THE LOGIC OF WILL

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THE LOGIC OF WILL

A Study in Analogy

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

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TO

PROFESSOR J. H. MUIRHEAD, LL.D.

"Take, since you bade it should bear,
These, of the seed of your sowing . . ."

PARTS of this essay have appeared in "The International Journal of Ethics," January and October, 1907. I am indebted to the Editor for allowing me to reprint them.

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CHAPTER I

THE SUBJECT

1. THERE is nothing new in the idea of an analogy between the two sides of our experience which we call the worlds of knowing and endeavour. Plenty of people have thought of it and plenty of people have applied it, with the object usually of throwing light on the problems of the second or conative world. The comparison, however, is generally not worked out in any great fulness of detail, since such a procedure is apt to appear a barren and trifling business, and is certainly a tiresome one to any but investigators with a special analogical cast of mind, involving a special taste for the subtle and minute. *The Analogy.*

Yet the absence of such detailed exposition seems to involve some danger if the analogy is to be pressed at all. Without it we shall be likely to grasp only the few resemblances between the two worlds which are so prominent as to strike us at the first glance, and we may miss some fruitful applications in obscurer parts from the want of a methodical key to the cipher. On the other hand, from this same practice of leaving gaps unfilled we may go wrong in those very resemblances that

we seem to see. It may be tempting to base an important argument on the correspondence, for instance, of A–B to X–Y, and yet it may be that to more careful observation Y–X would have appeared the truer correspondent.

Double object of this essay.

2. In the following essay the attempt is made to give some elaboration to the general analogy in a few directions, the choice of those directions being determined more by the random interests of the writer than by any systematic plan. No dominant scheme runs through the essay to give each of the notes and suggestions a definite place within it. Such unity as there is comes only from the fact that the guiding interests have been primarily ethical, so that most, though not all, of the investigations come to be grouped round certain ethical problems. This on the other hand has again contributed to diminish the unity, by leading to the introduction of a good deal of purely ethical discussion, not subordinated to the exposition of the analogy at all. Indeed the fairest description is perhaps to be found in saying that the essay has a double aim—the exposition of the analogical method on the one hand and the examination of some ethical problems on the other—and that its coherence depends only on some disconnected attempts to illustrate the first subject and to elucidate the second by bringing the two together.

Context of ethical problems.

3. Some explanation is required with regard to the context of the problems that have been introduced. The writer has had in mind throughout a certain connected system of ethical doctrine. It is a simple and compact

system, and seems in many ways an attractive one, but no great attempt is made here to establish it. The clauses of its creed for the most part merely provide the subject for discussions without any conclusions, and for illustrations of the cognitive-conative analogy. And it is not intended or believed to be an original system. The metaphysics it needs are like those of ordinary idealism, and many of its advantages and many of its difficulties are those which belong to idealist ethics in the ordinary forms. The great writers of that school seem from many of their statements to have committed themselves to at least this creed, and to be bound to face the most formidable of the problems which it raises. In the author's opinion, it might possibly claim to be simply a form of the common idealist ethics, stated from a special point of view. That point of view arises from opposing it to intuitionism.

Idealist and intuitionist ethics.

4. Since idealist ethics first began, its exponents have contrasted it in general and in detail with the doctrines of the naturalist and the hedonist schools, and what with Plato at the beginning and the latest text books at the end, this work now seems to have been effectually done. (So effectually, indeed, that the opponents might now perhaps venture to admit that some of their polemics have been a little unfair, and that after all there are certain points on which they agree.) The intuitionist has been such a useful ally against these schools that the idealist has always been a little tempted to slur the points of difference, and to think that he would be perfectly in sympathy

with a really intelligent member of the intuitionist group. A recent work (Mr. Warner Fite's *Introductory Study of Ethics*) actually treats intuitionism as a special kind of idealism. And an established idealist text book, after criticism of the older "morality of conscience," has the remark, "If . . . it be said that what is intuitively apprehended is not right and wrong as such, but the true end of human life, we have passed to a new theory altogether. . . . In this form intuitionalism can no longer maintain itself as an independent theory. . . . On any theory of the end, we may well admit that its worthiness is intuitively discerned. . . ."[1]

This inscription does not sound very unlike a doctrine which has lately been brought forward, and which seems to have much likelihood of maintaining itself as an independent theory. In the mutual criticisms of Mr. G. E. Moore and the idealists, it is interesting to observe how hard the critics sometimes find it really to meet each other. And I believe this may be due to the fact that each side partly fails to see how the two begin to differ. Idealists cannot help thinking that their opponent is really an idealist who has lost his way; while Mr. Moore on his part persists in regarding them as highly confused exponents of the intuitionist view.

It looks as though the next step required in ethics were to clear up the problems that lie between the idealist and the intuitionist grounds. This work has been done already on the naturalist and hedonist border of idealism. The fundamental questions there have been answered in this way or

[1] J. H. Muirhead, *Elements of Ethics*, page 82 (2nd edition).

in that, and according to his answer each writer has stepped to this or that side of the boundary, and has worked out the detailed consequences of the answer, and so the creeds on each side have been built up clear of each other, and we can now see them as a whole and combine their plans in a new one if we wish without fear of confusion. Or, if this is too cheerful a description, at any rate the work has been done much more completely than on the intuitionist border. Moral philosophers ought to turn their attention now, one would think, to discovering what the questions are whose alternative answers determine a thinker's position here, and they ought to work out the results of each answer. The two parties should cease trying to adopt each other as allies (and complaining of each other as bad ones). They should not even give their primary attention at present to finding an undenominational substratum on which they may agree, but should rather give it to formulating the types of highly denominational creeds; should find what fundamental opinions separate them, and what further separations must result logically from these. After that each side would be better able to reconsider its own position. "I think this and you think that, and there lies the origin of our differences," is a better preparation for mutual help than "Of course we really hold the same opinions, but how badly you are expressing them."

5. Some of the following discussions might possibly serve, if successful, as a small contribution towards the work. This, however, is not their sole or even their primary object. That object is the philosophical

Treatment not critical or historical.

one of examining the consequences and implications of certain articles of belief on their own merits, not the critical or historical one of enquiring how far these articles can claim to represent the position of any special writers. The names of writers, therefore, and the names of schools, will not after this chapter be mentioned in such a connection at all.

Plan of the essay.

6. With this explanation, it must be stated that throughout the essay a certain general philosophical position is *assumed*—broadly, that of a Hegelian idealist. The analogy of knowledge and will is worked out on the basis of the idealist account of each; a fact which will be evident so far as knowledge is concerned, though it may be rather disguised in the case of will. For, if the analogy is to be systematically set out, our account of the ethical doctrines seems obliged to take an external form which happens to be associated with the empiricist rather than the idealist. I believe, however, that the association is accidental, and that my ethical statements are throughout consistent with the great doctrines of idealism.

This premise is perhaps especially needed in connection with my next two chapters, which deal with ethical matters only. For the sake of my whole plan of procedure, it has been necessary to start with definitions of certain ethical terms; terms which, as it happens, empiricists have generally defined in one way or another, and idealists have not. I believe, nevertheless, that the idealist ought to define them, and that to be consistent he ought to define them in my way.

After these preliminary arrangements, and after some elementary psychology in Chapter IV., Chapters V.-X. are occupied with the analogy itself, worked out, as I said, on the basis of the main idealist doctrines. I have discussed first the correspondence of the psychology of knowledge with that of will, and then the correspondence of logic and epistemology with ethics. Wherever possible I have noted the bearing of my comparisons upon interesting ethical problems; on the position of casuistry, for instance; on the connection of virtue with wisdom; on the moral perfection of the Absolute.

Chapters XI.-XIII. are concerned with the greatest of all these problems—the question of the consistency of private with universal good. The first two of these chapters contain only ethical matter, being occupied with the idealist doctrine on that subject and the implications involved; the third reverts to the analogy, and tries to show the necessary metaphysical foundation in its correspondence with that needed for the corresponding doctrine of cognition—the consistency of truth for the individual with truth universal.

In my final chapter, XIV., I survey the position of the analogy as the essay has worked it out, and conclude that the arguments based on it are of two kinds, one kind being a good deal stronger than the other.

Note on use of such terms as "conative."

7. One more note might be added. In the psychological description of impulse and action, various words, especially the word "conation," are used in a far wider sense than is given to them by such great

authorities as Mr. Bradley. The writer believes, nevertheless, that the difference does not go much deeper than the use of words, and hopes that the convenience, for the purpose in hand, of taking these in their widest possible meanings may be held to justify the departure.

CHAPTER II

PROLEGOMENA: ELEMENTS OF ETHICS. I

1. BEFORE approaching the subject of the cognitive-conative analogy at all, let us begin with a purely ethical discussion, in order to clear the way for ethical applications of the analogy later on.

Must begin with definitions of ethical terms.

The analogy in question might exist, and be important so far as psychology and metaphysics were concerned, without, in the view of certain schools, having any great importance for ethics. It will not have the maximum of importance unless moral philosophy can be properly considered as bearing practically the same relation to our conative world as mental philosophy bears to the cognitive—unless, that is, a large part of ethics can be simply identified with what we might call the logic of will.

Now the possibility of this depends on the answers given to certain elementary questions in ethics, questions in particular of the best way of defining certain important terms, and, in connection with this, of the proper psychological analysis of certain important states of mind. To the writer, the greatest plausibility

Need of defining terms.

appears to lie with certain answers which as a matter of fact do make the above identification possible. In any case, it seems necessary at this point to introduce a discussion of these purely ethical questions in order to settle the position of ethics. It is only this which can enable us later to take up the cognitive-conative analogy with a view of using it to throw light on various interesting problems with which ethics is concerned.

Begin with "good."

What we have to do is primarily to find definitions for certain terms with which most of ethics, as ordinarily treated, seems to be concerned. Let us begin with the adjective "good," as it is used in such a phrase as "a good thing."

Begin with widest sense of "good."

2. In the chief schools of ethics it has perhaps been more usual to begin by examining "The Good" in some sense of a Platonic Idea of good, or an Aristotelian goal of the universe; and only then to proceed downwards to "good things." But if the other end is to exist at all, it would seem instructive to try sometimes to begin the statement of doctrine there and proceed upwards instead. And it really must be allowed to exist, on pain of a too intolerable departure from common language. We do continually talk of "things which are good" in a very wide sense; a sense in which goods may conflict, and in which a thing may be good and yet excluded from "the good" in the sense of "the best." It seems impossible always to avoid this use of it ourselves. We shall not try to avoid it, but shall try instead to fix an exact definition.

Let us begin, then, with the adjective "good" as indicating a common property and used in the widest sense. And let us propose to define it so that "a good thing" shall be exactly equivalent to "the object of a need." An object is good for any being, we shall say, in so far as it fulfils a need of his, or if actual would fulfil it.

Definition, "fulfilment of need."

3. There are some reasons, which will be obvious later, for choosing the word "need" instead of "desire." "Desire" usually means a conscious experience, and we do not wish to say that a thing ceases to be good for me whenever I cease to think about it, or to deny that it may be good for me even though I have never thought about it at all. Moreover, desire is not nearly so important a thing as "conative disposition," or "need." It is a complication of this, appearing under special circumstances, and not appearing in a degree which holds any fixed proportion to the motive strength or the "reality" of the need.[1]

Need, not desire.

"Need" is to be taken quite widely, so as to cover our cravings, conscious or not, for the smallest objects as well as the biggest, and for means as well as ends. My "good" will thus correspond to the broader use of ordinary language, which allows two inconsistent things to be both good for me. In

"Need" to be taken widely.

[1] A large part of the history of ethics has been worked out by conflict between the schools which upheld the half-truth "Good is what we want," and those which replied with the half-truth "Good is not what we seem to want."

the narrower sense "good" is used as equivalent only to an element in the best possible.

4. Finally, and this is very important, everything that is good is good for somebody, it is my good or yours or ours. What is good for me is not good for you unless the need of it is identically common to you and me. Then good will be common in the sense of belonging to us both, not independent and belonging to neither. It is no more proper to speak of a thing's being good without implying "for . . ." than to speak of a man's being a son or a father without implying "of . . ."

All good is good for somebody.

5. Now this is a deep dividing line in ethics, and underlies perhaps the most important differences of all. For it is possible to hold that the proper definition of "good" involves something quite opposite to this. The chief view opposed to the one we have considered seems to combine two or three points; (1) that the notion of "good" is unique, simple and indefinable; (2) that it is emphatically not equivalent to the fulfilment of a desire or need; (3) that "good for me" is nonsense—as much nonsense as, for a realist or a commonsense man, it would be to say "Charles I. died in 1649," or "the mountain contains granite," and to add "for me." A thing is good or not good as Charles did or did not die. "For any being" does not come into the matter in any way.

This is a dividing line.

Intuitionist's view.

Let us examine the contrast between this opinion and our own.

6. The proposer of the definition we started with

says, "These objects that we both call good have all, I believe, the property of somehow fulfilling a need. I shall for the future give the name in virtue of this property; shall give it wherever I find the property and simply because I find it; and shall distinguish 'my good,' 'his good,' etc., according to whose needs are fulfilled." *Our common property.*

His opponent replies, "The property you speak of may or may not be present in all these objects to which we both give the same name. The question seems to me irrelevant. What *is* present in all of them, and is far more important, is a certain unique and simple property known by us all, so unique and simple that it has received no name but 'goodness.' This property I shall continue to call goodness, and naturally it is in virtue of its presence that I shall bestow the name of 'good.'" *Intuitionist's common property.*

Our reply to this is simply that we do not perceive this property at all. So the question seems practically to reduce itself to that of the proper psychological analysis of the state of mind called the recognition of good.

7. When we try to solve the problem by introspection, we find out how difficult it is. Probably the man untrained in philosophy, if he keeps clear of the grosser errors of psychological hedonism, is apt at once to give our opponent's account. But, in the first place, this is by far the easiest account to give. If we find it hard to see a connection or an explanation, it is always easy to say that the thing is *Difficulty of introspection.*

unconnected and inexplicable. And of course, in the second place, the fresh mind of the amateur is notoriously the very worst at introspection. Idols of the tribe supply us with phrases and theories and descriptions and interpretations, more glibly and more tyrannously than any respectable philosophical god.

Intuitionism and faulty psychology.

8. There is some weight for our own view in the fact that our opponent's *looks* like a very natural remnant from an obsolete 'faculty' psychology. Nobody a while ago need have objected to the idea of a peculiar element in us which distinguishes this peculiar simple property in certain presented objects. Even now psychology has nothing conclusive against it; only the general tendency and sentiment against indissoluble bits of the world, and small closed universes inside the whole universe. We have become rather more confirmed in the habit of trying to explain everything in terms of other things, and of insisting that if this leads us to circles in the end the circles shall be very large. We admit that an analysed experience is not in all senses the same as that experience unanalysed, but we are uncomfortable if we can perform no analysis. Still, this is not conclusive.

Possible origin of intuitionism.

9. There is some weight also in the fact that a plausible account might be given of the way in which our opponent had been led to his false analysis. Suppose that what I do mean by "good" as opposed to what on reflection I think I have been meaning, is "need-fulfilling;" that this is the quality in virtue

of which I have actually been applying the name. This reason for my applications may be disguised from me when I come to reflect on them, because of the complications of the different cases. The need, for one thing, is not always present as a desire, and I may call an object good because it is the object of a disposition which I felt before and know I shall feel again, but which I do not feel at the moment. Some of my needs, again, are common to me and to other people; and some are only directed towards other people's satisfaction as such. So, as well as seeing that what I call goodness is often largely independent of my desires at the moment, I see that it may be common to me and to others, and that it may exist for me only because it exists for others. Thus, in analysing my own conception, I may easily be led to think of goodness (1) as if it were independent of all my needs, temporary or permanent and at top or at bottom, (2) as if a thing could be good without being good *for* anybody—good absolutely and independently and "in itself."

10. There is something in the evidence of language. If the peculiar property spoken of by our opponent had always been normally recognised, there would, one would think, be a word devoted to it in all languages; probably a pair everywhere corresponding to our contrast of simple "good" and "bad," if this has the meaning he suggests. As a matter of fact, this is not found. It is true that no general word is found for "need-fulfilling" either, so the same argument might be turned against ourselves. It does not seem

Evidence of language.

so strong against us, because our conception could be served well enough by all the different words for different kinds of fulfillingness—great, beautiful, powerful, fitting, and so on, of which there are plenty in all languages. Whereas our opponent's goodness seems left without a word at all. Once more, the evidence is not conclusive, yet it is worth something.[1]

Does our use lead to conflict with common ideas?

11. Now when we are speaking of language, our opponent may produce an argument of his own. It may be said that our definition is improper because in certain cases it would lead to a use of language so violently at variance with common speech. Suppose that a being existed whose nature yearned for nothing but what we call cruelty, hatred, and vice; our definition would compel us to say that these things were good for him; but no normal unprejudiced man would be willing so to use the word. That is, it may be said, we must have made a wrong analysis of what really leads the normal man to apply this name of "good," for according to us he would be led to apply it in a case where as a matter of fact he would not do so.

Peculiar cases will create awkwardness,

We must indeed admit that in peculiar cases like this the ordinary man will no doubt hesitate and be uncomfortable. He has not reflected on the underlying reasons for his conduct in giving the name in the ordinary circumstances, and now he is not clear as to what the consistent procedure would be, and it

[1] See note at end of book.

is quite likely that he may choose the inconsistent path because of sheer strangeness and bewilderment. But this misfortune may happen anywhere, and is not a sufficient objection to a definition.

but that might happen with any definition.

Further, I must remind the reader that this essay is written on the basis of idealist doctrines, and that these involve some very definite statements that we shall have to consider later, about the needs that are possible for conscious beings. Of a person who apparently wanted nothing but vice, idealism would certainly claim that he had mistaken his real wants; that, though vice must be termed a good for him, because it fulfils one desire, it is by no means "good" for him in the sense of being the greatest fulfilment possible for his total need. If an idealist says, "I believe this definition to be the best," it is somewhat irrelevant to object, "If your other beliefs are false it will not be the best." Euclid, with Euclidean space in his mind, defined a triangle as a three-sided rectilineal figure. If he were radically mistaken about space, we might perhaps meet with a three-sided rectilineal figure which had two sides less than the third, and four corners, and which was also perfectly round. We should certainly find it inconvenient to have to apply the name "triangle" here. Yet nobody brings up this case as an objection to Euclid's definition of the name.

We deny possibility of extreme case.

12. Finally, so far as it is a fair objection at all, our opponent's definition is exposed to it just as much as our own. For he is bound down to

this peculiar property of his. Wherever it turns up he must give the name of "good"; and, since he must be allowed no more doctrine of facts than he allows us, by arranging our suppositions we can get him into very inconvenient places. He is not allowed, for instance, to assume that this "goodness" will always be found in connection with desirability. Suppose it happened to occur in an object which was absolutely hateful to us and to him, opposed to everything that human beings have ever desired and toiled for. He would be bound in consistency to call this object good; and it is doubtful whether he would like doing so any better than we should ourselves.

Difficulty just as bad for our opponent.

13. Thus, to sum up this last discussion. It is of no use for either side to object, "Your analysis must be false; for if it is true, then in certain cases, which I could arrange, people would do something which we know they would feel inconsistent and uncomfortable in doing." We reply that even the best analysis must leave this possibility for borderland cases; and that if one's opponent has a free hand in his suppositions about the facts, the extent of the possibility will be quite unaffected by the goodness of the analysis.

So the objection fails.

14. Nevertheless, all this is not sufficient to decide the matter one way or the other. We shall have to admit in the end that psychology is incapable by itself of answering this question. In that department we simply do not know enough. We shall

In the end psychology cannot reply.

and must end by choosing that answer which fits in best with everything else we know.

15. If we assume our own definition, just one extension of it will be necessary later on. Every action follows from a disposition to do it, and is therefore a member of the class of "good things" in the wide sense of the term. But we are accustomed to speak of "a good action" in a rather different sense, a sense in which the adjective applies to actions only and not to other "things." It will be convenient then to say that an action is a good action in so far as it is on the wisest lines, as it is directed towards procuring the greatest possible fulfilment of need, and, apart from cognitive mistakes, does procure such greatest fulfilment. A good life will be made up of such actions, and a "good man" is one who leads such a life. Each of these ideas is a natural specialisation of our original widest definition of good.

Meaning of good in a good action.

CHAPTER III

PROLEGOMENA: ELEMENTS OF ETHICS. II

1. OUGHT. Let us define "ought" so as to have, as in common language, a broader and a narrower sense. In the broader sense, "This ought to be" shall mean "This is wanted." In the narrower sense it shall mean, "This is *the* thing wanted," the thing that enters into what is wanted most. Or, more specialised still, it shall mean "This is the thing that I want most." Thus we should be willing to use it in exactly the same sense as "This is good"; though in practice we shall use sometimes one and sometimes the other, as seems most usual in common speech.

Definition of "Ought."

It still seems possible with these definitions to use language almost exactly in accordance with custom. The context will determine whose need is in question. "He ought" may refer to his needs alone. "My would-be murderer ought to go well armed." But in the marked ethical sense, we can substitute "I approve," and then the reference is to *my* deepest needs, or (as we should probably later go on to claim) to *ours*.

2. The needs referred to, in the broader use at

any rate, may be of most miscellaneous kinds. "That bridge ought to bear an engine to be of any use." "A child should not have more than five hours' work." "There ought to be a Rembrandt on that wall." "There ought not, for the householder cannot afford it." "I suppose I ought to go and call." "We should love one another." "He ought to be hanged" (our notion of a satisfactory world demands it). "I ought to be immortal." *Different contexts and uses.*

An interesting class is derived from the need for logical consistency. "My whole system of thought demands . . ." "If the sides are equal, so ought the angles to be." "The sum ought to come out to this answer." "A kindly man ought to be pleased with such a thing."

3. "Ought" in the narrower ethical sense is used almost entirely in connection with a certain class of complicated needs. These are the needs that have to do with the kind of behaviour I desire from human beings as such. "Unless you do this, you fall short of the whole standard of my society-ideas." "It is wanted if you are to satisfy these;" this is something more even than "It is wanted if you are to do what happens to be best for the society or for me." In sinning we are violating more than the direct need for the thing we harm. In refusing a neighbour a loaf we are not only leaving him hungry as a catastrophe of nature would do. We are going against his needs for neighbourly behaviour. I desire that a man shall do his best to satisfy my body, and desire it not *Special needs for human behaviour.*

only for my body's sake. I dislike a natural catastrophe; I dislike a man's unkindness for additional reasons. Similarly I may dislike his inconsistency and changeableness even when it happens to suit my convenience; and may wish him to act according to his conscience even when I think him mistaken; and may bitterly resent a chastisement from a private person which from a magistrate I should accept with submission;—so important are these additional subtle needs.[1] And it is when such additional needs are concerned that people commonly speak of approval and condemnation in the narrower ethical meaning, and say, with the ethical meaning, "This ought to be."

Cases where these secondary needs are absent.

4. It is interesting to notice the bearing of this distinction on the statements sometimes made that there is no moral world uniting nations to one another, or uniting men and animals; no duties between them. Of course it is not true that they cannot hurt one another, and that wanton hurt is not always wrong. But the statements bear striking witness to the fact that the secondary needs created by human relationships are much stronger and more important than the primary; that injustice is far more hateful to the sufferer than pain. A hunter can hurt a wild animal, and a Crusader can hurt a Saracen, and both are quite

[1] Similarly the kindliness that seeks to give a friend pleasure gives much more than that pleasure; a flower given means something very different from a flower found in the street. So the *results* of seeking one's neighbour's pleasure and seeking his truest good will not be so different in level as the aims.

likely to be doing wrong. But neither can violate the victim's demands on him for proper conduct, for no expectations exist and no demands are made.

Hence the peace which atheism brings to a religious man tormented by the apparent cruelty of the universe. Hence also the peace of tolerance; the comfort of accepting people and things as they are, and recognising, like the lady with her kitchen-maid, that "one can't expect perfection for £14 a year." Thus again a man with strong desires may keep all their strength and yet be essentially quiet-minded, if he learns to give up the one claim that circumstances which do not suit him are not behaving as they should. Facts may be horribly painful, but to him they are simple facts and not "facts which ought not to be"; and it is not hunger but resentment which tears men and states to pieces. *Tolerance.*

Of course all this is akin to the relief found in abolishing any ideal, and we may pay too highly for it.

5. But this is a digression. To return to our definition of "This ought to be" as "This is what is needed." In discussions as to the propriety of this definition we find, exactly as before with "good," a deep dividing line amongst moral philosophers. *Second dividing line.*

6. All of them are agreed in the main as to most of "the things we ought to do." That is, a large part of the denotation of this phrase is fixed in common for both sides. The problem then is to find a suitable connotation which we must finally take as *Denotation of "ought" largely fixed.*

our guide when we proceed to extend the denotation beyond those things we are familiar with.

Our common property.

The upholders of our doctrine say, "In those things concerning which all of us use and intend to use the phrase 'They ought to be,' the most important common property seems to us to be the property of fulfilling a need;—or where we use it in a more special sense, the common property is that of best fulfilling the needs which are deepest in all of us. For the broadest sense, then, we shall choose the connotation 'fulfilling a need.' For the narrowest sense we shall choose '*best* fulfilling my needs' (as we do not want to bring in just here the doctrine that we have needs in common). In virtue of these properties we shall use the words in question. Thus our strict definitions will make 'It ought to be' in different senses precisely equivalent to 'It is good' in different senses, and we should be willing so to use them whenever it was demanded; though in practice, to make our language sound more familiar, we shall, in different circumstances, use sometimes one expression and sometimes the other."

Intuitionist definition.

7. Now a certain school of thinkers will reply to this, "In the things concerning which we say 'they ought to be,' the property of fulfilling need, even if present, is by no means the most important. What is really momentous is a property, possessed by them all, which is so unique and simple and singular that we can give it no separate name—it is just 'oughtness.' They are such that the universe involves an

'obligation' on us to do them. For this 'obligation' we can substitute no other word. (It is of course not 'necessity,' for we may leave the things undone.) And the quality itself is separated from the universe of desire; it is different from any quality of being the object of a need—object either as an end or as a means. Conceivably it may be connected with this in fact, and may even in fact result from it. Nevertheless it is a perfectly distinct thing. Now this most important property cannot possibly be left without a name for the sake of getting an extra synonym for 'the best fulfilling of need.' It is, therefore, the only proper content for the definition of 'ought.'"

8. As before with "good," the question at issue seems practically to reduce itself to one of psychology. Which of us is right in his analysis of the psychological state known to us both as "feeling that it ought . . .," or as "sense of obligation"? *Psychological question again.*

As before, again, we might use in defence of our own view an appeal to the general tendency of psychology to dislike closed universes. Our opponent has a hard line round a bit of the world where we have none.

9. A second argument is that the other view would be a very natural kind of mistake. Since we only bring into clear consciousness, generally speaking, such things as are important for our purpose at the time, we seldom think of our purposes and needs in themselves at all. When we are asked, "Why must such a thing be?" it needs a real effort of *Possible origin of intuitionism.*

reflection to bring us to the answer "Because it is *wanted* for such an end, or for its own sake." It is easier to reply simply "Of course it must be." So that, even if our analysis were the right one, our opponent's analysis would probably be that which at first we should be led to give.

Categorical imperative an un-analysed state.

There seems to be an interesting illustration of just this instinctive superficiality in a department where those trained to reflection would dispute less. This is the department of certain demands made by customs of society. We all know the phrases, commonest perhaps among schoolboys and women: "One *can't* do this." "No fellow can wear buttoned boots." "People *must* dress tidily, and return calls." "One can't say things of that sort." And the question "Why not?" though often admitting of a good enough answer on reflection, usually arouses a kind of irritation. Reflection is refused, and the statement merely reiterated, "Of course it is so." The more primitive the mind of the thinker, the harder it is for him to go further than this in the analysis of his own conception. Here in a small universe is a categorical imperative and the way it is made, or rather the way in which it is left in uncriticised possession of its world.

Criticism and analysis need not injure the force of the demand. It may be quite true that laced boots and returning calls are essential elements in the life we truly want, and therefore after reflection we shall still cultivate these things. All we want is to say "We ought to seek a certain life because it is the

kind of life we need," and to make these two assertions identical in meaning, and to make each a verbal assertion about the Good. It looks wantonly extravagant to make so many expressions into synonyms, and we are thereby leaving certain famous properties without any names. But then the upholder of our doctrine does not believe in the normal existence of any notion of these properties. And he may be wilfully extravagant, and make synonyms of more phrases than perhaps he would otherwise do, in order to leave no doubt about his unbelief. Even after he has squandered language in this way, he may, if he is right, still have enough distinct expressions to write the whole doctrine that belongs to his creed.

10. The last paragraph is a digression. To return to the subject of "ought," we must conclude as we did before with "good." Psychology, in spite of the arguments brought forward, is incapable by itself of answering the psychological question. The problem as to the peculiar element, distinct from the world of need, in the feeling of obligation, must stand along with the metaphysical problem about the existence of an "oughtness" distinct from that world. And both must be solved according to our whole philosophy of the universe.

Psychology cannot reply.

11. A few more remarks will be in place before the end of this chapter.

The opposing party who took their stand on the uniqueness of "good" and those who assert the uniqueness of "ought" need not be the same people. The two doctrines are

Concluding remarks.

quite separable, though perhaps they are oftenest held together. Perhaps, however, both together have seldom or never been explicitly asserted. Writers who have thought out and emphasised the uniqueness have mostly confined their attention to one or the other of them.

Two groups of intuitionists.

12. Will the upholders of these peculiar common properties have to add the presence of our property as a doctrine of fact? That is, must they say that "my Good," and "What I ought to do," are each after all what most fulfils my need, though neither is suitably defined with reference to that?

How far must they add our doctrine?

There is no necessity, of course; but unless they do add it, it looks as if they would come into conflict with common language and common ideas. This is perhaps best seen if we look at the ordinary conception of "right-mindedness." A right-minded man seems to be one whose thoughts, down to the most obscure, are in line with truth; who knows and *realises* the facts about himself and the universe; who is not enslaved by any minor part of himself, but is acting with his whole nature. That is, he is a man who inevitably chooses and pursues the thing that is most fulfilling to the whole of his need. If, then, our opponents refuse to add to their definitions the statement of fact mentioned above, they will be obliged to say that a man's right-mindedness may lead him to choose something other than his good, and to do something other than what he ought to do.

If they consent to add the statement, then the

application of the phrases in question will be precisely the same for us both. We shall differ only as to their best connotation; and the reason is that the others will believe in certain important properties, common to the class, in which we do not believe.

13. For the future, then, let us assume these definitions, and assign to ethics the place marked out by their means. We have certainly not set forth anything that finally establishes them. But let us go on as though they were established. *Assume these definitions.*

That is, when in the course of this essay we use the terms "good," "ought," etc., they will be used with the definite meanings that we have now explained. If the reader still sees reason to reject these meanings so far as ethics goes, he need only translate the words and then ignore any claim of the remarks containing them to have a bearing on ethics. Possibly they may still be relevant in other ways.

So much for our prefatory definitions. We will now begin the treatment of our real subject.

CHAPTER IV

ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY

1. How do we come to act?

On the surface it seems a non-controversial account to say that something arouses a "disposition" in us. This disposition has our natural inertia to overcome; it is also helped or hindered by other dispositions which the change would affect. These may modify the original suggestion or defeat it altogether; or it may carry itself out.

Dispositions.

It may not seem to take us very far to say that a chief condition of (*e.g.*) an idea's leading to action is that it should correspond to a disposition to act. But at any rate we get the implication that its working does not depend on chance but on law, and on the law of our character. According to this law, we respond thus under certain conditions to certain suggestions, and we express this conveniently by saying that we have a "disposition" to respond to these. Our responses, again, are complex, and part of this complexity it is convenient to express by speaking of a plurality of dispositions. Really, presumably, there is only one law, one "concrete universal"

Meaning of "disposition."

which works itself out in the life of the universe, and partly expresses itself in the life which is actually led by me. But if one remembers that this "disposition" does not take one very far; and in particular that it is a law or a phase of a law and not a "substance," the ordinary language is convenient.

"One" disposition.

The boundary of "one" disposition, or "tendency," or "want," or "need," of course, will often be quite conventional. We speak sometimes, for instance, of a tendency as "strengthened by habit," and sometimes as having "the strength of habit" added to it—the support of the separate tendency to do again what we did before. The impulse to pull at an oar is sometimes looked on as an element in the impulse to make the boat move, which again is an element in the wider disposition to get to the journey's end; on the other hand, these are sometimes looked on as separate impulses of which one is a means to the carrying out of another. The desire for a complex object may or may not be thought of as a complex of desires for its various attractive features.

No disposition stands alone.

And we must never think of "one" as independent of the others. The logical order for each individual begins with the total disposition which is the conative aspect of his character; then this is conveniently broken into "universes of desire," and the single dispositions are mere elements in these. A thing is commonly sought only as a detail in a wider state, and on condition that certain other things are obtained as well.

2. This kind of mixture seems to set a close limit

to any attempt at classification. For instance, take the distinction sometimes made between "fundamental" and "derived" needs. What is a "fundamental need"? If it is not the craving to lie in bed after 7 a.m. on Monday the 19th inst. (which conflicts with my wish to read pages 27-37 of the first edition of Godfrey's *Astronomy* before eight o'clock breakfast that morning), is it the craving to sleep late in general, or to have bodily rest, or to have some amount of bodily comfort generally, or to have comfort bodily-mental-or-spiritual, or simply to have my wants fulfilled? I cannot see any fixed or consistent way of using "need," unless we use it quite broadly and freely, for anything from the widest disposition at one end to what underlies the tiniest wish at the other. For in truth there is only the one total disposition, and I analyse "needs" out of this. If we reduce at all on an empirical level, it can only be to the one whole nature. At present we will not attempt to use the distinction.

"Fundamental" and "derived" needs.

3. All such interaction and continuity means that there must be great complexity in any approximate statement of the "laws" of a man's behaviour. And the difficulty of making such statements will be increased by the fact that any stage in a conative process may apparently vary indefinitely with regard to level of consciousness. Sometimes a disposition is aroused by a suggested idea of some definite change which might be brought about, and the ideas of other results of the change rouse other dispositions for or against them, and the whole thing is worked out in

Varying levels of consciousness.

a clear light. Sometimes the first disposition finds itself opposed by an indefinite mass of unwillingness in the rest of our nature, consisting really of a great knot of different tendencies which never get their objects systematically formulated. Sometimes there is no definite idea anywhere to begin with, but the disposition is roused at its root by some dull pain of repression which for a while is the only thing in consciousness. And sometimes the whole process is carried out without ever entering our consciousness at all.

4. Even when we say we are conscious of what we are needing or aiming at, wide limits of variation are left, for we may be thinking of such different elements or stages in this object. For instance, take a *desire*—an impulse whose feeling side is awake. It is usually said to be "for" the object which is in clearest consciousness, but that sometimes is evidently not the object of the impulse. In desire for a friend's presence, the impulse that is awake need not be the impulse to secure that presence—the attempt may be so evidently hopeless that this impulse is not aroused at all, and if the opportunity were suddenly presented I should have to collect my thoughts and get new thoughts before they tended to pass into action. The actual impulse is perhaps to share things and do things with him, to act as if he were present. Impulse seems to be a kind of strain in a particular direction, which breaks into action according to opportunity. If it is checked in attaining the object, desire for the object awakes. If it is hindered from working at all, desire to seek the object awakes.

"Object" of desire or impulse.

Once more it is a matter of choice whether we speak of two impulses or of two aspects or elements in the one impulse; need to work for the *object*, need to *work* for the object. The strain is all in the same straight line and *towards* the object, and we may or may not divide it for convenience.

Needs awake and asleep.

5. Still further complication is introduced by the fact that sometimes a need will awake and sometimes it will not. It may "be there" in the sense that it worked a short time before and will presently work again, but just at the moment apparently no suggestion and no stimulus may be able to arouse it. Or perhaps it may be incapable of any direct work, and yet may exist in the sense that a departure from its lines will inevitably bring discord and dissatisfaction, general discomfort and new conflicting impulses. We shall not hesitate to give the name of need to such a regulative disposition as this.

Regulative needs.

"Strength" of needs ambiguous.

6. We must notice here, by the way, a very important distinction. The "strength" of a need or want is an ambiguous expression. It is sometimes used to mean motive strength, power of producing action in its own lines. On the other hand it is sometimes used for that in it which determines the *value* of its object. My need for a thing is said to be stronger when I need it *more* than I need other things.[1] These two meanings are by no means identical, and the two qualities may to a considerable extent vary independently of each other. We shall return to this subject of "amount of need" at the end of Chapter IX.

[1] I do not necessarily *desire* it more.

7. Strength of need in either sense need not coincide with strength or vividness of wishing. And this leads to a new subject. In speaking just now of the feeling-side of a disposition, we anticipated our notice of an important quality. A disposition seems to have at least two sides; it is a disposition to act and a disposition to feel—a potential impulse and a potential desire. *Feeling and impulse.*

The two sides need not be equally prominent by any means. The awaking of a strong disposition may result in its sweeping automatically into a change of the not-self, with little accompaniment of feeling, perhaps none. Or even if the carrying-out is slow, the vividness of feeling may quite fail to match the strong motive-power. *Not proportionate.*

Feeling seems to be roused by conflict, as is natural according to the psychological account which makes it simply an accompaniment of prospering or hindered activity. According to this, we could not have feeling without any impulse, but a very slight impulse could be accompanied by a great deal of feeling. It looks as if we could certainly act against the greater mass of feeling, and show it in one way when we drag ourselves through a painful duty, in another way when we are dragged by a painful fixed idea.[1] *Feeling and conflict.*

8. Is the feeling a mere accompaniment, then,

[1] But in such cases the feeling has been awaked by struggle between the dispositions, and the feeling-side of the conquering disposition will also have been awaked, so that some pleasant feeling, though not a balance of pleasant feeling, will accompany the carrying of it out.

or does it to a certain extent affect the motive-force? The best answer seems to be that amongst the rest we have a disposition to augment the pleasant feeling and to avoid the painful; an action is really harder when it is unpleasant, and a tendency may conquer because of the actual bitterness of holding it in. When conflicting dispositions are otherwise equally matched, the one whose feeling-side is more readily waked to poignancy by the conflict may win by this means.

Feeling increases motive-force.

9. The introduction of this side of our conative nature adds its full share of complexity to the subject. For instance, not only must we distinguish strength of desire from strength of impulse, but we must distinguish desire from approval, from the recognition that an object would fulfil a need. In approval, I may know that the need is "there" and yet be unable to feel it as a conscious craving. Thus I may fully recognise that to sit down and write some pages of a book would best fulfil some deep-seated needs of mine—to make profitable use of my time, to do a thorough piece of work, to earn my salary in an honest way, to contribute to the progress of philosophy. If I consider that these needs are the most important that can be fulfilled just now, then I approve of the action in the special ethical sense as well as the broad. Yet I may not *like* it much at all. I may not carry it out. If I do carry it out, it may be by force of an unopposed tendency with no feeling-side awake. If desire is awake, it may belong not much or not at all to

Desire and approval.

the needs mentioned above, but rather to a need to quit company I dislike, or to banish disturbing thoughts, or to prevent future remorse, or to practise self-control and consistency. I may desire the thing, that is, in a very different respect from that in which I approve it.

10. Such illustrations as the last serve a further purpose in emphasising the *unevenness* of behaviour which comes from the way in which every need will fluctuate in its motive power and in its success amongst others. *Unbalanced action.* Sometimes the chaos of facts seems best described by some metaphor of an advantage of position; a small group of needs has got the upper hand, held the centre of action, for the time, and larger and stronger universes have not been able to come into action sufficiently to check the result. A self-controlled man in a certain mood may be wilfully self-indulgent with nine-tenths of his character disapproving and hanging back; just as a small boy may open a gate in spite of a big one if the small boy has hold of it near the latch and the big one near the hinge. At other times we resort to the metaphors of "losing balance," "being overcome." The reason for the science of ethics, indeed, lies in the fact that a complex disposition does not always work itself out to the most satisfactory result which is conceivable. Such phrases as "resultant object of need," and "fulfilment of the whole disposition," and "self-realisation," will all be rather ambiguous; for they may refer either to the actual inevitable working-out, or to that solution which would be the most satisfactory.

11. "*The Good*" for me, in the sense of the best possible state of things, will be that state which is the greatest possible fulfilment of my needs. And if I define "self-realisation" as the greatest possible fulfilment or most satisfactory working-out of my total disposition—of me who need—it will be a verbal proposition that "my good is self-realisation."

"The Good."

Self-realisation.

12. Is it true that all desire is for self-realisation? Not in the strict sense of that word, for there are such things as inconsistent desires, some of which must be sacrificed in order to reach the greatest possible fulfilment of the whole. If we take a looser definition, which would allow every fulfilment to be called a partial self-realisation, is the statement true? Not if a desire is "for" the object which in desiring I think of, and in the aspect under which I think of it. I seldom think of it as being a fulfilment of my need, or think of myself or my need at all. With the looser definition we may perhaps speak of the need or disposition as directing itself towards self-realisation—towards fulfilment as such. But it is an abstract way of speaking. The suggestion which arouses a need is the suggestion not of its fulfilment but of the concrete event which is to fulfil it. So we no more consciously aim at self-realisation as such in the abstract, than the artist thinks of procuring the right mixture of ether-vibrations. We think of the things we care about, and work at them till they look better.

Is all desire for self-realisation?

I *aim* at self-realisation, or at my true good, in the sense that my nature is always working itself

out in the direction of getting as much of it as is possible. (If self-realisation is the greatest fulfilment that is possible for my given nature, I aim at getting as much self-realisation as is possible under my given circumstances.) This seems to be a fair sense for "aiming," though it is not the sense in which we aim at the bull's-eye of a target. If the latter were equivalent to "trying to get as near it as possible," we should have to shoot crookedly when a small transparent obstacle was placed between us and the centre.

In speaking of self-realisation, by the way, we must often think of the self as being on the subject side, as "doing the wanting," doing the endeavouring; not contemplated as an object. For instance, when the idea of drunkenness, which in itself might attract a man, gets rejected by being brought into contact with his general world of endeavour, the situation may be expressed less well by "I don't like the notion of *my* getting drunk" than by "*I* don't like getting drunk." It is only an insignificant bit of me that wants it; the case is changed when the whole concrete self comes up to sit in judgment on the suggestion.

The self on the subject side.

13. To act in the lines of our greatest good, in this way of speaking, is to act "as a whole," with every element getting its proper share (*i.e.* the share which falls to it when we have the greatest fulfilment on the whole). This is what we call ethical freedom. It must not be confused with deliberateness or clear consciousness in action; there may be an intensely conscious struggle between two very narrow

Ethical freedom.

universes of desire, between a man's avarice, for instance, and his cowardice; whereas on the other hand we may act almost automatically and yet act "right-mindedly," "with the whole of ourselves," *i.e.* with great ethical freedom.

The actual will be fairly right in the long run.

14. Even short of this, if time and liberty be given, one would suppose that a complex disposition would work itself out to something like the most satisfactory result on the whole. An element which for some time got less than its deserts would become more and more acute in its need, and so in the end would prevail, and even push the result too far in its own direction for a while. The actual solution will vibrate about the proper solution as about its stable position of equilibrium; so that from an observation of a man's life as a whole we could probably tell a good deal about the kind of life he wanted most. It must always be remembered that *most* of what we work out is harmonious enough. Still, the result is not exact. And I do not know how on *a priori* grounds to fix a limit to the wrongness; to find the extreme possibility of the vibrations from equilibrium. Notice that I do not intend to go below the surface, and consider any sense in which evil itself may be an element in ultimate good. It may conceivably be good for a man to go wrong and make mistakes. But the question here is only, How far can I, on the mere ground that a certain thing is done, pronounce that it is not a mistake, that it is right and not wrong?

But not exact.

15. The test of right and wrong is always, Does the action fulfil a greater need than its omission would do? And the whole conception of need seems to offer the greatest difficulty when we come to attempt *measurement*. We have no unit, and we cannot explain in any general terms what we mean by more and by most. *Problems of measurement.*

We are continually challenged to measurement when we consider the undeniable existence of inconsistent needs in one nature. When we fix our attention on a single rounded φύσις, the idea of its straightforward working-out seems simple enough. But is the φύσις in its empirical existence anything else than that preponderant mass of the disposition which fortunately is internally harmonious? If this is a correct account, then self-realisation will leave certain elements in us unrealised. "What we are made for" really is only what most of us is made for. We may have some notion of our being *meant* to be made altogether for it, but we are not so made. It may be the perfect realisation of our "idea"; it is not the perfect realisation of us as an actual copy. This seems to hold, in spite of all the necessary qualifications. It is quite true that my dispositions are exceedingly variable; that the very act of decision, for instance, often changes them; or again, that when a long-expected friend arrives I no longer desire at all to go on with the book I was enjoying. Yet in spite of all this, there is such a thing as sacrifice, as refusing to satisfy a need which nevertheless remains. *Self-realisation and conflicting needs.*

16. So, though it sounds simple enough to say

that self-realisation in the concrete is that towards which my nature tends, we must admit that not all of it tends the same way. And how, in general terms, do you measure amount of nature and amount of tendency, and so decide? It is untrue to say that there is no practical difficulty in any concrete case. I want to read ethics and I want to talk with a friend, and I want each to go on from 4.56 to 6.30 on Thursday evening, the 4th of November. And I may be so doubtful as to which enters into the life I *really* want, that whichever I do will probably be regretted afterwards. Besides, even if no practical difficulty ever occurred, the defect in theory would remain. A cook may never have a failure, but she does not understand theory perfectly if she cannot write a recipe down to the minutest details—which would perhaps fill a library and more. A general may win every battle, but when he retires he ought to be able in leisure hours to give lectures on tactics. And a theory of measurement might not be needed in the least for morals, but such a theory, *or an explanation of its absence*, would be needed none the less for moral philosophy. We shall return to this later on.[1]

Practical difficulty.

Defect in theory.

17. Possibly when we do so we shall be forced to suspect that the idea of measurement cannot really be applied, though we do not see how to do without it. And we may as well make an equivalent admission at once with regard to other ideas which

Mechanical metaphors are inadequate.

[1] Chapter IX.

have been used freely in this chapter. *Mechanical metaphors*, though indispensable, must always be hopelessly insufficient. One simple and obvious reason is that in our talk of dispositions we need to introduce too many qualities. It is usually said in physics that a force is completely defined when we know its intrinsic strength, its direction, and its point of application. But after we have assigned corresponding qualities to a disposition, we still need statements about the ease and speed with which it is aroused, its persistency in time, its persistency in spite of defeat, its vividness on the feeling-side, and so on. Mechanical metaphors would become far too complicated here. The special quality of *amount* of need, as distinguished from the need's motive strength, seems in particular to be quite impossible of expression by their means.

18. Further, there is a more subtle danger in them. There is the possible suggestion that *I* am the gate as opposed to the boys pushing it. *I am my dispositions.*

One must remember that, in any sense in which they exist at all, the dispositions are simply myself, and, on this side, all there is of myself. They do not act upon me; I am not overcome by them, except in the sense that one element in me overcomes other elements. I have not wants as my possessions; I have them as an object "has" the qualities which make it. The plain fact is that *I want.*

Here once more we see the danger of thinking of the needs as primarily a plurality. We object instinctively, "*I* am not my needs—not a conglomerate of impulses, a *The dispositions are a unity.*

mere loose heap." The answer is that I am truly they, but they are not a loose heap. What is real is the total tendency, the active concrete universal, which is my character on the conative side. But its action is so complex that our best hope of describing it often lies in picking out these "elements," and talking of the interaction of a plurality of dispositions. When we speak of a mood in which a small element in me overcomes the rest, we might speak, instead, of the whole character losing its balance and acting askew.

19. All this chapter has been intentionally vague and superficial. It is meant as a mere descriptive introduction, dealing only with what should be accepted by ordinary common-sense. Almost every point in it will have to be returned to later, and developed, qualified, and cleared up.

This chapter a sketch.

CHAPTER V

KNOWLEDGE AND WILL. I

1. THE likeness of the psychology of conation to that of cognition has, as we said to begin with, been often pointed out. And in its broad outlines it is easy enough to discern. *Cognitive-conative analogy.*

2. I begin on the cognitive side, not with a heap of sensations, perceptions and ideas, but with a single presentation-continuum. At first all is vague and blurred and elementary, then gradually differentiation and detail appear, and the features of the nebula outline and define themselves. I pass along the scale of vagueness from the first "Something-or-other is," to "This is the case here," and "that is there," and "A is north of B," and "All men are mortal." The "notion" gradually is formed into the concept. And throughout I am governed by the idea, more or less explicit, of consistency. I criticise; I mould my beliefs till they fit in with one another. Incompatible ideas are not merely thrown aside; each is given its fair chance of claiming respect, and one or the other, or an element in both, is likely to succeed. A very obstinate and constant *Presentation-continuum.* *Development.*

perception some day probably gets the sphere of science modified to fit it. But every now and then an element is simply set aside and given up. It cannot possibly fit in with the rest; our ordered system of belief will admit most of what we tend to believe but not this. "We cannot allow this," we say, "we must sacrifice it to the rest; it must 'have been a mistake.'"

Sacrifice of elements.

3. I begin on the conative side with my nature's whole mass of tendency and craving, as yet undeveloped and undistinguished. Before I can give a name to any object of desire there is the mere "I *want* . . ." Then this continuum also grows and defines itself and differentiates, and here also through the differentiation the mere psychological unity of mass is turned into the logical unity of system. I add detail; on both sides one point suggests another. I come, for instance, to seek one thing as means to another, just as I believe one thing as a deduction from another. And just as independent evidence will attest a deduction, so independent affection springs up for a means. "A pet plan" is no longer merely a plan for the sake of an end.

Desire-continuum.

I try to mould my world to fit me; to get what is most comfortable on the whole. Bit by bit I try to work out that kind of life which is most satisfactory. And very fairly satisfactory it is normally found. The total creed worked out by the ordinary man—what he allows himself "really" to believe—covers most of what he has wanted to believe; and

Ordering and moulding.

similarly the practical life worked out gives fulfilment to most of his nature. And the working-out is mostly straightforward. Conscious choice between alternatives makes up as small a part of this side of our life as conscious decision between alternatives makes in the other. The next step is commonly the only natural one under the circumstances.

And yet here also, both conscious and unconscious, there is sacrifice. One aim must be subordinated to another; one satisfaction given up for the sake of satisfaction on the whole. *Sacrifice of elements.*

(Of course we do not explicitly think of our doings in this way; and we do not often formulate the idea of consistency. Neither does a research student or a detective think often of the abstract fit of beliefs, or think of his perceptions and notions as his, or even as perceptions and notions at all. I am distinctly conscious only of those features in a thing of which it is important for my purpose that I should be conscious, and thus I usually am not distinctly conscious of "my purpose.") *(Not explicitly conscious.)*

4. My present endeavours, then, like my present perceptions and notions and reasonings, are partly discordant among themselves. My present self could not be perfectly realised, and my present world of belief is not without fault. On the other hand, much asceticism is one with narrow-mindedness. We deny ourselves satisfactions which in a slightly different form would improve our lives; and we deny statements in which much truth could yet be found. The process on *Moulding on each side.*

both sides must be largely a matter of instinct and tact. We have a good accumulation of general knowledge as to methods which generally answer, but we cannot formulate rules to cover the details of special cases. Even accident and empiricism constantly come in. We construct a theory to account for a few little facts, and suddenly find it spreading and growing and accounting for the puzzles of our whole life. We get a thing almost by chance, and only then discover how much and for how many reasons we wanted it.

"Will" is not a distinct element in me, separate from my dispositions or needs. My choices and actions are not disconnected from these—not things invented by "me" for the sake of satisfying "them." The facts are simply that I, who *am* the total disposition, work myself out and imprint myself on the universe in this particular way of life. Similarly my thinking or believing is not something distinct added on to my immediate experiencing. My experience takes a certain shape before my eyes, and this shape—the *appearance* of what is happening—is what I sometimes call my theory. "This," I say, "is what the facts look like to me."

(What, it may be objected, about the case where we hold a theory only because we can think of nothing better, and drop it the moment a better one is suggested? Here there seem to be alternative beliefs about the same given experience. The answer is that the experience is not truly the same as it was. The new suggestion has produced a far-reaching though subtle change. Some points are more prominent than before; others brought nearer

together; relations are altered. Things looked at in a new light have actually a new colour, and a landscape is actually different when looked at from a different point of view. The "theory" still means just the shape which that part of our world assumes; it is *what we see.*)

5. All this has been stated in terms of the unity of my nature, but just the same comparison can be expressed in terms of the plurality of elements. It is quite common to speak of ideas and beliefs and perceptions as of things acting on their own account, conflicting with each other, moulding one another, working out to a result; we say as naturally "The sum comes out to this answer" as "I bring it out to this." And similarly we may speak of the interaction of needs or desires, if only we remember that in both spheres the unity is the given fact. *Plurality-metaphor.*

With these precautions, let us begin to work out the analogy in plurality-language.

6. A disposition—a law of conative experience—will correspond in the analogy to a law of my cognitive experience. "A certain action is always followed by a certain perception;" whenever I look from a special window of my house I perceive the beach and the sea. Similarly a certain cognition is always followed by a certain impulse; a cry on the beach awakens the impulse to look out of the window. In more complex cases, a whole group of actions and perceptions is followed by a determinate cognition or by a determinate conation. If I place a bowl of snow by the fire, I presently find water in the bowl, *Disposition = cognitive law.*

If I find myself in the sea and dislike drowning, I attempt to swim. A disposition awaked (we introduce awkwardness unavoidably by using the same word for the law and for the actual process) will correspond to an actual cognitive experience. To its power of carrying itself out in action will correspond the weight of the cognitive fact in determining our theories and systems of beliefs. (Its actual weight, that is; the weight it "ought" to have raises much more difficult questions.)

Disposition awaked = cognitive experience.

Power = weight.

7. What of a disposition that will not wake? A need may exist in the sense that a suggestion which was vivid enough could rouse it, and yet, because we are inert or pre-occupied in that department, the arousal may need a forcibleness which the suggestion now presented has not. So we may get the state of mind described in the words, "I know that I really want this, but at present I am unable to feel any impulse or desire for the object." Similarly a sensation or perception may be well enough known to us, and yet we be unable for some reason to experience it at the moment. And we can work from memory as we can believe from memory. "I shall work for it because I know I really want it." "I believe in it, because I know I did see it." Action and belief here are based in a new way. The belief is not based, for instance, on the evidence before me, but on the trustworthiness of memory and the trustworthiness of yesterday's observation. The action

Need may be unfelt though known.

Working from memory = believing from memory.

is based, not on the simple need for the object, but on the disposition to make provision for a need that I know "is there" or "will be there."

Indeed this "working from memory" in the conative realm really means working for the future, not working from the past. My action is taken because I know a need *will* come to life. In cognition, on the other hand, it is really the past that counts. If an experience has once certainly occurred, it must be taken account of, and its future recurrence is so far irrelevant. This fits in with the general way in which we sum up the past in cognition, whilst in conation we arrange the future. But the reason for it does not seem to go very deep. The case would be different if we had means of knowing the future or of altering the past.

8. Now the features of our cognitive world change as time passes, and similarly dispositions change; they are determinate but not fixed. A change of environment removes the possibility of certain perceptions; a change in our nature removes the possibility of certain impulses—extinguishes a need. The question whether a certain need "exists now" seems to be simply equivalent to the question whether, given our present nature, some conceivable suggestion could rouse the corresponding impulse in us. *Change in dispositions.*

Dispositions, then, vary at different times of our life, and so do the laws and experiences of our cognitive world. In the latter realm we distinguish two kinds of variation—in facts, and in belief apart from facts. A similar distinction could be made on the conative side. *Difference and discordance.*

When there is a simple change in the "facts" of what is going on, one part of the succession of experiences will be different from another part but not discordant with it. An earthquake may have shaken down a tower in the night, but I shall still believe in the presence of that tower in yesterday's landscape. A man's youth to-day is not discordant with the age and failing strength that are to come. Similarly I may desire to secure for old age a peaceful retreat that I should not like now. Or I may grow out of my childhood's love of hide-and-seek, yet not regret my child-self. On the other hand, there may be discord and rejection; I may decide that I have been mistaken till now. The evidence may lead me to conclude, not only that the tower is absent now, but that it has been an illusion all along; not even this feature in the past world remains. Similarly my lines of action at different times may be discordant; I may really *change my mind.* (The distinction is seen rather vividly in reference to the past of conation. The reformed drunkard, whose mind is changed, does not regret the times when drink was forcibly withheld from him; but I regret an unhappy childhood apart from any of its effects on my present character or health, and the man who was once a lover may grieve all his life for "the dream foregone and the deed forborne." When I have ceased to wish a thing to be, I may or may not still wish it to have been.)

The change in cognition, then, may arise simply from a change in the "environment,"[1] and then

[1] The meaning of this we must examine later.

there is no discord. Or it may arise because the environment, in itself unchanged, has succeeded in expressing itself in a new way in my consciousness, a way discordant with the old. The change in conation may arise from a simple change in the needs of my nature; or else that nature, while essentially unchanged, may succeed in expressing itself differently in my world of action and desire.

9. The most interesting case is that in which a habit or a notion gets abolished because it conflicts with the rest of our world. The notion may be rejected by the mere weight against it—"it *must* have been a mistake," and we may ignore it automatically henceforth, and so without more explanation it may in time cease even to put in a claim. Or we may go deeper, with a more or less thorough process of accounting for it. "The belief followed correctly enough from these premises, but the premises were wrong." When we have got as far as this, the root of the incongruity is more evident, and the notion is less likely to reappear. We can never come to an end of the process, since it is always possible to ask how we arrived at the wrong premise; but each step in the explanation, generally speaking, secures us further against the danger to the whole system which lurks in a rejected notion that may still turn up again.

Rooting out dispositions.

Similarly a way of behaviour may either be defeated on its own merits, and by sheer force be made to die out on its own merits, or we may cut deeper. A minor premise, for instance, may be found to be wrong, and the act felt not to lie in the path of the end we wanted. "I wished to kill

this villain for the good of the city, but the good of the city itself forbids it." S is not the proper kind of M; we come to a more correct feeling of what the principle covers and what it excludes. Or it may be the major premise that is condemned. "The good man must not kill here" becomes "The good man must not kill for hate's sake, for he must not hate." And in both ways we increase the safety of our system; the impulse to murder is less likely to recur.

Of course the conflict may end the other way. An examination of what lies behind may occasionally convince us that our system must yield in this place to the rebel suggestion. But whichever result does come will be more conclusive and final than if the struggle had remained on the surface.

Reductio ad absurdum.

Sometimes we get rid of undesirable impulses and incongruous ideas in the opposite way, by following them out to their furthest results and finding the impossible incongruity of these with the rest of the world to which we hold. "He who finds virtue disagreeable and vice pleasant," says a Chinese proverb, "is still a novice in both." We get a considerable increase of surface force by increasing the distance of the point of application instead of cutting below. This may be used in combination with the other method; as when a mathematician by this means convinces himself of the absurdity of a theory, of the falsity of which he is already nearly sure; or as when we idle deliberately in order to tire ourselves with it and make ourselves willing for the work which our deeper nature wants all along.

10. In the less complicated case of simple-minded following out, notice that a bad thing excellently done—an admirably organised system of smuggling, say—corresponds exactly to a piece of good reasoning from false premises. The thing in itself is ideal, but its roots are severed from the whole ideal world.

Bad thing well done.

11. Complete truth would account for all conflicting notions, and presumably a perfectly satisfied self would have all its tendencies rooted out whose satisfaction could not be allowed. In one sense there would be perfect satisfaction in any state which fulfilled this condition, but of course this is not the full sense of the self-satisfaction at which we aim. We try primarily to get, not absence of dissatisfaction, but as much satisfaction as possible.

Perfect satisfaction implies extinction of wrong tendencies.

It is interesting to notice that we do not always try to extinguish a desire which is not to be fulfilled; *e.g.* when we have decided to do without the presence of a friend, our loyalty is dissatisfied if we cease to regret his absence.

12. In general the cognitive world and the conative self, object and subject in their different spheres, unroll themselves smoothly enough. Sometimes a disposition in action, or a piece of knowledge in consciousness, develops itself further on its own account, sometimes new parts of the self or of the world come upon the scene, and there need be no hindrance for either. On the other hand, there may sometimes, as we have seen, be

There may be hindrances from different sides.

internal conflict and hindrance. Moreover, there is a fact to which we have not yet given sufficient consideration—the fact that the development of each of these more active members in experience is subject not only to its own conditions but to the conditions of the nature of the more passive member in its own sphere. An endeavour of mine may be hindered not only by inconsistent endeavours and desires, but by the intractability of the not-self on which I have to act. Cognition may be hindered not only by the difficulty and obscurity of the matter, but by the weakness of my mind.

13. All these, added to certain sideways conditionings of each sphere by the other (which we shall meet with presently), make it natural that the simple action and cognition should sometimes be found spread out and strained over a considerable space. It is such cases that lead us to mark off such steps as discomfort, conflict, decision, endeavour, and success. First, there is the feeling-consciousness of a tendency hindered, a function blocked. The throbbing rebellion of my nature here has to make its influence felt amongst other impulses, and it may not succeed sufficiently to determine any course of action. Let us assume, however, that presently it does attain the "centre of control," that my nature turns to develop itself against this special obstacle. Then follows endeavour, and finally success; I have imprinted myself in this place upon the environing conditions of my life, and the future expression of myself is made easier.

So we get elaborated cases.

Discomfort, control, endeavour, success.

To the case of impulse hindered there corresponds in the cognitive realm the case of knowledge tangled or knowledge incomplete—cognition with a ragged edge. To the gaining of control corresponds the *gaining of attention*; this special bit of the world is to develop itself. Then comes the development—the investigation, unravelling, filling of gaps, thinking out. Finally, the conclusion imprinted as a new *belief* remains, and the presentation-world is made easier thereby.

Incomplete knowledge, attention, investigation, belief.

14. This analogy of belief with complete or successful action needs some care in its use. Each member is two-sided—takes hold of the conditions of both subject and object. My successful endeavour modifies the not-self for one thing, making it better to deal with. It also modifies the self and its expression; I in my future actions shall be a slightly different person, a more capable and harmonised person, and also a person who has made himself responsible for his action, and has to reckon with it in making his plans. The established belief leaves an effect on my mind for one thing, making it a mind more capable of receiving future revelations. A geometrical problem which is insoluble by a Pascal at the beginning of his studies may lie open at once to a very moderate intellect trained by six books of Euclid. On the other hand, the established belief means a modification of the not-self, and still more of the not-self as it appears in my world of knowledge. That the new conviction has come about is a new fact; the world of universal

Belief and action affect both subject and object.

history is so far different. And (which is more important here) its appearance within my experience is modified, made larger and more determinate; a new cognition has been established and the cognitive context of other presentations will be different henceforth.

In the action, then, I have expressed myself, and have thereby modified (1) my nature that expresses itself, (2) my subject-world of expression, (3) the object-world on which I act. In the new discovery or conviction the object-world that I have to know has expressed itself, and has thereby modified (1) its own objective nature, (2) its expression in my cognitive world, (3) the mind to which it reveals itself.

(It is no matter, of course, whether the conviction arrived at is more naturally called a belief or a disbelief. Either will correspond to conative success. Conative failure can only correspond to the absence of any conclusion at all.)

Memory.

It is tempting to make a comparison between the conative not-self's retention of an imprint and the retention of a belief in *memory*. But a remembered belief is a presentation, an object, and cannot therefore be likened to the objective not-self in conation.[1] Remembrance—the possibility of knowing when the knowledge is relevant—must correspond to the power of *doing* when the action is relevant; and the preservation of the effect on the conative environment to the preservation of the effect on the cognitive self—its increased intelligence and tractability. The latter pair of corre-

[1] See par. 5 in the next Chapter if this is not clear.

spondents may remain after the former have disappeared, and *vice versa*.

15. If the tractability were perfect—if we had complete mastery over the not-self—our "endeavours" would have no place; just as, with perfect cognitive understanding, discursive thought would disappear.[1] There can, however, be no line drawn between the natures of thinking and believing, of endeavour and action. Thought is a series of cognitions and endeavour is a series of completed acts, and we give the different titles only with reference to the end of the experience.

Thinking involves belief, and endeavour action.

16. The analogy of attention and control is interesting, if only because the two are sometimes confused. As soon as a ragged edge in knowledge gains attention it tends to develop, to complete and fulfil itself. As soon as a hindered impulse gains control, becomes a purpose, it tends to fulfil itself. The world of action and the world of knowledge have each a focus of greatest life (though life is by no means confined to that point). Each focus helps to determine the position of the other, though their contents can never coincide. We sometimes, however, use the word "attention" in a sense rather conative than cognitive. "I will attend to this matter," we say; "it shall be put right."

Focus of attention and centres of control.

What we called a "regulative need," by the way,

[1] The mastery in the latter case belongs to the object. Understanding, by the very force of words, is not government but perfection of service; it is "submission" completed. (I suppose this etymology is too pretty to be correct.)

Regulative need; analogy.

always acting although there has never been a deliberate decision, is by no means to be confused with an impulse that has never gained control. Its analogy is not a marginal cognition but a regulative belief or idea, unformulated because fundamental and omnipresent. It must also be distinguished from a need which is unrecognised because it has not yet acted at all. This will correspond to a part of reality which is still unknown.

CHAPTER VI

KNOWLEDGE AND WILL. II

1. So far we have only observed the correspondence of the detail within each sphere to that within the other. But the two spheres interact with a symmetry very pleasing to the lover of analogy, and we shall now take account of this, and pass by means of it to a wider field of correspondences. *Interaction of the spheres.*

2. We are, first of all, not left to the play of direct impulse for complete determination of our actions. Knowledge of self and environment and of means to ends guides our endeavours continually, and helps to decide what part of the world of impulse shall gain control. Similarly the development of the world of knowledge is not left entirely to cognitive conditions, but "practical interests" to a large extent guide the movements of attention. *Knowledge guides endeavours; interests guide knowledge.*

But there is a more intimate and subtle connection between the spheres. We define and guide our actions by means of cognition; we carry forward our thinking because of the conative tendency to think. Unless *Conative suggestion = tendency to think.*

we had a cognitive side, no disposition could be roused by suggestion, and so we could never even seek an end, much less could we conceive and pursue a means. Unless we had the conative tendency to interpret sensations, and in general to go on thinking, we could never so much as perceive; much less reason out and believe in a deduction. In each sphere the life, by which the thing is, is conative, the form, by which it is something in particular, is cognitive. Without conation we should not *know* anything; without cognition we should not seek—*anything*.

(It may be objected that there is much less of a line between the tendency to think and the thought, which after all is a process, than there is between impulse and object. Yes, but not less than between impulse and suggestion, which is an idea, the content of the impulse. We sow a suggestion in the conative soil and it grows into an action; in the cognitive soil we sow an impulse to think and it grows into a definite conclusion. The former is some sort of action, and the latter some sort of belief, throughout the growing.)

Impulse and act, thought and conclusion.

3. A sensation left nearly bare without perception, or any immediate knowledge lying idle in a passive mind, will thus be like a nearly objectless craving, a discomfort and rebelliousness and no more. "No suggestion" corresponds to "no tendency to think." Such a vague need may have a fairly strong feeling-side, as a sensation received almost without activity of thought may yet be in clear consciousness enough.

Bare sensation = objectless craving.

Still, there is a limit to the clearness which can exist without noticeable activity, and to the feeling without a noticeable object of desire. Entire absence is perhaps impossible, and the approximate cases will be commonest on a low level of development, or in the extreme margin of attention.[1]

4. These primitive materials, then, mere promptings rather than anything else, coming we know not whence, correspond with each other. So the sources of experience, the sources of bare sensation on the one hand and bare craving on the other, must correspond; "the not-self" in one sphere to "the self" in the other sphere. Then we have cognitive suggestion in the conative sphere and conative tendency to think in the cognitive. Lastly, we have these two fulfilled; the suggestions have been carried out into an actual way of life, the tendencies to think have ended in creating an actual world of beliefs, and we have the concrete world and the concrete life with which we must always start. The elements are only analysed out of this.

Conative self = cognitive not-self.

Suggestion = tendency.

Action = belief.

5. To complete the key to the analogy, we must match the not-self in the conative world with the self in the cognitive. So we have the table on next page.

Tabular key to analogy.

[1] This objectless craving is not to be confused with an unroused disposition. The disposition is awake, and ready to pass into action if its *form* were not too wide and indefinite to allow of it. It needs more form, more formulation, before its life can be fuller; just as the bare sensation above needs more life before it can formulate itself in perception.

COGNITIVE SPHERE.	CONATIVE SPHERE.
Sources of the experience, in nature of cognitive not-self.	Sources of the experience, in nature of conative self.
Objective elements in experience—presentations.	Subjective elements in experience—impulses.
(Perhaps a tangle or blank amongst these.)	(Perhaps a discomfort; sense of impulse hindered.)
Mental activity—tendency to think.	Suggestions for action.
(Certain part gains attention.)	(Certain part gains control.)
Thought working out.	Suggestion working out.
System of belief.	Course of action.
The believing self; more passive member.	The not-self acted on; more passive member.

Concrete experience has the inseparable poles of subject and object, and the cognitive-conative analogy expresses the symmetry of the double life which centres about the two poles.

6. A curious feature of the interaction is that the two spheres come actually to include each an aspect of the other. The working out of thought and final reaching of a conclusion is certainly in one aspect just a special case of successful endeavour, whilst a practical suggestion and its carrying-out in action make a special object in the cognitive world. In applications of our analogy we must be careful not to let this confuse us.

Each sphere includes the other.

We must notice, however, how slight a thing this necessary interaction is. The tendency to think, the life in presentations that is necessary if there is to be cognitive consciousness at all, is some-

But necessary interaction is very slight.

thing far short of anything that we call desire for knowledge, or even curiosity. And the cognitive consciousness of a suggested change and its progress in realisation, which is necessary for all action, is something far short of clear observant attention given to these things.

7. With the key now obtained we could proceed to an inexhaustible number of applications. *Applications of the key.*

For instance, it is evident that a disposition which is frequently aroused because its suggestion occurs frequently will correspond to an idea which is often present because we have a tendency to run along that train of thought, or to a perception that is often present because we are specially sensitive to a particular sensation. A disposition which is easily aroused in the sense that our nature is quickly and uniformly sensitive to the suggestion when it does occur, or which is constantly involved in other dispositions, is like an idea that is constantly roused by the nature of our environment, or that is involved in many of the trains of thought that are frequent with us. *Ease of arousal of a disposition.*

8. A theoretical suggestion, again, not yet either accepted or rejected as a belief, will correspond not to a "practical suggestion" but to an endeavour which has not yet succeeded or failed in completing itself as a finished act. *Theoretical suggestion.*

Such a suggestion may be given us by somebody else, and such an endeavour may arise because of the incitement of somebody else. This second person is in both cases outside *Being told.*

the situation, he belongs neither to the self nor to the not-self with which we are at the moment dealing; for the suggester himself is not part of the subject matter of our knowing, nor is he part of that environment which we are trying to alter. But he will be nearer the self in the conative case—on our side, helping us to act; and in the cognitive case he will be nearer the not-self, introducing a new presentation by giving the new idea.

This indeed is only a special case of a general truth. It is impossible to draw a hard line round the self or the not-self in either realm. At any moment we may find that in order to understand the thing we are studying we must understand other things which at first appeared irrelevant; and we may get suggestions for our special part of a science from a different part. Again, we find an endeavour assisted by tendencies in us which were unfelt or irrelevant before; on the other hand we may find it necessary to alter our own disposition as well as altering the environment before we can get a satisfactory world. And so on, and so on.

No rigid line divides self from not-self.

9. Let us illustrate in particular by a special study of an interesting part of the analogy—the correspondence between the various difficulties and hindrances in the two realms.

Classification of hindrances.

An endeavour that fails because of the intractability of the environment will correspond to an intellectual puzzle—the failure of a train of thought—which is due to stupidity or other intractable-

Hard conative environment = stupidity.

ness in the cognitive subject; the world cannot lie clearly before us because our eyes are not clear. If the failure of the endeavour was due rather to weakness and irresolution in the conative subject, or to his excessive demands, then the failure of the train of thought, to match it, must be due chiefly to confusion and complication in the presentations themselves—the matter is really difficult. Thus, to generalise, a fault in one sphere may be due either to that sphere or to the other. "He would choose thus if his passions could be changed," and "He would succeed if his material were less intractable," correspond respectively (*not* in the reverse order) to "He would believe if he knew of this evidence" and "He would reach this conclusion were it not for his own stupidity."

Conative helplessness = cognitive hardness.

Faults in the two spheres.

But "He would choose thus if he could only understand this complicated case" brings in a hindrance to conation from the cognitive environment; and the analogy must be that of a hindrance to cognition arising from the willing and desiring self, *e.g.* "He would believe if he would let himself believe it." These are often expressed respectively by "He is all right at heart" and "He does believe at bottom." Or the hindrance to conation may come from the cognitive self, and the hindrance to cognition from the conative not-self. "He would do right if he were not too stupid to see what was to be done." "He would see the truth if he could get a quiet moment to think it over."

Table of hindrances.

10. By means of such investigation we get the following table of hindrances:

To Cognition.	To Conation.
From:	From:
(*a*) Cognitive not-self—case puzzling.	(*a*) Conative self; weakness, perversity, etc., or resistance from other tendencies.
(*b*) Cognitive self; stupidity.	(*b*) Conative not-self; intractability.
(*c*) Conative not-self; distractions, etc.	(*c*) Cognitive self; stupidity in finding methods, etc.
(*d*) Conative self; weakness, etc., or purposive inhibition; disapproval and resistance.	(*d*) Cognitive not-self; case puzzling.

(*a*) and (*b*) in cognition hinder a successful result of thinking; (*c*) and (*d*) hinder the giving of attention, and so the activity of thinking in itself. (*a*) and (*b*) in conation hinder success in endeavour; (*c*) and (*d*) hinder the passage from impulse to endeavour, *i.e.* hinder the endeavouring. We may notice that, when we speak quite strictly, we must say that hindrances in the purely conative part of a conation can only come from the conative world; and so on with the rest.

Those dealt with by logic and by ethics.

11. The ordinary logic and ethics deal chiefly with the difficulties in (*a*), to some extent with (*b*); often not at all with (*c*) and (*d*). This is what we often mean when we say that ethics is not concerned with questions of expediency; that if the will is right ethics is satisfied, and so on. "It is now only a question of what is most expedient." This

means that the dispositions concerned are fixed in their relative positions; the man has decided to seek his country's good or his private good as the case may be, and has now only to seek for means. Casuistical discussions in ethics, however, are concerned with (*d*)—puzzlingness of the material, as distinguished from its intractability. The correspondent in the cognitive realm appears in our endeavour to think out a subject, or in the tendency of a thought to work itself out, in spite of the resistance of other tendencies in our conative self.

Cannot divide rigidly.

But the classes distinguished are apt to invade one another; and it is often doubtful how we should classify a particular concrete case. The puzzlingness of a problem, for instance, is apt to work against even the disposition to think about it; it is apt to make that thinking an effort; and something of both is usually expressed by the exclamation "I can't think of an answer." Similarly the reluctance of half our conative self in an endeavour is apt to distract our minds and make us stupid or lazy in thinking of means to our end.

Hindered parts are vivid.

12. It is interesting to notice here how a hindered element in mental life, generally speaking, tends to force into clearer consciousness the part of the life concerned with it. On the cognitive side, when the hindrance is to the success of thought, we tend to get special explicitness in thought in the judgments we have arrived at. This is not only a deliberate way of helping ourselves to a further solution; it is a psychological fact that the presentational matter

around a dead-lock of thought glows with increased light. On the other hand, when the hindrance is to the thinking as such, prominence belongs to the sense of effort involved in such thinking as does get done. On the conative side, when an endeavour, fully present, is thwarted in its natural result (whether by the intractability of its material or by interferences from the part of the self which is not in sympathy with the effort), then we get a clearer consciousness of the endeavouring itself; a feeling of effort and strain. On the other hand, when the suggestion of a desirable end is prevented from leading to action because no means, no way from us to it, can be discerned, then it is this suggestion that glows with special fervency across the gulf, and we know vividly what it is that we want; we have our aim in full view.

13. We shall still be dealing with this subject of hindrances if we conclude the chapter by examining a particular class of needs—needs which have considerable interest because they show clearly a distinction most important in the ethical sphere.

Fulfilment without satisfaction.

This class is what lies behind the seemingly undeniable fact that I may desire things which, though actual, would never be part of my own experience. An obvious example would be found if a man, without believing in his own existence after death, still wished that after his death a friend or a cause should prosper. Such an object would be a state of myself in one of Professor James' senses of "self," where it includes everything in which I am interested; I desire a certain state for something

which I care about. But it is not a state of myself in the sense of entering into my life, being a personal experience of mine. My "last *will* and testament," for instance, concerns a disposition of my property that I shall never see.

(The only way of escape from this awkwardness would be to say that I do not really desire what is outside my own experience; that I only desire to do my best to promote it. The patriot, it might be said, only desires to promote his country's welfare so far as lies in him; the lover only to live and die in the service of his friend; and the welfare as such of the beloved objects is not desired unless by the objects themselves. This seems a great strain on our psychology. We *feel* as if we desired the welfare as an end, and our service as the means to it. Only the preconceived theory would prevent us from saying so.)

Now this gives a curious result. In words which, though awkward, seem the best available, we shall have to admit that in certain cases a need may be "fulfilled" without being satisfied. I keep here what I think is a strong implication of the ordinary use, that a "satisfaction" of my need means a personal experience of mine—"an enjoyment"; "fulfilment" seems more easily deprived of this implication. A case such as I mean would be found if my friend did prosper after my death, or if during my lifetime he obtained great good without my being aware of it. In the opposite case of false good news, my need might be said to be satisfied without being fulfilled. A dying man, again, may feel "satisfied" when his testament is signed and

witnessed, but the "will" thus formulated may not be carried out.

14. This separation of fulfilment from satisfaction means that a discomfort may remain in consciousness and an endeavour remain apparently uncompleted on account of a cognitive mistake. The analogy seems to be that of a train of thought apparently stopping short of its conclusion on account of a conative mistake; *i.e.* the *refusal to acknowledge* an evident conclusion. The opposite case of satisfaction without fulfilment will correspond to the opposite conative mistake in cognition—the leaping ahead to belief in a conclusion to which our honest train of thought has not led us. Each is a special instance of the kind of obstacle which may occur in one realm because of a defect in the other.

Analogy.

15. The importance of this distinction of fulfilment from satisfaction lies chiefly in its relation to the definition of "good." Was it right to define the term as we did, as the "fulfilment" rather than as the "satisfaction" of need?

Good = fulfilment.

The choice is difficult; and the matter is complicated by the fact that satisfaction itself is the fulfilment of another need, the need to know and be at peace. The writer chooses "fulfilment" after vacillation. It allows us to keep the verbal statement that I need or desire a thing inasmuch as it is good; for the "object" of a need is what fulfils it; satisfaction is only the *sense* of fulfilment. It is also convenient to be able to assert that I desire the good of what I love, and, so far as the writer's introspection goes, what I desire for my friends is the fulfil-

ment of their needs rather than their satisfaction. Yet this is said with diffidence.

The other side of the last case seems, however, to supply a really weighty argument. Where a man desires the prosperity of a person or a thing that he loves, there in all the finer cases the *fulfilment* of his need seems immensely important to him, and its *satisfaction* in comparison practically does not count at all. It is only for this reason that the lover who is not thinking of existence after death can give up his life as a small thing. There can be no "satisfaction" for a man's needs after the man is annihilated, but their "fulfilment" is not limited in any way, and it is the fulfilment that he cares about first. If he thinks of the sacrifice he is making it is probably of other fulfilments that he is giving up; it is far less likely that he will think much of the loss of satisfaction involved in his not being there to *see* the desire of his soul.

Martyr and fulfilment.

NOTE I

It will probably be evident from the last two chapters what we should like to do with feeling. By far the most convenient thing would be its identification with immediate sense of activity (activity greater and less, prosperous and hindered, etc.); so that all subjective elements in consciousness should fall into the conative sphere, all objective elements into the cognitive. But the writer's psychology is not thorough-going enough to provide anything to support this one argument, that the identification would be convenient for the analogical method.

Note on feeling.

Moreover there seems to be another doubtful psychological point. The identification proposed makes feeling, clear con-

sciousness of activity, analogous with clear consciousness of cognition in the other sphere. Is this compatible with the analogy formerly set forth between *attention* on the one hand and *possession of control* on the other (page 57)? The disposition which holds control is by no means always the disposition which has the most vivid feeling-side. We shall have to say, then, that the content in the focus of attention similarly need not be the content in clearest consciousness. The writer is inclined to think that this is true, but is by no means willing to pronounce positively on the subject.

NOTE II

Note on relation of spheres.

The suggestion in paragraph 6, about the way in which every process of life falls under both cognition and conation, may be easily worked out, though we have not dwelt much upon it for fear of confusion. In ordinary action the conative side is the more prominent, but even here a cognitive presentation is being developed. In ordinary observation the cognitive side is the more prominent, but even here there is activity in perception. "Mental activity," the thinking-out of a subject, is capable of showing an exact balance of the two sides. It may be described equally well in terms of either, though we have nearly always used the cognitive terms. The presentation-gaining-attention is also an interest-gaining-control, and a conclusion reached is an interest fulfilled.

CHAPTER VII

GOODNESS AND TRUTH

Further questions as to the analogy.

1. So far, in the working-out of the analogy between knowledge and will, we have confined ourselves almost entirely to psychology, to matters of fact. But now it is an obvious and important feature in the properties of these two worlds that they are capable of forming the subject-matter for not only natural but normative science. In each world there is an ideal, a standard, and different elements in them are habitually estimated according to the degree of their conformity with these ideals. It is imperative, then, to examine the nature of the latter, and to discover the way in which, if at all, the general analogy appears in them. In this chapter we shall try to set forth the general content of the two ideals, and to guard against certain false interpretations of them. In the next we shall examine the exact relations of the ideal to the actual, "what is" and "what ought to be."

2. We have discussed and compared the working-out of a system of belief and the working-out of a system of conduct, and found many points of likeness between the two. Will there be any likeness

between the answers to some further questions on each side, and what will those answers be? The questions are, what do we mean by *truth* on the one hand and *the truly good* on the other?

Truth and Good.

3. Good in the sense of "the best possible life," which is what will concern us here, has a position quite symmetrical enough with that of "truth" to suggest an analogy between them. In this specialised sense, only conation can be good,[1] just as only cognition can be true. Both ideals, presumably, stand for something satisfactory, something that works; but beyond that the matter is at present vague.

First outline.

It may be said at once that in this part of our discussion we shall be very sketchy and largely dogmatic. Nearly all the arguments on the matter seem to have been stated by other people in effective form, and the writer has no new arguments to add. So what we shall do will amount practically to setting forth opinions in outline and with very little attempt at justification. We will begin by explaining two or three things which Truth and Good are not.

4. Firstly, Truth and Good are not unique and inexplicable qualities possessed by propositions and by events or objects, and perceived by us by means of a kind of taste. This position will not be discussed here. So far as it concerns Good it has already been dealt with, and so far as it concerns Truth others have dealt with it.[2]

They are not inexplicable qualities.

[1] See end of Chapter II.

[2] *E.g.* Mr. H. Joachim in *The Nature of Truth.*

5. Secondly, Truth and Good do not consist of copies or correspondents of something fixed outside or behind our experience. The one is not a portrait, a representation, of "hard facts" fixed behind the not-self. The other is not an imitation or obeying or working-out of some solid kernel of "eternal self" in us which is somehow different from actual experience and its law. This position also will not be discussed further. *Not copies.*

(This paragraph seems for some reason strained and awkward. The analogy does not carry immediate conviction, and may be wrong. At any rate the opinion so far as it relates to conation was, presumably, never held by anybody, but only attributed by some writers to their antagonists; whereas so far as it relates to cognition it is held by a great many people.)

6. Thirdly, Truth and Good had better not be looked on as consisting in conformity to any one particular part of our experience.

Not conformity to one part of our experience.

This is rather difficult to deal with. For we shall agree presently that the ideal experience will be conformable and harmonious throughout its texture, and therefore it will be an attribute of it at any rate that it conforms to any element in it that we like to pick out. We can only say that this is a resultant attribute, and not suitable for use in a definition.

Traces of the view have appeared formerly in the idea that truth must primarily conform to dogmas divinely revealed, goodness lie primarily along the line of divine commands. Truth has perhaps never been *defined* in this way, but goodness has sometimes

been quite frankly so defined. In its more modern form, however, it is in its application to truth that the doctrine has seemed to be most tempting. We have still an instinct to insist that certain elements in our cognitive experience are bound to be right, only these elements are not now usually the theological ones. Logical and mathematical laws of thought we say are right, though we may err in following and applying them; and sensations are right; it is only our interpretation of them that can be wrong. These are foundations upon which the construction we call true thinking must be built.

Instinct to pick out fundamentals.

7. The first remark to be made on this is that, if we insist on the necessary rightness of these elements, we shall be forced to admit that the thing that is right is often not any conscious part of our experience. What is *given* is our actual experience and actual way of thinking, and by much reflection on this we arrive at length at the formulation of our laws, and sometimes, as in exploring mathematics, formulate them wrong. We are given a perception, and when we do occasionally try to distinguish the sensation from the rest of it we find out how hard the task is. With one eye open we perceive a field of vision; reasoning leads us to believe that the sensation part has a gap in the middle, but we are quite unable to notice that gap. We are given the whole thought, and have with much difficulty to find what it is in it that we cannot help thinking—what is this foundation concerning which no question of truth can be raised.

These are hard to arrive at; not given.

In the other realm, our bare conative nature is not evident, any more than our sensations and the laws of our thought are evident. It is not given in consciousness and then built upon. We find ourselves, when we are first able to look, with actual aims and philosophies, a whole concrete world of belief and striving. In this we have with much trouble to analyse down to the groundwork. "What sensation is at the root of this perception?" "What is it that makes me so much set on reaching this, and could not my 'fundamental need' be satisfied in some other way?"

We are given the house and look for the hidden foundations—and really, as with the world itself, there are none.[1] For the second remark to be made is that the only right lies with the whole, and the element has right only because it conforms to all the rest. "Securus judicat orbis terrarum," and that world is subjected to no spiritual Rome.

8. This leads straight up to the theory which in this essay is to be accepted without attempt at proof. We are not given a house built on foundations, or a pattern made on a groundwork. We are given a living creature and have to investigate the law of its nature. And that law is not to be identified with any bit of its skeleton.[2] When we seek for a bit of experience that is sure to be right we are driven beyond

Proper theory.

Law of a nature, not bit of a skeleton.

[1] The comparison belongs to Professor Henry Jones.

[2] Though, presumably, if we knew enough of that bit we ought to see the whole law expressed in it.

experience, and to something which shows itself only in the experience as a whole.

9. *A.* (i) Truth, in its outer aspect, is not conformity of one part of experience to another special part, but simply harmony throughout the whole. If half our actual world were discordant with the other half, we should presumably have no empirical ground for preferring one half to the other. But as a matter of fact most of it is harmonious; discords are only found in a detail here and a detail there. These details we judge "not right" because they disagree with the rest. And they are unstable because of this. The rest is always tending to overcome and alter them and make them take on a shape suitable to the whole. So we conceive of a kind of pattern of a "right" experience without discords, and we call it truth, or "what is really happening." In most of our experiencing we coincide well enough with this: not "copy" it, for the pattern then is no longer distinct from the construction. The pattern is embodied, appears, is, in the experience; our thinking is truth.

A. (i) *Truth = harmony throughout.*

Most *of our experience is right.*

Pattern experience.

It is true enough that certain elements in our belief are nearly always on the side of the majority, and therefore we give a good deal of weight to them. Our faith in the laws of number, for instance, would be very hard to upset now. But that is only because it has stood so many tests; because the other elements on the right side always do seem to find it indispensable to their support;

No doubt certain elements are more often right than others.

and also because the abstractness of these laws would always make it hard for anything to get in their way.

10. (ii) This pattern has not only to transform my present experience into harmony; it has to be right for the past and future too. When my experience expands, no discords must arise. If my present world is on the *right* lines, it will be satisfactory for ever. It may not be a big world, but it is part of the biggest.[1] No future discoveries can damage one completely stated truth.

(ii) *Harmony of past and future also.*

11. (iii) This harmony, then, is the outside of truth; it is what happens when anything is true. And that leads us to the inside. All this can only be done on certain lines. Only experience of a certain character can be harmonious.

(iii) *Inside of truth;* such as *to make harmony.*

There is a determinate law or pattern which is always tending to make our experience conform to itself. We must not identify this universal with any special group of the particulars in which it lives (though no doubt it has more uniform success in some parts of experience than in others). Nevertheless it does live in the particulars, and only there is it actual. Again, it lives in them, *is* in them; it is not copied by them. In so far as they partake of it, they are to be called true; this is the inside of truth. In so far as they

[1] I am deliberately speaking incorrectly here, and for the sake of simplicity neglecting the falsehood that is inseparable from finitude, and the corresponding fact that no truth can be completely stated till all truth is known. I hope this will be pardoned.

partake of it, they fall into harmony present and future, the harmony which is the outer sign of truth.

An experience, then, is true, when it is *such as* to be harmonious and to stay harmonious. That is the practical result of this mysterious-sounding paragraph. If personifications do not help the reader he may drop them.

12. *B.* Take now the conative realm.

B. (i) *Good is not conformity to a part of our nature; it is harmony of whole.*

(i) True good, in its outer aspect, is not appropriated to one special set of our desires, and does not lie in making all the rest of our nature submit to this part of us. There is no group—of "spiritual," or "moral," or "primary" dispositions, or whatever we may choose—which we can leave unquestioned as being certainly right. It is true that we want some things so much more than others that the former must have almost indefinitely greater weight in determining true satisfaction, just as the apparent result of a long addition would have practically no weight with us as against our conviction that five and four are truly nine. Yet there is no distinction of kind here; it is only that nearly the whole mass of our nature and experience is on one side in the conflict. Rightness lies simply with the *greater part* of what we want. If our total disposition consisted of two nearly equal and discordant parts we should be in a great difficulty, very greatly aggravated by the lack of an exact theory of measurement. But as a matter of fact most of what we want is harmonious, and its advantage is increased by the absence of any

unity amongst the discordant details themselves. These the main body is constantly tending to alter and overcome. And we aim at a pattern life which shall be altogether satisfactory. *Pattern life.*

13. (ii) This harmony must stand the test of the future too. As in the course of life I go on finding out what I want I must find nothing to regret in the things I have done. The proper way of life will alter, of course, just as the truth about a situation alters as time goes on. But a satisfaction accurately described, like a completely stated truth, will conflict with nothing in any other part of the pattern. It may, for instance, belong to the perfect life that at this point in it and never again a certain thing should be done. (ii) *Harmony for future.*

(iii) Finally, all this can only be done along certain lines. Only that which is "in harmony with my nature" can make harmony in my experience. This, then, is good. (iii) Such as *to harmonise.*

14. But one step more must be taken in order to connect all this with our previous discussions as to how "good" should be properly defined. In all this chapter we have not given any new *definition* of Good. Our definition remains what it was—in this context "the complete fulfilment of need." Harmony is the characteristic of good only because it seems to be a necessary characteristic of what we most want. If there were a being who wanted discord, then his good would be marked by discord and not by harmony. In just the same way intellectual harmony is a mark of truth only because it is *Not new definitions.*

impossible for the elements in our world of belief to maintain themselves in conflict. If there were a being who had no difficulty in clearly and steadily believing contradictions, then these would not invalidate the truth of his experience. Truth is in essence simply what we can perfectly well believe; a stable cognitive world.

15. As it is, satisfaction involves harmony, and entire satisfactoriness is only to be found in a certain pattern of cognitive and conative life. We are given an experience which can only be co-ordinated into "Truth," and a nature which can only be satisfied by "the true good." The constant tendency of our experience is to model itself according to the pattern, to be "true to" it. Compare a true glass, a true aim, a note sung true. The last is the best comparison, for the note is actual only in that true singing of it.

Determinateness of truth and good.

Right-mindedness.

In "right-mindedness," in "a cool hour," in "hours of insight," we are on the right lines. We do not know everything or aim at everything. But such experience as we have is all right.

Truth is that which perfectly expresses (not "corresponds with") the nature of the universe, *so that* it works. It is God's thought repeated. True good is that which is in harmony with our nature, so that it works. It is the object of impulse and desire because it is the fulfilment of our need; this latter quality is the one which belongs to its definition.

16. The only actual (existent) things here are the successful working and the believing and desiring;

the others have to do with the *law* of the universe, which is not existent. Some people (and this is a fifth view which we have not mentioned) take heed only of the existents. For them a successful belief is by definition a true belief, and an object of desire or impulse is by definition good. We have laid emphasis ourselves on the fact that success in working comes from character. Only along determinate lines—such is the nature of us and the universe—is satisfaction to be found; and these lines we call true and good.

Law and actuality.

CHAPTER VIII

ACTUAL AND IDEAL

1. WE have now given a general account of the contents of the ideal of truth and the ideal of good. In this chapter we must examine their relations to the actual course of experience. We shall have to begin by examining a conception which we have already used freely and must now use more—the conception of a thing's *nature*.

The "nature" of a thing.

By the nature of anything—a person, a situation, a fact—we mean simply a complex of laws of experience, in the most concrete sense in which "law" can be used. We get the right idea on a low and abstract level when we think of "the nature of the numerical system." It is not a "substance" to be imitated or worked upon. It can be partly expressed by multiplication tables and examples and formulae; long lists of rules that hold wherever number appears in certain forms, others that would hold if it appeared in certain other forms, and so on. It would be partly expressed also in another aspect by certain rules much too complicated to formulate; the rule, for instance, that for a particular kind of boy in a particular degree of hurry 5 and 6 will add

up to 13. (For this also is a true statement about number, and therefore by mere force of logic and grammar must be counted as a partial statement of the nature of the numerical system.)

The nature of a person or of a situation, then, similarly consists in, or "expresses itself" in, the laws of an experience. The validity of this whole conception is to be deliberately assumed and not argued for here.

Means the laws of an experience.

This being assumed, it follows that a certain person in a certain situation will do and believe certain things and no others. The doing or believing could not be different unless the nature of the person or of the situation or of both were different; for statements about the actual experience form part of the statement of these natures.

2. Now the question which concerns us is, What can be implied when we say that it would have been better if something else had been done or believed—A' rather than A?

Meaning of "It would have been better . . ."

It may be perfectly true that A' is the more satisfactory experience, more full and stable and harmonious. But why should the statement be made? how is it relevant? A' could not be substituted for A, for, being different from A, it could belong only to a different person or a different situation. It may be relevant because we simply mean to say, "It would have been better for the satisfaction of the person if the situation had been slightly different, so as to lead to the course of action A' instead of A;" or, "It would have been better for the comprehension of this case if the mind applied to it had been different enough

to cognise it as A' instead of A." But often our meaning is something less precise. Often, because of our partial *ignorance* of the person or the situation or both, two or more courses of belief or action look to us equally possible, equally "natural." Then our statement means that, because of such ignorance (or abstraction), we are treating the different courses as though they were on the same level as regards possibility, and are simply arranging them in order of satisfactoriness.

Degrees of ignorance or abstraction.

3. This is the simplest case. Usually, of course, when we are thus arranging a set of such courses, we do know enough to see differences of probability amongst them, even though they all seem to us to be, or to have been, possible. The exact line round what seems possible is also usually hard to draw, and a small amount of additional knowledge may make a considerable difference to it. A stranger may say that a man "ought to have done" something which an intimate acquaintance would not refer to because he would know it to be "out of the question," outside the boundary of what looks possible to his closer knowledge. A person with no idea of the historical development of morals may consider it equally relevant to say that Achilles ought not to have sulked so long and to say that he ought to have respected the chastity of his women captives. To another student the second judgment will seem scarcely more relevant than the statement that he ought to have used a flying-machine. It is true that the respect in question, unlike the use of the flying-machine, would not have been outside the power of

Achilles' will if he had chosen, but the student's increased knowledge sets narrower limits to what a man of that period can be conceived of as choosing.

If we knew *enough* of the nature of person and situation, then (the validity of our conception of "nature" being always assumed), only one course would look "natural" to us. When two or three courses are taken as equally possible, some ignorance or some abstraction must always be implied.

"Mood" and its analogy.

4. A common form of this ignorance or abstraction, where courses of *action* are in question, lies in omission of the details we sum up under the names "mood," "state of mind." The more unformed or unstable or unreliable the character, the wider the field of possibilities that is left by a little ignorance here. In the cognitive realm, the analogy must not be "state of mind" again. The nearest name for it would seem to be "presentation of the case." In our judgment above about action, we supposed ourselves, in popular language, to know the person's character but not to know in what state of disorder, with parts asleep and parts over-excited, it might happen to confront the situation. In the cognitive case corresponding we suppose ourselves to know "the facts" but not to know the way in which they will be presented—perhaps a disorderly way, with some parts over-emphasised and others left unduly in the background. We may know the laws of planetary motion and we may know a particular boy, but if we do not know the boy's teacher it may be only within wide limits that we can predict what the boy will believe about those laws.

5. Now within such limits, conative or cognitive, we arrange the courses *in order of satisfactoriness* by the ordinary tests. Of the one kind we ask, How far does this fulfil our needs? of the other, How far is this (logically) credible? The general test on both sides is that of harmony, both within the system itself and between the system and the rest of experience. The most satisfactory is by no means bound to be that which is actual in the end. We know well enough that the less desirable is often chosen, and the less credible often believed.

Degrees of satisfactoriness.

"The state of my nature," "the part of it that is roused and acting," "the proportions in which it is roused," "the aspect of it that is being displayed"—all these are ways of describing the same thing. If this varies markedly at frequent intervals, we get the "unstable" character, whose inevitable action at one moment hampers and hinders the action at the next, and whose course of life as a whole is a crooked scrawl. Each of his results is likely to be a poor and scanty good in itself, since often it will only be a small part of the character that is represented in the actual endeavour, and that part starred with discordant elements. Still it does not appear that one can rely on the two kinds of unsatisfactoriness being always proportionate.

6. The word "nature" is sometimes appropriated more particularly to the aspect of the whole that determines the laws of satisfactoriness, and sometimes to that which determines those of action. For instance, a man may say in the second sense, "Our friend's

"Nature" used for two aspects.

nature is entirely altered in these bad moods; he behaves quite differently," and another may say in the first, "His nature is the same; to-day as yesterday only a certain life could give him satisfaction; but to-day he is blinded and does not see where his good lies; he has forgotten what he really wants." As a matter of fact in this case both aspects are probably changed to a certain extent, but the laws of action more than the laws of satisfactoriness. When a man is in a moody and capricious state, the different degrees of satisfaction will not belong to the different lines of life in just the same order as when he was earnest and serene. But also what he actually does to-day is pretty certain to diverge from to-day's true good considerably more than yesterday's conduct diverged from yesterday's good. His disposition, we might say, is slightly different in quality, but much more different in crookedness and ill-balance and sudden unstable deformities. He does need rather a different path, but along that path he will not succeed in walking straight. "When our friend is in his particularly charming mood, as he was yesterday, one would like to give him charge of all the delicate business that has to be got through our committees. As a matter of fact one cannot expect him to come to more than three out of the four meetings even on such a day, but even that would be most valuable. To-day the best one could hope would be that he should stop away and say nothing, but it is not really to be hoped for; he will either come and insult everybody, or else he will write letters that will ruin the whole thing."

The bad man's good and his conduct.

7. To express all this with reference to what we said before about necessary abstraction:

Expression of this in preceding terms of abstraction.

We suppose ourselves to know fairly completely, but not quite completely, a certain situation. This in the cognitive world will consist on the one hand of certain "facts," on the other of a knowing mind of a particular quality, helped and hindered by particular circumstances. In the conative world it will have a certain conative nature on the one hand, and a not-self of a particular sort, governed by particular laws, on the other. Let us take a conative instance, and let us suppose that, amongst other things, the nature of the agent is in rather a different "state" to-day from that of yesterday. Our postulated ignorance allows of several courses or several views all looking possible under the given circumstances. Amongst such of these as are open to the nature in yesterday's state, A is most satisfactory. To-day it is not A but A', which has a smaller degree of satisfactoriness. The change may come either because the subjective change has actually altered the *order* of the satisfactoriness-hierarchy, or because it has made the course A or the view A impossible—cut a piece off the top of the series. The "best possible," then, is altered; which is the first point. The second point is that the average or the mean of the remaining possible courses to-day departs further from A' than yesterday's average departed from A: so that the two *probable* courses on the two days are still further apart than the two ideal courses. When our good is not very good, we are likely to fall far short even of that.

CHAPTER IX

BETTER AND WORSE

1. IN the chapter on "Goodness and Truth," we considered these conceptions only as they appeared in the form of the complete ideal. We used the names of Truth and Good only for an experience which was perfectly harmonious throughout, and which could be extended indefinitely without disturbing that harmony. But in the last chapter we evidently dropped this exclusive idea in favour of that of a universal which could appear in many different degrees of completeness. An experience may be more or less true, more or less good, according to its degree of cognitive or conative satisfactoriness. This chapter will be occupied with two notes on the measurement of satisfactoriness.

Enlarged meaning of "true" and "good."

Admission of degrees.

2. The first note to be made is that the satisfactoriness of a course of experience cannot be estimated by merely measuring the amount of content it has in common with the ideal course.

The note is necessary because there is an ambiguity in the use of words which may lead to some confusion, especially in the

Ambiguity.

cognitive realm. The "amount of truth" in our experience means sometimes simply the amount of satisfactoriness and stability, but sometimes it means rather the amount of items it has actually in common with the ideally true experience. These two ways of measurement need not always determine a hierarchy in the same order. In the conative realm, "amount of goodness" nearly always means the intrinsic satisfactoriness and not the over-lapping with the ideal. It is probably the prevalence of the correspondence-theory of truth that has made this more rigid and arbitrary use so common in the other realm. In ethics the analogous correspondence-theory has never existed as a force.

Patching experience.

3. An illustration will show that the ambiguity has real importance in reference to order. Given the same "nature," let us suppose that it may get embodied, according to circumstances, either in an unsatisfactory and discordant experience A, or in a highly satisfactory experience T. Should we necessarily improve A by altering it in the direction of T, say by removing some element in it and substituting an element from T, leaving all the rest unchanged? For instance, let a man be subject to lifelong illusions, and then force on him "true" beliefs quite inconsistent with these. Or teach him, simply by overwhelming authority, that the earth goes round the sun, and leave him with all his other beliefs on the subject conflicting with this. Have we improved on the original state of things? We might say roughly that we had increased the partial identity between A and T, but we have not increased the resemblance.

(Indeed we can hardly say that we have increased partial identity, when we remember that identity has to do with internal relations as well as with "material elements"; but this need not be pressed here.) This experience, split in two by a contradiction, is less like T than it was before; and, which is what chiefly concerns us, it is less satisfactory than it was.

Similarly we cannot always improve conative experience by the rough and simple way of altering any bits we can get hold of. It might truly be a subject for regret to have had "proper" conduct enforced whilst the mind was set against it. It is a risky thing to perform a violent operation on one element in our world of endeavour if nearly all the complex tissue of that world has to be left untouched; dislocation and deformity may sometimes be the result.

4. For the second note, it is to be observed that we are left in each realm with a somewhat unsatisfying definition. I cannot really explain accurately in any other words what I mean by saying that one state fulfils my needs "more" than another. There is no unit of need or of fulfilment. I cannot even explain the less complicated notion of what satisfies my desires more. In general this does not matter much for practice; we can feel our way well enough, and know what change will produce a "more satisfactory" condition, whatever that may mean. But the indefinability of it leads to real difficulty if we begin to set ourselves abstract problems. How many men's lives, asks a friend of mine, are equal

Unsatisfactory definition for measurement.

in value to St. Paul's Cathedral? Such casuistry is of course quite useless for practical ethics, but the insolubility of its questions brings out rather well the vagueness in this part of theoretical ethics.

Spoils casuistry.

The only philosophy which would supply a theoretical answer readily would rest on some such theory as psychological hedonism. This would say promptly enough, "Add up all the pleasure past, present, and future, which is produced by the cathedral; do the same with your men's lives; compare results and judge accordingly." This would still be quite impossible in practice, but it would be clear and consistent as a bit of theory. We, however, cannot use this. Even if we thought that feeling could be summed, and even if the feeling-side and feeling-result of a disposition were not so variable and uncertain, and even if we could believe that value was simply proportionate to feeling, it would still be only an accidental, not an essential statement,—a synthetic judgment and not a definition,—to say: "That state is the more satisfactory [the more fulfilling] which produces the greater amount of pleasant feeling." Such feeling is after all only an effect of getting what we want more. And it is this that we cannot explain.

Psychological hedonism complete in theory.

We are, of course, in exactly the same position with regard to "a more satisfactory system" in science or philosophy or the theories of daily life. We cannot say what we mean by claiming that the other theory left "more" facts unaccounted for

Our doctrine incomplete in both realms.

or "more important" facts. We cannot interpret the giving "due weight" to every piece of evidence. We can only say obstinately, "This *is* better. It is more convincing, for it convinces more."

5. On the whole in practice we are not often puzzled. When we have all the concrete conditions before us, one theory is evidently sounder than the other, and one course of action more satisfactory, and we need not trouble about the measurement. Even in practice difficulties do occur, but I do not wish to insist on them at present. What I wish to emphasise is the defect in theory. Most experiments we can work out; and the abstract statement of problems does not give us the full conditions which belong to experimental procedure, so it may be said that it is quite natural for us to be unable to give an answer. But it comes also from the defect in our philosophy that we can give none; and that means that the successful intuition and practical working has been at the stage below full understanding and not above. Casuistry is no more the goal of ethics than the solution of problems in Todhunter's Arithmetic is the goal of the acquired skill that never makes a mistake in the handling of merchandise and the money market, with its infinitely complicated subject matter. But our knowledge of the subject cannot be wholly satisfactory if we are helpless before the arithmetic book, and cannot even say how many shillings, in the abstract, go to a pound.

We get on in practice.

But defect in theory is a real fault.

Ethics and casuistry.

6. Our only attempt at a general answer seems to be the kind of thing that has been given in this

chapter and the two preceding it. We examine the harmony of a system, in both its internal relations and its relation to the rest of our world; and we examine its wholeness. The professor's science or philosophy is a better belief than his little boy's,—altogether more of a belief,—because it has fewer gaps and ragged edges, and because its elements are less inconsistent and conflicting, and because as a whole it accords better with the rest of what its owner believes. Aristotle's way of life is more satisfactory than that of either the fakir or the man who is drinking himself to death; that is because on the one hand it contains the fulfilment of more wants than theirs, and on the other hand it has fewer wants striving against it. If we had any way of measuring size and measuring harmony, and measuring the *value* of a given amount of each, this test would be beautiful.

Harmony and wholeness.

7. Casuistry is usually regarded with a dislike and suspicion that are not wholly unjustifiable. In its usual form of discussions of special cases, each case stated abstractly and taken out of connection with the rest, and then attacked separately by the individual thinker without any big ideas to guide him, it tends, no doubt, to be on the whole both unprofitable and clumsy. But the fascination of such problems is surely just the same as that which is exerted by the mathematical puzzles at the end of penny papers over people who know no mathematics. These puzzles are usually simple text book examples of algebra and mechanics. A man who had studied the general methods could solve each problem in a

The fascination of casuistry.

few lines, and would certainly not trouble to do so. If a boy wastes his time over such puzzles, the cure is not to forbid him penny papers but to teach him algebra. But in ethics our algebra is still unwritten. Our arithmetic, our very system of numeration, is still unformed. We are not likely to form it as a result of empirical explanation of incomplete and disconnected problems; casuistry is not likely to yield the clue to the theory of casuistry. But psychology and metaphysics will have to yield it before they can be called complete.

Philosophy must form its theory.

8. *Or else*,—and this perhaps will prove to be their answer,—*they must explain exactly why a clue is impossible.* They must show why there can be no system of numeration; why the categories of quantity, and even of order,[1] cannot be applied; why abstraction instead of simplifying a problem renders it insoluble. It may well be so, but the reason is not obvious, and it ought to be explained.

Or else prove the theory impossible.

In problems of conation, people's attention has usually been so concentrated on the special questions that they have thought little of forming a general theory. In problems of knowledge the whole matter has been left on one side. It is curious, when one comes to think of it, that we should have so very little attempt at a casuistry of cognition. "Given facts X, Y, Z ..., arrange in order of acceptability the theories A, B, C, and show the relative value of each." The entire absence of such discussions in

[1] For the questions can take not only the form of "By how much is course A better than B," but the more practical form, "Failing A, should B or C be chosen?"

this sphere makes it look more probable that we shall end in the other sphere by showing their necessary insolubility, rather than by making a science of their solutions. But one or the other must some time be done.

9. Now if the theory is to be proved impossible in the conative world, it looks as though the proof must rest on some such argument as the following:

Suggestion of such a proof.

The facts of conative life, as described in Chapter IV., are that we have desires and impulses, and amongst these all possible complications of varying consciousness, and varying ease of arousal and varying endurance; and that a motive at different moments and in different combinations differs in intrinsic force and in power over feelings and in "advantage of position"; and so on and so on. This chaos we try to simplify by making out knots of laws, and each such knot we say is a partial statement of the nature of the person's "need" for the particular object. A need, then, expresses itself in desire and impulse under endlessly different circumstances in endlessly various ways. No one of such expressions can fully represent it. If we enquire about a man's "real need" of a thing,—how far he really wants it,—the answer cannot be given by pointing to the force of any one moment's impulse or the vividness of any one moment's desire. So we conceive of something behind these which we call the need's "real amount." This it is which determines the value of the need's object. This, when a whole group of needs is considered, determines what state of things shall be the "greatest

fulfilment" of our natures; determines what we "want most,"—what is our "greatest good."

Now the way to abolish casuistry would seem to be simply to claim that this conception of "real amount" is illegitimate.

"Amount of need" perhaps an illegitimate conception.

After all there is no obvious reason why our dispositions should have this homogeneous measurable quality common to them all. There are other subjects in which the popular mind tries to assume something homogeneous and measurable, and the trained mind does not. Take such a question as, "Which of these men has the strongest character?" It is quite likely that the real student of character could only reply in the form, "One has most power of imposing his will on others in a leisurely committee, one in circumstances of imminent danger; one is not particularly good at imposing his will on anyone, but is remarkably single-minded and steadfast in himself; one is single-minded but not steadfast; one is steadfast in spite of constant struggles and opposing desires; one is strong against pain and fear and another against self-indulgence; one keeps his head better than others when bombs are exploding, another excels when office work is going wrong. As to the confused mass of all these elements in undefined proportions, which you call strength of character, there simply is no answer."

10. It would seem possible that the attempt to estimate "amount of need" is in no better case than this. It may be lawful to say, "So long as this disposition is unsatisfied, it will show itself under certain

Ambiguity in "what is wanted most."

circumstances as a desire of a certain poignancy, as an impulse of a certain strength and endurance,—under other circumstances it will be mere discomfort on the borders of consciousness,—again it will at other times add such an extra weight to a different craving,—and so on and so on"; and it may not be lawful to say anything simpler. Even desire, it may be said, may turn out to be equally un-homogeneous, and so may this "strength of impulse" of which we have said so much. Of course if we are determined enough we can make conventional scales wherever we like—so many marks for this and so many marks for that and so many for the next new peculiarity that turns up. But how much comfort our answers will be to us is another question.

This position will abolish casuistry readily enough. It will also, I imagine, introduce some considerable discomfort into ordinary thought on morals and conduct. For it will mean that the question "What is most wanted?" has, unless we give it a perfectly conventional precision, no precise meaning at all. And that means that the question "What ought we to do?" will in various cases have no answer. It will be on the same level as the questions, "Had St. Paul or St. John more religion?" "Was Raphael or Laplace the greater genius?" The conception of duty on this view is not, and cannot be made, a clear and distinct idea.

Duty a confused idea.

The consequences of all this are not clear to me. In the rest of this essay, as in the earlier part, I shall generally speak of better and worse and of value and of our greatest good in the

ordinary unanalysed sense. But I put down this account of a possible position as an argument which I recognise may have something to do with the matter.

Note on Measurement.

I fear this treatment of quantity must almost inevitably be misinterpreted, because it emphasises an aspect which has always been prominent in bad systems of ethics and almost ignored in good. It is perfectly true that the analogy of a system of forces is absurdly inadequate for a system of needs. So, too, is the analogy of the votes of a community, above all if each member is supposed to vote on the ground of his private interests only. Even a community has a general will. It is true, then, that it would be absurd to say, "My need for such a thing is of such a greatness; its fulfilment would have the following value"; as absurd as to assign so many marks to a certain curve without seeing the picture that contains it.

And yet one picture is more beautiful than another, and one course of action is better than another. Quantity is but the abstraction of the ground of order; and how can we get rid of order?

It may be said, "Arrangements of second-best and third-best are irrelevant to ethics; and the *best* is marked out by being the harmonisation of the *whole* situation." I cannot accept this. I admit all possible qualifications: I admit that a rebellious desire is often not left standing out, because I rearrange my mind to fit my solution, "make up my mind to it." Yet sacrifices do occur: and where they occur the whole situation, as it stood, has not been harmonised. "But sacrifices do not really count; our private personal needs have no claim at all against our wider self." Well, there are plenty of cases where this distinction does not come in. I build a university hall of residence, and give up a beautiful common-room for the sake of bursaries for poor students. That is, I arrange two plans in a definite order of merit. Yet how can I weigh against each other the fulfilment of such different needs?

"Quantity," "measurement," "proportion," "greater and less," represent in ethics (and in logic for that matter) the problem of a residuum; an inconvenient problem with bad associations, but how can it be abolished? "Satisfactoriness" is most ambiguous and vague, and how it can be made more definite does not appear. The next step is concealed.

CHAPTER X

WISDOM

1. "If we were wiser, our thoughts would be truer and our conduct better." This is a familiar-sounding statement which, variously interpreted, may serve as a text for the discussion of four or five different subjects, and perhaps supply enough connection amongst them to justify their inclusion in a single chapter. *Text.*

2. "If we were wiser. . . ." "If you knew more of the world, or of yourself, you would take back this." "Mistakes yield to the widening of experience." Let us discuss the text in this form first. *I. Widening of experience corrects mistakes.*

3. We must notice in the first place that the false experience is no less actual than the true. A man may have come to the conclusion that $6 + 5 = 11$, that matter is inert, and that personal devils do not exist. Now let him have a touch of fever, and he may find the spots on his wall-paper persistently adding up to 10, and his ink-pot walking across the room, and a devil crawling through the key-hole. On the other hand, such experience is in a minority, otherwise we should *Mistakes are as actual as the rest.*

not call it mistaken, and we should have no right to call it mistaken. The application of a distinction of true and false, good on the whole and bad on the whole, rests on the fact that certain elements of experience cannot maintain themselves in a stable experience along with the rest, whilst others can. We cannot find the greatest consistent fulfilment in a world of aims that has to include a certain element *a*. We can rest contented in a world of beliefs that includes such an element, only so long as we keep that world divided into watertight compartments. This is what is meant by calling *a* a mistake. Now the greater part of our experience, fortunately, is harmonious and stable enough. The mistakes are in a minority, and in a discordant minority; they do not support one another.

But they are in a minority.

4. This, however, cannot be evident at every moment for each particular error, otherwise that error would never occur. At the moment when and at the place where it does occur, it belongs to what then and there is the winning side. This theory, or this action, is the only one which could fit into this part of actual experience. It may be protected by some barrier from the elements that would unsettle it. At any rate, under the circumstances, it has weight and cohesion enough to maintain itself just here. So what we do, in appealing to the decision of "greater wisdom," is to appeal to the preponderance *on the whole* of the forces opposed to this. "If just at this point you were wiser. . . ." "If you

This is not evident at the moment.

Appeal to preponderance on the whole *of opposing forces.*

realised, if you brought into connection with *a*, the beliefs or aims to which even now you would say you held,—if the dykes were pierced and the whole volume of your knowledge or your purposes could play on this point—then *a* would go under. It only needs that the part of you which judges this should be a bigger part, should represent you more fully." Or perhaps the present experience is insufficient; perhaps even with pierced dykes and gathered forces it could not dissolve the grounds of the mistake. And then the spectator appeals to the future. By hypothesis *a* is stable—*i.e.* reasonable and sensible—when judged simply on the basis of what has so far been arrived at. No amount of recalling past knowledge, of realising present aims and beliefs, would overcome it. So when the spectator says nevertheless that it is a mistake, he is appealing only to what is going to happen. *Test of extension of experience.*

"This will not stand the test of *extension* of experience. When you have lived more, have explored the universe more and yourself more, this element will be swept away in recantation, in regret and repentance."

"It is wrong" implies, then, "it is out of harmony with the main part of experience; if not with the present, then at any rate with present and future taken together. The future will be mainly harmonious, it will give a clear verdict on this point, and the verdict will be adverse." The reference is to what the spectator thinks will be the actual future, not to the ideal. The universe or the self, he says, is such that further exploration, even with the normal amount of clumsiness and fallibility about it, cannot but end in such *Appeal to actual future.*

a verdict. He ventures his assertion on the probability that most of experience will in the long run be on one side and that side his own.

5. Now why should this be a relevant objection to α? How is the intrinsic satisfactoriness of the present system affected by the fact that the future will swing in the other direction? What *is* better, what *is* truer, must by definition depend simply on what gives more fulfilment to my present needs, what is more susceptible of present belief. How can any prophecy about the future affect this? It affects it only because of one presumed fact. That fact is, that there exists in me now a disposition to provide for future needs, and that I have even now a belief that present truth must be consistent with future truth. If these regulative ideas are deep enough, all others ought to yield to them. And it seems that they are deep enough. "In a cool hour" I choose nothing and believe nothing which has shown itself to be inconsistent with them.

Relevant only because of present belief in future, and present need to provide for it.

We must be careful not to confuse "fulfilment of present needs" with "present fulfilment." It may be that the next moment is rendered less satisfactory when its contents are governed by the prudent choice; just as the far-sighted belief might be unsatisfactory if judged only by what up to this time has been met with in our immediate experience. What we choose, and what we believe in, is the experience of life as a whole, and the contents of the next moment only in subordination to this.

"Fulfilment of present" v. "present fulfilment."

6. We have practically said here, "any one of my present mistakes would *probably* be rectified by the extension of experience in the direction that concerned it." Mistakes are mutually discordant, and the main body of experience is harmonious. It is unlikely that any one particular mistake will maintain itself indefinitely. *Probable rectification.*

Now can we go further than this? We will try.

7. "If we were wiser. . . ." "If we knew everything, we should believe truth and truth only." "If we could feel ourselves for once all through; if our desire could once represent the whole of our need, we should desire the Good." *II. If we knew everything.*

8. This may be true, but it is easy to take a wrong basis for the truth of the first part at any rate. We must not return to the haunting correspondence-theory, and think of the knowledge of "everything" as the contemplation of certain "facts" which are independent of our experience of them. The knowledge of everything, if the phrase has any meaning, must mean the contemplation of all the possible courses of experience,[1] false as well as true, that can go along with the "nature of the universe" in the sense before explained. The nature of the universe in any part may be partly expressed by a certain complex of laws. "A man of character A and clear-headedness B, undisturbed in his observation, will here have experience *a*." "Another man, of *Not correspondence-theory.*

[1] More courses than one will be possible if we fix only the nature of the "situation," and not the nature of the contemplating mind.

hastier temperament and with rather different prejudices, will have an experience differing in details u, v." "Distractions of a certain kind will bring about a certain further difference." A mind that knew everything would contemplate all these courses of experience. And then the fittest would survive. The most stable and harmonious,—the most credible,—would be believed. This mind's experience, in the most intimate sense, would be truth.

Contemplation of all possible courses.

In the conative realm there is less temptation to explain the doctrine wrongly. We lose fulfilment because certain elements in us are neglected; we choose what fulfils a part and does not fulfil the whole. If the whole of us were awake and spoke; if our conscious desire represented our need through and through, then what we desired would be our greatest good.

9. And yet is this certain? Do we not sometimes believe the less credible of two theories that are before us? Do we not sometimes choose, of two courses, the one that we know will not give us the greater fulfilment? This means that there are such things as obsessions. Then shall we not have to add another kind of wisdom to the unlimited knowledge and feeling, before we can be certain that our choosing and believing will be right? "If we were wise. . . ." "If we had no obsessions; if no element of our knowledge or of our conative nature had more or less than its proper force or weight,—then, when we knew everything and felt everything, we should

Yet is the fittest sure to survive?

Must add idea of "due weight."

believe and choose rightly." Indeed, we ought to get this into our original words. "Knowing everything" must be taken to include "knowing the relative importance of everything." Not only must the whole of our need come in, but our desire must *represent* the whole of our need.

But now how are we to define this due importance and proper representation? There seems no way except to refer to the satisfactoriness of what is desired and believed. We are wise in this last sense when we believe the more credible and desire the more desirable,—when we do select always the more harmonious system.

Cannot define this except by a circle.

10. So it appears that this last idea of wisdom has done no more than suggest another point of view. We have not explained away that ultimate idea of satisfactoriness. "Let every element have its proper weight," but the "proper" weight cannot be explained or defined except by using the notion of "greatest satisfactoriness on the whole in the result." If we liked, of course, we could take the "proper proportion" as the ultimate idea, and define satisfactoriness in terms of that.

So have no new information.

As to the preceding idea, of knowing and feeling "everything,"—it seems, on further reflection, as though it were not really wanted. Much of such knowledge will be quite irrelevant to our acceptance of the truest system of all, and similarly with the conative side. What is wanted is only such elements of knowledge and desire as *are* relevant, including the knowledge of the relative importance

of the elements of knowledge, and the desire for due proportion in the fulfilment of the several needs. That is, whatever is valuable in the "completeness" idea of wisdom is contained in the "proportion" idea. And the latter is only valuable because, in leading us round a circle, it shows us the view from the other side.

III. Comments on last.

11. Since this small amount of value may be conceded to the last idea of wisdom, a few more remarks may be added on the subject. First, take the connection of virtue with knowledge. "If I were wise, I should choose what gave most fulfilment." We have shown that this is only a verbal statement if it is true, but it is not even true unless the "wise" means "*desirous* of the greatest fulfilment."

Cognitive wisdom not enough for conative side.

No cognitive wisdom is enough here. I may know that A is less fulfilling than B, and I may still choose A. A man might recognise that it would have been better for him never to have met a certain woman, and yet he might not choose to have the hands of the clock put back in order that he might act differently and escape the meeting. Needs in possession may insist on their own satisfaction, in preference to a greater satisfaction which would exclude them. The most clear sighted nature will not choose its best course unless at the moment it wants it. Cognitive wisdom, then, in the way of knowledge of the best choice, does not secure that choice, any more than conative wisdom, in the way of desiring to believe whatever system is the most intellectually satisfactory, is sufficient to secure that belief. Virtue is more than

knowledge, just as knowledge in general is more than interest in truth.

Notice that the greatest good, the best possible life, will certainly involve that some of my nature shall *not* be awakened in it; for instance, that I shall not follow a course of education which would end in making me a morphinomaniac. In that moment in which I felt myself "in due measure" all through, I should form the desire not to desire certain things. Similarly in the moment when I perceived and "did justice to" all the possibilities of experience, with all its possible discords and mistakes as well as its possible harmonies, I should conclude that certain conclusions must not be reached.

The best course involves that some of me shall sleep.

12. It is to be remarked that up to this point the cognitive wisdom we have spoken of has been a quality appertaining to the side of the object. It has meant increase of presentational experience in time, or else it has meant a presentation of various possibilities out of time, each presented with its own just weight. Hence it has been rightly taken in the analogy to correspond with the wisdom of the conative self, the subject; to the further awakening, or to the due balance and proportion, of elements in this. But now the term wisdom in its cognitive sense is sometimes used with reference to a quality of the knowing subject-self. Perhaps some such term as "cleverness" would really be freer from ambiguity, but we might keep the other for the sake of keeping our text so far as the

IV. So far cognitive wisdom has been objective, conative subjective.

Now take cognitive wisdom = subjective cleverness.

cognitive world is concerned. The conative analogy will need very careful examination.

13. "If we were wiser, there would be fewer discords." With perfect subjective wisdom, perfect cleverness, would cognitive experience be *perfectly* harmonious?

With perfect subjective wisdom, we think cognitive experience would be perfectly harmonious.

There would certainly be no inconsistent beliefs. Would there be anything short of this; any sensations, for instance, that did not fit into the general scheme; any unharmonised residuum? It is a fundamental belief with us that in the cognitive world there would be nothing of the kind. The most difficult and complicated case, we think, *could* be harmonised if we were clever enough. "Facts are self-consistent," though they may be puzzling. If our stupidity could be altogether cured, we believe that experience would be perfect.

14. Now what is the analogy for this?

"Though we are hindered by our own stupidity, we cannot but *believe in* some perfectly harmonious cognitive experience. If two beliefs are seen to be discordant, we give up one or both." "Though we are hindered by an intractable environment, we cannot but *seek for* some perfectly harmonious conative experience. If two endeavours are felt to be discordant, we give up one or both."

Conative analogy = seeking for perfect conative experience.

Assume for argument's sake that nearly all our world is at some moment right and unquestionable. There is a stray "fact" outside the system. We

either believe that it can be fitted in somehow, or else we disbelieve in the fact; we say, for instance, "this sensation cannot have occurred, our memory must be deceiving us"; and then we believe that this failure of memory can be explained somehow so as to fit in. In the other world there is a stray impulse outside the system. We either do our best to turn it somehow into an endeavour consistent with the rest, or else we decide to abolish it, and now try to fit in with our other endeavours the new endeavour for its abolition. The analogy, then, is briefly this; that as we cannot but believe in perfection of cognitive experience, so we cannot but seek for perfection of conative experience. It is a law that all worlds of cognition are governed by a fundamental belief in the possibility of a solution of inconsistencies; "there must be some way out." It is a law that every complex of dispositions in action is governed by a fundamental endeavour to work out its fulfilment, so that it inevitably seeks to remedy imperfections of fulfilment; "there shall be some way out."

15. A law of present experience is: "Of two systems of belief, the more satisfactory is accepted. Of two courses of life, the more desirable is sought." Further, there is this: "If a system of belief is not perfectly satisfactory, *I believe in* the possibility of a better one. If a course of action is not perfectly desirable, I *seek for* one that shall be more so." The believing in and the seeking for may be weak enough, and may be shut off by water-tight partitions from the immediate believing and seeking above; may be

Double laws.

reduced to "I suppose there is some solution of this inconsistency," and "I wish I could lead a more satisfactory life," whilst we go on steadily thinking and acting as before, for lack of energy in the first case, and lack of knowledge in the second. But the supposition and the wish cannot be wholly got rid of.

To some extent we seek for cognitive perfection and believe in conative perfection.

To some extent we inevitably try to find the better system of thought. Where a belief in consciousness is inconsistent with the mass of other beliefs in consciousness, the mass tends to overcome and alter it, and so movement goes on. But how far we deliberately set out to try and find a better system of beliefs on any subject depends on how this fits in with other aims. To some extent also, wherever we are seeking to improve our conative world, some thin beliefs are present; we must have, at any rate, a suggestion presented to us as worth trying. (This is below belief in the strict sense, as the tendency above was below endeavour in the strict sense.) But how far we believe in the possibility of a better arrangement of life depends on how such a belief fits in with others.

Confusions in ordinary analogy.

16. This is all we can get. There seem, then, to be several confusions in an analogical argument that is sometimes used: "We believe that the world is such as to yield to our intellectual demands; we ought to believe similarly that it will yield to our moral demands,—will be such as to fulfil our fundamental needs."

To begin with, we cannot have "belief" on both sides of the analogy; belief corresponds not to belief but to action. Again, even if this were not so, the thing we believe about must not be "the world" on both sides; it must be "the self" on one. On the cognitive side what we believe about is clearly the not-self and that only. We commit ourselves to no assertions about its being possible to cure our stupidity; we only say "if it could be cured, then experience would become perfect." So if we did have belief on the other side of the analogy too, it must be belief about the conative self only, not about the conative not-self. It would be the belief that "the conative nature is in itself harmonious, and but for the intractability of the not-self it could work out in a perfect experience." There would be no belief justified about the nature of the universe with which our conditions deal.

Cannot have "belief" on both sides. Nor "the world" on both sides.

17. This suggests a way of re-stating the argument in a more justifiable shape. "Though the cognitive world as appearance is full of discord, yet as reality it is perfectly harmonious." "Though in appearance we are full of conflicting desires, still in reality we are such that we might be wholly and perfectly satisfied." The cognitive argument asserts nothing about any mind so getting rid of stupidity and finiteness as to experience this "real" harmony. The conative argument says nothing about the universe being such as to satisfy even what our need in reality is. Still, further arguments, with similar

Ordinary argument re-stated.

metaphysical meanings, might possibly be brought to establish these two last points.

18. When we make "belief" match "endeavour," what one-sidedness shall we have in the law of endeavour to match the one-sidedness of the law of belief? Apparently just that endeavour must take account of resistance of environment, just as belief takes account of the believer's stupidity. It is a fundamental element in my world of belief, that this world will settle itself more and more harmoniously so far as my incapacity does not get in the way. It is a fundamental tendency in my conative nature to work myself out more and more harmoniously so far as the not-self does not prevent it.

One-sidedness in the proper analogy.

CHAPTER XI

THE COMMON WORLD

1. So far we have dealt with the experience of a single individual. In preparation for the final part of this essay we must now deal with the experience of a group.

Experience of a group.

2. Most people's worlds, cognitive and conative, are very much alike in many respects. We assume indeed in daily life that human beings all want much the same thing, just as we assume that they all believe much the same thing; and the assumption does not work badly. When we call a person feeble-minded we assume that his fundamental perceptions and ideas are similar to ours, though we see that he does not hold them together as we do in an organised system of thought. When we call him morally feeble we assume that he wants the same kind of life as we, and only has not the energy to get it. Needs much like ours are assumed everywhere, and that is why reasonable action is supposed to be much the same for all. "Don't be silly," is what we say to a naughty child, and the reckless young man is one who has "played the fool." In accurate description of this kind of thing, we ought

People's worlds are much alike;

to go further and speak of more than similarity. The worlds of the different individuals actually overlap. Experience, both cognitive and conative, is capable of being identically common to the lives of two or more people. Ordinary language is justified when it speaks of the possibility of *sharing* perceptions and beliefs and needs.

Really largely identical.

3. The notion of a common need may perhaps modify the crudeness of our former insistence that all good was only good for *somebody*. It is true that the fulfilment of a need is fulfilment only for one who has the need, but many people may have it. The good "belongs" rather to the need than to the individual person. "The need of the universe, here and here and here, is for such a change." The conception of the "best" working-out of a set of needs will be just the same whether the various needs exist in one individual or in several. The ideal working-out will fulfil as much of the set as possible and remove the rest.

Common needs and goods.

Harmonisation not altered.

4. The description of a need as common, however, covers various cases where the sameness is on very different levels, and it is worth while to spend a few moments in distinguishing these.

Degrees of commonness in need.

5. When we first spoke of a need or disposition, we described it simply as a tendency to act in a certain way when a certain suggestion was given or a certain stimulus applied. Such a tendency can evidently belong to a group of individuals just as well as to a single individual. It might even

exist in the group without existing in any one member of it. Suppose that four mountaineers roped together are threatened by an avalanche, and that two have the impulse to escape to the right and two to the left. The tendency of the whole group will probably be to remain in the exact path of the avalanche. Here there is no common need. We begin to get commonness when the disposition of the group to do a certain thing does exist in each member, or in the weightier section of the members. And yet even here there may hardly be a need shared; "the disposition to do the thing" may be only an abstract name for several dispositions which cross at the one point of "the thing." A Town Council votes unanimously for making a suburban railway; that is the general description. The detailed truth may be that A votes for the railway that will bring people to his shop, B for the railway that will relieve over-crowding in the town, C for what will divert the traffic that annoys his friends, D for what will annoy his enemy. In our first case the will of the group was the will of nobody; in this it is the "Will of All."

May have group-disposition which belongs to no individual.

May have individuals' dispositions meeting at a common point.

6. When the *same* disposition really exists in each member, its object will thereby become what in the strictest sense we call a public good. Entire sameness demands that the need should have the same qualifications in each individual. A bookseller may advocate the establishment of a free library from the same disinterested motives (*i.e.* the same common, non-private motives)

Complete commonness.

as its other promoters. But if he would give up the project on being convinced that its success would injure his business, then his disposition was not altogether the same as that of the others. In all this there can be endless variations of circumstances and degree. The perfection of commonness would be found in a group where every member shared the dispositions of every other, and acted as in his circumstances the group personified would act. So far as any member of a community approaches this ideal, he may be said to partake of the "General Will."

"General Will."

7. This state may be described in another way by saying that the person in question has his most fundamental disposition directed towards the good of the whole community. He may never have formulated such a conception, nevertheless his nature is such as to tend towards this goal, as to find its fulfilment only along these lines. It is a matter of the "spirit" in which he pursues his ends. The General Will acts in us so far as, consciously or unconsciously, we seek every object under a certain qualification; the qualification that we should give the object up were it shown to be inconsistent with the good of the whole.

Seeks good of community.

CHAPTER XII

COMMON GOOD

1. PERHAPS the most interesting and daring doctrine in all ethics is one to which its upholders have sometimes failed to give the distinctness which is its due. They have slipped it into a postulate, or into the double meaning of a word, or have otherwise tried to make it look self-evident in a way that does injustice to its boldness and its interest. The application of the analogical method to this article of the ethical creed would seem to provide a fitting climax to this essay. In this chapter we shall confine ourselves to ethics, and to mere explanation of the matter in question. The cognitive analogy is to be left to the next chapter, as is also the question of proof.

Most interesting doctrine in ethics.

2. Put shortly, the doctrine amounts to this:— The best life for the individual, the life of actions directed always towards his greatest good, will consist everywhere in his contribution to the greatest good of the universe. We conceive of a process of life, a pattern world-experience, which as a whole fulfils the needs of the world better than any other could do. It is an

Conception of common good.

immensely complex process, and every individual in the world has his individual part to play and his special contribution to make. In the proper performance of this function, says the creed we are considering, lies his pursuit of his own true good. A man who has conative wisdom, whose needs are always balanced according to the real value of their objects to him, who never fails to seek what he really wants most—such a man will also have "virtue" in the sense of living what we call the moral life. There is no possibility of conflict. The individual's self-realisation is perfectly in line with the self-realisation of the whole world.

3. The same thing may be put in rather a different way.

Universe as total disposition.

The universe on its conative side consists of a total disposition,—a nature working itself out according to its own determinate law. This nature we analyse for convenience into a plurality of dispositions or needs. The best possible working-out could not satisfy every one of these, since some are inconsistent; but the mass is internally consistent enough for the best possible working out to satisfy by far the greater part of it. Now our analysis of the conative universe into needs exists side by side with another analysis much more independent of our convenience and choice; an analysis which arises from the fact that the universe exists in a plurality of finite beings. Some of the needs we mentioned exist in a great number of these beings; some only in a few or in none. Each finite being

Breaks up (i) *into different needs;*

(ii) *into finite beings.*

consists on his conative side of a group of needs, or rather of a whole disposition which is conveniently analysed into needs. Many of these are common to himself with other finite beings, and most are perfectly consistent with themselves and with the needs of others.

The difficulty only arises where inconsistent needs occur. These cannot all be satisfied in the self-realisation of the universe. We must distinguish this statement carefully from the other statement that no group of needs can be perfectly trusted to work out its greatest possible fulfilment at every moment; that is true, but is here irrelevant. What we are thinking of here is that the best possible fulfilment of the needs of the universe, and the best possible fulfilment of every group of needs which constitutes a finite being, are each practically sure to leave certain elements within them unfulfilled. And the question is this; Could that action of a finite being, which was directed towards the greatest possible fulfilment of the universe, ever conceivably be such as not to tend to the greatest fulfilment of the finite being himself? That is, in ordinary language:—Is a conflict conceivable between conative wisdom and public spirit—between private and public good?

No virtuous finite being must be left unsatisfied.

4. (i) A good deal of support can obviously be got from the doctrine of sanctions in a quite low and common-place form. A decent society does, as a matter of fact, secure that it shall usually be more comfortable and more convenient to lead a decent life, and

(i) *Sanctions.*

"nature" often backs society. If we get drunk at night we have headaches in the morning. If we steal we are usually put in prison. If we are not good-natured to our friends we get little good-nature in return, and if we make ourselves unpleasant to other people they make themselves unpleasant to us. Society has a good chance of the last word in its dispute with wilful and capricious non-conformity.

"This we learnt from famous men,
Teaching in our borders;
Who explainéd it was best,
Safest, easiest, and best,
Expeditious, wise, and best,
To obey your orders."

(ii) *Preponderance of common needs.*

(ii) Much more can be done, and always has been done by supporters of the creed, by pointing out the number of human needs that are common to many individuals, and the number of our desires which are directed towards objects of public and not only private good. "My own interest" is one of the smallest of the things I am interested in. The man in the street likes his football club to win matches even when he is not playing and has no bets on the result. He likes England to be the greatest nation in the world, and to be governed by his own political party, even though his own shop is quite unaffected by it. When we say a man cares about art we do not really mean that he cares only for the pictures he has a chance of visiting, and would be indifferent to their destruction afterwards. One might say that "strictly private interests" are only a small and

peculiar class in the mass that exists. Suppose even a common-place man, believing himself as selfish as he believes others, to be convinced that he is to die on August 6th and the world to end on August 7th. Apart from all thoughts of his own immortality, he will be much more excited about the second date.

(iii) Moreover, there is such a thing as love. A woman would really rather give food to her baby than have it herself. And it is common enough to choose that a tired friend shall have our comfortable chair, or to give up an hour of leisure for the sake of promoting the good of our college or our party.

(iii) *Love.*

We must remember in connection with all this that the case of a sacrifice of life (supposing annihilation at death) is hardly so difficult to bring under our creed as it looks. We have not to perform any such *tour de force* as that of the hedonist, which is involved in asserting that the moment of sacrifice contained more pleasure than could have been got into all the tranquil life which would have followed an evasion of the highest course. We need not even assert that this is true of the *satisfaction* obtained. For, as we have said several times before, the good that we seek is not satisfaction but fulfilment, and the fulfilment of the martyr's chief needs is quite uninterrupted by his death, seeing that the things he loves best do go on prospering.

Sacrifice of life not a hard case.

(iv) Merging into what we have already noticed, there is the law that decent actions are in themselves things that we want. To be honest and kind and

clean, and in the last resort to be a hero, may not give a man the greatest possible "pleasure," but it gives him very great fulfilment. This, he realises on the whole and with very different degrees of consciousness, is what his nature does tend towards and crave for; even though the more facile impulses with their more vivid feeling-sides are crying out against it. It is an oddly low view of language, by the way, which makes us treat such sayings as "honesty is the best policy" as low-minded proverbs. Why should we assume that "the *best* policy" is of course what satisfies our lowest needs? It might be the best simply as being the finest and the highest and the thing we wanted most,—the best thing.

(iv) *Desire for virtue.*

(v) Notice that we cannot here bring in the pains of internal discord and anarchy in the soul. These belong, in Plato's description, to the state where a man is not pursuing his own true good. Here we assume him to be doing this, and only ask whether this must always lie along the same lines as the good of the world.

(v) *Cannot claim pains of discord.*

5. (vi) The facts mentioned seem to ensure that the pursuits of private and public good in the vast majority of cases shall be identical. Can they ensure it for every conceivable case? The more importance we attribute to our deeper and finer needs,—the further down in our "deeper nature" we push the centre of gravity of our whole self,—the more cases will be safe. What we want to secure is that a man "in his right mind," viz. when following what

(vi) *Can we get* invariable *coincidence?*

he really wants most, should invariably choose the thing that tends to the greatest good of the universe. And for this it does not seem safe to rely on coincidence. The only way of securing it, it would seem, is to claim that the good of the whole as such, because it is the good of the whole, is the good of the individual. That is, that the good of the whole is the object of the deepest need of every finite being.

Deepest need for good of whole.

If we claimed that this was the only desire in the right-minded man, we should be left (in a world of right-minded people) without any special content for the good life, for every particular object would be indifferent to everybody. But if we claimed that it was so present and fundamental in the right-minded man that he desired nothing *in comparison* with it, that he would always pursue his own self-realisation in case of conflict by sacrificing other things for its sake, then we should have an infallible method for securing coincidence between private and public good.

This must not be the only need.

This implies a good deal.

6. One critical case will be that of a life-long martyrdom, or approach to it, where joy in the concrete work and even the joy of love is almost absent, and there is scarcely more than the one persistent need to carry us through.

Critical cases.

Life-long martyrdom.

> "We are weary in heart and head, in hands and feet,
> And surely more than all things sleep were sweet,
> Than all things save the inexorable desire
> Which whoso knoweth shall neither faint nor weep."[1]

[1] A. C. Swinburne: *The Pilgrims.*

A more difficult one still arises where some of the best elements in us struggle against the necessary action. One could at any rate conceive a case where a slight good to each of a great many unknown people demanded a brutal lie to one's dearest friend, and yet, even when everything was taken into account, was for the greatest good of the world.

Need for cruelty.

7. In this chapter we shall not discuss any proofs that might be offered for this article in the ethical creed. But it will perhaps make the conception clearer to anticipate a little, and mention the kind of metaphysical proof on which the matter might rest. We could get the basis we want, for instance,—to put it in a crude and thoroughly popular form,—by supposing us all to be incarnations of one spirit in such a way that we all shared his deepest need, *i.e.*, I suppose, the tendency of his whole disposition towards his greatest good as a whole. If we claim that this need is fundamental in each of us, there is no need to demand any conscious intellectual conception of "the greatest fulfilment of the dispositions of the universe," or any conscious judgment that "this is what I most want,"—such as for the generality even of human beings could certainly not be claimed. We only want this regulative need, this complex strain running through our conative nature, strong enough to make us infallibly lose fulfilment when we get out of line with it. The question of whether a "single fundamental need" exists is rather a matter of words.

Anticipation of metaphysical proof.

"Isolated" fundamental need.

All we need demand is a kind of balance of the whole, a qualification or quality.

8. One must be most careful not to blur any critical point by looseness of meaning in such a statement as "the good lies in the performance of function." My "function" is used sometimes to mean the working out of the tendency of my whole disposition, and sometimes to mean my contribution as a member of the universe to the well-being of the universe. That is, it means sometimes "my good" and sometimes "the good of me." Our creed asserts that the two always coincide, but it is far too bold an assertion to be turned into a postulate.

"Function" ambiguous.

9. We might throw light on our doctrine by stating it in a different form. It means that the General Will of the universe is fundamental in every finite being, so that only along its lines can he find its greatest fulfilment. If this is true of every single being it must be true also of every group of such beings,[1] so that we get the conception of the hierarchy of institutions,—individual, family, Church, class, nation,—all with their real deepest tendencies true to the deepest tendency of the universe, all finding their good in contributing to the good of the whole. In theological language: Truth, for the individual as for the world, lies only along the line of God's thoughts, and the fulfilment of craving, for the individual as for the world, lies only in partaking of God's will.

General Will of universe fundamental in all.

[1] Of every *concrete* group—of the men who make the group. See note on next paragraph.

10. A man may be deeply possessed with the spirit of a General Will, and may yet be mistaken as to what object will satisfy it. The most important and interesting mistake comes from the non-recognition of the hierarchy just mentioned, and rests on the idea that the good of a group may lie elsewhere than in the promotion of the good of the universe. A man may be willing to annihilate his private self in the service of his family or his church or his nation, but not perceive that these can truly prosper only by annihilating themselves if necessary in the service of the whole. "An English statesman's duty," he says for instance, "is to his country and not to the world," as if the two could diverge.

Mistakes of General Will.

Of course language creates a difficulty. The annihilation suggested may be the good of the whole group—be what all its members were born for. Yet the title of "England," or "Trinity College," or "The North Western Railway Company," seems to be given to the group in a certain *aspect*, and the good spoken of may involve this aspect ceasing to exist. And it feels awkward to say that this is still the good of England or of the L.N.W.R.[1]

Also we must of course distinguish two possibilities. The man, if questioned, might say it was for the good of the world that every country and college and company should receive unqualified and undivided service from its own members. This would presumably be a mistake, but a much deeper

[1] Or of a gang of thieves or a suicide club. The good of a group of people may involve the immediate abolition of that way of grouping themselves.

mistake would appear if he maintained that each body for its own good need look to itself only, and did not necessarily find that good in the service of the world; or, as he would probably express it, had no duty to the world. Yet even here, if the patriot seeks his country's good *as such*, the General Will of that country is acting in him, though the mind which guides it errs grievously.

11. The summary of our doctrine, then, is something of this sort. When we feel our needs in their true strength, we desire all such things as are good, and amongst these we desire especially such as are honourable and pure and lovely and of good report, so that these will make up the greater part of that life which is the good of the whole. But beyond all these we desire that abstract good, and, for the man who knows what he really wants, every special object of pursuit is tested by its relation to this. It is the expression of a supreme faith in human nature. What a man really wants, it is said, is "to know what is true, to make what is beautiful, to endure pain and fear, to resist the allurements of pleasure, in the interest of some form of human society." And all this he wants only in subordination to his pursuit of the good of the universe, though not only as a means to this end.

Summary of doctrine.

Faith in human nature.

But we imperfect beings work largely, as we noticed long ago, by remembrance rather than feeling of our deepest needs; it is only in hours of insight that we feel them vividly and clearly. Hence the apparently

Working from memory.

intellectualist character of much morality. I do a thing not because I want itself but because I approve of it, viz. know that I really want it. I remember Philip sober, and do what he would wish. Justice is often the memory of love.

12. It is necessary to consider, before ending this chapter, an ambiguity in the wording of the ethical doctrine in question; which raises the consideration of a group of cases more difficult than anything discussed yet.

Ambiguity in doctrine of common good.

The doctrine is often expressed (we have so expressed it ourselves) in the words: "There can be no conflict between the good of the individual and the good of the whole." And this seems quite consistent with the suggested metaphysical reason, that the deepest need of every individual has for its object the greatest good of the whole. Now from this it should follow, not only that the individual has never to choose between his own good and the good of the world, but also that *no individual can ever be sacrificed to the good of the world.* For instance, not only does the good of an axe lie in its being a good axe, but the good of a tree must lie in its being cut down for axe-handles. And if it is for the good of the universe that cats should eat mice, then it is for the good of the mouse that the cat should eat him.

Cat and mouse.

Again, we must apparently decide in the same way about the case where the fulfilment of the need for the greatest good of the world requires in a certain place the defeat of the disposition to do one's best to attain that

Acting against conscience.

good. Because of our ignorance and warped intellect, regard for the real good of the world might compel others to induce us to act in a way which we think is not for that good. The more emphasis we have laid before on these finer needs, the harder this case will be. If there is to be conflict anywhere between public and private good, the first person sacrificed for the world will not be the martyr on the right side but the traitor on the wrong. It may be urged with some show of reason that such a case can never occur; that a violation of conscience must always outweigh any fulfilment that could ensue for lower needs. It is a defensible position, yet it would involve results for which it is not certain that its defenders would be prepared. We might give up without much reluctance the bribing or torturing of prisoners of war. But take a Hindoo widow who believes in the duty of *suttee*, and cannot possibly approach such freedom of intellect as to be convinced by argument against it. The only way of preventing the act which would involve no violation of her conscience would be that of life-long physical constraint. If it were practicable, would the defenders of conscience wish to alter the law of India in that direction? Again, take a religious maniac who believes it his duty to sacrifice his child in imitation of Jephthah. Or take a child who, in one of the morbidly conscientious states of childhood, wants to do something which we know is foolish and bad for him and for others, and which we know in a year's time he will have outgrown all desire to do. Or finally, on a difficult level which we have no right to leave

unconsidered, take the faithful dog whom, against all his dim faithfulness, we entice away from a sick master.[1]

This complication of objective and subjective rightness can indeed be very complicated. It is hard enough to know in one's own case whether the highest motives are really guiding one, or only prejudice and opinionatedness in their dress. Again, what is one to do with a man who has confused opinions as to what needs are deepest in him; who honestly believes, for instance, that his highest and most sacred need is to gain heaven by obedience to arbitrary commands of an arbitrary deity. But neglecting all complications, and taking simply the question of promoting the good of the world, as against what one man thinks is for the good of the world, it is hard to say that the former could never be advanced by a moral injury to him. And if it could, the creed apparently binds us to saying that in spite of the moral injury the action will be for the agent's own greatest good. It will be the hardest possible test for the doctrine.[2]

[1] It is difficult to find unambiguous cases. For the purpose of my illustration, the dog must not have been deceived, but must really have been tempted away by an appeal to some lower instinct. And the other cases must be kept parallel to this in the sense that the motive for coercion must be the good of the world in general, not the good of the subject coerced.

[2] It is a curious fact that, as Leslie Stephen has pointed out, this is by no means the hardest test for our power of "being glad afterwards." If I were convinced later that by treachery to what I thought best I had unintentionally helped on the good of the world, and of a part of the world I cared for, it is probable that my remorse would not continue to torment me much.

13. The test, however, seems after all to rest on an ambiguity and not to touch what is really essential in the minds of most writers on ethics. What is important is only the claim that there is never any difficulty for the individual himself. So far as I am capable of seeking voluntarily to promote the good of the whole, so far, in doing this, I am leading the most fulfilling life possible for myself. Ideal conduct, "goodness" in the sense of action directed towards my greatest good, lies this way.

This test does not touch essentials.

Voluntary *service involves the good.*

14. "My greatest good itself" also lies this way. But where exactly does it lie? If we say it consists of the object, "the good of the world," we seem to commit ourselves to saying that the traitor by his fortunate perfidy has attained a greater good for himself than he would have done by remaining faithful. If we say it consists of action for the sake of the object, we seem to depart from facts. In any concrete case, this action is not what I seem to want most. I want that which the action is meant to obtain, and often I should be quite content if it came about apart from my agency. The answer seems to be simply that the greatest good is different for individuals at different stages and of different degrees of crookedness and darkness. My greatest good, when I am once "on the right lines," is truly "the good of the whole." When I am on the line AB, we might say, the aim is to reach the end of it, and it may not matter though I should be transported to that end without any effort of my own. But when I am

Complexity of the doctrine.

very far from being on that line, my good need not lie at all in being pushed directly towards B; it may lie instead in a very crooked journey indeed. This is only what we said before about the dangers of "patching experience." But it shows what a very complex state of things we have covered by the simple statement that "the deepest need of every individual is for the greatest good of the whole." It may give us no right to say more than "you will never find the greatest fulfilment until you learn to find it along these lines."

15. Meanwhile, there will be real sacrifice of individuals for the whole. The traitor *is* a sacrifice. If he had remained faithful the universe by hypothesis would have suffered, but he would have gained.[1] The ethical doctrine is that the greatest good for me at every stage lies along the line of my voluntary attempt to contribute to the good of the whole, so far as I can see it. But, here as everywhere, mistakes bring suffering to one side or the other.

Real sacrifices.

[1] Yet this does not seem perfectly clear. For, when he returns to his right mind after the betrayal, he will be glad to have lost, since, by hypothesis, the world was benefited thereby. The whole question is most difficult.

CHAPTER XIII

THE PROOF OF COMMON GOOD

1. WHAT justification can be brought for the claim that conflict is impossible between the greatest good of any individual and that of the whole, and what is the analogy in the world of cognition?

What justification for doctrine?

The supposed law in the conative world is that the greatest possible fulfilment of need for every individual fits in to the greatest possible fulfilment of need for the universe. The corresponding cognitive law is that the ideally true experience for any individual fits into the truth for all.

Cognitive analogy.

2. How is the validity of the cognitive law ensured? The correspondence-theory of truth seems to common-sense to support it, and presumably would do so if the "facts" are supposed to be governed by the laws of non-contradiction, etc., so that there can be no incompatibility amongst themselves. But we have rejected the correspondence-theory. Are we then left to rest on a mere coincidence or pre-established harmony amongst the "most satisfactory" forms of the experiences of the

Cognitive law not based on correspondence-theory.

different individuals? This need not be if we can join them all at the bottom in a certain way,—unite them all by a common regulative idea. This idea is the *belief in the conformity*. If your cognitive world and mine have in common the belief that somehow their most satisfactory forms will be consistent with each other, and if this belief is so deep-rooted that no form can be "the most satisfactory" unless the belief can be retained, then evidently the most satisfactory forms *will* be consistent. Now it appears that this really is a governing belief. Our experience, we think, must often be altered in order to be internally harmonious, and to remain still harmonious when it is extended. But we are sure that when this alteration has taken place the experiences of different individuals will be entirely consistent with one another. In "truth," we say, there is not only no discord for me, but no discord between you and me. The pattern cognitive experience for each fits into one great pattern experience for the world. Our belief in this looks really more fundamental than our belief in anything else. There is no idea whatever that we would not give up rather than believe that truth could be inconsistent with truth; that the same question (say the question of the date of Alexander's death) could be properly answered in one way by me and in another way by you. And if this is so, then truth really will be common to you and me.

Based on common belief in commonness.

Pattern world-experience.

This a fundamental belief.

3. Returning to conation, we need not be left

here to appeal either to pre-established harmony or to divine rewards and punishments, or to any other external device, if only we can join the experiences in the same way at their source. What is wanted is a common regulative need *for the fulfilment of the needs of the whole.* If this is so fundamental in every individual that he can never find the greatest fulfilment of his own needs in a course where this remains unfulfilled, then his greatest fulfilment will certainly lie along the lines of the greatest fulfilment of the whole. That is, if we want commonness of good more than we want anything else, then a common good there will be.

Must base conative law on common need for commonness.

It is a law, we believe, of the objective thought that takes shape in the universe we know, that the stablest form of any part of it is part of the stablest form of the whole, though that whole may be included in no one person's experience. It is a law, we should like to say, of the universal need that takes shape in the desires of living beings, that the best fulfilment of each being is part of the best fulfilment of the whole. But the fact here is not so obvious as the corresponding fact in cognition.[1]

Why believe in it?

4. The whole question is one that falls behind science, both natural and normative. Science says, "You think at bottom on the same methods as we, and see the same when you look in the same

[1] Though indeed we have no right to rest on the mere "obviousness" even of this. I wish to leave the cognitive question on one side, except for the few remarks which follow.

direction. Here are results of just such methods and such inspection, only extended further than you have been able to extend them." Again it says, "Your fundamental needs are the same as ours;—here are institutions and histories showing you how they work out and how they best find satisfaction;—here, in fact, is the explanation of the concrete ideal." Science turns into philosophy when it takes a step backwards and begins to examine the categories themselves,—to examine the nature of these methods and these fundamental needs. Philosophy must do this, and in her furthest effort she must not merely do this but must try to *account* for the methods and the needs, and so justify our assumption that they are always there. For as soon as we examine we may begin to question. The sceptic asks, "Why, after all, should a person think in terms of causation?" the egoists, "Why, after all, should he want to be moral?" that is, "What business have we to assume that everyone necessarily does so want and so think?" The last business of philosophy is to justify the assumptions. How is it to be done?

Question falls behind science into philosophy.

5. (i) The first and most obvious way is to appeal to every-day experience; the facts mentioned in the chapter on "Common Good" will all be relevant here. We do see that as a matter of fact a great many things are wanted in common by a great many people and believed in common by a great many people. Philosophy has often been afraid of claiming too much here; has

(i) *Appeal to experience.*

added, for instance, the hasty explanatory comment of "association." Their modesty has indeed been apt to compromise the philosophers, and give them insufficient foothold against the sceptics in either realm; "necessary association" is too easily turned into "mere association." In modern philosophy that explanatory comment is much less used. On the other hand, philosophy has occasionally claimed more than it needed. Take Butler's declaration that "there is no such thing as ill-will in one man towards another, emulation and hatred being away," and that "even emulation and resentment will be found nothing to the purpose"; that there is "no such thing as love of injustice, oppression, treachery, ingratitude; but only eager desires after such and such external goods." One might question the universal absence of the desire to hurt as such, and in any case there is no need to prove it. We know that there are such things as conflicting desires, and all we can put in our creed is that the *greatest* good will be consistent for all men. To defend our view that truth is one, we did not assert that nobody ever disbelieved another's assertion that there was a snake in the corner.

"Association."

Must not claim too much.

Still, we must claim a good deal and can find a good deal of support in empirical observation. We observe people finding their truth and their good in the common truth and good, and education revealing to them more and more that it is there. We trust so readily to this in common life that we seem taken aback and "brought up short" when our companions

Still, experience gives much support.

fail to recognise it; when a lady remarks that "no arguments will convince her" that Charles I. was not a saint and martyr, or when a man goes on doing a thing though we feel we have made the proof as clear as daylight to him that it is an unpublic-spirited thing to do.

Empirical evidence, then, can do a good deal. But other justifications would be welcome. This chapter is a mere indicatory sketch, so we shall henceforth neglect all such justifications so far as they concern the cognitive world, and only consider a few on the conative side.

6. (ii) Certain "logical" justifications have been offered. It has been asserted that such a life as promotes the common good is the only life which in consistency we can desire. We will examine two ways in which this assertion has been supported.

(ii) "*Logical*" *proofs.*

(*a*) It is sometimes said that the ordinary human ideal of the virtuous life is the only possible coherent one; the only one in which a conscious being, according to the very conception of a conscious being, could find satisfaction on the whole.

(*a*) *Only coherent ideal.*

It is true that it would seem impossible to pursue a kind of life made up simply of what the normal human being hates. Such a life would have to involve, for instance, on the one hand keen malignancy and persevering cruelty, and on the other a tepid character lacking all strength and energy and perseverance. Again, it would involve both clear-sighted choice of means for evil, and also an absence of all clear-sightedness (since that in itself is

a thing we think good). It would involve both persuasion of other people to forward one's wicked purposes, and also a refusal to co-operate with other people for any purpose whatever. But such arguments seem to be subject to a fatal objection if used to prove that ours is the only possible ideal. For even ours involves conflict and leaves a part of us unsatisfied. We do in the most virtuous life sometimes oppose others though we would rather help, sometimes hurt a man deliberately though we like better to show kindness,—in general, include things as unavoidable elements which we would leave out if we could. The diabolical ideal certainly seems to involve more conflict than ours, yet it is only a difference of degree. It may be pertinently objected indeed, that his conflict is essential and ours only accidental. If I were a perfectly wise and good person I should live out my ideal life without any conflict, for these random impulses of mine,—to be kind, for instance, when I should be stern,—would never present themselves. That may be true. But could we not so arrange the devil's nature that the same would be true of him and his ideal? A nature of pure hatefulness is indeed unmanageable and inconceivable; we had better propose to allow him cleverness at least. And then he might go on smoothly enough.

The conclusion seems to be, then, that these reasons by themselves do not justify us in considering our own ideal to be the only possible greatest fulfilment for conscious beings, given simply as alive and conscious, and with no other provision as to what their nature is to be.

7. (*b*) Another justification on the same sort of level has been given somewhat as follows: To think of anyone else's aim is to repeat it in thought; *i.e.* to adopt it as one's own. Therefore as soon as one reflects on the variety of aims in the world one is *ipso facto* adopting as one's own the resultant aim of them all. That is, as soon as one thinks about it, one finds that one's good is the good of the world.

(*b*) "*To think of other's aims is to adopt them.*"

I hope that I have not misrepresented this argument. I have studied it with much care, and it remains to me entirely unconvincing. Merely to think of another's aim scarcely ever means "repeating the impulse" with such force as to give it the least chance of maintaining its claim amongst my original impulses, or with such "reality" as to give it the least right to do so. And even if that were a common thing, it might be foolish on my part to reflect at all; I might get greater fulfilment without it.

8. (iii) It seems that we must really in the end rest only on our whole system of metaphysics to justify us. And into that justification we shall not go. It is a part of that idealism which in this essay I have assumed without undertaking to investigate.

(iii) *Need metaphysics.*

Let us only add a few words from an educational point of view. When in a text-book we try to indicate the metaphysics in question, we ought to endeavour to do it in such a way as to carry a little conviction to the student's mind, or else we ought to tell him frankly that at his present stage it cannot

Must explain them carefully.

be explained to him. For instance, take a proof that occurs in a recent American text-book: "If all Persons form a true community, then the end of one must be the end of each and of the whole. All Persons are mutually exclusive . . . yet are they One in God. Hence the Good for the whole is the Good for every separate member. The *True Good* for every man is a *Common Good* and an *Absolute Good*." This is all that is given in justification of the tremendous assertion of the commonness of good. It is obviously quite insufficient, without several pages of filling-in, to convince anybody; yet the student is made to feel that he is expected to be convinced by it. Similarly, if we take the line of justification mentioned some time ago, and the kind of philosophy that treats us as some sort of incarnations of the one spirit of the universe, it is not enough to leave the matter as vague as this. We must mention explicitly in our text-books that we are such incarnations of that spirit that our fundamental need is the same as his, and our self-realisation can only be along the lines of his. We must exclude the possibility that any individual could consist chiefly of such conative elements as do not get fulfilled in the greatest possible realisation of the whole. The comparison, for instance, of our relation to this spirit to the relation between our "minor selves" and us is apt to mislead. For we usually define a minor self as one abstract aspect only. The good of a philosopher king may be to serve his country in nothing but government and war, but we should not usually say that this was also the good of the

"*Minor selves.*"

student in him. The student has been sacrificed for the sake of the king and the soldier and the loyal man. And in our philosophy no individual must be left in this way to be such a mere aspect or element in the whole as is possibly to be sacrificed.

9. The spirit of the universe will "really want" everything (as each of us does in his own case) only under the qualification that it tends to the good of himself (what he wants) as a whole. Suppose that we are such incarnations that each of us has this qualification at the bottom,—this balance of all the elements,—"Seek this, but only so far as it tends to My good, to the greatest good of the whole." Then only along these lines will each of us find peace. As my "true" thought is what God thinks, so my "true" satisfaction is what satisfies God.

Qualification at bottom of each of us.

I need hardly say that I realise the crudeness of this as a statement of metaphysics. I am simply trying to express something in a way that I think a beginner might understand; in fact I have found that beginners accept something like it with apparent content. If the crude popularness of it makes it too bad as metaphysics, then let the text-books leave metaphysics out altogether, and simply tell the student that the doctrine of a common good rests on philosophical arguments which he cannot understand.

10. For curiosity's sake let us end by considering for a moment what would happen if the commonness of good did not hold. Let us suppose, that is, that beings existed who perceived truly that their good did not lie along the line of voluntarily promoting the good of the

Suppose good were not common.

whole. The cognitive analogy would be that of beings whose cognitive experience could not by any means be so adapted as to fit in with that of the rest of the world. There would simply be two truths, a double universe. Or, as we should probably put it instead, there would be a "lunatic" of a far worse kind than any we believe in now.

Cognitive analogy.

Let our moral lunatic,—our quite intelligent and justified lunatic,—first be a being whose needs are discrepant with ours to a marked degree; let him truly find his good in things which are hateful to us. We could dictate nothing to such a creature. Common-sense ethics would certainly be inclined to be shocked by this, and to claim its own right to dictate even to hell. Yet perhaps we do not lose so much, for common-sense would find it difficult to know what to dictate. The government of a world of such creatures would be bewildering, and it is a curious question what normal men would find it right to do if they had charge of even a single one. To some extent they would probably let him have his own way, as we let an ox spend a life-time in eating instead of making him visit the poor. But the satisfaction of impulses such as malignity would be difficult to allow, even if by means of some delusion we could permit it without sacrificing another sentient thing so greatly as to outweigh the value of the satisfaction of the first. It is not evident, by the way, that philosophical ethics as such has yet given sufficient consideration to the position of the moral

Case of devils.

What of real moral lunatics?

lunatics that we do believe in. Is their good part of the common good. It is a question that needs answering.

11. That leads on to the question of our actual world. What will happen to our ethics if we fail there to prove the universal coincidence of private and public good? We shall evidently have a kind of "dualism of the Practical Reason," except that we shall avoid any such ambiguous term. If "the reasonable course" means the course which tends to my own true good, it will lie along the line A. If it means that which tends to "the good of the whole," it will lie along B. A, again, is what I "ought" to do if that phrase is defined as "what I really need"; B is what I ought to do with the other definition. The unique and intuitive "ought" we have refused. There seems to be no self-contradiction here. Whether the realm of ethics vanishes or not will depend on our definition of ethics. A right-minded man will follow A and not B, if right-mindedness means acting with your whole nature and pursuing your true good. If it means the disposition to perform your function in the universe and promote that universal good, he will follow B and not A. The universe will be rather bad in the sense of being rather unsatisfactory to us, since it involves a conflict amongst some very fundamental needs. Whether the moral world collapses or not will depend on our definition of the moral world.

Case of actual world.

Dualism of Practical Reason.

Matter of definitions.

CHAPTER XIV

THE VALUE OF THE ANALOGY

1. THE use of an analogy, according to the general account of it, is to supply suggestions. We find, in some pair of objects, likenesses enough to catch our attention, and we reflect that the hidden reason which has produced these is not unlikely to have produced some more. Therefore when in one of the pair we notice some further detail of a relevant-looking kind, we think it worth while to examine the other object for a detail to correspond. Whether we may do any more than this depends on how much notion we have of a reason lying behind. If we were perfectly acquainted with that ground of identity, we should often not need to look for the correspondent detail at all; we could pronounce at once that it must be there. But when we thus quit the region of guesses and suggestions, analogy as such has ceased.

The strength of analogical arguments.

Depends on knowledge of ground.

2. Now on what level does the general comparison stand between the world of knowledge and the world of will? Is it *mere* analogy still, with no right to do more than barely suggest what it might be worth while to look for; and must we

supply independent evidences for any pair of similar assertions that we make about the two worlds? Or do we see with some distinctness the common ground that should supply further likenesses, and may we venture on at least a probable statement of their existence when we cannot find direct evidence in both worlds? Or is the ground so evident that such statements, when made at all, may be made with certainty? And if it is evident, how far does it extend?

How is it with the cognitive-conative analogy?

3. In trying to answer these questions, we must observe that in the course of this essay we have studied analogies of two kinds, which differ a good deal. One kind has consisted of correspondences amongst details of psychology, amongst the features of processes in actual experience,—such as the working out of a purpose on the one hand and of an investigation on the other, with the helps and hindrances met with in each. The other kind has arisen out of speculative questions such as those of the oneness and potential perfection of truth and good.

Two kinds of analogies used.

We will begin with the first kind. Of this we can say so much at any rate; it is very natural that the details we have examined should thus correspond, and very probable that if we examined further we should find further correspondences. Every process of experience is on one side a presentation process and on the other side an action process, and mere psychological description seems to show that these

First well founded.

two sides are symmetrical in all their important features, that object works on subject and subject on object in the same sort of way. It is only natural that an indefinite number of detail-resemblances should be involved in this. We cannot of course lay down rigid laws *a priori*, but psychologists would seem to be wise in taking a great many hints from either side of life for their examination of the other.

4. The second kind of analogy, connected with the most interesting of speculative questions, is, I fear, in a different position at present. It is too comprehensive and too much isolated. So little ground for it seems to be known that I cannot think the analogy lends much strength to the independent arguments in each world. No form of speculative philosophy, so far as I can see, makes any great difference in this particular way. We assume, for instance, that truth is one for all, and our experience falls in with this assumption. We try to find our good in the good of the world, and do find it there. Both of these are sound arguments, but they seem hardly to *strengthen each other* at all. I cannot honestly see any great reason why a universe which possessed one correspondent must also possess the other. It would be a better balanced universe if it did, and it is to be hoped that a reason may some day be found, but it does not yet appear.

Second not so well.

5. For speculative metaphysics, then, my conclusion is that our analogy at present is not of very much use. On the other hand, we may claim with good reason that its usefulness in psychology, ethics, and the theory

Conclusion.

of knowledge shows signs of being very great indeed. The labour of detailed work on the subject may find sufficient justification here. Even beyond these limits, however, there are justifications. First, we may find a better ground for the analogy some day, and then our arguments from it will be stronger. Secondly, though suggestions are not proofs, they are much better than nothing, and quite worth the trouble of attempting to reduce them to some methodical scheme. Thirdly, we shall no doubt go on using them, and even using them as arguments, which makes it specially important to clear up in our minds the vagueness which may cause us to get the suggestions wrong. Lastly and deepest of all, perhaps, comes the justification of every elaborate analogy that has ever been arranged, —and of every elaborate puzzle on which a child has ever wasted its hours. The thing is so pretty when it works out. The service to science may be doubtfully visible in the end, but it has been a pleasant game.

APPENDIX

NOTE ON EARLY EQUIVALENTS OF "GOOD"

See ch. ii. par. 10

IHERING: "DER ZWECK IM RECHT"

Zweiter Band, vierte Auflage, page 171

"In den *semitischen* Sprachen gehen nach einer Mitteilung, die ich der Güte von Professor Fr. Delitzsch in Leipzig verdanke, "die Bezeichnungen des sittlich Guten und Bösen ebenfalls von sinnlichen Grundbegriffen aus. Gut in seiner ursprünglichen Bedeutung ist, was einen angenehmen sinnlichen Eindruck macht. Demzufolge verbindet sich auch mit dem Begriffe des sittlich Guten der Begriff des Wohltuenden und Heilsamen, das es in sich schliesst und aus sich heraussetzt. Ebenso fallen die Begriffe des Bösen und Schlimmen zusammen. Statt: Baum der Erkenntnis des Guten und Bösen lässt sich nicht minder richtig übersetzen: des Guten und Schlimmen. Die gewöhnlichen arabischen Wörter für 'gut' bezeichnen das Gute als das Schöne und Vorzügliche."

Semitic; "good" has originally a sensuous meaning.

Ich habe mich ausserdem noch teils mittelbar teils unmittelbar an einige andere Gelehrte gewandt und ich glaube der Wissenschaft einen Dienst zu erweisen, wenn ich die mir gewordenen Antworten (wörtlich) mitteile.

Prof. R. Roth in Tübingen. Die Gegensetzung von gut und böse so verallgemeinert wie im heutigen Deutsch stammt nicht aus der ältesten Zeit der Sprache. Und man darf in keiner jügendlichen Sprache diese Abnutzung oder Vermischung der

Bedeutung erwarten. Das alte Sanskrit (im Veda) hat wohl ein Dutzend Wörter, die man etwa mit gut, eben soviel andere, die man mit bös übersetzen kann, aber allen kommt ein näher umschriebener Grundbegriff zu, z. B. pâpa [nicht zu etymologisieren] bös d. h. schlimm, übel, ungünstig; aber auch arm, elend. Gegensatz bhadra [wohl verwandt mit bass, besser] eigentlich erfreulich, löblich, glücklich; oder punja eigentlich rein. Satja . . . gut, eigentlich wahr, wirklich. . . . Sakrt gut=gut-handelnd, . . . Gegensatz dushkrt=böshandelnd. Das sind die "Guten und Bösen" im engeren moralisch religiösen sinn, die ἀγαθοὶ καὶ πονηροί, die wir aus dem neuen Testament haben. Ulfilas kennt aber das Wort bös gar nicht, sondern hat dafür ubils oder ursels (unselig) und bös ist ursprünglich=gering, unwert, wie gut=passend, fügsam, brauchbar.

Sanscrit; no general word for "good."

Professor Thewrewk in Pest. Gut ungarisch jó. In den ungrischen Sprachen ist der Begriff gut von Wohlstand, Reichtum, Glück ausgegangen. Der tscheremissisch jumo . . . als Bezeichnung für Gott im Gegensatze zum "armen" Menschen. Diese von Budenz aufgestellte Erklärung wird durch die Analogie im Indogermanischen geschützt. Slawisch bog=Gott, bogatu=reich, ubogu=arm; vergleiche sanskr. bhaga=Glück, Wohlstand, altpersisch baga=Gott. Böse ungarisch rossz. In der Wurzel liegt der Begriff von caedere, frangere; rossz ist also eigentlich, was seine Integrität verloren hat, corruptus, inutilis. Ein anderes Wort für böse ist gonosz, slawischen Ursprungs, slawisch gnûs=eigentlich schmutzig, garstig.

Hungarian; good=rich, great. bad=corrupted.

Über der heutigen ungarischen Sprachgebrauch füge ich noch eine Mitteilung von . . . Professor Biermann in Hermannstadt, hinzu.

Modern Hungarian; bad="a bad article" in trade.

Gut im technischen, ökonomischen, moralischen Sinne bezeichnen wir mit jó; unsere nationalen Philologen verweisen auf die Verwandtschaft mit εὖ, εὖς, dem deutschen gut, dem türkischen ejü, dem chinesischen jú [bene]. Für die einzelnen Nuancen des Guten gibt es sodann eine grosse Masse von Specialausdrücken.

Von jó jóság = die Güte und jószág das Gut im Sinne von Landgut. Böse und schlecht ist rossz, schlecht sowohl im ökonomischen Sinne, seinem Zwecke nicht entsprechend, rasch verderbend, als im sittlichen.

Professor Freiherr von Gabeleutz in Leipzig über das Chinesische. Haò ist gut [sittlich und physisch, ja sogar gelegentlich ästetisch z. B. haò niü, hübsche Mädchen], tãi schlecht, übel, ćén gut, namentlich der Wirkung nach, tüchtig oder geschickt, etwas zu tun, čùng aufrichtig, loyal, offenbar von čùng Mitte. Letzeres spielt in der chinesischen Ethik eine bedeutende Rolle; ein positiv Böses gibt es nicht, nur ein Zuviel oder Zuwenig, das Gute liegt in der Mitte.

Chinese; several words for "good."

Zu der zweiten Auflage trage ich noch das Zitat von Geiger, Ursprung der Sprache, Bd 2, S. 173 nach, der wie irgend jemand in der Lage war, ein massgebendes Urteil abzugeben; ihm zufolge ist die sittliche Bedeutung von gut und böse eine relativ spätere Bildung, die ursprüngliche war überall die sinnliche."

Sensuous meaning always precedes ethical.

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