

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 3 May 1963, at 11.00. a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Francesco CAVALLETTI

(Italy)

63-14556

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO
Mr. E. HOSANNAH
Mr. S. PORTELLA de AGUIAR

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA
Mr. V. PECHOTA
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU
Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

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Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKORONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN

Mr. E. CORNELL

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSIRAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. M.V. ANTYASOV

Mr. G.I. ZOLOTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S.F. IBRAHIM

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Mr. J.M. EDES

Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

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The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I declare open the one hundred and twenty-seventh plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. RĂDOVEȘCU (Romania): At our meeting today, which is devoted by the Committee's decision to the discussion of collateral measures, I should like to dwell on only one of the measures that have been submitted to us: the proposal (ENDC/77) made by the Soviet delegation to conclude a non-aggression pact between the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the States signatories of the Warsaw Treaty. It is our conviction that it is precisely the debate on that proposal which has provided the frame for certain observations which must be analysed earnestly and in a spirit of responsibility.

The Romanian delegation has always pointed to the primary importance for our Committee's proceedings of the debates on the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. That is and will remain the main task of our Conference -- to work out a treaty on general and complete disarmament. However, in view of the complexity and the difficulties of solving the issue of general and complete disarmament, it will be not only helpful but absolutely necessary to adopt also measures which, without representing per se disarmament measures or integrant parts of the process of general and complete disarmament, will still facilitate the implementation of our Committee's primary task, leading to a détente in international relations, building confidence, and thus helping to create the conditions propitious for disarmament.

It was precisely for that purpose that the agreement was reached, first between the Soviet Union and the United States of America and afterwards in the General Assembly of the United Nations, unanimously approving the joint Soviet-United States statement (ENDC/5) on the guiding principles of the disarmament negotiations.

Starting from that point, on 28 March last year our Committee decided inter alia that:

"Concurrently with the elaboration of agreement on general and complete disarmament in the plenary Committee, and not to the detriment of this elaboration, a committee of the whole will be set up by the plenary Committee for the consideration of various proposals on the

implementation of measures aimed at: the lessening of international tension; the consolidation of confidence among States; and facilitating general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/1/Add.1, para.2)

In this connexion perhaps I may be allowed to recall that the leader of the Romanian delegation, Minister of Foreign Affairs Corneliu Manescu, started from precisely those prerequisites when he proposed on 20 March 1962 that:

"a sub-committee be set up, consisting of the representatives of the eighteen States, to discuss the measures needed to relax international tension and ultimately to secure general and complete disarmament."

(ENDC/PV.5, p.19)

I deemed it necessary to emphasize those ideas and to recall those facts regarding the nature of the collateral measures which our Committee has to examine, because an event has recently occurred in our proceedings which we cannot disregard. Referring to the proposal to conclude a NATO-Warsaw Treaty non-aggression pact, the United States delegation tried to put into circulation a new concept, sui generis, of the nature of collateral measures. At our meeting on 26 April the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, defined collateral measures in the following manner:

"... we are discussing collateral measures -- those measures concerning the armaments of States which could be undertaken prior to the initiation of a programme of general disarmament". (ENDC/PV.125, p.18)

As corroboration of that new definition which the United States representative wishes to suggest to the Committee, I may cite another excerpt from the same speech by Mr. Stelle, in which, trying to prove --

"... that one of the Soviet proposals, that concerning a non-aggression pact between the members of NATO and the members of the Warsaw Pact organization, is inappropriate for discussion in this Committee." (ibid, p.20)

he stated:

"We are concerned in this Committee with matters relating to disarmament and to the control of armaments. We are not here seized of general political problems, and we are particularly not seized of those problems specifically related to European regional security matters." (ibid.)

Let us analyse this "new" concept of collateral measures in the light of objective facts. The point made by Mr. Stelle contains an affirmative element: that it should be a measure of disarmament or control over armaments; and two elements in the negative: that it should not be a general political measure or, especially, a measure related to problems of regional European security.

From the start we have to note that that concept obviously contradicts the clear, unequivocal provisions of our decision of 28 March 1962. I repeat: the conditions which, according to that decision, a measure ought to meet in order that it may be discussed in our Committee in addition to the issue of general and complete disarmament, are: that it be conducive to the lessening of international tension, that it promote confidence among States, and that it facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament. Consequently we have never decided that while discussing collateral measures we must necessarily have in view disarmament or control over armaments .

The United States representative stated:

"We are not here seized of general political problems". (ibid.)

Naturally, everyone is free to make any statement; but are these really the facts? In our Committee we have discussed general political measures, and our basic documents with regard to the work in this Committee do not, either expressly or by implication, exclude general political measures.

The United States representative continued:

"... we are particularly not seized of those problems specifically related to European regional security matters". (ibid.)

Of course such a statement can also be made, but does reality look like that?

First, a brief remark. Mr. Stelle places in the same sentence two contradictory conditions which by their very nature rule each other out: the problem must not be a general political one, but neither should it be special. What then should it be?

Let us skip that contradiction of logic and get back to the crux of the matter. May one plead the incompetence of this Committee to examine problems of a regional character, while we are all in agreement that we can discuss the problem of nuclear-free zones? The contention that a measure, in order that it may be discussed by us

in the framework of measures collateral to disarmament, should not refer to regional problems appears even more paradoxical since this Committee is discussing a measure -- proposed by the way, by the United States -- which does not concern stricto sensu the NATO States and the States of the Warsaw Treaty, and does not regard all the States of the world, but is a conspicuously special problem. I have in mind the proposal regarding the establishment of a direct communication line between the leaders of the Soviet Union and of the United States of America (ENDC/70, pp.10 et seq.). In the first place, that measure has a much more restricted area of application than a regional measure. From a technical and legal point of view it concerns the Soviet Union and the United States alone. But that does not prevent us from realizing and assessing the general political character of such a measure.

But is there any ground for the contention that a NATO-Warsaw Treaty non-aggression pact would be of interest for the security of one single region of the world -- only for the security of Europe? Obviously not.

Members of the two organizations are States which, by their geographical position, the spread of their territory, their military potential, the fact that they comprise all nuclear Powers, their economic resources, and their specific weight in international relations are influencing to a significant extent the international situation all over the world. The relations between the NATO States on the one hand, and the States of the Warsaw organization on the other hand, are influencing world international relations to such a degree that we can say without exaggerating that, were those relations improved, the international political climate generally would improve, the danger of war would be lessened, and the propitious conditions would be created for the implementation of general and complete disarmament. That is a conclusion which compels recognition on the strength of obvious facts, and for that reason I feel that there is hardly any need to insist on it.

I should like now to take up another aspect of the United States representative's statement of 26 April. Lacking valid arguments against discussion of the collateral measures proposed by the Soviet Union, Mr. Stelle contended that:

"As to the question of Western responses to Soviet proposals on collateral measures, we submit that it would appear to any objective observer of our work

that the problem is not one of any lack of Western responses to Soviet proposals, but rather a problem of the nature of the Soviet proposals themselves." (ENDC/PV.125, p.20)

That is an unusual statement to find in negotiations between States -- a statement alien to the spirit of negotiation in general, and alien to the spirit of the negotiations in this Committee in particular. It proceeds from the false premise that one party alone -- in this case the Western Powers -- holds the monopoly of correct, rational proposals, while everything coming from the other party fails to meet those requirements. That is, we must recognize, an extremely comfortable stand: on that basis any proposal coming from the other party can be rejected from the start and in its entirety, without any attempt being made to substantiate such an attitude by arguments. However, it is an attitude which can only spell harm to our negotiations. When one party to negotiations holds such a view, progress is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. That is precisely the conclusion that would appeal to the "objective observer" referred to by Mr. Stelle.

In addition to the obviously unconstructive character of such a statement, another excerpt from the statement of the United States representative arrests our attention, since it further reveals the contradiction into which he has fallen. He said:

"... For what are we supposed to be considering in our discussion of collateral measures proposals? We are supposed to be considering proposals which by their nature can be easily agreed upon before we have negotiated the more difficult and complex matters that must form the beginning of general disarmament. That means that the measures which we should be considering in this context are those measures that can, without upsetting the existing military relationship, reduce the risk of war, begin the process of halting the arms race, or initiate arms reductions." (ibid.)

Were we to be guided by the arguments submitted here by the representative of the United States, then the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Pact States would be the easiest of proposals for the United States to accept. An "objective observer" could not help noticing

that that proposal fully covers the elements which Mr. Stelle had in mind. Its implementation would not raise the problem of control, which is being put up as an obstacle to any proposal submitted by the socialist countries. It is a measure which would not upset the existing military relationship and which could not be detrimental to anybody who really wanted peace, since it is equally in the interests of all States that are concerned about their own security and about general security.

It is the measure which would be the easiest to achieve also because it alone gives concrete form to, and thus strengthens, the general obligation imposed by contemporary international law -- the prohibition of aggression. The confirmation by the NATO States and the Warsaw Pact States of the essential obligation -- to abstain from perpetrating aggression -- which international law and the United Nations Charter impose on every State would, under present conditions, have tremendous importance from the moral and political points of view and also as an element for strengthening the principle of non-aggression in the legal conscience of the peoples.

To oppose such a pact is tantamount to adopting a negative stand with regard to international treaties in general. Of course a non-aggression pact has no magic virtue. Its observance is dependent on the good faith and good will of the governments concerned, on the resolve with which the peoples struggle in order to impose their will for peace. But an international treaty in general, and a non-aggression pact in particular, is a powerful element of international legality.

It is, of course, superfluous to demonstrate in detail that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Pact States would contribute to the lessening of the danger of war. It would be of such a nature as to create propitious conditions for the halting of the arms race and for the implementation of general and complete disarmament. Last but not least, the adoption of such a pact would obviously have a beneficial impact on the development of the work of our Committee.

If, as the outcome of thorough negotiations, we were able to secure the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, that not only would be a factor capable of improving the international political climate but also would give a powerful impetus to the proceedings in our Committee. It would be a stimulus to renewed efforts in all the directions in which we are called upon to work, a pledge for the achievement of other agreements.

My aim today is not to embark upon polemics with the representative of the United States. I proposed to examine some of his objections to the negotiation of a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Pact States, and that analysis has shown the groundlessness of the United States objections. As a matter of fact, no valid argument can be adduced either against the competence of our Committee to examine the proposal to conclude such a pact, or against the conclusion of that pact -- and that for the simple reason that there are no such arguments.

The conclusion of a non-aggression pact would be a useful, timely and necessary measure. The necessity and usefulness of such a pact have been acknowledged in the past even by leaders of the Western Powers. On a previous occasion I quoted (ENDC/PV.115, p.12) to the Committee the statement made by the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, on 25 November 1961. The United States delegation has preferred to pass over in silence that very important statement by President Kennedy. For that reason I shall quote it again today. President Kennedy said:

"I think it would be helpful if NATO and the Warsaw Pact engaged in a commitment to live in peace with each other."

Those words are as clear as clear can be; they leave no room for misunderstanding. The person of the highest consequence in the United States, the President, believes in the usefulness of a commitment between the NATO States and the Warsaw Pact States "to live in peace with each other".

At this juncture it is not out of place to ask the reasons why the United States delegation to our Committee does not wish to listen to any talk about a commitment between the NATO States and the Warsaw Pact States. Does the evolution of the international situation after 1961 make the conclusion of a non-aggression pact less pressing and necessary? In our view it does not. On the contrary, the urgency of concluding such a pact has been stressed even more strongly by the present international situation. It is not only the socialist delegations present here which stand for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Pact States. The usefulness of such a non-aggression pact has been stressed in statements made by the representatives of Mexico, Brazil, Nigeria and Ethiopia.

We have before us the draft of a non-aggression pact submitted by the Soviet delegation. If it includes stipulations or clauses which the Western delegations do

not desire, or if those delegations envisage other stipulations or clauses which do not appear in the draft but which in their view should be included, why do they not speak out? Why do they seek refuge behind a screen of general statements instead of engaging in discussion with us in merito, touching upon the crux of the matter and putting forward arguments of substance?

It may well be that the Western delegations have certain reasons for rejecting negotiation of a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Pact States. Some of those "reasons" are being whispered but not voiced openly here. For the sake of making progress in our negotiations we are ready to listen to those reasons and to investigate them in all earnest.

To that end the Romanian delegation would like to ask the United States delegation the following questions, which we hope will facilitate our negotiations:

1. Is the United States delegation in agreement with the statement made by President Kennedy on 25 November 1961 with regard to the usefulness of a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Pact States?
2. Which of the provisions contained in the draft pact submitted by the Soviet Union do not suit the Western delegations in general and the United States delegation in particular?
3. Under what conditions does the United States delegation foresee the possibility of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Pact States?

Our questions are plain, clear and to the point. We shall be glad if the answers of the United States representative, which we hope to get without delay, are just as plain, clear, and to the point.

The President of the State Council of the Romanian People's Republic, Mr. Gheorghiu-Dej, recently stated that the Romanian Government considers that there is a sure way for the maintenance and consolidation of world peace: the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the liquidation of the remnants of the Second World War, and the development of co-operation between all countries, irrespective of their social order, on the basis of the principles of peaceful co-existence. The Government of the Romanian People's Republic is making untiring efforts to put these

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

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principles into practice, together with other principles which lie at the basis of its foreign policy. The Romanian people wants peace and is struggling to secure it.

In the light of these realities, the Romanian delegation again begs to draw this Committee's attention to the tasks and responsibilities incumbent upon all of us who have been working here so long. The Romanian delegation insistently requests all delegations to engage in purposeful negotiations in an effort to achieve our proposed goal: the conclusion of a treaty of general and complete disarmament. In order to facilitate our attainment of that goal, let us smooth the way by achieving agreements tending to the creation of the necessary climate. One of those agreements would be a non-aggression pact between the States members of NATO and the parties to the Warsaw Pact. Those who are against such measures assume the whole responsibility, now as well as in the future. History has its own laws and is merciless.

The Romanian delegation proposes an analysis, paragraph by paragraph, of the draft non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Pact States. That would be a useful undertaking and would be hailed by public opinion in all countries.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): I listened with much interest to the careful statement made by the representative of Romania, and I may have some comments to make later on the subject which he treated in particular.

When I last spoke on the subject of collateral measures I said (ENDC/PV.118, p.6) that in the view of the Canadian delegation our discussions on general and complete disarmament would continue to seem like speculations about remote contingencies unless agreement were achieved on a nuclear test ban and increased international confidence were created through agreement on measures collateral to general and complete disarmament. I urged that, in order to make progress towards our goal of a total disarmament programme, our efforts should be concentrated on those areas where agreement can be quickly reached and come into force prior to a general disarmament agreement.

An arrangement to reserve one plenary meeting a week for the discussion of collateral measures took effect at our meeting of 29 March (ENDC/PV.115), and since then we have had four plenary meetings devoted to collateral measures. In that short

time there has been progress. Agreement to establish a direct communications link between the United States and the Soviet Union was a significant development. My delegation appreciates that move of the United States and the Soviet Union, and we hope that a concrete agreement will be rapidly concluded and put into effect. The development is not only significant because the specific measure involved is a useful one which can help to avoid misunderstandings in dangerous situations; it is also a good beginning and a precedent for our future work. It gives us some ground for hope that, as our discussions in the field of collateral measures develop, it will be possible to agree on further measures which will help to create international confidence.

During our discussions at those recent meetings we have heard a number of interesting comments and arguments about various collateral measures and about the general nature of such measures. Representatives of communist States have emphasized that collateral measures must create confidence. The representative of Poland said also that such proposals -- he called them "cautious measures" -- should contain elements of "real disarmament" and of "political solutions calculated to reduce international tension". (ENDC/PV.118, p.10).

On 19 April the representative of Poland spoke of "introducing a series of military measures" (ENDC/PV.122, p.16) before the process of general and complete disarmament begins. In addition, representatives of Eastern countries have urged that collateral measures should contribute substantially towards eliminating the threat of nuclear war. The Canadian delegation welcomes the emphasis which communist representatives have given to the importance of this aspect of our work.

I propose now to examine the Soviet Union's draft declaration on the renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75), and to consider it from the three points of view which the communist representatives have emphasized: first, as a confidence-building measure; second, as a type of pre-disarmament measure with important military characteristics and implications; and, third, as a measure designed to reduce substantially the threat of nuclear war.

It seems to my delegation that the declaration proposed by the Soviet Union is less a confidence-building proposal than one which requires or presupposes the existence of a high state of international confidence. The proposal asks certain

States, unilaterally and without quid pro quo, to remove from their territories armaments which they consider essential for their defence. The United Nations Charter specifically preserves the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence (Article 51), and recognizes the legitimacy of regional arrangements for that purpose (Article 52). A State has the right to prepare its own defences and to enter into defensive alliances. The proposed Soviet declaration would primarily affect the European members of the NATO alliance. They would be required to agree to the removal of means of defence which they consider necessary for their security. To ask such countries to take that step, and at the same time to offer no other guarantees or arrangements for their defence nor in any way to alter military dispositions of the Warsaw Pact members, is such a one-sided proposal that it is difficult to understand how anyone could think it likely to create mutual confidence.

When we consider the military implications of carrying out the measures to which parties would be bound by the Soviet draft declaration, it is clear that the proposal is not an equitable one and that it is of a unilateral character. It is true that both sides would be bound by obligations contained in it, as Mr. Tsarapkin pointed out on 5 April (ENDC/PV.118, p.46), but those obligations cannot be viewed in the abstract; they can be viewed only in relation to the specific circumstances to which they are meant to apply.

As the representative of the United Kingdom pointed out on 29 March (ENDC/PV.115,p.39) the entire burden of the Soviet Union's proposal, all the actual obligations, would fall on the Western Powers. Therefore, contrary to what Mr. Tsarapkin said on 5 April, the proposal simply does not create reciprocal obligations. It would require unilateral action on the part of the West for which there is no quid pro quo. I regret to say that I find it difficult to envisage a proposal more lacking in real elements of reciprocity and more devoid of genuine mutuality of obligation.

It is true that, if implemented by the West, such unilateral obligations might add to the sense of security of the East. No doubt that is one of the reasons why the declaration was proposed. However, it would clearly lessen the security of the NATO nations, particularly those in Europe. The proposal, therefore, does not respect the principle contained in paragraph 5 of the joint statement of agreed principles (ENDC/5), which states that disarmament measures should be balanced so that no State

can obtain a military advantage over another by means of their implementation. The joint statement applies to a programme for general and complete disarmament, it is true; but there can hardly be any question that the same principle should be applied also to any proposal of this character affecting the military disposition of States as a preliminary to disarmament.

Thus it is barely necessary to dwell on the third aspect of collateral measures emphasized by communist representatives: that they should contribute substantially to eliminating the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet draft declaration involves, of course, no actual disarmament. Nothing need be destroyed. National arsenals will remain the same. However, as I have already said, the military dispositions of the Western Powers would be radically altered, to their disadvantage, while those of the Soviet Union would remain precisely the same. I regret that I am completely unable to understand how so radical a change in the security of one side without any corresponding change in the military dispositions of the other could be a stabilizing element or contribute to elimination of the danger of nuclear war.

Representatives of the socialist countries here have argued that certain proposals of the Western Powers are not desirable or may even be harmful as collateral measures although they could be considered as part of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. Such arguments have been advanced by the Soviet Union against certain proposals by the United States (ENDC/70) to reduce the risk of accidental war, and also against the Canadian proposal (ENDC/17) to prohibit the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. My delegation does not agree with those arguments. We believe that the proposals I have mentioned would be helpful as pre-disarmament measures. But we believe that the argument advanced by the Soviet representative serves to emphasize that proposals which are mainly of a military character -- for example, the Soviet draft declaration -- as a general rule belong more properly to the disarmament process itself.

It seems to my delegation that Mr. Tsarapkin recognized the force of that argument when on 5 April he asked, in reply to criticisms of the one-sided character of the Soviet Union draft declaration:

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

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"But how can one speak of a unilateral measure" -- he was referring to the draft declaration -- "when the Soviet Union is proposing to eliminate in the first stage missiles of every range, including intercontinental and global missiles, in which the superiority of the Soviet Union is unquestionable ...?"

(ENDC/PV.118, p.39)

I believe that asking that question the Soviet representative implicitly recognized that the draft declaration involved problems of reciprocity, of balance and of timing which can be appropriately dealt with only in the context of a more complete disarmament programme.

Finally, I should like to say a few words about the Soviet Union draft (ENDC/77) of a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the North Atlantic alliance and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. We have heard considerable argument this morning from the representative of Romania in favour of our considering the proposal as a collateral measure and discussing it in detail. I am sorry to say that I have not been convinced by the arguments he brought forward. Especially, my delegation does not agree with his implication that to be against such a pact is to be against treaties and peace in general. I think that the position of the Canadian delegation and of the Western countries generally is that "everything in its right place" is the principle we should follow, and I would cite the homely proverb which says that a cow is a very good animal in a field but we chase her out of the garden. In other words, steps toward disarmament must be taken in proper relationship, and it is on that point that we have to take issue with the arguments of the representatives of Romania and other socialist delegations which have urged the discussion of this pact in the committee on collateral measures.

It is not my intention in this statement to offer any comments on the specific obligations proposed in the draft pact. On 19 April, however, the Soviet representative criticized certain delegations for not contributing to discussion of this subject. He said:

"... in our Committee one can observe how some members prefer to remain aloof from this important discussion like a boy sitting on a fence and watching with curiosity what is going on in the yard." (ENDC/PV.122, p.27)

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He went on to say later, (ibid., p.34) that proposals of the Soviet Union were entitled to proper attention from all its colleagues here and that it hoped and expected that those who had not yet spoken would comment favourably on the Soviet plan.

Mr. Tsarapkin's statement was accurate in one respect. The majority of the members of the Conference have undoubtedly refrained from entering into a substantive discussion of the Soviet Union's draft non-aggression pact. But, instead of criticizing us for remaining silent, I think Mr. Tsarapkin ought to ask himself why we have remained silent. The answer is clear. The Canadian delegation and, I believe, other members of this Conference do not consider this to be the most appropriate forum for discussion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Powers. It is not necessary to look far into the records to see why that is so. Virtually all the Statements of the representatives of the socialist countries here give us some insight into the reasons. I shall offer two examples.

On 5 April Mr. Tsarapkin read into the record (ENDC/PV.118, p.41) a document (ENDC/81) emanating from East Germany which referred to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. It linked such a pact with the general question of security arrangements in Central Europe, and specifically with the question of existing borders in Europe.

On 19 April Mr. Blusztajn, the representative of Poland, argued that a non-aggression pact would fulfil certain functions of an agreement of mutual security between European States. After explaining why, in his opinion, that was so, he said that a non-aggression pact was related to "normalizing and stabilizing the European situation" (ENDC/PV.122, p.19), and he went on:

"Such stabilization primarily implies acceptance of the political and juridical status created in central Europe as a consequence of the defeat of Hitler's Germany and of the later developments which resulted in the establishment of two German States ..." (ibid.)

It is certainly not my intention to comment on those arguments. I only wish to point out that those who propose or argue strongly for discussion of a non-aggression pact in the Eighteen-Nation Committee themselves believe that the matter is directly connected with general European political questions. In the Canadian view a non-aggression pact at some point may possibly be appropriate in the context of an East-West understanding on those broader questions.

The representative of Romania commented this morning (supra, p.10) that a non-aggression pact has no virtue in itself but must derive its value from the sincerity and the proper attitudes of the parties to it. That certainly is very true, as all of us may learn from seeing what has happened in the case of certain non-aggression pacts we all know well which were entered into in the past. However, the pact proposed by the Soviet Union is not conceived merely as a measure collateral to general and complete disarmament but is also closely related to very far-reaching and extremely important political problems of a different character. For that reason many members of this Conference consider that the Soviet proposal should be considered in a forum other than the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): Before beginning I should like to say how interested I was in the statement just made by our Canadian colleague. He referred several times to statements of mine in the Committee. I should like to study his words in the record before passing any comment on them. At the present stage I wish merely to say this. The Canadian delegation has, I think gone much further in explaining its opposition to the idea of a non-aggression pact than have the United States and United Kingdom representatives. It has given us several reasons which we had, if I may put it that way, so far missed; and I am extremely grateful to it for that. Mr. Burns may rest assured that I shall have something to say on the substance of his arguments in a later statement.

I should now like to return to my main theme. I think we are all agreed on the importance of the question of reducing war risks. Clauses covering that problem are to be found in both the Western Powers' draft Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World (EMDC/30) and the draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under Strict International Control submitted by the Soviet Union (EMDC/2/Rev.1). The approach to the problem is similar in these two documents. Measures are proposed to enable each State to evaluate objectively the military movements and actions of the other party and thus to avoid any errors of interpretation.

The draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union thus adopts the main proposals contained in the United Kingdom-United States

plan, namely advance notification of all major military movements and manoeuvres, the exchange of military missions among States or groups of States, and the establishment of rapid and reliable communications between Heads of Governments and with the United Nations Secretary-General.

All these measures obviously have their place in a programme of general and complete disarmament. They can and must be undertaken at the very first stage of disarmament. They can and must, in the general pattern of disarmament measures envisaged for the first stage, play an important role as an element in the control system and as a factor strengthening mutual trust. Advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres thus becomes a corollary to measures aimed at the general reduction of the level of national armed forces. The exchange of military missions accordingly becomes an act calculated to improve relations and mutual understanding between States.

But it is quite a different matter if these measures are separated from the disarmament process and regarded as collateral measures. We are in agreement with the observation made in the Working Paper on Reduction of the Risk of War through Accident, Miscalculation or Failure of Communication, submitted on 12 December 1962 by the United States delegation, that:

"There may, of course, be differences in the character of measures suitable in the context of a disarmament programme and the character of those which might be acceptable in advance of such a programme." (ENDC/70, p.3)

But we dispute the argument that:

"... certain measures might be undertaken on a more extensive scale during disarmament than prior to its initiation." (ibid.)

For our view is that intrinsic differences -- and the differences concerned are definitely intrinsic rather than quantitative -- between various measures take their shape from the conditions in which they are put into practice. The basic quality of a measure depends on the stage to which it refers. And that applies as much to measures envisaged in the disarmament process as to anything proposed for implementation before that process begins.

Let me briefly review the various provisions of the Working Paper on Reduction of the Risk of War through Accident, Miscalculation, or Failure of Communication submitted for our consideration by the United States delegation. Take first the question of advance notification. The United States delegation asserts that:

"Advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres could provide additional opportunity for calm appraisal of military activities which might give rise to misinterpretation as threatening the imminent outbreak of hostilities." (*ibid.*, p.4)

The United States delegation also claims that a country would react differently to a previously-notified activity than to an unnotified activity, while at the same time acknowledging that:

"The ultimate character of such an appraisal would, of course, depend on many considerations in addition to the fact that advance notification had been provided." (*ibid.*)

Does not, however, the latter point contain the kernel of the problem? If the United States delegation really wants to prevent the interpretation of military movements from setting off a fatal process, some other approach is required. The first essential is to avoid all "movements and manoeuvres by ground forces of considerable strength", especially "where such activities may be conducted in the proximity of frontiers", all "significant movements and manoeuvres of naval surface forces of substantial size", and all "co-ordinated flights of sizeable numbers of military aircraft", especially aircraft carrying nuclear bombs, etc. (*ibid.*, p.5). Conditions must be created to make such movements and manoeuvres impossible to execute, by adopting various regional disarmament measures, by withdrawing offensive weapons from bases in foreign territories, and by concentrating military potential in national territories. The measures I have just enumerated would be incomparably more effective than the advance notification measures suggested by the United States delegation.

Let us now consider the question of observation posts (*ibid.*, p.6). The proposal on the subject is clearly pointless outside the advance notification plan. The gist of the United States proposal is therefore that observation posts would be part of

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

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the control system. Now, we have several times had occasion to demonstrate that such a measure, though appropriate in the execution of a general and complete disarmament programme, is unacceptable in an atmosphere of mutual distrust. Observation posts would inevitably become instruments of espionage and would be bound to aggravate international tension and to speed up the arms race. That is equally true of the proposed fixed ground observation posts and of the suggested measures for aerial observation, mobile ground observation teams, and overlapping radars mentioned in the United States document.

I do not propose to dwell on the question of the exchange of military missions (ibid., p.8). I think that by and large the points regarding observation posts apply here too. Moreover, States already have adequate facilities for carrying out, if they so desire, through their diplomatic missions the tasks which would fall to the military missions.

Means of reducing the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication should in our opinion be sought, not through administrative measures, but primarily through measures calculated to stop the arms race, to allay international tension, and to open the way to real disarmament.

The first step towards reducing the risk of war through accident is to eliminate all factors that might provoke an accident. Flights of aircraft carrying atomic bombs in the vicinity of the socialist countries' frontiers must cease. The spread of nuclear weapons must be prevented. The first step towards reducing the risk of war through miscalculation is to spare no effort to achieve a relaxation of international tension, to work for an acceptable solution of unsolved political problems, and to create such an atmosphere in inter-State relations as would exclude the possibility of countries misjudging each other's intentions. If we manage to do all that, we need not worry about the risk of war through failure of communications. Communications will work properly.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): During our recent discussions of collateral measures, and indeed during meetings devoted to other topics, we have heard -- perhaps it would be more accurate to say we have been subjected to -- a

rising chant of abuse by the Soviet delegation concerning the alleged motives of western Governments represented at this Conference, and particularly those of the Government of the United States. The statement of the Soviet representative at our meeting on 26 April (ENDC/PV.126, pp. 24 et seq.) fitted that pattern.

A natural reaction might be to respond in kind. There would be much to say. We could cite rocket-rattling statements of Soviet leaders, both military and civil. We could detail at length the many obstacles that the Soviet Union has placed in the way of successful negotiations -- obstacles which it has not yet removed. Our colleagues from communist States have spoken of so-called pressures that are exerted against Western efforts here. We could speak at some length about attitudes that have been expressed very openly by a régime that is an ally of the Soviet Union -- attitudes that express vitriolic opposition to the very idea of disarmament, and that openly urge the abandonment of any effort to achieve a peaceful accommodation between the communist world and the free world. That would be not idle speculation, but rather comment on open fact.

But where would a continuation of that line of discussion lead? What is the purpose of the shrill accusations we have heard from the Soviet delegation in the past few days? Of one thing we can be sure: accusations about motives have never been, and will never be, a contribution to serious negotiations. Representatives of great and strong nations have no need to resort to them, and certainly not to resort to shrillness and invective. The United States delegation, therefore, will not respond in kind to such statements. We should like, however, to make some comments -- with particular reference to collateral measures -- on where we stand.

First of all, let me say that we do not deny the Soviet delegation's legitimate right to express its concern about the lack of progress achieved in our work. Indeed, we share that concern. We are not here merely to go through the motions of making daily statements and setting forth our positions. We are here for the purpose of negotiation. There has been too much attention to the former, and too little attention to the latter.

All that does not mean that our discussions have not had some value. They have at least, let it be hoped, clarified for each side the views and concerns of the other. But when we reach the point where explanations on many of the agenda topics

have been made, and there is still no apparent opening to agreement, the easiest course is to accuse the other side of lack of sincerity. That, however, is a dead-end road.

The task of those who seriously seek rapprochement and progress through disarmament should be to try to find the real reasons for the lack of progress, and that, I submit, cannot be done with invective but only through a restrained dialogue which seeks not only to convince but also to lay the groundwork of understanding. It is in that spirit that my delegation wishes to respond to some of the remarks made by the Soviet representative on 26 April.

The Soviet representative spoke at some length about "events taking place outside the Committee" about "military preparations" in Western countries which, he said, "rise continually from year to year". (ENDC/PV.125, p.23). What the Soviet representative was speaking of was the fact -- or I should say some of the facts -- of the arms race. Of course nations are spending money on more modern armaments. Of course they are taking measures to improve their collective defence capabilities in the light of the constant changes and developments in weaponry. However, certain points need to be made in that connexion.

First of all, it is absurd to imply, as the Soviet delegation implies, that the arms race is some sort of solo run by the West, just for the exercise. We all know the tremendous efforts the Soviet Union is making to develop more powerful weapons, for Soviet generals have told us of them. The point is that it is because there is more than one in the race that the race is being run at all.

Secondly, it should be clearly understood by the Soviet delegation that that last comment is not made by way of condoning the fact that the arms race exists. As responsible officials of the United States have stressed time and time again, the arms race is not our desired path, filled as it is with threats to the survival of all that civilized man has created over the centuries, and diverting as it does massive efforts of the most productive nations from works that could better the lives of men.

Thirdly, it should be understood with equal clearness by the Soviet delegation that the arms race is not going to halt itself. It will take joint action by the major Powers to halt that race, and the chances of joint action are not improved

by the creation of a climate filled with invective. Invective will not dismantle a single missile, will not ground a single bomber, will not destroy a single tank, will not stop a single nuclear weapon test.

We would hope, therefore, that in our future discussions the Soviet delegation, when it cannot express agreement with our views, will at least limit itself to its views on where it believes we are mistaken, and forgo baseless attacks on our motives.

On 26 April Mr. Tsarapkin quoted (ibid., p.25) my comment, made on 19 April (ENDC/PV.122, p.5), to the effect that the risk of war would not be precluded even with the beginning of disarmament, and that we could not completely preclude the danger of war until we had removed the present ominous capacities of both sides to wage war. The Soviet representative, in what must surely be one of the most flagrant distortions that we have heard at this Conference, then said that my comment was made "joyfully" and showed that the United States had never set itself the task of eliminating the threat of a nuclear missile war (ENDC/PV.125, p.25). Certainly the Soviet representative was not speaking to the delegations at this table when he attempted that distortion. The representatives here are quite aware of the contents of the statements of my delegation to which the Soviet representative referred. They well know that we were in fact attempting to indicate to the Soviet delegation that the United States delegation agreed with the Soviet contention that the measures to reduce the risk of war that the United States proposes would merely reduce that risk, and that we could not eliminate all risks of war, accidental or otherwise, until we had removed the weapons of war and established adequate international machinery to keep the peace. The United States delegation was trying to clarify and reassure concerning areas of agreement. The Soviet delegation distorted that effort in a manner which, I submit, cannot possibly contribute to the building of mutual understanding.

Since those facts are known to delegations here, and since therefore the Soviet representative's remarks could not have been addressed to them, perhaps the Soviet representative might care to tell the delegations here why he has stopped speaking to them and indicate to whom his speeches are now addressed. We cannot solve our problems by hurling slogans. Our task is to resolve our differences in a manner that will take into account the concerns of each side.

In his statement the Soviet representative further stated that in the field of collateral measures the Soviet draft declaration concerning nuclear delivery vehicles (ENDC/75) was directed to the goal of eliminating the danger of nuclear war as soon as possible, and he implied that any opposition to the Soviet proposal must reflect an unwillingness to work towards that goal (ibid., pp. 25,26). Well, we have tried in our discussions to point out to the Soviet delegation some facts on this matter, facts that we feel sure the Soviet Government is quite aware of. They are that the Soviet proposal would not reduce the danger of war, for surely any unilateral reduction of Western military capability would not contribute to that end. The overall effect of the Soviet proposal would be the disorganization of Western defences and the redeployment of Western forces, without bringing about any real change in communist military capabilities. Can we **really be expected to consider such a proposal?** Surely it does not represent the limits of intelligent efforts by Soviet officials to study and propose for consideration here collateral measures that might be acceptable to both sides.

The Soviet representative went on to try to claim that a difference existed between the Soviet and the United States positions on disarmament, in that the Soviet Government wished to eliminate the danger of nuclear war as soon as possible while the United States did not. It is clear that that is a false claim. Both sides are in agreement on the general proposition that the danger of war, nuclear or conventional, should be eliminated as soon as possible; but we are in disagreement about how that can be achieved in the most rapid manner and -- here is the critical aspect -- in a manner that will, during the process, assure adequate verification and ensure that the military balance is not upset.

The Soviet representative spoke at some length also about the Soviet proposal (ENDC/77) for a non-aggression pact. I shall not comment on the inconsistency of Soviet and Eastern-bloc assertions that such United States proposed collateral measures as the reduction of the risk of accidental war (ENDC/70) are meaningless, while the Soviet proposal for reaffirmation of some of the existing obligations of States under the United Nations Charter is meaningful. This morning the Romanian representative posed certain questions (supra, p.12) in that connexion, to which my delegation will reply later as appropriate. But this morning I should like to comment on the professed unhappiness of the Soviet and other Eastern delegations with the position of my Government that this Disarmament Conference is not an appropriate forum for consideration of that purely political matter.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The world is filled with political problems and there is urgent need for their solution. But can it realistically be contended that this Conference is to be the forum for solution of each and every one of the world's political problems? What, then, would become of our efforts to devote our attention to the task of making progress on disarmament? Is disarmament to be brushed aside? Let us devote our attention to those subjects with which we are charged, not only by our Governments but by all the nations of the world: how to control the existing arms confrontation, how to halt the arms race, how to reduce and eliminate the weapons of war.

We have sufficient work to do in that area. On 26 April the Soviet representative emphasized the fact (ENDC/FV.125, pp.23 et seq.). I agree with him about that, though I do not regret his effort once again to distort my remarks as helpful to our work here. I refer, of course to his effort to distort my remarks (ENDC/FV.122, p.6) about our need to avoid complacency at such time as we are fortunate enough to achieve some initial agreement. As this Committee is aware, my remarks were an effort to indicate to the Soviet delegation that the United States was in agreement with the Soviet view that limited first steps would not completely remove the dangers of the arms race, a view often stated by the Soviet representative in our discussions. The thrust of my remarks was that initial success, when it comes, should act as a spur to greater efforts rather than as a sedative; for, important as agreements on initial measures may be, they will not remove the dangers posed by the accumulated armaments of both sides. But, there again, an effort by the United States to indicate an area of agreement was twisted in a Soviet attempt to show a basic disagreement that does not in fact exist. We cannot but wonder why

May I turn for a moment to the Soviet comments about measures to reduce the risk of accidental war? The Soviet delegation makes quite a point of emphasizing that those measures would not "eliminate the risk of war" (ENDC/FV.125, p.28). If that means a war by design, a war by calculation, we agree. But, as leaders of both sides have stated, the dangers we face today are not limited to any wilful launching of an aggression in the face of a clearly-calculable nuclear response. There are also the dangers of misinformed responses based on understandable concern about the consequences of a first nuclear strike by the other side.

Let us be very frank. Both of our nations have massive capabilities. We are both concerned about the strike capabilities of the other side. That concern will continue until those capabilities are eliminated under balanced disarmament arrangements, or at least drastically reduced. It is important that that concern should not be fed by error or by false assessment. We have proposed a perfectly "neutral" arrangement to enable the responsible States to exercise their ominous responsibility responsibly, without the confusion and error that have historically been as much a cause of calamity as have evil intent or aggressiveness.

If the Soviet Government is not prepared at present to explore with the United States Government the ways in which both might exercise in the most responsible manner the obligations they bear, that is a decision the responsibility for which the Soviet Government must carry. We have offered to discuss this matter informally with the Soviet delegation. We have clearly stated (ENDC/PV.122, p.6) that we do not regard our proposals as competing with other proposals which either are or claim to be initial disarmament measures. That observation has so far been ignored.

In view of that, there is little more the United States delegation would care to add at this meeting, for we are interested in discussions that lead to agreements and not merely in lengthier records. We do believe, however, that the Soviet representative might do this Committee the courtesy of explaining, for example, how a limited first-step agreement between the Soviet and United States Governments on exchange of military missions could easily, as he said, "become a means for collective reconnaissance information" (ENDC/PV.125, p.29) when the use of the mission, as we have proposed, would be entirely at the discretion of the host country.

As the United States delegation has emphasized before, we do not regard the measures we have proposed to reduce the risk of inadvertent war as competing with other collateral-measure proposals, and we are prepared to discuss them informally with the Soviet delegation to remove any possible misunderstandings. Therefore we do not wish to press the Soviet delegation on the matter here, but we do believe a simple explanation to this Committee is called for.

I am sorry if my comments today have been, for the most part, merely responses to statements by the Soviet delegation. But I believe they have been appropriate. What we need most of all at this time in our work is a sense of perspective, of balance and

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(Mr. Stelle, United States)

of reality. Our progress has been most limited. Our concrete accomplishments have thus far been nil. But our responsibilities remain unchanged. Our responsibilities require that we shall not misunderstand or misinterpret what the other side says. Our responsibilities require also that we understand each other's concerns and try to meet those concerns in a manner consistent with the common security.

Those words are easy to say. The performance calls for statesmanship. The all-important element is the will to make the effort. We urge the Soviet delegation to summon the will to join us constructively in our common task, for all else depends upon that.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): At present I shall limit myself to a brief answer in availing myself of the right of reply to the statement of the United States representative.

On 26 April, when we discussed measures aimed at facilitating disarmament and reducing international tension, we stated (ENDC/FV.125, pp.23 et seq.) our appraisal of the position of the Western Powers on the questions with which our Committee is dealing; and that appraisal was not a distortion of the position of the Western Powers, as Mr. Stelle tried to make out today. It was an objective analysis based on facts, deeds and incontrovertible data.

When we compare what is happening here in the Committee, what the representatives of the Western Powers are saying here, with what the Western Powers are doing outside the Committee, then, of course, it is impossible to make any other appraisal or draw any other conclusion than that contained in our statement at the meeting of the Committee on 26 April. In their speeches the representatives of the Western Powers use such words as "balance", "reality", and "sense of perspective". What "perspective" are you speaking of? The perspective of bringing the world to the brink of a nuclear missile catastrophe. We are opposed to such a perspective, and we will continue to make every effort to unmask the position of the Western Powers and to prevent, as far as lies within our power, a dangerous development of events in the direction of war, towards which the Western Powers are pushing the world. In this regard we shall never cease to subject the position of the Western Powers to the most ruthless criticism.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The point is that Mr. Stelle began his statement by saying (supra, p.23) that a great and strong Power should not venture to subject anyone here to criticism, no matter how well-founded, and that we must engage in constructive negotiations. But what do you mean by "constructive negotiations", Mr. Stelle? To exchange missions and so forth? And do you think that against the background of a frenzied armaments race, intensive military preparations and the conditions existing in the world today, these measures can bring any relief, can eliminate the threat of war, eliminate the threat of aggression? Of course not.

It is obvious that in the present circumstances, when the world is rolling towards the abyss of war with ever-increasing speed, the main task we must set about accomplishing without delay is to carry out decisive and radical measures, because at present you will not be able to stop or slow down the movement of the world towards the abyss of war with petty trifles. Here decisive and radical measures and not an exchange of military missions are needed.

I must emphasize once again that in the conditions of the intensive military preparations of the Western Powers, in the conditions in which the arms race is being accelerated at a frenzied rate, any military mission would be, above all, a secret service agency for the collection of intelligence data. The representatives of the Western Powers should not pretend to believe that a military mission could save the situation and avert the outbreak of war in a period of crisis.

Today Mr. Stelle tried to pass off as a virtue what he was compelled to say to us by sheer necessity. You see, he cannot level the same reproaches, the same accusations against the position of the Soviet Union and the other socialist States. We propose to disarm immediately and at the fastest possible rate. The West has no such proposals. The West is sabotaging the cause of disarmament, and for this rightly comes under our criticism. The United States representative cannot reply to the Soviet Union with the same criticism to which we have subjected the position of the United States and the other Western Powers. That is why he started talking about such things as that it ill becomes a great Power to make critical remarks about anyone who opposes disarmament.

We have heard again from the United States representative his favourite appeals for "balance", "reality", a "sense of perspective". What this means is evident from the fact that the Western Powers are even against the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. The representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, told us today that it was necessary

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

to know the time and place for concluding a non-aggression pact. He said: "A cow is a very good animal in a field, but we chase her out of the garden" (supra, p. 17). That is a graphic description of the attitude of the Western Powers towards the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. What are the conditions for the conclusion of such a pact which, in the opinion of Mr. Burns, would open the way to a non-aggression pact?

In this connexion you, Mr. Burns, referred to the letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Bolz, in which he drew attention to the revanchist demands of Western Germany (ENDC/81). So that is the crux of the matter, it appears. In the view of the Western Powers, it will be possible to conclude a non-aggression pact only when the revanchist territorial and other political demands of Western Germany have been satisfied. You tell us that until those demands have been satisfied a non-aggression pact would be premature.

It is all very odd. How are we to understand this? It is obvious that the Western Powers do not want to bind themselves with a non-aggression pact at least until the revanchist demands of Western Germany have been satisfied. But everyone realizes that any attempt to fulfil the territorial claims of the West German revanchists would mean a nuclear missile war. The same applies to the attempts of the West German revanchists to encroach upon the German Democratic Republic. So these are your plans, gentlemen! These are your pre-conditions for a non-aggression pact. It has now become quite clear that the Western Powers keep in reserve the threat of aggression as their accepted policy. That is why, as has now become clear from the statement of the representative of Canada, they refuse to conclude a non-aggression pact. We hope nevertheless that what has been said by the representative of Canada is not the final decision of the Western Powers. After all, in these dangerous times one cannot ignore the fact that the threat of war is increasing and it is necessary to take measures that would be a barrier in the path of the outbreak of a nuclear missile war.

A non-aggression pact is being proposed at a time when the possibilities of a military conflict are very great, when the threat of aggression is being talked of openly. It is precisely in these conditions that a non-aggression pact is valuable. When the danger of war has been eliminated and the threat of aggression has disappeared, there will be no need for a non-aggression pact. It is precisely at the present time that the question of concluding a non-aggression pact is opportune.

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(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The fact that you reject this shows that the Western Powers do not want to tie their hands but wish to retain their freedom of action for unleashing war, for a military attack against the other side. This is the only possible way to evaluate your opposition to and your rejection of the proposal that here in the Committee we should now discuss and conclude a non-aggression pact.

Of course we shall study with due attention what the representatives of the United States and Canada have said today. They have expressed a number of thoughts and considerations which, of course, we cannot leave unanswered. We shall try to answer them at the earliest opportunity.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and twenty-seventh plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Cavalletti, representative of Italy.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Romania, Canada, Poland, the United States and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 6 May 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.