peking, which lasted during the next ten years. At first the three powers simply asked for railway and banking concessions, but in addition Russia was promised a lease of the bay of Kiaochow (which figures in the present discussion). Germany, however, had already marked out that harbor for herself, and all that was needed was an excuse for taking it. This was soon forthcoming.

On November 1, 1897, a band of robbers plundered the village of Kiachwang, in the southwestern corner of Shantung Province. During the raid two German Roman Catholic missionaries were murdered. This was a wretched crime, but in no other country in the world would the national government have been held responsible. But it gave Germany the excuse she wanted. Within a few days a German squadron appeared in the bay of Kiaochow, expelled the Chinese garrison from the fort at Tsingtao, and occupied the town. Then, on November 22, the German minister presented the demands of his country. They included an indemnity, the punishment of the governor of the province, a monopoly of the right to construct railways and open coal-mines in the whole province, and the right to build a naval station on the bay of Kiaochow. Every

Christian should have hung his head in shame at this attempt of Germany to capitalize the murder of two servants of the cross to the advantage of the empire. China, of course, protested. She would erect an imperial tablet in memory of the murdered men, and she would pay a large indemnity, but she would grant no more. Germany stood firm. In December a reinforcement of ships and men was sent out under the Kaiser's brother, Prince Henry of Prussia. At a farewell banquet given at Hamburg, the Kaiser said:

I am conscious that it is my duty to extend and enlarge what my predecessors have bequeathed to me. . . . May every one in those distant regions be aware that the German Michael has firmly planted his shield with the device of the German eagle upon the soil of China, in order once for all to give his protection to all who ask for it. . . . Should any one essay to distract from our just rights or to injure us, then up and at him with your mailed fist.

Thus, with rattling sabre, Germany pressed her astounding demands. If there had been a League of Nations in existence at that time, Germany hardly would have dared to act in this manner, and if she had, the other powers would have possessed a method for protesting and for supporting China. But under the old conditions—which some of our senators seek to perpetuate—China was left helpless. No European power would risk the enmity of Germany in order to help so weak a power as China. The United States, true to its traditional policy, would not interfere beyond seas. At that time there sat in the senate the distinguished man who now leads the attack upon the League of Nations and who has denounced so vigorously the conduct of Japan. But I am not aware that Senator Lodge ever raised his voice in 1898 in protest against a wrong in comparison with which everything that Japan has done in China sinks into relative insignificance.

China, as usual had to yield. The negotiations were conducted in secret and Germany withheld from publication the agreement covering the economic concessions. Germany secured the indemnity, the economic privileges, and a lease of the harbor of Kiaochow for the term of ninety-nine years. What she did with these concessions will be discussed later.

It should be noted that Japan viewed with alarm the establishment of the leading military power in Europe upon the coast of China, just across the sea from Japan. Even the unfounded report that the Japanese thought of establishing a naval base at Magdalena Bay, eight hundred miles from our nearest port, has alarmed many of our publicists. The British minister at Tokyo reported that it was

the general opinion in Japanese official circles that the proceedings had been unnecessarily hasty, and that a prolonged or possibly permanent occupation of such an important strategical point by a Western power would imperil the peace of the Far East.

This act of Germany was infamous in itself, but its immediate effects were disastrous for China. It inaugurated the "vicious circle of demands upon China." Russia promptly sent a fleet to Port Arthur, and while it was there China granted a lease of that naval station to Russia for twenty-five years. Great Britain, under the theory of the balance of power, asked for Weihaiwei, and China yielded, on the same terms as those granted Russia. These two leases aroused intense feeling in Japan. Russia had obtained the very port which she had forced Japan to give up three years before, because its occupation by a foreign power would "endanger the peace of the Far East." Thus one of China's naval bases passed into foreign control. And Weihaiwei was another one, which Japan also had taken and which she still held pending the final payment of the Chinese indemnity for the late war. In fact China had to hurry up the payments in order that the Japanese troops might retire so that the British might move in. I firmly believe that if our own peace-loving people had faced such a set of facts we would have felt very much like fighting somebody. But Japan could not then face a western power and she had to nurse her wrongs in silence. But for her reliance on militarism the West alone is to blame. And the incident also explains why Japan will not restore Kiaochow to China unless she is assured that China will not turn it over to Germany or some other power within a few years.

France followed the lead of the others and received a lease for ninety-nine years of Kwangchow, in south China. And because France got Kwangchow, Great Britain asked for an offset, in the shape of Kowloon, on the mainland opposite Hongkong.

Thus, in 1898, the great powers of Europe had secured leases of some of the best harbors in China, including the naval bases of Port Arthur and Weihaiwei. Italy alone was denied a port. But the best harbor of all was Kiaochow, which Germany secured, but which China had, up to this time, done nothing to develop.

The aggressive conduct of the powers in 1898 was the leading cause of the Boxer Rising in 1899 and 1900. This was a hopeless attempt of ignorant but patriotic Chinese to drive out the foreigners. Soon the Manchu government joined half-heartedly with the popular movement and all north China was ablaze. This occasioned an international expedition for the relief of the foreign legations besieged in Peking, and for the restoration of order. During the military and diplomatic operations the troops and representatives of the United States, Great Britain and Japan worked in the closest harmony. All three stood for the doctrine enunciated by John Hay, our Secretary of State, that there should be equal opportunity for trade in China—the Open Door—and that China's territorial integrity should be preserved. Opposed to this policy stood Russia, seeking the possession of the rich Manchurian provinces. Even while the diplomats of a dozen countries were trying to arrange the terms of settlement in Peking, Russia was secretly trying to force China to yield to her the control of Manchuria. The three supporters of the Hay Doctrine protested, but Great Britain, involved in the Boer War, could do nothing but protest. The United States would not think of becoming involved in an Asiatic War, and Japan alone was not prepared to bear the whole burden of driving Russia back. But she knew her own safety was in jeopardy, and she was feverishly preparing men and munitions for the approaching crisis.

Once more, if there had been a League of Nations, Russia would have been forced to abandon her aggressive policy, and the Russo-Japanese War, which left in its train the Manchurian problem and the annexation of Korea by Japan, would never have occurred.

Japan, as I have said, prepared to stand out alone as the antagonist of Russia. She entered into an alliance with Great Britain which assured her a fair chance in the coming war. If a second power attacked Japan, Great Britain would come to her assistance. Thus Britain held the ring, and when Russia repeatedly broke her promise, given to China, to withdraw from Manchuria, Japan stepped in and insisted upon the evacuation. When Russia refused, war resulted.

Now please note the exact parallel between events in 1904-1905 and the present Shantung affair. In both cases Japan fought European nations holding fortified leaseholds on Chinese soil. But at the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, when Russia ceded to Japan her leasehold at Port Arthur, and her railway and mines in South Manchuria, China promptly confirmed the transfer from Russia to Japan.

The Boxer Rising of 1900 and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 may seem a far cry from the Shantung issue of 1919. But they form an important part of the story, and it is just because our publicists have failed to understand them that they have gone so far astray in many of their statements.

At the close of war Japan came to the parting of the ways. It is my firm opinion that up to that time the conduct of Japan as a member of the family of nations was worthy of the highest praise. She had been faultless in the observation of her treaties, and her diplomatic methods were comparable to the best. We may take some pride in this because ever since the early seventies the adviser of the Japanese foreign office had always been an American. But in 1905 two things occurred. The defeat of Russia caused a flood of articles to be written to the effect that as Japan had defeated the greatest military power in Europe (which,

of course, was far from the truth), she would brook no interference, and thus she would make herself master of Eastern Asia, conquering the French possessions in Indo-China, the Dutch in the East Indies, and even Australia. Now, for the first time, the Japanese menace began to be preached in this country. It was absurd on its face, but in our ignorance many of our people began to believe it.

The other change was more vital, for it involved the whole question of Japanese policy in Asia. As I have said, down to 1905 I believe Japan was sincere in desiring the integrity of China and the Open Door in Manchuria. She only wished to force Russia out of a region which was so near her doors. She also honestly desired to help Korea reform her administration and thus become able to defend herself against the Russian advance. The strongest evidence of this is shown by one very important fact.

Japan had hoped for an indemnity from Russia, but not a ruble was forthcoming. Thus Japan emerged from the war burdened with an enormous debt. The people were bitterly disappointed with the peace treaty. The government knew that Japan was almost exhausted and that almost any kind of a peace would have been a good one. But the people only knew that in every engagement on land and sea the Japanese forces had been victorious, and they expected an indemnity from Russia which would pay for the war. But all Japan obtained was the Russian railway, mines and leasehold in South Manchuria, and half the undeveloped island of Saghalien.

Burdened by this enormous war debt, the cabinet of Japan did not see how she could restore the South Manchurian railway to working order and develop it as she should. So a tentative agreement was reached with Mr. Harriman, the American railway genius, for the sale of the railway to American interests. He also hoped to purchase the Russian half of the line and thus the railway would pass out of political control. Japan would receive much needed funds, and she would be freed from further fear of Russia.

This tentative agreement is, in my mind, the strongest proof that down to October, 1905, the Japanese had no thought of ~~establishing themselves~~ as a political factor in Manchuria.

But when Baron Komura, head of the Japanese delegation to the Portsmouth peace conference, returned to Japan he protested stoutly against this arrangement. First of all, Japan could sell no railway rights to Mr. Harriman until China had first agreed to the transfer of all the Russian interests to Japan. This was agreed to in December. And then Komura convinced the cabinet that it would be to the best interests of Japan to retain the railway and use it for the development of Japan's commercial interests in South Manchuria. The railway was the most valuable asset Japan obtained from Russia. He believed she should derive the greatest possible income from it.

So when the cabinet decided toward the end of 1905 to take up the rôle of Russia in South Manchuria it meant a great change in policy. Japan abandoned her reliance upon the Anglo-American policy toward China and decided to play the game of her European rivals in that unhappy land. No one should condemn Japan for what she has done since 1905 until he has first studied the examples set for her by all the great powers of Europe.

This decision meant that Japan soon became involved with China in South Manchuria, and she resorted to Russian methods to secure the economic advantages she desired. For a few years she tried to reform conditions in Korea, but after Prince Ito, who had introduced the great reforms, had been assassinated by a Korean fanatic, the attempt was given up and, in 1910, Korea was annexed to Japan by treaty. The fate of Korea was an unhappy one, but no one at all familiar with the situation in that country could offer a better solution for the problem. She could not remain the prey of internal misgovernment and foreign intrigues. She must pass under foreign control, and Japan had far better claims to this control than Russia.

The decision to retain the Russian concessions in South Manchuria had, as I have pointed out, many grave effects

upon Japanese policy. She now adopted the practices of Russia, which had formerly aroused such protests in China and Japan. Her conduct increased the bitterness of the Chinese and brought down upon her the denunciation of European critics. But Japan could see no reason why she should not play the game according to the same rules which her European rivals were using.

The expansion of her interests on the continent also forced her to rely more and more upon her army. This gave the military leaders great influence in governmental circles, and tended to produce a form of "militarism" as dangerous as that in any other land. But the military party did not have an easy time of it. Japan was sick of war. She had suffered severely in the Russian struggle and her people were burdened by war-taxes which we would deem almost unbearable. The young men of Japan did not take kindly to conscription, any more than they do in this country. So the popular representatives in the Diet opposed every scheme for army expansion. For ten years the military authorities tried to secure funds for the addition of two divisions—say 70,000 men—to the standing army of Japan. And for ten years the Diet stoutly refused to appropriate a penny. It was not until the great war broke out, and then only after a bitter political campaign, that Japan added a single soldier to her forces.

In the meantime the Germans, with their usual thoroughness, bent themselves to the development of their concessions in Shantung province. They poured German money in to get rapid results. The leased territory covered about 200 square miles. On the fine harbor of Kiaochow there was only a small Chinese village called Tsingtao. Beside it they erected a model settlement, along the best lines of German town-making. They improved the harbor and built fine docks. They strongly fortified the hills overlooking the city. They promptly commenced building a railway into the interior, which finally reached the capital of the province, Tsinan-fu, 256 miles away. And they had a concession to build two other railway lines. They began to open mines along the railway, and two coal and one

iron mines were in operation. And they had a monopoly of the right to supply money and materials whenever China needed foreign aid for any public works in the whole province.

It must be borne in mind, therefore, that although the natural resources belonged to China, all the improvements were German. Germany exercised complete sovereign rights within the leased territory. Her money and her skill had transformed a neglected Chinese harbor into a fine port with an import trade of about \$50,000,000 in 1913. She had opened mines which China had never used, and thus added to the wealth of both countries. At the outbreak of the Great War, in 1914, Kiaochow was considered for all practical purposes as a part of Germany, and the whole province was set aside for German development.

With the declarations of war, Germany prepared to use Tsingtao as a naval base. Her reservists scattered through the Far East were assembled there. Great Britain at once asked Japan to act under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and remove this German menace, for the British navy was mobilized in the North Sea.

I might say that if Japan had any love for Germany she might easily have delayed action, for it would not have been difficult to find a loop-hole in the treaty, but her whole foreign policy was founded upon the British understanding and so she acted promptly. An ultimatum was served on Germany demanding that she surrender Kiaochow to Japan for eventual restoration to China. If the Germans had been reasonable they would have yielded to overwhelming force and thus saved the lives of many of their soldiers as well as clinched the restoration of the leasehold to China. But they refused to reply to the demand, and as soon as the ultimatum expired Japan and Great Britain took action. The operations were carefully conducted, for the Germans had no chance at all, and the Japanese did not wish to throw away any lives needlessly. On the 7th of November, 1914, Tsingtao surrendered. During the operations the Japanese marched across Chinese territory, thus violating its neutrality. But under the precedents established in the Russo-Japanese war the Japanese felt justified in thus proceeding against a foreign power holding fortifications on Chinese soil.

I may say frankly that I was sorry to have Japan enter the war in 1914. At its origin it was purely a European controversy and I did not see why the tax-ridden peasants of Japan should have to pay for Japanese participation. But, on the other hand, knowing how Germany had acquired Kiaochow and what mischief she might do were she not expelled, I rejoiced that Japan was able to come promptly to the aid of her British ally.

Shortly after the occupation of Kiaochow Japanese diplomacy took on a sinister form. If you will analyze your own memories of the early days of the war you will remember how few Americans understood the real issues at stake. It seemed to us to be merely another European upheaval in which the Central Empires and the Triple Entente stood face to face. Germany, we knew, was fighting for aggrandizement, and her conduct soon alienated the sympathy of the civilized world. So in Japan, this was looked upon as another imperialistic struggle, and thus it offered a good chance for Japan to better her own position in the world.

Now to Japan the place where she must hold a commercial and economic preponderance is China—the greatest undeveloped market in the world and the source of many of the raw materials which Japan so much needed. On the basis of this reasoning Japan launched her notorious twenty-one demands upon China. In doing so she again followed the precedents of Europe. Without offering any real consideration she demanded from China concessions which would greatly strengthen her position in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia as well as in some of the old provinces of China. Japan purposely urged these demands when all Europe was engaged in war and when China could obtain no support, for not one believed the United States would turn a hand to aid China.

Now, if we are honest, we will recognize that there was little in these demands which were not based upon earlier demands by Russia, Germany, France and Great Britain. Even in the methods used, the preparation of military forces and the ultimatum, I could cite many precedents.

One of the worst examples of the old diplomacy was in 1858—which happily is a long time ago. China was involved in a terrible civil war. The Imperial power was so weakened that for a time it looked as if it would collapse. Just at that moment Great Britain and France presented demands for greater commercial privileges, followed them up by sending a joint military and naval force to China, and extorted the Tientsin treaties of 1858. It was much as if, during the darkest days of our own Civil War, an allied squadron had appeared in the Potomac and demanded great concessions from us.

Because I cite precedents for what Japan has done, I would not have you think for a moment that I condone her acts. But because I try to be honest with myself, I cannot heap denunciations upon her, without remembering the examples which had been set for her.

In my opinion the Japanese statesmen who formulated the twenty-one demands and who pressed them through in modified form, will go down in history as men who wrought great harm to their country. The demands aroused intense resentment among the Chinese. They embittered all the European nations, including the allies of Japan, because she sought to reap a selfish advantage in China when they were involved in the Great War. And they served to increase American suspicion and alarm. Nothing that Japan gained through the concessions which China was finally forced to make could atone for the harm done to the reputation and prestige of Japan. I have never met a Japanese who attempted to defend these acts of his government.

The only consideration—except her good will—which Japan offered China was the return of the German leasehold at Tsingtao. One of the treaties provided that China would agree to the decision of the Peace Conference regarding the German interests in Shantung. And in an exchange of notes Japan promised to return the German leasehold under these conditions: that China would open Kiaochow as a commercial port; that a Japanese settlement (under Japanese jurisdiction) might be established there; that an

international settlement might also be established if the powers so desired; and that China and Japan would come to an agreement concerning the German public properties before the recession was effected.

Thus, in May 1915, China had agreed to accept whatever decision the Peace Conference arrived at regarding the German interests, and Japan, in turn, had promised to restore the leasehold under certain conditions. China, of course, never became reconciled to the 1915 treaties. They were extorted by force—as all previous concessions to other powers had been. She had no faith in the promise of Japan to restore Chinese jurisdiction in Kiaochow, and she hoped against hope that at the conclusion of the war the European powers would compel Japan to revise the treaties which had been concluded during their embarrassment. But the Peking government did not formally *denounce* the treaties and so they were legally binding.

The point has been made that if Japan were acting in good faith she would have returned the leasehold at once, in 1915. But that overlooks one very important point. Suppose Germany won the war. Would China have been able to prevent a victorious Germany from regaining Kiaochow? Japan did not intend to have Germany again in possession of a naval base on the China Sea, and she alone was able to prevent it.

As the war dragged on its gloomy course the Japanese continued to occupy Kiaochow. They had early seized the German railway and mines and had promptly commenced to operate them. Thousands of Japanese merchants and adventurers crossed over to Shantung and established themselves there. Some of them, without doubt, behaved very badly and further inflamed the Chinese. Camp-followers of any nation are not very good representatives of their home folk. And the Chinese central government became more corrupt and inefficient, rebellions broke out in various regions, and it looked as if only foreign control could maintain peace in any part of the land. Many Japanese expansionists talked in a large way about Japan's rôle in Shantung, and did not hesitate to say that the

promise to return the leasehold should be evaded in some manner. And the Japanese government gave color to these statements by setting up a civil administration along the German railway, which was an assertion of rights which Germany had never claimed.

In 1917 the Great War took a new turn. Germany, driven desperate by her inability to gain a decision on the western front, decided to break her pledge to the United States not to resume unrestricted submarine warfare, and prepared to carry her doctrine of ruthlessness once more to the high seas. The British government learned of this decision in January. The best way yet discovered for meeting the submarine menace was the use of large numbers of destroyers. The resources of Great Britain and France had been strained to the utmost and the United States still held aloof from the struggle. So the British Ambassador at Tokyo was instructed to beg Japan to come to the help of the allies by sending a force of destroyers to the Mediterranean. The Japanese government was ready to act at once and promised to do so. But during the discussion Viscount Motono, the Japanese minister of foreign affairs, raised the question of the disposition of German possessions and rights in the Far East.

It has been alleged that Japan demanded certain things in return for her help. It has even been asserted that she threatened to go over to Germany if she did not have her way. The latter charge is too absurd to be even discussed before a gathering of intelligent people. But as to the first one, it should be remembered that by secret agreements the Allies had divided among themselves certain territories which they expected to acquire—Russia was to get Constantinople; Italy, portions of Austria; France, Alsace-Lorraine, the Saar Basin and parts of Asia Minor. It was simply a matter of course that Japan should ask for a similar understanding, namely, that the Allies would support her claims to the tiny German islands north of the equator which she had captured, and to the German interests in Shantung. And you must remember that in agreeing to these requests the Allies understood perfectly

that Japan had agreed to restore Chinese sovereignty in Kiaochow. So Great Britain, France and Italy agreed to support the Japanese claims, in notes exchanged in February and March, 1917.

In April the United States entered the war, officially because of the wrongs done by German submarines, but popularly in order "to make the world safe for democracy."

When, in February, we took the first step and broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, we addressed an identical note to all the neutral powers, and asked them to follow our lead. China, glad of an opportunity to associate herself with the United States, broke off relations with the Central Powers on March 14. On April 6, the United States declared war upon Germany, and our minister at Peking urged this step upon China. Earlier in the war the Allies had not favored China's participation, which was sound policy, but now they needed her, if only in order to drive out the Germans who were using China as a base for plots and propaganda, and to secure the use of the much-needed interned German ships.

We have been told many times that China entered the war on our advice, and under a general understanding that we would protect her interests at the Peace Conference. Let us examine this statement in the light of the facts.

When the Chinese cabinet proposed that China declare war, the parliament refused to act. This was because of the bitter feud between the house and the cabinet, led by General Tuan Chi-jui, head of the so-called military party. The house was willing to declare war, but it refused to have it conducted by the military clique, knowing that this would simply strengthen the power of the generals through the money and arms they would obtain from the Allies. So it demanded that General Tuan resign as premier, and the cabinet be reorganized before any steps toward war be taken. But the generals have been ruling China for the past seven years, and they were strong enough to force the weak president to dissolve the parliament, which was contrary to the constitution. This act caused the civil war which has been going on in China since June, 1917. It

was soon followed by a *coup-d'état* in July which restored the Manchu dynasty for about ten days, but General Tuan mustered a force sufficient to overthrow the imperialists and restore the republic. Now this fact has been overlooked. During these days of strife the American government sent a friendly note to Peking stating that it was far more important for China to resume and continue her political entity than that she should join the Allies. But instead of acting on this advice, the military party secured a declaration of war by presidential proclamation, on August 14, which was another violation of the constitution. In view of these facts it would seem that the statement that China entered the war under our urging is subject to certain amendments and reservations.

A majority of the exiled members of parliament assembled at Canton and set up a government there. They denounced the action of the generals at Peking. Civil war was soon raging. At one time China was said to have 800,000 soldiers in the field, not engaged in fighting Germany but in fighting each other. While the Japanese were having things their own way in Shantung the governor of the province was leading his army against the southerners along the Yangtze River. And the parliament was quite right, for the militarists have used the money and supplies, largely furnished by Japan, solely in order to strengthen their control of the government. This became such a public scandal that on October 29, 1918, the ministers of the Allies, including our own minister, presented a note to the Chinese government protesting against her inactivity in the war. Twelve specific complaints were cited, and the attention of the Chinese government called to them.

During the last two years the speeches and state papers of President Wilson made a deeper impression upon thoughtful Japanese, and when travellers returned and reported the astounding military effort of the United States the idea began to dawn in Japan that after all this was something more than a quarrel between European dynasties. The issues began to be clearly perceived, and a fundamental one was that between liberalism and autocracy or mili-

tarism. So in October, 1918, a new cabinet came into office, which is still in power. The Hara cabinet is the most liberal and progressive that Japan has yet known. The prime minister, Mr. Hara, is the first civilian to hold that exalted post. Japan had liberalized her administration on the eve of the overthrow of German militarism, but the Hara government could not be expected to correct all the mistakes of his predecessors in a few months. One of its first acts was to reduce the suffrage qualifications thus broadening the basis of representation.

Then came the armistice, with the triumph of the associated powers, and soon the Peace Conference was to assemble.

China looked forward to this assembly with ill-founded hopes. She entirely misunderstood the purpose of the Peace Conference. Like other aggrieved peoples, the Irish for example, the Chinese believed that all wrongs would be righted at Paris. So she presented her complaints against all the world, including Germany and Austria with whom she had been at war. She sought the revision of all treaties and agreements which in any way impaired Chinese sovereignty, and these treaties affected not only Japan, but Great Britain, France, the United States and all the treaty powers. She soon learned, however, what some people do not understand to this day, that the Peace Conference was assembled in order to draw up terms of peace between the associated powers and Germany. It was concerned solely with Germany and with German rights. If there were wrongs existing in other nations the conference could not attend to them. Their hope lay in the League of Nations which it was expected would be established.

When this point was made clear, the Chinese turned their attention to the Japanese claims. They took the position that as China declared war upon Germany all German rights ceased from that date, therefore Germany had no rights to cede to Japan even if the conference demanded it. This was an interesting point, but as it was not accepted by the authorities on international law at

Paris I suppose it has only an academic value. If you will think it out you will see that it would have produced an impossible situation if every treaty ever made by Germany or the German States was abrogated. A study of the treaty of peace shows that no treaties are considered abrogated except those which are named in the document, to whose abrogation Germany specifically consents. But in regard to the German-Chinese treaty of 1898 the situation was complicated because Japan took possession of the German interests in 1914; China agreed, in 1915, to accept the decision of the Peace Conference; China did not declare war upon Germany until 1917; and before she declared war she carefully bargained with the allies as to what she should receive, and the restoration of German rights in Shantung was not included in the bond.

Another point has been made that the fifth article of the treaty of 1898 stated that "Germany obligates itself never to give any kind of leasehold right to any other power." This would seem to forbid a transfer of the German leasehold to Japan. But this is simply one part of the fifth article. The preceding clause reads:

In case Germany should hereafter at any time express the wish to give back Kiaochow Bay to China before the expiration of the lease, China obligates itself to make good the expenditures which Germany shall have made in Kiaochow, and to concede to Germany a better place to be under Germany's own jurisdiction.

From this it follows, that if China believes Germany is bound by the last clause, not to transfer the leasehold, then China must be bound by the first one, namely, that China must reimburse Germany for her improvements and concede her a better place to be under her own jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, the issue of the war tore up the German treaties, and the Allied and Associated Powers determined, at Paris, exactly which articles should be abrogated, which should be renewed, and what disposition should be made of German rights wherever they had previously existed.

Because of the interest we have had in China and the general suspicion of Japan which prevails in many parts of the country we have heard a great deal more about

the Shantung issue over here than has been the case in Europe. There it has scarcely been mentioned. The big issues of the conference were questions of reparation, indemnity, territorial cessions, economic readjustments, the creation of new nations.

The Chinese had sent a very able delegation to Paris. The ranking delegate, Mr. Lu, was an old-time official, who proved of little importance, but three of the younger men were American college graduates and they showed great ability. Dr. Kuo, of Columbia, Mr. Wang, of Yale, and Mr. Sze, of Cornell, were the real leaders of the delegation. Mr. Wang really represented South China, which then as now was in revolt against the North. He and Dr. Kuo were men of attractive personality who were masters of faultless English and who were able to get their case over to the American correspondents with little difficulty. They knew how to give out good copy.

The Japanese delegates were old and experienced diplomats. Marquis Saionji was a famous liberal, who had known Clemenceau in their college days in France. Viscount Chinda, Baron Makino, Ambassadors Matsui and Ijuin had all worked their way to the top of the diplomatic service. But they were not very accessible to the newsmen and they considered it beneath their dignity to reply to all the gossip that was flying about. Thus their case rarely came over the cables.

You may have read that in order to secure the German interests in China the Japanese played a very shrewd game. First, they frightened the western states, especially America, with a demand for racial equality and the privilege of immigration. Then having alarmed their associates they threatened to join Italy in withdrawing from the conference if the Shantung claims were not granted. And thus Mr. Wilson, in order to secure Japan's assent to the League of Nations, withdrew his opposition to the Shantung articles.

But in my opinion, all this is far from the truth. The Japanese did press their amendment for racial equality. But it simply read: "the acceptance of the principle of the equality of nations, and the just treatment of their nation-

als." It said nothing about immigration and was not meant to apply to it. Yet this simple statement of what should be an unquestioned principle of a league of nations was defeated by the votes of the United States and Great Britain. In my opinion this omission is one of the weakest points of the Covenant.

But the Japanese did not have to bargain about the Shantung rights. They went into the conference with all the cards stacked in their favor. They presented the Chinese treaty of 1915, and the promises of Great Britain, France and Italy in 1917. Of the five great Powers only the United States had not already agreed to the transfer. And as there was not the slightest question of her allies breaking faith Japan had merely to sit quietly by and wait for the formal drafting of the terms.

I believe Mr. Wilson did his best to show the Japanese that it was to their interests to waive these privileges in China. But I believe it is only through gross ignorance or blind partisanship that any one could blame him for failing to break the combination of great powers which were supporting Japan. Even if the Japanese had not been forehanded in securing these promises it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for Great Britain and France to have forced Japan to give up the German concessions while they retained leaseholds and railway and mining concessions in China themselves.

So the treaty of peace with Germany called for the transfer to Japan of the German leasehold and all other rights in Shantung province. It gave to Japan only such property or rights as were German, it took nothing away from China which she possessed at the outbreak of the war.

The statement has frequently been made that the League of Nations "underwrites" the Shantung "infamy." That is, that Article X of the Covenant guarantees that Japan shall possess these rights for all time. Like so many of the arguments which are flying about it is based on an inability to understand very simple English. Article X guarantees against external aggression "the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members

of the league." As Japan has been granted no territory in China, for there is considerable difference between a lease and ownership, Article X really guarantees Shantung and South Manchuria to China, and not to Japan.

One must distinguish, in dealing with China, between actual concessions and their possible consequences. The actual concessions which Japan has received really amount to very little. Japan will restore Chinese sovereignty in Tsingtao just as soon as the treaty is ratified by enough of the powers and she can negotiate with China. And Foreign Minister Uchida has announced that Japan is quite willing to join in an international settlement at Tsingtao instead of establishing a purely Japanese one. There is an international settlement at Shanghai, for instance, and several powers have individual settlements at Tientsin, Hankow, and other Chinese ports. If this is done it would remove the only possible objection to the Japanese in Tsingtao itself. But Japan wants to retain the German railway and the German mines. She needs coal and iron seriously for her industries, and she can get them from Shantung. And the railway will serve to develop her trade with the interior of the province.

Now if China were a well-organized state, under an honest and efficient administration, there would be no excuse for Japan's owning mines or railways there. The Chinese themselves would work the mines efficiently and Japan could buy the iron and coal she needed. And this would be true of the railway also. But so long as China suffers under the wretched administration she has known for so many years there is no guarantee that either the mines or the railways will be operated. During the present civil war several of the Chinese railways have been crippled by the warring factions and their rolling stock destroyed.

So if China will enter upon a career of active and intelligent reform, the Japanese economic concessions in Shantung will mean nothing at all. It will then be absurd to think of Japan controlling the economic life of a province containing almost 40,000,000 people. The Japanese railway, 256 miles long, will not serve so large and rich a province, and China can build others without Japan's interference.

But if things continue to go from bad to worse in China, then the economic concessions given to Japan may easily lead into political advantages. Japan will have to protect the railway and the coal mines if disorder occurs, and as more railways are needed, and China is unable to finance them, Japan may ask and receive the concessions.

The transfer of the German concessions in Shantung to Japan may prove a danger to China only in case China fails to protect herself. When the Germans invaded Belgium, King Albert said to his Parliament: "A country which defends itself commands the respect of all; such a country will never perish."

The wide discussion of the Shantung affair, in spite of the many inaccurate statements which have been circulated, has undoubtedly accomplished some good. It has aroused an interest in China and a desire to help her. But amending the treaty will do China no good and it may do us, and all the world, a lot of harm through delaying ratification. A wiser course would be for the Senate to pass a resolution to the general effect that it welcomes the promise of Japan to restore Chinese sovereignty in Kiaochow as the dawning of the day when *all* foreign concessions and treaty privileges which impair the sovereignty of China will be abandoned.

The discussion of the Shantung issue has aroused a new interest among young China. After they have ceased denouncing the Japanese they may begin to study the internal reasons for the lamentable weakness of a great state, peopled by one of the most estimable races in the world, which now lies at the mercy of any well-organized power. I have great hopes for young China, especially for the young men and women who have studied and are studying in this country. The future of their country lies in their hands.

It has also opened the eyes of the Japanese to the new spirit abroad in the world which will not tolerate imperialism, militarism, secret diplomacy and saber-rattling. It was only the other day that Premier Hara said:

The day of Machiavellian diplomacy is past and a new era of open diplomacy is arrived, with international affairs managed by co-operation of the powers, whether old school diplomats of Japan like it or not. . . Militarism has been absolutely discarded and the powers will work jointly for world peace.

And it should convince every one of us of the desirability of the speedy formation of the League of Nations. When the League is in operation, and the United States throws in her great influence in favor of a new world order founded upon the rock-ribbed principles of justice, then both China and Japan can enter upon a new era. Some Chinese profess to doubt whether the League can help China in the Shantung affair. It can do more than that. Mr. Wilson told us that he turned to his colleagues at the council board in Paris and asked: "May I expect that this will be the beginning of the retrocession to China of the exceptional rights which other governments have enjoyed there? And the responsible representatives of the other great governments said, 'Yes, you may expect it.' " With the League functioning there will be no excuse for Japanese rights in South Manchuria or Shantung, for Russian in North Manchuria or Mongolia, for British in Tibet, or for the railway and mining concessions of any of the powers. They can all be restored to China, with the right to control her own tariff and hold foreigners subject to her laws. Many Japanese long for that day, for they know that the most important thing in the world for Japan is to regain and hold the good will of China, but this they believe impossible so long as the international scramble for concessions continues.

And the League means for us a chance to help China and to live on good terms with Japan. For they are our neighbors. This is a physical fact which cannot be brushed aside, and it is plain common sense to live on good terms with one's neighbors. "A man to have friends must show himself friendly."

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE

PART V

By David S. Spencer, D.D., Nagoya, Japan

POLITICAL PARTIES AND TENDENCIES

The constitution of Japan makes no provision for political parties, though we consider them essential in carrying out a modern constitutional government.

As an aid to our understanding of our particular topic of investigation—the influences of clan and family upon the political life of the people—does the history of political parties in Japan teach us anything? Let us see.

To write a history of Japanese political parties is not our present mission. That has already been done by others.¹ Moreover, to offer a history, or list of mere names, without sufficient explanation and detailed statement of their origin, could benefit no one. It is a most difficult undertaking to frame a table of these parties since the first one appeared. I have repeatedly tried it without satisfactory results. No two of the learned writers above cited agree in regard to such an outline. The reason for this will appear as we proceed.

¹ Lay, A. H., Esq., *Transactions Asiatic Society of Japan*, Vol. XXX, pt. 3, pp. 363-462; "The Political Parties of Japan," a good outline down to 1902.

Satoh, Henry, *Evolution of Political Parties in Japan*. Tokyo, 1914; also a good account, though meager, down to 1914; but lacking in historical balance.

Ukita, Dr. Kasutani, in *Okuma Fifty Years of New Japan*, Vol. I, pp. 133-193; moderately clear, with valuable sidelights, down to 1908.

Uyehara, as above, pp. 250-273, valuable down to 1909.

McLaren, W. W., *Transactions Asiatic Society of Japan*, Vol. XLII, pt. 2, pp. 782-806.

Brinkley, as above, *Japan Weekly Mail*, various volumes.

Without, however, attempting such a detailed statement, some reference as to the genesis of the party system in Japan is necessary.

The shogunate had fallen; the feudal lords still retained their fiefs; a young man of seventeen had come to the throne, without experience in government, and lacking any adequate knowledge of his people. He had been born and reared in closest seclusion. Scarcely one in a million of his subjects had ever seen him. His advisers had put into his mouth the oft-quoted and fundamentally important imperial oath, (*go seimon*)* which is authoritatively translated as follows:

1. Public councils shall be recognized, and all governmental affairs shall be decided by general discussion.

2. All classes, both rulers and ruled, shall with one heart devote themselves to the advancement of the national interests.

3. All the civil or military officials and all the common people shall be allowed to realize their own aspirations, and to evince their active characteristics.

4. All base customs of former times shall be abolished, and justice and equity as they are universally recognized shall be followed.

5. Knowledge shall be sought for throughout the world, and thus the foundations of the empire shall be extended.

This was the starting point. Representatives were called by the emperor from each of the daimiates to form an advisory body or deliberative assembly, called the *gisei*, under the *dajōkan*, or government. On April 18, 1869, was opened at Tokyo the *kōgijō*, or place for public discussion. This was composed of 276 members, one from each of the daimiates. These persons represented not the people but the governing class; but the object was to encourage deliberative assemblies. The name *kōgijō* was soon changed to *shūgi-in*, which is the name now applied to the house of representatives in the imperial diet. It thus in a way perpetuates the enlightened spirit of the great Emperor Meiji. But the method of its construction, the nature of the restrictions placed upon it, and the total lack of interest in political life on the part of the people led to its being

* April 6, 1868.

ignored, except as a receptacle for the petitions from the people, and it soon fell into disuse, and on June 24, 1873, was entirely abolished.¹

The following is a list of the important men who made the Japan of today possible. They were then enterprising, loyal and young men, and to them fell the duty of stepping into the breach and leading the country into the way of civilized governments.² No history of the Meiji Era can be written and leave these names out. In order to guide the reader aright, I mention the date of birth and section or clan from which they come. They are:

Shimpachi Etō, (1835–1874), Saga
 Shōjirō Gōtō (1837–1897), Kōchi
 Tomomi Iwakura (Prince) (1825–1883), Owari
 Hirobumi Itō (Prince) (1841–1909), Chōshū
 Kaoru Inoyue (1835–), Yamaguchi
 Ki Inukai (1855–), Okayama
 Taisuke Itagaki (1837–1919), Kochi
 Tarō Katsura (1849–1913), Chōshū
 Kōin Kidō (1834–1877), Yamaguchi
 Kenkichi Kataoka (—)
 Kentaro Kaneko (1853–), Fukuoka
 Jutarō Kokura (1855–), Hyuga
 Hironaka Kōnō (1849–), Fukushima
 Hiroyuki Katō (1836–), Izuchi
 Masayoshi Massukata (1840–), Satsuma
 Arinori Mōri (1847–1889), Satsuma
 Munimitsu Mutsu (1844–1897), Wakayama
 Toshimichi Ōkubo (1832–1878), Satsuma
 Shigenobu Ōkuma (1838–), Saga
 Kimmonji Saionji (1849), Kyoto (Kuge)
 Takamori Saigō (1827–1877), Satsuma
 Taneomi Soejima (—1905), Saga
 Aritomo Yamagata (1838), Chōshū
 Nobuyuki Nakajima (—), Kōchi

Every one of them is a *samurai*. Keep that in mind. They *all* come from southern Japan, and they are practically all from Satsuma and Chōshū regions. They were all born about the same time, were all educated in the same manner, and were all working for the same end, namely, the restoration of the imperial house, and securing the rights of the people.

¹ *Okuma*, Vol. I, p. 141.

In 1871, Prince Iwakura, accompanied by Kidō, Ōkubo, Itō and others, visited America and Europe on a special mission, to secure revision of the treaties. The treaties were not then revised, but these men gained most valuable information on many lines, and saw that a Constitution was demanded for their nation. Two political currents arose in the minds of the leaders. One party wanted gradual progress at home and a conciliatory polity toward other nations; the other, rapid progress at home and a vigorous foreign policy. The peace party, supported by Ōkubo and Iwakura prevailed, and Saigō, Itagaki, Soejima, Itō and Gōtō resigned their offices.⁴ These protestants, led by Itagaki, then presented an important memorial to the government, asking for the establishment of political institutions. Popular discussion arose among the leaders, and the seeds of political institutions were here first planted. Early in 1874 an attack was made upon Iwakura in Tokyo, because he opposed war with Korea on account of her insolent letters to the Japanese government, the war project being also strongly urged by Saigō.

By an imperial decree of May 2, 1874, a deliberative assembly of local authorities was called which was opened by the emperor in person, June 20, 1875. Kidō became the first president. To the surprise and disappointment of the friends of popular government, of that day, these local authorities thought the country was not yet ready for a national assembly, the majority favoring local assemblies only, for the time being. The common people were taking no interest in the new national life. Public discussion increased, the press sought to stir the people, and this brought the wrath of the authorities down upon the press in the form of restrictions, and public speech was also curtailed. Editors were imprisoned and consternation reigned.

On September 6, 1876, Prince Arisugawa announced that to the *Genro-in*, or senate, had been entrusted the duty of drafting a constitution; but the Satsuma rebellion of Janu-

⁴ Black, John R., *Young Japan*, Vol. II, p. 409.

ary, 1877, put a check upon all such peaceful political activity. The students of the private school (Shi-Gakko) in Kagoshima took up arms against the government, and forced the leadership upon Saigō. Disgruntled because he could not induce the government to attack Korea and punish her, disappointed because the *samurai* as a class seemed to be losing their place of power, appealed to by thousands of *samurai*, the left-overs whom the government could not at once employ as officers, soldiers or police, and who were unfitted by training for any ordinary labor, and impelled also by the Satsuma clan spirit,—perhaps the strongest force of all—Saigō yielded and civil war began. The government won the day, and Saigō and his generals, seeing they were defeated, ended their lives in the orthodox way, by committing *seppuku*. The lessons of permanent value growing out of this war were the growing strength of the new government and the demonstration of the fact that the common people could fight. Compelled to face the flower of the *Samurai* swordsmen, as the government troops were—this was the first use of the commoners in war—the people had won. This greatly heartened the new leaders. Itagaki, through the aid of Kenkichi Kataoka, presented May 14, 1877, to the emperor in Kyoto, a memorial asking for the creation of constitutional institutions, including a representative assembly popularly elected. But the conservative elements were still strong and repressive measures were taken. Kataoka, later to become the Christian president of the house of representatives for several successive sessions, and Mutsu, later Count and Japan's greatest modern diplomat, with other good men, were on suspicion thrust into prison. But the attempt to suppress the popular movement only increased the determination of the oppressed, and tended to crystallize political ambitions. Public discussion persisted, in spite of the police. Among the friends of the people were, however, occasionally found those who were impatient to see results, and who wanted all restraint at once removed. On May 14, 1878, six of these mistaken enthusiasts murdered Ōkubō, the strong man and pillar of the state, because, as they claimed, he

obstructed open discussion and trampled upon the rights of the people. This was a great mistake. He should have lived to aid the people for many years, and enjoy the fruits of his sacrifices for them. But the event convinced the leading conservatives that they must hasten on with the reforms.

In September an important meeting was held at Osaka of representatives of the people's idea, with the result that the *Aikokusha*, or Patriotic Society, founded in 1874 but suspended because of governmental opposition, was resuscitated. This is notable, because out of the *Aikokusha* the first political party was really born.

In 1880, a third meeting of the *Aikokusha* sent a petition to the government, signed by 100,000 persons, asking for a national assembly. Progress seemed now to be made. But the government, hearing of the convention, suddenly enacted a law restricting public meetings, enforced it on the same day, and by telegraph ordered the dissolution of the convention. The leaders having heard what the government was likely to do, instantly passed a resolution to continue the organization until they had secured a national assembly, and rechristened their society the *Kokkai Kisei Domei Kwai*, or League for the Establishment of a National Assembly. They chose Kataoka and Kōnō to forward the petition to the government. The repressive measures of the government strengthened the opposition and was a means of educating the people politically. Shigenobu Okuma was prominent in the government at this time, and distinguished himself by opposing the government measures which denied the people their national rights.

Events now began to take political form. On October 29, 1881, the *Jiyūtō*, Liberal Party, the first real political party in the land, was organized by Itagaki, at the Ibumaruro, a restaurant in Asakusa, Tokyo. This party was really an outgrowth of the *Domei-kai* above mentioned, and for which Itagaki had so long striven. Government recognition was really not given till July 8, 1882, but the deed had been done and liberty had now a concrete name in the land.

And now comes another illustration of the clan spirit. Itagaki and Okuma had been working constantly for one and the same end. They were in constant touch with each other. They had been and still remained friends. In principle they had no differences. Why should not Okuma join forces with Itagaki in the *Jiyutō*, and so strengthen the common cause? But no, Okuma started his own party, April 1, 1882, called the *Rikken Kaishin-to*, or Constitutional Progressive Party. And thus the story of parties in Japan has run almost to the present day. The clan spirit disrupts and weakens political life. But more of this later.

The temptation at this point to trace the individual attempts to form parties, and to follow them to their fall or absorption with other parties is great, and the story interesting; but space is not sufficient. We must be content with noting the major accomplishments as they occur. Political parties so-called now spring up in great profusion. Forbidden by restrictive government measures to become legally political in name or character, there appeared all over the land clubs, societies, meetings, political groups of people, under the lead of some man more or less prominent, these groups having a great variety of names and meeting with great difficulties. But out of this stormy political sea, fog-bound, and swept now and again by waves of bureaucratic repression, there rises an island of hope. Out of the multitude of party groups, some unity and cohesion were at last to come.

With the object of controlling the parties, the government issued in 1882 a law forbidding political parties to have branches of their city or main organizations in the provinces. Of course this was a severe blow to the parties, and greatly impeded their progress. To repress and destroy rather than develop and control seemed to be the idea of the rulers. This repression tended to produce a class of lawbreakers. It also encouraged sentiment rather than fixed principles which should become the basis of political party life. When Mr. Itagaki was addressing a meeting at Gifu, April 6, 1882, one Shokei Aibara attempted to assassinate him, but at this critical moment the intrepid Itagaki shouted: "Itagaki may perish, but not liberty."

The continued restrictions upon speech and press began to discourage some of the leaders of the people's cause, and some of the best men such as Okuma, Ozaki, Shimada, Inukai and Kōnō resigned from the parties. By 1884, matters had come to be much worse. The political parties already formed were dissolved and all seemed to be waiting for something to turn up.

Itō, who had been sent by the emperor to America and Europe, in February, 1882, to examine political institutions and report, came back in August, 1882, and by March, 1884, a bureau for investigating constitutions had been formed in the imperial household department, and Ito became head of the department.

On October 12, 1881, the emperor issued a decree solemnly promising to convene a national assembly in the twenty-third year of Meiji, 1890. This wise move probably would have pacified the politicians had the government really taken them into its confidence and sought their aid; but the Constitution was being drafted behind closed doors and in profound secrecy,⁵ and restlessness continued. In order to pave the way for a house of peers, new orders of nobility were to be created, as notified July 7, 1884. There were to be princes, marquises, viscounts, counts and barons, five classes, who would number about 500 in all.

The first cabinet was organized with Itō as its head, and began its tenure of office December, 1885, as already outlined.

Itagaki and Gōtō had used great influence to bring the political leaders together, and to attain this end the *Daido-danketsu* was formed in 1887, thus increasing political activity. Then the government again came down upon these dangerous activities with the *Ho-an Jo-rei*, or Peace Preservation Regulations, of December 25, 1887. This law prohibited secret associations under a penalty of minor confinement of not less than one month nor more than two years, in addition to a fine of from 10 to 100 yen. Under this ban fell many good men, among whom were Hoshi,

⁵ Viscount Kaneko, in *Japan Advertiser*, February 12, 1919, an authority on the matter.

Hayashi, Nakajima, Ozaki, Kataoka, and hundreds of others, whose Christmas present was banishment from Tokyo. This reactionary move caused profound excitement. Still the government was pressing forward on the path of progress, and the next step in this line was the formation of the *sūmitsu-in*, or privy council, on April 28, 1888. Of this body also Itō was made president.

On May 25, 1888, the first draft of the Constitution was laid before this privy council for consideration in the presence of the emperor.

On February 1 of this year, a happy event was the reconciliation of Count Okuma with his colleagues, and his return to office in the government. He was made minister of foreign affairs, and soon undertook the work of treaty revision with some fourteen foreign powers, resulting in the new treaty with England July 16, 1894.

On February 11, 1889, *kingensetsu*, or anniversary of the birth of the Japanese nation, their Fourth of July, the emperor promulgated the constitution for which the people had been waiting all these long years.

How unspeakably sad was it, however, that Buntaro Nishino, a Shintō fanatic, chose this glad day on which to assassinate Arinori Mōri, the minister of education, and one of the people's best friends. What a co-incident, and what a pleasure, on the other hand, it is to the writer to be inditing this article on this particular 11th day of February, 1919, just thirty years from the birth of constitutional government in Japan, while Tokyo is celebrating with royal display this significant event, while the booming of one hundred guns is ringing in my ears, and to have lived here through all the years since the birth of the first political party, since the first drafting of the constitution began, and to have witnessed the struggle of a brave people towards constitutional government!

But these were politically heated and dangerous times. Late in 1888, Mr. Gōtō had begun "stump speaking" among the people of the northeast provinces, to awaken interest and encourage political union. Treaty revision had been a burning question. Men could not think dispassionately.

On October 18, 1889, Count Okuma came very near losing his life, and did lose one of his legs, at the hands of an assassin named Kuroshima, who threw a bomb at his carriage as it was entering the gate of the foreign office. But this is by no means the only instance in which the old warrior has been similarly attacked.

The first election under the new constitution took place July 1, 1890, resulting in the disclosure of the following political parties as represented in the first session of the diet: Independents, 69; Daidō-ha, 55; Kaishintō 46; Aikokutō 35; Hōshu-tō, (Conservatives) 22; Kyūshū Shimpō-tō, 21; Jiyūtō 16; Jishi-tō, 17; Officials, 18; uncertain, 2; a total of 300 members in the lower house. The lack of party unity is painfully apparent. In the very same month the bureaucrats showed their teeth by promulgating the law of public meetings, the object of which was to discourage the union of small political groups into a large and strong party which might, they feared, be found in opposition to the government. The Jiyūtō and the Kyūshū party both dissolved at once. Other dissolutions and combinations followed.

On November 29, 1890, the first session of the diet opened with a brief address by the emperor in person, Count Itō becoming president of the *kazoku-in*, and Mr. Nobuyuki Nakajima a member of the *Jiyuto*, president of the lower house, or *shugi-in*. The first session of the diet gave the Yamagata Cabinet great concern, but there was no open break since it consented to reduce the budget 6,590,000 yen; but with the second session the fight began a battle which has not even yet ceased. It has been from the first essentially a clan fight against the parties.

With the formation of the diet, the *genrō-in*, or senate, was abolished, having naturally lost itself in the *kazoku-in*. This was a step in political progress. To trace from this time on the ups and down of political parties would occupy too much space. A reference to the tables of imperial diet sessions and of elections reveals a period of more than ten years in which repeated dissolutions and elections occurred, neither government nor people making any decided progress.

In fact no *regular* election occurred until 1902, and then again none till 1908. Neither clan statesmen nor people were willing to yield, but both were gradually learning political wisdom and gaining in its practice. Collisions of rather serious nature have occasionally occurred, but at the right moment a mere mention of the imperial wish has usually served to bring order and progress. Any event like a foreign war instantly quiets all discord and unites parties solidly in the country's defense. When peace comes again, clan strife is likely soon to appear.

Political parties have occasionally formed a working union with the government, as did the Jiyūtō in 1895; but these unions have until now proven impracticable because they had no strong foundation. Itagaki and Okuma were at times brought into the cabinet; but they were never able to endure for any length of time the clan influences there.

On the breaking up of the Matsukata cabinet in December 1897, because it would not yield in any way to the opposition, Count Itō for the third time assumed the reins of government and made an effort to form an alliance with one of the two stronger parties, but in this he failed. The fact is that Itō himself was coming to feel that the Prussian methods foreshadowed in the constitution and practiced since political parties had come into existence were driving the people into a mood which would become dangerous. The government had not in the Japanese people the Prussian masses to deal with. Hence in the twelfth session of the diet the amended election law was passed, abolishing the property qualifications for members of the lower house, reducing the tax qualifications for electors, and establishing larger electoral districts, except in cities. This change in the law doubled at once the number of electors, and was a decided step forward in constitutional government.

But Itō had failed to get party support in the diet. The fight of the people against increased taxation served to unite the opposition more closely for the time being. Okuma and Itagaki had dissolved their old parties, the Shimpō-tō and the Jiyūtō, and had formed a strong opposition party called the Kensei-tō, or Constitutional Party. On June

24, 1897, the formation of a government party was discussed by all the government leaders in the presence of the emperor. It was at this meeting, it is said, that the break between Itō and Yamagata occurred—a breach which it required years to heal. Failing to get support for his government party ideas, and seeing that no cabinet could long hope to develop constitutionalism without a party to back it, Itō the next day handed his resignation to the emperor and turned the leadership of the government over to Okuma and Itagaki, who at once proceeded to form the so-called first party cabinet in Japan. In reality it was not a party cabinet, and lacked the necessary cohesion. But it was the kind of experiment necessary to show the parties how political foundations must be built. Okuma became premier and Itagaki home minister, and the leading positions in the cabinet were taken by members of the two former parties, now united. One fact to be well noticed is that this is the first time that any member of the lower house had been included in the cabinet. Another is that a few days before the formation of this cabinet the peace preservation regulations above mentioned were abolished.* But the peers, led by Yamagata, were strongly opposed to a party cabinet, and a great uproar was raised on August 20, when Mr. Ozaki, as minister of education, in addressing an educational society happened to use the word “republic” as of possible application to Japan. For this slip in his speech, the minister was compelled to resign his office.

On October 31, 1897, the Okuma-Itagaki ministry, rent by internal strife, laid down their portfolios, and on November 8, a cabinet headed by Marquis Yamagata was announced. It was composed of Sat-Chō clan statesmen only. The Marquis, though seeking at first to conciliate the opposition, let it be known that they must continue the elder statesmen as necessary. The *Kenseitō* led by Okuma, however, agreed to an increase of the land-tax, a measure necessary to the financial strengthening of the state.

* Lay, as above, p. 439.

Marquis Itō, in 1899, went to the provinces with lectures on the necessity of reconstructing the political parties; this was education in the right direction. He was not, however, persuaded to enter the *Kenseitō* as requested, but on September 15, 1900, announced the formation of the *Rikken Seiyūkai*, or Friends of Constitutional Government, usually shortened to *Seiyūkai*, as a substitute for the *Kenseitō* and the *Jiyūtō*, with himself as party leader. It should here be noted that the new party accepted Itō as leader absolutely on his own terms. The *Kenseihontō* or real Kensei party, then asked Count Okuma to become its head, and in December he did so, thus forming a sort of opposition party. The *Seiyūkai* now published a fairly comprehensive and satisfactory platform. All others up to this time had been practically the same mechanical and common-place affairs, apparently imitations of each other. This new platform suggested political principles and showed progress.

This fourth Ito cabinet has by some been called the second party cabinet; and it is true that its members mostly all belonged to the newly-found *Seiyūkai*; but it was rather the party of a man, and seemed likely to hold together as long as that man was its leader and no longer. Lacking any natural homogeneity of party to support him, and opposed constantly by the clan statesmen in the upper house, Marquis Itō turned the premiership over to Katsura, May 2, 1901, and himself sought to develop the *Seiyūkai* into a real political party. This party has remained in existence now for a score of years and finally controls the government under the present ministry of Mr. Hara.

The eighteenth session of the diet, May-June, 1903, was the occasion of the fight over naval expansion, the government finally withdrawing the bill after a conference between Premier Katsura and Marquis Itō, leader of the *Seiyūkai*. Weary with the constant opposition met with from the conservative elements and with the trials involved in training up a real political party, Marquis Itō accepted the invitation of his emperor to become president of the privy council, and turned the leadership of the *Seiyūkai* over to Marquis Saionji.

But the clouds of war now began to gather in the north-west. The long-dreaded day had come when Japan, to save herself from national overthrow, must fight Russia. With a unanimity which surprised every one, all political quarrels ceased, and as one man the nation went to meet Russia in Manchuria. This made possible to Mr. Katsura the record cabinet tenure in the political history of Japan to date—four years and seven months—while the average life of a cabinet for thirty-three years past has been but two years. In ordinary times no cabinet has long been able to remain in power. But no sooner had the treaty of Portsmouth been signed than another indication was seen of awakening ideas among the people. The publication of the conditions of peace brought riots in Tokyo of such nature and extent as to alarm the government, and Mr. Komura's return from Portsmouth had to be specially guarded. This event shook the bureaucratic foundation of things. Was it really coming to pass that the *people*, the *common people*, were unwilling to obey the dictates of the clan leaders? It must not be forgotten that, in Japan, not in Russia, the Russo-Japanese war was a *people's war* as none before or since has been. The people had sacrificed life and property without reluctance, and, after an unbroken series of victories on both land and sea, they felt that an indemnity was due them instead of countless years of taxation. They had begun to think. Of this thinking of its people the clan leaders have always stood in awe, and do so now.

Hastening on now, leaving to the student of these days the study of many points of interest, it is merely remarked that Katsura, being not particularly in favor of political parties, and meeting constant opposition on this line in the upper house, and among the *genrō*, threw down the reins of government. Saionji took them up, but his cabinet failed because of its fraudulent budget, it is said.⁷ Katsura came back to power July 14, 1908, and by a working understanding with Saionji, head of the *Seiyūkai*, remained at

⁷ Satoh, as above, p. 79.

the helm till August, 1911, when Saionji was called up again. The second Saionji cabinet failed, because, it is said, of his deceptive or insincere treatment of the two-divisions military expansion proposition under charge of General Uyebara, the minister of war. Prince Katsura had gone on a foreign tour and was recalled from St. Petersburg when the country met its tremendous loss in the death of Meiji Tennō. The Prince had, on the very day of his return,⁸ been made lord keeper of the privy seal and also lord chamberlain to the new emperor. Some call this a political trick of which Katsura was victim. It must be borne in mind that Prince Itō had been assassinated by a fanatical Korean on October 26, 1909 at Harbin, and now the young emperor needed near him, it was claimed, one of the strongest statesmen as councilor. Lifted thus to a place in the imperial house service, Katsura was supposed to be dead to politics. The *genrō* wanted to oust the government, and sought to find a successor to Saionji as premier; but men were growing suddenly scarce. Nearly a month passed amidst a perfect storm of indignation from press and people, when they turned again to Katsura, now made a prince, lifted him out of the service of the court, and set him up to form a new government. His cabinet assumed the reins December 21, 1912. But it had required an imperial order to Admiral Saitō to cause him to retain his office as minister of the navy.⁹

And now another important lesson was to be learned. Prince Katsura had formed his cabinet without a word to the *Seiyūkai*, which now commanded an absolute majority in the lower house. All attention was now concentrated on this issue. Suddenly Prince Katsura announced, early in January, that he was going to organize a new party, called the *Dōshikai*, or one mind party, with himself as its head. In doing this he evidently parted with his chief, Yamagata. He managed to collect between eighty and ninety supporters drawn from other parties. He had long

⁸ McLaren, *Transactions Asiatic Society of Japan*, Vol. XLII, pt. 2, p. 795.

⁹ McLaren, *Transactions Asiatic Society of Japan*, Vol. XLII, pt. 2, p. 797.

refused the premiership, said the critics, kept the *genrō* hunting for a leader, and now he would desert the young emperor, and take advantage of the situation to boost his own interests. The principal charge against him was his unwarranted requests to the throne for imperial rescripts in order to control the situation and defeat the parties. This was bringing the emperor into politics, and that Japan cannot stand. Public feeling had never appeared so determined. The *Seiyūkai* and the loyal part of the *Kokuminto*, the politicians and the people of Tokyo, were one. A riot broke out in Tokyo February 10, 1913, against "Katsura, the abuser of imperial authority."¹⁰ The diet had been suspended in an effort to compel the members to obey; the press had taken up the fight against Katsura, and he had found that he must either resign in defeat or secure the aid of the imperial name. An understanding with Saionji of the *Seiyūkai* had been reached, by which, if called by the emperor to special aid, he should summon his party to support Katsura. He was soon called to the imperial presence and asked to use his influence to tide over the crisis. Calling together all the members of his party in the lower house, Saionji delivered to them the imperial message, only to find them already strongly united to decline to follow their leader. This was tantamount to a refusal to obey the Imperial command!! Never before in history, it was said, had the people refused to obey a command from the throne. In 1900 Prince Itō had by a word from the throne controlled a most difficult situation. In 1913 the house would not listen. They held Prince Katsura wholly responsible, had advanced in political training far enough to be able to distinguish the real issues, and had developed party cohesion until they could defy him, and his government. Prince Katsura, the strongest clan politician in Japan, had been defeated by the people? He resigned in February, after but two months in the saddle, and died October 10, 1913, never, it is said, having recovered from the blow which this defeat gave him.

¹⁰ Satoh, as above, p. 87 and McLaren, *Transactions Asiatic Society of Japan*, Vol. XLII, pt. 2, p. 799.

Swiftly on the heels of this defeat of the government came another hint concerning this growing party power. Prince Yamagata, the chief of the conservatives, sought widely for a man to head the government but none could be found. Admiral Yamamoto of the navy, a Satsuma man, be it noted, appeared upon the scene and tried to persuade Saionji to again take up the task of leading the government, but the Marquis was growing wiser and declined. It thus fell to Yamamoto himself to take the responsibility of forming a cabinet, the *Seiyūkai* agreeing to support him.¹¹ This move, however, again stirred the clan rivalry between the army and the navy, a difficulty with which the country has for years had to contend. Reduction of taxation, readjustment of government finances followed, and Yamamoto seemed to be doing well; when suddenly the presentation of the budget to the lower house revealed the fact that the naval expansion scheme was to eat up all the savings made from various departments. The press started a campaign against increased naval expenditures, and popular dissatisfaction spread. Then the wires brought from London news of the Richter case,¹² revealing the existence of bribery and fraud in the navy. This naval scandal became the sensation of the day, and the interest taken in the matter by the common people was one of the very encouraging signs of progress. The matter got into the house of peers, also, and one of the most aged imperial nominees in the body made a fiery political speech, such as the walls of this circumspect house had never before listened to, condemning Yamamoto in the strongest terms, and then retired from the house for good. The people's representatives refused to agree with the upper house in restoring the budget, so that for the first time in the history of the diet, the body adjourned without having passed the budget, thus defeating the conservatives, and the naval plan, and necessitating the conduct of the government for the following year on the basis of

¹¹ Satoh, as above, p. 91.

¹² Satoh, as above, p. 93; also press of the day.

the previous year's budget. Mr. Yamamoto retired in defeat March 24, 1914.

Prince Yamagata, who is naturally of the army clan, now undertook to secure a man who would conduct the government to satisfy the prince himself. Prince Tokugawa, president of the house of peers was implored to head the cabinet, but refused. Men belonging to no political party were sought, but all refused. Viscount Kiyoura,¹² who is a great admirer of Yamagata, finally consented to undertake the formation of a cabinet, and spent much time in the effort; but the conditions laid down by Admiral Katō, proposed minister of the navy, could not be met and Kiyoura had to confess defeat.

Another month of searching for a government leader had passed, and no man could be found, so that the bureaucrats were compelled to turn to their life-long political adversary, Count Okuma, who on April 16, 1914, amidst nation-wide rejoicing, again came to power. Although the government had no working majority in the diet, and the outlook was not the brightest for the aged statesman because of the certainty of opposition from the bureaucrats, the cabinet boldly undertook its task. The nation's hopes were high. When the diet proved obstructive, the government dissolved the diet, appealed to the country, and were sent back to power with the country's approval, and a party, the *Kenseitō*, behind them. This was clearly a victory for the people. Even Yamagata was coming to acknowledge the necessity of constitutional government.

It would have been over-sanguine to look for great political reforms and substantial advancement under the Okuma government. Onlookers in the United States and in Europe were evidently disappointed in the outcome. They were impatient for results, and did not understand the strength of the remaining feudalistic tendencies. The Okuma government fell because of its attitude toward China. The people of Japan have no desire to coerce China. The

¹² *Japan Advertiser*, January 22, 1919, p. 2, by S. Akimoto; Satoh, as above, *Japan Press*.

twenty-one demands, backed of course by the military clan, sealed the fate of the Okuma ministry. The old hero could not stand against the opposing elements, and his government really accomplished little in the line of widely promised reform. But all the while a party was in building which later would come to power. The Terauchi cabinet was a setback to progressive principles in some ways,—was a conservative reaction to a limited extent—and, in turn, was overthrown because it could not satisfy the people. It lived two years, made no serious mistakes, was quite circumspect, but never for an hour got near the people.

At the fall of the Terauchi government great interest centered upon the action of the *genrō*. Would they venture to dictate the course of political progress? Marquis Saionji was asked to form a cabinet, and took a week to consider, then declined. The *genrō* were evidently much concerned. Their messengers flew hither and yon. The *Seiyūkai* had improved greatly in discipline and in the rank and file of its able men, so had the other parties. Mr. Takashi Hara, leader of the *Seiyūkai*, was finally summoned by the emperor, in a few hours named his cabinet, and with their accession to power began, September 29, 1918, the first genuinely party government in Japan. With the exception of Viscount Uchida, foreign minister, not a man of the nobility is to be found in the cabinet. While lacking nothing in political acumen or training, they are of the people—practical men and modern in spirit. They mingle with and know the people. Their treatment of the diet and the people is democratic. As members of the lower house, they take their seats in the body when voting. The tone of ministerial addresses to, and answers to questions from, the diet is that of equals to equals rather than that of the paternal or Prussian tone of superiors to inferiors.

Party government has at last begun in Japan. But let us not expect too much from it at once. The press will soon begin its chronic fault-finding; the bureaucrats will obstruct, and, worst of all, it will require yet a long time to awaken and educate the people. But Japanese democracy is coming.

The political parties of this present, or forty-first diet, stand as follows:¹⁴

<i>Seiyūkai</i>	165
<i>Kenseikai</i>	118
<i>Kokuminto</i>	37
<i>Shinsekai</i>	27
<i>Seiwa Club</i>	24
<i>Independent</i>	10

Tracing these chief parties back along the lines of their evolution as best one can¹⁵ the present *Seiyūkai* consists mainly of the former *Jiyūtō* elements with some of those of the *Kenseitō*; the *Kenseikai*, of the balance of the old *Kenseito*, the *Kaishimtō* and the *Shimpōtō*; while the *Kokumintō* gathers up the old *Kokumin Kyokai*, *Domei Club*, and other sympathetic elements, but even the attempt at alignment is unsatisfactory.

The writer feels keenly the imperfections, and the exceeding brevity of this sketch of the political parties of Japan. Summing up now as best we may the salient points of the case, what are the lessons to be learned?

1. One great hindrance to the proper political development of Japan along constitutional lines has been the stolid indifference of the people, their failure, largely to this hour, to take a personal interest in political questions. I have in this section, for the sake of brevity, spoken of the "people" as being in opposition to the bureaucrats and contending for their liberties. It has to be understood here that during all the battle for the liberties of the people from the restoration nearly to the present, it has been farsighted *leaders* of the people, themselves *Samurai*, who have represented the interests which belong to the people. And this *Samurai* class, the soldier-scholar, never amounting to more than 15 per cent of the population, have been defenders of the people as well as their oppressors. Since the Russo-Japanese War the people have been gradually awaking, but even now, outside the main centers, they know practically nothing about politics. Schooled for centuries to simply obey

¹⁴ *Japan Advertiser*, December 25, 1918.

¹⁵ *Japan Weekly Mail*, Vol. XV, p. 712.

and be cared for from above, their lethargy becomes a serious block to political progress.

2. Not only so, but neither the government nor the parties have made any serious effort to enlighten and lead the people in political affairs. As politics has been strictly tabooed in the schools of all grades and in the army and navy, and as educational men and religious leaders were excluded by law until recently from political office or the use of the franchise, and further as the discussions of politics by politicians before their constituencies have been almost wholly of a personal nature and with selfish rather than national ends in view, there has existed no medium by which the people would naturally secure instruction. Moreover, the rapid advance of the people in political acumen has never been desired by the bureaucrats.¹⁶ For their failure in this respect both government and political parties are now suffering.

3. Japanese political parties are built around persons, not principles. Here feudalistic influences are clearly manifest.¹⁷ And when an obstacle arises, or party administration suffers a test, or the personal leader is absent, how easy has it been to erect a golden calf and worship it. And it is in part for this reason here suggested that in Japan, political parties, the moment a crisis arises, begin to seek a path for compromise.¹⁸ We have from our nation's birth had in the United States two main political parties, and these parties change with the times. They have had their strong leaders who have at times wielded mighty influence. But parties have not disappeared merely because of a change of leaders, because they are built upon principles of political government. The day now begins to dawn in Japan when principles really play a part in political party life. Some day we may yet see the initiative, referendum and recall actually operative in the Sunrise Kingdom.

¹⁶ *Herald of Asia*, Vol. II, p. 132; *Japan Advertiser*, February 6, 1919.

¹⁷ *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 11th ed., Vol. V, p. 270; *The New East*, Vol. II, p. 302.

¹⁸ McLaren, *Transactions Asiatic Society of Japan*, Vol. XLII, pt. 2, pp. 291, 798, 800, 805; and McLaren, Vol. XLII, p. 788.

4. Party platforms have here meant practically nothing until now. The parties might, in fact, have traded platforms at almost any time without serious loss, provided the personal leader remained.

5. The failure of both government and people to make use of the diet as a valuable political instrument has to be noted. Instead of making this an effective school for both sides, as might have been done, the diet has until the present been chiefly a battleground for the clans. The wanton hostility of political parties generally to the government and the oppressive measures of the latter have resulted in a degree of stagnation, discouragement, and political corruption to a scandalous degree.¹⁹

6. A better adjustment of the franchise is loudly called for. In 1915 the number of highest taxpayers was 986,888. These comparatively wealthy men are given the right to choose their representatives in the house of peers, as outlined under that subject. Originally the wealth of the well-to-do was largely in land. Altered industrial conditions have largely changed the personnel of the wealthy class, and the possession of much taxable property is no longer an index to character. Furthermore, less than 2,000,000 of people do all the voting in political matters for 57,000,000 of people. Can any one suppose that this is a satisfactory state of affairs?

At the very moment of writing the above the following comes to hand:

At a meeting of the Reimeikai held last month the report of which is published in the *Chugai (International)*, Dr. K. Imai among other eminent speakers addressed the audience, insisting that the franchise should be extended to as many people as possible. In the course of the address the democratic doctor said: "Gentlemen: The world is wide awake. And Japan is still slumbering. What a contrast! If Japan wishes to catch up with the Powers she must take courage and take a decided step forward, and that immediately. What is to be more guarded against than reactionary thought is *selfish materialism*. The existing political parties are an embodiment of this evil form of materialism. The members of Parliament are the product of the existing election

¹⁹ *Herald of Asia*, Vol. II, pp. 100, 132, 164; *Japan Advertiser*, February 6, 1919, p. 4, ed.

law, and when a new election law is passed to replace the present, they will be the first to be thrown out of employment. Therefore I say that those who are most afraid of an extension of the franchise are the bureaucrats and the party-men."

Dr. Imai is a prominent man in Japan and his charge, selfish materialism, unquestionably holds against both government and political parties. When the average cost of election to the lower house approaches 10,000 yen per candidate and some men spend five or six times that amount for a seat, the time for radical reform has surely come.²⁰

7. The greatest obstacle for centuries to sound political government in Japan has been and is the strong clan influences which are the outgrowth of the people's history. It has embarrassed the best statesmen of the nation at critical periods of her history,²¹ Kidō, Ōkubo, Itagaki, Ōkuma, Itō, Saionji, Yamamoto,—all have suffered its baneful influences in their efforts for the people. Mr. Hara, because of its still existing influence, will fail to accomplish his deals for the people, and many will be disappointed in him. The clan spirit is manifest in the social life of the people, in religion, in marriage, in business. It directs in a measure the benevolences of the rich, and tends to deny the unfortunate poor, and the out-classed of the nation their just deserts. It is at the bottom of the ideas of the bureaucrats when they oppose a cabinet responsible to the lower house.²² It is a powerful factor in keeping up a system of taxation which is oppressive, unjust, and unnecessary. It maintains the principle that the portfolios of the army and navy must be held by officers active in these services, thus making it practically possible for those departments to dominate all other departments of government. This is a vicious policy, and Japan should throw those positions open at once to her civilian citizens. Every friend of Japan must have observed the danger here suggested.²³ The hopefulness of this whole situation regarding political

²⁰ *Japan Year Book*, 1912, p. 503.

²¹ *Herald of Asia*, Vol. V, p. 393; Vol. IV, p. 246.

²² McLaren, *Transactions Asiatic Society of Japan*, Vol. XLII, pt. 2, p. 791.

²³ McLaren, *Transactions Asiatic Society of Japan*, Vol. XLII, pt. 2, p. 796, 802.

party development in Japan lies in the rising political consciousness of the strong middle class. Democracy is in the air. Forward-looking men are using voice and pen in defense of the people. Students are becoming interested, and petitions are going from the people up to the imperial throne. The next ten years will witness important changes in the political life of Japan.

THE QUESTION OF THRACE AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

By George M. Bolling, Professor Greek Language and Literature, University of Ohio; and N. J. Cassavetes, Vice-President of the League of Friends of Greece

Thrace, consisting of the Provinces of Adrianople and Constantinople, has been on the table before the Peace Conference for more than two months, and has caused more discussion in the political circles than any other territorial problem, with the exception of Fiume.

Modern Thrace comprises the region extending along the Aegean Sea and the Sea of Marmora, from the eastern boundary of Macedonia, which is generally coterminous with the Mesta River, to Constantinople on the Bosphorus. Thrace touches on the east the Black Sea and extends northward to the Bulgarian Plateau. The river Maritza which leaves Bulgaria in the neighborhood of Adrianople and flows southward to the sea near Enos and Dedeagatch, divides Thrace into two parts, Eastern Thrace, otherwise known as Turkish Thrace, and Western or Bulgarian Thrace. The northern boundary of Eastern Thrace which is the present boundary with Bulgaria, passes to the north of Adrianople and Kirk-Kilisse from the Maritza River to the Black Sea. The northern boundary of Western Thrace follows generally the course of the Arda River, from the neighborhood of Pasmakli to its junction with the Maritza in the neighborhood of Adrianople. Western Thrace is sometimes called Bulgarian Thrace merely because Bulgaria obtained possession of it at the close of the late Balkan Wars. The port of Dedeagatch lies west of the mouth of the Maritza River in Western Thrace. From this point the railroad follows the valley of the Maritza to Adrianople, Philippopolis and Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria.

The treaty which was handed to the Bulgarian delegates at Paris upon September 19, and which has been signed by Bulgaria, provides for the cession of Western Thrace to the allied and associated powers. The new boundary is stipulated to begin at a point eight miles southwest of Bashnakli identical with Pasmakli, indicated above, and follows a line drawn through Kilkik, Kartal-Dagh and the Tokatjik-Dagh. The allied and associated powers thus come into possession of Western Thrace, which is part of the former Turkish Province of Adrianople.

The question on which all hinges is the disposition to be made of Thrace. To define sharply the issue, we shall quote the pertinent paragraph in the resolution introduced by Senator King on August 13, and referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that in the treaties of peace with Bulgaria and with Turkey western or Bulgarian Thrace, including Adrianople, to the line from Enos, on the Aegean Sea, to Midia, on the Black Sea, should be awarded to Greece, proper facilities for Bulgarian commerce to be reserved at Saloniki, Kavalla and Dedeagatch.

The solution there proposed is in substantial agreement with the request of Greece as presented by Mr. Venizelos. In the Peace Conference it is endorsed by the delegates of Great Britain, of France, of Italy, and of Japan. It has the support, we are told, of the first experts attached to our delegation in Paris. But the latest report is that our new experts have reached other conclusions, so that our delegates to the Conference are now urging, in opposition to all of our Allies, a very different settlement of the question; and one, too, which is open to the gravest objections.

The first question involved is a question of fact—the character of the population of Thrace. While we are not, of course, basing our request upon historical considerations, we nevertheless believe that an understanding of the way in which the present distribution of this population was brought about will help to carry conviction.

A little more than 1000 years B.C. the inhabitants of the Balkans could have been classified on the basis of language into three well-defined groups. The trunk of the peninsula was divided between the Illyrians on the west and the Thracians on the east, while its southern extension was in the hands of the Greeks. All three were members of the Aryan family of languages and all were, relatively speaking, new comers in this part of the world. Two of these languages have passed away without leaving any but the most insignificant traces; for of Illyrian and Thracian, practically nothing is left save a few names of persons and localities. The future was in the possession of the third group—of the Greeks. They were distinguished, among many other things, by a genius for colonization—for an ability to go out among other peoples and not only govern but assimilate them—that is, make Greeks of them in language, ideals, and feelings. They flowed across the islands of the Aegean, first to the shores of Asia Minor.

Then the tide turned toward the northern coast of the Aegean through the Dardanelles, the sea of Marmora into the Black Sea, reaching as far as Trebizond and the Crimea. The movement began in the eighth century B.C., lasted through the seventh, and on into the sixth century. The result, as far as it concerns us, is a fringe of Greek cities running around the coast from Saloniki to Constantinople and beyond. These cities were then the outposts of civilization, but by the middle of the fifth century they were equal to any part of Greece in art, science, or general cultivation. How rapidly their influence worked upon the natives of the hinterland is unknown in detail; but prominent Athenian families like those of Miltiades and Thucydides were soon intermarrying with the Thracians and proud of the connection. There is some reason for believing that the frontier of Greek influence reached at this time a line drawn west from Midia. A century later Philip of Macedon founded Philippopolis and other cities in the interior of the country and fought his way to the Black Sea at Varna, spreading Greek civilization as he went. A few years later Alexander completed his father's work by

carrying the frontier to the Danube. It is very significant that his fighting seems to have begun when he reached the Balkan range—the old boundary between Bulgaria proper and eastern Rumelia. Apparently that was then the limit of Grecian influence.

Under the Romans, the land remained Greek in language and civilization. Thrace being the last Province (46) in this part of the world to be incorporated in their empire. The Latin language never gained south of the Danube a foothold comparable with that which it won beyond that river. That points to the presence in all Thrace of a more highly civilized people, of a Greek-speaking population.

Coming to the retrogression of Hellenism in this territory, we need not trouble ourselves with the raids of the Celts, of the Goths, of the Huns, and of the Avars. These marauding peoples came and went without permanent results. But there was another great migration which we must mention—the coming of the Slav. Its effect is seen even today in the presence of the Slovenes, the Serbo-Croates, and the Bulgarians in the Balkan Peninsula. The movement began from the north bank of the Danube early in the sixth century of our era and lasted to the middle of the seventh century. It affected most of the Balkan Peninsula profoundly, but the remarkable thing is the extent to which Thrace (in the modern sense of the word) escaped. The situation may be seen at a glance on the ethnological map published by L. Nierdele (*Slavonske Starozitnosti*, 11, 2, 1910, p. 296), showing the status in the seventh and eighth centuries.

This map shows the extent of the invasion of the Bulgarians, who, like the Huns and the Turks, were a Tartar people from Asia. The modern Bulgarian is a cross between them and the Slav—a hybrid people with Tartar name, Slavic language, and mixed blood. Into the combination the Bulgar put what the Slav had lacked—initiative and organization. They established a kingdom in the region between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains—the territory that is Bulgarian in the strictest sense of the word and was known as such from 1878 to 1885. It was a State

with a checkered career into which we shall not go. It dreamed fitfully of vast dominion. The dreams took shape at times and led the Bulgars to the walls of Constantinople and Saloniki. But these cities were never destined to be theirs. The dreams vanished—the Bulgar could never establish himself upon the shores of the Aegean. His subjection in 1393 to the Turk put an end to such efforts. Bulgars then disappear from history until the year 1877.

We have told this story at some length to lead up to the question: Must we expect to find in Thrace a Bulgarian population or a population that is part Turkish, part Greek? On the answer to that question the whole issue depends. For, as Americans, we believe that most fundamental of all rights is the right of a people not merely to good government but to self-government. That is something entitled to precedence over considerations of policy and over economic desires.

Who, then, make up the population of Thrace? The most reliable statistics available are those of the Turkish government for 1912, which have been used both by Venizelos (*Greece Before the Peace Conference of 1919*, appendix 2) and Professor Sotoriades (an ethnological map illustrating Hellenism in the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor, London, 1918). These figures come from an ally of Bulgaria, and yet they show that in the whole of Thrace there are 957,000 Turks, 730,000 Greeks, 112,000 Bulgarians, 183,000 Armenians, 65,000 Jews, and 151,000 inhabitants of other nationalities.

The Turks are thus the most numerous element in the population. But there is one thing on which all parties are agreed. Four and one-half centuries of misrule, tyranny, and oppression on the part of the Turks have rendered it impossible to plan for any continuance of Turkish government in Europe. The Turks must either leave Thrace or accept the government of some other people. Their destiny is clear. Of the remaining element the Greeks have a large plurality, and in particular they outnumber the Bulgarians—the only others to be considered seriously—in the proportion of 7 to 1.

Now, it is possible to bring an objection to the form of this presentation of the case. We wish to consider it in order to show that the vital issue remains unaffected. It may be said that Mr. Venizelos is asking only for a part of Thrace and that our statistics should refer only to that part. We recognize the force of such an objection and will attempt to present such statistics. They cannot be given with absolute exactness, because the figures are based on the old administrative district and the new lines cut across them. The inexactness, however, shall not be permitted to work to the advantage of the Greeks. We subtract, therefore, the vilayet of Constantinople and the sandjaks of Rodosto and Gallipoli, which lie in the main beyond the Enos-Midia line, with a population of 489,000 Greeks and 9000 Bulgars. We subtract also four northern sandjaks—Achi-Tchelembi, Kirdjali, Mustapha-Pasha, Tyrnovo—not claimed by Mr. Venizelos, because they contain only 9000 Greeks to 35,000 Bulgarians.

The result is 232,000 Greeks as against 68,000 Bulgarians, or a proportion of over 3 to 1—certainly a sufficient preponderance on which to base a valid claim. It is to be noted also that the other nationalities (except the Turks, 348,000) have practically disappeared, there being but 5000 Armenians and 13,000 Jews. In the territory claimed the Greeks are thus much more than double the Bulgars, Armenians, and Jews taken together.

The Greeks who offer to nationalize everything east of the Saros-Midia line and make concessions so liberal, surely they are entitled to favorable consideration when they present other claims.

To attempt a similar calculation for the various divisions said to be proposed by Mr. Polk for the partition of Thrace is impossible. The details of his plan are reported too indefinitely and his lines seem to conflict more seriously with the administrative districts. We can form a better judgment by consulting an ethnological map.

In this connection we wish to call attention to the character of the authors of the maps which support the Greek view. We have already cited the map of Soteriades. He

is a professor of history at the University of Athens. His map is based upon these figures and so adds nothing more to the Greek claim. But there is the map published by Herman Hirt (*Die Indo-Germanen*, Strassburg, 1905-1907, map 2). It is on a small scale, but clearly corroborates the Greek position. Professor Hirt is the leading authority of the world upon the question of the original home of the Aryans and their dispersion through Europe and Asia. No scholar's opinion is entitled to greater weight. His work has been largely with the Slavic languages—that fact, his German nationality, the date of his book, all combine to free him from any suspicion of prejudice in the case. Then there is the map facing page 20 in the *Balkans*, Oxford, 1915, written by four English scholars, Nevill Forbes, Arnold T. Toynbee, D. Mitrany, D. G. Hogarth, at a time when it was hoped that Bulgaria could be won to the side of our allies. Of these, Toynbee and Hogarth are eminent names in the field of classical scholarship. Another excellent map is to be found in the *Rise of Nationality in the Balkans*, by R. W. Seton-Watson, lecturer in East European history, King's College, University London, London, 1917.

Then we have a book with quite a remarkable map by Amadore-Vergili, entitled *La Questione Rumeliota e la Politica Italiana*. The map is ethnological, but it shows the distribution of Greek and Bulgarian schools and churches. It not only proves the population but it also shows that the Greeks are better educated, more interested in education, as well as more numerous than the Bulgars.

We know that there are maps that show a different result—a Bulgarian population where a Bulgarian corridor was wanted. Soteriades mentions one such “issued under the auspices of the *Daily Telegraph* by the *Geographia* (Ltd.).” Another was published by Leon Dominian; a third appeared in the *National Geographic Magazine* for December, 1918. Of the last two, one was by a graduate, the other by a former professor of Roberts College. These three maps were based on the statistics offered by Bouchier, the friend of Bulgaria, and are necessarily biased. The Bulgarians seem, indeed, to be inclined to shift their position.

Our statistics, they say, are right for 1912, and our maps also. But the Bulgars have held the country since 1913—their troops have been there during the war—and the ethnology of the country, they tell us, has changed. We should, they urge, recognize the changed condition. In plain language, that means we should reward murder and frightfulness. Such an argument needs no answer.

To sum up, our view of the situation is based upon the principle of a people's right to self-determination.

In the part of Thrace asked for by Mr. Venizelos there are more than three Greeks to every Bulgar. They represent a population which has held to this land for over 2500 years in spite of indescribable cruelty and oppression. They desire ardently to govern themselves by uniting again with the land from which their fathers came. It seems to us, as Americans, a plain duty to place no obstacle in the way of this desire.

So far we have endeavored to establish the fact that the numerical, cultural, and economic superiority of the Greeks in Thrace is in the proportion of 7 to 1 in favor of the Greek element. This fact alone should be sufficient to induce our country to decide in favor of Greece in the question of Thrace. Unfortunately, it is understood from the reports which come to us from Paris that our American delegation, while admitting the numerical superiority of the Greek element in Thrace, is not prepared to allow Thrace to be united with the mother country Greece. What imperative reasons are forcing themselves upon our delegates at Paris to disregard the principle of nationality in favor of the ally of our enemies and at the expense of one of our faithful Allies?

According to the latest plan submitted by our American delegation at Paris in connection with the solution of the question of Thrace, the entire Province of Thrace is divided into three parts: that lying to the north of the River Arda is given to Bulgaria; the district of Xanthi, something like 30 square miles, is given to Greece, and the remainder is left for further consideration. The American delegation insists that this third part become international, together

with Constantinople. What are the reasons adduced by the American delegates in Paris in justification of this plan? In the first place it is contended that Bulgaria needs an economic outlet on the Aegean. Secondly, it is argued that unless Bulgaria has a guaranty of a free access to the Aegean Sea, she will not cease from plotting and preparing for a Balkan war. Thirdly, it is argued that the American delegation is forced to oppose Greek claims to Thrace, in order to discourage the desire of the Great Powers for splitting Bulgaria between Roumania and Serbia. We shall take up these arguments one by one.

Bulgaria has no economic need of an outlet to the Aegean. Bulgaria, a nation of 4,500,000, has two excellent ports on the Black Sea—Varna and Bourgas. Roumania, a nation of 15,000,000 has only one port on the same sea—Constanza. With the internationalization of Constantinople and the Dardanelles, Bulgaria can not be said to be barred from an access to the Aegean. The only port included in the international strip of Thrace is the port of Dede-Agatch. This port is absolutely unavailable for commercial purposes. The Dede-Agatch is only an open roadstead, which will take millions of dollars to render available for commercial purposes. Bulgaria has held that port since 1913, and she not only has not seriously attempted to use this port for commercial purposes, but she has not even passed any legislation providing for the future improvement of this port for commercial purposes. She has, however, provided the Dede-Agatch with a very small railroad line, which was meant to feed the submarines. Nor is it possible to believe that with the internationalization of this port Bulgaria will avail itself of it. No Bulgarian government would be willing to make financial appropriations for the improvement of this port, which will not be in the possession of Bulgaria. The eastern portion of Bulgaria in which the two great ports, Varnas and Bourgas, lie, is the commercial and industrial part of Bulgaria, and it so happens that it wields a preponderant influence in the politics of the country. It is impossible to believe that this preponderant influence will permit an appropriation in favor of improving the port

of Dede-Agatch, which is not Bulgarian and which will mean the death of the ports of Varna and Bourgas and the transference of the commercial and industrial center of Bulgaria from that portion of the country to internationalized Thrace. It becomes evident, then, that by internationalizing a portion of western Thrace, Bulgaria's economic necessity, if there be any, cannot be satisfied.

We have come to the second argument, namely, the fear that unless we give a guaranty to Bulgaria of a free access to the Aegean Sea, she will agitate for war in the Balkans. This argument may be considered from two points of view. It is either an American concession to a threat on the part of Bulgaria, or a fear on the part of the American delegates and an attempt to placate Bulgaria. If it is an admission of threat on the part of Bulgaria, the American delegation, by yielding to this threat, is clearly admitting that there is no moral force behind the league of the Allies to enforce justice. If it is merely a fear and an attempt to placate the Bulgarians, the American delegation shows that it ignores the lessons of the events which have transpired since 1913, and also, it seems to ignore the dreams and ambitions of Bulgaria. In 1912 Mr. Venizelos in the hopes of establishing the Balkan league, and in full realization of the fact that Bulgaria would not consent to become a member of the league without serious concessions on the part of Greece, offered Bulgaria not only the whole of western Thrace and a very large portion of eastern Thrace, but also the largest portion of eastern Macedonia at a small distance from Salonica. Was Bulgaria satisfied? In the summer of 1913 she treacherously attacked both Greece and Serbia, in the hopes of seizing Salonica and Monastir, and in the hopes of reaching the Adriatic Sea. The Bulgarian armies were completely crushed. At the treaty of Bucharest Mr. Venizelos was disillusioned as to the possibility of pacifying Bulgaria with any concessions lesser than the entire Balkan Peninsula. This time he refused to repeat the error of 1912, and insisted upon occupying Thrace, but Russia and Austria-Hungary, each vying with the other for the friendship of Bulgaria as a military power in the

Balkans, imposed upon Mr. Venizelos the necessity of yielding Thrace to Bulgaria. Was Bulgaria placated? Immediately upon the occupation of Thrace, the Bulgarian authorities initiated the most cruel persecutions against the Greek element, and in 1914, Bulgaria concluded a treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Turkey.

In 1915, France and England insisted that Mr. Venizelos should make concessions to Bulgaria in eastern Macedonia in order that she might be detached from the Central Powers. Mr. Venizelos, while completely convinced that Bulgaria was already determined to throw her weight on the side of the Central Powers in the expectation of annihilating Serbia, of crushing Roumania, and of driving Greece to the old boundaries of 1912, yielded to the demands of the Allied Powers and offered Bulgaria the port of Kavala.

These three instances in the course of six years show beyond doubt the ambitions of Bulgaria in the Balkans; that infinitely greater concessions have been made to Bulgaria by Mr. Venizelos and have proved futile, and that the thought of the American delegates that Bulgaria would be satisfied and placated with the internationalization of a strip of Thracian territory is undeniably erroneous.

In closing the reply to the second contention of our delegates, we should not fail to understand that an international strip of territory, far from succeeding in placating Bulgaria, will only expose eastern Thrace to constant dangers from that country and will encourage it to watch for an opportune moment to invade this international strip. The unfortunate events that took place between 1900 and 1906 in Macedonia under the very eyes of the European commission of control will inevitably be repeated in this international strip of Thrace.

The Bulgarians will subsidize immigration into Thrace, and the Greeks, in order to counteract this movement for the alteration of its national character, will do the same in their turn. Friction will be inevitable; revolutionary and guerilla warfare will take place in the international territory, in which the Greek element will side with the Greek revolutionists and the imported Bulgarians with the

Bulgarian contagion. War will thus be inevitable. The plan of internationalizing Thrace far from creating conditions which will foster permanent peace, creates causes for inevitable wars. Bulgaria will not be satisfied, no matter what concessions the peace conference is disposed to make. The only plan which can be a guaranty of perfect peace in the Balkans is the plan originally suggested by Mr. Venizelos and subscribed to at first by the American delegation at Paris. That plan is that Greece should occupy those portions of Thrace west of the Saros-Midia line to such points in the north as are preponderantly Greek, leaving the district of Moustapha-Pasha and of Tyrnovo to Bulgaria, because here the Bulgarian element is numerically superior to the Greek. This plan is a guaranty for peace in the Balkans because it is based on absolute justice. The Greek nation will be completely satisfied and the better elements of the Bulgarian nation, which are not poisoned with imperialistic ideas, will also be satisfied with this solution.

In case Bulgaria should think of disturbing the peace of the Balkans, a strong Greece, with a united Thracian front, allied to Serbia and to Roumania, will be a convincing argument to the practical Bulgarians that it will not pay them to launch again upon the adventures of 1913 and 1915.

Finally, we come to the last argument, that the American delegation is forced to oppose the claims of Greece in order to discourage the desires of the allied powers of Europe for the complete extinction of Bulgaria. We believe that American diplomacy can protect Bulgarian integrity by other means more just and honorable. It is not necessary to do injustice to Greece in order to defend Bulgaria from foreign aggression. But if it is necessary that Greece should give the first example of self-sacrifice and self-denial to the other allied Balkan States, we may indicate that Mr. Venizelos has already gone to the limit of such sacrifice. The Greek people have dreamed for centuries for the establishment of Hellenism in Constantinople. That portion of Thrace which is to be internationalized and is to include Constantinople as its capital is Greek in history, in population,

in commerce, and in culture, and yet the Greek people resign themselves to the abandonment of their claims upon the most cherished portion of the Thracian province in order to satisfy the rivalries of the great powers and to contribute as much as is within their power to the establishment of a permanent peace. But Greece has not only made concessions in Thrace, but also has offered willingly half a million of Greeks on the Black Sea to make possible the creation of an Armenian State. In view of such sacrifices we hardly believe justifiable the insistence of our delegates to force upon Greece the necessity of a greater sacrifice, which may exasperate the Grecian people and alienate their friendship for America and for the allied powers.

In concluding, we wish to repeat that Bulgaria has no need of economic access to the Aegean; that the internationalization of Thrace is not only contrary to the principle of nationality, but will also create causes for future wars in the Balkans; it fails to placate Bulgaria and is certain to alienate the friendship of Greece; it encourages Bulgaria to hope for a possibility of invading Thrace. In other words, it strengthens the enemy of yesterday, and the certain enemy of tomorrow by weakening our ally of yesterday, who of necessity must be our ally of tomorrow. Justice and sane policy dictate that Greece should have those portions of Thrace which are claimed by Mr. Venizelos. With Venizelos at the head of a strong Greece, we may be certain that Bulgaria can be persuaded to throw off her imperialistic dreams and to recognize the community of interests between the Bulgarian and the Greek nations, the one being an agricultural country, the other a commercial and industrial one.

THE QUESTION OF THRACE

*By Constantine Stephanove, Professor in the University of
Sofia, Bulgaria*

What the diplomacy of Europe has failed to accomplish in the past, the Peace Conference and the future League of Nations must realize, if permanent peace is to cheer the hearts of the oppressed. As far as the Balkan ills are concerned, President Wilson has found the sure remedy. The eleventh point of his program of January 8 contains the necessary and explicit formula:

The relations of the several Balkan nations to one another should be determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality, and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.

And the third and fourth points of his program of February 11, last, are no less explicit:

(3) Every territorial settlement must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment for compromise of claims amongst rival states.

(4) All well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely to break the peace of Europe, and consequently, of the world. . . .

In virtue of these declarations which served as basis for the Armistice, and in virtue of the fact that America's intervention in the war capped the victory for the Entente, the United States of America is morally and legally bound to participate in the conclusion and signature of the peace treaty with *all* the belligerent countries, even though with some of them she did not come into armed conflict.

America has incurred not only a moral obligation to participate in the solving of the Balkan problems, but

through its highest spokesman she has plainly and concretely stipulated how the solution is to be effected, as is evident from the above clauses of the Wilsonian programs.

"Historical lines," "political and economic independence," "territorial integrity of the several Balkan States," "for the benefit of the populations concerned," "satisfaction to all well-defined national aspirations *without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord or antagonisms*," are conditions considered *sine qua non* for the rational settlement of the long-mooted Balkan problem, and they exclude the claim advanced by part of the Entente press for handing over to an alien rule certain portions of the Balkan Peninsula occupied or disputed by, say, Bulgaria, simply because she is one of the enemy countries. Bulgaria in reality occupies a unique position as a foe. Strictly speaking, she was not an enemy of the Entente, as was Greece since that December morning and until she was forced by the blockade to "fall in line." Bulgaria, at any rate, was not at war with the United States, and if she is to be considered as an enemy because her unpopular king and government plunged her in a war even for the liberation of kindred folk, no less so should be treated the Serbo-Croats, who at Piave mowed down the Italian phalanxes, seeing in them their greatest foe of the future. Moreover, Zholger, one of the Seidel ministers and the tutor of the Ex-King Karl is one of the Yugo-Slav delegates at the Peace Conference!

Had the Entente applied one-hundredth part of the influence and support upon Ententephil Bulgaria, it did upon Germanophil Greece, or had it simply occupied Macedonia, as it was being urged by the Macedonian Organizations, thus putting an end to the terror of the Serbian "Black Hand" there, it would have had not only a most easy triumph, but would have been heralded as liberator by all Bulgarians, who thereupon would have fought its battles with the dash and fervour inherent in the race. As a matter of fact, the Bulgarian Opposition consisting of six parties against two making up the detested Radoslavoff cabinet had begged the Entente to occupy the country, while on the other hand, Venizelos protested when

the Entente troops landed at Salonica! The recent election at which the same opposition administered a crushing defeat to the Radoslavoff following by completely obliterating it, plainly shows what was the actual feeling of the people.

Bulgaria did not wage war against the Entente, but only against the cruel oppressors of her brethren. She sent not a single soldier outside her frontiers. The recent and future Croatian and Montenegrin actions against Serbian tyranny, are they to be taken as anti-Entente manifestations?

But even if Bulgaria is to be considered as an enemy, the formula for the solution of the Balkan territorial disputes holds good and is categorical—"the people concerned shall not be treated as chattels." Right or wrong, the Bulgarians were forced to wage a third fatal war, to prevent their brethren in Macedonia not only from being treated as chattels, but from being thoroughly exterminated.

The Thracian question, the case in point, as well as the Macedonian, Dobrudjan, and Albanian problems, should now be attacked, once for all, no more in the manner of the old, rough and ready diplomacy, but in harmony with the principles of nationality, self-determination, and justice,—along historical, ethnical, linguistic, and geographical lines and political and economic necessity.

Has Greece any serious claims to Thrace on any of these grounds? Those still laboring under the influence of Greek classical history and Byzantine learning would say yes. Serious and unbiased authors, however, conversant with the real facts are one with Professor Marriott in declaring Greece's pretensions in Thrace, too, resting only on a "glorious Byzantine past and Byzantine future." Professors Freeman, Jreček, Louis Leger, Niederle, Rittich, not to mention other equally great authorities on the subject, have shown that ethnically and linguistically Thrace since the seventh century has been forming an integral part of the Bulgarian land. According to these historians, Thrace, as well as Moesia (Bulgaria), Macedonia, Epirus and even Thessaly were in the course of the seventh century settled by kindred Slav tribes who were grouped together under

the name of Bulgarians. Thus Professor Freeman in his *Historical Geography of Europe* (p. 373) says:

These (the Slavonic powers) fall into three main groups. First, in the north-western corner of the Empire are the Croatian and Servian settlements, whose history is closely connected with that of the kingdom of Hungary and the commonwealth of Venice. Secondly, there are the *Slavs of Thrace*, Macedonia, and Greece. Thirdly, the great Bulgarian Kingdom comes between the two. *These two last ranges gradually merge into one*; the first remains distinct throughout.

Byzantium was a ramshackle empire, a prototype of the late Austrian Empire. It was composed of various states and nationalities which it ruled not by consent but *by conquest*. For over ten centuries it tried to impose its sway on the Balkans in vain. The Slavs of Moesia, Thrace, and Macedonia who "gradually merged into one" under the name of Bulgarians, proved too strong for Byzantium and Hellenism. Later on, in order to facilitate its process of Hellenization, Byzantium resorted to colonization. From that period date the Greek isolated settlements of Melnik, Stanimaka, Serres, Drama, Cavalla, etc., which are indeed interesting ethnical oases. Its unceasing and untiring efforts, however, could accomplish no more than give a certain religious and cultural veneer to the city populations, particularly to those inhabiting the sea coast of the Mediterranean and Black seas. Byzantium, certainly, gave the states of the near East their religion. It always fascinated them by its learning and hierarchical system, but it was unable to *assimilate* them and form a national unit with them. The Bulgar race proved its most recalcitrant convert, and subsequently its mortal foe. Moesia, Thrace, and Macedonia were never utterly subdued or amalgamated. The three provinces always maintained a strong racial and lingual affinity. Even in the flush of its success, during the last century, it had utterly failed to change the ethnical physiognomy of these lands. Urquhart, the well-known English writer who had visited Turkey at the beginning of the last century and had made the study of the Turkish Empire his special subject, wrote:

The portion of the Bulgarians who have conformed to Islamism occupy the mountains and remoter parts of the country. The portion that maintained their creed inhabit the plains of *Macedonia, Epirus, Bulgaria, Thrace, in the vicinity of Monastir, Salonik, Joanina, Nyssa (Nisch), Sofia, Philippopolis, Adrianople and Constantinople itself* (*Turkey and Its Resources*, London 1833, p. 77).

A quarter of a century later, in 1863, Lord Strangford, who visited the Balkans and was very much interested in the history of the Balkan peoples, hastened to warn his countrymen by declaring:

The limit of the Greek race—however they might have extended themselves thirty years ago—are now defined by that uprising of the Bulgarian nationality. . . . *The Greek can not overcome the Bulgarian, nor lead him, nor incorporate him* . . . for . . . the entire mass of the rural and non Mussulman population of Turkey in Europe, with the exception of Bosnia, Thessaly, Albania, the Chalcidic peninsula, and a *very narrow belt of seaboard consists not of Greeks and Slavs, but of Bulgarians*. . . . The vast and homogeneous majority of the Christian population in European Turkey *consists of Bulgarians*; neither Greek nor even Servian has any right or authority to set himself up and be trusted as their spokesman. (*The Eastern Shores of the Adriatic*, London 1863, pp. 350, 351, 314, 310).

The missionary scholars are among the most thorough and reliable authorities on the conditions of things in any country; when seventy years ago the European Turkey Mission was founded, its staff came to the Balkans with the belief it was to work among Greeks and Turks. They were astonished to find that the chief people with whom they came in immediate contact were Bulgarians. And as early as 1856, Rev. H. G. O. Dwight, giving a detailed description of the ethnical distribution in the Balkans, wrote (see *The Missionary Herald*, vol. liv, No. 10, 1856):

By far the greater part of these (various races) profess the Greek religion, though, as has been said, only about *one million*, out of eleven *are true Greeks*. . . . Of all the races now mentioned, *the Bulgarians undoubtedly claim our first attention. They inhabit not only what is usually called Bulgaria proper, extending from the Danube to the Balkan mountains, but also a widely extended region south of these mountains, reaching the Bosphorus and the Marmora, Thrace, Albania and Macedonia.*

The same fact is confirmed by many eminent writers versed in the subject. Thus Col. James Baker in his work *Die Türken in Europa*, Stuttgart 1878 (p. 44) says:

The Bulgarians constitute the great part of the population from the boundary of Macedonia to the Black Sea, and from the Danube to the sea of Marmora.

In regard to the language relationship uniting Bulgaria, Thrace and Macedonia, this one fact is most remarkable. Already in the ninth and tenth centuries the Slavs settled here employed the same dialect. Professor Bury in his *History of the Eastern Roman Empire* (p. 377) says:

In the tenth century the Slavs of Bulgaria spoke the same tongue as the Slavs of Macedonia. . . . He (Constantine) translated the Scripture into the dialect of the Macedonian Slavonic.

The Macedonian dialect, then, was taken as the *standard* Bulgarian in those days. Ten centuries later, in 1864, the American Missionary scholars in rendering the Bible for the Bulgarians chose the *Thracian* dialect. Thus Rev. Robert Thomson of Scotland, the veteran Balkan missionary and educator, in speaking on this point (*Memorial Service for the late Rev. Elias Riggs, D.D., L.L.D.*, Constantinople 1901, one of the chief translators of the Bulgarian Bible), says:

In the first instance, he [Dr. Riggs] had to decide, when he began work on the Bulgarian Bible, whether the *Macedonian* or the *Thracian* dialect should be employed—the two being at that time *about equally prevalent*. With astonishing intuition he decided in favour of the *Thracian*.

Slavic linguists, too, declare that the Thracian Bulgarians and even those found in the vicinity of Constantinople along Tchataldja, speak the purest Bulgarian.

The scriptures and other religious books of the Bulgarian race, therefore, were translated in the Macedonian and later on in the Thracian dialects, which shows that in respect to language Thrace and Macedonia are more Bulgarian than Bulgaria proper. Professor Dominian in his work, *Frontiers of Language and Nationality* (p. 220), in attesting

the Bulgarian character of the Maritza Valley, the heart of Thrace, declared that that territory should fall to Bulgaria, the mother country

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not because the beauty of the river banks is proclaimed in the Bulgarian national hymn, but rather on grounds of *Bulgarian linguistic preponderance in this valley*. Substantial coincidence between *Bulgarian political and linguistic boundaries* on the south-east would then have been obtained.

Geographically, economically and strategically, the Greeks themselves, prior to the second Balkan war argued that the Aegean Littoral with Cavalla and Dede-Agatch are Bulgaria's natural extension and boundary line. Thus Mr. Venizelos himself in March, 1913, in reply to an interpellation in the Greek Chamber, declared:

Of necessity compact Greek population would pass under the domination of our Allies. It is to be done not because that region was conquered by our Allies, or because they demand it, but because we are forced to it for *geographical reasons*. This is so true that had our Allies shown a disposition to allow us to extend our frontiers towards these regions, in order to include in our possession all these populations, I, at least, in my quality as Minister, would not have accepted a frontier *so full of dangers for us*, because if we are to extend *along the coast* without a break, in such a manner as to include all the Greek populations of Thrace, Greece thus extended *without a vertebral column along the sea* would be *weaker* than if its frontiers were rounded off in another direction [meaning in Asia Minor].

More eloquent proof of Greece's groundless claim on Thrace could not be found.

In 1915 the Venizelist party in order to gain the votes of the Bulgarian population declared

If you vote for us and Mr. Venizelos gets elected, we will give to Bulgaria not only Serres, Drama and Cavalla, but also the entire Slavophone region as far as Castoria (Τὸ φῶς, May 24, 1915).

It is also an open secret that at the Bucharest treaty, 1913, when Bulgaria was crushed and was completely at the mercy of its direct enemies, Mr. Venizelos was disposed to leave even Cavalla to Bulgaria. That the latter did not get it was mainly due to the German kaiser, who believing its possession would render Bulgaria commercially

independent and throw her out of the orbit of the Central Powers, "worked like a tiger," in order that Cavalla remain in Greek hands, thus proving more Greek than the Greeks themselves.

In view of the above significant facts, the radical change in Mr. Venizelos' attitude, who today demands for Greece the whole of Thrace and the Aegean shore, is difficult to explain. In this manner that statesman who always poses as a "moderate" and "conciliatory" diplomat is flagrantly contradicting his former statements and has gone back on his word so solemnly given. In order to defend his new position Mr. Venizelos has been constrained to have recourse to sophistry and skilfully manipulated statistical data. For this reason it is well to have in mind the warning against Greek statistical and political veracity sounded by Sir Arthur Evans, the Carnegie Balkan Commission, and others.

In his memorandum to the Peace Conference the Greek first minister ingeniously includes in Thrace also Constantinople, the Gallipoli Peninsula, the Marmora Littoral and the regions east of the Midia-Enos line—territories which constitute the hinterland of Constantinople, and to which Bulgaria lays no claim. The territorial dispute is over Thrace proper, Eastern and Western, covering the old Vilayet of Adrianople, or the land between the river Mesta and the Midia-Enos boundary line.

Now taking Mr. Venizelos even at his own figures, the total number of Greeks in Thrace, *with Constantinople, Gallipoli, etc.* is 730,822, to only 112,174 Bulgarians. Since the Greeks have themselves recently admitted in the London Westminster Gazette and other papers, that the number of the Greek population in Constantinople and its suburbs is over 500,000, the number of Greeks left in Eastern and Western Thrace, the Gallipoli Peninsula, etc., falls to only about 230,800. Furthermore, excluding the number of Greeks living in the Gallipoli Peninsula and the Marmora, which according to Greek claims are more than 100,000, the residue comes to only 130,000 souls. Lastly, deducting the Bulgarian Patriarchists (over 25,000 persons) whom

Hellenism always counts as Greeks, the grand total of the Greeks in Eastern and Western Thrace disputed by Bulgaria dwindles to some 100,000 inhabitants, which number is conceded by the Bulgarians themselves. But the real Bulgar representation in Thrace (Eastern and Western) is not 112,174, as Mr. Venizelos states. Should we add the Bulgarian Pomaks to the number of 135,000 and the 25,000 Bulgarian Patriarchists, whom Mr. Venizelos covertly omits to mention and who are as good Bulgarians as the Bosnian Mohammedans and Catholics are good Serbs, the total number of the Bulgarians even at Mr. Venizelos' reckoning would reach up to 272,174 to some 100,000 Greeks!

The actual figures about the two rival races in Thrace according to reliable foreign authorities is far more favourable to the Bulgars. The French paper *Le Courrier d'Orient*, published in Constantinople, gave in 1878 detailed statistics on the subject *Ethnographie du vilayet d'Adrianople* according to which, in that region at that time there were *males*, Bulgarians (without the Pomaks and the Patriarchist Bulgarians) 219,198, to only 74,614 Greeks.

The well-known German author, Richard von Mach, in his work *Der Machtbereich des Bulgarischen Exarchats*, Leipzig, 1906, for the eight dioceses, viz., Xanthi, Maronia, Enos, Demotica, Adrianople, Lititsa, Heraclea, and Viza, gives Bulgarian exarchists 229,216, Bulgarian patriarchists 56,608, Bulgarian Catholics (Uniates) 2688, or total 288,512, to 163,000 Greeks. Here, as is evident, the Bulgarian Pomaks are not included in the list of the Bulgarians.

The Bulgarian reckoning which in general is reliable gives for the year 1912, that is, after a decade of terrible persecution to which the Bulgarian element was exposed because of its uprisings against Turkish misrule according to Professor L. Miletitch, the following proportion between the two races; in Western Thrace 143,000 Bulgarians to 62,955 Greeks, and for Eastern Thrace as far as the Midia-Enos boundary, Bulgarians 145,720 to 92,825 Greeks

When taking into consideration the above distribution of the two contending races, one can easily detect the absurdity of the Greek assertion that in 1912, according

to a Greco-Bulgarian electoral compromise, the Greeks obtained for Thrace seven deputies to only one Bulgarian. The truth is, that the Greeks secured three deputies for Constantinople, three for the Gallipoli Peninsula and the territory east of the Midia-Enos line, while for Thrace proper (Eastern and Western), both the Greeks and the Bulgarians who were allowed by the Turks only two places, agreed to have one each. It was not so much a contest of Greeks against Bulgarians as *Christians* against Young Turks. The large Bulgar Pomak population was not permitted to vote.

Another equally untenable argument advanced by the Greeks in their favour is the assertion that the preponderating Mohammedan element in Thrace prefers Greek to Bulgarian rule. All unbiased foreigners who have lived in the Balkans will testify that, on the contrary, the Mohammedans would always prefer a Bulgarian to a Greek administration. That has been proved by the Carnegie Balkan Commission of 1913, by consular and missionary reports, and other authorities. The Carnegie Report establishes the fact that though the Bulgarians are rude and not very efficient administrators, the alien element in Bulgaria is treated with a remarkable spirit of tolerance. In it is pointed out that of the large Turkish population in Thessaly handed over to Greece in 1881, but a very insignificant number of it is to be found there to-day. The following is a significant fact. On March 5th last the Mohammedan deputies in the Bulgarian Assembly made the following declarations:

We hear with astonishment and indignation of the Greek pretensions. Indeed the Mussulmans in Bulgaria have suffered much because of the war, and do not conceal their discontent against certain arbitrary acts of the authorities, they nevertheless find no reason to prefer Greek to Bulgarian administration. . . . The Mussulmans in Bulgaria enjoy their national and religious privileges and live unmolested in the country. As soon, however, as Greece was created, our compatriots were obliged to quit their homes in Greece; not one of the 100,000 Mussulmans has remained in that territory [meaning Thessaly].

In Bulgaria, on the other hand, there live in contentment more than 500,000 Mohammedans, whom neither the proximity of Turkey, nor the incessant agitation of the fanatic *hodjas* have been able to persuade to emigrate. Many of the families who abandoned their homes in Bulgaria and went to Asia Minor subsequently returned to their original settlement, having found Bulgar government preferable to the unsettled conditions and misrule prevailing in Turkey, their mother country.

On the contrary, the Greeks are perhaps the most intolerant people in the East. The French soldier and writer, August Delvigne, who has taken part in the war on the Balkan frontier and had ample opportunity to study the condition of things in that part of the globe, has written a very instructive chapter on the Greek treatment of its non-Hellenic element. In his booklet, *Le Problème Macédonien*, Berne, 1919, (p. 15) he says:

When one takes into view the acts of Hellenic administration in general, the denial of justice, the arbitrary disposessions, the total disregard for labor organization, he is justified in asking himself whether the Greeks themselves don't feel as *aliens* in Macedonia, or if their stay is not *temporary*.

On page 13 he says that in 1913, no sooner had the Greeks become masters in Macedonia, than they suppressed with violence all the Slav schools and churches. They did not spare even the institutions of the Uniate (catholic) Slavs, founded and managed by French missionaries. And when one of these missionaries had asked a Greek Abbot how they expected to transform into Hellenes the large Turkish and Bulgarian population, he received the ready and categorical answer: "With the knife!"

Professor Charles U. Clark, of Yale University, who had recently traversed Albania, in an article written in *The Travel*, May 1919, and republished in the *Adriatic Review*, in speaking of Greek rule in the parts of Albania occupied by Greece, among other things, says:

I have myself seen village after village in which every woman had been ravished, every man killed, everything valuable seized, the rest burned and then the houses blown up; and to ride mile

after mile through smiling valleys past these deserted Pompeiis, makes one realize the force and the accusations brought against similar Greek bands operating in Macedonia.

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In the same article Professor Clark tells how the Turkish deputies on entering the Greek Parliament had been "hooted and jeered and compelled to take off fezes, which is in direct contrast with the respect the Turkish deputies enjoy in the Bulgarian Sobranie."

The Greek rule in Northern Epirus and Macedonia today, certainly, should supply sufficient evidence as to Greek civic liberality and humanity. Though the population in its large majority is non-Hellenic, all Bulgarian and Albanian schools and churches have been closed, appropriated or denationalized, all priests, teachers and more intelligent people have been compelled to emigrate, have been imprisoned or murdered. Even American citizens, humble ministers of the Gospel, have been thrown into prison and maltreated, and that in Salonica itself, for the simple reason that they have been distributing relief and religious tracts to Bulgarian war prisoners. Bulgarian and Albanian language and books are banned throughout Greece.

In Bulgaria, however, though the Greeks are a handful (about 40,000) in comparison with the large Bulgarian element found in Greek Macedonia (numbering over 300,000 people), there is a Greek church and school in Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria itself, in Philippopolis, Stanimaka, Bourgas, and other towns. Gospel in Philippopolis is preached in the Bulgarian Evangelical church to Armenians, Greeks and Turks in their own language. When, however, some years ago, the American missionaries proposed that services in Bulgarian be held at the Greek Protestant Church in Salonica, the Greek members raised such a violent opposition that the attempt was never again repeated.

The Greeks from olden times have never been good administrators. The corruption, inefficiency and inaptitude of Greek civil service is proverbial. Bad enough on its proper soil, Greek rule would be found over an alien people impossible and detrimental, be it in Asia Minor, in Macedonia, Thrace or Albania. *Qui vivra verra.*

In deciding the question of Thrace and the Aegean Littoral, therefore, these considerations must be kept in view:

1. Bulgaria's natural and most vital outlets on the sea are the ports of Dede-Agatch and Cavalla. They are the lungs with which the country can breathe and grow. They are its "two eyes." Its Black Sea ports of Varna and Bourgas, owing to the turbulent and dangerous waters of the Black Sea and the circuitous route, are of little value to Bulgarian international commerce.

2. The Aegean region is geographically, ethnically and linguistically Bulgarian. The Greek population here forms mere oases. The compact mass of the population is Bulgarian.

3. Economically and strategically it is indispensable to Bulgaria.

4. The Treaty of San Stefano, 1878, ceded to Bulgaria the Aegean coast between Struma and Porto-Lagos.

5. The Greeks during 1912 willingly ceded the Cavalla region and the Aegean territory to Bulgaria.

6. The Greeko-Serbian treaty of June 2, 1913, recognized as Bulgarian the entire Aegean Macedonia outside of Salonica.

7. Bulgaria's direst enemies at the Bucharest treaty, 1913, practically recognized the same necessity. If Bulgaria did not then receive Cavalla, it was due mostly to the intrigues of the German ex-emperor.

8. Mr. Venizelos on several occasions since then has offered it to Bulgaria, admitting its vital necessity to Bulgaria, and its great geographical and strategic weakness for Greece.

9. Dede-Agatch and Cavalla in Bulgarian hands would enhance commerce between the Balkans and the maritime countries, Italy, France, England, America, and would become flourishing world centers.

10. In the hands of Greece they would be condemned to desuetude as they will lack the necessary hinterland.

11. Bulgaria divested of the Aegean coast would be smothered economically and commercially, and would thus be placed in a state of political unrest compelling her to

resort to force in order to free herself from a strangling grip.

12. Bulgaria's claim to the Aegean Littoral are in conformity with the Entente's principles. Should however, all other means of solving it fail, its population should be accorded the right of plebiscite which has already been proposed by the Bulgarian Government, and which cannot be rejected by Mr. Venizelos, the advocate of such a scheme and of lasting peace.

ORIENTAL COMMENT

PEACE TREATY DEFECTIVE

Min Kuo Jih Pao (Shanghai): The attitude of the United States towards the Peace Treaty shows that it is a defective document. It is true there is some prospect of America reaching a settlement regarding the reservations, but it is doubtful whether the other Great Powers are willing to accept the same. It is impossible to say, therefore, just what will happen next, and how the matter will eventually end. There is no doubt, however, that this is the best opportunity for any one who would establish real lasting peace for the whole world. In our view the best way is to accept the suggestion of the French Press, namely to destroy the original treaty and make a new one. This would offer an opportunity to remedy the defects and alter those parts which are not just and fair to all concerned. The thing might be patched up by compromise and other means but the seed of discord will be there to spring into life at any moment. Some day it will surprise the world with another explosion.

THE TREATY UNJUST

Chung Hua Hsin Pao (Shanghai): The world is as much in confusion as it was during the war. The reason for such continued disturbance is injustice. The Peace Treaty of Versailles is by no means a document of justice. If the Great Powers were united it might have passed for the time being, but the right attitude of the United States has thrown a dark shadow over it as a whole. We regret, therefore, that the people of Great Britain and France do not agree with the people of the United States in this matter. The possible breaking up of the big Powers is not the cause, but the result of the injustice done to smaller nations by the Peace Treaty, which is the making of the big Powers. To expect good results after sowing the seeds of injustice after the defeat of Germany is like climbing a tree in quest of fish. Peace will only come with justice for all. Without it the world will never be peaceful. Statesmen who depend on manoeuvre for success are bound to fail.

PEACE MARRED BY SHANTUNG SETTLEMENT

Sin Wan Pao (Shanghai): The defeat of Prussian militarism ushered in a new settlement. The fact that the American Senate has voted it down is a sign that there is yet hope for the world. America is not at all concerned with Shantung, yet its Senate has done its best to uphold right and justice. It is our first duty therefore to do what we can to save ourselves and to compel our officials to stop internal quarrel.



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 (Continuing the Journal of Race Development)

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EDITORS

GEORGE BLAKESLEE, Ph.D. PRESIDENT G. STANLEY HALL, LL.D.

EDITOR FOR BOOK REVIEWS

Professor STEPHEN P. DUGGAN, Ph.D. New York
www.jstor.org

EDITOR FOR INTERNATIONAL NOTES

Miss MARGARET C. ALEXANDER New York

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS

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Assistant Professor FREDERICK W. WILLIAMS Yale University

PUBLISHER

LOUIS N. WILSON, Litt.D. Clark University

Articles intended for publication, and all correspondence relating to the editorial department of the JOURNAL, should be addressed to Dr. George H. Blakeslee, Clark University, Worcester.

Books for review, exchanges, subscriptions, and all correspondence relating thereto should be addressed to Dr. Louis N. Wilson, Clark University Library, Worcester, Mass.

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**CONTRIBUTORS TO THE APRIL ISSUE OF THE
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

Hon. A. F. Whyte, one of the editors of *The New Europe*, was a member of Parliament, 1910-1918. He has just returned to Europe after a stay of a few months in the United States, where he has lectured extensively on topics of international interest. His article was delivered as an address before the joint session of the American Historical Association and the Political Science Association, at their Annual Convention, Cleveland, Ohio, December 30, 1919.

Stephen Pierce Duggan, Ph.D., is at present Director of the Institute of International Education, which was founded last year with the aim to develop international good will by means of educational agencies. Previous to last year he had been a professor at the College of the City of New York where he taught history. He has written extensively on foreign affairs, particularly on the problems of the Balkans. Last spring he published *The League of Nations, the Theory and Practice*. In the summer and fall he visited the countries of Western and Southern Europe to bring their educational authorities in coöperation with the Institute. His article is the result of that visit.

Prof. Hiram Bingham, Litt.D. Professor of Latin American History, Yale University, has an intimate knowledge of Latin American affairs both from study and personal investigations. He has conducted a number of exploring expeditions to South America; was Director of the Peruvian Expeditions, 1912, 1914-1915; and was delegate of the United States Government at the first Pan American Scientific Congress, Santiago de Chile, 1908. He is the author of a large number of volumes on South America, but the work which attracted the greatest attention was *The Monroe Doctrine, an Obsolete Shibboleth*, 1913. Recent events have modified his views on this subject and the reasons for his change in opinion are described in the paper published here in full, and which was read in part at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, Cleveland, Ohio, December, 1919.

Albert H. Lybyer, Ph.D., Professor of Modern European History, University of Illinois, was attached to the American Peace Commission at Paris and was technical adviser to the Crane-King Mission to Syria and Turkey. For seven years he was a member of the faculty at Robert College, Constantinople. He is the author of *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent*.

Robert J. Kerner, Ph.D., Associate Professor of History, University of Missouri, was on the staff of the American Peace delegation at Paris and, in this capacity, spent considerable time in Austria, where he made the interesting and valuable historical discoveries described in the article in the Journal. Dr. Kerner is the author, among other writings, of *Slavic Europe*, 1918, and joint author of *The Russian Revolution and the Jugo Slav Movement*.

Harry J. Carman, Ph.D., Instructor in History at Columbia University, has interested himself particularly in recent Russian developments. He is one of the authors of the recent syllabus on *Imperialism and World Politics*.

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CONFLICTING FORCES AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE¹

*By A. F. Whyte, Member of Parliament, 1910-18:
Editor of The New Europe*

Never perhaps in the history of the world did the hopes of humanity stand so high as they did in November, 1918. There was a widespread belief throughout the civilized world that a unique opportunity for recreating the whole system of international relations was presented, and that, somehow, a new system would arise out of the ruins of the old Europe wrecked by the war, which would guarantee justice and good relations between the nations in a way that has never hitherto been achieved.

We only come down fifteen brief months to the present moment to find a general sentiment of disillusion, of hopes defeated, of ideals unrealized. We are today in a very different mood from that which prevailed on the night that the armistice was signed. Now, one of the reasons for the defeat of our hopes has been that although we quite properly set our hopes very high at the end of the war, as the result of the defeat of the enemy, we did not, I believe, take the true measure of the difficulties that would lie in the path of their realization. We did not realize that within the circle of the Allies themselves there were deep seated differences of opinion arising from differences of historic environment and from other causes for which a solution would have to be found, for which common ground

¹ An address delivered before the American Historical Association, Cleveland, Ohio, December 30, 1919.

would have to be provided, before the process of peace-making could be either smooth or easy.

There was, for instance, a real conflict of principle between many of the agreements made by the European governments among themselves on the one hand, and the conceptions underlying the League of Nations on the other. And when America entered the war there came into the political arena of the war a new set of principles, whether you call them the Fourteen Points or the general philosophy of the League of Nations, which were not in accord with the existing agreements between the European Allies. The most urgent task presented by the entry of America in the political sphere, a task quite as urgent as the organization of the military power of the Allies for victory, was to bring into a common accord the agreements between the Allies, known as the secret treaties, and the principles of the newer world order which found expression in the speeches and addresses of President Wilson.

The failure to explore the whole ground in the light of that conflict of opinion largely accounts for many of the difficulties that presented themselves at the Paris conference, and, I think, certainly accounts for the fact that many of the hopes entertained in November, 1918, have not been realized.

Let me come to the conference itself. Those who were at work in the conference in the various delegations and those who were in Paris simply to watch the conference, as correspondents of newspapers, found themselves in such a whirling panorama of swiftly moving elements that it was literally impossible for anyone to take an exact measure of the work of the conference at the moment. The conference itself was like a vast kaleidoscope in which it was impossible to trace the course of any one color. The machine revolved with such rapidity and we were all so close against the problems being solved, that it was difficult to see the task steadily or see it whole.

Now we are able to make a picture with a better perspective and, in order to present the picture I shall strip the conference of all unessential and accidental things and

describe it as a conflict between four sets of forces. Forces in themselves are abstract things when you discuss them either in speech or in writing and, therefore, to dramatize them, I am going—perhaps at the risk of some exaggeration and perhaps at the risk of some little departure from strict accuracy—to clothe them in the flesh and blood of the nations and men represented at the conference. The forces which thus emerge are France, Italy, the United States of America and Great Britain. You will see that I have omitted the fifth of the great powers, namely Japan. I do so not because I or anyone else will under-rate the position occupied by the Japanese people in the modern world or the part which they have played or will play in the generation to come, but because the Japanese delegation at a very early period in the conference let it be known, without saying so in so many words, that inasmuch as their primary interests lay in the Far East, they would not take a direct and active share in the settlement of territorial or economic questions in Europe. They equally well let it be understood that in return for that shrewd self-denying ordinance on their part, they would expect something in the nature of a European *quid pro quo* when the affairs of the Far East came up for discussion. We know how far that assumption proved to be right. I set aside, therefore, the part played by Japan at the Paris conference, although at certain turns the action of the Japanese delegation exercised a very considerable influence on its ultimate decisions.

I come first of all to France, as representing one set of forces. France came to the conference in the person of Clemenceau, her heroic old radical prime minister, asking for one thing, namely, security. Clemenceau and a whole generation of men and women alive in France today, have seen the richest provinces of their native country ravaged twice in their lifetime by the armies of the same hereditary enemy, and they saw in the victory over that enemy, a great historic opportunity for the French people, finally to guarantee themselves and western civilization against the threat of a German invasion. Clemenceau had the ambition to go down in history as the first of the sons of France who gave

his mother country the inestimable boon of security against the hereditary foe.

That ambition was received with universal assent and cordial sympathy by the whole conference. Everyone, no matter where he comes from, has a natural love of France. As a Frenchman once said, "Every man has two native countries, his own and France." Sympathy, however, changed into dissension and criticism when Clemenceau began to translate the demand for security into the specific methods by which he hoped to attain it.

Clemenceau, for all his radicalism in domestic affairs, was very much a child of the old diplomatic régime which had ruled the continental politics of Europe for a century or more. He had been brought up under the conception of the balance of power, and when he came to translate his demand for security into specific terms, he translated it into those terms taught him by the diplomats of the old school. He presented to the conference a program based entirely upon that kind of strategic security backed by economic guarantees, which was a natural product of the philosophy of the older school of European diplomacy. It was an arguable case but it had this great fault, that it was based upon the conception of the balance of power in Europe, which had been so largely discredited by the result of the war.

The war had arisen out of a system in which Europe was organized into two armed camps. The balance of power which had grown up gradually and had been accepted as something of a guarantee of the peace of Europe, turned out to be in the ultimate event only a means for organizing Europe in such a way that if a serious war did break out, the whole continent would be involved in it.

What Clemenceau and his friends failed to see was that the war had compelled the whole civilized world to take a new outlook upon its own affairs. Those who understand what he stood for and those who understand, on the other hand, the roots from which the League of Nations idea sprang, will realize that there was a serious conflict, not merely of personal opinion, but of fundamental political

principle between the two. This conflict of the Clemenceau conception against the Wilson conception dominated the peace conference throughout its entire work.

I set aside, in discussing the French contribution to the peace conference, all her colonial aspirations and all the other subsidiary activities of the French delegation, because France in the main represented that one thing. It is perfectly true that colonial aspirations in Syria and elsewhere played a large part, and I may add, that one of the most ironical spectacles of the Paris conference was to see Clemenceau—a French radical who had spent the entire period of a long and stormy political life, fighting desperately against all the forces of French colonial imperialism and had reached the crown of his career as a result—espousing the very ideas which he had done his best to defeat. I need not go into the various cross currents of French politics and the various parliamentary exigencies which forced him into that decision. I only note it in passing as one of the strange results of the influences of the war. Setting aside, then, what I may call the minor issues presented by the French delegation, France really represented that one thing, namely, security against the hereditary foe.

I come now to the second force. Italy represented in a certain measure the same demand for security. The Italian people had achieved their national unity by driving the same enemy, although under a different flag—because the German under the Austrian flag is not so very different from the Prussian—out of their northern plains, but they had not achieved it completely, for when war broke out the strong strategic points were in the hand of the enemy.

In a sense, Italy came to the conference with the same demand as Clemenceau—a military guarantee of security upon her northern frontier. Whether that northern frontier of Italy has been drawn so as to include too many Germans in it or not, remains to be seen, but I expect that the 200,000 or 300,000 Tyrolese Germans will probably give the Italian people a good deal of trouble in the not very distant future.

There was another factor in Italian policy. In taking the measure of Italian security, Baron Sonnino, who was foreign minister during the period of the war, conceived of Italian security as demanding complete Italian control of the Adriatic Sea and, in order to achieve that control, he wished to push the Italian frontiers right across the Adriatic to include a considerable territory inhabited in most part not by Italians but by the southern Slavs, whose revival of national sentiment was one of the striking political results of the war.

Sonnino himself was one of the most remarkable figures on the European stage. There were combined in him three of the most powerful racial strains in the world. He was in part Latin, in part Jew, and in part Scot, and those of you who know the parts which those races have played in the struggles and triumphs of modern civilization will realize that a personality so composed is a formidable personality indeed.

Italy, as you remember, declared her neutrality when German and Austria went to war. She declared her neutrality officially on the ground that the occasion for her joining with her allies in the Triple Alliance had not arisen. Officially the reason given by the government in Rome was that conditions were such as to enable her to refuse any demand made by Germany that she should join in the war. But, there was a stronger popular feeling than that. If there is any one feeling as regards foreign affairs which is strong in the hearts of the Italian people, it is the hatred of the old German ruler of the north, and it would have been very difficult for an Italian government to lead the Italian people into that kind of a war on the side of the Germans and the Austrians, and so, Italy declared her neutrality. But, I am not sure that Sonnino had yet made up his mind, even after Italy was at war, whether the permanent interests of Italy, considering her position in central Europe, would require her ultimate association with the western democracies of France, Great Britain and the United States, or with her old allies in the central empires. I think he had not made up his mind which way Italian

policy ought ultimately to turn and in many respects he did not close all doors leading to a possible renewal of the old association with the central powers.

Both Clemenceau and Sonnino by all their political associations, were typical, characteristic, distinguished children of the old regime which governed diplomatic relations in Europe. They were so completely steeped in the conception of the old diplomacy that they were hardly able to judge with a hospitable and understanding mind the newer conceptions underlying the League of Nations. Therefore, although the major conflict in the Paris Conference lay between Clemenceau and Wilson, there was also a conflict, in perhaps certain different terms, between the Sonnino conception and the Wilson conception.

Now I come to the United States of America. It would be an impertinence on my part, as a visiting stranger, to describe or criticise before an American audience, the policy which America represented at the Paris Conference. I understand that it is a matter of dispute—although I understand some would say that there is no dispute—as to whether President Wilson represented the American people in Paris or not. I am glad to think I am not called upon to enter that delicate ground or settle that difficult dispute. The testimony which I can bear, as a European witness, is that for a great period during the war and during the major part of the Paris Conference, President Wilson undoubtedly represented millions of men and women in Europe. The common people, as we call them in Europe, had caught a vision without much intellectual comprehension of it, of a new system of international relations which, in some way, would provide a guarantee against the outbreak of the horrors that had devastated Europe for five years during the war.

The political statesmen who led Europe during the war, were too deeply engrossed in the tremendous tasks of organizing the military power of their nations for victory, to be able to step back from the storm which was shrieking around their heads, to see that the achievement of victory would present tasks just as great as, if not greater than the

actual task of organizing the allied forces for that victory: the task, namely, of taking the ruins of European civilization as left by the war, of clearing the ground, and of rebuilding a new system of international relations upon the ground so cleared. Being, as I say, too closely engrossed in the immediate tasks of the war, they did not catch what President Wilson called the voices in the air. The voices undoubtedly were there. The people as a whole had caught a vision of something greater, more all embracing, than any system of international relations which had prevailed before the war and, inasmuch as it was he, above all living statesmen, who gave form and shape and voice to the inarticulate aspirations of the European peoples, he became in a very real sense, their true representative in the politics of the war. Lloyd George made us all *feel* what was at stake; it was Wilson who made us *think*.

I have said that the Paris Conference was a conflict between the conceptions of the old diplomacy and the conceptions of the new. It is not, however, generally recognized that when these European and American leaders met around the table, Clemenceau for France, Lloyd George for England, Orlando for Italy, and Wilson for America, they each of them represented a sovereign power from whose word there was no appeal to any higher authority. Lloyd George had in his pocket an overwhelming mandate, in the form of the most gigantic parliamentary majority that any minister could possibly ask, for the purpose of such a task as the Paris Conference. There was no appeal from him to any force greater than he in Great Britain. Therefore, when these men were met around that conference table, they, of necessity, had to find solutions or else admit that the tasks were too difficult for them and that the war must continue in a sort of incoherent state of belligerency. The second result was unthinkable, and, therefore, the first result is what we see today, the inevitable series of compromises arrived at by a conference met around a table, which was the final court of appeal for the politics of the entire world at that moment.

The more we realize how deep seated was the conflict of opinion around that table, the more you will see how enormous were the tasks which they had to face. The process of compromise inevitably dominated the entire course of the conference, and that brings me to the last of the four forces in the conference, Great Britain. The political student has long known that Great Britain is the home of political compromise. Political compromise is second nature to Englishmen, and the delegation we sent to Paris, represented both in its policy and its personnel, that typical British thing. The two forces which normally struggle for the mastery in British politics in peace time were brought together. There was first the combination of conservatism at home and imperialism abroad, forces very deep-rooted in the English soul and English character, forces to which, if you go far enough back, the whole British Commonwealth and even the United States of America owe a great deal. Stripped of many of the things which have made them distasteful to modern democracy, those two elements have drawn their strength in the past and draw their strength today in Great Britain from genuine qualities in the English soil, and in the English climate and in the English character.

That force was represented in the person of Mr. Arthur Balfour; and even life-long domestic opponents felt proud and glad to think that British Conservatism should be represented by so distinguished a character.

On the other hand you have the new democracy of Great Britain, that uprising of somewhat aggressive radicalism—not in your sense, but in ours—which found its personal epitome and dramatization in the person of Lloyd George.

Those two persons with the policies they represented, took to Paris a blend of characteristics and of policies which were a typical representation of the action of Great Britain both at home and abroad. It was perhaps inevitable that being adepts at compromise, it should have fallen to the British delegation very frequently to essay the task of modifying, or establishing a common ground

between, the conflicting conceptions of France and America, or rather shall I say to avoid dispute, of Clemenceau and of Wilson. I am not claiming for the British delegation that it was due to their skill or to their broad political capacity that all the various compromises in the Peace Treaty found their way there. Colonel House, played, perhaps, as large a part in the process as any living man, but in general the bringing together of the two sides was the part assigned by the British delegation.

Now, what was the result? If we take a clean grasp and a clear view of the forces which I have tried to describe—forces which of course did not appear at the Conference quite in the nakedness in which I have presented them—we shall see that the results before us now, could not well have been substantially different. This or that might have been changed in one way or the other, but the broad result was almost inevitable. The Treaty in itself is perhaps as imperfect a document as any treaty presented at the end of any great war in the past, but there is one thing that differentiates it from any other previous treaties. Treaties of old were like the family Bible. You could close it and lock it and put it away and forget about it. This treaty you can neither close, nor lock, nor put away, nor forget. It is not simply the bringing to an end of a process and then the rather blind and foolish attempt to put it away and forget. It is also the beginning of a new process, and I defy any man to lay his finger on any clause in the Treaty which does not represent a beginning rather than an end. The beginnings are sometimes false steps, but few of them are irretrievably so. They can be retraced. The great thing which differentiates it in that respect from all other previous treaties is that it contains the League of Nations.

The League in itself suffers from all the faults of early youth and infancy. It is in its infancy, but no man will condemn the infant, because it can neither speak nor walk, that therefore, it is unfitted for the tasks of human maturity. Everyone knows that the growing child is the product of heredity and is molded by the forces of its envi-

ronment. The parents of the League of Nations were perhaps not free from many of the taints from which we would wish our children to be free, but it lies with the nations composing the League, to make the League what they choose. The Covenant is in no sense a strait-jacket which, when once put on, you can never shake off. It is, like any constitution, susceptible of amendment and inevitably subject to the processes of change which go on in an organic world. It contains within it the promise—if we take it rightly—of its own improvement, and it contains within it the machinery and the instruments by which the errors and mistakes now enshrined in the Peace Treaty proper can be changed and amended as occasions and circumstances require. Because it contains within it those points, it is substantially different from all treaties in the last, and, because the League appears to my fellow countrymen as the only visible, substantial, guarantee that the horrors and terrors from which we have just emerged will not descend upon our children a generation hence, therefore, they have taken the League as their guiding star in the future of international relations.

I think what we look for from the American people is just this: We ourselves, in my opinion, ratified the Treaty and assumed the obligations of the League without adequate discussion, and the process is now going on in Great Britain of the progressive education of the people in the responsibilities of the League. For that we owe as deep a debt of gratitude to Lord Robert Cecil as anyone else.

The American people have adopted the other course, in some ways a wiser course, because no one wishes any modern power in the world to undertake the obligations of the League without a clear conception of what they are. Full discussion regarding the obligations of the League has tended to sharpen the eyes of public opinion and give them a clearer view of the responsibilities which they will assume.

No one will pretend it was an easy task either for Great Britain, with her characteristic isolation from continental politics, or for the United States, with a still more conscious policy of isolation, to assume that position, but I

think the force of circumstances, and the lesson of the war, have driven us from our isolation. Gradually we are preparing ourselves to assume new responsibilities.

The only thing I would add from purely the European point of view of ratification, is this, that the economic restoration of Europe cannot proceed upon normal lines, and no man, no body of men and no nation in Central Europe can really know where they are, until the Treaty is ratified by all the powers concerned and everyone is able to take a general conspectus of the entire world and know how and where the League is going to act. Of course the immediate sphere of the League is the economic restoration of Europe. Until the air of present troubles is clear, no nation in Europe or in the world can know precisely where they stand. Therein, from the point of view of Europe, lies the urgency of ratification.

The English speaking democracies have a peculiar responsibility in respect to the future of the world. Every nation in the world has emerged changed by the war. Some nations have emerged seriously hurt. Others are substantially unimpaired. There is little doubt, judging in economic terms or in military terms, that the United States of America is the most powerful of all. Despite some appearances to the contrary, there has been no serious damage done to the economic or the political or the naval power of Great Britain. Therefore, a peculiar responsibility rests upon us, holding so much of the economic future of the world in our hands, to see that Europe is given a new start under better conditions than she has ever previously enjoyed.

The impulse which carried the European powers through the nineteenth century, springing from the conception of the balance of power has not only exhausted itself, but it has destroyed itself. Those evil forces which brought the war upon Europe out of a summer sky, are for the moment out of action and exhausted. No one with his eyes open will pretend that they are dead, but they are out of action and exhausted; and a unique opportunity is presented by

their exhaustion for the entry of a new ideal which by the judicious use of economic power and political influence, can give the nations of Europe that new start upon a better road which will lead them out of the grasp of destructive forces into a better and a brighter future.

OBSERVATIONS ON HIGHER EDUCATION IN EUROPE

*By Stephen P. Duggan, Ph.D., Director of the Institute of
International Education*

The following article is the result of a visit made by the writer to the countries of western and southern Europe last summer and fall to study conditions of higher education there. In a brief article like this only the salient features can be mentioned. I shall first state those which apply to the European countries generally and then those which apply only to the individual countries. In each case I shall try to indicate how the educational relations between the foreign countries and the United States are affected.

GENERAL

1. The universities of the allied countries, and, no doubt of the enemy countries, are very congested this year and will probably be so for the next few years. Large numbers of the men who have been in the army during the past four years have returned to the universities and these, with the normal annual addition, have placed great burdens upon the housing and teaching facilities of the universities. Oxford and Cambridge have been compelled to lighten the restrictions as to where students may reside in order that the students may be housed at all.

The chief result for the United States of this condition is an intensification in Europe of the belief already held by most educational authorities, that exchange of students between the United States and Europe should be confined to graduate students. As this is the opinion expressed by the majority of college presidents in this country in answer to a questionnaire which I addressed to them last spring, there is agreement upon the subject on both sides of the ocean.

2. Not only will the universities of Europe be congested with students this year but there will be a dearth of teachers. Some of the university professors who went into the service of the government have not yet been relieved of such service; a few, though not so many as in the United States, will not return to university work; a considerable number, especially among the younger teachers, were killed. The French universities especially have been hard hit by the war. At least 25 per cent of the teaching staff of all the lycées and universities were killed; the great school of Education, the École Normale, lost 80 per cent of its staff. As there could be no recruiting of teachers during the war owing to the absence of men at the front, the handicap is obvious.

The chief result for the United States of this dearth of teachers is the unwillingness of the foreign universities to spare teachers as exchange or visiting professors during the present year and possibly for the next few years, though, as will be indicated later on, there would be no refusal to a request made by an institution in the United States.

3. A desire, amounting to a determination, to enter into closer relations with the universities of the United States, was expressed by the educational authorities and university officials of all the countries I visited. The officers of the American army who became students in the French and British universities during the last semester made a most favorable impression. In Great Britain, France and Italy, modifications of the requirements for degrees have either been made or are contemplated, largely in order to make residence in their universities more attractive to Americans. I shall indicate what these are in discussing each country. Movements are on foot in practically all these countries to establish fellowships for the exchange of students. The desire to have American professors at their universities was expressed in every country, but because of the poverty in the foreign universities resulting from the war, such professors would have to be at least partially supported in their stay from funds provided in the United States. This will to a considerable extent be true of foreign students coming

to the universities of the United States, though no such suggestion was made by the people on the other side.

4. The British Government have invited representatives from all the universities of the British Empire to an imperial educational conference at London in July, 1921. In practically every country the hope was expressed that at the close of the British Imperial Conference, an international educational conference might be held at Geneva to which the delegates attending the London conference might go. If this hope is to be realized the United States must take the initiative. It is better off financially to undertake it, and it is free from the distrust with which some of the countries of Europe regard others. The hope was also generally expressed that the League of Nations would at an early date establish as one of its bureaus a Commission on Education.

5. Everywhere the hope was expressed that the university authorities in the United States might come to some agreement with those of foreign countries as to uniform treatment of each other's degrees. One prominent university in the United States accepts, e.g., the French Baccalaureat given at the close of the lycée course for admission to studies for the doctorate. Another, equally prominent, demands an additional year of preparation. A third demands two additional years of preparation. This diversity of treatment is confusing to the educational authorities in Europe. Moreover there is the greatest need in the European countries of an accredited list of American colleges whose degrees might be accepted by their universities. It is as well known there as here that many American colleges are but glorified high schools, but it is not as well known which are.

GREAT BRITAIN

1. Every one of the British universities has now established the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and this was in part due to a desire to have graduate students from the United States. Such students should know of the differ-

ence in method in graduate work in the American and in the British universities. Here, the graduate student is more or less suspect if he does not attend lectures; there, no attention is paid to his absence from lectures. Here, he receives considerable supervision in his work from his professors; there, he is expected to depend almost wholly upon his resources. At Oxford a man may have any amount of personal help but it is left to him to ask for it. This means that only responsible and self-reliant students should be sent from the United States to British universities.

2. The recent action of the Oxford authorities in abolishing one of the requirements for the Rhodes scholarships, viz., the examination in Greek, has received general approval in England as it is hoped that thereby a more typical body of men will come from the United States. As but about 1 per cent of students in American colleges study Greek, it is evident that Rhodes scholars, however excellent they may have been hitherto, cannot have been typical of American students. The action of Cambridge in abolishing the requirement of Greek for a degree will in all probability be followed by similar action at Oxford this scholastic year—at least for a degree in all subjects except Letters. This will, of course, make those universities more attractive to American students.

3. Provision for the education of women in Great Britain is much more generous than is generally supposed in the United States. Not only are there two colleges at Cambridge and four "halls" at Oxford, but every provincial university provides for them. Some of the hostels for women students at the provincial universities are very beautiful and commodious, and in the Scottish universities the accommodations are particularly generous. Glasgow University has more women students lodged in Queen Margaret College than any other British university. Nevertheless, the congestion in the women's colleges is as great as in the men's. Not only can no American women be received at Oxford and Cambridge this year, but only the best of the candidates for admission among British students have been selected. The suggestion has been made to

relieve congestion at Cambridge by the erection of another college for women, but it has by no means aroused universal enthusiasm there. They are agitating the admission of women to Oxford degrees, and the Associated Press recently carried a dispatch saying that the statute had been passed. Women have long been able to take examinations at Oxford and to get everything but the actual degree.

4. There exists a feeling in the British universities that the exchange of teachers between the universities of the two countries should not be confined to teachers of the highest grade. Teachers of that grade might come as "visiting" professors who would not spend all their time at one university but would deliver a series of lectures successively at several universities. On the other hand, a real knowledge of the relative advantages of the systems of educational administration in the two countries might best be secured were a teacher of the grade of assistant professor in an American university to undertake the regular work of a teacher of similar grade in an English university and vice versa. The American teacher would probably return enthusiastic for a system wherein he need not devote nearly all of his time to recitations and administrative work, but might have the necessary leisure to keep informed of the advances made in his subject.

5. The provincial universities have always received grants from the government, but Oxford and Cambridge have until recently refused such grants, fearing governmental control of their policies. All the universities were hard hit by the war, however, and last year even the two old universities asked for grants. Mr. Fisher at once appointed a commission to study their financial status. It is obvious, I think, that an evolution is taking place in Oxford and Cambridge towards an organization in which the colleges will count for less and the university for more. No college has sufficient funds to provide the facilities for laboratories and libraries required by modern education. The university has practically no funds. But it is significant that whatever gifts have been made in recent years to Oxford and Cambridge have been made to the university

and not to one of the colleges. There is a strong movement on foot in England to interest people of wealth to support higher education in the way such people do in the United States.

6. Even before the war, the desire for closer relations with the universities of foreign countries had existed in the universities of Great Britain and had resulted in the establishment of the Universities Bureau of the British Empire. Last year the government appropriated £5000 for its use and it has opened extensive headquarters at 50 Russell Square, London. Certainly there is great need of knowledge in each country about the systems of higher education in others, and the establishment in each of a central clearing house of information and advice is the first step in supplying the need.

FRANCE

1. The British universities are not the only ones that hope that the stream of students which formerly flowed to Germany may be diverted to other shores. The French justifiably believe that many such students will hereafter seek graduate work with them. A strong belief is held in France that it would be to the advantage of an American student to spend his first year in a provincial university and his second at Paris rather than both at Paris. There are few subjects in which French provincial universities have not eminent teachers, and the life in a provincial university town is more typical of French life than is that of Paris. American students going to France on scholarships ought to receive advice about the possibilities of study in the provincial universities as well as at Paris. In fact, the need of a comprehensive booklet on opportunities for study in France is more pronounced when one considers the independent institutions that are not controlled by the Ministry of Public Instruction. Most technical schools in France come within the supervision of the *Ministère du Commerce*; some are municipal undertakings, and such splendid institutions as the School of Tropical Medicine at Bordeaux, the School of Decorative Art at Limoges, or even the School

of Commerce at Paris might not be listed in a publication of the ministry of public instruction.

2. Several of the French universities have summer sessions and at the provincial universities especially, excellent courses in the French language and literature have been organized for the benefit of teachers from Great Britain and the United States. The French are anxious also that the practice should be revived whereby groups of students were organized annually before the war in both countries to visit places of interest throughout France during the summer vacation.

3. The interest in attracting American students to French universities has resulted in several changes. In Paris and other universities, special courses for foreign students have been added to the regular courses, such as Cours de Civilisation française, and Cours de droit. The Medical School of Paris has started graduate courses open to all fully qualified graduates of American Medical Schools on the accredited list. Moreover, clinical teaching has been placed on a broader basis than before the war, and most of the lectures are provided with summaries in English, Spanish and Portuguese.

4. In addition to the Licence ès Lettres, Licence ès Sciences and Diplôme d'Etudes supérieures which are accessible to American students having the bachelor's degree from accredited institutions, the French universities have two doctorate degrees to offer to graduate and research students:

a. *Doctorat ès Lettres or ès Sciences*, sometimes known as "Doctorat d'Etat" because it is conferred by the state and is the essential qualification which university lecturers and professors are expected to possess. To secure this degree a candidate must already have obtained the Licence ès Lettres or ès Sciences; the theses represent years of research. For these reasons, the average Frenchman does not seek this degree, which is secured by a few specialists only; foreign students seldom secure it at all. It may be noted, however, that the Doctorat d'Etat of either description is open to foreign students whose qualifications

have been accepted by the French Minister for Public Instruction as equivalent to the Licence ès Lettres or ès Sciences.www.libtool.com.cn

b. Doctorat d'Université—(Sciences, Literature, Medicine, Law, Pharmacy)—is conferred by a university, not by the government, and does not entitle its holder to a lectureship in a French university. Candidates should possess either the Licence ès Lettres or ès Sciences or any such diplomas as may prove acceptable to the university council. There is a requirement of four semesters of work and the presentation of a thesis. As most Frenchmen who seek a doctorate do so with the intention to lecture in a French university, the Doctorat d'Université is mostly sought after by foreigners. Hence there is a feeling among some that it is an inferior degree. This is wholly wrong. The degree is in every way the equivalent of the German or American Ph.D. Following the controversy that arose sometime ago in France over the respective merits of the state doctorate, several changes have been suggested which would meet the case of the foreigner. It is probable that the French universities will consult the American universities with a view to the establishment of a scheme that would insure a better selection and more thorough supervision of such American students as might wish to obtain the Doctorat d'Université.

5. The French educational authorities are so anxious to continue spreading French culture and influence abroad that they will always find the necessary exchange or visiting professors. It must be remembered that it is far more difficult for an American professor to teach in a French university than vice versa. A graduate student in a French university seeking the doctor's degree has a much greater stake in passing the examination than does an American student, for success entitles him to a state position with valuable rewards and emoluments. The French professor, therefore, has certain definite responsibilities which would be difficult for an American professor in his place to assume.

6. Greater progress in the exchange of students with the United States has been made by France than by any other

country. In addition to the pre-war fellowships that enabled our students in the various fields of art to study in Paris, ~~others have been~~ founded since the war. The Association of American Fellowships in French Universities this year established ten such, worth \$1000 each, and expect to increase the number to twenty-five. The French government has also established twenty scholarships for American girls in French Lycées covering tuition, board and lodging, and two in the Ecole Normale de Sèvres. Two years ago, 120 French girls were given scholarships in American colleges and universities under the auspices of the Association of American Colleges. This year, the total number of French girls in residence has been increased to 181. 26 men have also been distributed among the leading American institutions. Most of these men are graduate students in economics, medicine, engineering and law. Moreover the American army students who spent a semester in French universities, after the armistice, collected 75,000 francs from which to allot 5355 francs to each of fourteen French universities to enable its representative to study this year in a university of the United States. These relationships have become so important that, thanks to funds provided by the French government, the "Office National des Universités et Ecoles françaises" has been able to appoint a permanent representative in the United States, who is in charge of all university relationships with the United States. In New York as well as in Paris, the Office National des Universités is acting as a bureau of information with a view to organizing university affairs with foreign nations.

ITALY

1. Except students of art or of the classics who study in the American School at Rome, few American students go to Italy for purposes of study. It is equally true that few Italian students enter American universities. Of the four great culture nations of western Europe, Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany, Italy has had the least influ-

ence culturally upon the United States. In this respect the millions of Italian immigrants have had practically no influence. They are almost wholly of the laboring class, entirely devoted to improving their material condition, and are ignorant of the glorious contributions of their country to art, science and literature. Moreover, the Italian Government and the intellectual class have until recently not been animated, as have the French, by a great desire to spread the influence of the national culture throughout the world. The Alliance Française is an international institution. The Società Dante Alighieri is relatively unknown.

The war has effected a change in this respect. The great outpouring of sympathy and assistance for stricken France on the part of Americans astonished the Italians, who believed themselves equally deserving of it but failed to receive it in anything like the same degree. They rightly ascribe their failure partially to an ignorance of their country and culture by Americans, which they are most anxious to remove. They are very desirous to establish a system of exchange of professors between Italy and the United States. Despite the fact that few American professors speak Italian and few Italian professors speak English, such an exchange is by no means impossible. In fact, a distinguished Italian professor is lecturing in the colleges of the United States this year, who will in all probability remain next year. And a distinguished American professor will lecture in the Italian universities next year. The Italians would also welcome American students to their universities, and there is much for an American student to learn in Italy in addition to the classics and the various branches of art.

SWITZERLAND

1. Nowhere did I meet a greater anxiety for closer co-operation with the United States than in Switzerland. The great desire of the Swiss to intensify the spirit of national unity which was roused by the war resulted in a considerable exchange of students between the universities of French and of German Switzerland. Now they wish to extend this

movement to other countries. There have always been large numbers of foreign students at the Swiss universities, especially at Zurich and Geneva. They come, however, chiefly from central and eastern Europe and the Balkans—few from the United States and western Europe. The Swiss understand that the flow of American and English students to German universities will be stopped for some years at least and they would like to see it diverted to Switzerland. They believe that the universities of German Switzerland can give the best developments of German culture to foreign students without any of its unpleasant associations, and they are deliberately starting out to organize ways and means to attract them, especially Americans and British. In all probability the exponents of German culture who will visit the United States for some years to come will be professors from Switzerland.

2. The seven universities of Switzerland are all cantonal and, like the universities of the United States, are not all of equal importance. They are found at Basle, Berne, Zurich, Geneva, Lausanne, Fribourg and Neuchâtel. The lack of unity among them is shown in the efforts made by the individual universities to make themselves known in other countries. Basle, for example, has recently published a catalog in English, for distribution in England and the United States, which has not only full descriptions of courses, terms, fees and degrees but of living expenses, social opportunities and sports. In addition it is beautifully illustrated. Last year the Swiss Association of University Professors was formed, and it is hoped there will result a greater unity of effort among the seven institutions.

SPAIN

1. Two years ago a devoted band of Spanish scholars and educators determined that the Spanish universities should be put abreast of those of the other countries of western Europe. The two essentials in accomplishing this were the removal of the blight of extreme centralization in higher education and the grant of sufficient funds to intro-

duce research upon a worthy scale. These were secured last year, and a complete revolution took place in the administration of Spanish higher education. From being the most completely centralized system it has become the most completely decentralized. Every one of the eleven universities are made absolutely autonomous. The connecting bond is the Board of Higher Studies, to which has been granted a considerable annual appropriation of money to encourage research and to organize close relationships with other countries.

2. The Spaniards have finally awakened to the opportunity which has been so long at their doors to enter into closer relations with the Spanish-speaking countries of the two Americas, and an earnest effort is being made to do so. Next May a congress will be held in Madrid of representative students from all the Latin-American countries of North and South America which, it is hoped, will result in a steady flow of students from those countries to the mother country. But the Board of Higher Studies will not confine its attention to the Spanish-American countries. It has noted that more than 200,000 students in the United States are studying Spanish and has organized a scheme to take advantage of this interest in Spanish culture in order to develop closer cultural relations with the United States.

a. It has arranged to invite research professors from the United States to go to Spain at the expense of the Board to train the brightest of their young men in modern research methods.

b. It has arranged to send Spanish graduate students to American universities upon government fellowships.

c. It has already organized courses in the Spanish language and literature which are given in Madrid during the summer vacations for teachers from foreign countries, especially English-speaking countries. The Board has arranged that the transportation, tuition and living expenses shall be reduced to a minimum.

d. It has organized for foreign students courses not only in the Spanish languages and literature but in other subjects

like Spanish history and the history of Moorish art. It has provided a dormitory in Madrid for women students where they can live under the most suitable conditions and at a minimum expense.

e. It has arranged to assist Spanish residents in New York and in other important cities of the United States to establish a Casa Española which will be a center of Spanish culture where lectures, art exhibits, musicales and other activities may be held.

No better method for developing international good will exists than the establishment of intimate relations between the universities of different countries by means of the interchange of teachers and especially of students. It would be difficult to calculate the influence that the German universities exerted upon American culture and education through the hundreds of students from our universities that studied in them. I venture to express the belief, however, that although some American students will always go to foreign universities to study special subjects, the number will never reach anything like that which formerly prevailed. Even before the war it was a diminishing number, and the war increased the confidence of Americans in their own universities. In fact, so great has been the admiration in foreign countries for the achievement of the United States in the war that in all probability the stream of student travel will be directed to our country rather than from it. Foreign students may be expected to come in increasing numbers to our universities to study the applied sciences, medicine, engineering, agriculture, education, social service, business administration and journalism. And although in the years immediately succeeding the war it should be the pleasure of Americans to help the stricken countries of Europe to educate their young men and women upon fellowships in our universities, that should be a passing phenomenon. The thousands of foreign students who crowded the German universities before the war were attracted to them not by scholarships, for none existed. They went because they believed they could get what

they wanted in the German universities better than anywhere else. I am convinced that the same opinion will be increasingly held of the American universities and that thousands of foreign students will be attracted to them without scholarships. It is to be hoped that American university authorities will devote some attention to providing for their comfort, convenience and happiness as well as for their studies.

THE FUTURE OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE¹

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By Hiram Bingham, Litt.D., Professor of Latin American History, Yale University

Six years ago I published a little book in which I undertook to show that one of our most popular shibboleths, the Monroe Doctrine, had become obsolete. It now becomes my duty to admit that the book was founded upon premises which have turned out to be false.

In the first place, I assumed that when we said Monroe Doctrine we referred to that presidential message prepared in 1823 by President Monroe under the influence of his able Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams. A great part of that message has become obsolete. The sentence "With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered and shall not interfere," became obsolete in 1898 and has had no force since then. The sentences immediately preceding and following it, however, in which Monroe says that we should consider any attempt on the part of the European powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety," and that "we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing . . . or controlling, in any other manner," the destiny of the independent American governments "by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States," are still very much alive and in the future must be extended so as to cover both European and Asiatic powers.

When the American people say they believe in the Monroe Doctrine and that it has a future, they do not mean to subscribe to the balanced policy laid down by President Monroe, but rather to the spirit which prompted John

¹ A paper presented before the American Historical Association at its Annual Meeting in Cleveland, Ohio, December 30, 1919.

Quincy Adams to reject the proposals of Canning and to enunciate the doctrine that the United States proposes to look out for the western hemisphere and does not need or care for European interference in so doing. Further than this it hardly needs to be said that the words of the Monroe Doctrine have been twisted and turned to mean many different things or that public writers have never been willing to agree as to details

In the second place, my thesis was based on the supposition that European nations had long since lost their tendency towards despotism and were quite as democratic as many American republics. And that therefore it seemed ridiculous for us to pretend that the Monroe Doctrine was a necessary element in our foreign policy.

It is hard to realize today what things we regarded as axioms six years ago. Although in my little book I did say "it is conceivable that there may come a day when threatened foreign invasion or racial migration will make it appear advisable for us to reassert the principles of the original doctrine of America for the Americans," I had not the slightest inkling of an idea that one of the great world powers would begin in 1914 to give an exhibition of military despotism such as had not been seen since the days of the Huns and the Vandals. It hardly need be said that any one who would have ventured to predict that a nation to which we looked for advanced ideas in education, science, and efficiency, which our students of municipal affairs visited in order to study improved social conditions, whose masterly handling of the difficult problems of foreign trade and international exchange won the admiration of our leading business men, and whose ability to promote scientific research for its own sake won the approval of our foremost educators—that such a nation would be capable of turning back the clock one thousand years, carrying on piracy on a gigantic scale, rejoicing in the murder of women and children, approving the action of naval officers in sinking life boats filled with non-combatants, and breaking at pleasure scores of rules which had been formulated and adopted by the civilized nations of the world—anyone who

would have ventured to predict such an event would have been considered to be mentally unbalanced or guilty of the wildest jingoism. Yet these are things which we have actually seen come to pass during the past six years.

In the third place, it was assumed that the stronger powers of South America would naturally be willing to join us in defending the Americas from any possible aggression on the part of the powers of the Old World. Although one of these powers—Brazil—always our best friend among the southern republics, did so join us during the World War, the most important temperate zone powers—Argentina and Chile—declined to sacrifice any chances of gain by placing themselves with the Allies, and refused to fight against the enemy of civilization. Furthermore, it is well known that Mexico stood ready to aid our enemy and the enemy of republican institutions as far as she possibly could. The case of Mexico was, perhaps, not surprising in view of her contempt for our citizens and their property.

The attitude of Argentina and Chile, however, was most surprising and unexpected. That Cuba should have been willing to join us immediately shows that our policy of intervention in Cuba whenever interior conditions have made it necessary has made us friends, instead of enemies as so many feared would be the case. On the other hand our unwillingness to intervene effectively in Mexico has made us enemies instead of friends. Furthermore, German influence in Argentina and Chile was sufficiently strong to prevent those republics from joining the cause of France in her hour of trial.

Viscount Bryce said in summing up the question of South American affinities, the South Americans "have an intellectual affinity for France, for the brightness of her ideas, the gaiety of her spirit, the quality of her sentiment. . . . In South America French influence reigns supreme." Yet the great temperate zone republics of South America refused to join us in helping France in her extremity.

In the fourth place, I believed that the great war of the future was to be fought with commercial rather than mili-

tary weapons. Repeated visits to South America convinced me that Germany was getting tremendous advantage commercially. Her merchant marine was successfully competing with that of England and was keeping ours from raising its head. The close combination between her bankers, manufacturers, and diplomats was proving a tremendous obstacle to our success. Many of the leading South Americans ridiculed the Monroe Doctrine and hated us for supporting it. I felt that it would be greatly to our advantage in the coming commercial struggle to abandon the doctrine and establish a Pan American concert of the powers as had been suggested by Prof. Theodore S. Woolsey in *Scribner's Magazine* in 1908.

The World War and the events of the last few years have shown that I was mistaken.

The Monroe Doctrine, which was becoming obsolete in 1913, is now no longer obsolete but is more firmly held than ever before and has a very definite future sphere of usefulness.

Germany has shown us that human nature has not changed in the possibilities to which it may go in acting on the unregenerate principle that *might makes right*. Germany has shown us that any foreign policy we may adopt which neglects the possibility of a world power seeking imperial conquest by force of arms is blind and feeble. Our foreign policy for the next generation must be based on lessons learned from what we have seen during the past five years. Germany has taught us many bitter lessons which we as lovers of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness would rather not have learned. If we show ourselves unwilling to face these lessons in all their ugly nakedness, if we prefer to obscure them with the smoke of sacrifices to some Utopian goddess of Peace-without-Preparedness, our children must suffer the consequences.

No one knows what will come out of present conditions in Russia. We hope for the best but we must prepare for the worst. If such selfish tyrants as Lenine and Trotzsky succeed in becoming the new czars of that great empire and utilizing its tremendous resources to crush the rule of government "of the people, by the people, and for the

people," wherever they can do so, we must be prepared to demonstrate the efficacy of the Monroe Doctrine to keep any such tyranny from operating successfully in the western hemisphere, no matter what ingenious phrases it may use to deceive lovers of liberty and independence.

There appears to be in Japan a powerful, highly intelligent administration resembling in many ways the Prussian military caste. This group appears at present to be guiding the destinies of the Japanese Empire. Many of the best friends of Japan, who believe in her people and in their aspirations, admit that the weighty arguments of the military caste by which they endeavor to convince the Japanese people that all of Japan's gains during the past century have come from military successes are highly significant.

Such arguments, like those used by pan-German writers during the present generation, will lead to future wars unless the Japanese people decree otherwise. We have never done much to make Japan love us or desire our friendship. We have frankly told her that her citizens were not welcome in this country. It seems probable that our policy of Japanese exclusion will continue for many years to come. The only way we can keep peace with Japan is by maintaining her respect rather than her regard. It would be greatly to her favor to secure a naval base on the Mexican coast. Many people in Mexico would regard such action with joy. It is obvious that the Monroe Doctrine must be maintained to give advanced notice that any such action on the part of Japan would be regarded as "the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States."

The nature of the various republics that border on the Caribbean Sea, their proximity to us and to the Panama Canal, and the strategic importance of their ports, so far as our national defense is concerned, make our interests in the Caribbean Sea paramount to all others. The acquisition by Germany, Russia or Japan, of a naval base in the Caribbean is unthinkable. A close alliance between any of the Caribbean republics and one of the great powers of the eastern hemisphere could not be tolerated. The need of

pursuing a carefully prepared policy of self-preservation has been borne in on us by the acts of Germany. As a people we do not wish to pursue an aggressive policy. At the same time, the fact that only a few months ago one of the greatest nations in the world was pursuing selfish aggrandizement in a thoroughgoing and pitiless manner, unrestrained by any handicaps of human sympathy, makes us realize the importance of looking fearlessly at the Caribbean problem. The condition of the Caribbean republics is such as to cause us grave concern for their welfare and for ours.

If there were more than one world power in the western hemisphere or if there were likely to be more than one during the present generation we should be obliged to look at this problem from a different angle. In the eastern hemisphere there are half a dozen world powers. Many of them are constantly rubbing elbows. While it is true that the world is smaller than it was before the days of steamships and airships nothing that man has done has served to make it as easy to cross the stormy Atlantic as it is to rush an army across a continental frontier. While it is true that the advance of the science of mechanical engineering has shortened the distance across the Pacific Ocean it has also shortened the distance between Peking and Petrograd. Army motor cars, tanks, and airplanes can be operated successfully over continental boundaries but not across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Everything that makes the world smaller intensifies the problems of the eastern hemisphere and of the western hemisphere, besides making each more cognizant of the problems of the other. Some writers seem to forget this and to feel that modern invention has overcome the handicap of oceans and the isolation made by stormy seas.

Since we are the only world power in the western hemisphere our duty to ourselves, our desire to preserve our own institutions and our own independence as well as our duty to protect the other powers in this hemisphere against possible aggression on the part of European or Asiatic powers, and to prevent such powers from securing bases

from which we or any other American republics might be successfully attacked, becomes evident. If Argentina, Brazil, and Chile were world powers the problem would be different. But they are not yet world powers nor are they likely to become such until they have followed a rough and rugged road and given proof of their faithful adherence to the cause of liberty as well as of their ability to take their place in world movements. Until such time we must not be accused of selfishness if we deem it our duty to maintain the Monroe Doctrine alone against all comers.

It will be agreed that the Panama Canal is one of the most important units in our scheme of national defense. We built it because we saw how long it took the battleship *Oregon* to come from the Pacific to our Atlantic coast and we desired to be able to use our navy to protect whichever coast was most seriously threatened. As has been frequently pointed out by the highest naval authorities, to divide our fleet would be disastrous. To divide it and have it kept apart through hostile control of the Panama Canal would be doubly disastrous. Since the Panama Canal is surrounded by the Caribbean republics it is obvious that instincts of self-preservation will lead us to keep the Monroe Doctrine alive so far as any countries are concerned whose boundaries are near enough to the Panama Canal to permit of their being used successfully as hostile naval bases for operations against the Canal.

These are some of the reasons why the people of the United States have decided to stick to the Monroe Doctrine and not to regard it as being obsolete. It now remains to be considered what form should be taken by the Monroe Doctrine in the future. This is a subject on which every one is bound to have his own opinions and on which as in the past there will be wide diversity of view.

Some of our people wish to see United States troops employed in any part of the world to prevent injustice and oppression. Some enthusiasts would even be willing to see United States troops employed to prevent aggression against any small Balkan State. Whether these Americans would be equally willing to see British troops employed in

Nicaragua to prevent active interference on the part of the United States; whether they would be willing to see French troops used in Haiti to aid the French speaking citizens of that black republic in expelling American marines; is another question. Certainly, the great majority of our people believe that we do not want to see any European or Asiatic troops operating in any part of America. Most of us believe that it would be better not to attempt to enter into acrimonious disputes around the Mediterranean Sea or use our troops for any such purpose. We can do our duty to the world by treating those nations that deserve it with generous consideration both as regards credit and raw material. We can always be counted upon to do what we did in 1917 and come to the armed assistance of France or Italy if Germany or Russia threaten to crush their civilization. But it is hardly feasible for us to consider entering into the rights and wrongs of disputes between the smaller European powers.

On the other hand, it is obvious that we must maintain a most active form of the Monroe Doctrine so far as the Caribbean republics are concerned. In this regard I have come to agree entirely with President Roosevelt's ideas on the Monroe Doctrine. "Our attitude in Cuba is sufficient guaranty of our own good faith. We have not the slightest desire to secure any territory at the expense of any of our neighbors." "All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous." "If every country washed by the Caribbean Sea would follow the program in stable and just civilization which Cuba has shown . . . all questions of interference by this nation with their affairs would be at an end." "The adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impotence to the exercise of an international police power." In these sentences Theodore Roosevelt outlined what I believe to be necessary in the Monroe Doctrine of the immediate future.

As a matter of fact, this has been our policy even under an administration that has made much of the phrase "racial

self-determination." Nicaragua, Haiti, and Santo Domingo—flagrant cases of chronic wrong-doing and of inability to "act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters," (Roosevelt's Message to the 58th Congress, 3d Session), unable to guarantee peace to their own citizens are kept in order by armed men wearing the uniform of the United States.

The history of some of the Caribbean republics shows that "self determination" is not necessarily a guaranty of liberty and that the right to rule sometimes leads to the practice of misrule. It seems to be our duty to say both for our own sake and for the sake of the other members of the family of nations that whenever a Caribbean republic makes it impossible for its citizens to enjoy the blessings of peace and to take their part in the work of the world, it must lose temporarily that delightful privilege of self-determination until such time as it will cease to abuse it and learn how to use it. The privilege of independence creates the responsibility of recognizing certain obligations to the family of nations. If you want to be free to take your part as an independent unit of that family we shall be glad to help you acquire and maintain this freedom, but if you want to be free to hold a continuous revolution, to protect the operations of murderous bandits, to kidnap and kill foreign engineers who happen to be American citizens, if you want to be free to steal from all those who are weak and defenseless, you must lose that form of freedom.

In other words, we owe it to the progress of the world and to the world's need for its natural resources to see to it that the republics of Tropical America behave like citizens of the world rather than like pirates or members of savage head-hunting tribes.

It has been said that the Monroe Doctrine is no stronger than our army and navy make it. That is partly true. An active Monroe Doctrine such as it should be our policy to maintain in the future as regards the Caribbean Sea must be backed up by a sufficiently strong army and navy to make it immediately effective in case of necessity. This is the surest way of maintaining peace and prosperity in the Caribbean Sea.

As regards the Temperate Zone republics of South America, we may well maintain a latent Monroe Doctrine—a Monroe Doctrine whose strength will not depend on our actual army and navy, but on our potential military strength when called upon to exercise it.

As soon as Germany saw what our potential army was going to be on the western front she realized that she could not possibly win and must accept the best possible terms that she could secure.

If we maintain a latent Monroe Doctrine so far as concerns the republics of the South Temperate Zone in the western hemisphere we need not have a sufficient military force for immediate action, but we should be ready to say that we would consider any attempt on the part of any Asiatic or European power to form close alliances with that or any other portion of this hemisphere "as dangerous to our peace and safety." Our attitude towards these republics, particularly towards the governments of Argentina and Chile, should be one of dignified friendship. There is no necessity for us to adopt any air of patronage toward them, nor should we expect them to be grateful to us for maintaining a doctrine which is more to our advantage than to theirs, even though it would be of tremendous importance to them to realize that we should be ready to come to their assistance in case of possible aggression on the part of European or Asiatic powers.

Finally, the immediate future of the Monroe Doctrine means intervention in Mexico.

Those who advocate intervention in Mexico are nearly always accused or suspected of being financially interested in that republic. For this reason I should like to state that I have no investments nor any business connections in that unfortunate country and never have had.

We have followed a policy of partial intervention and partial watchful waiting which has been largely responsible for present conditions in Mexico. We have meddled to overthrow a president chosen at a national election. We have failed to take steps to prevent the murdering of several hundred American citizens. By our attitude we have

encouraged the bad Mexicans to do their worst and have discouraged the good Mexicans from attempting their best. ~~Our adherence to~~ the Monroe Doctrine prevents other nations from taking steps to help Mexico to get on her feet. It seems to me that it is our duty to announce that we will accept the burden of doing for Mexico what we did for Cuba. We do not want any Mexican territory. We do not want special concessions nor do we desire to secure special advantages for American citizens. On the other hand, we do not propose to tolerate the present condition of affairs any longer. We should plan to introduce a sufficiently large force to preclude the likelihood of much blood shed.

When we practiced armed intervention in Cuba hardly a country in the world believed that we would get out when the job was finished. Our record in Cuba is one of the things to which we can point with utmost pride. We can Cubanize Mexico. It would probably take longer and would certainly take more men. We should go in on the distinct understanding and open announcement that we did not propose to stay any more than we stayed in Cuba, but that we did propose to help Mexico get on her feet and establish a strong, independent government which could guarantee her own people peace and happiness and guarantee to the citizens of other countries the exercise of their normal rights to life and property.

We are at the present time in a strategic position so far as trained officers and men are concerned, as well as regards the possession of munitions, so that it would be particularly difficult for Mexican jingoes to minimize the practicability of American intervention once we had determined upon it or to expect that it would fizzle out as did our visit to Vera Cruz and Pershing's attempt to capture Villa. Of course, after such an exhibition as we did give Mexico, many Mexicans would at first be inclined to disbelieve our ability to achieve successful military occupation. The seizure of her seaports by our navy and the occupation of her railroads and principal cities by our army would, however, soon convince the most radical gringo haters of our ability to Cubanize Mexico as well as our willingness to do so.

Notwithstanding the dismal forebodings of our calamity howlers and the accusations leveled at all those who were willing to have America assume the burdens of war, we have a record that we may be proud of not only in Cuba but also in France. There has been no demand in this country that Germany should pay us a great indemnity or should reimburse us for our heavy taxes and the dislocation of our normal activities. There has been no thought of securing a share of Germany's colonies. Our actions as well as our words have not shown any desire to profit from our entry into the European war except as we with the rest of the world are benefited by the downfall of the Prussian military caste. Consequently we need not fear to announce that in the future one of our duties to the world for the benefit of all concerned will be the maintenance of a strong Monroe Doctrine—latent in Temperate America, active in Tropical America, and immediately effective in Mexico.

THE BALKAN SITUATION

*By Albert H. Lybyer, Ph.D., Professor of History,
University of Illinois*

The commencement of the war was in the Balkans, and its end began there, when in September, 1918, mutinous Bulgarian regiments opened a gap in the line of the Central Powers on the Salonica front, after which the vigorous advance of the Entente troops led to the first of the series of armistices. But the peace did not begin in the Balkans, nor by March, 1920, had anyone of the Balkan peoples become certain of its political boundaries or its prospects for the immediate future. The world, and the United States as much as any country, has for the present given its attention elsewhere, and shows little interest in that region, which has been for centuries in a political sense one of the most active areas of recurrent volcanic disturbance on the earth's surface. It was the fond and fervent hope of many that the peace settlement now in progress would give security to the Balkan area. It seemed not too much to expect that boundaries could be arranged which after a time each people would be able to accept as just, and that during the transition period a World League would be in operation in whose essential fairness all would be able to trust. But nowhere in the new map of the world except perhaps in the proposals for the partition of Turkey, does there seem destined to be less harmony between ethnographic and political lines than in the Balkan peninsula, nowhere in an equal space more violation of "self-determination," and nowhere a greater certainty that a revision of the boundaries, if not by peaceful processes, than by renewal of war, is inevitable.

Six peoples occupy considerable areas in the Balkan peninsula; in the order of the appearance there of men speaking their languages, they are the Albanians, Greeks,

Rumanians, Serbians (including Montenegrins), Bulgarians and Turks. If on any ethnographical map prepared by disinterested scientists, the boundaries arranged or projected at present be drawn, it will be seen not only that most doubts stand resolved in favor of the second, third, and fourth of these peoples, but that a number of areas indisputably Albanian, Bulgarian, and Turkish are being assigned to others.

To be somewhat more specific, it is proposed to reduce the Albania of 1913, which was then cut somewhat too close at the north and the south, by further considerable subtractions at each end in favor of Yugoslavia and Greece. The remainder, further mutilated by assigning Valona and its neighborhood to Italy, is then to be placed under Italian "protection" with or without the consent of the inhabitants. Not only are those Bulgarian portions of Macedonia which were given to Serbia and Greece in 1913 to be left under alien rule, but four other areas, small to be sure, but containing no Serbians, are to be taken from Bulgaria and given to Serbia. Bulgaria has been compelled to surrender her outlet to the Aegean Sea, and has been granted no righting of the wrong done her in the Dobruja in 1913. As for the Turks, the world is little disposed to allow self-determination to peoples of the Moslem faith, but if it were so disposed, the claims of Greece to Bulgarian and Turkish Thrace could not come into court. In a word, not only do the errors of the treaty of Bucharest of 1913, which liberals in all countries have cried out against ever since, appear to be all in process of receiving the sanction of the Peace Conference and the support of the League of Nations, but other simple errors also are about to be committed and placed under the same high guarantee.

How has this situation come about in a world that has been ringing for years with the demand for the rights of small nations, and that has overflowed with sacrifice for idealistic ends and the removal of causes of war? The historian of a century hence may not be as puzzled as are men of today in explaining the inconsistencies of the peace settlement. It is worth while to endeavor as far as is

humanly possible to look at recent events in Balkan history with his eyes, putting aside the affections and hatreds of postbellum days, striving to evaluate events and estimate political and economic forces without fear or favor, and seeking to assign to each Balkan race as much as but no more than it should have of territorial claims, responsibility for the course of events, and prospective opportunities.

The future historian will trace out and lay bare a maze of Balkan propaganda which will astonish the world. So extensive and pervasive have been the falsification of facts and the deception of public opinion that no news item from the region, no writing by a native of the peninsula whether he be educator, clergyman, scientist, or statesman, and no expression of non-Balkan authors who are partisans to one people or another, can be given credence without the fullest investigation and corroboration. The average American can have little conception of the propagandist cast which during the past five years has been given to all information that has come to him concerning the Balkans. News was subject to adulteration—or indeed sheer invention—at many points from the place of origin through the means of transmission to the news and editorial rooms of the greatest American dailies; editors, statesmen, and speakers were cultivated with the greatest care; every address that was made or article written on the Balkans was scrutinized carefully, and if it contained anything friendly to Bulgarians, Albanians, or Turks, or anything critical of the claims of Greece, Serbia, or Rumania, an answer was promptly prepared, whose energy of statement was often equalled only by its disregard of fact. Every element of “war psychology” was cunningly turned to account by the identification of the former three peoples with the enemy (although the United States has never been at war with one of them, and none of them has ever desired to fight us).

After the armistice all these practices were multiplied ten-fold, with the aim of influencing American opinion, which was little informed as to the true state of affairs in the Balkans, to acquiesce in preposterous claims, and approve a peace settlement which would satisfy, not the

American ideals of fairness and liberty, but the demands of territorial and financial greed.

To cite but a single example, it is hard to imagine what influences were brought to bear upon Mr. G. Ward Price, "Official Correspondent in the Balkan War Zone," or to what extent his judgment was led astray, before he would send a despatch containing the following statements; and it is hard to see how a great journal would print and reprint them without thought of criticism against their self-evident falsity, except on the basis of much propagandist preparation:

A mile from Sofia, near the main road of Radomir, is a muddy compound about 3 acres in extent, surrounded by barbed wire. On October 23, 1918, there were in this pen 103,000 Serbians of all ages, together with 600 Greek civilians, carried off from Serres and Drama; a smaller body of Russians, and a detachment of French the greater majority of the Serbians had laid out in the open day and night, in wind and rain, summer and winter, many of them for three whole years of captivity. They had no blankets or protection of any kind. . . . For drinking and washing water in this enclosure there was a solitary trickle from one small tap.

Now there never were 103,000 Serbian prisoners in all Bulgaria during the war; nor could the sturdiest Serbians lying in the open without blankets, survive a single night at some periods of the fierce winter on the plain of Sofia; the foregoing falsities are not however self-evident. But if a small calculation be made, it will appear that not only could 104,000 men not lie down on "about 3 acres," but they could not even stand there! Furthermore, if they must all drink from "a solitary trickle," each must get his day's ration of water in four-fifths of a second!¹

¹ Quoted from *New York Times Current History*, xviii, 87. The despatch appeared in the *London Daily Mail*, the *New York Times*, etc., exactly as quoted. It is not impossible that a cipher was inserted by the telegraph agency at Salonica into the number of Serbians mentioned in Mr. Price's despatch. In that case the men in the enclosure might have been able to lie down, but they could not have satisfied their thirst in eight seconds each out of every twenty-four hours. Can it be that *two* ciphers were inserted, and that Mr. Price wrote originally one thousand three hundred? But if so, why did he not offer correction?

Those who know the Balkan peoples cannot be strongly moved by accounts of atrocities committed by anyone of them, especially when presented by citizens of a rival or hostile Balkan state. Not to go farther back in a bloody history which extends over milleniums, but which influences profoundly the thoughts and actions of the present generation, it is necessary only to examine the past twenty-five years to uncover such atrocities on the part of each people—Albanians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Montenegrins, Rumanians, Serbians, Turks—that none has the right to point the finger of scorn at any other. No doubt, even after the large percentage of hearsay, exaggeration, and deliberate untruth has been removed from the charges against Bulgarians, Albanians, and Turks, a sickening amount is left. But Serbians of 1885 and 1913, Greeks of 1913 in Macedonia and of 1919 in the Smyrna region, Rumanians of 1913, 1916, and 1919, and all three in the horrible Macedonian days of 1897 to 1908, have the same revolting cruelties for which to atone.

Many westerners, confused by the din of rival claimants, unsympathetic with the bargaining methods of Oriental business when introduced into affairs of state, and unable from personal observation to ascertain the facts, have become skeptical of the possibility of any reliable knowledge of Balkan history, ethnography, or national sentiment. Nevertheless it is possible to approximate the truth, and the world is under the stern necessity of doing this on penalty of paying an incalculable further price for another attempt to settle this unstable region without fairness, enlightenment, or serious concern for the wishes of the inhabitants. The writer has no brief for any Balkan people. He has studied their problems for twenty years but does not pretend to have any infallible solutions for them. He has sought earnestly for the truth, and so far as he has acquired sympathies, these are based upon nothing but an abhorrence of fraud and falsehood and a desire that every people shall have a "square deal." Furthermore, his comparatively brief period of observation has convinced him that the Hebrew prophets were right in foreseeing punishment,

sometimes speedy but always certain and adequate, for those peoples which break the commandments which forbid to steal, lie, covet, and kill, which in international relations include such matters as forcible annexations, the breaking of treaties, the imposition of punitive indemnities, and attempts to destroy the political unity of a people and partition its territory.

Only a few salient facts can be presented here. Early in 1912 Bulgaria and Serbia formed an alliance for the purpose of fighting Turkey, and perhaps Austria. The treaty provided a method for dividing territories that might be taken from Turkey. Serbia agreed not to claim anything south-east of a line that was carefully laid down across Macedonia. A territory north-west of this line might be submitted to the arbitration of the Czar of Russia. Greece came to agreement with Bulgaria a few weeks later, but nothing was said in their treaty about the partition of territory. It may be that no treaty was made before the first Balkan war between Serbia and Greece, but it is clear that they expected to divide Albania more or less equally between them, and the movements of their armies show clearly their intentions to get as much as possible of Macedonia. Montenegro hoped for considerable extension toward the east. Rumania desired some gain in case the others should win.

The enterprise succeeded with unforeseen rapidity and completeness except for the holding out of Adrianople, Yanina, and Scutari. After these fell, Turkey was compelled to cede nine-tenths of her European territory to the Balkan Allies. The great tragedy came over the disposition of this territory. Austria and Italy insisted that an Albanian area should be set off. Whatever may have been the motives of these powers, the preservation of the Albanian people from a divided subjection was a righteous and salutary act. But the immediate effect was to concentrate the attention of the Serbians and Greeks upon Macedonia as an area to be partitioned.

Much dust has been raised over Macedonia, with the object of obscuring the facts. From Salonica to Monastir

and Uskub, the great majority of the population is Slavic, and nearly all the Slavs from the days of the Bulgarian Empire of the middle ages until 1913 called themselves and were called by their neighbors Bulgarians. Their language is Bulgarian, and when their national sentiment was reawakened in the nineteenth century, they counted themselves Bulgarian. Russian policy in 1878 included them in the greater Bulgaria of San Stefano, following closely the fairly accurate ethnographical maps of the time. They were left to the rule of the Turk, however, because England feared Bulgaria would become a province of Russia, while Austria hoped to secure in the future an outlet at Salonica. Austrian policy strove after 1878 to turn the attention of Serbia, with whom she remained friendly for twenty-five years, away from the closely kindred provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Bulgarians of the valley of the Vardar. In medieval times both the Serbian and the Byzantine Empires have held this territory and people in subjection and some twenty-five years ago Greece also began to present a claim, and to back it, like Bulgaria and Serbia, with school teachers and brigands.

It was Bulgaria's misfortune that all of her "unredeemed" territory fell to be disposed of in 1913, whereas the greater part of that of Serbia was still held with apparent solidity by Austria, of Greece by Turkey, Italy, and Britain; and of Rumania by Austria and Russia. Early in that year the governments of Serbia and Greece began secret negotiations which resulted in the signing of a treaty immediately after Turkey had agreed to the Treaty of London. Mutual support was guaranteed toward holding those parts of Macedonia which each had in military occupation and in case of war with Bulgaria (the possibility of a "sudden attack" by whom was mentioned), a further partition was contemplated extending indefinitely eastward. A month later the Bulgarians, who appear to have known the fact but not the precise contents of the secret treaty, put themselves in the wrong by a sudden attack without a declaration of war.

These facts indicate that the elaborate negotiations between Serbia and Bulgaria looking toward the arbitration of the czar of Russia were only a blind on the part of Serbia, designed to delay matters until the stage should be fully set in Macedonia for the action contemplated in the Serbo-Greek treaty. They paid dearly for this, since their new enemies were able by skillful and unrestrained propaganda to blacken their reputation before the world, and to prepare the way for fixing upon the Bulgarians alone the blame for atrocities in which all participated fully according to their opportunities. Surrounded by enemies, Bulgaria's joy over the achievements of 1912 was turned to mourning. She was assigned by the treaties of 1913 a territory largely filled with mountains and inhabited in considerable proportion by Turks and Pomaks (Bulgarian-speaking Moslems). She was compelled to see nearly a million Bulgarians in Macedonia pass from the rule of the Turks to that of the Greeks and Serbians, to give back to the Turks Adrianople and a considerable area around it, and besides to surrender to Rumania a strip of land in the Dobruja which contained only about 2 per cent of Rumanians.

Many recent calculations of the population of Macedonia and Thrace have more or less deliberately overlooked one important element. In the hatred of Turk for Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian rule; of Bulgarian for Greek, Serbian and Turkish rule; and of Greek and Serbian for Bulgarian and Turkish rule, a very considerable exchange of population took place, often under harrowing conditions, in the years 1912 to 1914. The new portions of Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria lost heavily in non-national and gained decidedly in national elements. Turkish Thrace also saw considerable emigration of Greeks and Bulgarians, and much "consolidation" of Turkish population. Whatever the process, the result was natural and fair, and should be taken fully into account in new dispositions of territory. Greeks from Thrace who settled in "New Greece" in 1913 are not now entitled to recover their former lands unless they give up what they took in the rough exchange.

European diplomacy during the first years of the war was largely occupied with the three Balkan states, Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania. Not many of its documents have been published as yet, and no attempt will be made here to comment on its intricacies. The result was that Bulgaria entered into the side of the Central Powers late in 1915, Rumania on the side of the Entente in August, 1916, and Greece on the side of the Entente in June of 1917. Bulgaria was successful in occupying until the eve of her armistice all and more than all of her "unredeemed" lands; Rumania was defeated, and forced to a severe and humiliating peace early in 1918; and Greece, after very deliberate preparation, helped with the Bulgarian *débauche*.

The government of Radoslavoff had fallen months before the Bulgarian armistice. That of Malinoff held unofficial communication with representatives of the Entente and America, and appeared to have been promised considerate treatment in case it would abandon the Central Powers. It is clear that the Bulgarian people were possessed for some time after the Armistice with the expectation of a "Wilsonian Peace", according to which the Balkan settlement would give them the territory nationally theirs. Only gradually did they become conscious of the fierce hard spirit of the victors, which changed distributive to punitive justice, and sought that idealistic sacrifice and devotion to principle should be rewarded by land and gold.

Among the neighbors of Bulgaria and Albania, those who had done and suffered the least for the Entente cause demanded insistently the most. All the artifices of propaganda—villification of opponents, magnification of self, imagined or cunningly distorted statistics, personal pressure of every sort, adulteration of news, skilful identification of present mediocrity with past genius, reiteration of the false until it seemed to be true—were used without ceasing. All this, however, only created an atmosphere. The real disposition to put through the bizarre plan for "stabilizing" the Balkans was not a matter of science, prejudice, or principle, but of "high policy," that is to say, of the policy of a few men highly placed.

The time has not yet come for assembling and revealing in detail the methods by which the Peace Conference of 1919 arrived at its results. The general lines along which Balkan action was taken appear to have been these. Political and economic arrangements in Europe were on the whole left to France and England in exchange for forbearance elsewhere. The well-agreed, clear-headed French peace commissioners desired to secure themselves against Germany and "Mittel-Europa" by supporting a group of small favored states. These states were to be "strengthened" by giving them large territories and populations within the best attainable military frontiers. The doubtful financial prospects of these states would afford an excellent opportunity for French capitalists and financiers. The states to be favored, in the apparent order of preference, were Greece, Rumania, Poland, Jugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. States not favored were to be trimmed territorially, disarmed, burdened with indemnities too great to be paid, and declared bankrupt under receiverships called "Reparations Commissions." The treatment thus prepared for Germany was applied also to Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

A few comments may be made on this policy. It does not strengthen a state, large or small, to be given unwilling population. Generally speaking, the alien elements should be considered as deducted from, and not added to, the numbers of the predominant group. If to four million Greeks—be added one million Greeks, half a million Bulgarians, and a million and a half Turks, this does not in the long run make a state with the force of seven million Greeks, but one with the force of five million Greeks. After having at so great a cost destroyed large empires, why set up small ones?

Again, if the non-favored states are to be disarmed and chained down, why secure the favored states against them by strategic frontiers located often well within the non-favored territory? The authors of this policy were evidently distrustful of its results. Acting high above the realm of ordinary legality, they nevertheless felt that the non-favored peoples could not be considered morally bound by

treaties which had been prepared without their participation, and which they had signed under compulsion of a fear of indefinite military occupation. By such a policy the favored states will all be compelled to maintain extensive military establishments, both to hold down the unwilling annexed subjected elements, and to be prepared against a recovery of strength and revengeful feeling on the part of the non-favored states. The prospect for the Balkans, and indeed for all Europe, is not pleasing.

A description of present conditions in the different Balkan states must be hardly less tentative than a forecast of the conditions there ten years hence, in view of the fragmentary and often doubtful character of the information obtainable. The attempt has its value, however, as a beginning which can be corrected later.

Albania as created in 1913 contained about 11,000 square miles, with a population of perhaps a million. About an equal number of Albanians (according to the test of home languages) was left, in neighboring portions of Serbia and Greece. Differences of religion and dialect have not prevented the Albanians from retaining a sense of unity, which in recent generations has developed toward a genuine national consciousness. The provisional boundaries of 1913 were unfavorable to the new state at the south, in giving to Greece a section of what was then the only passable road of communication from the Adriatic Sea to the rich Korcha basin, and also at the north in assigning on historical grounds the towns, then Albanian, of Ipek, Diakova, and Prisrend to Serbia, thus separating the Albanians of the hills from their market towns. The government under William of Wied was an experiment which failed to have a fair trial because of the outbreak of the Great War. The prince fled, and Greece and Italy promptly occupied areas at the south. Later Italy extended her holdings, France occupied Korcha, and the Austro-Germans and Bulgarians, after the defeat of Serbia, took possession of the northern half of the area. Although their whole land was thus in the fighting, it can hardly be said that the Albanians themselves took any part in the war.

The mountainous character of most of the country has contributed to prolonging among the people a tribal organization in the north and a feudal régime in the south. The oppressions of the Turkish government were manifested by occasional punitive expeditions, but its backwardness and usual inaction were always visible in the absence of public improvements, such as good roads, bridges, and drainage systems for the fertile lands of the coast plain. Education was repressed not only by Turkish lack of enterprise, but because the leaders of the three religious groups were all disposed to teach in other languages than the Albanian.

Whether Albania can possibly be worse off now than in 1913 is open to question, but certainly nearly everything is lacking there. The best arrangement for the immediate future would be an enlargement of territory sufficient to correct the evils of the 1913 plan, and the temporary guidance of a disinterested nation which would initiate economic improvements, further education in the Albanian language and aid in the development of a unified system of self-government. The energy and ability of the population needs only fair opportunity to build a sturdy little state with qualities like those of the Scotch and the Swiss. The country would start with no capital, but also with no debt, and under efficient management, it could in the long run repay the assisting power in full. Switzerland could perhaps best fulfill the task, dwelling also in a mountainous country, with the habit of road-building, and a system of local liberty. Most of the Albanians in Paris in 1919 asked for the United States as mandatory, often with an urgency of entreaty which could hardly fail to obtain the desired result if it were possible to bring it fully and fairly before the American public. Italy is slated to be the mandatory or protector of Albania. The chief criticisms against this plan are that Italy cannot be considered disinterested, or disposed to withdraw after a time, having long coveted the land; that she needs all her capital for home improvement; that her presence will tend to embroil the Albanians more deeply with their neighbors the Serbians and Greeks; and

that an outside power of great strength will thus be given a firm foothold in the Balkan peninsula. It is of course true that Italy has the power to maintain order, that she has a small Albanian element in her own population which would prevent her action from being wholly unsympathetic, and that she understands the building of roads—at least for military purposes—and the development of economic possibilities.

If the plan of the treaty of London should be carried out, by which considerable areas were to be detached from the north and the south of the Albania of 1913 for the benefit of Serbia and Greece, the prospects of the Albanians would be miserable indeed. Cut into three parts like a small Poland, she must then await freedom through many weary years. While her people would not be likely to lose their home language, they would tend to become grouped as Roman Catholic, Moslem, and Greek Orthodox, and their education would be in Serbian, Italian, and Greek, a separation which would hinder greatly the establishment of reunion. Many of her people would perish in a series of insurrection and brigand operations. In short, left as regards personal liberty worse off than under the Turks, her small area would hold within it the continued possibility of disrupting the world peace.

Bulgaria will contain, if no part of Western Thrace be returned to her, about 35,000 square miles, and 7,500,000 people. At present the Bulgarians have plenty of home-grown food and depreciated paper money, but are very deficient in manufactured products, especially clothing, medicine and hardware. After the heavy losses of three wars, they have made no net progress toward the national unification for which they believed they were fighting. Of excellent repute eight years ago, as steady workers, thirsting for education, disciplined, ready to sacrifice all for freedom, they see themselves now proclaimed as outcasts of civilization. They are not likely again to try the fortune of war, though they have freed themselves from the leaders who lost all for them by bad judgment and shortsighted diplomacy. They seem determined to resume doggedly

the labors of peace, not yet devoid of hope that through the League of Nations some of their territorial wrongs will be righted. Their losses of Macedonia, the four areas assigned to Serbia, and the strip in the Dobruja which Rumania holds, have already been discussed. Something more may be said about Thrace. In the portion of Thrace assigned to Bulgaria in 1913, there were at that time by Greek figures about 9 per cent of Greeks and 11 per cent of Bulgarians, the remaining 80 per cent being Turks.¹ This is, however, on the basis of religion; actually about half of the "Turks" were Bulgarian speaking Pomaks, and probably more than half of the Greeks were "Bulgarophone Patriarchists," or Bulgarians who looked to the Greek Patriarch at Constantinople as their religious chief. It is likely, therefore, that a majority of the inhabitants spoke Bulgarian at the time of acquisition. But during the next two years many of the Greeks went to Macedonia, many Turks crossed the eastern frontier, and many Bulgarians came from Macedonia and were settled on the lands vacated by the Greeks and Turks. As explained above, this was roughly a fair exchange. At the present time, therefore, the area is overwhelmingly Bulgarian by language, and may have a majority of Exarchists, or members of the Bulgarian church. As regards eastern Thrace as far as the Enos-Uruidia line, which was recognized as Bulgarian by the treaty of Bucharest, but which was recovered by the Turks a few weeks later, the population was in 1913 by religion apparently about 40 per cent Turkish, 40 per cent Greek, and 15 per cent Bulgarian. But at present, owing to the similar exchange of population, the proportion of Turks is probably about 60 per cent. Bulgaria would have had no ethnographic claim to this region in 1913 had she been assigned the territory of her nationals in Macedonia. At the present time,

¹ There was no regular census in these areas prior to 1913, and all "statistics" are estimates based on imperfect Turkish returns, and Greek and Bulgarian church rolls. The figures given by Prof. Soteriades of Athens, used above, show a close relation to those of Amadori Virgilij, a Philhellene Italian, who made estimates about the year 1907, giving most weight to those from Greek sources.

in case it is taken from the Turkish majority, her claim is superior to that of Greece unless the latter should recede territory in Macedonia which in 1912 was inhabited by Bulgarians. Should Greece retain the Macedonian territory and also be given both Bulgarian and Turkish Constantinople, much of her land must be empty a long time for want of inhabitants. The true modern Greek—who both speaks the Greek language and belongs to the Greek Orthodox Church—is not so much a farmer as a trader, seaman or gardener. He cannot easily be induced to follow the plough. He is glad to be a landlord, with tenants of other races working his land. But Turks and Bulgarians do not like being his tenants. Bulgarians (with Serbians and Slavs generally) take naturally to farming. If Bulgaria remains within her present boundaries, and receives these continuing streams of refugees from Serbian and Greek Macedonia, the Dobruja, and Thrace, the disproportion of the density of population which already exists as between Greece and Bulgaria will be heightened.* In such case there will very likely be a considerable emigration from Bulgaria to the Americas, whereas that from Greece will probably diminish.

The financial burdens upon Bulgaria are very heavy. Besides the external pre-war debt (about \$225,000,000), the expenses of the occupying troops, the return of commandeered property (estimated on a generous scale), and some \$440,000,000 in gold value as indemnity; Germany, Austria, and Hungary are being required to surrender to the Entente their war claims against Bulgaria. The per capita load of foreign debt will be very heavy for so poor a land. The government will besides be obliged to deal with a vast internal debt. On the credit side is to be placed a great reduction of army expenditure, and the fact that agricultural products, of which in normal times Bulgaria has a considerable surplus, will command good prices in

* In 1912 the population per square mile in Greece was about 105, and in Bulgaria about 133. A comparison of these with similar figures for American States is instructive as regards the much greater density of country population in the Balkan peninsular.

western Europe for some time to come. But from 1900 to 1912, in time of peace, Bulgarian imports regularly exceeded their exports, and the balance was obtained by borrowing abroad. It seems impossible that the country can export the equivalent of even the interest on the debt of approaching a billion dollars in gold. Certainly in order to pay their debts, the Bulgarians will have to use their labor power to the utmost. If they succeed ultimately in lifting the load, and are able to keep out of war, they will become economically strong; their agriculture will have been greatly developed and the high cost of foreign products will have stimulated home manufacture greatly.

Bulgaria as a country of land-owning farmers is in small danger from Bolshevism. She may take up many of the ideas of more moderate socialism. The present government and the people generally are very averse to war, but it will not be easy to restrain refugees from the "unredeemed" territories so as to prevent their organizing brigand bands and violating the frontier.

Greece played so small a direct part in the war that she lost little in money and men. Great numbers of her citizens gained greatly in shipping and commerce. But her finances were in perilous condition before the war, and the military expenses after the war are a grievous and continuing burden. She bids for the entire periphery of the Aegean Sea, and hopes to take sufficient toll on the outward and inward trade of the hinterland to carry the expense of empire. She does not now demand Constantinople, but plans to clasp it from the two sides, and take it at the next juncture. Should she receive both Thrace and Smyrna, it is not easy to see how she will be able to carry the burden of her necessary military establishment, although she relies for the maintenance of her positions upon the disarmament of Turkey and Bulgaria by the Entente. It is far from impossible that she will be compelled to become an economic protectorate of France. Her people have not had their courage and self-sacrifice developed by such strenuous and undivided participation in the struggles of the past two years as is the case with her neighbors.

The success of Greece since 1911 is a singular tribute to the ability and efficiency of one great man, M. Venizelos. He stands so much alone that he found it necessary to appoint himself representative of Greece in the Council of the League of Nations. In spite of the fact that his country, on the whole, helped one side about as much as the other during the great war, he appears to have obtained from the heads of the French and British governments the promise of the great extension of territory for which he seeks. It appears to be the intention in Europe, although Greece has theoretically a constitutional government, to maintain him in power indefinitely; the collapse that would come with his fall is too serious to be contemplated.

The dangerous rival of Greece at present is Italy. In Albania, the Dodeamse, and Asia Minor, their claims overlap. Italy is many times larger than Greece, but she has not enjoyed a like favor since the armistice. She is for one thing unlucky in that those whom she wishes to prevail over—Greece and Yugoslavia—are counted as having been on the Entente side, whereas the opponents of Greece—Bulgaria and Turkey—were unmistakably on the other side. Greece has so far made more progress than Italy in attaining her aims for the above reasons and because of more extensive and skilful propaganda, greater persistency, and better unity of direction. Should she obtain most of her present claims, she must needs look forward to the active opposition of a recovered Russia. It might in the long run be no more profitable for her to become the opponent of states much larger than herself than it has been for Bulgaria and Turkey.

Rumania is already suffering from the acute indigestion which Greece longs to acquire. The election held a few weeks ago returned a constituent assembly in which the largest party was Transylvanian, and a very considerable one was composed of farmers from Bessarabia. The people of Transylvania were as a whole better off educationally and economically under Hungary than the people of independent Rumania. The Bulgarian element among them, however, was largely deprived of political rights.

Rumania has now a fantastically large internal debt, which is being increased rapidly by the military enterprises of its government, in the effort to obtain wider frontiers towards Jugoslavia, Hungary, and Russia or Ukania. In contradistinction to Serbia and Bulgaria, Rumania has been a land of large estates and peasant tenants. This makes her peculiarly open to revolutionary impulses from the Russian side. The new land law is expected greatly to mitigate this situation, but it hardly goes far enough. The rich soil and minerals of Rumania may in time enable her to escape the toils of western European financiers. She would do well to agree with her neighbors, and in particular, now that she may obtain all of her unredeemed land, to restore to Bulgaria what she exacted in 1913.

Serbia has earned great sympathy for her unexampled sufferings during the war, in spite of which she resolutely refused to make peace with the enemies who held all of her land, as did Rumania. Her losses from battle, privation, and disease were the greatest in proportion that were endured by any of the combatant nations. She has now been placed at the head of a vastly increased area, with a population three times that which she held before the war, and perhaps six times the present number of actual Serbians. The majority of the new state lies outside the Balkan peninsula. Formerly in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, this majority, in spite of various restrictions and oppressions, is more prosperous, better educated and better trained politically than the people of Serbia. Therein lies the ground of great future difficulty. A party of Serbians would subordinate all the rest in a unified kingdom of Greater Serbia, in which the Serbians would play a preponderant role. There can be little doubt that the great majority of the non-Serbs, while willing to join in a federal government, are not willing to admit the Serbians as a ruling group over them.

The case of Montenegro is in point. Montenegro was promised restoration as one of the small nations for whose rights the war was fought. In December, 1918, certain Serbians aided a minority party of Montenegrins to assemble

a packed convention, which voted the incorporation of Montenegro into Serbia. The evidence is strong that a large majority of the Montenegrins are willing to abandon King Nicholas and join Yugoslavia as a federated state, but that a similar majority is averse to the loss of the name and autonomy which has made the Black mountain famous across the centuries.

Serbian Macedonia also is a liability and not an asset in Yugoslavia. Its people are nearly enough akin to become good Serbians in the course of time if there had never been a Bulgaria. But having become attached to the Sofia government, and in touch with many thousands of refugees in Bulgaria, there is small prospect that they will ever love Belgrade. And should this improbable event occur, they will probably proceed to embroil Serbia with Greece, since Greece holds the coveted outlet to the sea through Salonica. The only peaceful solution of the Macedonian problem seems to be that Bulgaria should come into the Yugoslav union, and thus recover a political relationship to Macedonia. Such a union is unlikely, for both Greece and Italy will oppose it actively, since it threatens the attempts both are making to cut the Slavs from the sea and take toll of their trade.

Yugoslavia, like Greece and Rumania, as well as Czechoslovakia and Poland, has also an appalling financial prospect, considering that to a pre-war debt is added a great war debt and the necessity of heavy armament. The small and fettered non-favored powers, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania, will all be bitterly hostile, but cannot soon be dangerous. But there exist first-rate boundary troubles with Italy and Rumania. The type of peace that has been attempted in central and southeastern Europe promises not less militarism than before the great war, but more small empires have been set up, modern children of the dragon's teeth. They have men and food, but they must import the weapons and trappings of war. In fact, their militarism constitutes for them a financial burden of much the same impossible weight as the indemnities of the non-favored states, so that all promise after a few years to

be laden crushingly, and to be financial provinces of the great creditor nations of the reconstructed world.

The powers that have predominated in the Balkans during recent decades, Austria and Russia, have lost their influence during the war. Italy and France are striving to take the place of their former allies. Though the lire is worse depreciated than the franc, Italy is the nearer neighbor, and she is promised a direct foothold in Albania. The role she appears to be taking up is the cultivation of the non-favored states, which is the easier since her relations are strained with both Greece and Jugoslavia. Czechoslovakia and Rumania may become more drawn in the same direction than toward France, but will be restrained by their common attitude toward the Hungarians, a people who have not in the depths of defeat lost all their combativeness.

In the presence of these rival forces, the United States having nearly withdrawn from the field, and England tending to do likewise, there seems but a remote prospect for a successful economic reunion of the Austrian lands (which would have to include the pre-war Serbia and Rumania, and perhaps Poland) or of a revival of the Balkan League of 1912 (Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro). There is a greater possibility of coöperation between Serbia, Rumania and Greece, as in 1913. But Rumania is not needed by the other two to restrain disarmed Bulgaria, and she has her dispute over the Banato with Serbia. The "Balkan Balance of Power" is gone beyond recovery, with a Greece of six or seven millions and a Bulgaria of four and a half millions, over against Rumania and Jugoslavia with twelve to fifteen millions each.

Finally, what can be conjectured as to the relations of the League of Nations to this transformed, but unimproved Balkan situation? The council of nine men, each holding a prominent part in the activities of his own government, cannot be expected until its personnel has been changed to modify the policy that has prevailed since the armistice. Only one of the Balkan states is represented, and M. Venizelos is not likely to favor relaxation of the bounds of Bul-

garia and Albania, while he would support Jugoslavia as against Italy, and Rumania as against Russia. One or two decades hence, the spirit of the times will perhaps be changed, and the League of Nations may then be expected to ameliorate conditions. Such a development ought strenuously to be striven for, for its only alternative is the renewal of devastating wars. If the League of Nations should become an instrument for rigidly enforcing the severities of the current settlement, it would better never have been, for it would but postpone and therefore magnify an inevitable catastrophe. America could not remain outside the disaster, and if for no other reason than self-interest, she should work to secure for the League a real power and a healing spirit.

TRANSYLVANIA

*By M. M. Knight, Ph.D., Historian, American Red Cross
Commission to Roumania*

Eighteen hundred years ago, Transylvania was part of the Roman province of Dacia. Of its previous history, we know next to nothing. The north-and-south Carpathian range, which forms the two hundred miles or so of its eastern boundary, has been merely scratched for evidence of early races of men; but these scattered explorations have disclosed a region as rich in such remains as any in Europe. The character of these mountains has had much to do with the curious history of the territory on each side. They divide Transylvania (until recently the easternmost part of Hungary) from Moldavia, the northern half of Rumania. North of present-day Moldavia is the old Moldavian territory of Bukovina, which contains the former Moldavian capital, Suceava, the burial place of the kings. Dividing Bukovina on the east from the extreme northern part of Transylvania on the West, the Carpathian range bends northwestward (and later almost due west), continuing another three hundred miles or so. The north-and-south part of this mountain chain is quite high, and rises so abruptly from the plain to the eastward that it formed an effective barrier to primitive race movements. Military roads have been constructed of late years, but these abound in very steep climbs. The few passes are high, the folding generally parallel with the range.

From the southern end of this chain, the Transylvanian Alps extend almost due west, forming the boundary between Transylvania and Wallachia, the southern portion of Rumania. These mountains are also quite high, but are pierced with some easy passes. In the east, the railroad from Kronstadt (Brasov) runs southward to Bucarest over fairly easy grades. In the center, the old Roman road

follows the gorge cut by the Olt River southward through the mountains to Slatina on the Wallachian plain. This is one of the most beautiful automobile drives in the world, and there are not even moderately steep grades in it. Still further westward, the river Jiu breaks southward through the mountains on its way to the Danube.

The Theiss or Tisza River rises on the western slope of the Carpathian range, flows generally westward then south-westward to a point East of Budapest, (and some 250 miles west of the Carpathians,) then turns to flow almost due south another 200 miles, emptying into the Danube just above Belgrade. The territory included between this river, a short stretch of the Danube, the Transylvanian Alps and the Carpathians is shaped somewhat like the map of Australia and oriented in almost the same way. This vast country, about 300 miles from east to west at the widest place and slightly less from north to south, has been assigned by the Peace Conference to Rumania, Jugoslavia (Greater Serbia) and Hungary. They are all dissatisfied with the award. Especially are Hungary and Rumania discontented; Hungary because so much of the western part went to Rumania, Rumania because the southwestern part, the Banat of Temeshvar, was divided between her and Jugoslavia, whereas in the secret treaty of August 17, 1916 the Entente promised her the whole of it.

Probably the best way to give an idea of the merits of such a complicated case, involving geography, history, racial majority, economics, politics and military defensibility among other things, is for some unprejudiced neutral who is familiar with the disputed region to set down a sketchy account of how conditions came to be as they are. In this general historical introduction we must keep the main geographical peculiarities of the country constantly in mind.

When the Romans first came in contact with the people north of the lower Danube a little over a hundred years before the Christian era, these had evidently been fairly stabilized for a long time with the general boundaries of the "Greater Rumania" of 1920. Herodotus mentions

them as allies of Philip of Macedon. A little later, Alexander the Great burned some of their villages because they helped certain Thracian tribes against him. He did not do a very thorough job, however, and fifty years later these Getae captured his successor Lysimachus, took him to their capital in Transylvania and only released him upon payment of a heavy ransom in gold. Some of these gold pieces, bearing his name, have recently been dug up in Transylvania.

These rather highly-organized tribes of Getae and Dacians made the Romans a great deal of trouble. In 111 B.C. we find them fighting the Roman legions along the Danube. Julius Caesar was preparing an expedition against them at the time of his death. In the ensuing civil war they sided with Anthony. Augustus had intermittent wars with them, and there is record of an alliance in which he called them the "friends and allies of the Roman people." In 86 A.D. they defeated two Roman generals and drove the legions back to the Balkan Mountains. Emperor Domitian won some local battles against them, and finally secured a precarious peace by agreeing to pay an annual tribute to the Dacian king. Carefully concealing this latter fact from the popular view, he actually held a triumph at Rome to celebrate his alleged conquest of the country and added "The Dacian" to his titles.

After two terrific wars, Emperor Trajan finally conquered the whole of Dacia in 106 A.D., left garrisons, built roads and began to exploit the mining and agricultural resources of the country. The only extensive gold mines in Europe were in Transylvania, then as now. The Romans penetrated this region by way of the level Banat, opposite Belgrade, and across the passes in the Transylvanian Alps especially the easy slopes of the Olt River gorge. The Roman capital was at Apulum, the modern Karlsburg. Many immigrants came in from various parts of the Empire, and the Dacians so completely abandoned their language for the easy, adequate colloquial Latin that not a trace of the original Dacian dialect remains. The country became so fabulously prosperous that it is called "Dacia Felix" on

the Roman medals. Dacia was a Roman province for 165 years. Abandoned to the Goths in 271 A.D., it was temporarily reconquered by Emperor Constantine about 330, but the Romans were unable to hold it. The Asiatic race movements were already beginning.

During the next thousand years or more, the Carpathian mountain barrier, discussed above, is one of the most outstanding facts in the history not only of Transylvania, but of Europe. One Asiatic horde after another, interspersed with European race fragments fleeing before the irresistible Orientals, swept into what is now Moldavia—northern Rumania. They came westward through the gap between the southern end of the Ural range and the Caspian Sea, followed the steppes just North of the Black Sea until they were confronted by the frowning Carpathian wall, then turned southward. Keeping to the plain, some 200 miles wide, between the Carpathians and the western shore of the Black Sea, the emigrant hordes crossed the Danube and descended by way of the Balkan passes into the Eastern Roman Empire. Only a few fragments straggled across the main part of the Carpathian barrier into Transylvania.

There are two or three negotiable passes about the head waters of the Theiss (Tisza) in the extreme northeastern part of Transylvania. One of the two wings of the Hunnic invasion of about 375 A.D. penetrated here, descended by the Theiss Valley floor north and west of the Transylvanian valleys, and here split in two. One part swept westward toward Châlons and defeat, the other turned south and entered what is now Bulgaria. The Magyars or Hungarians appear to have come in by the same route in the tenth century. These took up their residence on the western bank of the Theiss. They were defeated by the Germans in an attempt to expand toward the Northwest, so they spread eastward to the foothills of Transylvania proper.

Here we should remark that East of the Theiss River itself the level valley floor is from 50 to 75 miles wide—more in several places. This became almost entirely Hungarian (Magyar). But Transylvania proper is a network of valleys, separated by much higher mountain

ridges than a glance at most of our maps would suggest. Incidentally, it is one of the most beautiful countries in the world.

Thus while the Slavs and Magyars, lowland peoples, were settling in Hungary and the Balkans, thus completely changing the character of the population of most of south-east Europe, Transylvania's lofty isolation made it a sort of stable "island," surrounded by a seething flood of invading settlers and pure adventurers. This relatively inaccessible territory geographically includes both the Carpathians and the Transylvanian Alps. The latter have very long and quite broken southern slopes, extending in many places 50 or 75 miles southward into Old Rumania. In the mountains may still be found the headdress to match that shown on the Trajan column at Rome. Occasional references to these people during the middle ages mention them as "former colonists of the Romans." Their speech is as Latin as is Italian or Spanish, though it sounds more strange to us because the non-Latin element is largely Slavic, whereas the other Romance languages, in common with English, contain many Teutonic words. The Greek Orthodox priesthood accounts for a sprinkling of Greek words, and there are also some of Turkish origin. The Slavic are evidently superimposed. For example, for "good man" in English (both Teutonic) words, these Transylvanians say "om bun"—both Latin, as are nearly all of the commonest words used in everyday speech.

The race problem in Transylvania is bound to be peculiar because while the rest of southeastern Europe was getting mixed up and readjusted, this region was protected rather by its geographical character than by its organization or powers of resistance. Being a network of valleys, it was inevitably weak politically in an age whose mode of life did not compel daily intercourse between one valley and the next. The barbarian invasions *via* southern Russia practically over, solid Rumanian political organizations came into existence almost immediately on the Wallachian and Moldavian plains. Not so in Transylvania, of which the Magyars took possession in the 11th century. The

Szecklers, an Asiatic tribe related to the Magyars, were settled in almost a solid block against the extreme eastern frontier of Transylvania. Some Saxons were colonized in the southern part in the twelfth century, and reinforced from time to time afterward. These were important at different periods as relays in the trade with southeastern Europe and as frontier guards against Islam.

Sultan Solymán the Magnificent took Buda, the Hungarian capital, in 1526, King Louis II being slain in the preliminary battle, Solymán sanctioned the election of Zápolya, Prince of Transylvania, to succeed him. The Turks never entirely relinquished their sovereignty over Transylvania and eastern Hungary until 1698—though it was fitful and inconsistent. In the meantime, Michael the Brave of Wallachia began a revolt against the Turks in 1593, in which he ravaged the Sultan's lands clear to the gates of Adrianople. Prince Sigismund of Transylvania, his ally, deserted him in 1596 and made peace with the Sultan. The vigorous Michael retaliated by conquering and annexing Transylvania. He also placed himself on the throne of Moldavia, holding all the Rumanian lands until his death in 1601. He was murdered by a Greek, Basta, in Austrian pay, as a result of a general conspiracy between the Turks, Germans, Hungarians and Slavs against the Latins who stood in their way. His political structure fell to pieces. Always the Turks had at least a nominal suzerainty, and Transylvania was usually under the rule of some Magyar satellite of the Porte, united with some part of Hungary. During the period of 172 years between the capture of Buda in 1526 and the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1698, interminable wars were waged between the Habsburgs and the Sultans. By the Carlowitz treaty, Transylvania became an Austrian Crown land. Austria also gained a suzerainty over all of Hungary North of the Marosch and West of the Theiss Rivers.

By the treaty of Passarowitch in 1718, Austria got the remainder of Hungary. Thus through the long Ottoman episode, Hungary lost her independence. Her rule over Transylvania, at times real and at others merely nominal,

had been succeeded by Austrian control. Austrian rule was not particularly oppressive except on isolated occasions. The Hungarians never forgot or forgave the shrinkage in their frontiers or the loss of their sovereignty. Their subsequent struggle with Austria up to 1867 is dealt with in sufficient detail in general treatises on European history.

One fact should be remarked, however—that many of the English versions of the revolution of 1848, as it affected Hungary, are likely to create an erroneous idea of the relative weight of the factors involved. In March of that year, Hungary was guaranteed a constitution and virtual independence. Taking advantage of the general disorder and the break-up by General Windischgrätz's troops of the Pan-Slavic Congress at Prague in June, the Hungarians declared their complete independence of the Habsburg crown and set up a republic under the Presidency of Kossuth. We in the West have shed many idle tears over the way Austria, aided by 50,000 Russian troops, reconquered Hungary. As a matter of fact, the Hungarian chauvinists themselves brought this misfortune upon their country. Remembering their past glories, the Magyars attempted to set up quite as despotic a control over the South Slavs and the Rumanians of Transylvania as they themselves had suffered at the hands of Austria. Evidently the two subject races involved thought it would be worse. The South Slavs (Jugoslavs) appealed to Russia. What was really the last straw was the violent opposition of the Transylvanians to this change of masters. They lent their full military support to Austria. The result is well known.

Transylvania's real troubles began in 1867, when Hungary forced Austria, after the disastrous war with Prussia, to grant her complete independence under the Habsburg crown and also to relinquish to her both Rumanian Transylvania and the South Slav territories. Up to this time, German cities and Szeckler colonies had been planted on the frontiers next to Turk-controlled Rumania, and there had been some general oppression; but no systematic attempt to denationalize the country had been made. Since then, the Hungarian government has sought to

Magyarize it by whatever methods seemed likely to prove efficacious.

Americans should try to avoid intolerance in judging either side of a struggle of this sort. We are inclined to be vain about our "melting-pot." Evidently, however, it is one thing to admit foreigners a person or family at a time into a country with its language, customs and local government already fairly fixed. This would, ideally, completely sever the association with the old environment, and at the same time furnish a powerful incentive to get oriented in and assimilated to the new. Even this is imperfectly successful when immigration is rapid and many of the immigrants settle in groups or semi-colonies in large cities. But it is an entirely different and more difficult thing to impose a new language and new ways upon a community or colony from without—to change, within the same environment, the speech and folkways which have become rooted in that particular spot for centuries. When the old language has the age, prestige and simplicity of the colloquial Latin, as in Transylvania, and the tongue it is sought to impose, whatever its merits, is Asiatic, with an utterly strange orthography, syntax, idiom and genius generally, the difficulty is raised to the n th power.

Neither do we dismiss the subject by simply crying for "self-determination." These nationalities are hopelessly mixed up together—by communities, not by families. In the extreme east there is a fairly large block of Szecklers—somewhat over a quarter of a million. But it is not purely Szeckler. Next to this to the southwest is another fairly large block of Germans—say sixty thousand in a territory of a fairly symmetrical shape which might be delimited. Around this pair of colonies, on every side, are substantially solid Rumanian settlements—not 100 per cent Rumanian, any more than the two mentioned above are 100 per cent Szeckler or German (Swabians—the Schässburg group is referred to). Klausenburg (Koloszvar, Cluj) is a German-Magyar-Jewish city in the center of a rather small Magyar colony (predominantly, not purely), surrounded by Rumanians. Temeshvar is a German-Magyar town in a con-

siderable German colony (but sprinkled with Rumanian, Serbian and Magyar communities), with Magyars to the southwest, Serbs to the west, Rumanians to the east and a rather slender island of Rumanians wedged in between the Germans and Magyars to the north. And so on around, to Hermannstadt (Nagy-Szeben, Sibiu), Kronstadt (Brassó, Braşov), etc.

These little patches of nationalities have had their own language and their own ways for a very long time. The country has enjoyed a fairly enlightened economic administration on the whole, and has become an interdependent unit in that respect. The German cities have developed considerable manufactures, and the exploitation of mines is important in some districts. These require interchange and exchange with the outside world of their products on more than a primitive scale. The lines of communication—roads, railways, telegraphs, telephones—are established, and radiate from Budapest.

The Peace Conference settlement gives most of the Serbs to Yugoslavia. But among these Serbs are settlements of other nationals. It is not incredible that some of the Rumanian communities thus put under Yugoslav rule have existed for the entire one thousand eight hundred years since the Romans. At least they have been there so long that the "mind of man runneth not to the contrary." The surrounding Slavs outnumber them overwhelmingly, but they have not been there so long—we know approximately when they settled in the territory. How are these Rumanian communities, for example, to be dealt with? Must they be made over into Slavs—learn the Slav language and adopt the Slav ways? It was to get around such difficulties that the Peace Conference insisted on holding a sort of mandate over minority nationalities within national boundaries. But it is an infringement of national sovereignty which no western European power would brook for a moment, except under military compulsion. Both Yugoslavia and Rumania long withheld their signatures from the peace treaty because of it, and it has already been a prime factor in the fall of cabinets in both countries.

This Banat settlement (division between Rumania and Jugoslavia) likewise makes the Hungarian and Transylvanian commerce on the Theiss River pass through Serb territory, since Jugoslavia has both banks of the Danube lower down. The Jugoslavs got the best of the bargain materially, considering the mineral and agricultural resources, and the developed industries in the towns. The Magyars and Germans were apparently more hardly used than anybody else, since the industries were largely in their hands. In many cases they are city groups, surrounded by Slav or Rumanian peasants, or a mixture.

The Peace Conference refused to consider a tentative Rumanian claim to the level valley floor east of the Theiss River (described above). This claim was based on the historical argument that the land was part of Roman Dacia, and the idea of its geographical and military unity with Transylvania. That is, the Theiss was assumed to be a "natural" frontier. There are some Rumanians in this strip from 50 to 75 miles wide, or still wider locally; but it is so obviously and overwhelmingly Magyar on the whole that the Conference could hardly do otherwise than leave it to Hungary. The writer covered it in some detail with officers of the Rumanian army during and after the recent Rumanian-Hungarian war (July-August, 1919). So few of the inhabitants speak Rumanian, German or French that it was often difficult to get information about the roads. An occasional Jew, functionary, gendarme, school-teacher or business man may be found who can be communicated with in German. Rumanian speaking people are encountered only on the rarest occasions. Most of the Rumanian army officers who talked with the writer on the subject, on the ground, realized the infinite difficulty involved in administering such a territory, whose language is not only foreign but Asiatic, and said frankly that they hoped it would be left in Hungary. Some people seriously entertained the (merely tentative) Rumanian claim on military or economic grounds. On the whole, however, it was regarded, I think I am safe in saying, as an offset to any attempt which might be made to detach southern Dobroudja or Bessarabia from Rumania.

Let us now consider as a whole the population of Transylvania as Rumania gets it, within the boundaries fixed by the Peace Conference. (The technical geographical error of calling this all Transylvania is of no consequence, since the reader is advised that by the term is meant all the territory which Rumania gets from Hungary.) The three chief races are the Rumanian, the Hungarian-Szeckler (best discussed together, since their differences are chiefly historical) and the German (Saxon, Swabian and a few Flemish, if we may believe the medieval chronicles). The statistics usually include all of the Banat, part of which goes to Yugoslavia; but the resulting relative error in any percentages given will be very slight, since the detached part contains few of any of the nationalities in question.

According to the Hungarian official statistics,¹ the Magyar population in Hungary increased from 4,812,000 in 1840 to 7,426,000 in 1890; and between the same dates the Rumanians increased from 2,202,000 to 2,589,000. These figures are obviously "queer," since the Rumanian element, largely peasants, is represented as practically stationary, while the Magyars, in much better economic circumstances on the whole, are shown as having increased by over 50 per cent. This is contrary to the way populations usually increase at different economic levels, in rural *vs.* urban environments, as shown by practically all the unbiased statistics collected in various countries on the subject. It is contradicted by other figures given in the same official Hungarian statistics for the same years. For instance, the Rumanians are Greek Catholics, the Magyars Roman Catholics. But the statistics by religious beliefs contradict those by races and suggest that the Rumanian increase was greater than the Magyar, which is what we should expect.

Coméne² goes into details as to how the Hungarians juggled these figures. He points out that the Hungarian

¹ Discussed in detail in Enescu, "Ardealul, Banatul, Crişana şi Marmurasul," Bucarest, 1915, pp. 10 f.

² Coméne, N. P., "Notes sur la Guerre Roumaine," Lausanne and Paris, 1917, pp. 43 f.

censuses for 1850 and 1890 show a decrease in the Rumanian population. The increase in Magyars for the whole of Hungary is given as 35.74 per cent for the 40 years; but for all non-Magyars only 6.23 per cent. This is impossible, unless a good many of the children of non-Magyars can fairly be classed as Magyars; which of course raises the question: "What constitutes a Magyar?" The question asked by the Magyar census-takers was not: "To what nationality do you belong?" It was: "What language do you speak from preference?" Since all positions of honor or emolument entailed the use of the official Hungarian language, it would not be strange if many people of Rumanian nationality who had been obliged to learn Magyar in the schools stated to an official census-taker that they used it from preference.

Even a cursory survey of the 1911 Hungarian Statistical Annual discloses absurdities. For example, the Magyar population in the county of Turocz shows an increase of 154 per cent between 1900 and 1910; in Zolyoni the increase claimed would be 82 per cent and in Lipto 60 per cent, etc.

Enescu adopts a method of correcting the figures by use of the rate of increase per thousand in Rumania, applied to the numbers given in the Austrian census before Transylvania was handed over to Hungary. The estimate thus arrived at (1915) was: 3,535,120 Rumanians, or 56.1 per cent; 1,200,755 Hungarians, or 19.1 per cent; and 730,962 Germans, or 11.6 per cent. But these figures will not do either, even after making a correction for the Rumanians who emigrated between the dates given—some 200,000 to America alone. Transylvania is, on the whole, a more highly developed country than the Old Kingdom, and the rate of increase has been consistently lower. Moreover, some of the non-Magyars have certainly become quite Magyarized. Colonization, or at least immigration, must be taken into account.

Lieutenant-Colonel Antonescu³ adopts still another fallacious method of estimating the relative numbers of the

³ *Romanii, Origina, Trecutul, Sacrificiile și Drepturile Lor*, Bucarest, 1919 (p. 31). This book formed a part of the Rumanian argument before the Peace Conference.

different races. His argument runs as follows: Only three races in Transylvania—the Rumanians, Serbs and Ruthenes—belong to the Greek Catholic church. But the Hungarian figures on the membership of that confession are much higher than the total number of Rumanians, Serbs and Ruthenians as stated in the tables by nationalities. Hence, he says, if we subtract from the 3,412,852 Greek Catholics the number of Serbs and Ruthenes given in the Hungarian statistics, we should get the correct number of Rumanians in Transylvania, or 3,103,034. Yet it is evident that this author, who has just refused to accept the Hungarian figures as to the number of Rumanians, adopts them in respect to Serbs and Ruthenians in his subtraction to get the true figure for his own nationality.

The truth is of course somewhere between the widely divergent claims of the two nations at debate in the matter. Obviously only the roughest kind of guess can be made. As to getting an accurate census, according to a clearly understood definition of nationality, we had as well dismiss it at once, since it is at present impossible. We will not be very wide of the truth in estimating the Transylvanian population at half Rumanian, one-fourth Magyar, one-eighth German, plus some other fragments of nationalities, especially Jews and Ruthenians. Now that the Serbs get part of the Banat, they may be said to be practically negligible in the remaining part of this territory.

What is a nationality? No one has yet proposed any generally applicable definition. Evidently it is some quality which attaches to a group of people. Is it a matter of language, of folkways, of actual biological measurements showing heredity, or is it what people of any group to be studied have been taught to say they are? Or is it a combination? For instance there is no dearth of people in the Transylvanian back country who speak Rumanian at home, learn a smattering of Magyar at school and are unaware that being of Rumanian origin has any political significance. Some of these clear in the western rim of the country still build their houses in the Rumanian fashion, others about Kronstadt, near the Rumanian border, build like the Hungarians.

Some people imagine that a question of political allegiance can be simply settled by holding a plebiscite or election. In the first place there are not always two simple alternatives. In Transylvania the question would have to be three-cornered—for adherence, under some terms, to the old union or one with some fragments with the old empire; to join Rumania; or to be independent. Within this there are other choices to be made. If one of these three moves must be made *en bloc*, the decision different groups would make must depend largely on what kind of internal administration is to be set up in each case. This would be influenced by the presence or absence of outside interference. There would have to be outside interference to guarantee a fair election. Any group in charge would almost certainly be able to carry it. Before the Rumanian occupation, this racial group was almost entirely unrepresented in the government. Now the tables are turned, and the others have practically no representation. If an outside power were to hold an election by communities, the real racial units, how much are these to be allowed to decide? If each chooses its own allegiance and form of government, the result will be hopeless confusion. If any larger units are polled, simple plurality must decide. For example, any electoral unit which is 35 per cent German, 40 per cent Rumanian and 25 per cent Magyar would be ruled by 40 per cent, with 60 per cent, a majority, unrepresented. Or a German-Magyar coalition could entirely freeze out the largest single element in the population.

If an election were ordered and not thoroughly supervised by outsiders, this coalition would be almost certain to take place. Transylvania, like many other southeastern European territories, is stratified by nationality. The bulk of the Rumanians are peasants. The rich, the powerful, the well-educated, the astute, those with administrative experience in the government, are mostly Magyars, Germans and Jews, living in the towns. It would take almost an army of neutrals to carry on a really fair election because of this peculiar stratification of nationalities by occupation. It would be difficult for even a neutral to

remain unbiased, as is evidenced by certain Allied representatives who attempted to study the race problem in such regions in 1919. These of course descended into fair-sized towns, the composition of whose population is very different from that of the surrounding country. When they could not speak the languages of the country, these men naturally formed acquaintances among congenial people who could speak theirs. Here the propagandists got in knockout blows. Without being on the ground, it would be impossible to conceive of the amount of such literature floating about southeastern Europe during the past year. America was at a peculiar disadvantage. We are not a nation of linguists. Most of the Americans who can speak Serbian, Rumanian, Hungarian, Polish or Russian, for example, came from the countries in question, or their parents did. Hence there is a peculiar probability that their minds were biased when they went in.

One might suggest: "Well, why not make the communities themselves autonomous, and set up a general government with chiefly generally-regulative economic functions?" In the first place, this would be fatal from the military point of view, until we can be much more certain than is now possible that the more centralized governments will not commit aggressions. It is not a question of "developing" aggressive tendencies. They are already present. The military point immediately suggests another: Is not war merely one phase of competition, i.e., is it not chiefly economic, representing merely a change of competitive *method*? And is not an organization which lacks the cohesion to successfully wage war by that fact economically weak? That is, if it cannot mobilize its economic resources for one form of activity, how can it for another. Surely, few students have failed to remark and to marvel at the smallness of the Hungarian and Russian soviet armies, relative to the population of the countries. Of course, neither government has been strictly communistic, but both were obliged to approach it more nearly in fact than in theory, due to a preponderance of rural population.

Communistic spirit is, in fact, very strong in many rural sections of Transylvania. The Rumanian civil and military officials have already had some experiences in this connection which were more amusing to a spectator than to themselves. For instance, orders to display flags from all public buildings in towns and communes on certain days were repeatedly defied on the ground that this was an unjustifiable subversion of the inalienable rights of the commune of X—— to take whatever attitude it pleased toward any outside governing group. Once finally rid of their expansionist government, the peoples of the late Dual Monarchy will be found to be astonishingly democratic at heart. Socialism is rampant in the industrial towns—a fact which is already causing some uneasiness in Rumanian government circles.

Rumania faces a very complicated problem in devising a workable economic and political union with Transylvania.⁴ The peculiar form of peasant cooperative which has achieved startling perfection in the Old Kingdom is quite foreign to the new territory. For many years, Bucarest cannot hope to become the real economic capital of Transylvania, whose roads, railways and long-standing habits unite it commercially rather with central Europe. Shall the political union be a loose one, on the federal type, or shall it be organic? Rumania has the French highly centralized type of administration, which may make it difficult for her to work out a federal union with her new possessions. On the other hand, if she should undertake to interfere with the well-established avenues of trade and exchange, or to impose any sort of arbitrary political control, she would risk the hostility of the half of the Transylvanian population least inclined to be loyal to her—the moneyed, directing, non-Rumanian elements. At a moment when the other Allied countries are frantically trying to purge themselves of very small dissenting groups, Rumania and Jugo-

⁴Since this was written, a ministerial crisis and an election have wrought a bloodless revolution in Rumania, leaving the united peasants of Bessarabia, Transylvania and the old Kingdom in control. The new Premier is M. Vaida of Transylvania.

slavia are prevented by the terms of the peace treaty from assuming full and unlimited sovereignty over the aliens most likely to make trouble.

In this respect the Rumanians and the Serbs are pretty much in the same boat. The old governmental organizations were adapted to small countries, with no great industrial or commercial development. They must now administer ex-Austro-Hungarian regions whose populations are used to the rather enlightened economic policies of the late Dual Monarchy. These populations are on an average better educated and used to life on a more complicated plan. They tend to look patronizingly, or even contemptuously on their new governments as "muzzle-loaders," "key-winders," or something of the antiquated sort.

The attitude of the Saxons of Transylvania generally on the question of government is interesting, especially as compared with the ideas which prevailed in the late German Empire. They sent a delegation to the National Assembly which voted the union with Rumania in December, 1918, which stated that they would be loyal to the new government, as they had been to the old; that no government which decently provided for the economic machinery which enabled them to carry on their industrious personal and community activities, achieve honest prosperity and live their cultural lives in peace need entertain any fears of their hostility. In private conversation they voice these sentiments with astonishing frequency. Government to them is a necessary evil—necessary to enforce certain regulations and look after the machinery essential to modern life. They do not appear to care who runs it as long as it subserves these functions and does not get officious.

There is something engaging about the spirit of this philosophy, whether or not it is capable of leading anywhere in practice. Greeks, Jews, Bulgarians, Germans and Russians in Bessarabia frankly expressed the same sentiments to the writer last year. It would be strange if out of the Balkans and the Near East, torn by so much political strife and dynastic war in the past, should come the new tolerance which alone can do away with such

things. These people cannot understand why men should take such a passionate interest in a government—to them a mere subsidiary mechanism maintained by a number of communities to supervise their interrelations—unless it is actively bad.

Transylvania is still an island in civilization. The struggle for economic empire comes only faintly to its ears. While western Europe has crowded itself into cities and compact groups, dependent for their bread and raiment upon the simpler world outside, this loose network of semi-isolated mountain valleys has remained largely self-sufficient. The war, which devastated or disorganized most of the continent, ruining the compact groups because they could not produce their bread and the most primitive exploited by these because they had in their turn become dependent for machines they had learned to use but not to make, eddied about Transylvania, but left it almost untouched. Two invading armies filtered through, but each claimed the country and so left it substantially unscarred. The young men were away on a dimly-comprehended adventure; but the taxes were not high, goods were not particularly scarce, and life went on from 1914 to 1918 almost as before.

When the peace came, artificialized Europe generally looked in despair upon the tangled wreckage of the commercial and industrial fabric upon which the lives of millions depended—starved, smashed, bankrupt. Famine stalked in Vienna, Bucarest, Belgrade, Constantinople, claiming its thousands. On two sides of this territory, Hungary and Russia were in the throes of class war at the same time. Everywhere else, even hope for the future was dying with a generation of rickety, tubercular, famished children. But Transylvania had been the favored land, the mountain-girt heaven in the center of this gigantic hell.

The year 1919 saw the beginnings of a bewildered awakening. Central Europe was paralyzed, which really, seriously hurt trade and business in Transylvania for the first time. The currency had been the Hungarian *Korona*,

now hopelessly debauched. The incoming Rumanian government stamped these Hungarian notes, fixing the value of the crown in Transylvania at half that of the Rumanian *leu* or franc. But the *leu* itself was worth only about a third its normal exchange value, which placed the money of Transylvania at about one-sixth normal. Prices were amazingly low, partially because goods were fairly plentiful, and very largely because of a slow adjustment to this incredible debasement of the currency. Merchants could not realize the ruin and bankruptcy of Europe, so they grew petulant, and blamed the new government for their growing misfortunes. The old régime began to stand in their fond memories for prosperity and industry, "business as usual"—the new one for pinching shortage and a groping uncertainty about the future.

A nice old German-Jew dealer in post-cards and antiquities in Kronstadt expressed this feeling well enough to be worth quoting. In the confidential soft voice of the European small shopkeeper, he wandered on in this wise:

Business is rotten (*sehr schlecht*). . . . Do you not think that the new government is bad? What we should like is as much of the government here in the commune as possible, where we might watch it. Then it would furnish the simple things we ask—protection, exchange—and we should not have to worry about it. I wish the same things of my government that I do of my banker: He must be honest; he must keep books, and run his business in a businesslike way. Then if I do not like his ways, I can get a new one. . . . If I could get a new government as easily as I get a new banker, it would be much better managed. Do you not think so?

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN WAR-AIMS IN THE WINTER OF 1915-1916 AS REVEALED BY SECRET DOCUMENTS¹

By Robert Joseph Kerner, Ph.D., University of Missouri

In May, 1915, General Mackenson tore a huge hole in the Russian lines at the river Dunajec in Galicia. This was the beginning of a campaign which did not end until all of Russian Poland had been occupied by the Central Powers and the Russian Empire had been delivered a staggering blow from which it never recovered.

In October, 1915, the Central Powers opened the Balkan campaign under the same German general and with the same tremendous concentration of artillery, and assisted this time by Bulgaria, subdued Serbia and Montenegro in two short months, bringing the whole of the Balkans, with the exception of Salonika, under their power.

It was at such a moment that Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf, Chief of the General Staff, opened the discussion to define the war-aims of Austria-Hungary. In the Memoir² which he sent to Emperor Francis Joseph on October 27, 1915, the Chief of Staff analyzed from the military point of view the fundamental bases on which the strategy of the monarchy must be based. The document became at once the basis of a long-range discussion between the General Headquarters, Vienna, and Budapest which lasted far into the

¹ Copies of the secret documents on which this paper is based were given to the writer while on official duty at Vienna as a member of the staff of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace by M. Čerović, at that time representative of Yugoslavia at Vienna. Their authenticity is beyond any doubt. Their index numbers may be verified in the archives of the General Staff and their contents demonstrate that they are a direct complement of documents recently published by the Austrian Foreign Office. They consist of six memoranda by the Chief of Staff and a lengthy confidential note by Count Tisza.

² See Document I (Op. No. 18620 of 1915) in the Documentary Appendix.

spring of the next year and apparently was unfinished at that time.

Two important facts led the Chief of Staff to initiate such a matter. The first of these was the opening of the Balkan campaign, whose outcome might "prove decisive for the whole war situation."³ The other was that Austria-Hungary was virtually played out in man-power. In his own words:

If we should wish to conduct the war with the same great number of troops as heretofore and must expect the losses which experience has shown in the past, our physical resources—that is men qualified for military service—will come to an end in June, 1916; from that time on we should lack additions—the army would wholly disappear.⁴

For the purposes of the discussion he had in mind—the definition of the war-aims—only the eventuality that the war would end with an addition of territory to the Central Powers would be considered. This consideration was to be based, so far as he was concerned, on the limits set by the monarchy's dwindling resources in men and on the actual situation in the field at that time. This would determine "for what price one may be relatively forced to stand ready for peace."⁵

The Chief of Staff thereupon analyzed the value of the various possible additions to the territory of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

Before entering into the detail of the acquisition of territory from the Russian Empire, he stated that Austria-Hungary's relation to Germany must be defined. This he declared should be in the form of participation in the "Central European block."

I think that the existence and the prosperity of the monarchy may be best secured through the Central European block—that this must be the guiding idea for our policy and for the military development of the monarchy, and that all decisions in regard to territorial compensations should take this as their basis.⁶

³ See Documentary Appendix: Document I, p. 460.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 460.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 461.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 461.

Against the group of three enemies, Russia, which was the "most dangerous," Italy, which was the "most odious," and Serbia and Montenegro, which would "remain bitter" as long as they could be towed around about by Russia, the monarchy, in his opinion could "prosper only in a close union with Germany." The time had gone by for a Three Emperor's Alliance, and the time had come to diminish the power of Russia. By taking Russian territory, Russia would not only be weakened, but the Central Powers would be strengthened in territory, population, and military strength. Furthermore, the unfavorable boundary line would be rectified. He preferred the Bug River as the better line, but would be content with the Vistula River. He also preferred that all of the Russian Polish territory should fall into the hands of Austria-Hungary, but if that were not possible he would be willing to see Russian Poland partitioned between Germany and Austria-Hungary "somewhat after the boundaries of the year 1795," rather than restore it to Russia.

By such a step Serbia's resistance would be broken because it is only in depending on Russia that the little state can defy the monarchy. In regard to the question of Serbia and Montenegro, he was in favor of completely annexing them to the monarchy.

How great a significance the union of all Yugoslav lands in the monarchy denotes for its position as a Great Power and in particular for its position as a Sea Power I have thoroughly explained in memoirs from time to time for years and in this sense, as well as in reference to the incidents of the year 1909 have advised measures of force—at that time with the purpose of incorporating the whole kingdom inclusive of the very important region about Nish (Niš) and of the whole valley of the Morava River. Unfortunately, as a result of the failure to go ahead on this, a situation has now been created by which, even in the case of a triumphant war against Serbia—important districts will pass into the hands of Bulgaria.⁷

Although he advised that Montenegro should be annexed, he thought that a state like that without a sea-coast would be forced to look to Austria-Hungary, if Mt. Lovćen and

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 463.

the plateau of Grab (the only places of strategic value in that tiny state) were surrendered, so as to give the monarchy complete domination over the magnificent harbor of Bocche di Cattaro.

Although he foresaw that the population of any (at present) Italian territory which they might annex would present a problem because of its expected disloyalty, he nevertheless advised the annexation of Venetia to the Po-Mincio boundary or, if not that, the Piave, or the Tagliamento. He wanted this "rectification" for military reasons "whether as a point of departure for an offensive with a deploying space in the Venetian plain or as an easily held and far-extended defensive front-line so that it releases Tyrol, Inner Austria, and the Trentino from a direct threat and likewise the better defends Pola by the land route."⁸

So far as the Italian population, which might be annexed in such a manner, was concerned, he believed it could be brought to a "passive attachment to the monarchy" by releasing it from military service and requiring from it only labor for public or military works.

He concluded the memoir by pointing out that they could "only arrive at assuring (themselves) of the maximum of the attainable in a continued and clear consideration of the situation—and" by remaining "in a firm understanding with Germany in regard to it."

Less than a month later on November 22, Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf wrote a secret note⁹ to Emperor Francis Joseph referring to his Memoir of October 27 and stating that he felt it his duty to defend his views once more. He was opposed to a "one-sided evaluation of this enormous war" to the advantage of Hungary and the disadvantage of Croatia-Slavonia. This would set at nought the "coöperation of all the nations of the Monarchy" which had been "one of the most valuable results of the war."

From the information which he had received from the Minister of War, von Krobatin, he concluded that the

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 463.

⁹ Behandlung des okkupierten serbischen Gebietes. Op. No. 18260. Geheim! MS.

statesmen in Vienna were contemplating a solution of the Yugoslav question which would bear the "stamp of an entirely untenable construction." He decried the idea of leaving behind an independent Serbia which "with its own regent, foreign ambassadors and consuls and all former attributes of sovereignty would be a center of constant agitation which would very soon show similar manifestations, such as were the causes of this catastrophic war."

The idea, of leaving an independent Serbia, of annexing to the Banat (of Temesvár) the region about Belgrade, of making two Hungarian counties out of the Macva and Paraćnica, and of so regulating the Bosnian boundary that the monarchy touches Albania, I consider to be entirely unrealizable, and, if this should be attempted, I would look upon it as an artificial construction of the most serious kind, which must soon lead to the gravest conflicts.

By this statement we are enabled to get a glimpse of the solution with which Baron Burián was at that time playing and which appears to have been the one which the Chief of Staff fought throughout the correspondence which is being analyzed here.

He was likewise opposed to giving all of the Yugoslavs (including those inhabiting Bosnia-Herzegovina and even Dalmatia), with the exception of the Slovenes, to Hungary for the permission to add Russian Poland or a part of it to Austria. All parts of the Monarchy "must be assured equal advantages" in the Orient which he looked upon as the "most natural field for the development of the economic efforts" of its peoples. They wanted equal rewards for their participation in the war.

Two weeks later, on December 7, 1915, Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf wrote Baron Burián, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a memorandum,¹¹ the occasion of which was the rumor of a grave illness of the King of Montenegro. He urged that advantage be taken of the situation to secure a complete submission of Montenegro and that the country

¹¹ Kuenftige Gestaltung der Verhaeltnisse in Montenegro und Serbien. Op. No. 18867, 7 Dezember, 1915. Geheim. Zur eigenhaendigen Eroeffnung. MS.

be limited to the region bounded by the Tara mountains on the north and east and wholly cut off from the sea. He urged once more his "radical" solution of the Yugoslav question, stating that he had come to that "very firm conviction" ever since his entry into office in 1906. He also urged that the three interested governments, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Bulgaria should declare that Serbia had ceased to exist, that the Karagjorgjević dynasty had ceased to reign, and that the territory of the former kingdom of Serbia would be administered in the future until further notice by the three Allies, they reserving to themselves the right to agree on the further partition of the whole.

By this time news of the discussion initiated by Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf had reached Count Tisza, President of the Ministry of Hungary. Baron Burián had sent him the correspondence. It was to this that Count Tisza replied in a lengthy confidential note, dated December 20, 1915.¹²

He agreed with Austria-Hungary's chief strategist that there was a "necessity of a complete orientation in regard to the military situation from the standpoint of the political leadership" and that foreign policy and military leadership should go hand in hand.

He was not inclined to view the military situation as particularly rosy and pointed out that a complete victory could be spoken of only in the Balkans and there only when Salonica is in the hands of the Central Powers. Nor was there any hope, in his mind, that Russian war-power could be annihilated. France could not "be brought to her knees," and it was "out of the realm of the attainable" with regard to England. Italy had to be beaten as yet in an offensive campaign. And there were not a few fears that "new forces," meaning especially Rumania, might come into the struggle on the other side, when, as a matter of fact, Austria-Hungary had already been reduced to the defensive.

¹² See Document II. (Streng vertraulich!)

Perhaps the entry of Bulgaria on their side more than made up for things, but he was disquieted when the military recently sought "to bring about the participation of Rumania on our side with all means, even at the price of heavy sacrifice." He knew this could mean only one thing, i.e., at the cost of territory which then belonged to Hungary.

He did not wish to pose as a pessimist, but he wished to warn people before optimism. After all, Austria-Hungary had to conserve its forces and "obtain peace in a not too distant time" or else it would soon be so exhausted that, if not its downfall, at least its permanent disablement might follow.

We cannot force this peace upon our enemies. Only through further military victories may we create a situation whereby the enemy may become convinced that it would be aimless to continue the struggle and that peace lies in his own interest.

He personally favored a discussion in regard to Austro-Hungarian war-aims, but only on the condition that it should be kept confidential, lest the prestige of the Monarchy might suffer in some future set-back and its friends in those parts might be put into a very bad situation in case they were forced to give up the territory.

Count Tisza pointed out that he was in complete agreement with Baron Burián in regard to Poland and Albania, but wanted to examine the plan closer so far as it pertained to Serbia—which with the Magyars was naturally a very vital question.

He was in favor of making Serbia harmless, but not of annexing that country. He argued for this solution, he stated, only "from the point of view of the well-known power-interests of the whole monarchy." The interests of Hungary and Austria in his mind were identical. "The existence of the Hungarian national state is entirely bound-up with the position of Austria-Hungary as a Great Power; on the other hand the position of Austria-Hungary as a Great Power cannot be thought of without its surest support, the living force of the Hungarian state."¹⁸ Their union

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 467.

had stood the test of fire "and it would be entirely impossible for me to understand that now in the seventeenth month of this struggle one would seek to distinguish between a one-sided Hungarian historic point of view and that of the monarchy as a whole." The Hungarian national state, in his mind, made up the "greatest living force and the surest support of the position of the whole monarchy as a Power." No plan should be adopted which would weaken this source of strength.

The incorporation of all the Serbs in the monarchy would not dispose of the Serbian danger. "The annexation of hostile peoples does not mean the cessation of their hostile sentiments." Furthermore, by the annexation of these Serbs, "the Serbian idea would receive an important impetus, the Serbian nationalist agitation would secure a greater resounding-board, their hopes would revive, and their self-consciousness and their claims increase." He believed that the monarchy was saturated territorially, that the centrifugal forces were greater than the centripetal forces within the monarchy, and that it could not outlive a strengthening of the former.

The war had taught that the Austrian Germans—or pro-Austrian elements—would have perhaps too great a task on their hands with Poland. "To increase the load by the acquisition of new and hostile elements in the south would certainly not meet this problem." The weight of such a task as the new Serbian acquisition would fall on Hungary and only "a harmonious coöperation between Croatia and Hungary could guarantee the result." If the Croats should take up a position hostile to Hungary, the latter would not be strong enough to assimilate all the Serbs, while to hand over all the Serbs to the Croats would mean the sacrifice of the Croat people to the Serbian majority and its "disappearance in Serbianism as a certain result in the course of a few decades." He believed both Croats and Magyars had enough to do to take care of the Serbs already in the monarchy.

An incorporation of several millions of Serbs and Montenegrins would place us before an impossible task, would lay the monarchy

open to internal description, and would not mean an increase in strength, but a diminution of our living power and would compromise the future of the monarchy.

He advised therefore that Serbia be partitioned—"cut off from the body of the Serbian state all that has been promised to Bulgaria, give to Albania those parts of Serbia and Montenegro which naturally belong to it, cut Montenegro off from the Adriatic, and we need only annex the northwest corner of Serbia to separate Serbia and Montenegro from the outerworld and to make them economically wholly dependent on the monarchy." The resultant "statelets" would have to behave properly politically in order to save themselves from economic ruin.

And finally, he pointed out that the annexation of Serbia would prove to be an obstacle to peace as much as Belgium had.

In concluding, he brought up the question of what had taken place at the Common Ministerial Conference of July 19, 1914. At that time, it had been unanimously decided that "only so much Serbian territory was to be annexed as would be sufficient for a boundary ratification." It was on such grounds as that that Hungary gave its consent to the note to Serbia—and, from his point of view, these grounds furnished "a binding solemn promise on the part of all the competent factors, a promise which can be abolished or changed only by a unanimous decision." He was not opposed to adding somewhat to the amount of Serbian territory formerly intended to be annexed, but he would not depart from the basic principle involved, i.e., the retention of a diminished Serbia.

And finally, he was agreeable to the calling of a Common Ministerial Conference between January 6 and 9 to which the Chief of Staff would be invited and where these matters would be discussed.

Meanwhile, Count von Hoetzendorf on December 30, 1915, sent Count Burián a lengthy memorandum in which he enlarged once more upon the political aims of the war and showed his great dissatisfaction with the views held by the political organs of government and especially by the

Magyars. He stated that he would be delighted to go to Vienna at the first opportunity and discuss the matter with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.¹⁴

He made it clear that he could not accept Count Burián's statement of war aims, while the latter, stressing the different external and internal political current questions, found Count Hoetzendorf's inadequate. "In that way we shall scarcely reach a conclusion before the end of the war," wrote the latter.

He was opposed to bringing up all sorts of internal problems which must be subordinated and fitted into the "grand aims of the future of the monarchy." As for himself, he believed it better to define these aims and even "reduce" them in case of defeats, than to go ahead under the present lack of clarity.

It is clear that Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf had somewhat "clarified" his own views on Poland in less than a month. In the memorandum under discussion he urged the erection of Russian Poland, including that part occupied by Germany together with Galicia, "excluding the preponderantly ukrainian part, Eastern Galicia," into a crown-land of the monarchy. An independent Poland, "as a Slavic state, would fall under the influence of Russia and become a new enemy for us." If the solution suggested above could not be obtained, he was in favor of dividing Russian Poland between Germany and the monarchy.

In regard to the Balkans he rather amplified than revised his previously expressed views. To state them briefly he came out most emphatically for the annexation of all Serbia, Montenegro and Northern Albania to the Mati River except that part which would fall to Bulgaria.

He regarded the plan of Count Burián, of incorporating the bridgehead at Belgrade and the Mačva only, as an "unnatural and half-artificial solution."

I know full well that the dominant circles of Hungary have propagated this idea, since they fear for Magyar hegemony, if we annex Serbia, and wish to turn their eyes away from the irre-

¹⁴ Politische Ziele des Krieges—Erwiderungen auf Ausführungen Baron Buriáns. Op. No. 19694. Geheim. Zue eigenhaendigen Eroeffnung. MS.

futable truth that the national union of the Yugoslavs is uncheckable and only a question of time. I can only repeat: If we do not carry out a unification which will be at once radical and unhesitating, then, in spite of Magyar hegemony, it will be accomplished against us and the loss of all Yugoslav territory will be the unavoidable result. What fate will then await Hungary—if we add also the Roumanian and Russofil Irredenta—the Hungarian politicians should have learned, I think from the last year's winter campaign against Russia.

The present war would perhaps have been entirely avoided, if we—as I had from my side recommended with all emphasis—had subdued and annexed Serbia in 1908–1909 or even in 1912.

He repeated again his appeal that all questions be considered from the standpoint of the whole monarchy, not a part of it. He doubted the practical value of “protectorates” or “dominions.” He saw only danger in them when it was a case of the Balkans with their low cultural condition. Bulgaria shook off the “protectorate” of Turkey in 1908 and 1912. He was opposed to any pardoning of Montenegro, even at the loss of much territory on its part. “Montenegro, as well as Serbia, should be definitely removed from the family of states.” The King of Montenegro had played a double-handed game.

The conditions in Albania had changed so that the advisability of leaving an independent Albania had passed. “We must ourselves oppose an independent Albania in order to prevent Italy from establishing itself on the eastern coast of the Adriatic.” This was the great aim of Italy! He would divide Albania between Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Greece. This would keep Greece friendly to the Central Powers. And while it was not the best policy to admit Bulgaria to reach the Adriatic, it was better to have that power there than Italy. Friendly relations between Greece and Bulgaria could be better maintained if Albania were divided and the possibility offered “to increase our influence in Bulgaria and Greece so strongly reduced by Germany.”

He concluded his memorandum by referring to the press campaign which the Germans were conducting with regard to making Poland a state in the German Empire. It was

an attempt to sound the Austrians. They were also writing of a Montenegro made larger by territorial additions from Serbia. It was high time therefore to let them know what were Austria-Hungary's war aims.

On January 4, 1916, Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf wrote a memorandum to Count Tisza which bears the title of "The Political Aims of the War. The Position of Count Tisza." In this he repudiated the intimation that he cherished any "boundless annexation wishes," and he went over his entire plan toning it down here and there. He ridiculed leaving behind "a harmless Montenegro" or a "harmless Serbia" by pointing out what a "harmless Prussia" did after Napoleon partitioned that state. Economic compulsion only inflamed nationalism. The real cause of the present war and Austria-Hungary's most vital question was the stabilization of its Balkan frontier.

He pointed out also that the decision¹⁶ of July 19, 1914, was taken under the impression that this war was to be a war with Serbia alone and a punitive expedition only. A world war was to be avoided. But contrary to expectation a world war followed and had "completely changed the ministerial decision then taken. This decision under the present circumstances can hardly be considered as unchangeable." He urged that a full appraisal be made of the changed conditions and all the consequences drawn which could serve the monarchy and its future.

The longest document—and the last—of this series which came into the possession of the writer is a memorandum¹⁷ written by the Chief of Staff to Francis Joseph on April 16, 1916. In this document Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf complained that the military officers were still without a definite orientation and that the populations in the occupied

¹⁶ Politische Ziele des Krieges. Stellungnahme Graf Tisza's. Op. No. 19830. MS.

¹⁷ See *Diplomatische Aktnestuecke zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, 1914. *Ergaenzungen und Nachtraege zum Oesterreichisch-Ungarischen Rotbuch*. Wien, 1919. Tiel 1, pp. 25-38, 65. See also the *New York Times Current History* (December, 1919), pp. 455-459.

¹⁸ *Alleruntertaenigster Vortrag Ueber Kriegsziele der oe.-u. Monarchie*. Op. No. 24005. Geheim. MS.

districts were in great uncertainty as to what would be done with them. To leave the Allies of the monarchy without notice as to what it desired to do with these regions, in his opinion, meant the certain loss of the territory to the Hapsburgs. Moreover, if this had already been done the "great difficulties" which had arisen with Bulgaria over the Pristina-Prizrend region would have been avoided.

The Chief of Staff could not refrain from again expressing himself strongly against the "extreme national party point of view of the Magyars who, fearing to diminish their hegemony which is maintained only by force, oppose" the annexation of the remaining Yugoslavs and would much rather expose the monarchy to the greatest danger "than make the slightest sacrifice on the part of the Magyar minority whose ethnographic and cultural preponderance is unjustified."

In regard to Russian Poland, Baron Conrad von Hoetzen-dorf was now inclined to see that it might delay peace to demand all of it. He insisted again on the re-partition of whatever part fell into the hands of the Central Powers. By this he meant Russian Poland west of the Vistula.

Coming to the Yugoslav question, he urged that Austria-Hungary solve the problem of the Balkans, instead of merely playing the rôle of an observer. But to leave a small Serbia and a small Montenegro and a larger, artificial Albania, which had been the laughing stock of Europe, was not going to solve the Balkan problem; it would perpetuate it. He ridiculed the proposal of Baron Burián to create an Albania. Baron Burián, he asserted, believed what the Albanian fanatics were preaching, namely that the "Albanian tribes make a united and a spiritually and morally highly-exalted nation" which could become, with some grooming, a true ally of the monarchy. He pleaded with Francis Joseph that "just the opposite of this idealized point of view is correct." It was merely a "rendezvous of foreign influence."

And finally, the Chief of Staff laid down as the chief war aim as regards Italy¹⁸ "the unconditional and definitive exclusion of the same from the east coast of the Adriatic."

¹⁸ He appears to have given up his Po-Mincio ideas by this time.

In his mind he stated the minimum of Austro-Hungarian war-aims when he wrote that "neither an independent Poland, nor any kind of Yugoslav state should be tolerated outside of the Monarchy, if we do not wish unmistakably to lose Galicia in the north or to lose all of our Yugoslav territory in the South and to have conducted the gravest of all wars in vain."¹⁹

What, then, is to be learned from this discussion of Austro-Hungarian war-aims? Can we put together a few statements which these documents will bear out and add to the mosaic of truth?

It is clear, first and foremost, that the war was expected by the men highest up in Austro-Hungarian circles to be a punitive expedition and not the beginning of a world struggle. How they happened to fall into this amazing blunder if they had had the history of the Balkans in mind as they should is inconceivable. Hardly less unusual is the fact that the war should have lasted seventeen months before the question of war-aims was again seriously and generally considered by competent circles.

Next, we may notice that the strategic frontiers as drawn by the Chief of Staff did not meet with the support of the statesmen in Vienna. The Vistula on the east, the Mati on the south, and the Po-Mincio on the south-west may have been good, so far as they were concerned, from a strategic²⁰ point of view, but were regarded as betraying "boundless annexation-wishes" by Count Tisza, the coolest statesmen of them all. He foresaw that the peace they needed would never be forthcoming if they betrayed such an appetite. And that peace would have to come soon for their supply of man-power would be at an end in the summer of 1916.

¹⁹ The ex-chief of Staff announced in 1919 that he was writing a book which would explain the war as he saw it and in which he would endeavor to fix the blame for the downfall. Preliminary announcements gave the following description: C. v. Hoetzendorf (C. F. Novak, ed.), *Der Weg zur Katastrophe*. Wien, 1919 (?).

²⁰ And even this is to be doubted. At the Peace Conference professional geographers and strategists usually fought shy of rivers as boundaries. They preferred mountain ranges.

The hopeless situation into which the Austrian side of the Polish question fell is to be imagined from the documents. After all, it became more and more evident that what Germany wanted would happen with regard to Russian Poland—and Germany did not wish to see it independent or under Austria-Hungary. The last few documents show that the original hope of uniting Russian Poland with Galicia under Austrian rule was fast fading. In its place emerged what was to be expected—a complete subservience to German policy in regard to Poland, and eventually, as we now know,²¹ the willingness to give Germany the Austrian share, including even Galicia, if Germany would make territorial concessions to France in the west (i.e., Alsace-Lorraine) as a price of peace.

From the documents which have been reviewed it would appear possible to say that the Yugoslav question had been guided largely by Magyar statesmanship since 1905 and particularly in crises. Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf would hardly be so bitter against the Magyars had he not always been blocked in his desire to annihilate Serbia. Magyar statesmanship was based on the "dominant" idea, the idea that Hungary must have its own highway to the sea even at the cost of the prevention of the formation of the Yugoslav nation and should aspire to the final absorption of the Croats, if possible, since they stood on the direct route. To let them unite in one nation would destroy this dream for all time. For that reason Count Tisza wished to "retain" Serbia, but also to make it "harmless." At the same moment, he would keep down the number of Serbs within the monarchy and prevent them from "Serbianizing" the Croats. This is indeed an elaborate precaution for an "artificial" nationality such as the Yugoslavs! It clearly belongs to the old order of statesmanship.

The statesmen at Vienna likewise believed it a good policy to "re-create" Albania, whereas the strategist saw in such a "state" only a good opportunity for Italy—which he

²¹ See *Ottokar Czernin ueber die Politik waehrend des Weltkrieges*. Rede, gehalten den 11. Dezember, 1918. Wien, 1919, p. 15. Also his memoirs: *In the World War*. London, 1919.

insisted on entirely excluding from the east coast of the Adriatic—to bottle up the Adriatic by securing a foothold at Valona. Therefore, to admit Bulgaria to the Adriatic was a lesser “evil.”

The documents show that there were internal differences as between Austrian Germans and Magyars and as between Germans of the Empire and of Austria, but these were subsidiary to the Ausgleich of 1867 and to the Central European conception. They often told each other the blunt truth—that both were minorities and really maintained themselves by force and would continue to do so in the future only by a miracle, but it never went further than that.

Therefore, those who calculated that the Magyars of Hungary might revolt or that Austria-Hungary might make a separate peace early in the war were wrong. There is now sufficient proof to show that Austria-Hungary could not break-away from the Dual Alliance.²²

We are amazed when we note that the Chief of Staff appears to take such a jealous and free attitude as against Germany when he must have viewed from his exalted position the miserable Austrian failures in Galicia and in Serbia—failures which were turned into decisive victories by the Imperial Germans under the one and same general, Mackenson, who with a large force of Germans and an immense quantity of artillery accomplished the task. In these campaigns the Austrian army had virtually ceased to exist as an independent unit and many details of the arrangements behind the lines were put into the hands of officials from Germany. The Old Austria had indeed come to an end. And yet it reappeared in the person of the Chief of Staff and showed an enormous appetite. This is no more incomprehensible, however, than the opacity of that group of men who sat in council on July 19, 1914, and believed they had started a simple punitive expedition against Serbia to which they had all “happily” agreed.

²² See Czernin, Rede. 11 Dez. 1918. Wien, 1919, and *In the World War*. London, 1919.

DOCUMENTARY APPENDIX

I

MEMOIR OF BARON CONRAD VON HOETZENDORF ADDRESSED TO
EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH

October 27, 1915

1915²²

MEMOIR

I beg most respectfully to be allowed to present the following memoir to your Majesty.

It is impossible to foresee at this time when and with what results this war will end; likewise it can not be said whether it will close favorably to the Central Powers or whether they can count on any increase in territory.

We would be anticipating events too much to attempt *positive conclusions* in this respect, but, on the other hand, it is even now advisable to examine these questions, first, because they will help to determine the limits of the war aims, and, second, because they make necessary the steps which, even while the war is on, appear to be advisable, if one does not wish to lose the advantages which opportunity offers, and because they touch the vital interests of the monarchy.

In regard to the limitations of the war aims, the military situation is the determining factor and for that matter the actual situation in the field, as well as the material, situation in so far as the determination to carry on the war with prospects is concerned.

The situation in the field is for example at this moment favorable, but it is not yet so favorable as to cause the enemy to be inclined toward peace. It is also likely at the same time that a change may come, whether for better or for worse. In particular, the re-opening of the war in the Balkans will bring a new movement in the direction which, according to the outcome, will be favorable or unfavorable for the Central Powers and may prove decisive for the whole war situation.

The (future) phases of the situation in the field are not to be foreseen; it is, however, different with the material situation.

In this regard, it can already be said that if we should wish to continue the war with the same great number of troops as heretofore and must expect the losses which experience has shown in the past, our physical resources—that is men qualified for military service—will come to an end in June, 1916; from that time on we should lack additions—the army would wholly disappear.

²² This memoir (in M.S.) bears only the date of the year, 1915, but Op. No. 18260 proves that it was written or dispatched October 27, 1915. Its index number is Op. No. 17283.

We must for that reason bring our war aims into harmony with this situation—and these considerations together with the situation in the field will be decisive in such a matter.

So far as ~~the financial resources~~, the supply of munitions and materials, as well as the need in food products and horses, all this is left out of the calculation—because by and large these can not go beyond the limits set by the resources in men.

The latter together with the situation in the field must therefore be held firmly in view, in order to determine for what price one may be relatively forced to stand ready for peace.

Conditions may arise which may bring with them loss in territory, as well as those which have the status quo as a result, or also those which may lead to an addition of territory. We shall consider here only the last eventuality and in this connection the evaluation of the various (possible) additions of territory will be explained, so that these can be drawn into the calculation, if it is a question of the determination of the results to be striven for and regarded as attainable.

The following (possible) additions of territory come into question:²⁴

- (a) The Russian territory
- (b) The Serbian territory
- (c) The Montenegrin territory
- (d) The Italian territory

Before entering into any discussion of these questions—and in particular with reference to the Russian territory—it is necessary to explain clearly a capital question—and that is the question into what relation with Germany the monarchy will enter in the future.

To be brief, will the monarchy go its own way without a closer alliance with Germany or will it create that Central European block in a solid union which will be in a position to hold its ground against all hostile intentions and which could pursue a great and above all a common commercial and political policy in the Orient, whereby it is calculated that the Balkan States would also be included?

I think that the existence and the prosperity of the monarchy may be best secured through the Central European block—that this must be the guiding idea for our policy and for the military development of the monarchy, and that all decisions in regard to territorial compensations should take this as their basis.

I base this view more particularly on the following convictions.

First: Russia is and remains the most dangerous enemy of the monarchy which it aims to destroy by its own expansion;

²⁴ For light on this see Count Ottokar Czernin. *In the World War*. London, Cassel, 1919. Also the review by R. M. Seton-Watson. Count Czernin's Memoirs. (*The New Europe* (London), December 4, 1919, vol. xiii, no. 164, pp. 238-243.)

Second: Italy was, is, and remains the natural and the most odious opponent of the monarchy whom Italy regards as an obstacle to its Adriatic, as well as to its Mediterranean and Balkan, interests;

Third: Serbia and Montenegro remain bitter enemies of the monarchy so long as they can be towed around by Russia and do not see that their cultural development would be best assured by connection with the monarchy.

Against this group of three enemies the monarchy can prosper only in a close union with Germany.

There were times when a Three-Emperor Alliance between Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia could have been thought of, but the last few years, especially the now-raging war have made clear forever the whole brutal spirit of expansion and the true aims of Russia and demonstrate that Central Europe and along with that the monarchy appeared to be threatened in proportion as the already oppressed power of Russia increased.

It must be the aim of Central European policy to diminish this power as much as possible and with that observation I take up the first case of possible territorial changes, namely that of Russian territory.

If the military situation were so favorable at the conclusion of peace that vast territories should be given up by Russia, it would be a great advantage for the Central Powers—no matter how difficult would be the decision of what would happen with these territorial cessions.

If Austria-Hungary and Germany stand on the basis of a durable common Central European policy, then they must and will overcome these difficulties without dividing on small jealousies; the important thing is that that territory does not remain Russian any longer, but may be reckoned as an addition to the strength of the Central Powers;—such an arrangement may be considered from two points of view, first, as an addition of territory and population and with that is bound up the increase in military strength; second, as a very much desired rectification of such an unfavorable boundary line with which the northeastern part of the monarchy is geographically surrounded at its very doors, and which in case of a war against Russia is very disadvantageous.

The latter would be done away with if a boundary should be fixed on the Bug (river) and modified (only) if the boundary is fixed on the Vistula.

Let it be noticed here, that it would be most desirable, if the whole Polish territory fell to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy—but even a partition of it with Germany (somewhat after the boundaries of the year 1795), I consider to be more to the purpose than the restitution, of this territory to Russia.

Should it come to such a diminution of Russian power, Serbia's resistance would be broken by it indirectly, since the latter can only stand up while depending on Russia,—and the monarchy would then have the power immediately or later to solve the question of Serbia's territorial cessions.

As regards this, I stand as I did long ago²⁵ and I stand now on the ground that only the complete incorporation of Serbia in the monarchy can bring about a salutary result and free it from the danger which ~~lies concealed in~~ an independent Serbia. Such a Serbia remains for time to come the center for dangerous agitation for all Yugoslav separatist movements and the active ally of Russia as well as the ancient enemy of the monarchy—an ever open sore. *How great a significance the union of all Yugoslav lands in the monarchy denotes for its position as a Great Power and in particular for its position as a Sea Power*, I have thoroughly explained in memoirs from time to time for years and in this sense, as well as in reference to the incidents of the year 1909 have advised measures of force—at that time with the purpose of incorporating the whole kingdom inclusive of the very important region about Nish (Niš) and of the whole valley of the Morava River. Unfortunately, as a result of the failure to go ahead on this, a situation has now been created by which, even in the case of a triumphant war against Serbia—important districts will pass into the hands of Bulgaria.

An independent Montenegro appears to be far less dangerous than an independent Serbia in so far as it is not allowed to have any seacoast whatsoever.

Thinly populated, poor and without resources, an independent Montenegro could be brought into economic dependence of such a kind upon the monarchy, that it would be forced to unite with it—the condition being, however, that it retains no sea-coast at all.

Those parts of its territories must be given to the monarchy which are indispensable for the strengthening of the Boccha di Cattaro (namely, Lovćen, the plateau of Grab); and the coast up to the boundaries of Albania as well. Should the harbor of Antivari remain in the hands of Montenegro, it must be dominated by Austro-Hungarian coast fortifications.

As a matter of fact, the annexation of Montenegro appears to be more advantageous and that too even for the economic prosperity of this country itself.

THE ITALIAN TERRITORY

There is no advantage to be seen from annexing the Italians of Italy to the monarchy. They would hardly make loyal citizens because of their sharp national antagonism and for that reason cannot be regarded as an increase in military strength.

On the other hand, military considerations demand the restoration of the Po-Mincio boundary, inclusive of the hill country south of the Lake of Garda, whether as a point of departure for an offensive with a deploying space in the Venetian plain or as an

²⁵ In another document (Op. No. 18867, December 7, 1915) he stated that he had advocated this policy since entry into office in 1906.

easily held and far-extended defensive front-line so that it releases Tyrol, Inner Austria, and the Trentino from a direct threat and likewise the better defends Pola by the land route.

The disadvantage of the long Venetian coasts must be done away with by fortifications, which even now exist. The population though lacking in military value, could be so utilized under an application of the army law that it would serve in military construction and manual labor divisions and could be used, in times of peace, for different kinds of construction work. This release from military service might bring the inhabitants to a passive attachment to the monarchy.

Should Venetia's annexation appear impossible, then the territory to the Piave (should be included) or at least to the Tagliamento along with a thorough rectification of the boundary of Tyrol, in the sense of an extension of the same to the mountain²⁶—from a military point of view, and for that matter from analogous grounds such as can be brought up with regard to the whole of Venetia.

If I have endeavored to expose the dominant considerations for the determinations of the war aims from the military point of view, I can only reiterate at the conclusion that because of the present total ignorance of the outcome of the war one cannot speak of definite demands, but only arrive at assuring the maximum of the attainable in a continued and clear consideration of the situation—and to remain in a firm understanding with Germany in regard to it.

II

COUNT TISZA TO BARON BURIÁN

*Copy of a confidential note to the Royal and Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs.*²⁷ MS.

[Strictly Confidential.]

Budapest, December 20, 1915.

Right honorable Baron:

In the correspondence graciously sent to me which was carried on with the Chief of the General Staff in regard to our war aims (Note Op. No. 19380 from Baron Conrad²⁸ and Secret Note of your excellency No. 5892) highly important questions were broached which touch the fundamental basis of the monarchy, which exercise a penetrating influence upon the determination of our future, which require the attention of all those factors who are responsible for the orientation of the policy of the monarchy, and which at least in part already demand a clear understanding.

²⁶ The name is left out in the document.

²⁷ Count Stephen Burián.

²⁸ Conrad von Hoetzendorf.

Since I also have the honor to make some remarks in regard to the same, I shall at the start most emphatically declare, that I wholly agree with the opinion of Baron Conrad "that foreign policy and military leadership should have the closest unbroken contact with each other." Of course, the necessity of a complete orientation in regard to the military situation from the standpoint of the political leadership becomes evident in a perhaps increased measure.

The position to be taken with regard to the war aims is dependent in the first place on the military situation, whereby I believe I must point out with the greatest emphasis the circumstance that after all the shining deeds and triumphs of our troops the situation as a whole is not of such a kind that we could speak of forcing our enemies to seek peace or of forcing our will upon them.

We can really speak of a complete victory only in the Balkans, but there only when we have driven the Entente out of Salonica. The shining victories in Russia have indeed put us in the possession of a vast tract of enemy territory, but on the other hand given us the definite knowledge that one can hardly be able to think of an annihilation of Russian war-power nor of a blow at the heart of the enemy.

After all of the impressions received here one must reckon the chances of a victorious offensive in France as very moderate and really put into our calculation only the firm retention of what we have now. We must cast aside the idea of bringing France to her knees, while to do the same to England cannot really be spoken of as this lies out of the realm of the attainable.

Due to the heroic courage of our troops who are above all praise we have succeeded in checking the Italian offensive. The military conditions for our offensive in Italy do not appear to be propitious at present, but it must not be lost sight of that the setting for a peace suitable to the prestige and the interests of the monarchy will be lacking to us—due to the sacrifices brought to us by experiences already lived through—so long as we have not defeated the Italian army in offensive battles and advanced victoriously upon Italian soil.

And, finally, the used-up and almost exclusively defensive tasks of our fighting strength appear to be so much occupied that the thought of any increase in new forces²² on the part of our enemies must cause the greatest anxiety to our army command.

One should point out what a great importance our competent military officers attach to the attitude of Rumania. Perhaps the development in the Balkans, the entry into the war of Bulgaria in our group of powers, the restoration of the communication with Turkey and the destruction of the Serbian army may have in this respect brought about a change. It was only a short time ago that we heard the desire from the side of the military,

²² He is thinking of Roumania, possibly even of America.

to bring about the participation of Rumania on our side with all means, even at the price of heavy sacrifice.

The situation as a whole may be characterized as follows: that we have made conquests against our principal enemies and hold these in a fairly certain good defensive position, that we have too little strength in reserve for further offensive purposes and cannot at all think of a complete and annihilating victory over our principal enemies.

Our army attained unforgettable glory—the army which achieved so much against attacking superior forces. This is certainly not a fact which would permit us to dabble with and attain our war aims according to (mere) opinion.³⁰

After the struggles, which I have carried on against every kind of small-minded pessimism during the gravest campaigns of the war, I believe myself justified in warning the people before optimism. We must conserve our forces and obtain a peace in a not too distant time, otherwise such an exhaustion in men and economic forces will set in, which would result, if not in our downfall in the war, at least in permanently disabling us after the war and in endangering our future.

We cannot force this peace upon our enemies. Only through further military victories may we create a situation whereby the enemy may become convinced that it would be aimless to continue the struggle and that peace lies in his own interests.

The conviction depends in a great part upon our terms of peace. It must come at given times to a compromise between our wishes and the point of view of the enemy, and, as it was very correctly maintained in the note of Your Excellency cited above, we must be prepared to limit our wishes to the measure of the attainable.

Although I likewise do not oppose the arguments of Baron Conrad and must admit his excellency is right that our silence in regard to the future of the occupied territories is bound up with several disadvantages, I must nevertheless point out that we must exercise the greatest reserve in making known our annexation-wishes, for such an attitude, in regard to territories, which we might eventually have to restore to the enemy, would be bound up with the gravest consequences, as well for our friends in the population there as for the prestige of the monarchy.

Nothing would stand in the way of a confidential discussion by those factors competent to handle the question. On the contrary, I can promise only advantages to come from such an arrangement and would welcome with great joy an agreement in principle on the pertinent vital questions in the confidential circle of responsible advisers.

In regard to the merit of the proposed questions, I can express myself as being in complete agreement with the proposals of Your Excellency in regard to Poland and Albania.

³⁰ Count Tisza's German is not always clear. Here he evidently means that one should not play lightly with such a serious theme as war aims.

I believe it to be in order to examine the plan with regard to Serbia a bit closer.

The formula of a solution of the Serbian or the Yugoslav question within the boundaries of the monarchy presents different interpretations. If one means by it that one will meet a movement directed by Serbian policy against the integrity of the monarchy with vigorous means and that the fate of Serbia will be regulated in a way which will make the same harmless, then there is nothing to bring up against it. But if the incorporation of all Serbs within the monarchy is to be understood in the matter, then I must with great emphasis take position against it.

It is of course understood that I do this from the point of view of the well-known power-interests of the whole monarchy.

In my opinion, I need no special proof to show that this covers the well-known Hungarian national historic point of view. The existence of the Hungarian national state is entirely bound up with the position of Austria-Hungary as a Great Power; on the other hand the position of Austria-Hungary as a Great Power cannot be thought of without its surest support, the living force of the Hungarian state.

This identity of Magyar national interests with the demands of the position of the monarchy as a great power was the fruitful fundamental thought of the Compromise of 1867. It has already proved itself in the Balkan crises of the seventies and eighties of the nineteenth century, and in the present struggle for life and death has victoriously stood the test of fire, and it would be entirely impossible for me to understand that now in the seventeenth month of this struggle one would seek to distinguish between a one-sided Hungarian historic point of view and that of the monarchy as a whole.

One has not only utilized the loyalty and the heroic courage of the Hungarian people with which the monarchy victoriously stood the trials of the first half of the war and after the colossal losses in those struggles with the superior might of the Russians could give the old enemy blows and offer a front to its new enemies, but also brought to it its life-prolonging force, which the twenty millions of inhabitants of Hungary united into a compact living organism as a result of the most holy and vital emotions, so that in the hour of danger the spirit of a common bond and thought—to give up everything for the fatherland—emerged successfully in all nationalities.

If one is not completely blinded by prejudices, he cannot question as a result of the experiences of this war that not only the energy of the Hungarians ethnically considered, but the firm resolve of the Hungarian national state makes up the greatest living force and the surest support of the position of the whole monarchy as a Power.

If one would not wish to rob the whole structure of the monarchy of its strongest pillars and call up internal complications and dangers, which would endanger our future more vexatiously

than any foreign foe, then one must not leave out of sight these historic points of view in the decisions in regard to Serbia.

The assertion that the incorporation of all Serbs in the monarchy is the only practical disposal of the Serbian danger appears to be based upon a double error in my opinion. On the one side, that the annexation of Serbia really disposes of the Great-Serbian danger, and, on the other hand, that a separate Serbia would not be drawn into the orbit of the monarchy and be made harmless.

I believe I must take stand against the acceptance of both opinions.

That the annexation of hostile peoples does not mean the cessation of their hostile sentiments, I do not need to prove. The recent history of the monarchy is far too full of such experiences. The monarchy will be just as much the arch-enemy of the annexed Serbs after the annexation as before it, and it would be a fact that the number of our Serbian subjects would be increased by a few million and the strength of the Serbian idea would receive an important impetus, the Serbian nationalist agitation would secure a greater resounding-board, their hopes would revive, and their self-consciousness and their claims increase.

The oft-repeated expression that the monarchy is saturated was no phrase coined ad usum Delphini. It arose from the wise insight of our important statesmen and expressed the truth that the relation of the centrifugal forces to the centripetal in the monarchy was really an unfavorable one and that it could not outlive a strengthening of the former.

The famous events of this war do not permit us to judge wrong in making a proper estimate of the same. This war, in spite of several elevating experiences has made clear the entire seriousness of the situation. In the fearful call of the Austrian Germans that their position be strengthened, in the feeling of uneasiness which had gripped these circles by the thought of acquiring Polish territory, the observation is in place that the dominating movements on foot among the Czechs, as well as the manifold confused conditions in Galicia present a severe trial of strength for the Germans—or, shall we say rather, for those elements which have a feeling for the Austrian state or have Austrian patriotism—and they place these before a task whose solution can only be arrived at by a conscious pledge and the greatest possible exertion of all the state-upholding forces, so that an addition of greater and indifferent Polish elements can only be taken on, in case the position of the elements in Old Austria clinging to the state with life and soul is strengthened as much as possible.

To increase the load by the acquisition of new and hostile elements in the south would not certainly meet this problem, and such an experiment would be bound up with the most pitiful consequences for the situation as a whole in the Austrian state.

Under these circumstances, the center of gravity of the Serbian question would fall upon the lands of the Hungarian crown whereby

only a harmonious cooperation between Croatia and Hungary could guarantee the result. If the Croats should take up a position hostile to Hungary, the latter would not be strong enough to assimilate all of the Serbs while to hand over all the Serbs to the Croats would mean the sacrifice of the Croat people to the Serbian majority and its disappearance in Serbianism as a certain result in the course of a few decades. It is one of the absolute conditions of life-existence for the Croat people to lean on Hungary in the struggle against Great-Serbianism and not to take in more Serbs than it can master, and from the standpoint of the monarchy as a whole, as well as that of the Hungarian and Croatian historic point of view, nothing would be more foolish than to wish to play out the old differences between Croatia and Hungary at this moment when such a problem knocks at the gate, a problem which is to be solved only by the united exertion of both.

If we should wish effectively to influence the Serbs in Bosnia, Croatia and Hungary in a patriotic sense and really bring about an essential improvement in the situation there, both of us have plenty to do. An incorporation of several millions of Serbs and Montenegrins would place us before an impossible task, would lay the monarchy open to internal disruption, and would not mean an increase in strength, but a diminution of our living might and would compromise the future of the monarchy.

In opposition to this tottering policy with its catastrophic consequences, one could so arrange the parts of Serbia and Montenegro still left, whereby the monarchy could have the choice of taking up with success the struggle against hostile movements within them. Cut off from the body of the Serbian state all that has been promised to Bulgaria, give to Albania those parts of Serbia and Montenegro which naturally belong to it, cut Montenegro off from the Adriatic, and we need only to annex the north-west corner of Serbia to separate Serbia and Montenegro from the outworld and to make them economically wholly dependent on the monarchy.

There would be left then only one or two poor statelets wholly dependent on the monarchy for whom the welfare of the monarchy would be a vital question in the truest sense of the word, which could be brought into permanent dependency on the monarchy by far-reaching commercial concessions combined with political and military agreements.

We and only we would be in a position to satisfy them economically. We could also do it without cutting into our own flesh. Political dependence would result as an automatic consequence of ours and their sought for economic needs and would offer guarantee for its continuation as a result of the circumstance that a political attitude displeasing to us would involve their ruin as a direct result.

While I believe I am forced to consider this solution as the best for the interests of Austria-Hungary, I shall not pass by unnoticed the fact that I regard a more far-reaching solution as not only

harmful, but as unattainable in practice. The annexation of Serbia would prove to be quite as unconditional an obstacle to peace as that of Belgium, and the monarchy must find a solution which gives Serbia a certain existence as a state, as it is the case of Germany as regards Belgium.

This is not the first time that this question engaged the attention of the competent circles of the monarchy. It was brought up by the Hungarian government before the war and resulted in a unanimous decision in the common Ministerial Conference of July 19, 1914, according to which only so much Serbian territory was to be annexed as would be sufficient for a boundary rectification. The Hungarian government made this decision the condition of its consent to the sending of the note to Serbia. I brought this matter up as such and it was agreed to by all present. This also makes a binding solemn promise on the part of all the competent factors, a promise, which can be abolished or changed only by a unanimous decision.

Although I believe that I must remain firm on the fundamental principle, to which this decision owes its origin, I cannot oppose the grounds which might permit a certain revision of this decision as desirable. It may be that the amount of Serbian territory to be annexed to the monarchy should be somewhat greater than was then in mind, and it would be certainly better if the fate of the parts of Serbia to be annexed, as well as those which were not, were cleared up, and in regard to this the military administration can with full right demand an explanation.

The desire of the army-command to secure definite limits in regard to the size of the expected annexation, as well as in regard to the fate of the annexed regions, is completely justified, and the clearing up of certain vital questions of principle must appear desirable from the standpoint of the governments.

For that reason, I beg Your Excellency to have you put this question on the order of the day at the earliest summoned Common Ministerial Conference to which the Chief of Staff shall be invited and permit me to suggest that the Hungarian Parliament which assembles on the third of January will hold no sessions from the sixth to the ninth, so that one of these four days can be utilized for the holding of the suggested Conference.

Accept, right honorable baron, the expression of my highest esteem.

TISZA,
m.p.

RUSSIA AND THE REVERSAL OF ALLIED POLICY

*By Harry J. Carman, Department of History,
Columbia University.*

I. INTRODUCTION

To the student of history and international relations the recent reversal of the allied policy toward Russia is an event of prime significance. It practically marks the abandonment of an ill-advised international program which from the first was doomed to complete failure as a solution of the Russian problem. In adopting a more sane policy, however, the Allied statesmen seem to have been motivated neither by humanitarian considerations nor by a more intelligent conception of the real needs of Russia. Their action appears to be rather one of expediency. Menaced by the spread of Bolshevism to their own domains, threatened by political groups at home and having failed after relentless efforts to destroy the dictatorial Lenine government, they were virtually compelled to adopt a more conciliatory attitude. To the end that the last named of these underlying causes for this change of policy may be made more apparent it is the purpose of this article to show in a brief but comprehensive manner how the Allied policy toward Russia has operated during the past eighteen months. Obviously many details must be omitted; nor is it possible to give the text of important documentary materials which are as yet zealously guarded from the eyes of the world.¹

II. OPPOSITION GOVERNMENTS

After the Bolshevik insurrection in 1917 and the establishment of a dictatorship by the left wing of the revolutionary party, Russian irreconcilables and conservative statesmen the world over repeatedly urged that Bolshevism

be destroyed and that a government of "law and order" be substituted for the Lenine régime. It was not, however, until the summer of 1918 that the advocates of such a program were able to perfect their plans. In their judgment three methods of procedure were possible for the resurrection of revolutionary Russia. (1) To encourage the establishment of anti-Bolshevik governments which would be aided and abetted by the Entente powers. (2) To crush the Bolsheviki by military force. (3) To surround the Soviet republic with a cordon of hostile states and armies, isolated it, and by means of a stringent blockade starve it out of existence. All of these possible solutions were tried.

1. *The government of the north.* The first of many opposition governments set up with only mediocre success was the so-called "government of the north" established under the leadership of the famous revolutionary socialist, Nikolai Tschaikovsky, during the first week of August, 1918, and, incidentally, shortly after the landing of Allied forces at Archangel. This government announced its assumption of power in a proclamation signed by the members of the abortive constituent assembly representing the provinces of Novgorod, Archangel, Vologda, Viatka, Kazau, and Samara. Its political program provided for the regeneration of Russia on a democratic basis, the reestablishment of local self-government with universal suffrage, reorganization of the national army, renewal of the war against Germany, and the repudiation of the famous Brest-Litovsk treaty. Labor unions and war organizations were to be allowed to function freely and local governments were to control the food supply. While the new organization abolished Soviet institutions and ordered the arrest of all Soviet officials, it retained the Bolshevik policy of nationalizing finance and various branches of industry. Naturally the extreme reactionaries were bitterly opposed to such a program and largely as a result of their efforts the Tschaikowsky government on September 8 was overthrown and its leaders expelled from Archangel. Inasmuch as this government had been financed in part by the British and apparently had the support of the Social Revolutionists

and the Menshevik wing of the Social Democrats, the allied diplomatic and military chiefs at Archangel immediately demanded that it be restored to power, a request which was complied with on September 12. The restored government, however, assumed a position subordinate to a government set up in September at Samara on the Volga by two hundred members of the constituent assembly of 1917 which had been dissolved by the Bolsheviki upon the latter's assumption of power. This government, which proposed to assume control of all Russia, was headed by Avksentief, formerly minister of the interior in the Kerensky cabinet, assisted by General Alexieoff, the well known military leader. Its program provided for a federated European Russia and for the continuance of the war against Germany in alliance with the Entente. With the capture of Samara by the Bolsheviki, however, this government ceased to function.

Another and more serious effort to centralize authority and unify action in combating Bolshevism was made late in September when a so-called National Congress assembled at Ufa. In attendance at this meeting were many members of the defunct constituent assembly as well as representatives from Ural, Orenburg, Uralsk, Semirietshensk, Yenieslisk, Astrakhan and other districts; the Cossacks, the Kirghiz Tartars and all political parties except the Bolsheviki also sent delegates. Under the leadership of President Maslov of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, this congress organized an all-Russian provisional government nominally to succeed the Kerensky government of 1917, and as such to have dictatorial power. Plans were made for the summoning of a national constituent assembly which should convene in January, 1919, but in the meantime supreme power over all Russia was to be exercised by a directorate of five members; the convention unanimously elected to this directory Nikolai Avksentief (Socialist) as president; Peter Vologodsk (Socialist), of the Western Government of Siberia, as prime minister; N. Tschaikovsky (Socialist), of the Archangel government; N. Astrov (Cadet), former mayor of Moscow, and General Vassili Boldyrev (non-party) commander-in-chief. According to its program the

Ufa government sought to overthrow the Bolsheviks, reintegrate Russia, repudiate the Brest-Litovsk treaty, restore relations with the Allies and continue the war against Germany. It failed, however, to specify whether the future Russian government was to be republican or monarchical and it was equally ambiguous on the question of land ownership. In contradistinction to the Bolsheviks, it welcomed foreign capital and private initiative in the development of the productive resources of the country. The Ufa government was openly supported by Kerensky, who, on October 10, asked the British government to accord it formal recognition. Great Britain and her allies, however, apparently decided to await further evidences of its ability to act for the Russian nation. Not unnaturally it was vigorously opposed by the Bolsheviks and in October it was forced to seek quarters in Siberia where it joined the government of Omsk and became the fourth which had been set up in that city.

2. *The Omsk government.* Meanwhile anti-radical governments were springing up in Siberia. In May, 1918, General Semenov, an anti-Bolshevik commander, and Admiral Kolchak, a reputed monarchist and former commander of the Black Sea fleet, set up an independent government in eastern Siberia at Lake Baikal. At Harbin, two months later, General Horvath, commander of an anti-Bolshevik Russian force, appointed a provisional war cabinet for all Siberia of which he styled himself prime minister. During the same month still another provisional Siberian government was established at Omsk; like all the other opposition movements, it proposed to overthrow the Bolshevik régime, restore order throughout the country if possible without foreign help, convoke a constituent assembly to be elected on the basis of universal suffrage, distribute land among the landless, insure state control of the nation's economic activities, and establish a labor bureau. This government did not show sufficient ability to command respect for its authority and in consequence was overthrown. It was quickly followed by another which met a similar fate. Not discouraged by the two previous failures, anti-

Bolshevik leaders under the protection of Czecho-Slovak troops made a third and more successful attempt. To the end that the new government might be strengthened and the reactionary elements discouraged, President Avksentief, on November 7, appealed to President Wilson for American and allied recognition and aid; it was to no avail, however, and in less than two weeks Avksentief was imprisoned and the supreme power was in the hands of Admiral Kolchak assisted by General Horvath who announced the *coup d'état* as a counter-measure against the radical wing of the Omsk government. By this action Kolchak actually eliminated the few remaining liberals of the Omsk organization. The new dictator at once issued a proclamation in which he declared: "I am not about to take the path of reaction or of disastrous party politics, but my chief aim will be the creation of a fighting army, victory over the Bolsheviks and the establishment of justice and order so that the nation may without interference choose for itself the form of government it desires." Kolchak was at first vigorously opposed by General Semenov, the "Napoleon of Siberia," but late in December it was announced that he had agreed to recognize Kolchak if the latter would retire in favor of General Denikin, the leader of the Don Cossacks, as soon as a junction of Cossacks and Siberian forces could be effected. The Kolchak government proved to be more stable than its predecessors, its reputation for establishing "law and order" and the military success which it achieved against the Bolsheviks finally resulting in its conditional recognition by Japan and the Council of Four on June 12, 1919. So promising was the outlook for the continued success of the former admiral that a month later the Allies agreed under certain conditions to assist him in establishing an All-Russian government. Kolchak agreed to hold elections for a constituent assembly as soon as he could reach Moscow, or, if conditions should be too disturbed for such a procedure, then to reconvene the former constituent assembly. He further promised to recognize the independence of Finland and Poland and come to an amicable arrangement with other governments in the terri-

tories of the former Russian empire. The associated countries in turn agreed to supply arms, munition, food and money but not troops.

This arrangement did not fully satisfy the ardent admirers of Kolchak, who were clamoring for full American and Allied recognition of the Omsk organization. Accordingly in July, Roland S. Norris, American ambassador to Japan, and General William S. Graves, Commander in chief of the American forces in Siberia, were delegated by the Peace Conference as a special mission to investigate the strength and permanency of the Kolchak régime. After three weeks of careful study and inquiry, during which time a series of conferences were held at Omsk in conjunction with representatives of the British, French and Japanese governments, Mr. Norris reported in favor of immediate and full recognition for in his opinion such action would have a splendid moral effect upon the population and soldiery of Siberia. In spite of this recommendation the committee found, however, many disintegrating influences at work which, unless eliminated, seemed to foreshadow the collapse of the Kolchak government. On the field of battle the "Resurrector of Russia" had suffered disastrous defeats; his armies in full retreat were disheartened and demoralized; the entire Ural front was in the hands of the Bolsheviki; the Czechoslovaks refused to fight longer on Russian soil; relations with one of his prominent leaders, General Semenov, were strained to the breaking point; by the civil population Kolchak himself was feared and distrusted. In light of these conditions full recognition was postponed indefinitely.

By mid-September, 1919, it was evident that the Omsk government was tottering; striking evidence to this effect was seen when on September 15 it was announced that Ivan Yakushev, president of the first Siberian Duma which had been dissolved by Admiral Kolchak in the fall of 1918, had issued a proclamation for the overthrow of the all-Russian government. After roundly denouncing Kolchak and his coadjutors as "reactionaries" the document proposed that an all-Siberian constituent assembly be convened which should at once proceed to wipe out the existing abuses. It

further enumerated a long list of suggested reforms including local self-government, allotment of land to the peasant, freedom of ~~workmen's unions~~ and military changes. Although Yakushev was unsuccessful, Kolchak's grip rapidly relaxed and it was with increasing difficulty that he managed to keep in check his none too trustworthy subordinates. In Eastern Siberia, for instance, the activities of General Rosanov, the Russian commander, were so drastically criticised by the inter-Allied military chiefs that he was recalled. No sooner was this action taken than a Cossack conference hastily called at Omsk for the purpose submitted a protest to Kolchak bitterly denouncing Rosanov's reprimand. Late in October General Semenov unsuccessfully attempted to seize a trainload of rifles consigned from America to the all-Russian government; again in early November plans were brewing in Vladivostok for a revolt against Kolchak's authority.

Thus faced by rebellion from within and harassed by the incessant onslaughts by the ever-advancing Bolsheviki, the Siberian dictator made desperate but futile efforts to stem the tide. Finally on November 15 his capital fell into the hands of the enemy, his government in the meantime having sought headquarters at Irkutsk. So much opposition was encountered here from the social revolutionary elements that Kolchak under threat of being deposed, reluctantly gave his consent for the formation of a coalition cabinet. The task of forming the new ministry was undertaken by M. Pepelaiev whom Kolchak appointed as premier. Pepelaiev, a constitutional democrat (Cadet), a former member of the fourth duma and a member of Lvov's government during the early days of the revolution was strenuously opposed to both the Bolsheviki and the monarchists. On December 2, after avowing its purpose to continue the struggle against Bolshevism, the newly constituted government announced its principles as follows: (1) emancipation of the civil administration from the political influence of military leaders; (2) curbing of all abuses and acts of injustice no matter by what faction or party they might be committed; (3) reduction of ministerial staff; (4) granting

of increased power to local assemblies; (5) establishment of more friendly relations with the Czecho-Slovaks and with such ~~other~~ ^{other} ~~groups~~ ^{groups} whose coöperation might be distinctly beneficial.

Several other reform projects were announced including a proposal for a Siberian representative parliament (Sobor). But they failed to quench the smouldering fires of discontent. It was too late for Kolchak or even for a coalition government to prevent the conflagration which burst forth in late December. At this time some 800 radical revolutionaries of the Kolchak army formed a "Committee Government" and took possession of the Irkutsk station on the Trans-Siberian Railroad. In less than a month the revolutionary forces were in complete control; the Pepelaiev government had ceased to function, the Kolchak armies had melted away and Kolchak was himself a prisoner in the hands of the Irkutsk revolutionary committee.

3. *The government of the northwest.* One other government of importance was set up in opposition to the Bolsheviki—the government of northwestern Russia. Organized in August, 1919, soon after the Anti-Bolshevist offensive against Petrograd, it established its capital in the Esthonian city of Reval. While it supposedly represented all factions opposed to Bolshevism, its real soul was General Nicholas Yudenitch, an emigré and a thorough-going reactionary. In announcing the birth of the new government, Yudenitch expressly stated that it had been formed "in complete harmony with the plenipotentiary representatives of the Allied powers" and that it was "united with the rest of Russia in the person of the chief executive, Admiral Kolchak." Its declaration of principles contained many interesting features. For instance, it alike condemned Bolshevism and reaction, declared Russian citizens, irrespective of race, nationality or religion, equal before the law, and guaranteed all civil liberties, including inviolability of person and domicile, freedom of the press, speech, assembly, association and strike. Immediately upon the liberation of Russia "from the tryanny of the Bolsheviki," the people were to select an all-Russian constituent assembly on the basis of a

"general, direct, equal and secret vote." If in the meantime the provinces of Petrograd, Pskov and Novgorod should be liberated, their inhabitants should choose a "Territorial Popular assembly" to determine a form of government for these three provinces. The solution of the land problem was left to the constituent assembly, which, however, was to solve it "in accordance with the will of the toiling agricultural population." The labor question was to be settled on the basis of an eight hour day, state control of industry, and full protection of labor and the working class.

There is little doubt that this movement was sponsored by Great Britain, for according to the terms of a compact between the northwestern and the British governments, it appears that the latter agreed to (1) support the northwestern government in every possible way in its struggle against the Bolsheviki and especially in its efforts to occupy Petrograd, (2) supply Yudenitch with munitions and modern weapons of war such as tanks and aeroplanes, (3) exercise pressure upon Germany so as to facilitate recruiting among the Russian prisoners of war still in Germany, (4) furnish supplies, especially food to the districts suffering from the effects of Bolshevik rule, (5) and, lastly, grant a special credit of 1,000,000,000 rubles to purchase machinery and raw materials for the restoration of Russian industry. Great Britain was to withhold this money, however, until after the Lenine government had been overthrown.

This generous support on the part of Great Britain was not to be rendered gratis; in fact the arrangement is typical of modern imperialistic methods. The northwestern government agreed to (1) recognize all of Great Britain's special interests in the Baltic region, (2) give the Baltic countries opportunity to exercise the right of self-determination, (3) declare officially, after the capture of Petrograd, its disinterestness in the Persian question, (4) recognize all the debts of the old Russian government, (5) and forbear making any important purchases in Germany so long as delivery agreements based upon any credit arrangements with Great Britain exist.

The government of the northwest was even less successful than the Omsk organization, for General Yudenitch, after smashing forward to the very doors of Petrograd, was hurled back by the Bolshevik forces, his scattered army falling victim to fever and starvation. This military disaster sapped the life blood of the northwestern government so that to all intents and purposes it became a negligible force in Russian affairs.

III. MILITARY INTERVENTION

The stated reason for Allied military intervention in Russia was three-fold: to crystallize opposition to Germany by accentuating the difference between Allied and Teutonic methods, to aid the Czecho-Slovaks in effecting a passage to France by way of Siberia, and to help the former Russian Empire in establishing internal peace by freeing the country from maleficent alien domination and domestic enemies. Efforts to this end were foreshadowed when in the spring of 1918 small contingents of British and Japanese troops were landed under protest of the Soviet government at Vladivostok upon the pretext of protecting life and property. A few months later Allied forces landed at Murmansk on the Kola peninsula for the avowed purpose of protecting war materials which had been collected there during the Kerensky régime.

For some time there had been considerable agitation in America and in the Allied countries for military intervention on a large scale, but the United States, believing it would result in greater confusion and misunderstanding, was reluctant to accede to such a course, in this decision being supported by the Liberals of the associated countries. During the summer and early autumn of 1918, however, Russian emigrés advised the Allied leaders that comparatively small Allied forces introduced into several Russian ports would have no difficulty in penetrating the country, rallying the people to their support and crushing the hated Bolsheviks. Blindly or unblindly, the Allied diplomats resolved to try this military expedient. Their decision did

not have the unanimous approval of public opinion and apparently in consequence "declarations of intentions" were issued by the United States and several of the Allied governments. The American government declared that the "only present object" for which troops would be employed would be to guard military stores and to render such aid as might be acceptable to the Russian people in the organization of their own self-defense. It emphatically stated that the United States did not contemplate interference with the political sovereignty of Russia nor intervention in her internal affairs. On August 8 the British government issued a declaration similar to that of the American government stating that "we wish to solemnly assure you that while our troops are entering Russia to assist you in your struggle against Germany, we shall not retain one foot of your territory," and that it was for the Russian people "to decide their form of government and to find solution for their social problems." Like assurances given by the Japanese government were concurred in by the other Allies.

In the meantime Allied troops which had landed at Archangel on the south shore of the White Sea, were soon in control of the coast from there north to Murmansk and in the following November French detachments occupied Odessa. These expeditions made little headway, for with the exception of the landowners, former officials and part of the Cossacks, the Russian people did not rally to their support as had been prophesied and expected. Insistent demands for their withdrawal were made not only by the Soviet authorities, but by individuals both in Europe and America. For example, in supporting his resolution in the United States Senate for the withdrawal of the American troops from Russian territory, Senator Hiram Johnson of California on January 29, 1919, characterized Allied intervention as a "miserable adventure," and Allied dealings with Russia as an "exhibition of the crassest stupidity." The Allied governments, although the target of much adverse criticism, and apparently realizing the failure of partial military intervention, nevertheless did not imme-

diately direct the withdrawal of their troops. In the opinion of the Entente diplomats the presence of these troops on Russian soil was a necessary adjunct to what appeared to them to be the one remaining method for the destruction of Bolshevism—the sanitary cordon.

IV. THE CORDON SANITAIRE

By means of hostile states and armies and a stringent blockade Russia was to be isolated and cleansed of her political leprosy. Already Allied forces held the gateway to the north, Czecho-Slovaks, Russian and Allied troops controlled the Trans-Siberian railroad eastward from Omsk, Turkestan and Trans-Caucasia were dominated by Cossacks and British troops, an Allied squadron in the Black sea supported French and Greek forces at Odessa, and the western front was to be barred by the buffer states of Ukraine, Roumania, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Esthonia. To the northwest Finland, no longer under German tutelage, was to form the connecting link in the chain of opposition. This "barbed wire fence" policy, as M. Clemenceau glibly termed it, was destined to be no more successful in accomplishing the desired end than had been the policies of opposition governments and partial military intervention.

1. *The Murmansk-Archangel link.* On the Murmansk-Archangel front the Allies and Russian White Guards, totaling approximately 15,000 men, were faced by a Bolshevik force of about 50,000. Outnumbered and under constant bombardment of the Red artillery, they were able to achieve but slight success. In an attempted offensive during March, 1919, they were easily driven back and their situation became so serious that on April 3 it was announced that only immediate reinforcements could prevent disaster. Just a week later Washington officially disclosed the fact that American forces in North Russia were discontented and had threatened a general mutiny. In June the American as well as the British detachments were withdrawn, their departure removing all danger of anti-Bolshevik aggressiveness on this particular front.

2. *The eastern barrier.* The situation on the eastern or Siberian front was of a very different character. On January 1, 1919, the Omsk government had an estimated fighting force of 300,000 including the Czecho-Slovaks under General Gaida as well as contingents of allied troops. Thanks to the Entente, it had an excellent base at Vladivostok and its line of communication, the Trans-Siberian railroad, was under the protection of Anglo-American-Japanese forces. Although it is impossible to state the exact strength of the Soviet armies opposing the all-Russian Siberian troops, it has been conservatively placed at not less than 1,200,000, a figure probably not over-estimated, inasmuch as the Lenine government sought to defend itself by the annihilation of its enemies through offensive tactics. During the months of January and February, 1919, little permanent progress was made by either army. By the end of March, however, the Kolchak forces had advanced to a line paralleling the Urals and running from Omsk northwardly beyond Perm. Further advance was also made during April and the early part of May when Kazau and Samara were occupied and Viatka taken. In an effort to protect his advance on Moscow, Kolchak using Viatka as a temporary base made desperate attempts to establish a connection with the Allied forces on the Archangel front. At this time unfortunately these troops were so hard pressed that they were unable to render assistance and as a partial consequence before the end of May the main Siberian armies encountered severe defeat, being forced to retreat from both the Kazau and Samara regions. Within the next two months they struggled desperately to regain their lost ground, but the Bolshevik forces succeeded in taking the important center of Ufa and capturing Perm. By the end of July the Siberian armies were hard pressed against the Urals.

Simultaneously radical revolutionary forces in Eastern Siberia carried on a guerilla warfare which constantly threatened communication with the rear. Late in the summer Kolchak was pushed out of European Russia, his position becoming so desperate that in August he issued a

proclamation appealing for assistance; after declaring that the destiny of Russia was at stake he exhorted every "peace loving person" vigilantly to defend it against disintegrating forces within and without; at the same time he endeavored to reorganize and reequip his demoralized and disheartened armies. Even the United States hurriedly shipped large quantities of arms and ammunitions which had been manufactured for the Kerensky government. Early in September he again assumed the offensive and by the end of the month had advanced along the entire front for a distance of from 75 to 100 miles. In the face of deadly counter attacks, however, he was unable to hold his line and was again forced to withdraw; so rapidly did the Bolshevik armies advance that by the end of October they were within striking distance of Omsk. In the mad scramble to get out of the Kolchak capital, carts, trucks, and unheated box-cars were pressed into service; by November 6 all the Allied missions, except the Japanese, had left the city. Although Kolchak resolved to defend his capital at all costs, it was occupied on November 15 by the victorious enemy, the Siberian troops retreating eastward in great disorder. This disastrous defeat virtually settled the fate of Kolchak and the Omsk government. It was officially reported that the Bolsheviks captured over 40,000 prisoners including 11 generals and 1000 lesser officers as well as 2000 machine guns, 4,000,000 rounds of ammunition, 30,000 uniforms, 75 locomotives, and 5000 carloads of supplies.

So closely did the Bolsheviks follow up this decisive victory that Kolchak had no opportunity to rally his disorganized army, and by mid-December he was in such desperate straits that he was reported ready to cede part of Siberia to Japan if the latter would come to his relief. It was too late, however, to save the day; the power and the authority of the Siberian dictator had crumbled away. Toward the end of December he retired as commander in chief of the all-Russian army, designating General Semenov as his successor. It was the last authoritative act of the "supreme ruler," for on February 7, he together with his former premier, Pepeliaev, were executed by direction of the Irkutsk revolutionary committee.

Kolchak's failure in Siberia is to be attributed in part to his terroristic methods, both military and civil. Under his régime the whole country was subjected to martial law. The zemstvos, the organs of local government, were reduced and restricted as in the days czardom; labor unions were suppressed and labor leaders banished; workers were forbidden to strike and were placed under military law. All civil liberties were practically obliterated; wholesale floggings and shootings were of daily occurrence. Especially severe was the administration of that part of Siberia east of Lake Baikal. Here General Horvath and his co-workers, Semenov and Kalmikov, were amazingly cruel. Not infrequently the whole population of a village was stripped and knouted; sixty workmen in a Chita workshop were flogged so severely that seven died. Kalmikov was publicly denounced by General Graves of the American Expeditionary Force as a bandit and a murderer. Further proof of the barbarity of the Kolchak régime was contained in a memorandum delivered by the Czecho-Slovaks to the Allied representatives at Vladivostok on November 15. In setting forth their reasons for desiring to quit Siberia they stated, among other things, that "the military authorities of the government of Omsk are permitting criminal actions that will stagger the entire world. The burning of villages, the murder of masses of peaceful inhabitants and the shooting of hundreds of persons of democratic convictions and also those only suspected of political disloyalty occurs daily." By such methods Kolchak instead of winning support won popular antagonism; instead of destroying Bolshevism he created it. Perhaps no better summary of the attitude of the people toward the Kolchak rule can be found than that expressed by the Siberian coöperative journal *Nashe Dyelo*:¹

¹ In the preparation of this article it has seemed unnecessary to add page documentation. The material has been drawn from a number of sources including *The New Europe*, *The New York Times Current History Magazine*, *Eastern Europe*, *Struggling Russia*, *Soviet Russia*, *The Independent*, *Nineteenth Century*, *The National Review*, *The London Times*, *The Manchester Guardian*, and the *British Parliamentary Journals*. I am under special obligation to the Editors of the *Political Science Quarterly* for the use of material which appeared in the September, 1919, issue of the *Record of Political Events*.

At first the Siberians rejoiced at their liberation from Bolshevism, but as time went on the people learned that peace and democracy seemed even further off. Six weeks after the clearing of Siberia the reactionary elements had completely strangled democracy . . . The rapidly monarchical element reappeared and below the discontent grew even more real.

The rule of Semenov, Kolchak's military successor, in the Trans-Baikal province, the only part of Siberia where a semblance of anti-Bolshevik authority still prevailed, was even worse than that of the Omsk government. Local administrative and economic institutions such as the zemstvos and coöperative unions have been summarily suppressed; gambling and profiteering were notoriously prevalent and robbery and brigandage were reported to be every day occurrences. Incidentally a close bond of friendship and mutual understanding seems to have existed between Semenov and the Japanese since the former came into prominence. Wherever and whenever possible Semenov has granted all sorts of concessions to the Japanese and they, in turn, while not officially representing Tokio, have aided him with arms, munitions and funds.

Even before the fall of Kolchak it was evident that as far as Siberia was concerned the sanitary cordon was breaking down. On December 8, for instance, the United States government, in reply to a note from Japan requesting whether the former proposed to maintain its *status quo* or to withdraw its troops either partially or entirely, or whether it was ready to send reinforcements, advised that it had decided to withdraw all its forces and leave the Russian people to work out their problems without further assistance or interference. Coincident with the withdrawal of the United States troops, the American railroad experts under John F. Stevens, who had been superintending the operation of the Trans-Siberian railroad, were also withdrawn. It was further announced in mid-January that the Czecho-Slovak troops whom the United States agreed to help consolidate and repatriate were virtually all concentrated in Eastern Siberia and that on February 1, 1920, ten thousand of them would embark for their homeland.

3. *The southern barriers.* Opposition to the Bolsheviks in South Russia centered in the Ukraine and in the trans-Caucasian country. With the withdrawal of the Germans from the former territory numerous claimants eagerly seized the opportunity to expropriate the soil of the Little Russians: the Poles seized Kholm and eastern Galicia; Roumanians with French sanction grabbed Bessarabia; the Turks claimed Crimea; the Cossacks under General Denikin, aided by the British, attacked on the east, and the Bolsheviks pushed down from the north, while French reinforced by Greeks and Sengalese occupied Odessa. The Ukrainians, opposed to all these claimants, rallied around General Petlura and Vladimir Vinnichenko, both members of the Social Democratic party. These leaders, although they had sufficient men, lacked money, officers and transportation experts; but their urgent appeals to the Allies met with no response. In March, 1919, Petlura was driven out of Kiev by the Bolsheviks, the French refusing to come to his assistance unless France should have complete military and industrial control of Ukraine for an "indefinite" period. The situation was not improved when it became known that the French were committed to support the Poles in their claim to Eastern Galicia where the population, with the exception of the city of Lemberg, is predominantly Ukrainian. Finally convinced that the British and French, especially the latter, intended to deprive them of their land and liberty and set up a reactionary régime, the Ukrainian peasants joined the ranks of the Bolsheviks.

Meanwhile the anti-Bolshevik leaders and their allied advisers were mapping out a plan of attack with Moscow as the objective. The Cossack generals, Denikin and Krassnov, were to mobilize their troops in the region between the Black and Caspian seas preparatory to advancing up the Don and Volga. On their right the Ural Cossacks were to effect a junction with the Orenburg Cossacks which were fighting with the left wing of the main Siberian army; to the west of the Denikin troops an Allied army was to push northward from Odessa. A general offensive launched in early April was most unsuccessful. The Franco-Grecian

army of 50,000, instead of pushing triumphantly northward and winning brilliant victories over the Bolsheviki and capturing Kiev, as was fictitiously reported, was decisively defeated, Odessa being abandoned on April 6. The French soldiers refused to exhibit any enthusiasm in this enterprise and the offensive virtually collapsed from within. By May 1 Kherson and Sevastopol were in the hands of the enemy. The Ural Cossacks were equally unsuccessful and together with their British allies were for the time being forced out of the valuable Trans-Caspian region. In the center the main army under Denikin was within the next two months almost surrounded by Trotsky's forces. Undiscouraged, Denikin reorganized his armies and in June with approximately 300,000 men he again launched an offensive in the hope of relieving the pressure on the Kolchak forces who, at this time, were being tumbled over the Urals by the aggressive Soviet troops. With the use of British tanks and artillery he succeeded in taking Kharkov, Tzaritsin, Bielgorod, and Ekaterinoslav, while Petlura, the Ukrainian chief, recovered Kiev. As a result of these sweeping victories Denikin counted 22,000 prisoners, 150 guns of heavy calibre, 350 machine guns, and an immense amount of other booty. Even more important, he gained control of the rich industrial basins of the Don and Volga. The success of his armies was largely neutralized, however, by the hostile attitude of the Caucasian population and by the menacing attacks of guerilla bands which threatened communication with the rear.

Notwithstanding these dangers Denikin prepared for a further advance by dividing his forces into three units: one, the western, was to advance in the direction of Kiev; another, the central division, was to move on Kursk and Orel; and the third, the eastern, was to push up the Volga to Kamishin. Meeting with no serious opposition from the enemy forces, he easily captured Voronezh and Graftskia on October 8; at the same time one of his trusted lieutenants, General Mamontov, with 13,000 Cossacks drove a deep wedge in the direction of Tambov, 250 miles southeast of Moscow. In the face of stubborn opposition his advance

gradually came to a halt and by mid-October he held a line extending from Kiev to Kharkov eastward along the Don to Tsaritsin. At this time a series of problems loomed up: the Bolsheviks after careful preparation began a general attack along the entire 700 mile front; on October 11 General Petlura, who had reached the conclusion that Denikin was a representative of reactionary monarchism, declared war on the counter-revolutionaries; the inhabitants of the Kuban districts were openly hostile; Astrakhan on the Black Sea at the mouth of the Volga had fallen under Bolshevik domination and his lines of communication were seriously menaced. Of all these problems the most serious was the Soviet offensive. With a fighting force variously estimated from 350,000 to 600,000, the Bolsheviks concentrated their attack on the Denikin center. After two weeks of desperate fighting their cavalry, on November 12, broke through on a 47-mile front between Orel and Kursk; in less than a week the central column of the Denikin army was practically annihilated. Throughout December the Soviet advance continued uninterruptedly, Kiev, Poltava, and Kharkov, the latter a strategic key of south Russia, falling into Bolshevik hands. Denikin strove desperately to halt the advancing army, but on January 1, 1920, they had captured Ekaterinoslav and were in possession of the Donetz coal basin; while to the southeast they had cut a deep wedge into the Trans-Caspian territory. Before the month was over the anti-Bolshevik forces had been completely routed and the Denikin link in the sanitary cordon which a few months previously had given so much promise ended in a wretched *débâcle*.

4. *The buffer states.* One of the most interesting phases of the sanitary cordon policy was the attempt on the part of the Allied governments to hem in Soviet Russia on the west by means of buffer states. Russia having sinned against the "national idea," it was only natural, therefore, that the submerged nationalities of the Russian border provinces should seize the opportunity of civil war to reassert their independence. To the Entente powers these new states, especially Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and

Ukraine, seemed to afford a means for establishing a barrier against the spread of Bolshevism westward as well as a base for military operations against the Lenine government.

At the outbreak of the Russian revolution the three Baltic provinces were completely dominated by a minority, the Baltic barons, who owned the greater portion of all the land in Esthonia and Latvia as well as a large part of the Lithuanian territory. Soon after the collapse of the czar's army the Germans overran Latvia and during the winter of 1918 they continued their advance into Esthonia where a Soviet republic had just been proclaimed; the Bolsheviks were soon expelled however, and the whole country placed under German military government. In the meantime, every effort was made by the baronial and junker element to hand the Baltic territories over to Berlin, the packed Balt assemblies, for instance, openly voting for union with Germany. This move was bitterly opposed by the non-German population of both the former Russian provinces, who, inspired by patriotic emotions and by the desire to be rid of landlordism, secretly organized National Councils, which blossomed forth as provisional governments as soon as the armistice with Germany had been concluded.

So cordially were the Germans hated and distrusted that even before hostilities terminated, an agrarian revolution occurred, the peasants boldly seizing the great estates and evicting their former owners, who in most instances fled to Berlin. Curiously enough, however, clause 12 of the armistice between the Allies and the Central Powers provided that all German imperial troops "at present in the territories which before the war formed part of Russia must likewise return to within the frontiers of Germany as above defined as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories." On the very day that the armistice was signed, Mr. Balfour of the British foreign office, in an official document expressed "the deepest sympathy" with "the aspiration of the Lettish people and its desire for liberation from the German yoke" and of Great Britain's "readiness to grant provisional recognition to the Lettish national council as a *de facto*

body." At the same time similar recognition was accorded the provisional government of Esthonia. This action on the part of the British government had the approval of the Allied diplomats, who in other words, proposed to use both the German troops and the Baltic states as an effective means of resistance to Bolshevism. The scheme at best was risky for the Germans evidently dreamed of subjugating the Baltic states and restoring the emigré barons to their land, while on the other hand, the Baltic patriot leaders were more keenly concerned with establishing their complete independence than being used as tools by the Entente. The young nations became, therefore, storm centers of three conflicting forces: Imperialism, Bolshevism and Nationalism.

With the withdrawal of the Germans from Esthonia in the fall of 1918, that country was promptly overrun by Soviet troops. Thoroughly frightened by the advance of the Bolsheviks, the Allies for the time being halted the further withdrawal of the Germans from the Baltic countries, at the same time helping the Esthonians to organize a counter-revolutionary offensive which succeeded in checking the invaders. In the meantime the Bolsheviks were advancing into Latvia and by the end of January, 1919, they had occupied Riga and Mitua and had reached the coast of Windau. With the tacit approval of the Allies the Germans now posing as enemies of Bolshevism, were to rid the country of the hated enemy. Quick to perceive the situation, General Von der Goltz, the German commander, assumed dictatorial power, full control of railroads, highways and telegraphs passing into his hands, German reinforcements were rushed into Latvia, and by the end of March, 1919, he had at his disposal an army of 20,000 German volunteers and 4500 Balt Landwehr for an offensive against the Bolsheviks. It was not long, however, before the real character of his mission became manifest. All attempts on the part of the Letts to raise a national army were stifled and in April the ministers and officials of the Lett government were either arrested or confined. Still fearing the Bolsheviks but alarmed by the imperialistic

ambitions of the Germans, the Allies now insisted that they withdraw, but it was not until near the end of November, 1919, and then only at the point of the bayonet, that the repeated requests of the Allies were complied with.

Meanwhile the Baltic states were tiring of constant war. For over a year they had been compelled to carry on an incessant struggle against both the Germans and the Bolsheviks. Then, too, the national leaders in the border states began seriously to consider what their situation, relative to Soviet Russia, would be upon the withdrawal of allied support; and in many quarters it was apparent that the people wanted peace. Efforts to this end assumed concrete form when at the invitation of Esthonia, a conference of the Baltic States was called at Riga in mid-September.

Just at this time, however, General Yudenitch, with the support of the Allied governments, was preparing for a drive on Petrograd, and strong pressure was brought to bear on the Baltic States, particularly Esthonia and Latvia to coöperate in the movement. Yudenitch, who had recognized the supremacy of Admiral Kolchak, as already noted, did not have the confidence of the government of either Esthonia or Latvia, and in fact both very frankly stated that if circumstances compelled them to choose between Yudenitch, Kolchak and the Lenine government, they would choose the latter. They were firmly convinced that Yudenitch, Denikin and Kolchak, even though all three had made very liberal proclamations on paper, were fighting the Bolsheviks for one, and only one fundamental purpose—the restoration of a strongly centralized monarchical government in Russia. Nevertheless, Esthonian and Lettish troops joined Yudenitch in a general offensive against Petrograd. After leading his forces to the gates of that city, the emigré general was driven back and his army so scattered that all hopes of the Allied governments for the capture of Petrograd vanished.

With the collapse of the Yudenitch offensive, the peace plans of the Baltic States were revived and on November 6 representatives of Esthonia left for Dorpat, where they

were joined by delegates representing Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland and the Ukraine, the last three being unofficial delegations. This conference was held apparently with the approval of the Allied powers, for even at this time certain of the Entente diplomats, including Mr. Lloyd-George, had come to the conclusion that the *Cordon Sanitaire* would not solve the Russian problem. After more than a month of negotiation, marked by numerous delays and interruptions, peace was practically concluded between Esthonia and the Soviet Republic on December 31, 1919. By the terms of the treaty, Soviet Russia recognizes "without reservation the independence of the Esthonian state and freely abdicates for all time, all the sovereign rights which belonged to Russia with respect to Esthonia's land and people in accordance with former state orders, as well as those rights given under international treaties. Esthonian land and peoples shall have no obligations whatever with respect to Russia because of the former connections of Esthonia and Russia." Latvia soon followed the example of her northern neighbor and at the time this article is written Poland and Lithuania are talking peace with the express consent of the Allies. Even Great Britain, it would appear, has abandoned the idea of a "ring of fire" and is now ready to conclude peace with the Soviet government. These facts go far to prove, if not to explain, the dismal failure of the *Cordon Sanitaire*.

V. CONCLUSION

In a word, the policy pursued by the Allies toward Russia from the overthrow of the czarist régime to the recent lifting of the Allied blockade, was founded on fear and distrust. The Entente diplomats failed to perceive the psychological temperament of the Russian people; they failed to understand that the Russian masses were struggling in an effort to find their way out of the meshes of czardom. They persisted for over two years in adhering to a policy which at best netted a maximum of irritation and a minimum of effect—in other words a policy which served only to con-

solidate Bolshevik resistance and to prolong civil war. In supporting Yudenitch, Kolchak and Denikin, all three of whom in the eyes of the Russian masses, were apostles of reaction and monarchism, the Entente simply strengthened the opposition. Rather than eat bread with a Protopopoff or receive salt from the hands of a Pobêdonostsev, the peasantry, proletariat and even the bourgeoisie chose to rally round the standard of Lenine. If the world has learned any lesson from the failure of the Allied program let us hope that it is that so aptly expressed in the noble words of General Smuts:

Russia can only be saved internally by Russians themselves, working on Russian methods and ideas. . . . Our military forces, our lavish contributions of tanks, and other war material may temporarily bolster up the one side, but the real magnitude of the problem is quite beyond such expedients. . . . It may well be that the only ultimate hope for Russia is a sobered, purified, Soviet system and that may be far better than the tsarism to which our present policy seems inevitably tending.

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE

PART VI. THE CONSTITUTION AND RECENT TENDENCIES

By David S. Spencer, D.D., Nagoya, Japan

I. PREPARING THE WAY FOR THE CONSTITUTION

"We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union," says the opening of the Constitution under which we are shielded.

"The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of emperors unbroken for ages eternal," are the words with which the constitution of Japan greets us. Each in its opening expression breathes the spirit of the nation in which it was born. In the first the central theme is the people, human liberty, democracy; in the second, the ruler, an imperial house, autocracy. The thought of the first is to perpetuate a nation of free people; that of the second, to perpetuate a throne, a ruling house. The one takes a far view of real national interests; in the other, the people are nowhere in sight. In America, national stability resides in a strong people. In the Rising Sun Kingdom, a strong people was to be feared, and national stability secured through making strong the imperial house.

The constitution of Japan can be properly understood only when we study its genesis and the underlying causes for its provisions. We thus find that racial characteristics, insular setting, feudalistic and family influences abound.

How did this constitution, an interesting document in itself, ever come into existence? This is the way it happened:

Before the coming of Commodore Perry, some of Japan's brightest men, a few only of her millions, had begun to study the development of nations, and saw that the people of Japan were being neglected—that they were not being given voice in any public matters. Such men as Kido, Okubo,

Okuma, and Itagaki began to petition the government for the granting of a constitution and houses of parliament, that is, for the political machinery by which to develop the people. It was the idea of these bright minds that no nation can be stronger than are the people who make up the nation. A list of these intrepid spirits is found in Part V.¹ Some of these men accompanied the Prince Iwakura mission to America in 1871. On June 20, 1875, the first deliberative assembly was opened in Tokyo. On September 6, 1876, Prince Arisugawa announced that the *genro-on*, a body of chief advisors to the crown, had been ordered to prepare a constitution, but the breaking out of the Satsuma rebellion in January, 1877, put a stop for the time to all such wider political plans. Nothing daunted, Okuma, on May 14, 1877, presented a petition through Kataoka to the emperor at Kyoto asking for the installation of constitutional institutions. The murder of Okubo, May 14, 1878, because it was mistakenly thought that he hindered the advance of measures for the uplift of the people, convinced the leaders that reforms must be hastened. This led to the sending of Ito to America and Europe in February, 1882, to study constitutional government. This he did, making somewhat wide investigation, but spending the greater portion of his time in Prussia, and returning in August the next year. The promise of a national assembly had been made by the emperor, October 12, 1881, and now attention was riveted to the drafting of a constitution. It was this imperial promise of coming parliamentary institutions which did much to console the people and lead to good results. As a preparatory step in this direction, a new order of nobility was created July 7, 1884, out of whom the house of peers was formed. Japanese writers often seem to take pleasure in the fiction that the Japanese constitution is an unsought gift of their emperor; and a pure fiction it is; for the pages of history reveal many a sigh and hope in the form of a petition for the erecting of constitutional machinery in Japan. Such were the petitions of Saigo,

¹ Spencer, D. S., *Political Parties and Tendencies*.

Itagaki and Soejima in 1873; Itagaki in 1877; the *Aikokusha* or Loyalty to the Country Association, producing a paper with 100,000 signatures; and the petition of Mr. Tōru Hoshi.*

II. CONTRIBUTING INFLUENCES FROM ABROAD

Not all the influences making for government by law came from Japanese environment. Just how much influence Prince Bismarck had over Ito in the writings of the constitution may be a matter of opinion; but there is on record an incident which, I think, has never been given proper publicity, and which may properly find place here. When General Grant's term of office as President had expired, he made a tour around the world, accompanied by Mrs. Grant, and several important friends, among whom was Mr. John Russell Young, of the American News Company. On arriving in Japan, an audience with the emperor was arranged for the General, and of this and other interviews it may be well to let Mr. Young tell his own story:

NOTES ON THE VISIT OF GENERAL GRANT TO TOKYO, 1879

The General was given residence in the Hama detached palace, or in Chinese the "Enryokwan" (Palace for receiving guests from afar.) The Japanese very kindly "arranged that at two o'clock on the afternoon of the Fourth of July the audience with the Emperor should take place." (This sort of delicate and thoughtful courtesy is genuinely Japanese.) General Grant was accompanied by Rear Admiral Patterson, Pay Inspector Thornton, and Lieutenant Davenport, Captain Benham of the *Richmond*, Captain Fitzhugh of the *Monongahela*, Commander Johnson of the *Ashuelot*, Lieutenant Springer and Lieutenant Kellogg, Judge John A. Bingham, American Minister, and Mr. John Russell Young; Mrs. Grant was also present. ("Around the World with General Grant," pp. 523-4.)

"In this palace took place a long personal interview between General Grant and the Emperor. . . . The Emperor sent word to General Grant that he desired to see him informally, and the General answered that he was entirely at the pleasure of His Majesty. Many little courtesies had been exchanged between the Emperor and Mrs. Grant, and the Emperor and his ministers kept a constant watch over the General's comfort. The day

* Uyehara, as above pp. 84, 86, 87; *Herald of Asia*, November 17, 1917.

fixed for the Imperial interview was unusually warm. At half past two in the afternoon (August 10th, according to Viscount Kaneko) as we were sitting on the verandah, a messenger came to say that His Majesty had arrived, and was awaiting the General in the little summer house on the banks of the lake, which I have described. The General, accompanied by Colonel Grant, Prince Date, Mr. Yoshida, and the writer, left the palace and proceeded to the summer house. We passed under the trees and toward the bridge. . . . We crossed the bridge and entered the summer house. Preparations had been made for the Emperor, but they were very simple. Porcelain flower pots, with flowers and ferns and shrubbery, were scattered about the room. One or two screens had been introduced. In the center of the room stood a table with chairs around it. Behind one of the screens was another table, near the window which looked into the lake. As the General entered, the Prime Minister (Prince Sanjo) and the Minister of the Imperial Household (Marquis Tokudaiji), advanced and welcomed him. Then, after a pause, we passed behind the screen, and were in the presence of the Emperor. His Majesty was standing before the table in undress uniform, wearing only the ribbon of a Japanese order. General Grant advanced, and the Emperor shook hands with him. To the rest of the party he simply bowed. Mr. Yoshida, (Mr. Kiyonari Yoshida, Japanese Minister to the United States then on leave of absence) acted as interpreter. The Emperor said: "I have heard of many of the things you have said to my Ministers in reference to Japan. You have seen the country and the people. I am anxious to speak with you on these subjects, and am sorry I have not had an opportunity earlier."

General Grant said he was entirely at the service of the Emperor, and was glad indeed to see him and thank His Majesty for all the kindness he had received in Japan. He might say that no one outside of Japan had a higher interest in the country or a more sincere friendship for its people.

A question was asked which brought up the subject—now paramount in political discussions in Japan—the granting of an Assembly and legislative functions to the people.

General Grant said that this question seemed to be the only one about which there was much feeling in Japan; the only one he had observed. It was a question to be considered with great care. No one could doubt that governments became stronger and nations more prosperous as they became representative of the people. This was also true of monarchies, and no monarchs were as strong as those who depended upon a parliament. No one could doubt that a legislative system would be an advantage to Japan, but the question of when and how to grant it would require careful consideration. That needed a clearer knowledge of the country than he had time to acquire. It should be remembered that rights of this kind:—rights of suffrage and representation—once given could not be withdrawn. They should

be given gradually. An elective assembly, to meet in Tokyo, and discuss all questions with the Ministry might be an advantage. Such an assembly should not have legislative power at the outset. This seemed to the General to be the first step. The rest would come as a result of the admirable system of education which he saw in Japan.

"The treaty between Japan and the United States," the question of "national indebtedness," of "Loochoo," and of a possible "War with China," were other subjects discussed, but of which no extended quotations were given.—Young: pp. 540-543.

III. THE WRITING OF THE INSTRUMENT

When we come to the practical work of drafting the constitution, we are no longer left to mere guesses of what happened. The writer was in the country during all the years of the process, but aside from the persons directly engaged in the process, nothing was known as to what was transpiring. All the work was performed behind closed doors, and any newspaper statements then made as to what was going on were mere guesses and unworthy of credence. Not until the great emperor, Prince Ito and Viscount Inouye had followed their ancestors was the silence really broken. On *Kigensetsu* February 11, 1919, the thirtieth anniversary of the granting of the constitution, Viscount Kentaro Kaneko, Secretary to Prince Ito in the drafting of the constitution, allowed to be made, through the columns of the *Jiji Shimpō*, a statement as to the work of drafting, and as to the nature of the constitution. Seeing this account, and questioning in my mind the accuracy of some of its statements, I secured an interview with Viscount Kaneko, during which he carefully outlined the process followed, corrected certain details, and after I had written out carefully the statement, had the courtesy to review and amend the same. The outline herewith made is, therefore, what may be considered an official statement of the case; and it is here indited, on this 11th of February, the thirty-first anniversary of the promulgation of that document by which Japan sought to place herself before the civilized world as a nation governed by *law* and not by a single human will.

THE BUILDING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN

An interview with Viscount Kaneko, March 4, 1919

The persons chosen by Prince Ito to aid him in the work of writing the first draft of the Constitution were Viscount Inouye, who had charge of the Constitution and the Imperial House Law, Viscount Miyoji Ito, who had charge of the Law of the Houses, and Viscount Kentaro Kaneko, who prepared the Imperial Ordinance of the House of Peers and the Law of the Election of Members of the House of Representatives.

Prince Ito, then the *Samurai*, had returned from study of Constitutions in Europe in 1883, and in December 1885 began the difficult work of drafting the Constitution.

The Emperor had commanded Prince Ito to prepare the draft of the Constitution, and upon him alone rested the responsibility of accomplishing this task for the Sovereign. Of all men he is the one sole personality who carried this burden. Others discussed, criticised, offered amendments, and added their councils to the discussion, but upon Prince Ito rested the burden of furnishing the matter in due form for the body of this document.

Prince Ito had formed the conclusion from his investigations that Japan ought to have a Constitution differing in its fundamental nature from those of Western lands, so as to make it in harmony with the national polity of this country. The constitutions of Western countries have usually been wrung from the kings as the result of turmoil and strife; but the Constitution of Japan is a gift of the Emperor, and was freely conferred.

When we first gathered to begin our work, the Prince said to us, there is absolutely no necessity for you to follow after the examples laid down by other countries. We must have an entirely new Constitution, having always in mind that the national polity of our country has been and is and should be different from that of the others.

Western constitutions speak of "the King in Parliament" being clothed with power; implying that the King must work in and through the Parliament, and has not power alone to decide. Such constitutions are sometimes made to include forms of impeachment of the Sovereign, in case he does not conform to constitutional law. The Constitution of our country makes no such provision.

Early in 1886 we started work at the Premier's official residence at Nagata-cho. We worked each day. Our work usually began at 4 p.m., when the Premier could be free from official duties, and we sometimes continued till midnight. Finally the pressure of official duties began to interfere with our work on the drafting of the Constitution; then the Prince decided that we should work at his villa on Natsu-shima, or Summer-island—an island which is situated just in the mouth of the Yokosuka Harbor. The villa has been removed, and no one resides on that island now, as it is a fortified section.

Our method of work was this:—We would take up some section and prepare the matter belonging to it at the Nagata-cho office. Then the Prince would decide to go to Natsushima, where we could be quiet and meet with no interruptions, and there we would stay two or three days, and sometimes a week. There was no one with us but our body guards. We reached the island from Yokohama Harbor by using a small launch belonging to the harbor authorities or to the steamship company. The conference chamber was nothing but a small 12-jo room, opening southward. Nothing was to be seen from the room but water and a number of islands. The Prince, Viscounts Inouye and Ito and myself went from Tokyo. Strict precautions were taken to keep our work secret.

Each of us secretaries did his work as he thought he should do it, and Prince Ito never at any time doubted our loyalty and confidence. No one of us felt any necessity of asking another how he thought a given article should be drafted. Each man was left to do his best.

We often had heated discussions, and this was encouraged by Prince Ito, who listened attentively to what we had to say, and criticised us when he thought necessary. He urged us to speak without ceremony, and to pay no attention to the fact that he was Premier. "Instead," he said, "you must each consider himself the highest authority on Constitutional Law."

There were many occasions when we jointly opposed the views of the Prince. Then he would say, "You must not speak nonsense any more;" but none of us was afraid of his words. "You can't dictate to us," said Mr. Ito; and Mr. Inouye many times left the chamber saying: "The Prime Minister is not in a good temper today. Sayonara."

The work of drafting the Constitution continued at both Nagata-cho and Natsushima in this way till March 1888, when the first draft was finally completed.

The discussions of this draft in the Privy Council began February 8, 1888, and lasted till February 5th, 1889. I was present at all those sessions of the Privy Council. The method was this: Prince Ito, having resigned the Premiership, had become President of the Privy Council. Hence he presided at the meetings held for discussion. The Emperor always attended, at every session, and sat in an appropriate position, Prince Ito sitting near him at a table. A Secretary would be asked to read an article and then discussion would begin, the Secretary who wrote it often having to explain its meaning to the members of the Privy Council. The Emperor himself never took part in any discussion, but heard attentively all that was said by all the members. When the discussions had ended on a given day, the Minutes of the Secretary, in which all amendments had been inserted in red ink, were taken by Prince Ito into the presence of His Majesty, in a private room. The Emperor would then consider carefully what had been proposed, and approve or not as he thought best in the

interests of all his people. But he never decided these things in the Privy Council.

It has been asked if Prince Ito was not much influenced by the Prussian Constitution, and thus inclined to draft our Constitution in a like spirit. The only point which he sought to incorporate from the Prussian Constitution is the relation of the Sovereign to the Constitution and to the Parliament. In this point he liked the Prussian system better than that of England or any other country. The two forces which chiefly influenced us in our work were: (1) *The Federalist*, a publication originating in New York, and much used at the time of the adoption of the American Constitution by that state. We referred constantly to the arguments contained therein; I had it constantly by me; and (2) a remark made to our Emperor by General Grant. This took place in a little summer house, on an island in the little lake at the Hama-goten, where ex-President Grant was being entertained, in the summer of 1879. It was a hot day, and the Emperor called on General Grant, and we sat in the summer house for some time talking. In answer to a question about the constitution General Grant said it must be given to the people, and a Parliament must be erected; but in drafting the Constitution great care must be taken. The Constitution must grow naturally out of the nation's past history, and the franchise and legislative power must be given to the people only so fast as they have learned to make wise use of it. This statement of General Grant greatly influenced the Emperor, and it gave color to all our thought in drafting the Constitution. You can state this with my approval to the American people.

Another point in our Constitution which may be overlooked is the fact that it is shorter than most Constitutions. It has but 76 articles, and even these are each briefly stated, and simple. Other national constitutions are usually much longer.

Still another point is its flexibility. This is fundamental in its nature. It deals with principles only, and hence is not likely to demand radical change for a long time to come. Without any violation of its spirit or letter, it may be interpreted in a way to give large liberties to the people as they advance in a knowledge of political institutions.

There is another disputed point in connection with the office of Ministers of State. The 55th article of the Constitution says, "The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor and be responsible for it." Thus the Constitution does not necessarily limit the responsibility of the Minister to the Emperor, but simply says, "shall be responsible for it." It means that he is responsible, has a moral responsibility, is responsible. A distinct difference is made between personal responsibility and official responsibility. Hence should a minister of State make an official mistake, he is not held personally responsible for the consequences.

At this interview with Viscount Kaneko there was revealed an incident of real human interest concerning the emperor, who, in this constitution, is regarded as a lineal descendant of the gods. Condensing the conversation greatly it was this: In the midst of one of the sessions of the privy council when the constitution was under discussion, a messenger arrived to announce that a little son of the emperor was thought to be dying. Prince Ito, the president, turning to the emperor said:—"Would it not be the pleasure of your Majesty that we now adjourn, to allow your Majesty to attend the bedside of his sick son?" "Oh, no," replied His Majesty, "the illness of the son is a personal matter. Matters of state are a first duty," and the discussion continued. I replied to the Viscount that we had in our country a parallel case, where a Methodist bishop, while presiding at an annual conference, received a telegram announcing the death of his son. He showed the telegram to the conference secretary at his side. The secretary at once proposed adjournment of the conference. "No," said the bishop, "let us attend strictly to the work of the conference." "That is it," said the Viscount, "two men, on opposite sides of the earth, each moved by the same high sense of religious duty, places the work of his church or state above personal or family interests. That is noble loyalty."

IV. KIGENSETSU—FEBRUARY 11, 1889

It was a glad day, this Ascension Day, in Japan. Celebrations unique in character and gigantic in scale had been planned. All ministers had received imperial summons to the palace to have handed down to them by the hands of the emperor the long expected constitution. A hush such as the Orient alone understands held the capital in waiting. Then happened one of those events which to our unimaginative American minds seem so uncalled for. Mr. Arinori Mori, Japan's great minister of education, when about to enter his carriage on his way to the palace, was cut down by a fanatical Shintoist. And the deed was performed not by

the use of the honorable Damascan blade of Japan—but with a *debabōchō*, a vulgar kitchen-knife, used for the dirtiest of all work. The cause of the assassination was said to be that Mr. Mori, in visiting the sacred shrines at Ise, had been so irreverent as to push aside with his cane the curtain that veils the sacred precincts. Sad as was the event, and great as was the loss of this progressive mind to Japan, the news of the occurrence neither checked the ceremonies at the palace nor chilled seriously the ardor with which the people greeted the new day.¹

February 11, 1919, was observed in Japan as the thirtieth anniversary of the promulgation of the constitution, and an important program was carried out in Tokyo. The ceremonies centered at the Constitution Memorial Hall, at Aoyama, Tokyo, the gift of the Emperor Meiji Tennō to Prince Ito. In this hall much of the work of preparing the constitution was carried on. The building, now of historic value, has been presented by Prince Ito, the son, to the imperial house, together with the statesman's library of 90,000 volumes.

Prince Kanin presided at these ceremonies and 1200 of Japan's most noted people were present. The house of peers presented, through its president, the following address to the throne:

PEERS ADDRESS THRONE

The House of Peers, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the promulgation of the Imperial Constitution, has addressed the Throne as follows:

May it please Your August Majesty:

Our late Emperor, cognizant of the progress of the world's affairs, moved by the noble desire of enhancing the people's happiness and developing their moral efficiency, and also for effecting a permanent consolidation of the basis of the Empire, formulated the Imperial Constitution and promulgated it amidst the universal rejoicings.

Since our Imperial Ancestor founded this Empire, the succeeding Emperors, pursuant of the will and aims of the preceding rulers, have been discharging their heaven-bestowed duties pertaining to the sovereignty over the State by adhering to the principle guiding the ruling authority and by avoiding aggressive

¹ Personal Journal of the writer; *Japan Advertiser*, February 11, 1919.

oppression. The relations of the rulers and the ruled have been always cordial. In principle they have been Master and subjects; in sentiment, fathers and children. They have thus created a nation unique in the world, and its foundation dates back to the time immemorial.

The text of the Imperial Constitution had been compiled by consulting the European constitutions, but in its principle it has observed the sagacious policies and golden rule set down by the former Emperors and thus showed the people the ways they might follow. Our traditional good customs, in consequence, became more apparent and more commanding of admiration.

A faithful exponent of code

Your Majesty has been a faithful exponent of the noble code left by the late Emperor which is now thirty years old. During these years our Empire frequently faced national difficulties both at home and abroad, but the Imperial Constitution has been making a normal progress with beneficial results. Our social order has become increasingly strengthened and our national enterprises more efficient. We venture to pledge ourselves to further efforts in discharging our respective duties and to offer our humble services for the prosperity of the country.

We venture to thank Your Majesty most respectfully for sovereign benevolence and to pray for eternity of the Imperial regime and the long life of the Imperial Throne.

Your Majesty's most humble and obedient servant,
PRINCE IYETATSU TOKUGAWA,
President of the House of Peers.

The lower house also passed unanimously a resolution on addressing the throne similarly today.

Three thousand university students paraded the streets, a thing that could not have been allowed thirty years ago. From Hibiya Park, the great commons for Tokyo, they marched to the house of representatives, where they were received with manifest approval by many of the members of the diet. A spokesman of the students then began to address the crowd, but the police prevented him from speaking. This interference of the police elicited angry protests, but nothing serious resulted. The young men marched to the palace grounds, outside Nijubashi, sang the national song, shouted *banzai* to the emperor and dispersed.

The ringing note of the orators of the day was the call for universal suffrage. Viscount Okuma declared that

"constitutional government of Japan has made no progress whatever in thirty years." Amidst all the rejoicings of the day runs a note of keen dissatisfaction.⁴

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V. THE DOCUMENT CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE

What is the reason for the dissatisfaction of the Japanese people concerning their political affairs? If they do not like their constitution, why not say so? Since they have a parliament, why not seek redress through it? Is there any class faction, clique or influence, it is asked, that so operates as to prevent the people from getting what under a plain interpretation of the constitution properly belongs to them?

In a recent article of very great value⁵ Dr. S. H. Wainwright of Tokyo has discussed "Japan's Transition from the Rule of Persons to the Rule of Law." He therein cites the leading contemporary Japanese writers on the constitution, analyses their position, points out errors, and concludes that, generally speaking, neither Japanese nor foreign critics have attributed to the constitution its full value as a political stabilizer. By the promulgation of this constitution, he continues, Japan has become a "Legal State," and has thus placed herself far in advance of any other Asiatic state. This constitution is not merely a law binding upon the Japanese subject, but is a law by which the imperial house agrees to limit and control the Imperial prerogatives. As Ito also points out⁶ this constitution protects both sovereign and subject.

Dr. R. Masujima of Tokyo, a member of the American Bar, in an important address at Manila, also referred⁷ to the legal status which modern Japan has assumed.

We must not overlook the very important point here raised by two eminent authorities. The position of Japan in the international sphere has been greatly enhanced through this imperial favor.

⁴ *Japan Advertiser*, February 11 and 12, 1919.

⁵ *Japan Advertiser*, January 30, 1919.

⁶ Ito, *Commentaries*, as above.

⁷ *Japan Advertiser*, February 9, 1919.

At the same time we must not fail to measure exactly what powers this constitution really does confer—where it falls short, if at any point it seems to fail—and to discern, if we can, the sources of political unrest in Japan.

In passing we should note that in Japan the emperor is above the law.⁸ The British sovereign is under the law,⁹ that law made by *the people*, with or without the king's consent. The president of the United States is under the law, made by *the people*, with his consent or even in spite of his opinions, and he may be impeached for maladministration.¹⁰ The emperor of Japan is the law and the source of the law.¹¹ Under article VIII of the constitution he may issue laws, or ordinances, on the ground that he is the *source* of law. These ordinances require to have the approval of the diet at its next session, but that may be when the mischief, if such be possible, has been done; and the diet has not power to make its nullification retroactive.

All the different legislative as well as executive powers of State, by means of which He reigns over the country and governs the people, are united in this Most Exalted Personage, who thus holds in His hands, as it were, all the ramifying threads of the political life of the country, just as the brain, in the human body, is the primitive source of all mental activity manifested through the four limbs and the different parts of the body.¹²

The emperor of Japan is inviolable. No law court can touch him. By means of the imperial house law, issued simultaneously with the constitution, the imperial family is placed in a sense outside of the constitution, and all questions of succession, ascension, imperial estates, financial allowances, litigations, etc., are determined by the special provisions of this imperial house law.¹³ Can any student of history fail to see what such constitutional provisions tend to provoke?

⁸ Ito, *Commentaries*, pp. 7, 9.

⁹ Masujima, as above, *Japan Advertiser*, February 9, 1919.

¹⁰ Reed, Thomas Harrison, *American Government*, p. 237.

¹¹ Ito, as above, p. 10.

¹² Ito, as above, p. 7.

¹³ Ito, as above, p. 172, "Imperial House Law."

In a similar way as already pointed out when treating the diet, the "Imperial Ordinance concerning the House of Peers,"¹⁴ "The Law of the Houses,"¹⁵ and "The Law of Finances,"¹⁶ take out of the hands of the people matters which in British and American, in modern political polity generally, are considered as belonging essentially to the people. The restrictions upon the activities of the diet are severe. If it fails to pass the budget, the government is authorized to fall back upon the budget of the previous year. If the diet fails to pass projects of law submitted by the government, the government can dissolve the diet, require a new election and gain its point in this way. The government has never yet failed to win such an election. Under the plea of the demands of state interests, it can control the judiciary. Through the aid of the house of peers, most of whom owe their places in the upper house to the imperial favor, the bureaucracy can defeat any legislation it may not favor. By thus centering the legislative, the judiciary and the executive departments of government all in one person, and with the ministry all amenable to the emperor instead of to parliament, have not the makers of the constitution of Japan tied up things a little too tight? This is the opinion of many Japanese leaders today and of many foreign students of the situation as well. The day is surely passing when autocracy can blind an intelligent people as the bright people of Japan are now bound.¹⁷

Viscount Kaneko asserts, and rightly, that the constitution of Japan is characterized by brevity and by being capable of interpretation in either a liberal or a conservative sense. May it not, however, be that this very element of indefiniteness is also an element of weakness leading to dissatisfaction?

Article XXIX of the constitution reads:

Japanese subjects shall, within the limits of law, enjoy the liberty of speech, writing, publication, public meetings and associations.

¹⁴ Ito, as above, p. 186.

¹⁵ Ito, as above, p. 191.

¹⁶ Ito, as above, p. 208.

¹⁷ Uyehara, as above, pp. 63-117, 151, 161, 167; McLaren, *A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era*.

To show how the "limits of law" may be made to withhold what the constitution has apparently given, let a Japanese editor reveal to us another side to the nature of this constitution:

THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC OPINION¹⁸

The regulation of public opinion in Japan falls under three main heads: legal, administrative and judicial.

I. Japanese laws prohibit publication of (1) Comments on the case sub judice, (2) Secret documents of the government, (3) Discussions, proceedings of the secret sittings of any public conference, (4) Any article or opinion liable to induce crime, or intended to attack or defend the accused, (5) Any news or article detrimental to the welfare of society or inducive to disturbance of public order, and (6) Anything whatsoever which impairs the dignity of the Imperial Household.

II. The administration is empowered to regulate at its will any kind of public opinion, whether it is press or book or speech. The Secretary of Interior has supreme right to decide what opinion shall prevail and what shall be suppressed. He has the right to put under ban any daily, magazine or book. He can permanently entomb a *Wealth of Nations*, an *Origin of Species*, a *Faust*; he can silence a Demosthenes, a Cicero, a Webster, he can suppress a *New York Times*, and above all a Hearst type of yellow journal if only he so wishes. This an authority which has never been granted to a mortal since the Christian era, save the Pope. Not only the minister of interior, but the ministers of the army and navy exercise similar authority over public opinions on military questions. There is also the minister of foreign relations who sees to it that no one talks on questions which he does not wish the people to discuss.

III. The department of Justice exercises an independent power to control public opinion. Secret court proceedings are never allowed to be published; publication of any facts concerning a crime before preliminary examination is through is punishable by a severe penalty. Further, the courts enjoy the right to regulate public opinion on the basis of past judgments.

The failure to conform to the regulation is punishable by severe penalties varying from fine to a long imprisonment. The viciousness of the regulation is in its lack of precision, definiteness, in a word, in its arbitrary nature. As the consequence, editors, lecturers, authors are not sure when their publications may be suppressed, and when they shall be accused. This uncertainty has been the chief cause of the slow progress of Japanese public opinion. No free government, no democracy can grow where the institution of exchange of ideas is controlled by a few men and left to suffer a constant uncertainty as in the case of Japan.

¹⁸ *Japan Review*, Vol. IV, p. 68.

There is no objection for a rather fruitless attempt of Japanese elder scholars to prove that democracy has existed in Japan since time immemorial, but our real duty is to see the truth as it exists and be sure that any obstacle to progress shall be promptly removed. libtool.com.cn

Article LV declares "The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it." Responsible for what? Responsible to whom? No other article composing the seventy-six that make up the constitution has been the subject of greater contention and dissatisfaction than this one. The people want a Cabinet responsible to the Diet; the bureaucracy want the cabinet to remain under their control. The provision is equivocal and hence unsatisfactory.

Article LXXII means that amendments to this constitution can be made only upon recommendation by the emperor. Neither house is permitted to suggest such a change. The constitution is called by Ito "an immutable code of laws." Its "essential character" can never be changed."¹⁹ In this twentieth century when laws, both national and international, are having to meet the acid test of practical value as never before in all history, how unwise it seems to undertake to tie a great people up almost unchangeably to a set of rules drafted in the midst of such an environment as was that of Japan in 1889!²⁰

Another anachronism is the demand that the Ministers of Army and Navy in the Cabinet must be men in the active service in those branches. To this practice even thoughtful Japanese are now objecting.

It gives militarism all too strong control over the nation.

VII. CHANGES LIKELY TO BE CALLED FOR

Up to the present I have purposely given Japanese opinion the preference. We need to know their viewpoint. But we must not be blind to inherent defects in this constitution—defects which perchance Japanese publicists have not

¹⁹ Ito, as above, 153.

²⁰ Burton, Theodore, E., in *New York Times*, February 8, 1920.

yet discovered. While avoiding the application of strictly American standards to this Oriental people, history in general has valuable lessons for all of us; and we must not shrink from the frank and fair application of these principles to the Japanese constitution.

Some of the changes apparently already called for are:

1. A frank recognition by both Japanese and foreigners of the environment out of which this constitution sprang. Keep in mind what Viscount Kaneko has said about secrecy. Note what Mr. Motosada Zumoto, M. P., editor and proprietor of the *Herald of Asia*, has said upon this very point:

We refer to the existence of conservatives because, if the Constitution had been drafted in more liberal lines, they would have compelled postponement of its promulgation in 1889. To silence both radicals and conservatives, therefore, the Constitution was promulgated as "granted by the Emperor" (*kinkei*), without submitting its draft to the Imperial Diet for approval or confirmation. Prince Ito, who knew well enough that a nation's constitution could not be created but must evolve out of the minds of the people, had to adopt this somewhat unnatural method from the pressing need of effecting a revision of the onesided treaties with foreign powers, who would not recognize the tariff autonomy of a country not legally governed, nor remove the consular jurisdiction in one without a code of laws.²¹ Mark the subterfuge to which the bureaucrats drove Ito. Now compare this environment with that out of which the Constitution of the United States sprang. What has been the relation of the people to the framing of their fundamental law in each case? Is it not clear as the sunlight that Ito and his co-laborers were so hampered and opposed by the reactionary elements of the day that the production of a broad, safe and unchangeable instrument of government was rendered impossible?

2. Early provision for suitable amendments to this constitution, under proper safeguards. Article LXXIII and LXXIV of the constitution²² make any change in this fundamental law *impossible*, except by the emperor and at his own suggestion. Then the continued existence of the conservative forces which, in 1889, made necessary the

²¹ *Herald of Asia*, March 22, 1919, p. 704; Theodore E. Burton *New York Times*, February 8, 1920.

²² Ito, *Commentaries*, pp. 153-156.

tying up of political rights and privileges in this fashion might make the granting of political justice to the Japanese people *forever* impossible. But we have now come upon a time when no mere phraseology can save thrones. Where is the house of Hohenzollern? All the voices of history tell us that those governments are strongest which are built into the hearts of intelligent peoples with their full consent. Japan has never given her people their constitutional rights. She must either modify her constitution or face political upheaval. Let us trust her to find the road to political justice, peace and power.

3. The abolition of a double-headed government system. There are two governments in Japan—the one with constitutional approval headed by the cabinet, the other headed by the great general staff, but operating in practical defiance of the constitution. Among the leaders of this second group have been found since restoration days the strong men, mainly, from Satsuma and Choshu, who have built modern Japan. The military victories scored by Japan in 1895, 1900 and 1905 were due to the leadership of these men. These men, either personally or by means of their spokesmen, have filled all cabinet offices until the coming into power of the present Hara cabinet. To them Japan owes much. But today they are her danger. Since the Russo-Japanese war they have steadily risen in power, carrying with them men like Ito, Okuma, defenders of the people, and at times the whole country. To them must be charged the Annexation of Korea, the grasping of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, the twenty-one demands against China, the troubles in Shantung, Fukien and Korea. It is their course which is causing Japan to be distrusted today in every land. Because of these men and their policies, Japan is losing the confidence of the world, and that at a time when she needs that confidence more than ever before.

But for the worthy Japanese people the day is not yet lost. Since the downfall of Germany, a distinct tide has set in against this militaristic bureaucracy, and this should have careful attention. The Okuma ministry fell because

the people of Japan opposed the ill-treatment of China.³⁵ The Terauchi ministry went out because it did nothing to create better neighborly feeling with China.³⁶

The attitude of the Japanese press is against taking advantage of China on the Shantung question.³⁷ The press has counselled wisdom regarding the Foochow incident, and Japan has withdrawn her gunboats with diplomatic explanation.³⁸ The people's representatives interpellated the government as to the general staff deceitfully sending 70,000 troops to Siberia in place of the agreed 7500, and the press has been unanimous in opposing the sending of reinforcements.³⁹ For perhaps the first time in history the military training school at Tokyo (their West Point) cannot get students to fill its classes.⁴⁰ For the crimes of the militarists in Korea, the chiefs had to resign, some subordinates were courtmartialed, and a new and liberal government has been set up, and the condemnation of these outrages by the Japanese press and by many prominent Japanese has been clear, positive and purposeful.⁴¹ The demand for universal suffrage is strong and cannot be ignored. The people are beginning to find themselves, and the liberal elements are rising. This is the time for Japan to free herself for real progress.

4. The establishment of a cabinet responsible to the diet, and the education of the people in political institutions. By hiding behind the fiction that the ministers are appointed by and responsible only to the emperor, the bureaucracy has succeeded in hindering any real progress in political government. Both they and the politicians have appeared to fear the people, and hence have held them as far as possible from real participation in the activities of political life.

³⁵ *Japan Advertiser and Herald of Asia*.

³⁶ *Japan Advertiser* and conversations with leading Japanese.

³⁷ Consult leading Japanese papers. *Yomiuri*, January 8. 1920.

³⁸ *Japan Advertiser*, current issues Japanese press.

³⁹ *Japan Advertiser*, *Jiji*, *Tokyo Nichi-Nichi*, *Yomiuri*, *Kokumin*, *Herald of Asia*.

⁴⁰ *Japan Advertiser*.

⁴¹ Current issues of Japanese and English periodicals, especially *Jiji Shimpō*, *Yomiuri* and *Kirisutokyo Shimbun*.

The electorate needs educating. They are a good and able people, and will respond at once to constructive leadership. The imperial house in Japan need never fear for its safety, if it will only take the people fully and honestly into its political confidence as the great Meiji Tennō evidently intended.

5. The abolition of secret methods of conducting both national and international affairs. The curse of Japan is official secrecy. This is essentially a feudalistic method, and is doing Japan great injury. It has rendered her people abnormally suspicious, both of each other, of the government and of other peoples. Much of what is most valuable in citizenship—a knowledge of the governments' plans and sympathy with them—is wanting in Japan, and loyalty is a blind impulse, and hence capable of being turned against the very government to which it is thought to be most loyally devoted. An open and frank treatment of the people of Japan and of foreign peoples and governments by the officials of the Japanese Empire would raise the standing of Japan at home and abroad.¹⁰

The six articles, of which this is the closing, must have made it clear to the American reader that racial peculiarities, insular position, family institutional life and feudalistic training have constantly influenced the political development of this most interesting Japanese people. The retaining of what is best in their past, the enlisting of the people in their new life, and the purifying of the political stream generally is their great task.

¹⁰ *Japan Evangelist*, July, 1917.

NOTES AND REVIEWS

The League of Nations: Principle and the Practice. Edited by STEPHEN PIERCE DUGGAN. Boston, The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1919. 359 pp.

The purpose of this book is to contribute "to an understanding of the most important problem that confronts mankind at the present time." It is intended for two classes of readers: "intelligent laymen seeking a general exposition of the subject, and students seeking a textbook on the subject." Its language is lucid, simple and untechnical. Although sixteen American scholars of recognized authority in the fields of law and government, history and economics have cooperated with the editor, Dr. Duggan, as collaborators in the exposition, there is a logical unity and sequence running throughout the work. With so many skilled marksmen shooting at the same target, some duplication is expected, but it is not enough to cause adverse comment. The first series of papers, eight in number and including 160 pages deal with the history, philosophy and organization of a league of nations. The second part of the work devotes 112 pages to a discussion of international cooperation as illustrated by concrete problems. The third part in 34 pages considers the relation of the United States to a league of nations. Six handy appendices give Abbé Saint-Pierre's famous five "Articles" for "Preserving the Peace of Europe" (1713); the preliminary articles of Kant's Perpetual Peace" (1795); The Holy Alliance (1815); The Monroe Doctrine (1823); the "Provisions for a Permanent Court of Arbitration" of the Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907); and the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919). Finally an excellent bibliography, helpful rather than exhaustive, with comments of value, conclude the volume. An index would have added to the usefulness of the work.

Professor Duggan writes the first chapter, which is modestly called an "Introduction," but which sets forth the problem in a stimulating manner. The political organization of the world in 1914 is portrayed briefly but clearly. The reaction of the people of the United States to the World War and their insistence upon a form of world organization that will prevent its recurrence is

stressed, and followed by a brief analysis of the Covenant of the League of Nations as a means of solving the mighty problems incident to the conflicts and disorders of the world under the national imperialistic regime. This clear-cut discussion compels thought and makes one wish that the editor had devoted an entire chapter to the amplification and further illustration of the five points dealing with world conditions—economic, social and cultural as well as political—prior to the outbreak of the war.

With a masterful survey of world conditions from the days of Greece and Rome down to the year of the Lord's disgrace in 1919 Professor Hayes points out those forces that strove for a better world and finally culminated in the League of Nations. Special emphasis is laid on the developments after the American and French Revolutions, such as the Industrial Revolution, international congresses, alliances, the democratic and nationalistic movements, socialism, the Pan-American Union and the Hague Peace Conferences, which supply the historical background for the League of Nations. Particular reference is made to the experiment in the American Federal Constitution. While brief mention is made of the reasons for the failure of previous devices for maintaining peace, one wishes that these forces had been more fully elaborated. In a chapter all too brief Professor Moore indicates the essentials of a league of peace, and explains in a judicial manner the difficulties. He does not undervalue international conferences, arbitration, mediation, the limitation of armaments and other agencies, but insists that back of all of these, in last analysis, we must "rely upon the cultivation of a mental attitude which will lead men to think first of amicable processes rather than of war, when differences arise," get rid of prevalent notions about the state, and shake off the delusion that our own motives are always higher, purer and more disinterested than those of others.

In discussing the League of Nations in respect to the national state, Professor Rogers holds that internationalism must be founded on nationalism. To him it seems an anomaly that the number of small states should be increased while an effort to organize a League of Nations as the stable basis for world federation is being made. He fears that the multiplication of small states will open opportunities for insidious economic exploitation. The orthodox definition of sovereignty is accepted, but it is pointed out that the League of Nations is only a treaty and hence will limit the state's sovereignty only in the sense that all treaties do. He argues that the new order must come through the reconstruc-

tion of the national state. National egotism must be abandoned; morals must guide politics; generosity must replace selfishness; and competition must give way to coöperation.

President Lowell writes an illuminating chapter on the organization and operation of the League of Nations. Assuming that the supreme function of the League is to prevent war, he explains that this will be accomplished by removing the causes of war and by forcing the submission of disputes to arbitration through adequate penalties such as economical boycott and the use of military force. The organs of a League of Nations—judicial, mediatory, advisory and deliberative—are presented with a clarity and authority that carry conviction. President Lowell does not contend that the present Covenant is ideal, but he does regard it as a step—perhaps the only one possible now—towards the ideal. "The future" he says, "can be trusted to take care of itself, if we do the right thing now." A League of Nations, Professor Ogg explains, must rest upon international sanctions or authority, and that authority may be either public opinion, or economic boycott, or armed force. The various projects for international organization—such as that of the Fabian Society, General Smuts, the French, the German, the League to Enforce Peace and the League of Free Nations—are reviewed and compared with the League of Nations. The various plans for the limitation of armaments are likewise considered without the advocacy of any particular scheme. Professor Sayre has a most informing chapter on the gradual growth of international administrative control of world affairs. He believes that former leagues have failed because of a lack of adequate administrative machinery. One is surprised to learn how many official international Unions, Institutes and Commissions already exist in successful operation, and indicate that we are moving irresistably towards world organization.

One of the most constructive chapters in this meaty volume is the chapter in which Professor Barnes reviews the significance of nationality as a force in Modern History. He shows how, fired by the French Revolution, it sought to conquer the world and won the support of Liberals everywhere. It unified Italy, Germany and the Balkan state. It led to national imperialism and transformed Europe into a gigantic military camp. It was largely responsible for the outbreak of the world-war. The desire to protect the independence of small states like Servia and Belgium and to secure the freedom of submerged nationalities like the Poles, the Czecks and the Jugoslavs was set forth as one of the

important war aims of the Allies. There can be no lasting world peace until some satisfactory compromise is made between the principle of national self-determination and a stable world-organization. In a brief but discriminating explanation of nationality, Professor Barnes shows himself in accord with Alfred E. Zimmern in regarding nationality as "a cultural or psychological force or principle," and not a political concept. A nation is the group held together by nationality. When the group organizes politically it becomes the national state. Nationalism was not only one of the greatest factors in the armed conflict but also in the gigantic task of reconstruction. There will be no peace with victory until the principle of national self-determination has been established. This cannot be accomplished without an effective League of Nations.

Mr. Glenn Frank in a logically argued thesis contends that a purely political league of Nations to adjust ugly disputes after they arise between states, is not adequate to save the world from war. Political internationalism must be supplemented by economic internationalism, just as political democracy must be safeguarded by economic democracy. Hostile tariffs must give way to the open door policy. Economic opportunities the world over must be internationalized. Most modern wars have been predominantly economic in motive. Hence the "most finely conceived league of nations will utterly fail unless a constructive attempt at economic internationalism is made." A new political order predicates a new economic order. Mr. Frank hopes that the League of Nations by setting up instruments and methods of international counsel may "expose the fallacy of substituting a war of tariffs for a war of trenches."

The problem of backward areas and of colonies, as economic and political factors in blocking the road to peace, is clearly shown by Professor Borchard—The solution of this knotty world question is recognized as difficult, but not hopeless. The way out is through international commissions to apportion raw materials, to regulate prices; to prevent exploiting syndicates; and to internationalize stockownership justly distributed among the various nationals—all under the League of Nations. In like manner Mr. Chamberlain contends that international waterways, railways, highways and ports, as well as such conveniences as mail, cables and the telegraph should be brought under the control of international commissions. In urging the "complete international control of the sea and its approaches" under an international tribunal, Professor

Gettell carries the argument a step farther. Mr. Andrews defends the inclusion in the peace treaty of the nine principles affecting labor and shows that since 1889 international organizations have paved the way for this action. The protection of the rights of the workers is a world concern and essential to the peace of the earth.

The last two chapters of the volume deal with the United States and the League of Nations. Professor Munro shows that for over a century the United States had the good fortune to follow a policy of isolation. Today former conditions have passed away. The United States is confronted with three possible courses: (1) to participate in the League of Nations; (2) to enter into world alliances and the balance of power system; (3) to continue a policy of isolation. A return of America to the former policy of isolation is an impossibility, for Europe flanks our east and Asia our west, and isolation could only be partial. Further, such a course would mean for the United States increased armaments by land and sea on a gigantic scale. Hence league or alliance is the only choice left; and wisdom and faith must decide between them. The Monroe Doctrine in its relation to the League of Nations is ably explained by Professor Kimball. He thinks that President Wilson originally intended, through Article X, to extend the principle of the Monroe doctrine to the entire world, but, as a concession to those Americans who are "imperialistic at heart," Article XXI was inserted in the Covenant specifically recognizing the Monroe Doctrine. Professor Kimball believes that if the League of Nations is modified by America's insisting on its imperialistic interpretation, the power of the League to guarantee permanent peace will be weakened, because the door will be left open for other powers to insist upon their spheres of influence in the Near East, the Far East and Africa, which may lead to serious consequences. On the other hand, if the United States is willing to sacrifice its imperialism, and return to the original idea of mutual non-intervention under a League of Nations, the system of mandatories or regional agreements would be a useful instrument in guaranteeing world peace.

In conclusion it may be said that a study of the various aspects, of world relations discussed from so many different angles in this book, leaves the conviction:

1. That the greatest political forces in modern civilization are nationalism and internationalism.

2. That these forces are not hostile and antagonistic but complementary.

3. That nationalism in its exaggerated form is a world menace and the source of injustice, misunderstandings, hatreds and wars; but in its true form it is a world blessing and the source of justice, cooperation and peace.

4. That in the new world order immediately ahead nationalism will not disappear, but through internationalism will continue to play a still greater part in human affairs.

5. That the League of Nations is not an innovation but merely the culmination of many historical forces of the past—the latest concrete expression of internationalism—sort of a milestone to mark further advances.

6. That as a piece of governmental machinery the League of Nations will not give the world peace, unless back of it are peaceful intentions, the will to foresee the causes of war and to remove them, an honest effort to cooperate in order to bring all international relationships up to a higher level of morality, justice and good will.

This handy, compact volume, packed from cover to cover with facts from the pens of sixteen specialists, is a genuine contribution to the new science of international relations. It is a sane, sensible book based on history, political science and economics, and admirably suited to its purpose. It should be read by every American who desires an intelligent conception of present world conditions. Professor Duggan deserves the gratitude of every student of international affairs for having produced it.

A. C. FLICK,
Syracuse University.

The Italian Emigration of Our Times. By ROBERT FRANZ FOERSTER. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 1919. 556 pp.

Professor Foerster has made a notable and unique contribution to American literature on immigration. His exhaustive study of Italian emigration at its source, and in the various countries to which Italians emigrate, is the most illuminating study that we have seen of any of the races of America's recent immigration. Seven chapters are given to an analysis of the causes of their emigration, the information being drawn from Italian official reports and the writings of Italian scholars. The influence of such factors as malarial low lands, unwise deforestation, deficient rainfall, defective systems of land tenancy, poorly

balanced taxation systems, starvation wages, and unrestrained birth rates, upon emigration, is carefully worked out. Then one follows the Italian to the various countries of Europe; to France, Germany, Switzerland, Austria Hungary; and to North Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and the United States; and then back to Italy again. For the author is studying a migration problem, not an emigration or an immigration problem, and he covers both the flow and the ebb of the tide.

It is a book of facts. The author has been more interested in providing information than in proving a thesis. The majority of the books and articles on immigration at the present time available in the United States were written by people either so biased in favor of the immigrants, or so biased against them, that they are not dependable. Feeling rather that scientific research is the basis of many of them, while others have been written by people who have read about immigrants rather than had first hand knowledg, Professor Foerster's book is to be classed with the small number of thorough studies. It is well worth the time of every student of immigration. It should be widely read by thoughtful American citizens.

D. D. LESCOHIER,
University of Wisconsin.

The Foreign Trade of China. By CHONG SU SEE, Ph.D. New York. Columbia University, 1919, 450 pp.

The closing of the "Great War" has brought to some of the belligerent countries definite rights, opportunities, and responsibilities. In many instances the wrongs of centuries are being corrected. For the most part those countries, whose abuses and sufferings have been widely advertised and are therefore well known to the populations of influential nations, are the ones who have been definitely accorded justice in the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. The League of Nations has started upon a mission of administering that which has been accomplished by the Treaty of Versailles. To assume that this treaty has rectified the wrongs of every country or has even touched upon the most intense abuses of countries having potential influences of the greatest importance for the future, is absurd. The infant League of Nations is therefore born into an opportunity unlimited in its scope but nevertheless clouded by the shortsightedness of at least certain of the treaty's guarantees.

It is most fortunate that, at this time, China, a nation representing a quarter of the world's population, whose contact with other civilizations has been so unenviable and for whom the Treaty of Versailles has given such doubtful consolation, should have her case so clearly written in the volume by Mr. See. Step by step Mr. See shows the unrivaled freedom which all foreigners enjoyed in China in residence privileges, official recognition, trade opportunities, and popular esteem throughout antiquity and up to about the sixteenth century, A.D.

The succession of barbarous acts perpetrated upon the Chinese during the past four centuries do not constitute a record of which the so-called enlightened civilizations may feel at all proud. Dr. See shows that the Portuguese developed pirate bands during the sixteenth century which infested the Chinese coast and terrorized traders. The Portuguese were involved in numerous outrages upon Chinese citizens and against Chinese sovereignty.

Contact with the Spaniards was initiated by the Spanish massacre in 1603 of about 20,000 Chinese in the Philippine Islands, and by the repetition of this sort of brutality in 1639 when a further 20,000 or more were murdered.

The British in 1637 in order to overcome the misrepresentations intentionally created by the Portuguese resorted to armed force to compel Chinese merchants and officials to permit trading in Canton. This action was the first of a series of British encroachments upon Chinese standards, laws, and sovereignty that would never for a moment have been tolerated by a less amiable or more militaristic people than the Chinese. In spite of Imperial anti-opium edicts as early as 1729 and subsequent official Chinese action against the growing "opium curse" both English and Portuguese smuggled opium into China against her laws and by methods which violated her sovereignty. A veritable class of outlaws, who were English smuggling pirates, fostered this illegitimate trade. Even the English East India Company from 1780 thereafter was authorized to engage in the traffic and developed the opium monopoly.

In desperation the Chinese declared opium contraband in 1800 and its cultivation at home and importation from abroad were prohibited. In spite of this the British government in India even went so far as to encourage shipment of opium to China by giving bonuses. Suffice it to say that Dr. See shows how such violations of accepted international law culminated in the British war of aggression in 1839 whereby China was forced to admit opium into the Empire.

Following 1840 every excuse was taken advantage of by various foreign powers to extort from China trade concessions, territorial rights, spheres of influence and other privileges which ultimately developed into a regime of foreign domination and exploitation. In fact China was forced by degrees to sign treaties which developed the unjust and discriminating principle and practice of extraterritoriality.

It is no wonder that the Chinese people developed characteristics of seclusion and intolerance of foreigners after several hundred years of experience which impressed them that force and not persuasion was the road to foreign trade! Throughout the book Dr. See presents views and conclusions from British and French writers which strengthen the conviction that the Chinese have been treated shamefully and unjustly. Her country has been regarded as a mere market for foreign commodities to be disposed of by any method regardless of Chinese customs or well-being. The products of China were desired and it was proposed to secure them under regulations and tax levies which blindly disregarded the continued maintenance of the producing industries. Thus China's maritime customs have been built up to favor foreigners as against her own citizens. Discriminations have arisen which redound to the benefit of foreign trade and paralyze native industry. And to free the country of such conditions the Chinese government finds itself fettered by the fact that each country having treaties with her must give consent before change is possible.

In spite of the chaotic system which Dr. See so clearly described, Chinese imports and exports have made remarkable growth, but with every increase there has been a falling proportion of revenue to the imperial government. At this time, then, when China feels the need of abolishing ruinous feudal methods of internal trade taxation her hands are tied because she has not control of her tariffs and because other dependable sources of revenue are not recognized. Meanwhile the costs of revolution and essential improvements are for the most part paid from funds obtained by mortgaging and even selling to foreigners natural resources of inestimable value.

China is certainly in a most unenviable position. When she declared war on Germany and participated with the Allies in the "Great War" it seemed that at last a step had been taken which would bring proper recognition of her ideals as well as sympathetic foreign interest in the solution of her pressing problems.

The solution of these problems, however, is not in sight, for as the author suggests at the end of the treatise—the foreigner has made China what she is today. Upon the foreigners' willingness to lend a helping hand depends the future of China and just what her course of development and action shall be. Continuance of past relations forecasts wars in the future. On the other hand a change of heart and methods on the part of the civilized world in its relations to China will surely simplify the task of the League of Nations.

Dr. See has presented a most valuable contribution to the literature which ultimately will influence international sentiment for a change of the status quo in China. It is to be hoped that the book will receive wide publicity and thereby be given a chance to do its part in undermining the wall of indifference in foreign countries which is so largely responsible for the Chinese Question.

THEODORE MACKLIN,
University of Wisconsin.

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