

NAVAL

DUTIES AND DISCIPLINE,

WITH THE

POLICY AND PRINCIPLES

OF

NAVAL ORGANIZATION.

BY

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Dedication.

TO THE

HONORABLE GIDEON WELLES,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

TO WHOM

THE UNION IS INDEBTED FOR A NAVY,

CREATED WITHOUT RESOURCES,

MAINTAINED WITH ENERGY,

AND CONDUCTED TO VICTORY THROUGH THE MOST TRYING YEARS

IN THE

HISTORY OF A NATION,

THIS WORK

IS

Respectfully Dedicated.

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PREFACE.

THIS little work has grown up under my hands in a curious manner. During the engrossing labors of a previous command of a new vessel which I had commissioned, I was importuned by the executive officer and others to write internal rules and regulations. I had often before been requested to do so, but my mind had been always persistently opposed to it. Yet it seemed positively necessary to have some regulations of details of duty, whereby the young volunteer officers might be guided as well as instructed. I therefore resolved to make the attempt, and in so doing, I found that in order to explain clearly the exceptions to rules, and how and when to make them, was the most difficult thing to perform of the whole task. Every rule must have its exceptions. Hence it was that, in the endeavor to state things clearly, and not to have a constantly recurring clash of orders and counter orders and disorders, my labors swelled into the proportions of a *work*. I gave up the attempt as a failure, knowing that experience, good judgment, in fine, *education*, must be the reliance of a commander upon his subordinates. The result of all this is a book, and one which I modestly hope may be productive of far more good to our growing navy than any system of rules and regulations.

The sudden, the almost unexampled development of the navy since the beginning of this great rebellion, seems to point to the necessity of more instruction from books and a more extended professional literature than we yet possess. In this respect, it may be fairly stated that all navies, and especially our own, are exceedingly barren. Officers have no time for writing books. The demand upon their time and their abilities is so enormous, that we have fears that our best men will yield to exhaustion or failing health long before their services and usefulness can well be spared from active service. Who can have the heart to devote mind and body to the advancement of young officers of the navy, after weary years of ceaseless and restless labor, and under its exhaustive pressure? Many of these pages were worked out, and the work itself projected, under similar conditions, and when the cares and anxieties of an active career were straining the vital energies of the writer to the utmost. It is therefore believed that no more earnest apology is needed for the production, and if the jaded and weary men who have mingled in the trying scenes of this war, can find the energy or the courage to read it, not to

condemn, not to censure, but to pass lightly over its discrepancies, and award an approval of the effort, the writer will be recompensed. Abler and better pens have not devoted time and labor to it. No one regrets this more than the author. If the "pen" be indeed "mightier than the sword," it has not yet demonstrated the fact in this haughty rebellion. That the sword has been drawn in the most righteous cause a nation ever had, that our guns have flung their bolts in the most manly and heroic strife men ever engaged in, will not be questioned a few years later, if it is now. But before the sword returns to its scabbard, or the iron masses of our guns are laid away to rust, it is well to ask if we may not yet apply ourselves to a more accomplished use of them. Courage is, after all, a weak and impotent element, if it be not taught and cultivated to strike its blows at the vital point, and with fatal power.

To the recent and young graduates of the Naval Academy, and to the volunteer officers being incorporated amongst us, this book is specially devoted. To the former, who have been and are pushed forward to fill stations of responsibility with unprecedented rapidity, and to the latter, whose previous training has possibly instilled prejudices that may be injurious to them, these pages are particularly addressed. It has, indeed, been a labor of love, performed in fugitive moments, under the heavy weight of duties and the depressing effects of shattered and waning health. To these two classes of officers I commit my reflective admonitions, I trust not in vain.

The heroes and founders of our navy have spoken to us through the trumpet tongue of Cooper and the living voices of tradition. When this arrogant rebellion grew into war, and during its bloody progress, the word GLORY found no utterance amongst us. We took a nobler and higher word than Glory; it was *Duty*. We accepted the grim fact without a shadow of its delusion, and entered into the contest with a sad but earnest consciousness that we had a *duty* to perform, and to be performed with the relentless energy of men fighting for a greater boon and a nobler end than life or glory. The navy has added grand and heroic pages to the splendor of its annals.

U. S. S. MICHIGAN, *February*, 1865.

NAVAL DUTIES AND DISCIPLINE.

CHAPTER I.

ORGANIZATION OF FLEETS AND SQUADRONS.

THE greatest combination of ships and vessels of war yet organized under the command of one officer, has received the title of squadron, in our navy. Hitherto, we have not had a navy of sufficient numbers to warrant a higher organization. Indeed, it may be said, that we have hardly, as yet, had an organized naval squadron. Any number of vessels, from two upward, assembled under the command of one officer, has been denominated a squadron. It is believed that the time has now come, when a consideration of this subject is needed. Many of our blockading squadrons are rather fleets than squadrons; only as yet the incipient fleet is not composed of squadrons and divisions.

Any assemblage of twelve steam-vessels, or upward, is a fleet. Any number of vessels less

than that, should be denominated a squadron. The squadron is again subdivided into divisions. Whatever may be the number of vessels which compose a fleet, it should be subdivided into three squadrons, each again subdivided into divisions. Two or three vessels constitute a division, and should be placed under the orders of the senior officer of the three. An admiral commands a fleet; a commodore, a squadron; and a captain, a division. The three squadrons of a fleet are numbered, 1, 2, 3, from right to left, and from van to rear, upon the primitive orders of front and file. The divisions and the vessels themselves are numbered according to the same principles, according to the natural order of numbers.

The squadrons are composed of equal numbers of vessels whenever the vessels in line are a multiple of three; in the opposite case, the strongest squadron is that of the admiral—that is to say, the second, then the first.

If the admiral does not form a light squadron, or a reserve squadron, independent of the squadrons in line, then the third squadron should be composed of the fastest steamers, and be in readiness to be detached from the line, as a light squadron, to form the reserve. Such are the general principles laid down in the French navy,

and, in general, by European navies. It would be difficult to simplify this organization, or to improve it.

Our navy is now composed of so many different kinds of steamers, that, at first view, it seems impossible to organize a fleet with them, destined for attack or defence. But this is not so. This very diversity is but an additional element of strength to it. The great feature of a fleet, or a squadron, or a division, is the *line-of-battle.* We do not require *line-of-battle ships* to form a *line-of-battle.* What is a *line-of-battle?* Simply the line or column of ships, presenting their artillery to the front of the enemy. Admiral Farragut took his fleet up the Mississippi to New-Orleans in two lines of battle—one for each bank of the river. Its simplicity was admirable, and was a perfect success, when he encountered batteries on each bank, at *Chalmette.*

Heavy *broadside* ships are essential to the line-of-battle. Such are the frigates Wabash and class, the screw sloops Richmond, Hartford, and class. Where wooden ships are operating with iron-clads, there should always be double lines-of-battle, in the order *endenté*—for we must use French words to express these technicalities. The heavy sloops, as they are termed, mounting pivot-guns, may help out the line-of-battle at its ex-

tremities; but they are nondescripts, and may better be used elsewhere.

We have in our navy the heavy steam frigates, steam sloops, screw gunboats, and paddle-wheel steamers, and iron-clads. The former are slow but heavy ships, formidable for the line-of battle, as all broadside ships must be. They are the backbone of the line-of-battle. It is not necessary that they *should* go fast. We have the other vessels for that purpose—for the light squadrons. The new screw sloops are fast, but they need the broadside batteries. The iron-clads, as elsewhere observed, are essentially vessels to form lines-of-battle. They may be considered the siege artillery of the navy. The side-wheel ships, of batteries, both of broadside and pivots, are the cavalry of the navy. The fast screw sloops may be considered the mounted infantry of the navy. It takes all these to form a fleet, for offensive or defensive operations, just as it requires the various arms of an army to form a *corps d'armée*. To suppose that a navy can be built all of iron-clads, or all of gunboats, is the grossest ignorance, if you wish to perform more than one species of service. Necessity dictated, at last, the building of fast paddle-wheel steamers, at a time, too, when certain builders and theorists were prophesying that no more paddle-wheel

steamers would ever be built—just as some enthusiasts suppose that nothing but monitors will ever be built again. These paddle-wheel steamers were not constructed for reserve squadrons, but they are doing that duty nevertheless.

We observe, then, that we have all the material for the thorough organization of fleets, both in vessels and officers of rank and grades to command them. It might be asked why the organization is not then completed, and right names given to right things? Perhaps the time is not yet come for it, and perhaps the leisure is wanting.

It is to be regretted that our signal-books have not kept up with other progress, and an ample system of tactics promulgated. Nothing can be simpler than the French system, always excepting their signals. We have three orders of steaming in our signal-book. This is far, very far from being complete. In the French system, the orders of a fleet are divided into three categories, namely, simple orders, compound general orders, and compound orders by squadron. Upon these three are based all the forms that may be possible for a fleet of ships to assume, or that it may require. The entire number of orders are reduced to thirteen, of which not one half would be probably used in times of war. To adopt a perfect

system like this, would require a complete revision of our signal-book, which would not be so great a task after all. An additional book might be furnished, containing all the orders in diagram, and it would only be necessary for the admiral to throw out his signal for any one order to be formed which he might select, and the commanders of squadrons, and divisions, and vessels, might turn to it, and see at a glance what their duty would be. This requires no study of naval tactics. The simplest mind could comprehend it, even though it had never before been thought of. The boat signal code has already partially anticipated this.

It is not the intention or design to enter here into a complete discussion of naval tactics. It is only designed to point out what the necessity is, and how it may be met, in so far as this question has relation to that of the organization of fleets and squadrons.

The first care of an admiral, or that of his fleet-captain, might be to organize his fleet into squadrons and divisions. The vessels should have their places and numbers assigned to them, and their duties should correspond to their capacity and adaptabilities. It is greatly to be desired, also, that commodores and officers commanding divisions should wear their pennants and distinguish-

ing flags. Why a commodore should not wear his swallow-tail at the mast-head, is a question which no one has satisfactorily answered.

It may be suggested by some, of what use this fleet organization? and it may be supposed that we are doing well enough as we are. It is a sufficient reply, that any system which is wanting in completeness, in naval affairs, is not good. The business transactions of a division or squadron are necessarily performed loosely as they are. The admiral may be at New-Orleans or Fort Monroe, and squadrons under his command several hundreds of miles distant, and the commanders of ships are out of reach of communication with him. A senior officer present can never assume that direction of his junior, also in command, which appointment and rank give.

Steam has cleared the way of many difficulties and obstacles in the matter of naval manœuvres of large numbers of vessels. They are free from all those obstacles which beset an army. Cavalry can only operate upon certain ground; artillery can only be brought up under certain conditions of the roads; infantry, in fine, can only be used under similar advantages. Ships at sea have none of these trials. They have always a plane on which to move, and most generally a plane of vast extent. The cavalry, artillery, and the

line-of-battle, may move uninterruptedly to their work. The wings may advance or fall back at perfect will, and the centre may manœuvre at the caprice of the commander. Tactics are greatly simplified, and once the method of battle chosen, the fate of arms must decide the chances. In the old sea-fights of Van Tromp and the admirals of his day, there was much that depended upon what was called the fortune of the day; but now, the issue must depend upon no luck—no chance—but on the drill of the single ship, the discipline of the fleet, and the nautical skill displayed by the admiral who handles it. Even with our present navy, we could not consent to carry on a foreign war in our old-fashioned way of fighting single ships. We must fight squadrons and fleets now, or abide by the reproach of fear or ignorance. The day may not be far distant when our captains will have to decide this question in the field; and it might be difficult, or at least embarrassing, for most of our captains to handle twenty or thirty steamers off-hand, and form them into such line-of-battle as they would count upon for success.

CHAPTER II.

GENERAL DUTIES AND CHARACTER OF A SHIP-OF-WAR.

A SHIP-OF-WAR is, in herself, the exponent of the Power and Will of the nation to which she belongs. Vested in her strength, with the legal authority of the nation to represent it, she carries the power and force to give it effect wherever she may be placed. The nation cannot move as an armed man to all the points of its interest, but the ship-of-war, armed with authority, armed with weapons, and armed with intelligence, is the strong representative of the nation, moving everywhere over the globe.

To meet these high ends needs no ignoble training, and no small degree of capacity. The responsibility is great, and the character should be equally great. Animated with a cultivated intelligence, the ship-of-war is indeed the highest and safest representative of the nation. Armed to enforce her will, with men proud of their mission, trained to exercise and use, there is no statesmanship like the cannon and its oaken bulwarks. Statesmanship, political wisdom, pru-

dence, and courage must also be found in her cabins and upon her decks. No knowledge of professional details are too trifling to be dispensed with, and no embellishment of an accomplished man or gentleman can well be spared. The moment an officer places his foot upon the deck of a man-of-war, he should feel, if he is to do service there, that he has a man's work to do.

Thomas Carlyle tells us that a ship-of-war is a *Great Fact!* This great thinker has found few facts in this world, and a man-of-war is one of them.

A nation's interests are never confined to its own borders. Its ramifications grow and spread, until they become grafted in every land, and upon every shore of the ocean. Commerce is the life of a people. Trade is the pioneer missionary, opening up all lands and peoples. With trade come international relations, and then treaties. The serious thing is to observe treaties, and see that the compact is not violated. Travel follows commerce, as the wave follows the wind. The pursuit of gain, pleasure, knowledge, and science, tie up the civilized and uncivilized nations into relations so close and so narrow, that every nation is more jealous of her foreign relations than of those at home, in the interior. From all this, too, follows another necessity of a grave nature—

the police of the seas. Navies were primarily created to perform the police of the ocean. In proportion as nations become more civilized, so this duty of ocean police becomes more delicate and various. It is the first great duty of a ship-of-war to observe the ships and traders of all nations which may be found upon the ocean. The day of pirates, when they ravaged the coasts and seas, has passed away. But the day of illicit trade has not yet passed away. Legitimate relations of the citizens of one country with those of another require protection. To create law, to define and make treaties, is not enough; they must be enforced and carried out.

In ordinary times, the ships-of-war of the navy found their occupation in these multifarious duties. Their presence, even in European ports, has always facilitated the ordinary negotiations of national business, transacted by ministers, ambassadors, consuls, and representatives of whatever form or character. Often the commander of a squadron has been called upon to render decisions touching difficult questions in dispute by our ministers and diplomats. The very presence of a squadron in a foreign port gives assurance and stability to the citizens of a nation, and proves as sure a protection to their persons and to their liberties, as if they were in their own land.

We did not create a navy in anticipation of the present rebellion. But what would have become of our armies and interests without one? The most trying service of a ship-of-war is that of blockade. Its duties are arduous, and require ceaseless vigilance and activity. Too much cannot be expected of all officers, but above all the officer of the deck, while upon this service. The ship is treated in a manner totally different from that of other times and services. Never, in times of war, should a cruiser strike the bell or use the pipe at night. A ship-of-war should move to her duty with the silence of the grave, and with the darkness of a demon of destruction. All lights, at sides or mastheads, should be darkened. No lantern or lights should ever appear on deck under any circumstances. Pilot-houses, binnacles, engine-room, hatches, in fact, wherever a ray of light might escape, should be darkened or concealed. Men properly drilled need no battle-lanterns upon a gun-deck. Whitewash that deck at night, if you expect a fight, and there will be no need of showing yourself to the enemy's gunners. The enemy himself, whether he be in a fort or in a ship, will show you all the light you need. We have seen ships during this war, and upon blockade, too, which had more the appearance of a dozen lighthouses on fire, than of a ship-of-war

with intelligent officers on board. The guns should never be secured more than is absolutely imperative for the moment, but always ready for immediate use. Arms of all descriptions should be kept ready loaded and at hand, and the watch fully on the alert. We know that many officers have a great dread of seeing a gun-tackle cast loose, or a rifle or pistol at hand. But if the people be properly drilled and disciplined, it is not a moment's work to secure a gun when bad weather begins to manifest itself. It is a good plan, indeed, for the watch to consider themselves as at quarters *resting*. In one word, a man-of-war should always be ready to give a "word and a blow," but generally the blow first. The Government will never find fault with the ship which does this. If "vigilance be the price of liberty" among politicians, it certainly is the pearl of safety among seamen. That officer who allows himself to be surprised, deserves death; and if this were an article of war, it would be one of the best in the book. If she be upon the ocean, a ship-of-war should allow no sail, no vessel whatever to elude her search. If along an enemy's coast, the slightest suspicious change in its appearance should at once excite the attention of the officers. Nothing is too small in times of war to pass unnoticed, and when the suspicion is

aroused, the mystery should at once be cleared up by the free use of powder and shell. Many officers are afraid of burning powder unnecessarily, which would appear to be a mawkish sentimentality.

Whatever may be the station assigned a ship-of-war in a blockading squadron by the commander-in-chief of the station, the duties are full of peril and anxiety. She is in peril of being fired into by her consorts, if she be not prompt to make signal-lights or to answer a challenge. If she be required to stand in at nightfall, close under the battery of the enemy, as is often the case, the utmost silence, the most intelligent care is required by every man on board, not to display her presence to the enemy. It may be laid down as a general law, when in the presence of an enemy, a ship-of-war should never be at anchor at daylight. In rivers, harbors, or close under the land, this rule should be invariably followed. The author could give several instances of disaster happening from an oversight of this principle.

Whether as a cruiser or a blockader, whether abroad or in her own waters, a ship-of-war should always present the same character and maintain the same appearance. It is to be regretted that that *trimness*, so essentially the characteristic of men-of-war, has somewhat disappeared among

most of the vessels of our navy. It is not meant here that Ben Bow neatness, which was exhaustive of all comfort and happiness of life on shipboard, which was holy-stoned out of the decks and bones of the crew and officers, which characterized many vessels of other days. But there is great danger of falling into the opposite extreme, which is perhaps still worse. A slovenly ship makes a slovenly crew and slouchy officers. These produce a condition of inefficiency which all must deplore. A ship should be *trim* and scrupulously clean. To be prompt for any duty, ready for any service, are her first requisites. And how can this be attained? In no way but by an exhaustless perseverance and labor. Nor is this incompatible with comfort, nor, indeed, with some degree of happiness. It matters not her size nor the number of guns she may carry. If she be not perfect in drill and discipline, in the care that should keep her "to rights," she will be a failure, and had better belong to no squadron. Some of our officers lament that the day of the staunch frigate, with her square yards and light spars and spacious decks, is over. It is only because that perfect seamanship which existed then, and that pride of place which animated their people, are waning away. In this matter progress appears to be going backwards. He

who thinks that no seamanship is required to handle a steamship, had better commence his professional career over again. The day of seamanship is *not* over. It is a new kind of seamanship that we require—more delicate, more studied, and perhaps more comprehensive. A slovenly, dirty gunboat, colliding with every vessel she meets, is a painful sight. Such a vessel could not make a flying moor, even though *that* were considered *good* seamanship.

It is hoped the young officers of the navy will avoid these strange misconceptions in regard to their beautiful profession. They may compare the old Brandywine with the Hartford, or the Savannah with the Ticonderoga, and judge for themselves, if our new ships should be handled in a way to disgrace their old lumbering rivals. The high character and appearance of our men-of-war and of our steamers is proverbial. Let them be handled as they should be—let them be models of neatness, promptness, and efficiency, and as they cleave their way through the sea, with a speed that is wonderful, do not attempt to open wide the throttles and run down a gale of wind with them.

CHAPTER III.

ORGANIZATION OF SHIPS-OF-WAR.

I PROPOSE to treat of the navy as we find it in 1864, and not as it was represented in 1861, before the outbreak of the rebellion; and, consequently, sailing ships, frigates, and sloops-of-war, will find no consideration in these pages. Men-of-war, manœuvred by sails, may be considered obsolete. Sails are auxiliary to the great motive power, *steam*, and hence I shall have nothing to say of any other than a steam navy, aided by canvas, in all the various ways at present adopted.

The first thing that strikes a young naval officer, or any person indeed not belonging *regularly* to the navy, upon going aboard of a man-of-war, is the great number of officers and men she carries, of so many ranks, and grades, and classes. There is nothing perhaps so difficult for the volunteer to encounter as the numbers he is called upon to handle, in the way of duty. Accustomed to a crew of fifteen, twenty, or at most of thirty

men, without material distinction of grade or rank, he finds himself embarrassed by the presence of crews ranging from one to five hundred men, and a multitudinous array of grades and ranks—of warrant officers, petty officers, seamen, etc. etc.; and he finds that he is involved in a net-work of complications beyond his experience and judgment. In the multitude around him, over whom he has complete and ample authority, he is incapable of knowing to whom special orders should be given, or if given, perhaps to the wrong persons; and a most painful embarrassment ensues to the unfortunate officer, or, what is worse, confusion, discontent, and anarchy, are produced among the people he pretends to govern. It is essential, then, that every officer of the navy, of whatever rank he may be, should be thoroughly acquainted with the internal organization of the people around him, that he may rightfully comprehend his own official and social position, as well as that of others by whom he is surrounded.

The perfect system of a man-of-war has always been a subject of mystery to the uninitiated. A system of organization, of arrangements, of duties, of health, of life, in fact, that may challenge sternest criticism.

The number of officers and men to be sent on

board of a naval vessel, is not based upon her tonnage, her length, or breadth, or depth. The great principle that designates the crew for a ship is based upon the number and calibre of guns she is intended to carry. This must be obvious, as it would be idle to place guns in a vessel which could not be worked, or fought; or men on board of her who have no work to perform.

In like manner, the engine department is proportioned in its *personel*, to the size and character of the engine in the ship. The size of the vessel, the sail she carries, or her rig, has nothing to do with the number of officers and men apportioned to her.

There are two principal divisions of a ship's company, namely, the combatants and non-combatants; or, in other words, the men required to fight the guns and small arms—the sailors and marines—and the firemen, coal-passers, medical nurses, and surgeons and paymaster's stewards and attachés. Besides the regular allotment of men to serve the guns, there is also to be considered the necessary force to pass shot, shell, powder, and a few men to steer the ship, stop shot-holes, and stopper rigging, and fish spars, when shot away.

First, let us consider the principal division of a

ship's company—the combatants. This is divided into various grades of men, depending upon their training, and experience, and fitness for certain positions. All sailors are then divided into seamen, ordinary seamen, landsmen, and first and second-class boys. Seamen are supposed to have been fully taught in all the duties of sailors, and of daily routine of duties, by experience of six, or ten, or more years' service. The usual allowance is about one fourth of the whole number for seamen, one fourth ordinary seamen, and one half landsmen and boys. From the seamen are selected the best, by reputation and recommendations of previous service, to be rated *petty officers*, than which no class of persons are more important. I shall have occasion to speak of this class in a chapter apart. From the few who remain, rated as *seamen*, prominent positions are filled at the guns, and they are distributed as equally as possible throughout all parts of the ship, that they may be leading men, and serve as instructors by example to those of less experience and inferior rank. They are the men who are expected to be found in dark nights, on occasions of peril, and where *leaders* are specially needed.

Ordinary seamen are distributed at the guns, and throughout the ship, in the same manner and proportion. These men already have had

experience—they are "broken in," and are the link connecting the landsmen with the full developed seamen. The best of this class of men are expecting to be rated, and officers should never lose sight of this fact, and their hopes should always be nourished.

Landsmen and boys comprise one half the numerical force of the fighting portion of a ship. When we reflect that no man hardly ever makes the second cruise as a landsman, we are apprised of the fact, that we are *making sailors* with great rapidity, but, it must be remembered, with great labor and patience. Place one hundred farmers, or carpenters, or canal-diggers, on the deck of a ship-of-war, and conceive how much use they would be in fighting a battle, or in wearing ship in a gale of wind! They do not even comprehend the language you address to them. They do not know the parts of the ship, nor where they belong, nor where they live or sleep, nor of the officers who attempt to command them. In one word, their ignorance of their new positions is opaque—it is dense. The attempt to perform duty with such men is desperate. The officer of the deck, if he be not wise himself, will be in despair, the petty officers beside themselves, and the executive officer has the terrible task of restoring this chaos to order, and of producing system

and intelligence, where all was desperate confusion. Of all the tasks a naval officer has to perform, this of making sailors, and often of subordinate officers, is the most difficult and fatiguing. Like the two other grades of men, the landsmen and boys are dispersed in equal proportions at the guns, and through the different parts of the ship. Time, labor, and example of the few seamen on board can alone make them useful. Such is a slight sketch of the raw material out of which a ship's crew is made.

The first thing to be done, when the fighting crew are placed on board of a man-of-war, upon her going into commission, is for the executive officer to subdivide his men. He should first of all, select his petty officers out of the seamen, taking their recommendations, certificates of honorable discharge, and their own acknowledgments as to capacity for special duties, and place them upon a separate list. They are not rated at once, but placed on trial for a month or so, and rated back when they are found by actual trial fitted for their stations. This is a most delicate duty, and requires fine judgment to execute it well. There may be from twenty to fifty of these appointments to make, and it must be borne in mind that a petty officer in one station is not generally adapted for that of another. It is rarely that a

quarter-gunner can be a boatswain's mate, or a captain of a forecastle, or quartermaster—so different and varied are the qualifications required.

The entire crew — petty officers, seamen, ordinary seamen, landsmen, boys, and marines—are divided into two equal parts, or watches—starboard and port. These are again subdivided into quarter-watches, the whole watch stationed in different parts of the ship, according to the size and rig of the vessel — such as forecastle men, afterguard, and top-men, where the vessel carries topsails. In *all* fore-and-aft rigged vessels, of whatever tonnage, or size, or character, it is recommended to subdivide into forecastle-men and afterguard only.

This subdivision of the watches enables an officer to call out his men as he wishes—one fourth, one half, or the whole. He at once has the large numbers around him, whom he cannot call upon by name, completely under his orders by *titles*, far better than calling men by names. Names are always *personal*. Titles are always *official*. Petty officers are placed at the head of all these detachments, which are thus distributed about a man-of-war. Work can be carried on in every part of the vessel at the same time, and proper men are responsible for every part of the ship, where they are stationed. I have known of

young officers, who could not run up more than one or two boats of a ship at once, and yet they complained of there being so many men about decks that they were in each other's way. The fault was in the officer, who could not handle three hundred men, simply because he did not know how to call them out, and divide them equally upon the falls. With four boats, for example, are eight falls, and your crew are just equally divided into eight parts, so that at the word the boats move at the same second from the water, and touch the davit-heads, also at precisely the same second! It is impossible for an officer to perform deck duty, without a thorough knowledge of the organization of his men.

The next step is to berth and mess this crew. Ten or fourteen men make a very good-sized mess. I am not at all partial to small messes, as any executive officer who has pride in his berth-deck, and the comfort of his men at heart, will understand. Men are messed according to their watches, and ship's stations: Forecastle men by themselves, afterguard by themselves, the watches also separate, and the petty officers invariably by themselves, with few, rare, exceptions. A man from each mess, by turns of one week, takes the office of cook for his mess—not that he really cooks, but receives the rations of his mess, takes

the provisions to the ship's cook and his assistant, (if he has one,) to be received again when cooked; he cares for his mess stores and utensils, spreads the mess-cloth, clears up the same, and performs his duties below for the week. All cleaning on the berth-deck is performed by these mess-cooks. If they have any spare time, it is well deserved. They should have it to mend clothes, repair their little wardrobe, and for many other personal duties. It is the fashion to call berth-deck cooks, *idlers*. I know of no class of men who are so little idle during that long week below, as the berth-deck cook. It would be a term of ignominy even to a *steady cook*, which I hope never to see on the deck of a man-of-war.

Messed, watched, and stationed, the last great duty remains to be performed of quartering the men at the guns. An ordnance regulation prescribes the number and rates of men to be stationed at each gun. A single gun's crew is composed of petty officers, seamen, ordinary seamen, landsmen, and boys, of *each watch equally*, no matter what size the gun, or what the number placed at it. It is the same rule applied to a gun's crew of seven or twenty-one men. The least deviation from this rule produces confusion, and upturns all order. Observe how accurate and nice the system is, which enters into such

excessive details. Can any one be surprised that a well-regulated naval ship is the most perfect thing in the world?

This done, the battery is divided into divisions —the same in all ships—laid down by order, and invariably followed. Each division is of such dimensions that the officer appointed to command it may have it entirely under his observation. This finishes the labor of dividing, subdividing, and classifying the body of men presented upon the deck of a man-of-war, when she is placed in commission. They are now stationed, quartered, messed, and ready to begin that arduous, dreary, and perilous life, known only to the sailor. Let the young officer study well his duties of caring for that portion of the men which fall specially to him, to make them comfortable, to treat them with the most inflexible justice, and exact the most rigid observance of duties. This is discipline.

The officers of a ship are similarly stationed. They are divided into watches, according to the number of watch officers on board. They are assigned to the divisions of the battery, and in the capacities of divisional officers are brought twice each day, and indeed oftener, into direct personal contact with their men. Here the officer learns their true worth, their real character,

their personal wants, and no man is overlooked, or can escape the eye of an officer, if he have merits or demerits. It is here, too, that even his clothing and personal cleanliness and condition are observed twice every day.

The engine department is divided into three classes of men—first and second-class firemen, and coal-heavers. The same system of gradation in position, due to worth or personal merit, is observed here, as well as in the department of the fighting men, of a ship-of-war. The senior engineer divides, again, his three classes of men, into *three watches.* As the duties of these men while on watch are exhausting and unremitting, they cannot keep "watch and watch." The assistant engineers are watched, as the deck officers are ; and the senior engineer performs the duties of an executive, over all his entire department.

The medical department is small, consisting of a steward, who is a petty officer ; and one, two, or more nurses, according to the number of the crew.

The Paymaster's Department is similarly composed of a steward, a clerk, and too often one or two assistants to the steward, which has at times run into a grave abuse.

One of the greatest mysteries in the organiza-

tion of a man-of-war is the execution of its police duties. This is specially one of the cares of the executive officer, and should form his most anxious consideration. A master-at-arms, and a ship's corporal, (petty officers,) and the non-commissioned officers of the marine guard, where the ship has one, are the persons to whom are confided the watch and guard of a ship, safety from fire, from filth, from evil-minded and malevolent men; in fine, from all that may endanger a vessel internally, whether in character, discipline, or good order. These men live on the same deck with the crew, they eat and sleep within a few feet of them; the only division being that of a separate mess—a purely moral one. The police officers themselves care for, and trim, the standing lights upon the berth-deck, which are reported every hour or half-hour during the night. On the main deck, a good, careful man, well selected, and easily spared from another part of the ship, is especially appointed to trim, clean, and light, and put out those lights. The master's mate, or midshipman of the watch, makes occasional visits all through the lower decks, and these reports are exacted by the officer of the deck, with the utmost fidelity. The mystery then is all explained. It is resolved into constant, unceasing, never-ending care and watchfulness. It depends

upon the executive officer, how thoroughly he inspires his subordinates with the supreme importance of these duties.

Up to this point we have considered the essential and material departments and branches of our organization into a complete system, than which there is none more perfect, of a military character. But we have now to consider the only defect in the whole system. In a war steamer of a thousand tons, there are probably twenty warrant and commissioned officers. For the personal attendance of these officers, the Regulations only specify two officers' cooks, and two officers' stewards. By universal custom, the cabin and ward-room take one of each of these. There are no other stewards, cooks, or servants, or attendants specified for the other officers. Their place is supplied by selections from the ship's company, provided any among the landsmen are willing to accept the offer. Men suitable for attendants are shipped at officers' request, when a vessel is fitting out for sea. We would be rejoiced to see a better arrangement. We could wish that the chief of the Bureau of Equipment would draw up an allowance of attendants for each mess of officers. It should be liberal, without extravagance. Too many attendants in a mess is expensive, troublesome, and a worse evil, if possible, than

too few. It is an error into which all young officers fall. But, on the contrary, no officer should ever suffer in his personal appearance for the want of attendant's services. In the present state of things, it is earnestly recommended that officers should look well to this in the formation of their messes. These attendants, in whatever way they may be obtained, or designated, should be stationed in the powder or shell divisions, and never at a gun. Their assignment in this way is equally important in the hour of battle, when no man on board of a vessel-of-war, be he whom he may, is without a regular station.

The marines, when the vessel-of-war is so fortunate as to have them, are divided into watches, and stationed at great guns at quarters, or as riflemen, or infantry, to board, or repel boarders. Their mission is two-fold. At other times, they are the "*posse comitatus*" of the police officers of the ship. As sentinels, they are under the orders of the captain and executive officer, or the marine officer; and no officer can relieve them, or oppose them, or order them. The sentry is a sacred person, whom all persons must obey, even to the captain, or executive officer. The marines live and mess apart, they dress apart, their duties are apart from the rest of the crew. But never let it be thought that they are not the bulwarks

of our discipline, the "ever faithful" of our navy.

I have traced but an outline, a graphic outline, of this subject of organization of the *personel* of a ship-of-war. But it is believed the features of an important and vital subject are so far discussed that any officer, young or inexperienced, may see the first great mystery of the order of a man-of-war in it. The principles are the same in all ships, whether great or small. They should be closely followed, and never departed from. No military organization is so perfect, and none so efficient in its results and combinations, and none have triumphed over so many difficulties. In the navy, we have to grapple with dangers and trials in every form; with fire, water, steam, disease, battle, discomfort, hunger, thirst, and collision. Fewer lives are lost—fewer ships perish—less waste of public property is made than elsewhere, and our ships are always ready for emergencies, our men for all services, and our guns are true to our aim, even though we are moving and rolling upon an inconstant and fickle element. These are results of our *organization.*

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE CAPTAIN.

It were no trifling attempt to portray the grand leading features that should characterize the naval captain. From the remotest days, the sea-captain was regarded as an object of superior veneration and respect, and he was as often called king as captain. Indeed, his estate has ever been one of regal courage and hardihood, and the old sea-kings of the North were not mythical characters, but many of them founders of principalities and nationalities. They carried their Norman blood into England and France, and to this day it retains its heat and persistency. Even pirates, in the days of piracy, thought it becoming and decent to be polite and gentlemanly, and when they robbed, and plundered, and killed, it was thought to be characteristic to commit those acts with great *sang froid*, if not with the most delicate courtesy. Certainly, the ideal of a naval captain is no common portrait. Accustomed to command others with supreme authority, he should first of all know how to command himself. Dur-

ing the greater portion of his time he is placed in circumstances where he cannot call to his aid the succor of civil law. He is called upon to "suppress dissolute and immoral practices," as well as all private and public crimes. An administrator in his ship, he is called upon also to decide great questions of law, of right and wrong, of public polity, wherever he moves. Rarely advised of the designs of his Government, he is compelled to be its interpreter upon his own responsibility, and his exposition is always attended with gravest consequences to the rights or dignity of his country. Military law, international law, and social law, are all to be expounded by him in the varied career of his duties. Hence it is that vast authority is lodged in his keeping. That authority is often enough ill defined, and he must guard himself against being a despot or an arbitrary man. No country—no government—can avoid giving to him this authority. It was so great until very recently, and even at this time, within certain limits, that he holds the power of life and death. The least of his acts are grave. In his military capacity, he presides at a tribunal where life and death are discussed, and often at issue. In his capacity as a seaman, his life is a perpetual struggle with death to himself or to his subordinates. Death by

shipwreck, by collision, by the sea, by disease, by accidents, or by battle, are ever staring him in the face. To encounter responsibilities like these, it requires no ordinary authority, and no common education and training. He is called upon to correspond directly with his government, with his superiors, with civil and military officers, as well as with subordinates and inferiors. In his capacity as administrator, he is called upon to interpret naval laws, and to decide issues among his subordinates which would puzzle and perplex the craftiest lawyer. He is ever held up as an example in his moral and personal deportment, and his professional acts are scrutinized with the most searching criticism. With little or no time to read or study, he is expected to be the best seaman in his ship, and the most accomplished scholar. In his intercourse with foreigners, he is expected to use their language, either with his tongue or his pen. There are no graces of a gentleman that he should not possess, and he is expected to appear alike at ease in a court, at a levee, or in a gale of wind, or storming a battery. In later days, politicians even require him to be a stump orator! Nor can he be permitted to forget, or to be ignorant of, the immense details of his profession. The lock-string and the broadsword, the sextant and the chart, the pike, the

drill, the rifle and the pistol, are alike familiar to him. He is called upon to understand the secrets of the winds and waves, and the very air is a book that he must read.

This surely is a catalogue sufficiently exhaustive for any one man's mind. But if no one man is perfect in all these things, there is no captain who should not be more or less proficient in them all, and his study and aim must be to attain perfection. There are many captains who are quite content, or who, fatigued with the multiplicity of their labors, delegate many of their duties to the executive officer of the ship. Under the false impression that he may appear to interfere with executive duties, the captain is tempted to remain ignorant of many of the details of his ship. No captain can afford to do this, if he expects to administer his government with justice and wisdom. The stamp of his hand should be upon every order that issues from the quarter-deck, and his knowledge should be perfect and complete over every portion of his ship. Details weary, but details make up a grand whole. It is imperative upon him to exact the most scrupulous reports of every executive duty from the executive officer himself. The cabin is the most proper place for such information to be given. It is there that the captain can instruct his subor-

dinate without having the appearance of too frequent correction—of undue interference. No captain, who wishes a successful administration of duties, can afford to wound the pride of his executive officer. If he has pride, nourish it, for it is a plant of fickle growth. The relations of the captain with the executive officer must be intimate and to a great degree confidential. There must be mutual confidence, or there will be mutual distrust. There is a natural feeling among the crew of every ship, of aversion, to see the captain too frequently prowling about, as if seeking to find fault with some one. An instinctive feeling betrays itself, that the captain had better be in his cabin, or taking a quiet walk upon the quarter-deck. There are certain times, however, when a careful visit to every portion of the ship is imperative and healthful for all concerned. Visits of careful inspection should be made with great regularity, and the critical eye of a captain who has served his time at the painful drudgery of executive duties, can quickly detect the ordinary condition of his ship by these official visits, even though there has been preparation to receive him. He will detect a dirty habit if it exists, or an untidy appearance, with a glance of experience.

One of the most fruitful sources of trouble in a ship-of-war arises from the improper relations existing between the captain and executive officer. Under no circumstances can any commander allow the executive officer to indulge in general orders, regulations, punishments, or rewards, without making full and detailed reports to him first. This principle does not take from the usefulness or dignity of the executive; it but serves to make him strong in his duties, and fortifies him doubly in his authority. It should be the aim of every commander to throw as much responsibility as possible upon all his subordinates and men. If he attempts to assume all the responsibilities of a ship, he will soon succumb to fatigue, or to nervous imbecility. While, in reality, he is responsible, yet it is a mistake to suppose that no responsibility can attach itself to the officers, who hold commissions as well as himself. There is a theory which supposes the captain to be always on deck. If an accident happen, by night or day, the captain is supposed to be on deck. If there be truth in this, then there should be no officers, holding commissions to intrust the watch to. But this is absurd. No one supposes it to be true. Yet sophists in military law vainly struggle against moral convictions, to establish the

veriest absurdity. The captain has graver duties in his cabin to perform, than that of a perpetual deck-walker. Many young officers of the service are so spoiled with this notion, that they have become well-nigh worthless.

So far, then, as regards the position of a captain on board of his ship, it is a question of the most delicate conservatism. There should be no transaction affecting health, discipline, duties, or routine, that he should be ignorant of. He cannot afford, indeed, to be ignorant of the smallest details; nor can he well afford to lose his dignity by an officious interference in those details which disgust an intelligent and right-minded executive. The happy mean here is the vital point.

Many captains think it a desirable thing to keep their officers and men in ignorance of the movements and designs of the ship. Instances have been known where everybody in the ship has been deprived of having letters sent from their friends, for many weeks, on this account. Unless there be some special reason for such mystery, it is altogether misplaced and unwise. It is seldom, indeed, that the public interests are harmed by the fact of the people of a ship-of-war knowing what they are going to do. The days of all such mystery are happily among the things of the past; they are

buried with the old seamanship and the old frigates!

The government of the commander of a ship should always be cool, kind, deliberate, but inflexible as the decree of death. Make it as paternal as you choose, but it must be inflexible and unyielding. An active intelligence of all that is passing—of all that transpires—is necessary to its complete execution. It would be most wise legislation that would require every officer to have served his apprenticeship as an executive officer, before he can become eligible to the rank of a commander. This experience is of vital necessity to fit him for his responsible station. The drudgery, the perplexities, the harassments, and fatigues, of executive duties, are the essential ordeal to purify and ennoble the high character of a naval captain. It is easy to figure a captain sitting in his cabin, with some executive performing the duties of which he is himself ignorant; but it is also easy to see what the efficiency of that ship must be. Nowhere in the vast range of human duties is a leader so much needed as on board of a ship-of-war. It is not every man who possesses the essential character of a true leader. But every man on board of a ship must be *led*, and the leader must be captain and chief. There cannot be two cap-

tains in a ship; there cannot be two heads to one body!

When, at the beginning of our rebellion, it was thought we were in need of more captains, it was gravely proposed to create them outside of the regular service. It was said that there were officers enough of experience to perform executive duties, and it was not necessary for the captain to know those details. It was answered, that the frigate Potomac was fitting out at the navy-yard, and five hundred sailors might be put aboard and turned over to the new-made officer to organize and drill! But it may be conceived that few officers could be found, ready-made, to assume such weighty responsibility.

Whatever may be said of it, it does not require great capacity to sail a ship from one port to another. To handle five hundred men; to teach them the art of fighting; to create a unique, nondescript military establishment out of a ship with this crew, does.

I have not attempted to portray a model captain. I proposed merely to point out such salient features of his character as are necessary, and which are found, in a greater or less degree, in every successful commander afloat. These qualities, indeed, make him a gallant man, if such a thing exists. They form the highest type of chival-

ry, and win the honest admiration of friends and foes. Let every young officer, in his professional career, aim at this high perfection ; let him look for it in his own commander, and figure to himself the attainments which alone can fit him for that post of honor and courage.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER.

FEW persons in the naval service appreciate the trying position of an executive officer. All the drudgery of the ship is his. If he be not properly sustained and assisted by captain and officers, he must succumb with fatigue and despair, provided he possess the pride due to his profession. There is no position so wearying, none so trying, none so much needing wisdom and good judgment, good temper and professional skill. In his general deportment he is supposed to represent the captain's wishes, and yet avoid any blunder the captain himself may make. He is the great *conservative* element in a ship-of-war. He stands between officers and themselves, between officers and men, and, at need be, between the captain and all the rest. His position is almost a paradox. Knowing more of the personal character of the men than any officer on board, he is, perhaps, better able to judge of their wants and treatment than any other. The same may be said of the officers themselves. From the first

moment they come on board of a ship, the executive officer is brought in contact with them in all ways. He gauges their ability, their moral character, and their social temper. The organizer and law-giver on board, he cannot be ignorant of the most minute detail, or condition of men and things on board. With such a vast detail fretting him from daylight to dark, he should possess a clear eye for the general conduct of the duties carried on around him, and have a hand in the whole conduct of duty in general. He is responsible for the trimness and general tidiness of the ship herself; for the external appearance of her crew; for the general drill and exercises, as well as for the condition of a single mess or a single store-room.

When the crew first comes on board of a ship which is newly put into commission, his first duty is to watch, and mess, and station them. Whenever it can be done, all this should be arranged before the men go on board, and while they are yet on board the receiving-ship. If possible, it would save much labor and time if, when the crew are mustered round the capstan for the first time, every man were given a billet of paper, containing his number, station, and duties. This has been done in more than one instance, but it requires close attention to accomplish it by

the executive officer. At all events, he should proceed without delay to the work of organization, such as is pointed out in the first chapter of this book. Every hour lost at this time costs weeks at a later day. The duties of organization may proceed with great rapidity. If the executive is backed up by watch officers who know their duty, and who do it, the work of organizing is more rapid than any one would suppose. Get the officers and men at *quarters* as soon as possible. Let them feel that the vessel is a ship-of-war, and that the *guns* are the first things to look to. Go to quarters to inspect, to muster, to make acquaintance with your men, even if you do nothing more. The moment the crew are at quarters, *that moment they are under control.*

There is always a solemnity in the call to quarters in a man-of-war, be it for what purpose it may. It is *there* that her people are brought face to face with the engines of war, which their own handling must prove either their disgrace or their pride, their shame or their honor. It is *there* that each man—each and every individual—forms the acquaintance of the particular weapon which must belong to him for the cruise, and whose honor is and must be inseparably attached to his own. *The ship was built for the guns.* The officers and men are sent to her to

use them. At the guns, officers and men become acquainted, and authority assumes its true martial character. It is here that the first definite orders are promulgated. Communication begins between officers and crews, which is to grow closer and more intimate the longer the ship is in commission. Here, too, the first notions of official etiquette, and that genuine politeness which characterizes all true men-of-war's men, are apprehended and learned. The character, the individual calibre, and personal deportment of each man stationed at the battery, is there measured closely by the officers. If any distinction has inadvertently been made by the executive officer in his stations, he very soon hears from it, from the divisional officers.

Nowhere, perhaps, can general orders be so well enunciated to a crew as at quarters. Men and officers always instinctively feel that the call to quarters means something earnest, and attention there is more easily and completely obtained than anywhere else. Sailors from the merchant service comprehend, for the first time, when they go to quarters, that a man-of-war's man is something more than a sailor. The occasion is always an impressive one, and the executive officer who understands his position will avail himself of it, to accomplish his most essential object. *Disci-*

pline — that much-abused word — discipline is, first and last, inculcated at the guns. From here, as a fruitful source, all discipline and all teaching begin; and the *tone* of a ship's company is sounded from the guns of the battery. It is the one great, vital thing in a ship-of-war, which possesses a common interest — all have a fraternal interest and possession in the battery.

It seems to me that it is to be regretted that these points are not sufficiently comprehended by officers generally. No man ever saw a ship with a good, well-kept, and well-drilled battery, sluggish, dirty, or undisciplined. The two conditions cannot go together.

I would suggest, then, to executive officers, to make their *quarters* the starting-point of their labors. It should be the central point around which every other duty of organization turns, and whence all its ramifications radiate.

The morning and evening inspections should be made scrupulous, and no excuse received for officers or men except sickness. These inspections should be made, of persons, small arms, and great guns, with fidelity. Correct the least neglect with persistency. This is the beginning of drill and discipline. At morning inspection, the guns' crews should muster with their swords and belts, battle-axes, priming-wires, and boring-

bits. The guns' crews should form two lines on the starboard side of the deck, composed of the first and second parts, each toeing a seam, and the divisions nearly joining, only leaving a convenient space from the head of one to the foot of the other. The mustering officers muster, but never twice in the same way; sometimes by names, sometimes by stations, and sometimes by gun numbers. The advantage of this is obvious. No man or boy should ever be permitted to answer muster without touching his hat. The advantage of this, too, is most obvious. He will do it everywhere else, and the first rule of politeness is cultivated. Men should be polite, or they can never hope to be gallant. When the mustering officer, whose station is at the foot of the division, has finished and reported, the divisional officer, at the head of his division, orders, *Division—ready for inspection—draw swords!* when they draw and present, the axe-men with battle-axes, and the powder-men with priming-wires, together; the officers exposing their own blades also to view. The divisional officer passes down the column and inspects one line, and the other is inspected on his return, when he passes around to the guns and inspects these also. This done, he orders, *Division—return swords—take stations!* when the men file off and assume their positions at the

guns ready to cast loose. This programme may be adopted, also, for Sunday morning inspections, or for any official inspection whatever. No officer who has witnessed such an inspection would hardly be tempted to change it for any other. In a large frigate, it is finer in martial effect than any parade the writer has ever seen.

This system once accomplished, the executive officer may feel that he has made an immense stride toward getting his men in hand, and the first simple but great lesson at the guns is taught.

For my own part, I do not care how fastidious the officers and men of my ship become, in so far as regards the smallest thing relating to her battery. A scrupulously clean carriage; the trucks free from a grain of sand; the sponge and rammer-staves scoured, not scraped; the gun-tackles and gun-gear made up as only a neat seaman can do it; the spare wads bucketed up, not lying about jammed into a mass; the gun itself so clean a cambric handkerchief could not be soiled. Such are not unfair criterions to judge of a ship; but a polished, lackered gun I detest—it is a *blind*, and you are always afraid to use it.

Attain this much in the battery, so it be done thoroughly, and the matter of a clean, neat ship is surely and easily accomplished. If your

people are educated to proper habits, the emulation born in the division will grow to maturity in all other parts of the ship.

Much is said about *daily routine*. This war, and especially the blockade, has pretty well demonstrated that no *daily routine* can be carried out; the exceptions will be oftener than the rule, and, perhaps, one exercise will get far more than its share of good days. The frequent interruptions, consequent upon active war duties, will break into every rule of regular exercise. Yet it is perhaps well to have one, in order that you may be directed constantly toward it. Yet I would advise a departure from it, wherever it might be necessary, in order that no one division or one kind of exercise should have the advantage. Every arm, every weapon furnished to a ship needs more or less exercise in its use. The great guns, surely, must have a preference; yet after all, who can neglect the rifle, the broadsword, or the pistol and pike? Men should be drilled with a pertinacity which few executive officers possess. If the event of the day prevents one kind of drill, choose and order another; but do not allow a day to pass without a drill at something. With all this, great care must be used not to disgust or over-weary your people. Vary the exercise. If your men are weary by

reason of a hard night, save running out and in the guns. A discourse on fuzes, shells, powder, or general instructions about the use of the boarding-pike, of boarding or repelling boarders—any or all of these are useful, and enliven and give *snap* and *zest* to the men you are training to arms. The fact is, a man-of-war's man should be taught to fight with every thing, and under every possible disadvantage. If you wish your people to feel strong, invincible, or to be accomplished, you must see that they are taught *how* to fight. Bravery, alone, and without culture, is weak, after all.

I dwell thus upon quarters and exercises, for it is the secret fulcrum of the power, pride, and authority of an executive officer. You cannot stimulate a sentiment of pride, which must be even personal, with a ship's crew in any other way. The beautiful lines and fancies about tapering spars, so much loved by our old seamen, will only raise a faint smile if alluded to now. But if "man is a fighting animal," the man-of-war's man should be the highest type of the class.

The executive officer is the chief of police of every ship-of-war. By police I do not simply mean the apprehension of all offenders, I mean also the sanitary and cleanly condition of the vessel as well as the external character and appear-

ance of her hull and spars. Bright work is an abomination, and will do more to disgust a good ship's crew and good officers than any thing I know of. Men and officers have too much that is needful and useful to do, to be scouring and polishing a row of old brass pins or a battered railing. Ropes are a great deal better than iron or brass rails. They never splinter—iron and brass work do.

Holy-stoning is another barbarism, if it is indulged in more than once a week, especially after the tar and pitch are once removed. These nuisances have been handed down to us from a certain class of men who wrote a vast quantity of "internal rules and regulations," whereby their ships are ever remembered as places of floating misery—men who died and passed away nobly devoted to round shot and long eighteen-pounders. A ship may be kept as healthy and clean as a dairy without them. Perhaps a brass rail around the cabin-hatch might find employment for some incorrigible black-listers, but even *that* is doubtful. There is no excuse, no apology whatever for a dirty ship, or for a clean spar-deck and a vile hold, or for berth-deck corners full of piles of dirt. A dirty ship should condemn any executive officer to the drudgery of living in it all his days.

Has it ever occurred to executive officers that, if they should keep a careful system of books, they would be able to perform their labors with a tithe of the fatigue they now suffer, and, with an infinitely better success? I can say to you, *try it!* You have now a ship's writer;—a rating, the service has grievously more needed, than it ever did that of a paymaster's clerk or steward. Verbal reports of offences against men, are fruitful of injustice, trouble, and wrong. A report book, ruled for names, dates, rates, offences, and punishment, should be sent by the executive officer every morning to every officer in the ship, and in it they should record their reports of delinquents and offenders. There may occasionally be a case requiring immediate attention; but this is rare, and such cases generally go to the captain. In this way the executive officer selects his own time, his own leisure, and then carefully investigates the complaint, records his decision, and, while no man is punished or condemned in anger, and the judgment is deliberate, he is also sure that no offence is ever forgotten. Moreover, a history is written for future use and reference. This book, when it is seen coming coldly and deliberately up the hatch on its way to the mainmast, is more than any rod of iron over the head of an offender. He hates it—

for it is so terribly just and deliberate. Six or eight months' use will soon do away with its necessity.

Morning orders should invariably be written in a book and preserved. These orders should always be written by the hand of the executive, and never delegated to a clerk.

The black-list book is also of vital necessity. It should be carefully kept up, and the terms of punishment and the discharges duly noted. It should always be accessible to the officer of the deck. There is nothing so potent as the pen, where the sword is not directly used.

The boat-list book is also necessary to the officer of the deck. I was once in a vessel, and a very good one, too, where the men could never be got into the boats when called away; and the officer of the deck, who never knew who belonged to them, suffered frequent mortification from the neglect of the executive officer. Let these boat-lists, also, always have two or four supernumeraries, whose duty it is to know when a man is sick, and go in his place without special orders. If the officer of the deck is expected to do his duty, he must be cared for by the executive.

The master-at-arms should always be required to keep a book of record of all confinements made, subject to the weekly inspection and *ap-*

proval of the executive officer. He should also keep a mess-book, containing the names of every member of every mess; and this book should be also inspected by the executive, to see that it is *always* correct.

The general station, watch, quarter, and fire bills, should be constructed with numbers, and no names used. In this way, they never require correction. But a book must be kept by the executive, embracing the names as well as numbers. This book is always rough — it is constantly corrected; so much so, that a new one must be made every few months.

Lastly, the *liberty book* is one that no executive can possibly dispense with, if he expects to complete the history of his administration, and be able to decide the important question of honorable discharges at the end of the cruise. In this book should be noted the complete list of the liberty men—dates of going, how long, and when returned, and in *what condition.*

Many a one who may read these pages, will, perhaps, stand aghast at this array of bookkeeping. It looks very serious; but once the books are opened, it is much easier to keep them than one would suppose, and the vexations and labor saved in other ways will amply compensate for the task. There will be at the end of your admin-

istration an official record of all your acts, the least of which is watched with so much jealousy. Moreover, you have a written history of the conduct of every man, or at least of every offender. Should you be relieved by a successor, during an unfinished cruise, he is presented with a system which he cannot alter for the better; there is no new broom to sweep clean; there is no embarrassment for the successor, for he can soon know as much about the ship and her crew as you may know yourself. No man-of-war, however small, however large, can be well governed without some such system as I have here proposed.

Many executive officers have an idea, when they join a ship, that they must have an interview with the captain, in order that they may be the executive officer of the captain's caprices rather than that of the ship. There never was a graver mistake. If an officer understands his duties, his position, and his profession, he has only to go on and perform his duty. Most officers are disinclined to seek that advice of the captain which he is so able and willing to give them, and, if they be young and inexperienced, which they so much need to know. I have elsewhere discussed the mutual relations which should exist between these two officers. There must be mutual confidence, or there will be mu-

tual distrust. All young officers are more or less addicted to fall into the sad habit of distrust, and a want of confidence. Certainly, some of the relations which existed formerly between captains and executives were not calculated to create a very deep feeling of repose and confidence. No captain can allow himself to be kept in ignorance of the official course or acts of his executive. The executive, then, should make up his mind to make an elaborate system of reports to the captain. He should, from day to day, and from time to time, most scrupulously inform the captain what is going on in the ship, what he does, what orders he issues, and consult with him frequently upon minute details of duties. He should especially keep him advised of the progress of drill, of organization, of discipline, and he should never think of assuming the right to confine men, or to execute the least degree of punishment the law awards, without first receiving assurances from the captain that such a relinquishment of his own authority would be agreeable. All captains are specially tenacious and jealous of this thing punishment, and few, very few, can afford to delegate it to a subordinate. An executive officer, however young or inexperienced he may be, need have no fears of not getting along with his captain, if he keeps him fully

posted on all his acts, and if he frankly looks to the captain for advice and instruction. There are many things, indeed, which a stern experience will suggest, that no executive will presume to assume without fully consulting his commander. He, in this way, is not mortified by making frequent mistakes, and he fortifies his own power and authority. There must be no vanity in the relations of an executive officer with the commander of his ship. It would be fatal to the most talented of young men.

Remember that your station is one of extreme labor and activity. Your presence about the ship is needed and felt constantly. Especially during the early part of the cruise, you must be indefatigable and industrious. There is no surer way of raising distrust in the mind of a captain, than for him to know that the executive officer is spending the greater portion of his time in his state-room. No sluggard ever yet made an executive. Better be without him altogether. Activity and a ceaseless vigilance are constantly demanded. This, too, must be accompanied with a general deportment of gentleness, of politeness, of ease of bearing, which always impress men with a consciousness of strength and power. There is no virtue, perhaps, more necessary to an executive officer than extreme courtesy and

gentleness of manner. A rough, arbitrary manner, even unaccompanied with violence or oaths, will inevitably fail. Every subordinate naturally partakes of the characteristics of deportment and bearing of the executive. *His* presence is "here, there, and everywhere," yet it should not produce restraint either among officers or men. The warrant and petty officers are the mainstays of an executive, if he knows how to treat and use them. A happy ship is almost always a fighting ship. A genial, cheerful humor should pervade the atmosphere of a ship-of-war, if she is to be in vigor and pluck. The men —all rates, all classes—must be taught to feel that the ship is as much the pride and property of each one, as of the captain. There must be a sentiment of *camaraderie*, of common interest, or the ship will be a failure, and a very unhappy one, too.

An oath should never pass the lips of an executive officer, if he does not wish to lose prestige and authority. The matter of dress, too, cannot be overlooked or neglected. If he be capable, industrious, and comprehends his station, he can even afford to be foppish in his appearance and personal dress. It is a sin any man will pardon if there be brains and bravery behind it. The deck officers instinctively take their style from a superior whom they have constantly before them,

and this is again communicated to the petty officers and crew. His example and deportment, his method of doing duty, are all imitated, and give tone to others. In regard to this matter, it is observed that, of late, the executive officer rarely shows himself in the capacity of officer of the deck. There was sound judgment in the old habit that required the executive to relieve the officer of the watch during an hour every morning-watch. By common consent, that morning-watch is pronounced to be the most fatiguing and dreary of all others. The hour's relief, which is a courtesy extended by the executive, is one of inestimable value to the morning-watch. It gives him a chance to make his toilet, and get a little refreshment, and, moreover, it gives him opportunity to breakfast by nine o'clock, and the servants are enabled to get the mess-room cleared up and put in order at an early hour. The executive thus becomes a public benefactor; and he can also secure those many little duties of a morning-watch which no one can so well perform, and which sets him at comparative rest for the balance of the day. It is good in many ways for the executive to relieve the officers occasionally. He sets an example of courtesy to all the rest; he has opportunity to set an example, too, as to the method of carrying on duty, and he infuses his own spirit

into all his subordinates. Such favors, too, are never forgotten, and many ends are subserved by granting them. But they must be regarded as favors, and in no way as a right.

Finally, it may be some recompense to the hard and fatiguing duties of this important officer for him to remember that, if he is successful, his professional comrades, and his captain, too, will ever be ready and eager to award him all the praise. I never yet saw a commander who grudged the meed of praise to a faithful executive. It is in his power to have a happy or unhappy ship—a pride to himself, his men, and his officers, or one of misery and wretchedness. The demand upon his temper and his abilities is enormous. The better and more efficient he can make others, the more he relieves himself. With all the strain upon his energies that body and mind can endure, he must be even of temper, and infuse good humor and cheerfulness in the atmosphere around him. A high moral character, united with an indomitable courage, bold and daring, quick of wit, and slow of passion, he must seek to cultivate and embody in himself the graces of a *gentle life*, the generosity of a knight, the gallantry of a sea-officer, and the cool, cutting discernment, and judgment, with all the polished graces of a gentleman.

CHAPTER VI.

THE MASTER.

In former times, the master occupied the position rather of a sea-pilot, than that of one of the regular officers of the ship. He was called the "*sailing-master*," and this title will indicate, in a certain degree, the character of his duties. In the days of Sir Walter Raleigh, seamanship, like every other art, took a powerful development. Sir Walter was himself, perhaps, one of the best practical sailors England ever had. He enunciated the doctrine, only recently indorsed by ourselves, that the life of a ship was in a long scope of cable; that a single anchor and a long scope, were better than two anchors and a short one. He first put the jib on a ship, got topmasts aloft, and bent topsails. He struggled a long time to show that a ship could not "*lye*" and "*trye*" well under a mainsail, and the main-topsail was introduced, to heave a ship to in a gale of wind. Under Sir Walter Raleigh, the office of master was the most important in a ship. Shakespeare

represents the master, and his mates and boatswains around him, piping and giving orders to save the stranded ship, in a language unfamiliar to us. His picture in the Tempest is probably the grandest sea scene ever produced.

The master was the navigator and pilot. He always directed what course should be steered — what sails should be carried—and the mystery of his landfalls won for him the gratitude and admiration of everybody. Whatever appertained to the navigation or sailing of a ship, to her anchors or anchorage, was under his direct and exclusive orders. He had nothing to do with guns, arms, fighting, or the discipline or *personnel* of the ship. He had charge of the cordage, the masts, spars, sails, anchors and cables, hawsers and steering gear. To a great extent, these ancient and honorable duties have been continued to him. It is true, time has modified very greatly the positions of others. The captain is now *leader* of his ship. He has become responsible for every thing, and for every officer under his command. The executive officer is one of more modern creation. Only to these two, however, is the master subservient in the sphere of his duties. The captain is no longer contented with being carried about by his master, but is the chief of this department, directing much of its

details, and, if need be, ready to assume the duties himself. No captain can afford to be ignorant of his position, nor can he allow another to shape his course upon the chart. The executive officer has gradually relieved the master of the charge of chains and anchors, of the rigging and cordage. Nevertheless, the position of the master in a ship-of-war is no sinecure. He has quite as much responsibility as he can well answer for. Inasmuch as he is intrusted with the delicate duties of navigation, all and every instrument in the ship is under his charge. All the charts and sailing directions are likewise in his care. Of all the instruments ever devised by man, perhaps the chronometer is the most beautiful and the most sensitive. Not many officers are fully competent to this charge. When we reflect that the safety of a ship is immensely hanging upon a few seconds of time, indicated by this instrument, we may well feel its importance. It cannot be given to the hand of a careless or neglectful officer. So perfect is this instrument, that no one nowadays ever thinks of steering around a shoal, or shaping a course by the cumbersome logic of a lunar. The man who did it, would justly be considered a lunatic. So important is the chronometer, that many captains, in their extreme jealousy, or fear of its ill-treatment, insist upon keeping it in their

cabins, just at the extreme end of a ship, where the constant vibrations and shocks of the vessel are more violent than anywhere else. I had as soon think of putting it at the bowsprit end, as in the cabin of a gunboat.

The proper place for a chronometer is as near the centre of motion of a ship as possible. It should be placed down upon the deck, and not upon the top of a bureau, or on a frail shelf, as I not long ago observed a very intelligent master place it. The only place for its better security is in the master's state-room, and if he be not fit to be intrusted with it, the sooner his commission is revoked, the better.

It is customary in the navy for the master to place the position of the ship, at sea, on the cabin chart, at eight o'clock in the morning, at noon, and at eight o'clock in the evening. In consultation with the captain, the course is laid off and given to the officer of the deck by the master himself; and this course should always be given in writing. There is too grave a risk to be run, to hazard the possibilities of its being forgotten or misunderstood. This practice should invariably obtain. At those three periods indicated, the master should have his position deduced with utmost care, by every ready method available. His work, after it is completed, should be care-

fully reviewed before it is finally accepted. If any doubt exists, let it be known frankly to the captain, and let the master too have the benefit of that doubt. I have known some masters who, after giving a notoriously wrong position to the captain, and the error discovered, had the culpable vanity to insist upon his first position as the correct one. While a bold confidence may and should be placed upon a careful reckoning, once it is assumed as correct, the guilty vanity of adhering to a palpable error should subject the offender to the charge of cowardly incompetency.

Where every one is vigilant—where the daily law is vigilance—it would seem superfluous to admonish the master of a ship-of-war that an *intense vigilance* is exacted from *him*. Whenever the color or temperature of the water indicates the possibility of soundings, the lead should be sent to find them. No indication, however trifling, should pass by the navigator without observation. Vigilance and careful observation have saved more ships, perhaps, than scientific navigation.

I have a great appreciation of the lead. It never, or rarely, tells us an untruth. Hand-leads and deep-sea leads should always receive the master's special care, and he should be as jealous of

their condition and place as the gunner's mate is of his guns. The lead is the master's touchstone of safety. Its honest, truthful story, on dismal nights, has caused more than one master to bless its presence.

The stowage of the holds and their order, cleanliness and convenience, are among the principal duties of a master, which, we fear, are passing too easily out of remembrance. This charge cannot and ought not to devolve upon the executive officer, as is becoming too frequent. The latter officer has care enough, and this should never be imposed upon him.

When one contemplates what a convenient place for the accumulation and concealment of rubbish, filth, and every possible thing not needed elsewhere at the moment, and further reflects that air is easily tainted and soon becomes impure, it is easy to see what excessive care is incumbent upon the master in this important charge. The executive officer will, perhaps more often than any one else, order such and such a thing down into the hold, especially if it appear to him a little unsightly. A golden rule, in a ship-of-war, finds nothing unsightly that is needed and in its proper place. Things should be carried where they are to be used and where they belong, or they have no right in the ship.

I have long thought that we carry too many spare articles in a ship-of-war. The gangways are crowded, the store-rooms are filled, and the hold is jammed to repletion, with spare articles—things supposed to be handy to have about. Many of us rejoiced when the lumbering cargoes of spare yards, spare topmasts, spare booms, began to go ashore. It was a bright day when our ships got rid of them.

In regard to the hold, it should be remembered that if it be not carefully stowed at first, it will always be in confusion. Any master who prizes his position, will be as watchful over his hold as he is jealous of his chronometer.

In addition to the hold, and directly connected with its charges, is the care of the wood and water. It is true that our ships now condense their drinking water, but it nevertheless requires management and attention in its cooling and issue. At sea every person should be upon an allowance of water, but that allowance should be a large one. Fresh water cannot be deliberately wasted, even though it is made at hand.

A very important word may be said about the log-book, which is especially under the charge of the master. It is the exception rather than the rule to see a neat, well-kept log-book. Young officers invariably commit one of two faults—

they either omit what is important and official, in the record of their watch, or else they narrate trifles and unofficial acts, which should not appear in a midshipman's diary. The log-book is the official record of the ship's transactions. As such, any intelligent mind should comprehend what to write in it. This book should be regularly sent to the commander for periodical inspection and signature. And when it is transferred to the Bureau of Navigation, it should be fit for an admiral to read.

There has long been a discussion as to the propriety of the master taking a watch. I am of opinion that, if no other reason weighs in the discussion, the master should keep his watch regularly, to be posted as to her position and weather at all times. The experience of watch-keeping is a benefit no master can deprive himself of, without the imputation of wanting in professional zeal and interest. I know of no more painful sight than to see the master of a ship lounging in the ward-room all day, occupied merely in finding his position three times a day. He is relieved from great-gun drill, and that is a fair offset to his extra duty.

The Signal Quartermaster, with his signal lockers, stores, and lamps, signals, colors, and bunting, is under the jurisdiction of the master.

And this department also embraces the wheel-ropes, and steering gear, and whatever belongs to the rudder and tiller of the vessel. In the French navy, all the quartermasters are especially under the orders of the master, and it would be well if it were so regulated with us. But a general supervision, yet nevertheless a supervision, is all that need occupy the master in these details. He should be responsible to the executive officer for the good order and efficiency of his department.

The duties and responsibilities are not very fatiguing, however closely and attentively they may require watching. It is a position of the greatest trust. It is an office of the most serious character, and requires unlimited and unsparing devotion. It is while the young officer is undergoing this period of his life that he learns more of his profession than he ever knew before. While he is performing the beautiful and scientific duties of navigation, his labors are diversified by deck duty, and by a close observation of the mysteries of weather, of tides, and of currents. Perhaps the happiest person on a ship-of-war is the master, or navigator. It would be pleasant to see his title changed to one more appropriate to its present meaning.

Lastly, his station at the hour of battle, or in

cases and times of emergency, is always at the side of the captain; and also as an assistant to the executive officer. He stands in a confidential relation to both, and is in reality an aid to either. It is here that he learns to judge how a ship should be manœuvred, and his opportunities are the best for learning the seamanship of a steamer. Let him not think his station in the ship an unimportant one, for none is perhaps more delicate. The only officer of his rank on board, he is more subject to criticism, less subject to fault-finding, and more observed than any other. If I were to offer him a parting suggestion, it would be, not to neglect the hold, and that a few seconds of error in the little instrument ticking in his room may strand the ship, and cost the lives and honor of all on board.

CHAPTER VII.

THE OFFICER OF THE DECK.

AFTER the terrible battle at New-Orleans, delivered by Admiral Farragut in 1862, certain officers of the large steam sloops-of-war predicted that they would probably be the last regular men-of-war that we should have for a long time, if ever. Certainly those ships were models, whatever may be said of those of a former day. They were in good discipline; they were healthily clean and trim; and every man and officer on board of them felt that they were a part of themselves. Better drilled men never served a cannon. Drilled not only at the guns but at fighting iron, fire, water, hot shot, and boarders. Whether we shall ever see their like again, we cannot tell. We know that *they* gave a "good account of themselves."

It is profoundly to be regretted that the old rivalry among our lieutenants, as to capacity for handling ship and doing deck-duty, seems to have entirely died out. A few years ago the deck could

never be left without a lieutenant in charge. These officers criticised each other with a sharpness and vivacity that served to stimulate to the highest degree of professional perfection. Not to be a sailor, or to be a very inferior one, was the last term of reproach that could be offered. Lieutenants vied with each other in noble emulation in professional attainments. The *style* showed the officer, and the *style* and carriage of the officer meant something real. It has been a common remark of capable observers that, in those days, each officer of the deck was as fully competent to take care of a ship as the captain. There was nothing professional that was considered too mean to cultivate. The method of doing duty, the manner of giving orders as though they meant them to be obeyed, the cheerful, good-humored, and perhaps reckless air of the officer, and the very dress and manner in which it was worn, as well as the rapid judgment of and precision with which evolutions were performed, were all alike objects of attention and study. Those officers liked nothing better than to be taken aback or to be caught on a lee-shore, or, in fact, to be placed in any position that was critical, for the pure love of working out of it handsomely. And, as a general thing, they did it handsomely, too. It is told of the elder Commodore Morris, that a cer-

tain line-of-battle-ship, of which he was the first lieutenant, was thrown upon her beam-ends, and, amidst the most intense excitement and inextricable confusion, he came on deck, mounted the horse-block, and coolly began to tie up his shoe-strings. It is needless to say that his calm deliberation fell upon his excited people like a wet blanket, and the ship was saved.

A lieutenant, as the title indicates, is the representative of the captain on deck. Hence the fiction arose, that the captain himself is supposed always to be on deck. Although the lieutenant *holds the place* of the captain, it is proper to remember that he holds a commission as well. Every order he gives is supposed to emanate from the captain, or to be given in furtherance of the captain's wishes. This position does not release him from obligations to the executive officer; but it requires the executive officer to perform his duties, and give his orders through the medium of the officer of the deck. The officer of the deck has a right to know, and must know, all duty that is being transacted everywhere throughout the ship. He cannot be ignorant if work is going on in the hold, magazine, or shell-rooms. The whole ship, from kelson to truck, is under his immediate care.

When the officer is called to relieve, there is no

excuse or apology for lingering below. Five minutes is ample time for him to get on deck. This matter of relief is of vital importance, and one which seems not to be fully comprehended by young officers. The most exacting etiquette should be observed. No matter how intimate the two officers may be, when they are brought together, one to relieve the other, the attitude and act are purely official. Salutes should always be *given* and *returned*. The transaction is solemn. It is grave for the honor of both parties. Make it formal as you choose, for it is official. The officer being relieved, transmits the situation of the ship, her condition, the course steering, (if at sea,) or the scope of cable and depth of water if at anchor; the exact condition of the weather, the vicinity of land, sails, or color of the water, if it has changed; the general nature of the duties going on about decks, what boats are away, where the remaining ones are moored, and, finally, what orders are unexecuted from the captain or executive officer. All this information should be given distinctly and intelligibly. If not understood, it must be repeated. If the relieving officer supposes he does not receive all the information he requires, he has the right to demand it; nay, it is his duty to do so. "*My relief did n't tell me, sir,*" is the worst excuse ever given. So

soon as this is over, the new officer of the deck first looks at his compass and passes the course to the quartermaster at the wheel. It is a good plan to ask the quartermaster what the course is, to verify it; for these officers pass their orders to each other in the same manner as officers of the deck. Having observed the ship steering her course, it is proper to look around generally and observe if the information given by his predecessor is correct. A few slight orders are well to be given, by way of announcing to the watch that he is at his station. In this way, too, the petty officers are apprised to whom they should make reports or seek for information. I have before stated that the course should always be given in writing. If not so handed over, it should be put in writing by the officer of the deck. Nothing is easier forgotten than a quarter of a point of a compass course; and nothing is easier lost than a ship.

Having taken a general look around, a *special* one should be made. If the master has neglected to have his lead-lines ready for use, it should be known why. I had as soon think of taking the deck without having a course to steer by, as to have no leads about. From the first moment an officer takes the deck, he should give himself up to its cares and duties. He should begin to antici-

pate some unforeseen accident, and prepare for it. The best place to study seamanship is on watch. Conceive of a thousand contingencies that may suddenly arise, whether by day or night, and depending mainly on what *might* happen under the existing conditions. The mind will promptly suggest what to do. Discuss the *what* and *how* to do, and some dark night the reward for such habits will be sure to come. An officer who, after six months' service, will answer the demand of the captain for some information pertaining to the ship, "I don't know, sir," or "my relief didn't inform me, sir," deserves to be granted a perpetual furlough, without pay or emoluments. Yet such practices obtain now but too universally. Better the boatswain's mate or quartermaster had the deck, than such an officer. It is his business to know, and if he do not he is incompetent. I have thought that our present officers of the deck are getting fearfully spoiled. Whose fault is it that they do not know and feel that they have commissions and responsibilities as well as the captain? Yet is a grievous vice, and the sooner we get rid of it the better.

If the executive officer be fit for his place, it should be the aim of deck officers to model their style and methods of duty upon his. Nowhere is uniformity so much required as in daily deck

duty. The agents who perform that duty are the watches, all under the same officers. If one hoists ashes at six bells, and another at seven; if one officer requires a jib to come down at the "word," and another allows the boatswain's mate to "haul down when he is ready," you may rest assured that there will be a slovenly ship, and a discontented, ill-natured crew. Daily routine of ship's duties is soon obtained from the repetition of the executive officer's orders. I think the hardest task I ever had to perform was to get the pea-jackets stowed away, before breakfast, in the morning watch, after having been used during the night. Sometimes they are wet, and cannot be put away. Sometimes there is too much work; sometimes they are overlooked. There are always more exceptions than there are rules, but for all that, we cannot dispense with a rule. It is a perpetual point of reference, and one must exercise good sense and judgment in coming back to it or departing from it. The same thing may be said of the executive officer's routine for drill. Have a routine by all means, but do not fear to depart from it, when circumstances require it. There is nothing more imperative to the well working of a ship than a uniformity of doing duty by all the officers of the deck, and this uniformity must be obtained from a fixed model—the execu-

tive officer! The best executive that ever lived will fail if he be not properly supported in his position and duties by the deck officers. Of what use for him to order, and direct, and discipline, if, the moment he leaves the deck, his efforts are not pursued and carried along? There must be a mutual support in these things, or neither party will get along. Suppose the executive cannot always be approved. Suppose he be not liked. So much the worse; but the personality, the like, or the dislike, must never for a moment interpose. If it does, you infallibly weaken yourself and your authority. I cannot too strongly word my language upon this matter. Thrown, as the officers of a ward-room mess are, so closely together, if there is a foible, a weakness, or a fault, it grows bigger every hour in the eyes of the observer. From dislike it is but a step to the vilest passion of hatred. I defy any officer to maintain proper official relations with one whom he hates. There is no place where a manly and noble indulgence should be exercised so faithfully as in a ward-room mess. I have seen dislike grow into hatred so extreme, that the two officers could not and would not remain together long enough to pass the orders of a relief. Their usefulness was entirely destroyed by it. It is better to agree boldly to dislike each other, and there end the

matter. Official courtesy, respect, and etiquette, will come to your aid in a most agreeable and potent manner. Preserve the official relations with jealous care, with extreme fidelity, and you erect a wall of fire around yourself and your person which no personalities can ever pass over. This is one of the highest and bravest duties of an officer.

The officer of the deck is, by his position and the nature of his duties, brought into more direct personal relations with the men than he is generally aware of. Hence that relation should be an object of culture. No body of men will ever be admirers of a rough bully, or an ill-dressed, ill-tempered, or violent officer. Human nature loves contrarieties. There never was a more stupid blunder than to suppose the language and manners of the forecastle carried force with them from the quarter-deck. The greater the contrast of the two, the better it is. If men will curse and swear, if they will use obscene language or coarse jests on the berth-deck, they themselves loathe and despise it on the quarter-deck. It is a mistake to suppose the assimilation of manners of the two parts of the ship will create popularity, or induce a familiar obedience. All men, no matter how humble, no matter how ignorant, no matter how poor, require and seek, instinctively, to be com-

manded by a gentleman in manners and habits, if nothing more. An order delivered in good grammar is the most persuasive of all orders. A blow with a white kid glove behind it will sink as deep as a soiled fist, if properly planted. So that there be brains and courage, men will overlook even a fastidious elegance in a leader. No class of men living so well appreciate the genuine qualities of a cultivated gentleman as the American sailor.

The art of governing men is not to be had in a day. Some men do not get it all their lives. An officer of the deck who is ceaselessly growling, always finding fault, and always in a coarse ill-temper, is a public nuisance. One of the greatest and most valued traits in a sea officer is a broad, gentle, good humor. There is no adornment so beautiful and so much prized and beloved by every body in a man-of-war, as an amiable, even-tempered officer. Let the amiability be tempered with as much firmness and decision as possible: let it be inexorable in discipline and points of duty: but let it be amiability at the last. Such a combination, if it possess a good share of daring and dash, will win favor and make a leader of men.

The relations of the deck officer should be especially friendly toward the men of his watch.

This friendliness in nowise militates against dignity or authority. A gentle tone need not be devoid of force, nor a gentle manner wanting in decision. Discipline should be inexorable as justice, and though every fault should not be punished, not one should be overlooked or hidden.

Most young officers find themselves extremely perplexed, as to what reports should be made to the captain, and what to the executive officer. It is difficult for them to draw the line of distinction. They hesitate about reporting too many things. They fear to make trivial reports, and they fear to make too few. Perhaps, after all, experience will clear up this point better than any other teacher, and much too will depend upon the nature of the orders given by the captain and executive officer.

Whatever may have a bearing, however remote, upon the safety of the ship, or upon the objects of her immediate service, should be promptly reported to the captain. All movements of men-of-war, or other important vessels, and all signals, should be reported to him. The approach and movements of superior officers, or any officers of elevated grade, should be immediately announced. The captain is specially and alone interested in these things.

All accidents of a comparatively slight nature,

any *emeutes*, or difficulties in the ship, whereby the harmony is disturbed, the breaking or the loss of property belonging to the apparel of the vessel, are proper subjects of reports to the executive officer. Whatever may disturb the government or discipline of the ship rightfully belongs to him. Sometimes, indeed, there are facts that concern both captain and executive, and in such cases the reports should be made to both. The officer of the deck need have little doubt as to his duties in these things. If he be in doubt, let him give himself the benefit of it. It is safer to make too many reports than too few. The captain is in the ship, to be disturbed as much as the officer pleases, night or day, in such cases. No apology is ever needed for disturbing the captain by making reports. The captain's customary orders will indicate his wishes in such matters.

The executive officer must depend largely upon the deck officers to obtain and secure a well-disciplined ship. His best efforts will fail if he be not judiciously supported by them. If you desire a well-disciplined ship, you must begin with your watch. Make yourself an example to your watch, and especially in your intercourse with the petty officers. Your relations with these are, and should be, extremely delicate. Inform your-

self carefully what their rights are, and respect them. Petty officers have rights, and very sacred ones too. There is no class of men in the navy which has so earnest a claim upon commissioned and warrant officers as this. They have neither the position, nor dress, nor appointment, that insures obedience to their rank. They are held responsible for almost every thing in the line of duty ; and just in that proportion of responsibility, and want of rank to enforce it, they deserve your protection and support. Disobedience or insubordination toward a petty officer, by an inferior, is a worse offence than if committed toward an officer holding a commission. If you make a boatswain's mate a messenger boy, or a "Handy Billy," or if you use the quartermaster to perform the service of an attendant, you commit suicide to your own dignity and authority. You cannot too rigidly abstain from requiring one petty officer to do another's duty. You cannot inflict a graver wrong to the boatswain's mate of one gangway than to require him to perform service in another. To the young and inexperienced officer of the deck, the sensitive feelings of these men are not generally appreciated. It has become almost impossible to get a good gangway boatswain's mate, or a good quartermaster, on this very account. Nourish the

pride—even the vanity, if you choose to call it that—of your petty officers. Support them in their authority, treat them with respect, and never, as you value their services, infringe upon the rank and rights tacitly conferred upon them as a class, ever since a navy existed. Their rights are traditionary! It is in your relations with this abused and neglected class of men that you can strike at the very heart of discipline and efficiency.

I am aware that I have but lightly sketched an outline of a subject upon which a volume could be written. But if I have drawn outlines only, it must be borne in mind that they are amply traced. No amount of study alone will make a good officer of the deck. A successful deck officer must have a versatile talent, an infinite art, and a rapidity of judgment which few men possess. It is in this capacity that the officer learns what are the essential qualities of a leader, and how to become one. He is on trial of his metal as an officer, and at school, training for the high station of command.

CHAPTER VIII.

FORWARD OR WARRANT OFFICERS.

In the army, officers are denominated *commissioned* and *non-commissioned officers*. The army has no class that assimilates to the warrant officers of the navy. Midshipmen, gunners, boatswains, sail-makers, and carpenters, are warrant officers in the navy. Their warrants are issued on parchment, by the President of the United States, and not by authority of Congress, as the commission declares. In England, the Sovereign's signature alone is appended to the commission of an admiral. We have no regulation in the navy which defines the limit of authority of a warrant, or its distinction from a commission. Custom and tradition alone seem to have fixed the distinction, the principal of which prohibits the warrant officer from sitting upon courts-martial. The authority of the warrant over inferiors in rank is as good and legitimate as that of the oldest commission in existence. The sin of disobedience to it is just as great.

I have a long time held it as a truism, that if discipline is to be maintained in a large body of men, obedience should be the more exacting, in direct proportion as rank *decreases*, not as it *increases*. If the officer of the deck is faithfully obeyed and respected, the captain may have no fears of the obedience granted to him.

Of the four grades of warrant officers, specially so called, for we rarely include the midshipman when the term warrant officer is used, the gunner and boatswain alone are line officers—the sail-maker and carpenter are staff officers. These distinctions are of recent creation. Whatever may be said of it by heated newspaper writers, these officers have from time immemorial been always treated by the line officers holding commissions with great tenderness and respect. And it is one of the beautiful traditions of the service. To the executive officer, to our old first lieutenants and captains they were always pets. The author hopes they may always remain so; cherished and esteemed, as a part of the *personnel* which never can be dispensed with from a ship-of-war. If the recent rage and legislation for rank do not destroy that old affectionate relation which has existed always between this class of officers and others, it will be a matter of profound congratulation to them and the navy generally.

It is painful to observe that many of the younger appointments are becoming poisoned with that most unhappy notion, and without the slightest foundation in fact, that they are "looked down upon" by others. This is the expression in which the idea is couched. In all my personal acqaintance with officers of any merit at all, in all the professional reading I have had, I confess I have never seen this class of officers "looked down upon;" but, on the contrary looked *upon* with extreme official tenderness. And so it should be. It was mystery to every officer of the service, until he became an executive officer, when that mystery soon vanished.

The change in the character of the vessels of the navy has well nigh taken from us the necessity for this valuable class of officers in most of our vessels. But it is earnestly hoped that the United States may yet have frigates afloat, and then we shall always need the corps of *warrant officers*. These officers on board ship are, and should be, the special objects of interest to the executive officer. Their duties seldom call them into relations with any one else; it is with the executive officer that they have all to do.

The gunner and boatswain are the only ones of this class of officers who are termed line officers, that is, one who possesses military authority, and

military rights to command! As for the gunner, all the material, whether of ordnance or ordnance stores, used for fighting, is under his especial care. He is to a great degree responsible for the condition of every gun, musket, and pistol, or boarding-pike. The ordnance stores of every description are under his charge; and the magazines and shell-rooms are the peculiar objects of his care and solicitude. The divisional officers look to him for the good and perfect condition of the battery and its equipments—its carriages, tackle, and general furniture. The executive looks to him for the good condition of the magazines and shell-rooms, and their valuable contents. He requres an accurate account from him of the smallest expenditure in his department. The captain looks to him for the good keeping of his ledgers and returns, and invoices, and the papers pertaining to this department. The young men and boys look to him to decide questions in discussion of a familiar nature on gunnery, and the specific duties of men in detail, at the guns, or at general quarters.

Frequently, too, young divisional officers appeal to him to settle pretty knotty questions on the transportation and handling of heavy guns, or on the details of ordnance instructions. The master or executive officer looks to him for

the good condition of the lower rigging, the main yard and mainsail, if the vessel have such gear. If a mainsail is to be close-reefed, the gunner and his mates are the leaders in the work. If a main shroud is carried away or stranded, if any accident happens to the mainmast, from a ratlin to a truss, the gunner is called upon. Let no man ever call a gunner an idler! If there ever was an outrageous misnomer, this is one. Good men are, however, beginning to think that main yards and anchors, and all such matters, would be far better if left in the hands of the master, and the gunner would be far better employed and more judiciously responsible for guns and ordnance, and that the boatswain should relieve him of these matters altogether.

I cannot but think that the standard of education and character of this noble class of officers should be changed and elevated.

The gunner should be a sailor, no doubt, but if he neglect "book-learning," as it is sometimes called, he will soon show himself unfit for his station. The gunner of a ship-of-war must study, and should read books. And in this connection I cannot forbear the regret that the illiberal allowance of books, on the subjects of gunnery, ordnance, and every kindred subject, in our ships' libraries, is a sad error, which I trust may

soon be obviated. Every book and every publication, in the French or English languages, on the subject of gunnery, should find a prominent place in the ship's library, and that, too, for the purpose of being *used*.

To the gunners of the navy I would say, let no sickly notions of being "*looked down upon*" ever enter your imaginations. If you are intelligent, active, and capable, every body in a man-of-war will look *up* to you, and no power on earth or water can get you to be looked down upon. You must forget and ignore that miserable doctrine, which once obtained, that "book-learning" was ignominious. You must study books: but you must study the beautiful questions of your specialties as an artillerist to the utmost. If there is one thing peculiar to a man-of-war's man, and to all on board a man-of-war, or, in other words, to naval men, it is, that they are the great artillerists of the world. Of late years, in the Crimea, among Russians, English, and French, and among the rebels, and in our own service, whenever a stern, hard, and severe artillery duel is to be fought, the navy has always been called upon. After the unhappy battle of Bull Run, the whole country and the army were anxious, and the navy was called upon to man the heavy forts of General McClellan's left flank,

at Alexandria, where the exposure was very great. The distress of the hour, and the relief to the commander-in-chief of the United States armies, as expressed to the author many times by him, were the highest compliments the navy could receive.

To the boatswains belong the care of all the rigging, whether over yards, mastheads, or in the store-rooms. Daily morning and evening inspections are made by him, or should be made by him, throughout the whole ship. He is required to examine carefully every masthead, every fathom of standing or running rigging, and their eyes or blocks, and report the condition to the executive officer before he goes to breakfast. At the same time, he receives such orders as his superior may see fit to give, in regard to repairs, changes, or remedies. The boatswain has generally been regarded as the leading head of a ship's company. His influence for good or bad in a ship-of-war is of the greatest, and a disobedient or insubordinate boatswain should never be tolerated an hour on duty. There is no person in the ship whose influence for evil is so quickly felt, or who is of such importance to discipline, if his influence be extended for good.

The importance, and the necessity, of this class of officers are so apparent and so great, that no ship

or gunboat carrying a half-dozen guns in battery should ever be without one. It is much to be regretted that the practice obtains, not to give a boatswain to any vessel not a frigate. It is my opinion that every sloop-of-war, and every double-ender in the navy, can lose an anchor or a gun easier than a good boatswain. No matter what the class of vessel may be—be it double-ender, side-wheel, or screw, be it sloop or frigate, monitor or iron-clad—the boatswain is an indispensable part of the vessel's equipment. It is not only the care of the rigging of a ship that he is required for, it is as a leader of the crew. A boatswain of a ship-of-war is supposed to be the most capable seaman in her, and the courage and pluck of a leader are eminently the qualities we look for in his character. To "call all hands" without the boatswain, is the beginning of an incompetent administration, and the boatswain who permits the officer of the deck to neglect or slight him by assigning such duties to his mate, without a stern remonstrance, without injured feelings, and a justly wounded professional pride, should be broken, as a spiritless drone, unfit to carry his *call!*

For my own part, I am fond of remembering the days when the boatswain carried his rattan, and when he sometimes knew how to use it, even

upon the jacket of a wilfully mischievous midshipman.

No boatswain can afford to carry a silver call and not know how, nor be too indifferent to use it well. There is something romantic in the character of a boatswain, and the complete idea of one has always found a prominent place in the naval life on a true man-of-war. It has been so from the days of Elizabeth and Raleigh and Shakespeare down to the era of iron-clads and monitors. No boatswain can afford to be ignorant, however much he may realize the idea of a blunt, tough old sailor. No boatswain can afford to be wanting in a thorough knowledge of seamanship, whether it be that of steam or sails. The course of his professional attainments is immensely enlarged, whatever may be said of it. It is constantly said that we "have no sailors any longer." The fact may be so, but it is the living shame of the *personnel*, not the fault of the growing changes in the navy; not the fault of steam; not the fault of ironsides! It is simply because the noble ambition of a simpler age is dead or dying. It is simply because vanity has usurped the throne of pride, and the false, hateful notion, that a strip of copper lace on the sleeve, placed there by legislation, is sufficient also to legislate the wearer into some vain, mythical region of *position!*

I would invite the boatswains of the navy to read our past naval history; to recall the noble traditions of earlier days, and, if possible, let their calls speak in the old-fashioned tones of music so dear to the heart of every sailor and man-of-war's man! Legislation can't help you. Intelligence, pluck, and the old time-honored, rough-coated bravery can and will, so soon as professional pride regains its supremacy over an imbecile and sickly vanity, and aspirations for court graces, rather than the stern and manly graces of your calling!

The grade of *sail-makers* in the navy has recently been assigned to the position of staff officers. This question of *staff*, as used in the navy, is not identical with the army staff. Admirals and commodores and captains do not have a real staff. The title seems to me a fiction, harmless enough, perhaps well enough. Certainly, there can be no objection to it. It seems to classify with precision certain grades of officers, and this is one good reason why the term should be used, though strangers may be led into error, inasmuch as it has become fashionable to *assimilate navy* things with *army* things.

The sail-maker has, like the boatswain and gunner, his special charge and department, as the name indicates. The routine of his daily morn-

ing and evening duties is similar in his department with the boatswain and gunner. In large sailing-ships, or ships carrying suits of sails, this officer is indispensable. It has been suggested by some ardent controversialists recently, that this valuable class of officers, in common with the other warrant officers, should be abolished! No doubt progress never goes backward. But it may be well to "*keep a bright lookout ahead*," lest progress should, some fine morning, land us high and dry on a sand-bar.

This officer has, perhaps, less military functions and responsibility than any other person in the ship. But does he become jealous for this? Is he discontented because he is alone? I hope not. In large ships—iron-clads, monitors, and the like—this officer has enough to do. In addition to the duties of caring for the ship's sails, there are the tarpaulins to the hatches, the canvas screens, the canvas shoots, the hammocks, the bags, and, in fact, all the material of canvas that is used on board ship—and it amounts to a great deal. This officer is specially an object of interest to the executive officer. In small vessels and in gunboats, his place is supplied by a competent sail-maker's mate. I do not think a regularly appointed and warranted sail-maker has any business on board of a ship of less rating than a frigate. A mate

can perform all the duties with ease; but that mate should be carefully chosen, and well cared for by the executive officer. But in frigates, this officer is as indispensable as any other; and if, for want of his services, the hammocks and bags of the crew are neglected or in bad condition, the executive officer is straightway thrown into trouble and overwhelmed with complaints. Let it be remembered that the hammocks and bags of a ship's crew are the only furniture, the only direct personal objects of comfort that pertain to each individual, no matter how humble or lowly! If these be neglected, discontent, disobedience, and unhappiness are sure to follow. I am sure I need not again remind my readers that an unhappy ship is sure to be an inefficient ship. People will not remain unhappy long, unless there is some good, substantial reason therefor, or unless the community is irretrievably spoiled and demoralized.

There is a class of warrant officers in the navy denominated *carpenters*. Among other wrong titles, or wrong names to things, this is also a misnomer, and I hope may be abolished without delay. Things should be called by their right names, especially in an *exact service*.

The duties of the "carpenter" of a ship-of-war extend literally from kelson to truck. A

ship is like a house—it always requires to be kept in repair. It is the prime duty of this so-called "carpenter" to maintain the hull and spars of a ship, together with all her boats, in the perfect condition in which she is supposed to come from the hands of the *constructor*. This is no easy task. The wear and tear is immense, especially in times of war, or upon any hard and severe service. If the running rigging is found to lead wrong, the carpenter must alter shears and angles. He must revise the work of the constructor. If the standing rigging chafes or works badly, the carpenter is called upon to correct a blunder of the constructor. If the various pumps in the whole system of a ship do not work well, again the carpenter is called upon. If a leak springs unexpectedly from deck or hull, the carpenter replaces the defect of the constructor. If any accident happens—and they are *always* happening—again the carpenter is called to devise remedies, without means or material, except a fertile brain and a mechanical genius. Masts or yards sprung; boats out of order; eye-bolts and leaders not in proper place, the acute eye of the carpenter must replace the oversight of the constructor by his own unaided faculties. I hazard the broad assertion, that no simple carpenter—no carpenter, in fact—can do all this; can give a

cheerful "Ay, ay, sir!" to such demands as are made upon him. He must be a mechanic of the first water. He is to revise the work, and supply deficiencies and errors of constructors, when the ship gets to sea. I have known one of these "carpenters" to shift wheel-ropes and steering-gear all through, of a long double-ender, and work out a complete success in the problem of steering so long and fast a ship, where the naval constructor of the yard had totally failed, and the ship could not be steered within less than sixteen points! If this fact reflects upon the ability of the naval constructor, it reflects credit upon the carpenter, who could do what the constructor failed to do. It matters not whether the vessel be of wood or iron, or whether she be of one rating or class or another, the hull, the woodwork, the spars and boats, and pumps are alike under the charge of the carpenter.

I could wish to see the title of this class of officers changed to that of *assistants to naval constructors*. It does not follow thereby that they must become constructors, but it may follow that, if the officer has sufficient talent, he may become *assistant naval constructor*. He is as much employed in construction as the man who builds the ship. He has no rules or lines to guide him; he is an original worker; and, besides understand-

ing the structure and build of ships and boats, he is, moreover, called upon to remedy the errors of detail which constructors may commit. If a thorough mechanic is anywhere needed, it is in the position of carpenter of a man-of-war. He is the chief of all the mechanics in the ship, except such as are in the engine department, and the sail-maker. The armorer and his mate look to him for orders and instructions. The calkers are to be directed by him in the practice of calking. The carpenters and carpenter's mate are specially his people. His examinations and responsibilities extend out-board and in-board—from royalmast-head to keel. Painters and glaziers are under his directions also. He is essentially the master mechanic of the ship, and his duties never cease. He is not a mere *carpenter*, as we generally use the word. Neither is he a ship-carpenter simply; but every branch of mechanical art and skill is exercised by him. The standard for admission of this class of officers into the navy should be much higher than it is, and the title by which he is known might be changed with great advantage to the service as well as the officer.

Every executive officer feels and comprehends the great usefulness of these four classes of warrant officers more than any one else. The routine of

a man-of-war proceeds so quietly, so noiselessly, so perfectly systematic, that few persons can fully appreciate the quiet *rôle* of duties assigned to warrant officers. Most persons are apt to think they are quite an unnecessary expense to a ship-of-war; but the supervisor of this miniature world, in the capacity of the executive, feels and experiences the full weight of their importance. To do without them would be to remove so many spokes from a wheel, which would soon fall to pieces, or relapse into a rickety, crazy machine, liable to go to pieces at any critical moment. Foster and cultivate the warrant officers of the navy. We can do without many others rather than them. A mistake, in times past, was too often made, in assimilating them with passed midshipmen, and midshipmen in matters of liberty and visiting the shore, without once reflecting that they were men of mature age, and required not that "parental care" which it was incumbent for captains to proclaim to youngsters. But such monstrous misconceptions of duty are fast dissipating, even if we are admitting new ones, nearly as pernicious.

CHAPTER IX.

MIDSHIPMEN AND MASTERS' MATES.

It is now about fourteen years since we have had midshipmen, regularly established on duty, in our men-of-war. The system adopted, of sending this class of officers directly to school, and, indeed, of retaining them there during all their novitiate, has deprived the navy of the services of midshipmen. It has also deprived the midshipmen themselves of much valuable experience—of much professional culture—which they, perhaps, never attain. So soon as the midshipman graduates, he becomes an ensign, now a commissioned officer. It is then too late for him to learn that essential part of practical duty so necessary to him in after life. Much discussion has taken place upon this question; but as the Government has decided the matter, we must accept the fact as we find it. The abuses and bad habits of an earlier day have produced this result, no doubt, as much as any thing else. Whether midshipmen would be benefited by first serving a cruise of two years in

the service, and then going to the school, I shall not discuss. Whether their present education is not more *scholastic*, or whether, indeed, it be not more *pedantic* than is good for them, I will also not discuss. The subject is a delicate one, and we are trying an experiment. West-Point is the model on which our naval education is formed. I am inclined, however, to the opinion, that naval life is much more of a practical thing than army life, and that there is a stronger call for judgment —a judgment, too, aided by stern experience. It is a much easier thing to lose a ship than to lose an army. In the former case, it is not a question of capture; it is a question of life or death. A rush of waters—a gurgling at the hatches and ports—a few moments of settling—and all is over, for ship and crew. While the young ensign is pondering in his mind the parallelogram of forces, these forces take a sudden diagonal—and it is too late. The habits of the school-ship are the habits of the academy, which is officered and manned by the *alma mater*; the habits of the service are not scholastic—are not pedantic surely; and the school-ship and the man-of-war are very far from being the same thing, and they cannot be made the same thing.

When the midshipmen all disappeared from our ships-of-war, it seemed as though the navy

had changed its character! There was a vast blank where before there was light; there was a solitary steerage, where before it had been full of noisy mirth, life, and sharp, cutting wit. The forecastle was deserted of its young lord; the quarter-deck missed the "young gentleman" more than I can tell. It seemed as though a bright light had gone suddenly out, and the ship became solitary and lonely! The performance of duty became extremely awkward; the routine changed; and, I am inclined to believe, the whole service felt chilled by it. About this same time, the order was promulgated to abolish flogging—a noble order, not only a step forward, but a whole seven-league stride at once; but there came no order for a substitute for flogging, and for a year or two our ships were sailed over the world, without midshipmen and without discipline, without the power to punish mutiny, to suppress insubordination—in fact, to carry out the law. It was a strange period—a transition period from something, to something better, no doubt, but which tried the abilities and courage of the officers of the navy to the last degree. But I leave this subject as matter for the historian to chronicle.

The midshipman's berth had to be filled. The department renewed the appointment of an old

class of officers, which had not existed for years. *Masters' mates* were appointed. They were placed on the forecastle and on the quarter-deck, and at divisional quarters. I need not add in what manner those of that day filled the bright places of their predecessors. This practice still obtains, and, with all its incongruities, it would be difficult to adopt a better plan, or fill a void of such magnitude otherwise.

Masters' mates, then, are to take the position and assume the duties of midshipmen. Until the advent of the present war, their position was extremely anomalous. Appointed from whatever source seemed best, these officers had no advancement to hope for—no promotion to expect. Seeing every other person in the service on the way or *in* the way to advancement, no matter how low or how high they might be, *they* alone stood like stocks and stones, without progress and without future, their hopes killed, their zeal dying out; they had neither the animation to be useful nor the spirit to be efficient. They were, indeed, as stocks and stones. Without much or any education, destitute of culture, and often of refinement, they possessed all the keenness of injured sensibilities and humiliation. The crew never respected them: they would not obey them, even when they gave proper orders; and from their peculiar po-

sition as pivoting between officer and man, they were ever producing insubordination, by the fact of insisting upon the execution of improper authority and command. Half, or more, of the insubordination, and consequent punishment, of our crews was traced to this very cause. The collisions between them and the petty officers were constant and unceasing. The men would not and did not regard them as officers, and were reported constantly for disrespect or disobedience, which would never, or rarely, occur to other officers or to midshipmen, who are readily educated to the habits of subordinate command. The *report-books* of ships, at that period, show that three fourths of the complaints and punishments arose from the masters' mates. I have heard men say, repeatedly, when brought up to the mast, and angered by being reported for some trifling offence, that "*these men an't officers any how*"—"they don't know how to treat men." And no amount of punishment could overcome the difficulty.

The advent of the war brought some relief to the difficulty. Masters' mates of a better quality were appointed—some by the department, and large numbers by the commanders-in-chief of squadrons. The prospect of promotion to the rank of ensign and to that of master was a pow-

erful stimulant, and the grade began to assume the character and attitude of a permanent thing, recognized by officers and men. A better demonstration of the effect of no promotion in the grades of officers could not be wished for. You may have "stocks and stones," but not keen, live men.

I have often been asked by masters' mates themselves, who really were anxious to acquit themselves well and dutifully: "What are the duties of a master's mate?" If it were possible to sum up a disjointed and fragmentary statement of those duties, it might be comprehended in this: You are an assistant to the officer of the deck on watch; you are an assistant to the divisional officer at your division of guns. The midshipman's query was perhaps more comprehensively answered: "You were to do whatever you were ordered; you are under the paternal care of the captain." This may not have been so satisfactory; it certainly was vast enough. As an assistant to the officer of the deck, there is certainly duty enough to perform. To walk up and down the deck for four hours; to lounge away the time on hammock-boxes or rails; to quietly look on and see the officer of the deck manning boats, attending to the detail of deck duties; to wait for special orders from him for every thing required

to be done—these are *not* the duties of a master's mate. The officer of the deck who may be so fortunate as to have a master's mate in his watch, deserves a reprimand if he allows himself to attend to every detail of duty, beyond a sharp eye to see that the proper persons are executing his orders. There seems to be an utter want of comprehension, by officers of all grades, as to the assignment of duties to masters' mates. Yet nothing is simpler. Once the general nature of his position known and understood, the master's mate who waits to be called on for help, when duty is being performed, may be given up in despair. The sooner he goes forward, the better. He is the mustering officer of the watch and division. He sees the look-outs posted, and alert. He superintends all the detail duty of the deck. He is the official medium of communication from the quarter-deck to all the officers of the ship. An official message to an officer of whatever rank, should always be carried by an officer, and never by the messenger-boy. Official communications to petty officers and men should be carried by the messenger. If boats are called away, it is the duty of the master's mate to see them properly manned, properly provided, and then report them such to the officer of the deck. If sails are to be taken in or set, he should attend to it himself, and see

that the ropes are properly led out and manned. In the division, his position is indicated in a similar manner. He is the mustering officer, and should use his eyes, at inspection, to assist the divisional officer. He should be permitted to drill the division, so soon as he is capable of it, but never before he is as well acquainted with the exercises as the men whom he attempts to teach, otherwise it would be worse than "blind leading the blind"—it would be insult added to wrong.

Much, very much, must depend upon the individual ability and exertion of the officer himself, if he desires to succeed. The uniform alone will never make an officer, however much he may fancy it would be agreeable. If one man is to command others, he must be superior to them in most things at least. The master's mate is even yet in that floating, uncertain condition between the officer and the man, which occasions embarrassment. It is one of the difficulties he first and last encounters. With a very small salary indeed, he is inclined to lavish it too extravagantly on those necessities of appearance which are absolute in an officer. But it was never contemplated that this class of officers should attempt to maintain a mess, other than that within the reach of the navy rations. Any attempt to do more

than this is folly, and will result, in most cases, in disgrace or crime.

It seems to me, that no more indications need be given to this class of officers, as regards duties, and position, and station. Live within the means of your pay and devote yourself to duty, and in so doing you gradually acquire the knowledge of the profession you have chosen, and perhaps become a close critic of your superior, whom you are mated with to assist. Your official position will never be measured by the extravagance or elegance of your mess, but by the effort to maintain the solid dignity of the grade and rank which the Government has bestowed.

Much may be said of the distribution of officers, to render a ship-of-war efficient. My own observations lead me to feel that a good corps of junior and subordinate officers, of different rank, is in the highest degree necessary to the complete organization and discipline of a man-of-war. The want of midshipmen in the service is severely felt in the matter of discipline, as well as in a great number of cases of duty to be performed. These subordinate classes of officers mingle more directly with petty officers and old seamen, and come in direct contact with the crew of a ship-of-war; and while thus the influence of their education and *esprit du corps* is communicated

throughout, they benefit its moral tone and discipline, in an infinite manner. These officers should not, therefore, be renowned and famous for ignorance or immoral character. The influence for good or evil of subordinate officers is far greater than is generally supposed. They should be encouraged where encouragement will profit; they should be protected where protection is needed; and while a prudent and careful indulgence can be bestowed, it should be tempered with the just rigor of naval discipline. As they are always in such relations with the people of the ship, the tone and character of the officers are passed to the men, and it follows naturally that a proper and judicious government should be exercised over these officers. There is nothing so fatal,—so completely demoralizing to the discipline and efficiency of the crew of a ship, as the bad government and disgust of the inferior officers of that ship.

CHAPTER X.

PETTY OFFICERS.

As I approach this part of my subject, so fruitful in discussion, I feel aware that I am getting into deep water; but deep water is the general indication of "sea-room." I am aware, too, that I am verging gradually nearer to the sensibilities of a certain class of persons, which perhaps I may touch not too lightly. But here is a large and important class of officers, who had been too long ignored, and who perhaps are the most overlooked—perhaps neglected—of any in or out of the naval circle. Observe their history, observe their stations, their duties, and, I may add, responsibilities too. Are they not responsible, indeed, to every body? Are they not looked to for all drudgery, all the dreary detail, all the calls for posts of danger? If an extraordinary effort is to be made, if something unusual is to be done, if a severe task is to be performed, are they not the first ones called upon? Do we not require them to spur the flagging strength and en-

ergy of those under their orders? Do we not require them to set not only an example of cheerful obedience, but of stern and hard endurance? A ship's vitality is in her petty officers; and as I approach this subject, I feel somewhat as though I was about to take up the gauntlet in defence of a class of men honored by our history, honored by tradition, honored by bravery, yet neglected and overlooked to a sad degree. In the French navy nearly all appointments of petty officers are based upon their merits as gunners. I think this system is extreme. There are other qualifications, also, than a knowledge of gunnery required in a ship.

The petty officers of a ship are all made by ratings, upon the order of the captain. The authority competent to create the rating is also competent to unmake it. This authority is never abused. The captain is too well aware of the importance of his ratings to abuse the power.

The selections are generally made by the executive officer, who seeks the past history of the men, the previous service and ratings they have held, and their character in every respect, when the appointments are made probationary for a few weeks or months, to verify his judgment as to capacity. If found capable, they are confirmed. They form a large class of the ship's crew.

The ratings carry with them a slight increase of pay, a great increase of responsibility and authority—the latter of which is very ill defined—and increase of rank, which is equally vague.

When we reflect that these petty officers live, mess, and fare in precisely the same way and under the same conditions as the rest of the crew, and that their associations are intimate, and blended all into one whole, it is matter of surprise that they retain the power of commanding obedience and respect at all. It cannot be done, indeed, when there is not merit. The sole power of this class of officers rests purely upon the superiority of merit, unaided, except rarely, by the usual attendants of rank. When these facts are considered carefully, a proposition laid down in an earlier page becomes apparent. Obedience should become the more imperative precisely as we descend the scale of rank. Disobedience, or abuse, or insubordination to a petty officer is infinitely more aggravating than when committed against any one else. If the petty officer is not supported in his authority, he has no business to occupy the position.

The principal solution to the question of discipline appears to lie here. What is discipline? It is the right government of men, and an efficient system of order. An unhappy ship can never

be in good discipline. Mere arbitrary coërcion to obedience is not discipline. Have petty officers rights? I am aware that that word has a fearful sound, and a portentous significance to a good many officers. But the age has declared that all men have rights, and the fact may as well be admitted gracefully. The rights of men-of-war's men are not many, but they are dear and sacred. We may ignore and despise them, but the fruits will be bitter disappointments, and the indifference will be visited with retribution, sooner or later. Very few young officers, and not many older ones, I fear, bear in mind that the sensibilities of brave, but humble, men, are strong and holy. A reckless violation of them, no matter on how small occasions, will prove disastrous to the efficiency and discipline of a ship-of-war.

It should be the first care of a commander and his executive officer to cultivate a sense of self-respect among the petty officers. Officers of the deck, who have not long held that position, never think how humiliating it is to give improper orders to their inferiors, or to require without cause that one petty officer should perform the duties of another. There is nothing a boatswain's mate dreads so much as to be ordered to leave his own station to perform the duty of another. There is

nothing so mortifies one petty officer as to require him to do a duty that does not belong to him, if unnecessary to require it. The allotment of a station to him is as sacred and dear as that assigned to a commander. To humiliate him before the crew is the gravest wrong. If he does wrong, he will submit to punishment as another. But an act of injustice ruins his usefulness for ever. The act of carrying on duty with these men is an extremely delicate one. It is that I would impress upon all young officers. An indulgence in money, or in "*liberty*," a confidence and trust to responsibility, are little rights which no one will more fully appreciate than the old petty officer. If he has a complaint, listen to it patiently. If he has a grievance, redress it. If he has been wronged, right the wrong as publicly as it was given. Impress him with a deep sense that he is of importance in the ship, and that her honor is as much to him as it is to yourself.

Moreover, the petty officers are the only medium through which the crew can reach the executive, or commander. Such applications for personal intercourse should never be denied, or granted grudgingly. There is a point, too, at which such liberties should find a limit. I have seen a ship's company so spoiled, with frequent and idle appeals to the captain, that they were

on the verge of mutiny. It seems that a very simple judgment can discriminate when an abuse is made of a privilege. Whenever it is possible to show a deference to or compliment a good act, or a marked deportment of good behavior, it should never be omitted. These are some of the rights to which men of this class cling with real tenacity, and which are tacitly theirs.

There is nothing so much conduces to the efficiency of a ship, as a studious care to grant cheerfully the favors and protection of the little comforts of our petty officers, together with good humor and amiability. Cheerfulness is worth more to a ship than good rations. Men will go hungry, so that they may live cheerfully and in good humor. A perpetual fault-finding executive, or officer of the deck, is a curse to a ship-of-war.

It seems to be a misfortune that a greater distinction is not made in the uniform of the petty officers. Something is certainly needed, to draw the lines of distinction clearer than they are. A badge upon the sleeve, simpler than the one now prescribed, might be suggested; or the shirt might perhaps be more prominently marked. Under the present pressure for time, occasioned by drill and exercise, there is not opportunity to work those tedious silk eagles, which are now rarely worn.

It has been suggested more than once that the chief boatswain's mate, the chief gunner's mate, and chief quartermaster's, should be required to wear their jackets all the time. There is no reason why it should not be done, save the peculiar prejudice of sailors to it. Why that prejudice exists I am at a loss to know, but it does exist to an extraordinary degree. An effort on the part of commanding officers might overcome it. A fashion too much prevails for a certain class of petty officers to wear flannel sack-coats. Nothing is more slovenly, nothing more out of taste, and nothing more calculated to bring disrepute upon the time-honored jacket. A greater attention to this matter of dress is surely required throughout the whole navy. The present cap is an outrage upon the face, the neck, and the whole person of a man. It is not a lawful uniform; it is not appropriate, and it is not ornamental.

It is probable that this matter of uniform for the crews of our ships has been unavoidably neglected, or overlooked. There are grave reasons why the whole subject should be looked to, and perhaps a great change made. If our medical officers would take time to look into it, they might find many useful and healthful observations to make on the manner of dressing our seamen in the navy. Each rating should be distin-

guished clearly in the dress; and the petty officers have as great, or greater, need of being distinguished from their subordinates, as others of a higher rank. The whole class of petty officers should be elevated. It should be a rank to be eagerly sought for, on account of its honors, its emoluments, and distinction. That distinction could nowhere better begin than by giving them a uniform better adapted to their positions.

We should regard the petty officers as the main bulwark of a ship. They are the chosen men of all the crew for experience, length of service, devotion to their profession, and genial, manly, and intelligent qualities. They are all picked men. They are the leaders, when leaders are wanted. They are the tutors and teachers of the rest of the crew. They give tone and character to the ship; and, above all, we rely upon them to inculcate discipline, and then to support it. It is our duty to sustain them with great care in the exercise of their authority, and observe that they be not treated with disrespect, either by those above or below them. Intercourse with them should and can be always friendly and pleasant, and very often, indeed, confidential. I never knew an instance where responsibility was reposed in them that it ever was abused. If a petty officer is frequently found wanting, it is no use to find

fault; it is better to break him at once and promptly. We should instruct young and inexperienced officers especially, to use the greatest circumspection in their official or personal intercourse with them. There is nothing more difficult for young officers to learn, than the proper discrimination of conduct to be held toward their subordinates. One of the most fruitful sources of discontent, and consequent inefficiency of a crew, arises from this one fact. If the petty officers are once disgusted, jaded, discontented, and indifferent to the position they hold, it will be a hard task indeed to make much of the ship.

I do not wish to be understood that this class of officers should never be punished, or corrected, for wrongs. I do not mean to say, they cannot, and do not, commit wrongs, or deserve rebuke, as well as others. The same inflexible justice should obtain here as elsewhere. Nay—the second, certainly the third grave offence should be confronted with the last penalty of the law. But these men are human—and they are tried more in their patience than any class of men in the navy—and great allowances should always be made. An officer will never go far wrong, who forgives the wrong, when penitence is the pleader. Men of iron endurance, and noble, modest worth, as a class! An infinite world of virtues and heroism

exists in their untold histories. Uncomplaining and silent as they are devoted and faithful, there is not an old officer of the navy who does not frequently look back upon his naval life, and find many of its hard and dreary passages brightened and ennobled by the memory of some one of these men, whose career in the service has been in parallel lines to his own, and who can recount a thousand deeds, or a multitude of acts, that would shed lustre upon a higher name! The lives of these have passed into tradition—that history of all others the truest, the dearest, and the most honorable. This class of men stands in no need of being petted or humored. They are too hardy a race for that; they only require fair play, and an honest chance in the common struggle for the rights inherent to their manhood.

CHAPTER XI.

THE SAILOR.

I HAVE already stated that there are four grades or classes, composing the combatant portion of a ship's crew, after the class of petty officers. These many gradations of ratings, which constitute grades in the scale of *personnel*, are eminently wise, in the organization of a crew. There is always a hope for the aspirant to a better position. There is always food for ambition. There are always checks, and fears of falling into something lower. They infuse a living vitality into the whole body politic. I do not see why the Anchor should symbolize Hope. Hope is a close kindred to Ambition, and *its* symbol is the Eagle!

After selecting the petty officers, there remain several seamen among the crew. These are generally composed of young men, who have seen service, and profited by their service, and who possess the ambition to learn, to lead, and to advance. They are smart, active men, for the most part. Then there are others—older men—who

have seen long service everywhere, both in and out of the navy. These men are perhaps indifferent to the allurements of active leadership, and are something of slow, steady plodders in their way. They are invaluable in their place. The seamen are distributed equally throughout all parts of the ship, and at each gun. They represent some special part of the ship, and become, insensibly, teachers to the younger men. It is important to have a thorough knowledge of their natures, and, so to speak, of their official relations to others. These men are always so stationed in the *bills* that at "all hands" they take the important positions. They are the leadsmen, on whose report the safety of the ship often hangs. They are the steersmen, on whose steady but quick eye the executive officer greatly depends. He is the leading man at every important post.

He is already so well drilled by past experience that he readily acquires the facility of acting, when he is placed at something new. It is easy to teach him, for he teaches himself.

The officer of the deck, and the executive officer, soon learn to distinguish this class of men from others, and they are not slow to call upon them. Whenever it is possible, a good young seaman should be marked for advancement to a petty officer. They should always feel that pro-

motion is before them, and the first happy opportunity will bring it. I think executive officers and others do not sufficiently estimate this power of promotion, which authority confers upon them. It does not seem to be sufficiently availed of, for objects of discipline and efficiency. There is not a more powerful agent in the hands of an executive, for good to his ship, than this of promoting men from one rating to another. It is true, the men must be so cultivated as to appreciate it. Promotion should not be considered a stepping-stone to drudgery and fault-finding. Vacancies for these promotions generally occur much faster than men can be found to fill them. But this too is sometimes the fault of officers, as well as of other circumstances. A good seaman should be a marked man, and he will soon grow into rapid favor. I have seen some ships where capable men could not be induced to accept the petty officer's berth; so low was the self-respect, and so wanting in professional pride were the seamen! But those days are happily passed, and a class of men are growing into service who are only too eager for such gifts. There were two reasons for such a state of things: one of which was, that petty officers as a class were not properly appreciated; and another was, the low order of men in the service.

Ordinary seamen are rated a grade lower in pay and position. These men are almost all, without exception, ambitious of becoming seamen. There are great fears of their being advanced faster than they deserve. Like the seamen, they are distributed equally throughout all parts of the ship, and at the guns. This careful and accurate blending of classes of men together on duty, begins to show how perfect the system of our organization is to the young officer. While he has the example of superior pay, and authority, and trust, above him, among the seamen, he has also a large class of men who are again subordinate to him. He lives and moves in the very midst of activity and stimulants to do well. There can be no dead-wood, no drift-wood floating upon a dead sea here. Every possible incentive to do well is around and before the ordinary seaman, as to others. He will rarely linger in this rating longer than one, or at most two cruises. Seamen are, after all, educated pretty fast. But it requires the unwearied attention of the executive officer, aided by the watch officers, to keep pace with his duties and his obligations. These men should be constantly put forward to the higher duties. Whenever it is possible, they should be sent to the lead. No executive officer can afford to lose opportunities

of calling out the abilities of his men. He and all of us must remember, that we are making seamen, as well as sailing and fighting our ships. Use the greatest discretion and judgment in selecting seamen from this class. Next to ability, and general aptness for duties, let good character be the essential claim for the promotion. Indeed, this quality should be the *first* considered, for let a man be ever so smart, ever so good a seaman, if he does not possess a character that will bear trust, he should never be considered as an applicant. An ordinary seaman of notoriously bad habits should never be advanced to the rate of seaman. He may as well be given over at once, for sooner or later he will be broken, and his fallen condition will render his estate worse than it was before.

It is while in this rating that men become good boatmen. Nearly all the boat's crews of a ship are taken from the ordinary seamen. A more important branch of duty than boat-duty can hardly be specified. Broken oars, lost row-locks, a plank stove in, or a gunwale smashed, are the torments of an executive officer.

The landsmen constitute one half of a ship's company. The proportion is large — too large indeed for a ship that is expected to be ready for action soon after she is in commission. The

large number of landsmen which constituted the crew of the lamented Lawrence, was the cause of his unhappy but gallant death, and the surrender of his ship. Yet we may not too readily regret it, for he has left us a heritage in his dying words that will be as imperishable as his fame.

A careful distribution of this class of men throughout the ship, always mixed and associated with due proportions of numbers of the superior ratings, obviates much of the difficulty which otherwise would be insurmountable. With a careful and judicious amount of drill, teaching, punishments, and rewards, these men soon become useful, rather than obstructions to the progress of duty. When every body above and around them are actively engaged in professional but strange duties to them, they soon catch the spirit of emulation, and make efforts to learn. But, after all, much depends upon the character of the men themselves, and from what previous occupations they have sprung. The common shore-laborer rarely emerges from the rails of the quarter-deck, or from the dignity of an afterguardsman. The farmer or the mechanic will. The fisherman and the whaler are the best materials out of which to make a ship's crew. The daily drudgery of ship's duties, the sweepers, the swabbers, the scrubbers, and cleaners, cannot strap

blocks, or pass seizings, or reeve running gear. Their lot of labor falls to the capacity suited to it.

Enlisted boys, not apprentices, are assigned to the complement of vessels, for the purposes of messengers and powder-boys. There are rarely over half a dozen detained for each ship. These boys are under the special care of the executive officer, who again assigns them to the peculiar guardianship of a master-at-arms. Small and unintrusive as this class is to the people of a man-of-war, they fulfil an important function in the vast detail of the organization. In large ships, especially in our long-floored steamers, the officer of the deck, or executive officer, has constant need of sending official messages from one end to the other, and to different parts of the ship. But it is not intended that official messages should ever be carried to an officer by them, so long as there is a master's mate on board; nor is it the duty of a master's mate to convert the official messenger of the quarter-deck into errand-runner for himself. This practice is a common abuse, and no officer of the deck, or executive officer, should go long without a stern rebuke, who permits it. Ship's boys should never be converted into attendants or servants, and the fact was so important, that the Department wisely issued an

order prohibiting the practice. These boys should be practised at every exercise the ship affords. They are of an age to learn rapidly, and, if their ambition be not early quenched, they will soon become as useful as seamen.

There is no title perhaps so monstrously abused in popular language and notions as that of *sailor*. To go on board of a ship, and assist at making a passage across the ocean, and then to unload her and come back again, is very far from making a sailor of a man. He is more of a travelling stevedore than a sailor.

To sign the books of a passenger steamer, and make a voyage in her from port to port, where the highest duties are to wash off the filth of emigrant passengers, does not make a sailor either.

Going out on the banks of Newfoundland in a schooner, to drop anchor and fish for cod, is not making a man a sailor. He is about as far from being a sailor as the cod are from being meat. Oystering and clamming are very useful vocations, but one may pursue them many years with credit, and yet never become a sailor! very far from it!

A man may track a tow-path of a canal all his life, and even then not become a sailor. Even a three or four years' cruise round the world, in a whaler, does not make a sailor. It makes a very

hardy, courageous fellow, but he is far from being a sailor still.

Steamboat-men, on tugs, steamboats, or our Sound steamers, are not sailors, though they sometimes assume the title for its honor, and claim a usurped privilege, which is a theft. Men may live on the water, or near the water, or travel over it in long voyages or on pleasant excursions, and yet be no nearer the mark of a sailor than any other traveller or lounger.

In earlier days, when ships carried heavy crews, and mounted cannon, and carried arms and powder, with the prospect of using them—and when, indeed, they *did* use them—they carried all the attendants for such purposes, and a corps of officers—surgeons, chief mates, and supercargoes and pursers. Then they became sailors, such as the best ships and nations boasted of. A kind of military system and organization and discipline obtained, and there was some approach to the modern idea of what a sailor is. Perhaps my idea of a sailor is a large one; if so, I am not ashamed of it. The character of their duties and education, the life they lead, the discipline and responsibilities under which they are reared, make them a far superior class of men to others of their grade in society. Their lives are a perpetual combat with danger in every

form: danger from accidents, if they go aloft or if they go below; danger from shipwreck from storm, from a faulty ship; danger from air, fire, and water; danger from disease; danger from battle; danger from boat-service — a service full of peril always; danger from collision; and danger everywhere. From the hour he puts his foot on deck, that hour begins a contest with difficulty. How many years of such life can a man lead, and not have his wits sharpened or his intellect brightened? The nature of his duties are ever drawing upon his mind for original thought, and a new judgment from the day before. His very education is to attain a fruitful source of intelligent remedies for whatever unexpected thing may happen. The mind must become fruitful of resources indeed, when life or limb are always at stake. The discipline of his life makes him subordinate and respectful, and gives him a reverence for *law*, and for whatever is superior to him. Reverence, alas! It is a word quite going out of use, as its idea has long since among men. Discipline, too, makes him polite. There is a polish in the manners of a good sailor that would grace many other classes of men. I never knew a lady who did not respect—almost admire—the sailor. She feels instinctively that he is a protector and a

guardian. There is that in his manner that still speaks of chivalry. The finest act of politeness ever heard of is now a matter of history. Even in the polite and gallant age of Queen Elizabeth, the greatest sailor of the times could offer his doublet to his mistress for a carpet over a mud-pool. No lady ever felt afraid of a sailor — not even of a drunken one. Philip drunk, in her eyes, is safer than some people sober. The life-long habits of a perilous career, the habit of looking danger in the face deliberately in infinite ways, will at last make man brave. Combine bravery with politeness and humble modesty, and you constitute gallantry of the highest type. A sailor has something knightly about him, however roughly it may be expressed. If he fights, if he conquers his adversary, he is the most generous conqueror in the world; he not only forgives—he embraces and lavishes love upon his late adversary. You see this fact in every-day life aboard ship. He is a stubborn foe, but a generous one. He cruises over the world to police it, and if he meets wrong, he redresses it. The law of nations requires this of him. In China and Japan, the cause of one nationality was the cause of all — England, France, and America. The man-of-war is a knight-errant, and the man-of-war sailor instinctively becomes so, by the very

duties and discipline of his life. I never knew two sailors nourish a life-long hatred or grudge. They will quarrel, and fight it out right manfully, till one be victor, and then they are the best of friends. It is not simply living on the ocean, I conceive, that produces this peculiarity of character. It is the sum of all his surroundings. He is violent, rapid, direct, in all his acts and thoughts. He is not skilled, moreover, in the profound arts of petty vices, such as nowadays taint the society of all men, especially *business men*.

Some persons have talked a great deal about the sailor's generosity. Shore people are always harping upon this romantic virtue; others, and those who go to sea, aver that the sailor is the greatest miser in the world, and the stingiest and meanest of men. Both these views are extreme; both are one-sided, and both are right.

The sailor is the most profound stickler among men for what he conceives to be his *rights*. He will not bate a jot of them; he will fight to the bitter end for them. It is not because his pay is so small; it is because that little, to the quarter cent, is his; his by divine and human right. Paymasters sometimes make very slight mistakes. The sailor is ever on the "bright look-out" for them, and woe to the man who is in the wrong! It is astonishing how close he is with the

accounts and paymaster's reckoning. He will detect the very fraction of an error. Once the money in his pocket—once the business over, and full possession given—the sailor is generous, lavish, a very spendthrift with his hard-earned dollars. In two ships I have commanded, I found it to be necessary to interpose my authority to repress an extravagant generosity. In one ship, the fashion got vogue, of making up contributions of money for every men who left the ship to go home for discharge. I knew one man who went away thus with five hundred dollars, contributed by the crew of his vessel. The amount of subscriptions was thenceforth more limited, and, it is needless to say, reduced. The same thing happened in another vessel. The aid societies, and benevolent agents to collect funds for them, always know when a ship-of-war is in port. Subscriptions of this sort also required at last to be checked.

It is needless to gainsay these facts, which almost any commander has observed. I never knew an instance of a sailor hesitating to put his name to a charity subscription, or to share his purse even with a vicious comrade. Yet I have known him to refuse to sign his accounts for months, on account of a dispute with the paymaster over a few cents.

Are these strange contrarieties of character a mystery? I think not. They are the inseparable adjuncts of his life and education. By the word education, I do not mean the refinements of learning. I mean the severe, stern lessons of a life of various and infinite conflict with things. As a general thing, our sailors all know how to read and write; but books, alas! are luxuries they never grasp. Theirs is the ripeness of a matured thought over the realities of a bitter, and often of a too thankless life. Rough and crude they may be, but there is always to be detected a cutting logic in the reasonings of their mind, that arrives at a definite and certain conclusion.

I confess I look upon this character of the American sailor with profound respect, not to say affectionate esteem. There is a jewel of inestimable value under the blue flannel shirt, that many a class more favored, more wealthy, more learned, might envy till they despaired. Our sailors are the children of the sea—the orphans of the land; poor waifs of forgotten and neglected manhood, floating like drift-wood upon the world; the shield of the nation's rights and laws; the protectors of our nationality and commerce; the bulwarks of our land. The ephemeral applause of our newspaper literature rewards their passing achievements, but it dies out before the smoke of battle

dissipates. Long after they are laid in miserable graves, with torn bodies and stripped of limbs, whose tombstones mark the sandy beaches of every shore; when their noble lives have ceased to consecrate victory; when a peaceful and prosperous people are enjoying immunities of *their* earning—then, perhaps, and not till then, will history tell the world of their virtues, and honor their modest and noble *worth*.

CHAPTER XII.

NAVAL APPRENTICES.

THE Government of the United State has instituted an entirely new system of Naval Apprentices for its service. Some twenty years ago, there existed in the navy an apprentice system, but it had so many defects about it that it proved a failure, and a loss to the national interests. Boys of a certain age were taken into the navy, and drafted on board of different ships as they were commissioned and sent abroad, a certain number to each vessel. The officers were required to take special care of these youths; they were required to drill them, and practise them in the details of seamanship. With the usual zeal of naval officers, they entered into the principle with great zest. But seamanship was about all they were taught; and, indeed, all that the exigencies of the service and the case admitted. These boys were thrown at once, while in susceptible and tender years, on the berth-deck; they mingled freely among the crew; they contracted, as far as they

could, the vices of older men. They learned rapidly — became good petty officers and good seamen in an incredibly short space of time. The very fact that they were a class set apart, occasioned jealousy, envy, hatred, and malice; and, moreover, this fact added somewhat to the possibilities of an abuse, and there was an abuse, and a grave one, in spite of the officer who was generally detailed to occupy himself with their welfare. The youths grew up the very best sailors on the sea, after schooling in a man-of-war for three or six years. But, after a time, they suddenly disappeared, and in a few years those who had taken an interest in them discovered that they had fled—the bird they had loved and fed, had flown! The Government had lost the fruit it so carefully nurtured. Nearly every one entered the merchant service, and of these youngsters who may have survived the accidents and perils of a seafaring life, there is not one to-day, who cannot purchase the entire estate of any admiral in the navy. This, indeed, was love's labor lost, and the Government gave over the attempt, which resulted in educating captains and officers for the merchant marine.

The present apprentice system is intended for a nursery in which these young plants may be cultured into thrifty oaks for the nation's serv-

ice. They are taken between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, at a period when judgment can be made upon the character and mind of the youth. Like the young appointments at the Naval Academy, they are given away by the parent or guardian to the country. The Government becomes their sponsors, and is responsible for their training and morals. At the age of twenty-one this responsibility ceases, and it is supposed that the youth has by this time so identified himself with his profession, by his tastes, his peculiar and special education, by habits which unfit him for other avocations, as well as by the incitements to advancement, that he is ever after engrafted into the service of the state. His education has been purely professional. He has been taught all the arts of the seaman, and an ample amount of those of the navigator. The Government is so jealous of this education, that it has established school-ships apart from other vessels of the navy, for his special education. These ships are officered, organized, and strictly modelled on those of regular men-of-war. Carefully selected petty officers and a few seamen are placed there to drill and teach, as well as to assist in forming that peculiar character which belongs to naval men. Schoolmasters are appointed to give lessons in navigation, and the solid and

simple branches of learning, which are fitted to make the apprentices practical men and prepare them for stations of petty and subordinate officers. Hence it is contemplated that, on the day a youth binds himself to the navy, the parent surrenders him for life to the service of the state, which cares for him, educates him, and disciplines him for a career of usefulness and honor. It is not contemplated that all these apprentices shall become commodores and admirals. While the path is opened to the ambition and ability of the boy to attain the highest grades, it is not expected that there will be many whose capacity will carry them so far on the way to greatness. But it is believed and hoped that no one need attain his years of manhood without becoming an ornament to his country, and a credit to the paternal hand that has raised him.

As in every condition of apprenticeship, it is not intended that the boy shall receive wages of a sufficient amount to excite his cupidity or love of money. He is clothed, fed, and has a little to spare. His wages are stored in his mind, and in the ornaments of a character formed to last for ever.

I regard this apprentice system of our navy as one of the most beautiful features in it. It is of recent creation. It is born in the same hour with

the new navy itself. Every youth thus planted in its midst is a tie which binds the navy with the interests and affections of our people. Whenever the youth has a mother or a sister, there lives an imperishable interest and pride in the ship to which he belongs, and her course over the ocean will be fondly traced and followed by the instincts of affection of those left behind. The navy will become better known, and, we trust, only known to be better appreciated. Hitherto the great majority of the men in our navy have been castaways from the land. Men flung adrift from the world by misfortune, by poverty, by the loss of kindred and home, have found an asylum upon the sea, where their bitter misanthropy could be lost in the immensity of sky and ocean. No tie beckoned to them from the land, its interest, or its love. There was no churchyard they could look to where their graves might one day be crowned with flowers. The land had for them only visions of wrong, neglect, and vice, which at times grew black with hatred. Of such materials pirates were often made, but of such materials it is hard to make a navy that a nation can really cherish. Certain it is, that society has vaguely looked upon navy men, generally, as not being worthy of their highest regard. Vices and characters have been attributed to them which they never possessed, and

which they disown with scorn. These castaways of the land despise and scorn the petty meanness and narrow vices which even a very respectable portion of civil society is tainted with.

Let us hail the advent of these youths in our midst with gratulation! The officers of their school-ships have a noble duty before them, and one which they will perform with enthusiasm, pride, and pleasure. There seems, however, one thing to be profoundly regretted. The laws of the navy do not give them quite that authority for discipline which youths need. The grave punishment which is proper to a grown man—to an old offender—is totally inapplicable to an apprentice. Who would wish to see a boy of fifteen in irons? Such a punishment, by its anomalous character, would prove a failure. Yet such is the law. The problem is difficult to solve. At a time when nearly all parents have repudiated the command of the wise preacher, it would be objected to if the officer in his official capacity were to adopt it. Yet it seems as though that official capacity was the very one to decide whether the rattan should be used, or not.

We must not forget or abandon the principles of our discipline in this naval nursery. If we would grow hardy, noble plants there, we must remember that they will not flourish of them-

selves. If we would send forth *leaders* for the crews of our ships, the education and discipline must be such as to make leaders. Sooner or later these youths will become the leaders of the service, and the past should admonish us that the question of apprentices is full of gravity to the future, as it is full of hope to the present.

CHAPTER XIII.

MARINES.

THE marines of the navy have been called "*sea infantry*." They are a class of men apart and distinct from all others of the navy. They have been a much-abused people, although a secret recognition of their value has always been tacitly acknowledged by officers and men.

These men are soldiers—*sea-soldiers* I may call them—and an uninstructed observer would not ordinarily distinguish them from the soldiers of the army. In earlier times, soldiers from the army were drafted for sea service, and were expected to burn all the powder and do all the fighting, while the sailors merely took care of the ship and sailed her over the world. This practice finally became obsolete, and, as sailors began to think more of themselves, they claimed the privilege of handling the great guns as their exclusive right. Still a certain number of soldiers were retained for special uses, and right well have they served them.

It is the practice now to allot a *guard* of marines to each ship-of-war, depending upon her strength and importance. Vessels of the third-rate have a corporal's guard; a second-rate ship has a sergeant's guard; and a first-rate, a lieutenant's guard. These are in general terms the allotments.

Drill and exercise sailors at small-arms as perfectly as possible, yet when they come to act on shore, in companies and battalions, as infantry, they make straggling work of it without some soldiers to guide and form them. All ships-of-war are required to be able to land their forces and operate at times on shore. Hence they are drilled and exercised to a certain extent to meet such emergencies. The marines are often called upon to operate thus. In times of peace, the Government always found the marines of the navy a staunch and faithful guard in cases of riot or disturbance in our large cities. They have been honored with the title of the *Ever Faithful*, and I am glad to believe they earned it. In consequence of the absence of our regular army upon our frontiers, the marines have acted as the home-guard to the Government for many years. They have been tried everywhere in our large cities in hours of temporary disturbance, when the civil authorities were too weak to preserve order and law, and they have

still been the "*ever faithful.*" The celebrated John Brown raid, at Harper's Ferry, at the commencement of our intestine difficulties, was crushed by a handful of marines sent from the capital. When treason and rebellion were fomenting in frightful passion all around the horizon, the marines were still the "ever faithful."

Much has been said about the natural antipathy of sailors to marines on board our ships. I think this is a great error. Since the necessity arose which frequently prevented the guard of marines from being assigned to some of our vessels, I have heard more than one sailor and petty officer lament their absence. Sentry duty is intolerable to a sailor. He will take a lookout at a masthead or a cathead, and keep it securely; but make him a sentry, and put him on post, and he will shirk his duty in the face of court-martial or punishment.

The chief duties of the marine guard, on a ship-of-war, are those of a sentry. The sailor loves to see his stiff, erect form pacing up and down on his post, with his clean trimmings and bright glittering musket. They feel a sense of security to see him there, which is fully shared by those aft on the quarter-deck.

Sentries are placed at conspicuous points about a ship, and they receive their orders from the

marine officers only. They are always on police duty, whether below or above. All prisoners are under their charge: objects and places of trust are assigned to them, and in all cases of alarm, or of an *emeute*, or of disturbance, the marines are required to preserve order and maintain the peace of the ship. Great preservers they are, with their bright but pitiless bayonets! A ship-of-war loses her true character without a marine guard.

These men are regularly and carefully drilled at infantry exercises. We all know the admiration with which Napoleon drilled the marine guard of the English ship that was carrying him to St. Helena. Of late years, however, the practice has obtained of giving the guard one or two guns of the battery to drill and to fight. They have shown themselves good artillerists, and take great pride in it. They are also drilled at the light artillery pieces, so that in case of need their services can be called into play.

Many officers have complained bitterly that the marines are not allowed to perform the holy-stoning and cleaning of a ship, the same as the sailors. This is quarrelling with one's own bread and butter, or with one's self. They do stand watch at sea; they do haul ropes; they do pass water; but beyond this it is right they never should go.

Do we forget that this sentry duty is a dreary, tedious, responsible task? Do we forget that they are a class of men apart, with special services assigned to them all the time? Are we unmindful of the fact that these men are the guardians of the police and repose of the turbulent community about us? I fear so. The separation and distinction of them as a class from their comrades of the blue shirts, is a prime necessity. Living, messing, and associating with the sailors from year to year, it is a mystery that they retain their special characteristics at all, and he who would totally obliterate them is an official suicide.

I have been surprised that young officers have so little and poor an idea of sentry duty. I have seen an officer of the deck deliberately order a sentry to come down from his post, and that, too, in terms of ignominy and contempt. Instead of addressing him as Sentry, the title was disrespectfully withheld, and he was addressed as *Soldier!* A sentry is placed upon post by an officer of his guard, no matter if he be a corporal, sergeant, or lieutenant, commissioned or non-commissioned, and from him, and him alone, he receives his orders. No power existing can relieve him or change his orders except the officer of his guard. A sentry is a sacred person. Officer of the deck

or lieutenant, captain or admiral, cannot touch him—they cannot relieve him or remove him legally; a corporal of the guard can. A sentry on post knows no rank, no power, no authority living except the power that put him there; and he is as justifiable in pushing his bayonet through a commissioned officer, even if he be the officer of the deck himself, as he would be at a sailor or any stranger. A sentry is a sacred thing; and if he bid you stop, or give you an order which you do not obey, no rank can save you from his bayonet or his ball-cartridge, if he knows his duty. I had as soon think of disobeying the President as a sentry on post, however humble. The commander of a ship cannot place him there, and he cannot remove him, once he is there, except by passing his orders through the marine officer. The sentry knows no rank, no person, no authority, save one—which is legitimate. The President of the United States was not long ago stopped by a sentry from passing from one room to another in his own mansion. He had the good sense, and the respect for orders, to obey him. Many young officers of the navy may learn a lesson of value from this fact. There is no official crime so great as the violation of a sentry on post. There is no excuse for its commission except the grossest ignorance or the most wilful outrage.

In all cases of great emergencies, the value of the marines is felt and appreciated. There is no alarm in a ship like the cry of fire. It fills all minds with terror. It is appalling, and in the scene of alarm and bewilderment that follows, even in the best drilled ship, the calm, cold attitude of the guard, drawn up in file on the quarter-deck, gives the only relief and sense of security. There is one invariable station for the marine guard at all alarms. They are drawn up on the quarter-deck, ready to receive any order the commander may give.

In times of battle, the marine guard act as sharpshooters or rifle-men, if not otherwise directed. They always follow the boarders when called away, and their bristling bayonets are ready to receive the boarders of the enemy. The confidence inspired by their presence, and cold, unflinching look, is a wonderful support to the boarding party.

I confess I have a great esteem for the marine corps of the navy, and I should feel as though we had lost one of our great essentials in a man-of-war if that corps were abolished, as I am sure it never will be. No army soldiers can ever take their place. They have a special fitness for their peculiar position, which education and experience alone can give. They are sailors in their pecu-

liar way. They are sea-soldiers in one word, combining the knowledge, drill, adaptabilities, and peculiarities of soldier and sailor in one. It is a happy combination of qualities and service, that is a mystery to even sea-officers generally. No ship is perfect without them. The experiment has been faithfully tried, and found a failure. I could wish to see the full dress—as it is called—of the guard abolished. There could be nothing better, or in finer taste, than their present undress. I would like to see them furnished with a long-barrelled breech-loading rifle, and the heavy infantry drill totally abolished. The marine is essentially a rifleman and an artillerist combined. I would like to see a guard on every third-rate of the navy, and I believe the service would be infinitely benefited thereby.

The guard of marines should be the special pet of executive officers—not a pet to be spoiled or humored, but to be cared for, as he would his right arm. He should see that an undue interference by the officer of the deck, or young officers of the ship, should never be tolerated for a moment. Above all, he should preserve the inviolability and sacred character of the sentry and corporals with a jealousy that should be direct and personal. Remember that they are the "ever faithful;" they have earned the title, and

they have a right to be permitted to retain it without reproach or blemish. They will be faithful to you, even though they be neglected and abused, and if you are guilty of a want of fidelity to them, they will reproach you only by fidelity to you in return.

CHAPTER XIV.

ENGINE DEPARTMENT.

We approach the very heart of the subject of organization of ships-of-war. Amid the multiplicity of ratings, grades, ranks, and classes, we see what a perfect unit it all is, and how harmonious and how full of energy and vitality such a body politic must be. There are jostlings and rivalries, jealousies and emulation, and a zeal, too, which attributes to itself each its importance, each its ambition, and each its belief of superiority over all the rest. Calmly and judiciously guiding all the activities and rivalries of each, the executive stands at the head of all departments, the supreme judge, the conservative and preservative element of each and all. There is and can be no one interest more selfishly his than another. To his commander he owes responsibility for the perfection of the world, intricate enough in all its noisy and busy rivalries, which surrounds him. It is the perfection of the ship, its efficiency, its strength, his pride in her to at-

tain more than is required of her, and that that which she may be assigned to do, she should do gallantly and well—it is this end to which all his aims, all his interests, verge.

The engine department is composed, in *personnel*, of the officers, who are the engineers, and the firemen and coal-heavers. The chief engineer presides over the entire department. His assistants are of three classes—first, second, and third assistants. The men compose the first and second-class firemen and coal-heavers. Thus it will be seen that there are seven different classes in the organization of this department alone, continuing the scheme of gradations here as well as in the other portions of the ship's crew. Promotion goes on regularly, from coal-heaver to second-class fireman, and thence to first-class fireman, and, when capacity and character admit, to the grade of an assistant, when the man becomes an officer. All these grades receive pay, and perform duties, and have responsibilities, in the direct ratio of their positions. There is still preserved the incitement to good character and professional improvement.

The coal-heavers, as their name implies, perform the labor of receiving and stowing the coal, and wheeling it to the fire-room, to the hands of the firemen. A hard, grim duty it is!

The firemen are responsible for the fires, the boilers, and are the oilers of the machinery. They are under the orders of the engineer of the watch, the men who work and run the engine and machinery. A higher order of ability is needed for this service. They are not mere laborers, and some of the best mechanics in the world are found in their midst. The art of *firing* is one which requires a great deal of skill and judgment. Some men will burn a third more fuel than others, and get less steam force from it, and burn out grate-bars and boilers besides. The matter of fuel is always one of extreme anxiety to the commander.

Watches are as regularly kept in the fire-room as they are upon the quarter-deck. There is always an engineer there, superintending the men on duty, the same as on deck. Watch bills, cleaning bills, fire and quarter bills, are as necessary in this department as they are upon deck. The whole system of duty is modelled precisely upon that of the deck above. The same discipline obtains; the same system of rewards, punishments, and reports. The engine watch officers make their reports to the chief engineer, and he to the executive officer.

The relations of this department to the deck are simple and direct, and any misunderstanding of

these relations are due only to extreme ignorance or wilful bad temper. I am aware that young and inexperienced officers are frequently making trouble about this matter. There is no need of it, and a little reflection ought to lead to right views. The officer of the deck has probably learned by this time, that mere arbitrary will is not government. He has recognized the fact, that in his relations with those around him, men are extremely jealous of their *rights*. If they were not so, they would be worthless. A delicate sense of justice is imperative, for all the rank and authority that may be conferred cannot justify an injustice or coërce obedience to an improper order. The men of the engine department belong to that department, and they are under the orders of the officers appointed for that very purpose. Their duties are peculiar and special. What greater violation can there be, than to require a coal-heaver or fireman who has just come off watch, or come on deck from a heated, red-hot fire-room, with clothes dripping and shining with coal-dust and perspiration, to get a few gasps of fresh air, and require him to haul out an earing or set up a ridge-rope? He is not fit to be there; he is not free to go, perhaps; and it is not his duty. If such an order be insisted upon, trouble will as surely follow as

the sparks fly upward. Moreover, it is an interference with the officer immediately placed over the man, and he is wronged.

Orders to these men must pass through the rightful channel. If their services are needed—and they sometimes are—to give a lift to a heavy drag, the chief engineer, or the engineer of the watch, must receive the order, and not the men themselves. No engineer need ever fear that his men will be called upon without necessity or need. No executive ever wishes them, if he can possibly avoid it, moving about the paint-work or the clean deck with oily shoes or greasy clothes. Whatever pertains to the engine-room, fire-room, or coal-scuttles above deck, especially the smoke-stack and ventilators, belongs to the engine department. The ladders and combings of the hatches leading to the fire and engine-rooms belong to the engine department. Nevertheless, I am clearly of opinion that the spar-deck duties should *all* belong to the spar-deck people. I have seen a good executive officer voluntarily relieve the chief engineer of all these duties, in order not to have men with soiled clothes, making more dirt than they cleaned up. It worked well, and I became converted to his idea. It is an astonishing thing, however, how some chief engineers manage to keep such clean

floors in their rooms. It requires a great deal of perseverance and judgment to do it; and yet if it be not done, every footfall, from the rooms below to the decks above, and over those decks and ladders, will make a greasy highway. There is nothing that will sooner destroy the temper and amiability of an executive officer than such a thing, perseveringly followed out; and the engineer who will look on with indifference to this trouble, deserves to be quarrelled with by every officer and man on deck. It *can* be prevented, and it has been. Yet, for the first few weeks of a newly-commissioned ship, it will require patience, and the executive officer must remember that the chief engineer has his drilling and discipline to enforce as well as he, and under infinitely greater disadvantages. Both officers must be considerate and amiable, and exercise an earnest effort to gratify one another. And after all, is not and ought not the engineers to feel as much pride in the ship as any one else? Do they not belong to the ship as well as to the *engine-room?* I fear too many young men forget this, and when they do, their just pride degenerates into a local and puerile vanity.

It is a common remark, and a true one, that the engineers and their men are the best dressed people at muster. It is a compliment I trust

they may always deserve. A clean, bright engine-room and its approaches are equally worthy the aims of a good engineer.

It seems to me, that this harassing question of the relations of this department and the deck is reduced to a small issue, if any at all. Certainly, if people do not wish to agree, it is easy to find matter to fight about. Be assured, the *coil one* will always find plenty at hand.

No engineer need ever be afraid of interferences from the quarter-deck. People there are but too glad to get rid of a class of men from deck, of whom they generally know too little. If an officer, whose experience is not great, should give an improper order, it is certainly easy to rectify it without bitter acrimony. Do not all persons commit errors, and sometimes blunder? As a general rule, no deck officer should give orders to the men of the engine department, until those men are officially surrendered to him from below. There is no need of it; the occasion can never arise. The chief engineer needs the assistance of an amiable executive officer quite as much as the latter needs him. But the executive can have no excuse for that want of consideration which was more common a few years ago than it is now. I have seen an executive officer who could not bear to see a fireman or coal-heaver on deck. Per-

haps he did not visit the fire-room often himself. These men are as much a part of the crew as others. They are as much under his supervision as others. The executive officer's duties and interests stop at no bulkhead; they are barred at no passage-way. He must remember that he is the executive officer of the whole ship, fire-room as elsewhere. It does not follow, however, that he should attempt to run the engine or order the detail of engine-room duties, no more than it follows that he should enter into the detail of any other officer's duties. These dirty men, which are such an eye-sore to deck officers, can be taught habits of neatness and cleanliness; and if the engineer sees the deck or paint-work oiled, or soiled, or smeared with grease, and does not struggle to remedy it, he is unworthy of his place as an officer. These men should all be furnished with two clothes-bags; they must have soiled clothes, and they should be provided with a place to put them, so as not to stow them with their good ones. Rather than do that, any respectable man will find a stow-hole for them somewhere. The wash-room should never be appropriated for such purposes. That room is made for these men to clean in, and itself should be a model of cleanliness and order. I would varnish every wash-room, and ornament it with gilt if I could.

There is no surer way to make careful, clean men, than to provide the means for becoming so, and then, if advantage be not taken of it, punishment should inexorably follow.

There is an unhappy notion, I fear, among some engineers, that because the deck officers are not skilled mechanics or engineers themselves, necessarily, they are totally ignorant of every thing connected with their department.

It is related that Lord Nelson, who was a very petulant man, once undertook to carry on the detail of tacking ship, giving orders to the officer of the deck. The indignant officer greatly irritated his commander, who relieved him and took the trumpet himself. It so happened, however, that the renowned admiral swung his yards at the wrong moment, handled his sheets badly; the ship refused to tack, to wear, to box, or to chappel: she was unconsciously tight in irons, and the admiral was forced to send for the officer to get her at liberty again. Lord Nelson was a very poor sailor, but he was a stout fighter and a good tactician. Will any one smile at any thing in Lord Nelson except his foolish irritability? It is the duty of the deck officer to carry his ship into such positions as he may be ordered to place her. He clearly has the right and the knowledge, too, to slow, stop, or back her; and

if these orders cannot and are not executed, the fault is with the engine-room, and it is not necessary for him to know whether steam used expansively is better than if it be not so used ; it is not necessary for him to know if Sickles's cut-off is better or worse than another. He does know, if the ship or engine do not obey his orders, that there is something deficient, and the officers who are responsible should be held to an accountability therefor. It is a very delightful thing to know all things ; but I question if the gunner, as he "brings his eye on a line with the reënforce sight and the notch in the sight-bar," would fling his bolt any better for knowing the atomic character of each grain of powder that sent it. I would not discourage knowledge ; but the truth is, there is so much in the book for a naval officer to learn, and, moreover, so much out of the book to learn, that if he attempts too much, it is probable he will fail altogether.

There is no reason at all why the relations of the engine department and deck should be a vexed question. Nothing simpler, I am sure. The ship is or ought to be a unit. The engine department is a part, and an important part, too, of the ship. I knew an acting chief engineer who considered it so important, that when the ship was anchored, he deliberately took large portions of

his machinery apart, when the commander was expecting to get under way in an hour or so! There cannot be but one head to a body, unless you have a monster. There cannot be but one commander to a ship, unless you have a monster, too. A dual government never yet prospered, nor a dual command. It is neither democratic, aristocratic, nor autocratic. It is not even a decent oligarchy.

I have now rounded the circle of discussion of organization in a ship-of-war. Complex, intricate, many-sided as it is, there never was a more perfect unit of man's creation. It is founded on the military experience of ages. It is the result of experience in all navies, and of all naval men. It is the complete work of time and wisdom. No officer, old or young, can assume his place and command here effectively, without fully comprehending its history and its bearings. The relations are intimate, social, official, and dependent. A violence offered to one relation, reacts upon others. An ignorance of them will entail weakness upon the officer, and incompetency in the execution of duty. Nearly all the evils under which we are suffering, arise from ignorance or a want of true perception of the mysteries of organization. No young officer, and surely no old one, can afford to stumble along the path of daily

and weekly routine, doing violence everywhere, under the shield of official power. We should make this more a study—more of observation, and more of culture. Nowhere in human society—nowhere among bodies of men, nowhere in military life—can we effect so much wrong and do so much evil, if we are content to ignore the moral obligations of men when we attempt to command them. It is for this reason that, in earlier days, a man-of-war was a name that called up visions of violence, of sin, and of misery. Men fled from their unhappiness, from tyranny, and the despotism of a man-of-war, to madness, mutiny, and rum, and finally to a death of shame and dishonor.

CHAPTER XV.

SEAMANSHIP

It is a very common saying that there is no more seamanship, and that there are no more sailors in the world. Perhaps, indeed, there is much less seamanship displayed nowadays than there might be. Seamanship is the art of caring for and handling and manœuvring ships. Now so long as vessels are built and go to sea, so long as there are floating machines to be carried about and manœuvred and fought, just so long there must be seamanship. An immense modification of practice is necessary. The officer who goes on board a vessel and finds no topsails or courses, no royals or topgallant-sails, need not for a moment suppose that there is nothing to do, that "the thing will go itself." I fear too many come to this comfortable conclusion, to the great dismay of the commander.

Every class of vessels except the monitors carries some masts, sails, and rigging. It is very true, they are not always as trim about the mast-

heads, nor the eyes of rigging so neat, as have been seen or might be again. But why should they not be? There is a great passion for wire rigging in vogue, but it is questionable if it is good. Wire rigging snaps to the frost; if it is shot away or stranded it cannot be spliced; it turns the compasses crosswise, and has lost more than one ship thereby. Very few officers appear to understand the proper use to be made of the sails of steamers, with which they are furnished. The use of fore-and-aft sails is becoming very common, and, indeed, they are the only kind of sails proper for gunboats and sidewheel steamers. As inconsiderable as these sails are, they are of vast importance if properly used. But I take it for granted now that all sails are *auxiliary*. To talk about steam being auxiliary to sails, is very like saying the horse is auxiliary to the wagon-wheels. No doubt he helps them in their revolutions! Steam is the motive power, first and last. All the gear and rigging you may put into or upon a ship will help the steam do its work, but they will never again be the "prime movers" in a man-of-war. Perhaps there may be large frigates again, with three royals aloft; nevertheless, they will be auxiliaries. The first order in preparation of battle is to roll up the canvas, upon the probabilities of an engagement; clear ship for action, and get the

auxiliaries out of the way. Every ship must be manœuvred under steam, be she large or small. I have long thought that no vessel under the size of a first-class sloop-of-war, should ever carry a square yard or a square sail. It would be better if they were fore-and-aft rigged; but then these sails should be large, carry reefs, and be rigged so that they could be taken in, and not left to blow away. These fore-and-aft sails in frigates and sloops-of-war should be very large sails, and every inch of canvas should be crowded into them, so that they may be made to draw and set well. The reason is obvious. A propeller should never be put head at it under steam alone, unless there exist some grave reason for driving her unduly; and even then I regard it as bad seamanship. If the wind comes out ahead, let the sheets be trimmed well aft, keep the ship off sharp on a wind, and make tacks. A good ship will thus lie at least within five points of the course, and often within four and a half. I have seen gunboats very well within four points. It is not necessary that the sails should go a rap-full. When the "eleven-inch gunboats" came out, there was a general cry against them, and only because they would not be driven right into a heavy head sea and gale of wind. One can very well conceive how their frail engines must have chafed

and worked at being required to do such work without any help from the canvas. A ship thus handled will make good weather, and at the same time will crawl along toward her destination and not be going astern. She is in a manner hove-to, yet doing duty ahead, especially if the weather be not too heavy. If we accept the principle that the sails are put aboard to help the steam, then they should do so. None but sidewheeled steamers ever expect to make a dead course to windward, and even *they* cannot do it always.

When the large sloops of the Richmond class were first sent to sea, there was hardly one favorable report made of their performances. It was gravely alleged that they would do nothing in a head wind and sea, that they would not "hold their own," and that in a gale of wind they were all "*beasts*." If they got into a heavy head sea they pitched frightfully, and, in so doing, the bows went all under and the propeller would be thrown out of water, and, when thus released from strain or resistance, they would spin and whirl round to such a violent degree that it was feared the engine would be rent to pieces. It may readily be conceived, that such treatment would produce precisely such results. Propellers do not pretend to full steam power; and so much the more necessity is there for sails doing more duty.

It was the practice, so soon as the wind hauled ahead, to furl all sail and put the ship head at it under a full head of steam. To attempt to run down a gale of wind and a heavy sea, in this fashion, is not very good seamanship. A ship must be humored and petted more than any other coquette in the world. In making passages, this class of vessels should always carry canvas. If the wind draws ahead, the square sails must be furled and the fore-and-aft sails kept on—all of them—and keep the ship by the wind and regulate the turns of the engine to suit the weather. If a gale of wind comes on, there is no help for it, the ship must go slow and she must make tacks. I would adapt the principles of schooner-sailing to all propellers, the moment the wind hauls ahead, so that square sails cannot draw. So long as there is steam in the boilers and coal to spare, if a quick passage is to be made, I would certainly beat up to a head wind under steam and trysails both. The ship will be easier, she will make better weather and better time. Of course, if this principle is to be adopted to good advantage, the trysails and staysails must be enlarged to the fullest capacity. They must be provided with reefs and bonnets. They must not be expected to come in with brails alone. They must be amply furnished with down-hauls and clew-

ropes, and the gaffs must be rigged to lower easily. The throat and peak halyards must become running rigging.

There is no reason why the larger ships should not scud as well as any old-fashioned frigate; but low steam must be carried, and the engine used with extreme care. No ship should ever scud, if it can be avoided, without steam being ready for prompt use. It is an additional element of safety, in case of broaching to.

The sidewheel steamer is perhaps the most difficult vessel to manage in bad weather. Her huge paddle-boxes are always acting against the helm, and tend to throw her up into the wind, if it be forward of the beam; if the wind be quartering, it will be exceedingly difficult to steer her without the aid of sails. As a general thing, the double-enders refuse, incontinently, to obey the helm at all with the wind quartering. The sidewheel ship is not intended to depend upon her canvas. Yet the use of a fore-trysail is extremely necessary, to heave many of them to. But these ships can plunge fearlessly into a head wind or sea. It seems that then they exhibit their real qualities. In all such circumstances the engine must be humored, and it is an easier thing to run a sharp sidewheel steamer under headlong than most sailors believe. I once played with a ship some

hours, trying her mettle, to observe how much she could stand. The breaking of the seas over both bows, and a certain tremulous quiver through her hull, plainly indicated when the engine should go a turn or two slower. It was a gradual process of slowing down, until the ship was fairly hove-to. The proper way to heave such a vessel to, is to weather-bow it by about two points. Much, of course, will depend upon the sharpness and model of the vessel. But the experiment of forcing a sharp sidewheel ship into a heavy head beat sea is somewhat hazardous, and might not be repeated too often, if due regard be had to her safety. I have seen a sidewheel steamer hove-to under trysails alone, and she did remarkably well. The drift of the sea against the stationary paddles, had a strong tendency to keep her to the wind, and at the same time to quiet her. So various are the models, and so peculiar the characteristics of side-wheelers, that each one must be studied by her officers to understand her wants and caprices.

Of all vessels in the world, a side-wheeler should never be put into the trough of the sea. They will roll so fearfully that there is great danger to the machinery: and I have known one of them to loosen her wheel from the shaft, and it was a providence that she did not cast it off altogether.

If it becomes necessary to make a passage, and the wind and sea cross the course, it would be much better to head-up for the sea and leave the course. There is nothing else left to do, if the ship is not to become untenable, and if the safety of her machinery and hull are to be considered. Good seamanship requires a ship to be humored as much to-day as it did before steam became the motive-power. We have too long tried the experiment of driving our ships dead on to the course, without regard to consequences; and when the ships and engines complain of our bad treatment and of our want of seamanship, we ungratefully retaliate by condemning the ship and not ourselves. It is proper to remember that a ship is still a ship, and that gales and head-seas are just as obstinate as they ever were. We should remember, moreover, that the motive power has been transferred from the spars and from the yards down into the bowels of the vessels; that to furl royals and topgallant sails, we have only to touch the bell-pull; and if we wish to reef topsails and furl the courses, we have only again to touch the bell. Only now, we can take as many reefs as we please, and the driving force can be subdued to the least shade of our will, and almost instantaneously, too. It is from this very fact, of the ease with which the gigantic power

that propels the ship under us, with its living world of freight, that it does not occur to use it more rationally. There seems to be a perfect infatuation, with many officers, to drive their vessels, at all times, under a *four-bell* speed!

There have been plenty of opportunities during the war to notice the absence of good seamanship in the handling of our vessels-of-war. Ships under steam have been run into by others, broadside on, and sunk in a few minutes, and that, too, in daylight and on the broad ocean. Vessels have been known to run into each other, under a good head of steam, each bows on to the other. Instances are known where a steamer has gone boldly into a line of breakers, and that, too, when the breakers were seen some minutes before striking. It was a display of courage "worthy of a better cause." It has been a common occurrence for vessels to come plunging into a closely packed anchorage, and carry away spars, anchors, masts, and all at a clean sweep. To drop anchor foul of another's moorings, has been often done. In this manner Admiral Farragut's fleet, in the Mississippi, was about undergoing destruction, and it has been said that the collisions and injuries his ships were undergoing in the violent current of that river hastened his movements toward the great battles of April, 1862, perhaps

before he was quite ready. Such collisions and foulings, and losses of anchors, chains, and spars, no one ever heard of before. Will any one doubt that much, if not all of it, was the result of bad seamanship under steam? Our officers, generally, had not had great experience in handling steamers, and the large numbers of vessels grouped into close anchorage, the preparations for battle, the stream nightly filled with blazing fire-rafts, and the violence of the current in the swollen floods of the river, all required the very best of experience and the best of seamanship. The lessons of that school will never be forgotten, and will endure as long as the memory of the brave Admiral's amiability of temper lasts.

Some officers think it fine and dashing to go into an anchorage, or to pass through one, foaming at a furious speed. I have heard an officer lauded highly for dashing boldly up alongside of a dock or a coal vessel without so much as "slowing down" before the final bell to "stop her." Such feats may be ascribed more to good luck than to good seamanship, where they result without accident. A steamer, provided she answers her helm, may be taken into any position if she be properly treated. But woe to the officer if he neglect to observe the force and direction of the wind, the force and direction of the tide or

the current, and the momentum of his own vessel! It is infinitely a more critical operation to work a steamer in a crowded anchorage, with a heavy current, than it ever was to make a "*flying moor.*" No steamer should ever be allowed to approach an anchorage or another vessel or a dock under any thing more than a slow bell. By slowing and stopping, a ship may be coaxed into the narrowest berth without bruising her paint-work. A propeller is the easiest of vessels to manœuvre. In a narrow stream, with a violent current, it is possible, nay, it is easy, to turn round in four times her length; but it can never be done under a fast bell; indeed, the ship must not be allowed headway at all. The propeller alone will *screw* her around if properly managed. The thing may be tried if the reader be not convinced. If you would turn a propeller short around, try the slow process—ring four bells until the ship gathers headway, when stop; as soon as she ceases to cant, repeat the same bells, and continue the same operation. The ship will truly "come round on her heel."

I have seen some ships which seemed so anxious to dash up to their anchorage, that they would drop anchor before headway was stopped. As a sure result, when she dropped astern, and got a strain upon the cable, the anchor lifted, and

was fouled and the ship dragged. In nine cases out of ten there is no necessity for a ship to be always dragging around the harbor. A little, a *very* little sternboard when the anchor was let go, would have secured it firmly to the ground, and there would be no dragging or compelling other vessels to get under way to avoid a troublesome neighbor.

The question as to the proper management of iron-clad monitors at sea is divided into two opinions, both of which are maintained by our highest and the most capable authority in the navy. It is said on the one hand, that they should always be kept in tow, especially in heavy weather, and that they should be kept up to wind and sea the same as other vessels, the ship towing with a long scope, not less than one and a half or two cables length, and weather-bowing it. This treatment looks natural, and accords with all of our past and present notions of seamanship. On the other hand, it is asserted upon authority that carries with it the profoundest respect, that on the approach of a gale of wind or a heavy sea, the towing vessel should cast off, and the iron-clad should be surrendered to the free action of the sea, and drift to it as a log would do. It is said the sea will break and roll over her as harmlessly as it would over a log, and the vessel will drift as

easily and without harm. This proposition is certainly novel, and has much to recommend it. But as discussion upon the matter would be both imprudent and premature, it had better rest with the decision experience may render. It is very certain if a monitor can be delivered up thus to the action of the sea, the question as to their ability to make a sea passage is for ever set at rest.

The Wilmington blockade has taught us pretty well what ships will do at their anchors when properly tended. A propeller may ride out a very heavy gale in a rough sea by a little prudent use of her screw. I have seen one of our large sloops-of-war ride out a terrible storm with a huge pile of rocks directly under her taffrail in this way. Sir Walter Raleigh, who wrote great deal of good seamanship, writes in 1650: "We have fallen into consideration of the length of cables, and by it we resist the malice of the greatest winds that can blow; for true it is, that the length of the cable is the life of the ship in all extremities; for the reason is, because it makes so many bendings and waves, as the ship riding at that length is not able to stretch it, and nothing breaks that is not stretched." However perfectly we may have known this fact in earlier years, we seem to have overlooked it entirely of late.

Our notions of seamanship require some modifications to adapt them to the present state of things. I fear we have not kept pace with our ships, as slow as people say they are. A well-handled steamer has not hitherto been a very common sight. But experience is helping us vastly, and if we are not willing to see our beautiful art relapse into a lubberly system of blunders, seamanship must occupy some little place in our attention. Nor do I think it fair to hold our ships responsible for their ill-doings when they are not guided by a better intelligence.

CHAPTER XVI.

DISCIPLINE.

So much has already been said upon the subject of discipline, that it seems almost superfluous to consider it further. Yet, perhaps, there has been no word so much abused in naval circles as this. It is everywhere said that there is no discipline like that we have in the navy. The army profess admiration for naval discipline wherever they go. . Writers and citizens alike praise the navy for its discipline. Among ourselves, we are pleased to think it the best that obtains in any society, or among any organized body of men in existence. Parents with bad children are ever striving to get them under its benign influences, and think, by so doing, it will make a man of the evil-doer. It is, perhaps, not so much because naval discipline is perfect, as it is because there is so little everywhere else. I am no admirer of the discipline, such as I have seen it, in our armies. There is a code of laws there which pre-

scribes rigorous punishments for crimes, but this is not discipline. It may be the next best thing to it attainable. It does not make duty of law, and performance a thing of high moral obligation and happiness, and a thing of love.

It is a trite saying, that there are no longer children in the land. The saying is almost a truism. Those bright, beautiful pictures in our society have vanished, or are vanishing. It is a terrible thing to say, and still worse to believe, that "there are no longer children in the world!" They are leaving a vast, dreary blank behind, in society, which no image can fill. Our youths are men before they are boys; and what kind of men are they? The innocence of boyhood, and its simple love and faith, its beautiful obedience, give place to a premature monster of vice, of rudeness, of infidelity and disloyalty, and a brazen defiance of law. There is no discipline in our houses and at our firesides. The disrespect of the child at the fireside has but a step to go to disobedience to the civil and divine authority, and a step more attains to defiant rebellion. How many are taught to obey commands *because* they are commands? Who teaches obedience to law simply *because* it is law? simply because it is duty? simply because law is of divine authority? Rather are we taught to obey because it is

pleasing, or because it is pleasing to those who order.

I have intimated that discipline was the right government of men; that it was the art of obtaining obedience, for the common good and happiness of those who govern and are governed. The governed have as profound an interest, therefore, in good discipline, as those who govern. There seems to be an inveterate dislike growing amongst us to recognize and acknowledge any one as superior to ourselves; and this feeling has led men to think, in their gross ignorance and selfishness, that there is no superior thing above them. Can any one be surprised that that divine thing, law, is dragged down from its high estate, and draggled into the dust of self? I have heard young officers object to use the words, "superior officer." Cannot one officer be superior to another, then? Can he not be superior in age, rank, wisdom, and even in honor and virtue? Cannot labor, toil, service, brains, and pluck make one man *superior* to another? Rank is the fitting reward for merit and for service. Is any youth so dull, so stupid, so dead to ambition, as not to hope to become himself, some day, a superior officer? Many men conceive, that because we are taught—and rightly taught—"that all men are born free and equal," there can be

no one *superior* to another. We are born free and equal in the noble heritage of human rights, and these rights permit all to struggle for honor, for fame, for learning and wealth. It is the grandest heritage of humanity, that the poorest and humblest can have fair play to become superior in position to another. This declaration is a sublime one, and fitly is it the corner-stone of our liberty and our land. Yet all men are not born to the same talents, or to equal wealth, or to equal privileges. If this fact be stern—if it be our enemy—we must quarrel with nature, and not with society or ourselves. God himself has placed obstacles in the path of men. He has sent sickly bodies, sickly minds, poverty, and a thousand miseries. He has planted bars of brass and iron in the paths of some, over which they can never pass. The American Declaration—the most sublime declaration that ever sounded through the ages—permits men the noble privilege to struggle with their destiny, and attain superiority wheresoever and howsoever they can, without human hindrance, and unfettered by arbitrary law. The right to competition among men, gives the right to its rewards, and the enjoyment of that superiority which claims honor and obeisance from inferiority, wheresoever it may assert its right.

Naval rank and superiority are based upon these broad principles, the same as others. The success of long and arduous service gives rank to some, and the brilliant manifestation of talent, or courage, or capacity, gives it to others. Naval rank is the reward of merit as much as it is in civil or military life, and he who fails to recognize a superior, fails in his conception of human virtue. In the navy we recognize these general principles, and bow to them. It is the first bow we make to discipline. If naval rank be the result of merit, then it should be obeyed and honored. There is nothing arbitrary in this; it is a necessity, after conviction.

There is nothing arbitrary in our naval discipline. If there is any thing the conclusion of reason, it is our discipline. So deeply rooted is this fact in the minds of our sailors, that it grows down into their hearts. There never was an organized mutiny that did not come from the attempt to enforce arbitrary and unreasonable laws, and even then they were endured to the bitter end. Our naval discipline is uniformly based upon the recognition of certain rights, which inhere in all grades and classes. Hence it is that justice has so large a living, and is so respected in our ships-of-war. The absence of discipline in a ship-of-war is more lamented by the

crew and the subordinates than by any one else. Without it, there is no protection to the weak, no shield to those who have no rank, and no guardianship over the subordinate. Arbitrary will usurps the place of justice, and violent caprice breeds riot, and disorder, and wrong.

To govern men rightly, the cardinal principle is to know what are their rights, and not only cheerfully to grant them, but to protect them by authority. I dwell much upon this obligation of authority, for the moment it is violated, that moment authority itself is struck. No man ever yet was strong when he was wrong. He may do much mischief, but he is vulnerable and weak at last. If the rights of subordinates be not religiously respected, there will be weakness discovered in authority, and discipline is injured. Naval men will endure wrongs perhaps longer and less complainingly than any other class of living men. But it is a silent endurance, that produces misery and unhappiness, and saps the vigor out of their usefulness. This remark is true of all classes, officers and men. While I plead so earnestly for this sacred obligation to respect the most delicate rights of men and officers, I do not wish to be understood as pandering to the morbid sensibilities of discontented and jealous men. I do not mean to say that it is

the sole duty of an officer to cater to the caprices and wishes of men, when they go a hair beyond those rights. I do not wish it understood that men should be spoiled by indulgence and then treated like spoiled children. It is a worse error than the withholding of indulgence altogether. I do not believe in this thing of indulgence at all, among large bodies of men. A simple guarantee of inalienable, reasonable rights, is not an indulgence.

I have never thought that naval discipline should exist only abaft the mainmast. I do not know why insubordination or wrong should be punished inexorably on the quarter-deck and nowhere else. I have seen some ships where what was called discipline was found nowhere except aft. Discipline is inexorable. If the laws are made and read—and that is what we take good care to do in the navy once a month to every body—if these laws are violated, no matter where, or by whom, they should be vindicated. That discipline which is partial and not whole, is an outrage. If we have one fault more than another in the navy, it is in too great a leniency forward of the mainmast. If the punishment of death is too grave for the crime of desertion, let it be altered; but so long as the law reads Death, it should be administered. Justice

is inexorable. Discipline, which is founded on justice, should be inexorable and pitiless, too.

While discipline provides, with extreme care, over the administration of men, guarding them at every point against wrong, it must equally provide and execute punishments on all offenders and violators of law. The habit, so general, of not punishing a first offence, is arbitrary and puerile. "It is the first step that costs," and it is the first offence that needs to be punished, to guard against a second. It should be ever understood, that it is not the officer who punishes offences; it is the law; the officer is the obliged agent to fulfil the law. There can be no plea in the navy of ignorance as to what the law is. There is not a month that passes, when the articles for the government of the navy are not read to every officer and man on board of every ship in the service. This fact alone is the best index of our discipline. As the rules of discipline apply in the protection of every soul in a ship-of-war, so it applies to the punishment of every offence committed by the least person on board. No concealment can avert the searching eye of discipline; no plea can extenuate a wrong, to avert its punishment. This has hitherto been applied to officers only with great severity, and it has been said that officers should suffer as an

example. Now, I am not at all aware that the crew of a ship-of-war are any more ignorant of their duties than the officers; nor do I see that the sacrifice of an officer should be made upon the altar of a ship's company. Let discipline be just; and it will confer happiness and efficiency, instead of misery and weakness. Let it penetrate the fire-room and forecastle, the berth-deck and hold, as well as the quarter-deck.

The object of discipline is to protect men from wrong and to execute the law. The law was made for the common good. But the law must be respected and loved in order to insure a cheerful obedience to it. I never knew an unhappy ship that was an efficient one, and I never knew a ship that obtained a good condition of discipline that was unhappy. The two conditions are inseparable. Obedience and respect of superiors never made a man unhappy. An improper order can never be justified; but to obey it need not to produce unhappiness. No duty is ever degrading. Duty is sacred, and its execution confers dignity upon the performer, whatever may be its character. An humble duty can never humiliate; it can ennoble; and the manner of performance gives character to the performer. Every man and officer is sworn to obedience; hence the crime of disobedience is twofold, for it

involves the violation of an oath as well as of duty. I fear too many young officers forget this grave fact; and I fear, too, they forget it when they sometimes give improper orders. It is easy enough to give an order, but he who gives it should remember that it is a grave thing to obey it.

Our naval discipline is patriarchal. While it imposes an inflexible obedience and a relentless system of punishments to evil-doers; while the violation of duties, of respect, and obedience, is subject to an unwavering consequence, the relations existing between the different grades are characterized by the refinements of courtesy and the elegancies of politeness, which approach often to an affectionate esteem. The navy is justly honored for its graceful amenities as well as for its pure integrity. The politeness of the disciplined sailor is proverbial. There is nowhere a society of men, deprived of the influences of womanhood, or even where their presence flings a graceful charm over men, that is so distinguished by the dignified amenities that mark the *gentle life*. I have seen a soldier enter the tent of his commanding officer with his hat nailed to his head, and deliberately help himself to a comfortable seat, without so much as receiving permission to enter. The sailor

would be shocked at such a thing, and would rightly feel that such a presumption was an outrage upon his self-respect. His feeling of independence would never tolerate such a breach of good taste, not to say of personal respect. He would stand in the presence of his superior until the "crack of doom," if that superior did not invite him to the rights of ease. It is not the sense of humiliation or slavish fear, as some persons would suppose, but it is the higher sense of personal independence that characterizes his notions of courtesy. If civility be not freely given, it is unworthy to be accepted. Such notions, such a system of education, is hardy, and men learn to be brave, when the challenge for battle comes. It is the blending of courtesy and politeness with bravery that makes a man gallant. Gallantry and the obligations of a protector, which the sailor ever wears in his heart, constitute him the finest type of chivalry I know. The sailor is the true knight-errant of the nineteenth century.

The discipline of the Roman armies and of the Roman society was as brutal as their savage lust of conquest. The discipline of the Roman society was that of the legions, and it recognized no rights to the inferior. It was blind, fatal obedience or death, or worse than death. The power

of might and the supremacy of authority, which were absolute in the Roman camps, gave its sanction to the iron laws that bestowed upon the parent the right of life, or the right to take the life of his own child. In later days, human sentiment began to touch the hearts of men. Men began to feel that punishments might be greater than offences. The weak claimed the right of pity from the strong, and pity ripened into a nobler sense of the recognition of duty. The oppressor became the enemy of society, and war was declared against him. Chivalry was born, and grew into a vital principle, and the sword and battle-axe were wielded into new uses. The discipline of the French armies has ever since been tempered by the warmth of sentiment cultured from the school of chivalry. But it never yet, even in the days of the great Napoleon, distinguished clearly between the right of claiming an implicit obedience and a profound respect for the sacred rights of the inferior. The discipline of the English army and navy has always been of the Roman school, without its prestige of grandeur or regal splendor. The flowers of European chivalry never bloomed in England. There is much theory there of the great chart of human rights, and everywhere, save in the army and navy, the noble Anglo-Saxon love for

"*fair play*" is the brightest element of social discipline. That discipline is sombre, moody, violent, and arbitrary, respecting neither rank, persons, or condition. It is the bastard imitation of the Roman, without its genius in authority, or its silent acquiescence to obey in the unthinking and unfeeling inferior. Our American discipline has always been a mystery to the English officer. How people who are all "born free and equal" can ever find superiors or inferiors among themselves, or how they can learn to obey and respect, is a problem they have not solved. Yet they find the fact that our sailors obey and are courteous, and they see our clean, tidy ships, and quiet, orderly decks, and console themselves that we do not exercise or drill. They see, too, that our ships-of-war, instead of presenting a motley, rabble crowd upon their "peopled decks," are presented to them as models of order, efficiency, and obedience.

Of all men in the world, the American is the most easily governed, and the most readily submits to discipline, if it be based upon intelligence and *justice*. Justice he will have, cost what it may. The troubles, the insubordination, and the violence to order in our ships, rarely or never occur from native-born Americans. They arise invariably from foreign-born men, from England or Ireland. The loudest-mouthed dis-

content, who brawls most about his being as good as others and a free, independent citizen, is invariably a native of the British Isles.

Good government of men—a calm, inflexible but just discipline—conduces to the happiness and efficiency of ship or state. Without it, disintegration and disorganization will as surely follow, as the apple does gravity. Injustice to one or a few members of society will not insure justice to the rest. Protection is the first law of life, and in a ship-of-war authority must protect when it is refused to the individual. Good men must suffer if bad men are allowed a course of wrong-doing. If certain men neglect their duties, others as surely will be compelled to perform them. Discontent must then occur, and its contagion will spread as no other evil will. A keen sense of perpetual and daily wrong fixes itself in the heart, and gloom, indifference, unhappiness, and anger will destroy the efficiency of a crew as inevitably as they occur. The finest ships, the bravest men, the most terrible fighting-men, I have ever known, were all happy, and their lives were filled with a breadth of humor that made them invincible. But no ship will be happy, no men will be contented, if it be attempted to purchase those boons at the expense of indulgences, rather than by the hardy gifts of justice and an unflinching demand for obedience.

CHAPTER XVII.

OF BATTLE AND FIGHTING QUALITIES.

THE final object to which our organization and the attainments of the *personnel* and discipline of the crew tend, is for the hour of battle. It is for this final end, that the ship-of-war is built and equipped and commissioned. She must possess the highest fighting qualities, or she fails in her mission. No ship can be fully prepared for battle that has not been some months in service. Her people must know their ship, and be familiar with the perfect use of her weapons and of her own powers. It requires time, moreover, to get the officers and men familiar with their stations. Every ship has something peculiar to herself. Even if a large portion of her officers and crew have been drilled before, it needs experience to make them fully prepared for *that particular* ship. Officers and men, too, must become habituated to their vessel; and they must identify themselves with her, and feel that she is their home and castle. This sentiment acts powerfully upon men in the hour of battle. A man

will fight better in the defence of his own home which he loves, than he will anywhere else. Hence it is, that every possible effort should be used to attach the crew to their vessel.

Speed is not a necessary fighting quality for a ship. It is a great convenience, and that is all. It is rather a negative quality, for it is mainly good to help her escape from a too formidable adversary. I never knew a man who would willingly sacrifice any positive virtue for a negative one. This is specially true of a broadside ship. It is worth more to her to be able to maintain herself stoutly when once in combat, than to be able to escape from one with great ease. It is better for her to bear herself proudly into conflict than to be sure of safety by getting out of it. Our frigates and sloops-of-war are *line-of-battle ships;* and they have no such great need of fleetness. There never was a greater mistake than to cripple the quarters for the battery, for the sake of the long floor and narrow beam. To endanger the stability of the battery for the sake of a few fathoms speed, is a very false economy. The ship should be built for the battery, and not the battery for the ship.

The present arrangements for the supply of our batteries, and for their whole service, leave nothing to be desired. They are as perfect as they

need to be. No gun need to wait a second for its ammunition, if the men be well drilled. There is hardly an accident that can occur, which skill has not amply provided for. Every magazine, every shell-room, and every gun is perfect in itself. There is no dependence of one upon another.

Until very recently, there has been a most pernicious habit of overloading and encumbering our ships-of-war with an immense quantity of rubbish. One ship-of-war has generally carried another inside of her, in the way of *spare materials*. The chains have been so crowded with spare spars that another vessel might be completely rigged out anew. Spare topmasts, yards, booms, two sets of topgallant masts, were heaped and piled up inboard and outboard, until a grand magazine for splinters was prepared sufficient to destroy the whole crew. I have seen an entire gun's crew wounded by splinters, from a shot coming through the bulwarks, when there were no spare spars at all in its wake. What would have been the result if it had passed through a half-dozen spars lashed tightly together? This custom obtained when the world afforded few harbors where a lost spar could be had. But like many other things, it long survived its necessity. I have never seen a topmast carried away yet,

it may be because I have been lucky. But this supply of spare spars is unnecessary, and in the last degree pernicious. A similar passion to provide spare objects in case of accidents which never happen, has filled the berth-deck with lumber and the hold with trash. It all adds weight, and every useless article occupies a space that is invaluable. Certain ships have so cleaned out their holds that they were converted into hospitals for the wounded, during the slaughter of action. It was the best use ever made of them. There is no part of the globe where a spare spar cannot be had. There is no port where most spare articles cannot be bought with money. There is barely room for the necessaries of a ship's life, and if any can be spared, the engine department will gladly take it for fuel. As a general rule, every unnecessary piece of lumber or carpenter work about a ship-of-war should be dispensed with. Our constructors are using what they term "booby hatches," in our smaller ships. They tell us it is cheaper to use them than hollow brass railing and hoods. Perhaps so. The great box of wood is always in the path of shot, and the lives of the men surrounding them are placed in expensive jeopardy. These brass railings can be unshipped in one moment and put out of the way—the big wooden box never can be.

To prepare a ship properly for battle, she must be stripped completely of her adornments. Every possible thing that can obstruct the path of the projectile should be put out of the way. Not a railing should be left, but ropes for life-lines rove instead. I am personally knowing to more than one life lost by the cutting of a smoke-stack guy, which should have been put out of the way. There must be a clean, clear sweep for the guns, on the probability of an engagement. Much must depend upon the time allowed for preparation before an action takes place. There are an infinite number of small devices and cares which every ship must make, and which should tax the skill of the officers. If men observe an anxious solicitude to save life, there need be no fear that it will make them timid. On the contrary, there is nothing so *settles* men in courage as to know that every thing has been done for their good; and men thus convinced will fight with sterner resolution than ever. I have seen a spare lashing upon an anchor save a ship from a most unpleasant anchorage, where disaster would have been sure to ensue. In a night action, I have known white-washed decks and a spotless white paint-work to lighten the gear of the guns better than battle-lanterns could serve the enemy. No ship should ever be painted any other color within than the

most dazzling white. It not only gives a clean and wholesome look, but it gives light at night which no enemy can see. I see no reason why a ship-of-war should not be as scrupulously white, and her decks as spotless in times of war as at any other. It is no sign of a brave ship that she should be slovenly or ill-kept, no more than it is for a man. Stripped of her ornaments, every particle of useless dress laid aside, snow-white decks and a spotless paint, she is ready to move to her work like an accomplished athlete, conscious of her strength, as if she were an animate creature.

No ship-of-war, however, can be prepared as she should be for battle without a previous long and careful drill. There is so much in the art of sea fighting to be learned and practised, that it requires immense industry and activity to accomplish all of it. Few, very few, ships, indeed, are perfect in the use and drill of all the exercises of battle. In this respect, the soldier is formed and schooled in a fraction of the time a sailor can possibly do it. The soldier learns his musket and his march, and his school is over. The sailor must use the cannon, the field-artillery, the rifle, the musket, the pistol, the broad-sword, the boarding-pike, and battle-axe. Naturally, his school begins with the great guns; but at once he is put to drill with the broad-sword and musket and the

rifle. Oftentimes, indeed, the haste is so great, the emergency so pressing, that he is crowded into exercises until he is bewildered. Drill can never cease in a ship-of-war. The commander cannot afford to have arms furnished to him, with hands to use them, and not have them understood. Drill cannot cease with a tolerable proficiency at great guns, or with muskets, or light artillery. The broad-sword is one of the most essential drills in a ship-of-war. The boarding-pike and pistol demand less attention, yet they demand exercise and drill. There is not a weapon, not a method of fighting that can be dispensed with. A ship's crew that are incited to the use of these weapons, will soon take pride in them, and their accomplished use of them will render them very devils in battle. If men *know* what they can do, they are ready to undertake it. To every additional accomplishment of the art of fighting that is added to the sailor's education, there is also added an immense confidence and element of strength. I have seen some ship's companies that could make a better fight with singlesticks than others could with bayonets upon their muskets. An accomplished man-of-war's man can fight under any circumstances and with any weapons. The drill for boarding and repelling boarders is soon learned, as it is gen-

erally taught. But as a divisional officer, I should never let my men separate from each other or myself, and if I could not cover my own guns, I would cover those of some one else. If the enemy is to be met hand to hand, if swords and pikes are to be crossed, there is need of the men and officers of a division fighting side by side, as they have done already at the guns. Men and officers can never be too perfect at the art of fighting. Drill is needed for every thing, and among the rest a drill for fighting fire. The fire bill, in most ships, is unhappily too little looked to. There have been seen ships where none existed even on paper. No one would expect such ships to fight. In time of battle, a ship must be prepared to fight fire, water, and the enemy, all at the same time.

It is surprising that so little divisional emulation exists among the officers of our ships-of-war. If the officers themselves do not enter body and soul into these duties, they cannot expect the men to do so. It needs zeal, it needs untiring energy, and it needs a love for the noble profession of the arms they have embraced to be thrown into the work of preparing a ship for battle. If she is to be invincible, if she is to go fearless to her work, strong in the confidence of her might, she must first undergo the drudgery of drill.

Mere drill of empty motions is generally profitless. More powder should be burnt in target practice. Men must first feel the spiteful recoil of a gun and see the effect of the shot it flings before they can have full confidence in its virtue. Ammunition thus expended is well spent. But most of our target practice of late years has been at the live enemy at our doors, and a good school it has been.

The perfect ship-of-war must have her people imbued with a large *esprit-de-corps*. They must be fond of their ship—they must be proud of her and of their profession, and if they are egotistical and fancy *that particular* ship to possess more virtues than any other, it is a fault that should be cultivated. I knew the crew of a certain ship-of-war refuse to speak to that of another, occasioned by some disrespectful words spoken of the vessel. The boats' crews would lie alongside in their boats and could not be induced to go aboard. But when those ships moved into battle, it was terrible. Such fighting the world never saw. If there are virtues in a ship, the men will soon find them out and make the most of them. But the pride and affection for a ship by her officers and crew will, if properly cultivated, render them invincible. If that pride is wanting, it must be cultivated or the ship will be a failure.

We see now what a charm an enlightened discipline gives to a ship-of-war. It is, after all, the very heart of its vitality, the life of its being. It diffuses a spirit of contentment and personal interest throughout the whole ship. The vessel herself becomes personal to the officers and men, and one is identified with the other. The honor of the ship is the honor of the people as well. There is no danger of stimulating this pride in a ship beyond undue limits. If the men of a ship are boastful of her, it is easy enough to require them to make good their boasts by exhibiting their efficiency.

I am convinced that much drill by general quarters is not productive of great good. It is well enough to practise it at times in order to keep the men in hand to work together. But the drill must be special and particular, if men are to learn much from it. It will be obvious from this, that after the ship's work is done, after such as the daily duties of sailing her, cleaning her, and keeping her in repairs, there is not much time to be lost if the men are to undergo that perfect system of drill I have indicated. I know of no busier place than a man-of-war. A gale of wind, at times, is a comfort, for it brings rest with it.

A ship-of-war, under ordinary conditions of equipment, in furniture and ordnance, if she have

no serious defects, can thus be made one of the most formidable engines of war that a nation can produce. Under a humane but stringent discipline, the officers and men alike inspired with pride and confidence in her, her people well taught in every accomplishment of naval duties, in every mode and method of fighting an enemy, bold for offence, confident in defence, her commander may well feel himself a strong man and a dangerous enemy to an aggressor. There are no fears or quakings among his men as to what they can do, nor does their fearless confidence in themselves or their oaken bulwarks pass over into an extreme of vanity. If any men on earth can know precisely what they can do, they are those of such a man-of-war as I have depicted. If any men can measure their own strong arms with precision, they are they.

A ship thus prepared, stripped and ready for combat, should move into action with clean, livid fires, but with low steam. Guided by the intelligence of her commander, she goes silently, slowly, but magnificently, to the work of battle. It is no time for multiplied orders, or for human voices. The dead silence of a ship-of-war moving into action is sublime. The hour comes when instruction ceases, and when orders are not needed. I love that silence that precedes the strife of

battle ; it gives men time to say a prayer, and then to look the lion in the face. There is no rush, nor shout, nor clang, nor brazen trumpet-blasts, that open the scenes of a naval conflict. The enemy is before you, and the approach is slow, solemn, and stately, like the tread of a demon of conquest, whose victory is already won. It is good to look the enemy fairly in his face, to contemplate him as he is, and select your position with cold deliberation before the guns have spoken. It is the American temper to let the enemy open the first communications, and treat them with that scornful disdain which a consciousness of strength and will alone can give. These serious moments that usually precede a naval conflict, do not shake the courage of our men. It is plain that there is manly, solemn work to be done, and fears of results find no place of lodgment in the hearts or minds of the men who are to do it. The ship slowly and silently moves to her position, and that once assumed, the work begins. The men, who were as cold as the iron of their guns, only warm with the huge masses they are serving. Not a man falls that he is not taken to a place of safety by trusty hands, who have already been drilled to the duty.

The report of fire has now no alarms, for there are men already chosen to fight it. The report

of water making below has no terrors, for that also has been provided for. The men at the guns steadily ply at their work, dazzled only by the blazing flames from their own pieces. The conflict progresses with the quiet, orderly system of a daily routine, save there is a deep and profound earnestness upon the faces of the combatants. There can be no disaster to that ship! She is a living, crushing Amazon at her work of death. Even though her vitals are struck and pierced by the enemy, there is no tremor, no cry, no falter. So long as the ship floats, even though she can no longer move, even though she be crippled and blinded, yet her guns can work, and their bolts be flung with increased rapidity and deadlier aim. So long as the ship floats upon the bosom of her element, so long she is terrible in combat, and no gun hesitates or slackens its fire.

People talk very easily and fluently about sending a ship to the bottom. It is much easier said than done. She may be pierced and torn to pieces, but it is a difficult thing to sink her, and is very seldom done. If the machinery and steam could be confined below the water-line, a ship-of-war might be made invulnerable, and invincibility might become a reality instead of a word. It is incredible how much injury a ship-of-war may sustain, and yet prove a dangerous

adversary. The perfect habit of our profession of encountering obstacles, removing difficulties, and repairing injuries, is the great element of a ship's tenacity in action. There is a ready remedy for every evil. It is not, perhaps, that there are special, inherent capabilities in a ship that makes her so formidable as an antagonist. It will be readily observed that it depends mostly upon the drill and education of her people and her commander. The fighting power of a ship may be measured by the character and amount of drill she has had. A single fatal shot may sink the best ship that ever floated; but that single fatal shot rarely strikes in the right place. I know of a certain ship which was taken deliberately abreast of a heavy casemated fort, and there stopped within less than one hundred yards' distance to fight it out, "yard-arm and yard-arm." The combatants on either side were so close that they talked to each other. At the third broadside from the ship the fort was as silent as the clay and brick of which it was made. Live men could not stand at the embrasures or barbette guns, under the heavy shower of nine and eleven-inch grape that was poured into them until the entire face of the fort was spattered over with their scars. The fort silenced, the ship quietly passed on. This, too, happened at a time when

army teaching half led us to believe that one gun ashore was competent to fight five guns afloat. Yet there are artillery officers who are foolhardy enough to cling to this school still. For my own part, I trust I may never find greater odds against me in the path of victory; nor should I be content with much less, whether the guns be *en barbette* or in *casemate*.

I know of no nobler or grander sight than a beautiful ship going into action. A man who once sees it, is not likely to forget it; and the young officer who does not feel ennobled by his magnificent profession, can possess neither an imagination to strike nor a mind to conceive. Nearly every great event in the history of nations and men has been decided by a naval battle. The battle of *Salamis* overthrew the Persian power for ever, and stayed its conquest over Grecian civilization and letters. The battle of *Lepanto* broke the scimetar of the Turkish power, and the Christian world was at last relieved from the shadows of Mohammedanism which had so long threatened to blot it out for ever. Europe was upon the very verge of losing her Christian lights and Christian name, and we may shudder to think what the world would have been had the scimetar triumphed over the Christian sword. The battle of the Great Armada extinguished the last

dream of universal monarchy. It ended the horrible wars of conquest against the brave republic of the Netherlands by the greatest power on earth, and finally freed Protestantism from the crushing grasp of its arch enemy. It laid Philip the Second in the tombs of his ancestors, and sent the Duke of Parma unto despair and death. The fight at Trafalgar established England firmly among the nations, and enthroned her upon the British Islands for a lasting memorial to liberty and Christianity. The conflicts of our noble Old Ironsides did more to establish American nationality upon the Western Continent than all the fighting of 1812 upon the land.

Almost every memorable event among the nations has been connected more or less intimately with a battle on the sea. I trust that the American navy may not prove unworthy of its high and generous mission, and that our young officers will bend themselves to renewed labor, to ceaseless study of their gallant profession, which calls for endless toil and tireless application.

CHAPTER XVIII.

HE NAVAL OFFICER.

THE entrance into regular naval life of this public servant is made in boyhood. The youth is given away by the parent to the nation in tender years. To a certain degree, the boy is severed from the family, and the home discipline and home authority given up for those of the Government. The child is literally given away to the State, for weal or woe, for life or death. Henceforth, his education, his morals, his labors of mind and body, belong to the country. He enters under a discipline that is both parental and military.

The first four years of his new life are devoted to a preparation by study to mould both mind and character for the peculiar duties of the profession he has chosen. This course of education is mostly theoretical, its main object being to develop the mind into full capacity for thought and judgment, as well as to attain that scholastic knowledge which the many problems of the navigator continually present. There is also blended

with this course of education as much practical experience as possible. He gets an insight into the world of service beyond his horizon, and gets some early and primary notions of the responsibilities of command. It is intended to embrace in this four years' course of study such, and only such, teachings as bear more or less directly upon his profession as a sailor, and a public man. It is a course of education that is peculiarly technical, and which, outside of his special sphere of life, is not calculated to fit him for other pursuits. It is true, his mind is taught positive and exact things. Only such graces of education as will bear upon his usefulness in public life are needed, and only such are given. His whole course of education is special, and apart from that of other men. And hence it is that the naval officer is rendered so unfit for the pursuits and business of civil life.

As a special institution for professional learning, I doubt there is any in existence so careful, so thorough, and so complete, as the Naval Academy of the United States. In contrast to the military schools of our own and other countries, the naval student graduates with a mind better tempered for the prosecution of future study, and with a healthful elasticity, that none others give. On the day of graduation, he learns

the lasting lesson of life that he is only thoroughly prepared to attain knowledge, and that *he knows how to think*. He is then thrown into the arena of service—a service that is almost new to him, and where a stern, practical school is opened, where lessons are learned in the acts of duty. Responsibilities are thrown upon his young shoulders, as weighty as he can bear. But they are worn like a mantle, clothing him with dignity and care. From a pupil, he at once becomes a teacher to his subordinates. Every task that he has learned at school now finds a practice. The problems of the blackboard are solved among the stars, and in the depths of the ocean.

The naval officer is always at school. The very routine of his profession changes day by day. Progress, invention, change, keep him ever learning new things, and solving new problems. To keep pace with the progress of his profession, he must be a scholar as well as a laborer. New ships are given him to sail, and fight. New weapons are placed in his hands. Progress meets him everywhere, and on every tack. He has already learned to take interest in the progress of sciences, and the teeming events of each day invite him to study their nature. There is but little time for general reading, but the demand

for it is imperative, if he would not be ignorant of those things which men discuss around him. In the mean time, the labors of daily duty tax his temper, his judgment, and wisdom.

His cruising over the ocean enhances the powers of his observation. Foreign tongues and habits, foreign systems of government and religion, foreign society, and contact with the great world in its multifarious aspects and interests, are so many volumes for study and intelligence. Such a life renders it less possible for the naval officer to deceive himself than any other. Of all men who make direct approaches to truth, he is perhaps the one who finds the shortest line.

As age wears on, rank brings with it additional responsibilities. With increased authority come increased cares, and a more composed and thoughtful judgment. He begins to realize that to some extent many of the great interests of his Government are intrusted to his keeping. He is brought in contact with the chief men of his country, as well as those of other nations. Wider and broader opens up the sphere of his action, and the sun never sets upon his horizon.

In the mean time, he has passed the best years of his life, away from ties and associations which are the dearest to man. The life apart has weaned the brother, perhaps the sister, from the passion-

ate love of youth; and the parents, who gave him away to the country, are buried in the grave. The society of his youth has undergone change. They know him by his good name, and delight to recognize him, if by chance he pays a transient visit to the tombs of his now broken and dispersed friends and family. He then feels a secret, passionate longing to get away again upon the broad bosom of his mother ocean, where he can draw a sigh from the deepest depths of his soul. He feels indeed that he is the child of the ocean, and the orphan of the land!

There is an habitual sadness, as well as earnestness, in the deeper currents of the naval officer's life. If he be not like the brave and noble Collingwood, and have children born to him, they grow up to lisp the name of the absent, or to ponder over the lines of a photograph. This absence, this utter sundering from social life and home, brings a well of everlasting love in his heart, and the delusive pleasures of his life are spent in long, earnest yearnings over the sea to the little islet of affections, anchored on the very rim of his horizon. Why should he not be an earnest and thoughtful man? From the day he leaves his school, and enters fairly upon the duties of his profession, his life is a ceaseless struggle with difficulty, and a never-ending combat

with danger. Men thus living together on shipboard contract fellowships which are unknown to other men. There is a common bond in the society of the shipboard life that, though it may be unspoken, has a singular strength and tenacity.

The stern earnestness of the naval character is not a morbid or gloomy one. If too often the heart is carried upon the sleeve, there is generally an honorable confidence in it that is fearless and cheerful. A life spent amid tempests and ocean storms, with the symbols of eternity above, below, and around, is not calculated to make a man very bad. I never knew a sailor who was an infidel, and who did not reverence and know as much of God as most men. Unaccustomed to the infinite vices of every day civil life, the meanness of a lie or a cheat fills him with angry indignation, which most men smile at. A life of command, and of the exercise of authority, renders him impatient at beholding a wrong, and his impulse is always to redress it. A mean act fires his indignation sooner than a crime.

Of all men living, the naval officer should possess in the fullest degree the graces of a Christian gentleman. No man is so closely watched, none so closely criticised, nor so relentlessly discussed by citizens. As a living example, more than any man, he is all his life through placed before

others who are but too willing and ready to quote him for authority. The sailor looks to him as his model, the young officer as authority, and the citizen to scan and probe. He is a sworn man, and his word should be better than most men's oaths. Sworn to truth, sworn to fidelity, to loyalty and honor, he is, or should be, the incarnation of a gentleman.

Rev. Dr. Channing, of Boston, in a very able discussion on the character of the great Napoleon, assumes that the genius and abilities required for a great military man are of a secondary order. In this discussion, however, he confines military genius to the exercise of overcoming physical obstacles only. He limits the capacity required for a great military man to the art of crossing a river, or a desert, or a mountain, or to overcome fortifications, and lines of defence, and the mechanical tactics of an army of men. Had any other than so great a writer assumed this position, I should not acquit him of a partiality too strongly tinctured with prejudice. If the Duke of Wellington never made a fluent speech in the House of Lords, history gives him credit for shaping and originating the articles of the great treaty of 1815, which has secured the peace and happiness of Europe and the world ever since. Whatever conquest is made, the victor must create a gov-

ernment, and organize society, out of violent and dismembered fragments. Will any one say it is a secondary order of talent that performs this duty successfully? Was Lord Nelson greater at Trafalgar or at Naples? Granted, at Naples he was not so agreeable to contemplate, but which position gave England most advantages? If Napoleon did not write the articles of the *Code Napoleon*, it is well understood that he framed the best body of laws France ever had. Napoleon, dictating the principles of his Code to his ministers, is greater than Napoleon in Russia, or at Tilsit. Cæsar was essentially a military man. Was Cæsar greater among the Gauls or subduing the turbulence of Roman society, and creating the grandest empire the world has ever seen out of its torn and mutinous elements? While the statesmen of England were coquetting with their Spanish politics, and ruin to the world of religious liberty was hanging on a balance, the old admirals of Elizabeth grappled with the Armada, and secured freedom to the world and safety to their country by making a wreck of it. Our own commodores of an earlier day were as ready at making treaties as they were at conquering them. The statesmen of Europe had humored the Barbary pirate princes, and paid a shameful tribute to them from the days of Louis XIV.

to those of Porter, and Decatur, and Bainbridge.

There is something more required of naval and military men than merely to conquer rivers, and mountains and fortresses. In the higher demands for talent, history furnishes no example where military or naval education was unequal to the duty to be performed. No nation ever yet got into trouble that this talent was not called into requisition to extricate it.

There is something beautiful to me in the contemplation of the character of our naval men. Their simplicity and directness is admirable, whether we concede to them ability or not. No naval officer can ever console himself that his school-days are ended, except with his life. The brightest and fairest qualities that adorn human nature must be his. If he has not the local polish and elegance of manners of the etiquette of the land, it may easily be forgiven. But there are qualities and virtues that, if wanting, never can be. He is as often called upon to exhibit the wisdom of a statesman as he is the courage of a hardy warrior. We expect from him purity of manners and morals, and the cultivation of a scholar. We look for wisdom in his judgment, and grace in his deportment. We expect the courage of the lion to be blended with the gentleness of a

woman. His position in society and in the state is anomalous. Placed on the nation's borders, he is a sentinel on post—the very incarnation of fidelity and vigilance. His life passes in exile, oftentimes hungry and stinted for the commonest necessaries of existence. Often forgotten, frequently neglected, he is the guardian at the watch-tower of the nation's liberties. If he be not rich, or honored, as other men are, with half his labor, and half his inellect, he possesses the inestimable consciousness, at least, that his career has been useful, and his life spent for the welfare and good of his fellow-men.

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